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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Ethics
+
+Author: Benedict de Spinoza
+
+Posting Date: May 28, 2009 [EBook #3800]
+Release Date: February, 2003
+First Posted: September 26, 2001
+Last Updated: December 11, 2017
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ETHICS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Tom Sharpe.  HTML version by Al Haines.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The Ethics
+
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+
+by
+
+Benedict de Spinoza
+
+
+
+
+Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+
+
+
+PART I. CONCERNING GOD.
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+
+I.  By that which is self--caused, I mean that of which the
+essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
+conceivable as existent.
+
+II.  A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be
+limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a
+body is called finite because we always conceive another greater
+body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a
+body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
+
+III.  By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a
+conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
+
+IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
+constituting the essence of substance.
+
+V.  By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or that
+which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than
+itself.
+
+[1] "Affectiones"
+
+VI.  By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a
+substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
+expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.
+
+Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its
+kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
+attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
+contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves
+no negation.
+
+VII.  That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
+necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is
+determined by itself alone.  On the other hand, that thing is
+necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by
+something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of
+existence or action.
+
+VIII.  By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
+conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
+that which is eternal.
+
+Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
+truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
+explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may
+be conceived without a beginning or end.
+
+
+AXIOMS.
+
+I.  Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else.
+
+II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
+conceived through itself.
+
+III.  From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;
+and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
+impossible that an effect can follow.
+
+IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
+knowledge of a cause.
+
+V.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
+one by means of the other; the conception of one does not
+involve the conception of the other.
+
+VI.  A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
+
+VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non--existing, its essence
+does not involve existence.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
+
+Proof.--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
+
+PROP. II.  Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
+nothing in common.
+
+Proof.--Also evident from Def. iii.  For each must exist in
+itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the
+conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.
+
+PROP. III.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
+cause of the other.
+
+Proof.--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
+cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
+therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IV.  Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from
+the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
+substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
+
+Proof.--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else (Ax. i.),--that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing
+is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and
+its modifications.  Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
+understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one
+from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see
+Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  There cannot exist in the universe two or more
+substances having the same nature or attribute.
+
+Proof.--If several distinct substances be granted, they must
+be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
+their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
+(Prop. iv.).  If only by the difference of their attributes, it
+will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
+identical attribute.  If by the difference of their
+modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its
+modifications (Prop. i.),--it follows that setting the
+modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is
+truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one
+substance different from another,--that is (by Prop. iv.), there
+cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
+
+Proof.--It is impossible that there should be in the universe
+two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have
+anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.
+iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be
+produced by the other.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that a substance cannot be
+produced by anything external to itself.  For in the universe
+nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as
+appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.).  Now (by the last
+Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,
+therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.
+Q.E.D.  This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the
+contradictory.  For, if substance be produced by an external
+cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its
+cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be
+substance.
+
+PROP. VII.  Existence belongs to the nature of substances.
+
+Proof.--Substance cannot be produced by anything external
+(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause--that
+is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence
+belongs to its nature.
+
+PROP. VIII.  Every substance is necessarily infinite.
+
+Proof.--There can only be one substance with an identical
+attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);
+its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or
+infinite.  It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it
+would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which
+would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be
+two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd
+(Prop. v.).  It therefore exists as infinite.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note I.--As finite existence involves a partial negation, and
+infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given
+nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance
+is necessarily infinite.
+
+Note II.--No doubt it will be difficult for those who think
+about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them
+by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.
+vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the
+modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and
+are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence
+they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe
+in natural objects.  Those who are ignorant of true causes, make
+complete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as
+men--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;
+and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
+also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,
+readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long
+as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.  But, if
+people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no
+doubt about the truth of Prop. vii.  In fact, this proposition
+would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.  For, by
+substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself--that is, something of which the
+conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas
+modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a
+conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the
+thing in which they exist.  Therefore, we may have true ideas of
+non--existent modifications; for, although they may have no
+actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their
+essence is so involved in something external to themselves that
+they may through it be conceived.  Whereas the only truth
+substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in
+their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.
+Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and
+distinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is not
+sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he
+said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it
+was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if
+anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same
+as saying that a false idea was true--in short, the height of
+absurdity.  It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
+existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth.  And
+we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that there
+is but one such substance.  I think that this may profitably be
+done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
+demonstration, we must premise:----
+
+1.  The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
+expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined.  From
+this it follows that----
+
+2.  No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
+individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature
+of the thing defined.  For instance, the definition of a triangle
+expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it
+does not imply any fixed number of triangles.
+
+3.  There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a
+cause why it should exist.
+
+4.  This cause of existence must either be contained in the
+nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated
+apart from such definition.
+
+It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual
+things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the
+existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less.  For
+example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's
+sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have
+had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of
+these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of
+human existence in general; we must also show why there are
+exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be
+assigned for the existence of each individual.  Now this cause
+cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true
+definition of man does not involve any consideration of the
+number twenty.  Consequently, the cause for the existence of
+these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must
+necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may
+lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of
+several individuals must have an external cause.  And, as it has
+been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of
+substance, existence must necessarily be included in its
+definition; and from its definition alone existence must be
+deducible.  But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii.,
+iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances;
+therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same
+nature.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IX.  The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the
+number of its attributes (Def. iv.).
+
+PROP. X.  Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
+conceived through itself.
+
+Proof.--An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of
+substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,
+therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note--It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in
+fact, conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of the
+other--yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two
+entities, or two different substances.  For it is the nature of
+substance that each of its attributes is conceived through
+itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
+simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;
+but each expresses the reality or being of substance.  It is,
+then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one
+substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each
+and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that
+its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its
+attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.
+Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite
+being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite
+attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and
+infinite essence.
+
+If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to
+distinguish different substances, let him read the following
+propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the
+universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a
+sign would be sought in vain.
+
+PROP. XI.  God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,
+of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
+necessarily exists.
+
+Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God
+does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.
+But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd.  Therefore God necessarily
+exists.
+
+Another proof.--Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason
+must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its
+non--existence--e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be
+granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not
+exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from
+existing, or annuls its existence.  This reason or cause must
+either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be
+external to it.  For instance, the reason for the non--existence
+of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it
+would involve a contradiction.  On the other hand, the existence
+of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its
+nature involves existence.  (See Prop. vii.)
+
+But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle
+does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the
+order of universal nature in extension.  From the latter it must
+follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
+impossible that it should exist.  So much is self--evident.  It
+follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or
+reason be granted which prevents its existence.
+
+If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
+existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
+certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist.  If such a
+reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the
+very nature of God, or be external to him--that is, drawn from
+another substance of another nature.  For if it were of the same
+nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist.  But
+substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God
+(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or
+to destroy his existence.
+
+As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
+existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine
+nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn
+from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction.  To
+make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and
+supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of
+God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be
+assigned which would annul his existence.  Therefore, God
+necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.
+
+Another proof.--The potentiality of non--existence is a
+negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence
+is a power, as is obvious.  If, then, that which necessarily
+exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more
+powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously
+absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
+absolutely infinite necessarily exists also.  Now we exist either
+in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see
+Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.).  Therefore a being absolutely
+infinite--in other words, God (Def. vi.)--necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's
+existence à posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily
+followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence
+does not follow à priori.  For, as the potentiality of existence
+is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases
+in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength
+for existence.  Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as
+God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence,
+and hence he does absolutely exist.  Perhaps there will be many
+who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as
+they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from
+external causes.  Of such things, they see that those which
+quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into existence--quickly
+also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of
+accomplishment--that is, not so easily brought into
+existence--those things which they conceive as more complicated.
+
+However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here
+show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly,
+goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of
+universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I
+need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which
+come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of
+substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any
+external cause.  Things which are produced by external causes,
+whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever
+perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of
+their external cause;  and therefore their existence arises
+solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from
+their own.  Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by
+substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence
+of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is
+nothing else but its essence.  Thus, the perfection of a thing
+does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it.
+Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we
+cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the
+existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is, of
+God.  For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and
+involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his
+existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question
+is given.  This, I think, will be evident to every moderately
+attentive reader.
+
+PROP. XII.  No attribute of substance can be conceived from which
+it would follow that substance can be divided.
+
+Proof.--The parts into which substance as thus conceived would
+be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they
+will not.  If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will
+necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self--caused, and (by
+Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so
+that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one
+substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd.  Moreover, the parts
+(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and
+the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be
+conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be
+absurd.  If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the
+parts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the whole
+substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature
+of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is
+absurd.
+
+PROP. XIII.  Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
+
+Proof.--If it could be divided, the parts into which it was
+divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite
+substance, or they would not.  If the former, we should have
+several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is
+absurd.  If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely
+infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also
+absurd.
+
+Corollary.--It follows, that no substance, and consequently no
+extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.
+
+Note.--The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
+understood as follows.  The nature of substance can only be
+conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else
+can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii)
+involves a manifest contradiction.
+
+PROP. XIV.  Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
+
+Proof.--As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no
+attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied
+(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any
+substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained
+by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
+attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,
+besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be
+conceived.  If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have
+to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this
+proof) is absurd.  Therefore, besides God no substance can be
+granted or conceived.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--Clearly, therefore: 1.  God is one, that is (by
+Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and
+that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already
+indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).
+
+Corollary II.--It follows:  2.  That extension and thought
+are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents
+(affectiones) of the attributes of God.
+
+PROP. XV.  Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can
+be, or be conceived.
+
+Proof.--Besides God, no substance is granted or can be
+conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which
+is in itself and is conceived through itself.  But modes (by Def.
+v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;
+wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only
+through it be conceived.  But substances and modes form the sum
+total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing
+can be, or be conceived.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
+mind, and is susceptible of passions.  How far such persons have
+strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
+said.  But these I pass over.  For all who have in anywise
+reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body.  Of this
+they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body
+a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a
+certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate
+such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite.  But meanwhile
+by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they
+show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart
+from the divine nature, and say it was created by God.  Wherefrom
+the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant;
+thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of
+their own words.  I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at
+any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop.
+viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything
+other than itself.  Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that
+besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.  Hence we
+drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the
+infinite attributes of God.  However, in order to explain more
+fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all
+start from the following points:----
+
+Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
+as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
+infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God.  This
+they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
+two.  If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be
+conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be
+either finite or infinite.  If the former, then infinite
+substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd.  If
+the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another
+infinite, which is also absurd.
+
+Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths,
+it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would
+equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part
+measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve
+times as great as the other.
+
+Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn
+two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance
+apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the
+distance between the two lines will be continually increased,
+until at length it changes from definite to indefinable.  As
+these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity
+as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance
+must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain
+to the nature of God.
+
+The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme
+perfection.  God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely
+perfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance,
+insofar as it is divisible, is passive.  It follows, therefore,
+that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.
+
+Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who
+by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the
+divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto.  However, I
+think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered
+their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the
+hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such
+a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.)
+to be absurd.  Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all
+these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now
+discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion
+that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the
+notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that
+an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts
+therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that:
+infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of
+finite parts.  This is exactly what we have already proved (in
+Prop. xii.).  Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in
+reality recoiled upon themselves.  If, from this absurdity of
+theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended
+substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like
+a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,
+and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to
+deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to
+the circumference are equal.  For, taking extended substance,
+which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible
+(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it
+is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can
+be multiplied and divided.
+
+So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of
+points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
+infinitely divided.  Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert
+that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it
+would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface
+of lines, and a line of points.  This must be admitted by all who
+know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who
+deny the possibility of a vacuum.  For if extended substance
+could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why
+should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others
+remaining joined together as before?  And why should all be so
+fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum?  Surely in the
+case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one
+can exist without the other, and can remain in its original
+condition.  As, then,  there does not exist a vacuum in nature
+(of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to
+prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be
+distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
+substance cannot be divided.
+
+If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally
+so prone to divide quantity?  I answer, that quantity is
+conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially,
+as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by
+the intellect.  If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented
+in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall
+find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but
+if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and
+conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we
+shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is
+infinite, one, and indivisible.  This will be plain enough to all
+who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination,
+especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the
+same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as
+we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
+distinguished, not really, but modally.  For instance, water, in
+so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts
+to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is
+extended substance; from this point of view it is neither
+separated nor divisible.  Further, water, in so far as it is
+water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is
+substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
+
+I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in
+fact, founded on the same assumption as the first--namely, that
+matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed
+of parts.  Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be
+considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God
+(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could
+receive its modifications.  All things, I repeat, are in God, and
+all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the
+laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly
+show) from the necessity of his essence.  Wherefore it can in
+nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other
+than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the
+Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is
+granted to be infinite and eternal.  But enough of this for the
+present.
+
+PROP. XVI.  From the necessity of the divine nature must follow
+an infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things
+which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
+
+Proof.--This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
+remembers that from the given definition of any thing the
+intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily
+follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
+defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the
+definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in
+proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more
+reality.  Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
+attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite
+essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its
+nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
+can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must
+necessarily follow.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
+cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
+intellect.
+
+Corollary II.--It also follows that God is a cause in himself,
+and not through an accident of his nature.
+
+Corollary III.--It follows, thirdly, that God is the
+absolutely first cause.
+
+PROP. XVII.  God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and
+is not constrained by anyone.
+
+Proof.--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
+the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
+solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things
+absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved
+(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived
+but that all things are in God.  Wherefore nothing can exist;
+outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to
+act.  Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
+and is not constrained by anyone.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--It follows: 1.  That there can be no cause
+which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
+perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.
+
+Corollary II.--It follows: 2.  That God is the sole free
+cause.  For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature
+(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole
+necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the
+sole free cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
+as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have
+said follow from his nature--that is, which are in his power,
+should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him.  But
+this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
+that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its
+three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles;
+or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is
+absurd.
+
+Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
+proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
+nature.  I know that there are many who think that they can show,
+that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature;
+for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can
+attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in
+ourselves.  Further, although they conceive God as actually
+supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring
+into existence everything which he actually understands, for they
+think that they would thus destroy God's power.  If, they
+contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he
+would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,
+would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to
+asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates
+nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute
+exercise of will, to create.  However, I think I have shown
+sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme
+power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things--that is,
+all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of
+ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as
+from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for
+eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right
+angles.  Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from
+all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state
+of activity.  This manner of treating the question attributes to
+God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect.  For,
+otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an
+infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able
+to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,
+according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render
+himself imperfect.  Wherefore, in order to establish that God is
+perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,
+that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power
+extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most
+repugnant to God's omnipotence.
+
+Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the
+will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain
+to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
+significance quite different from those they usually bear.  For
+intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
+would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
+intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with
+them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence
+between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
+constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.  This I will
+prove as follows.  If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it
+cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,
+posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,
+inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality
+(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.).  On the contrary, the truth and formal
+essence of things is as it is, because it exists by
+representation as such in the intellect of God.  Wherefore the
+intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
+God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
+essence and of their existence.  This seems to have been
+recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,
+God's will, and God's power, are one and the same.  As,
+therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,
+both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ
+from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its
+existence.  For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely
+in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
+
+For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence,
+but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
+therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but
+must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of
+one of them cease, the existence of the other will not
+necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be
+destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be
+destroyed also.  Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of
+the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ
+from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in
+respect to its existence.  Now the intellect of God is the cause
+both of the essence and the existence of our intellect;
+therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to
+constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in
+respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in
+anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before.  The
+reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone
+can easily see.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  God is the indwelling and not the transient cause
+of all things.
+
+Proof.--All things which are, are in God, and must be
+conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
+Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.
+This is our first point.  Further, besides God there can be no
+substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to
+God.  This is our second point.  God, therefore, is the
+indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIX.  God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.
+
+Proof.--God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)
+necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains
+to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its
+definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.).  Further,
+by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.
+iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other
+words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should
+be involved in the attributes of substance.  Now eternity
+appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in
+Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the
+attributes, and thus all are eternal.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition is also evident from the manner in
+which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is
+evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,
+like his essence, is an eternal truth.  Further (in Prop. xix. of
+my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the
+eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.
+
+PROP. XX.  The existence of God and his essence are one and the
+same.
+
+Proof.--God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
+eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
+existence.  Therefore the same
+attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at
+the same time his eternal existence--in other words, that which
+constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his
+existence.  Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one
+and the same.  Q.E.D.
+
+Coroll. I.--Hence it follows that God's existence, like his
+essence, is an eternal truth.
+
+Coroll. II--Secondly, it follows that God, and all the
+attributes of God, are unchangeable.  For if they could be
+changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be
+changed in respect to essence--that is, obviously, be changed from
+true to false, which is absurd.
+
+PROP. XXI.  All things which follow from the absolute nature of
+any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in
+other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
+
+Proof.--Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition
+to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow
+from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the
+same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or
+duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the
+attribute thought.  Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to
+be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its
+nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,
+it is supposed finite.  It cannot, however, be conceived as
+finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is
+not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
+the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);
+therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not
+constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)
+must necessarily exist.
+
+We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the
+idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
+follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for
+it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,
+the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis.  Wherefore, if
+the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
+anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any
+example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from
+the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the
+said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
+point.
+
+Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of
+the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration.  For
+if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of
+the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God,
+for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought,
+and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be
+about not to exist.
+
+Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist
+unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond
+the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the
+latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to
+exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of
+God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,
+thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed
+therefrom.  Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or
+anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of
+some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but
+through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.
+Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of
+anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's
+absolute nature.
+
+PROP. XXII.  Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so
+far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily
+and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist
+necessarily and as infinite.
+
+Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the preceding one.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
+infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature
+of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
+modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
+
+Proof.--A mode exists in something else, through which it must
+be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in
+God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode
+is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must
+necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of
+God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the
+infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.)
+eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely.  A
+mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must
+follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either
+immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some
+modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said
+attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily
+and as infinite.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The essence of things produced by God does not
+involve existence.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from Def. i.  For that of
+which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
+self--caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
+things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
+existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
+the being of things (essendi rerum).  For whether things exist,
+or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
+that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently,
+it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other.  God must
+be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
+appertain.  (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
+of things, but also of their essence.
+
+Proof.--If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
+essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by
+Ax. iv.) be conceived without God.  This (by Prop. xv.) is
+absurd.  Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
+For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
+essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
+existence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
+in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself.  This
+will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
+
+Corollary.--Individual things are nothing but modifications of
+the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
+are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.  The proof appears
+from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
+manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that
+which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
+act.
+
+Proof.--That by which things are said to be conditioned to act
+in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
+obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God
+by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.
+xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point.  Our second point is
+plainly to be inferred therefrom.  For if a thing, which has not
+been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part
+of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is
+absurd.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act
+in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from the third axiom.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  Every individual thing, or everything which is
+finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be
+conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
+action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and
+has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in
+its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be
+conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also
+is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to
+infinity.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
+thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,
+Coroll.).
+
+But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,
+cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God;
+for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any
+attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.).  It
+must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as
+the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for
+substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.
+and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the
+attributes of God.  But from God, or from any of his attributes,
+in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite
+and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow.  Wherefore it
+must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by
+God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
+modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence.  This is our first point.  Again, this
+cause or this modification (for the reason by which we
+established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be
+conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the
+same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
+namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
+nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
+nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
+follows:--1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
+things immediately produced by him.  I say absolutely, not after
+his kind, as is usually stated.  For the effects of God cannot
+either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.
+xxiv. Coroll.).  2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote
+cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing
+these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what
+follows from his absolute nature.  For, by a remote cause, we
+understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.
+But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that
+without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all
+things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular
+manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.).  But God cannot
+be called a thing contingent.  For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
+necessarily, and not contingently.  Further, the modes of the
+divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
+(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the
+divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
+conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.).  Further, God is not only the
+cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
+xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as
+conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).
+If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition
+themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
+themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
+the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also
+to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing
+that is contingent.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
+we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura
+naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata).  I say
+to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,
+from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature
+viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,
+and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
+substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other
+words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,
+in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
+
+By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which
+follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
+attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of
+God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
+and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXX.  Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
+infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
+modifications of God, and nothing else.
+
+Proof.--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in
+other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect
+in representation must necessarily be granted in nature.  But in
+nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save
+God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in
+God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived.  Therefore
+the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
+comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
+and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  The intellect in function, whether finite or
+infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to
+passive nature and not to active nature.
+
+Proof.--By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
+thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
+other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)
+requiring to be conceived through absolute thought.  It must (by
+Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
+expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
+conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
+conceived.  It must therefore be referred to nature passive
+rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
+thinking.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
+admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:
+but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
+what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
+understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived.  For
+we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
+the act of understanding.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
+necessary cause.
+
+Proof.--Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
+intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
+nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
+other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
+and so on to infinity.  But if will be supposed infinite, it must
+also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
+being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his
+possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
+essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.).  Thus, however it be
+conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
+which it should be conditioned to exist and act.  Thus (Def.
+vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
+constrained cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+Coroll. I.--Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
+according to freedom of the will.
+
+Coroll. II.--It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
+stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
+rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
+conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
+manner.  For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
+which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
+And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
+number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
+said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
+number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
+that motion and rest act by free will.  Wherefore will no more
+appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
+in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
+we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
+and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
+manner.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  Things could not have been brought into being by
+God in any manner or in any order different from that which has
+in fact obtained.
+
+Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
+(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist
+and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.).  If things, therefore,
+could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
+to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have
+been different, God's nature would also have been able to be
+different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that
+different nature also would have perforce existed, and
+consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.
+This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd.  Therefore things
+could not have been brought into being by God in any other
+manner, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note I.--As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
+noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
+contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall
+attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the
+words necessary and impossible.
+
+A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence
+or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing
+necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
+from a given efficient cause.  For similar reasons a thing is
+said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or
+definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
+is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but
+a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation
+to the imperfection of our knowledge.
+
+A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or
+does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it
+does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt
+concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes
+us,--such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
+impossible.  Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
+
+Note II.--It clearly follows from what we have said, that
+things have been brought into being by God in the highest
+perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a
+most perfect nature.  Nor does this prove any imperfection in
+God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection.  From its
+contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just
+shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
+brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
+God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute
+to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
+
+I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
+will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply
+because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very
+different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced.  They
+assign to him, in short, absolute free will.  However, I am also
+convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly
+weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
+such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
+but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge.  There is
+no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
+xvii.  But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
+that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of
+God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things
+could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
+different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what
+our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely
+on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is.  If
+it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.
+Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all
+eternity by God himself.  If it were otherwise, God would be
+convicted of imperfection or change.  But in eternity there is no
+such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely
+from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never
+could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist
+before his decrees, and would not exist without them.  But, it is
+said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had
+ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and
+her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in
+God.  But persons who say this must admit that God can change his
+decrees.  For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature
+and her order, different from those which he has ordained--in
+other words, if he had willed and conceived something different
+concerning nature--he would perforce have had a different
+intellect from that which he has, and also a different will.  But
+if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a
+different will, without any change in his essence or his
+perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the
+decrees which he has made concerning created things, and
+nevertheless remaining perfect?  For his intellect and will
+concerning things created and their order are the same, in
+respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.
+
+Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that
+God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as
+they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's
+essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a
+different actual intellect and a different will, his essence
+would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at
+first, if things had been brought into being by God in a
+different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and
+will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have
+been different, which is absurd.
+
+As these things could not have been brought into being by God
+in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as
+the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection
+of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
+believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were
+in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he
+had understood them.
+
+But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
+imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be
+called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the
+will of God.  If God had so willed, he might have brought it
+about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,
+and vice versâ.  What is such an assertion, but an open
+declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he
+wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should
+understand things differently from the way in which he does
+understand them?  This (as we have just shown) is the height of
+absurdity.  Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its
+employers, as follows:--All things depend on the power of God.
+In order that things should be different from what they are,
+God's will would necessarily have to be different.  But God's
+will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly
+demonstrated) from God's perfection.  Therefore neither can
+things be different.  I confess, that the theory which subjects
+all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that
+they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth
+than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all
+things with a view of promoting what is good.  For these latter
+persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not
+depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,
+or which he aims at as a definite goal.  This is only another
+name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter
+absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first
+and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of
+their existence.  I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting
+such wild theories.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  God's power is identical with his essence.
+
+Proof.--From the sole necessity of the essence of God it
+follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all
+things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.).  Wherefore the power of God, by
+which he and all things are and act, is identical with his
+essence.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
+necessarily exists.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.)
+be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it
+necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  There is no cause from whose nature some effect
+does not follow.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in
+a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is,
+(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given
+conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things,
+therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.
+Q.E.D.
+
+
+APPENDIX:
+
+In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties
+of God.  I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:
+that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;
+that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;
+that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without
+him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all
+things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or
+absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power.
+I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the
+prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my
+demonstrations.  Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,
+which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the
+understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained
+it above.  I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these
+misconceptions before the bar of reason.
+
+All such opinions spring from the notion commonly
+entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,
+namely, with an end in view.  It is accepted as certain, that God
+himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
+that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship
+him).  I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
+why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
+prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and,
+lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about
+good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
+confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like.  However, this is
+not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of
+the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
+starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
+that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all
+have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they
+are conscious of such desire.  Herefrom it follows, first, that
+men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their
+volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance,
+of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire.
+Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that
+which is useful to them, and which they seek.  Thus it comes to
+pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of
+events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having
+no cause for further doubt.  If they cannot learn such causes
+from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering
+themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them
+personally to bring about the given event, and thus they
+necessarily judge other natures by their own.  Further, as they
+find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist
+them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance,
+eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for
+yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding
+fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means
+for obtaining such conveniences.  Now as they are aware, that
+they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think
+they have cause for believing, that some other being has made
+them for their use.  As they look upon things as means, they
+cannot believe them to be self--created; but, judging from the
+means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they
+are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe
+endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted
+everything for human use.  They are bound to estimate the nature
+of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in
+accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that
+the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind
+man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.  Hence
+also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according
+to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God
+might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course
+of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and
+insatiable avarice.  Thus the prejudice developed into
+superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this
+reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain
+the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that
+nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to
+man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,
+and men are all mad together.  Consider, I pray you, the result:
+among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some
+hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they
+declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at
+some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in
+their worship.  Experience day by day protested and showed by
+infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of
+pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their
+inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such
+contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were
+ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of
+ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
+and start afresh.  They therefore laid down as an axiom, that
+God's judgments far transcend human understanding.  Such a
+doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the
+human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished
+another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and
+properties of figures without regard to their final causes.
+There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides
+mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed
+to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge
+of the truth.
+
+I have now sufficiently explained my first point.  There is
+no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in
+view, and that final causes are mere human figments.  This, I
+think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and
+foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and
+also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in
+fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that
+everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with
+the utmost perfection.  However, I will add a few remarks, in
+order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly.  That
+which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versâ:
+it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that
+which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.  Passing
+over the questions of cause and priority as self--evident, it is
+plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most
+perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which
+requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in
+that respect, more imperfect.  But if those things which were
+made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his
+end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the
+first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
+
+Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:
+for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something
+which he lacks.  Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a
+distinction between the object of want and the object of
+assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for
+the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation.  They are
+unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God
+himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore
+driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those
+things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he
+desired them.
+
+We must not omit to notice that the followers of this
+doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final
+causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their
+theory--namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to
+ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of
+exhibiting their doctrine.  For example, if a stone falls from a
+roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate
+by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man;
+for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how
+could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent
+circumstances) have all happened together by chance?  Perhaps you
+will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was
+blowing, and the man was walking that way.  "But why," they will
+insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very
+time walking that way?"  If you again answer, that the wind had
+then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day
+before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had
+been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was
+the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?"
+So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at
+last you take refuge in the will of God--in other words, the
+sanctuary of ignorance.  So, again, when they survey the frame of
+the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the
+causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been
+fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural
+skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt
+another.
+
+Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and
+strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,
+and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as
+an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the
+interpreters of nature and the gods.  Such persons know that,
+with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only
+available means for proving and preserving their authority would
+vanish also.  But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my
+third point.
+
+After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is
+created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as
+the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to
+themselves, and to account those things the best of all which
+have the most beneficial effect on mankind.  Further, they were
+bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature
+of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,
+cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that
+they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and
+blame, sin and merit.
+
+I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human
+nature; the former I will briefly explain here.
+
+Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God
+they have called good, everything which hinders these objects
+they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not
+understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any
+way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their
+imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that
+there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things
+and their own nature.  When phenomena are of such a kind, that
+the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of
+imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say
+that they are well--ordered; if the contrary, that they are
+ill--ordered or confused.  Further, as things which are easily
+imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to
+confusion--as though there were any order in nature, except in
+relation to our imagination--and say that God has created all
+things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing
+imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God
+foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it
+should be most easily imagined.  If this be their theory, they
+would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an
+infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and
+very many others which confound its weakness.  But enough has
+been said on this subject.  The other abstract notions are
+nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
+differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant
+as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that
+everything was created for the sake of themselves; and,
+according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,
+healthy or rotten and corrupt.  For instance, if the motion which
+objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,
+the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary
+motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
+
+Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are
+styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,
+full--flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,
+rough or smooth, &c.
+
+Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,
+sound, or harmony.  In this last case, there are men lunatic
+enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in
+harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded
+themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to
+harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone
+judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather
+mistakes for things the forms of his imagination.  We need no
+longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we
+have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human
+bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they
+differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;
+what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what
+is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on.  I need not
+further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the
+subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well
+known.  It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;
+everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as
+palates."  All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things
+according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
+understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
+mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I
+have urged.
+
+We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly
+given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate
+the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the
+imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were
+entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
+entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all
+arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily
+rebutted.
+
+Many argue in this way.  If all things follow from a
+necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there
+so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things
+corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,
+confusion, evil, sin, &c.  But these reasoners are, as I have
+said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be
+reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not
+more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human
+senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to
+mankind.  To those who ask why God did not so create all men,
+that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but
+this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of
+every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more
+strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to
+suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an
+infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
+
+Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if
+there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily
+dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.
+
+
+
+
+Part II.
+
+ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+
+I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
+necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and
+infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part
+i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
+infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
+us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
+and its highest blessedness.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS
+
+DEFINITION I.  By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain
+determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is
+considered as an extended thing.  (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,
+Coroll.)
+
+DEFINITION II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing
+that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,
+and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;
+in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
+without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
+
+DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is
+formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
+
+Explanation.--I say conception rather than perception, because
+the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in
+respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an
+activity of the mind.
+
+DEFINITION IV.  By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so
+far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the
+object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
+
+Explanation.--I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark
+which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and
+its object (ideatum).
+
+DEFINITION V.  Duration is the indefinite continuance of
+existing.
+
+Explanation.--I say indefinite, because it cannot be
+determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or
+by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of
+the thing, but does not take it away.
+
+DEFINITION VI.  Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.
+
+DEFINITION VII.  By particular things, I mean things which are
+finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several
+individual things concur in one action, so as to be all
+simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so
+far, as one particular thing.
+
+
+AXIOMS
+
+I.  The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that
+is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or
+that man does or does not exist.
+
+II.  Man thinks.
+
+III.  Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
+the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
+individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c.  But the idea
+can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
+
+IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
+
+V.  We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
+modes of thought.
+
+N.B.  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
+xiii.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS
+
+PROP. I.  Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
+thing.
+
+Proof.--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
+modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
+of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.).  God therefore possesses
+the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved
+in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
+Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
+which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
+vi.).  In other words, God is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we
+are able to conceive an infinite thinking being.  For, in
+proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
+thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
+perfection.  Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
+number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,
+in respect of thinking, infinite.  As, therefore, from the
+consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,
+thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the
+infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
+
+PROP. II.  Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an
+extended thing.
+
+Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the last.
+
+PROP. III.  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
+essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his
+essence.
+
+Proof.--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
+infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
+thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
+and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.  Now all
+that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).
+Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and
+in God alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part i., Prop. xv.)
+
+Note.--The multitude understand by the power of God the free
+will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
+latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent.  For
+it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
+reduce them to nothing.  Further, the power of God is very often
+likened to the power of kings.  But this doctrine we have refuted
+(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown
+(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as
+that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
+follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
+that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
+necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways.  We
+further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
+identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
+impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
+him as non--existent.  If we might pursue the subject further, I
+could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
+God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
+multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
+negation of power.  However, I am unwilling to go over the same
+ground so often.  I would only beg the reader again and again, to
+turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from
+Prop. xvi. to the end.  No one will be able to follow my meaning,
+unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of
+God with the human power and right of kings.
+
+PROP. IV.  The idea of God, from which an infinite number of
+things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
+
+Proof.--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
+attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
+Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.).  Therefore the
+idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in
+infinite ways, can only be one.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only
+in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far
+as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas
+both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own
+as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
+perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
+Part.  We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
+of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
+therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
+he is the object of his own idea.  Wherefore the actual being of
+ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
+ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
+xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
+nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
+(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
+of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
+of any attribute save thought.  Therefore the actual being of
+ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
+thinking thing, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in
+so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they
+are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other attribute.
+
+Proof.--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
+any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
+attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
+any other.  Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
+in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
+they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence the actual being of things, which are not
+modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because
+that nature has prior knowledge of the things.  Things
+represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
+particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
+necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
+the attribute of thought.
+
+PROP. VII.  The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
+order and connection of things.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.  For
+the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of
+the cause, whereof it is an effect.
+
+Corollary.--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
+realized power of action--that is, whatsoever follows from the
+infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
+follows without exception in the same order and connection from
+the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
+
+Note.--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what
+has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be
+perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
+of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
+consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
+and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
+now through the other.  So, also, a mode of extension and the
+idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in
+two ways.  This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
+those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
+things understood by God are identical.  For instance, a circle
+existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
+also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
+different attributes.  Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
+attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
+under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
+and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
+in either case.
+
+I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
+idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
+circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
+actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
+proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
+through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
+consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
+of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
+attribute of thought only.  And, in so far as we consider things
+as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
+nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in
+the case of the other attributes.  Wherefore of things as they
+are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
+consists of infinite attributes.  I cannot for the present
+explain my meaning more clearly.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
+not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
+the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
+are contained in the attributes of God.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
+understood more clearly from the preceding note.
+
+Corollary.--Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
+except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
+God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,
+except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when
+particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they
+are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they
+are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,
+through which they are said to continue.
+
+Note.--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
+this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
+which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
+inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
+illustrate it as far as possible.  The nature of a circle is such
+that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the
+rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;
+thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle.  Yet
+none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far
+as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
+rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
+comprehended in the idea of the circle.  Let us grant that, from
+this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist.  The ideas of
+these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the
+idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of
+those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the
+remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
+
+PROP. IX.  The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
+existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
+by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
+
+Proof.--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
+(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus
+(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only
+as he is a thinking thing.  But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)
+in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
+is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so
+on to infinity.  Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by
+Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of
+causes.   Therefore of a given individual idea another individual
+idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that
+idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in
+so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of
+any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he
+has the idea of the object.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
+idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
+is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
+another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
+Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the
+same as the order and connection of things.  The knowledge,
+therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
+will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. X.  The being of substance does not appertain to the
+essence of man--in other words, substance does not constitute the
+actual being[2] of man.
+
+[2] "Forma"
+
+
+Proof.--The being of substance involves necessary existence
+(Part i., Prop. vii.).  If, therefore, the being of substance
+appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
+would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
+consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd
+(II. Ax. i.).  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which
+it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same
+nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is
+not that which constitutes the actual being of man.  Again, the
+proposition is evident from the other properties of
+substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
+immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
+constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
+For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to
+the essence of man.  That essence therefore (by i.  15) is
+something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
+nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),
+or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
+manner.
+
+Note.--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
+conceived without God.  All men agree that God is the one and
+only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
+existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
+respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect
+to their being (secundum esse).
+
+At the same time many assert, that that, without which a
+thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
+thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
+appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
+things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
+probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines.  I think the
+cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the
+proper order of philosophic thinking.  The nature of God, which
+should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the
+order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be
+last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
+what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are
+considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to
+the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to
+the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in
+mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the
+knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are
+no help towards understanding the divine nature.  So that it is
+hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
+themselves freely.
+
+However, I pass over this point.  My intention here was only
+to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
+cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
+individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
+does not appertain to their essence.  I said that "I considered
+as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
+the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
+thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
+thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
+conceived."  (II. Def. ii.)
+
+PROP. XI.  The first element, which constitutes the actual being
+of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
+existing.
+
+Proof.--The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)
+is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
+(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
+Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
+given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
+in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
+Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
+mind.  But not the idea of a non--existent thing, for then (II.
+viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
+therefore be the idea of something actually existing.  But not of
+an infinite thing.  For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
+always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
+absurdity.  Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
+actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
+existing.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
+the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human
+mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
+this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
+as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so
+far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we
+say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
+constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
+he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
+another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in
+part or inadequately.
+
+Note.--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
+will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;
+I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
+not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
+end.
+
+PROP. XII.  Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,
+which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human
+mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of
+the said occurrence.  That is, if the object of the idea
+constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in
+that body without being perceived by the mind.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
+the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in
+so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said
+object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
+of anything.  Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
+constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is
+necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
+the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of
+the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words
+the mind perceives it.
+
+Note.--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
+to be understood from II. vii., which see.
+
+PROP. XIII.  The object of the idea constituting the human mind
+is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which
+actually exists, and nothing else.
+
+Proof.--If indeed the body were not the object of the human
+mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
+God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but
+in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that
+is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body
+would not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the
+idea of the modifications of the body.  Therefore the object of
+the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as
+it actually exists (II. xi.).  Further, if there were any other
+object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as
+nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
+xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
+which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but
+(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea.  Wherefore the object of our
+mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
+united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind
+and body.  However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately
+or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the
+nature of our body.  The propositions we have advanced hitherto
+have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to
+other individual things, all of which, though in different
+degrees, are animated.[3]  For of everything there is necessarily
+an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as
+there is an idea of the human body; thus  whatever we have
+asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be
+asserted of the idea of everything else.  Still, on the other
+hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from
+the other, one being more excellent than another and containing
+more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent
+than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
+
+[3] "Animata"
+
+
+Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind
+differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is
+necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of
+the human body.  What this nature is, I am not able here to
+explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,
+that I should do so.  I will only say generally, that in
+proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
+many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
+the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for
+forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions
+of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
+concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it
+is the object for distinct comprehension.  We may thus recognize
+the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the
+cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,
+and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following
+propositions, deduce from what has been advanced.  Wherefore I
+have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my
+present statements.  In order to do so, I must premise a few
+propositions concerning the nature of bodies.
+
+AXIOM I.  All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
+
+AXIOM II.  Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
+sometimes more quickly.
+
+LEMMA I.  Bodies are distinguished from one another in
+respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in
+respect of substance.
+
+Proof.--The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
+self--evident.  That bodies are not distinguished in respect of
+substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii.  It is brought
+out still more clearly from I. xv, note.
+
+LEMMA II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.
+
+Proof.--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
+conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).
+Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,
+and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
+
+LEMMA III.  A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
+motion or rest by another body, which other body has been
+determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third
+again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
+
+Proof.--Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
+(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to
+motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be
+determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
+(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
+motion or at rest.  And this body again can only have been set in
+motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to
+motion or rest.   This third body again by a fourth, and so on to
+infinity.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
+motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other
+body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a
+state of motion by some other body.  This is indeed self--evident.
+For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
+rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,
+I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is
+at rest.  If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
+this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no
+other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at
+rest.  If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
+long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
+concerning it, except that it is in motion.   If A is
+subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
+of A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to
+continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted
+from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
+cause determining A to a state of rest.
+
+Axiom I.--All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
+body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected
+and the body affecting; so that one and the same body may be
+moved in different modes, according to the difference in the
+nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different
+bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.
+
+Axiom II.--When a body in motion impinges on another body at
+rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to
+continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in
+the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
+body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
+of motion of incidence and the same plane.
+
+So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
+which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and
+rest, quickness and slowness.  We now pass on to compound bodies.
+
+Definition.--When any given bodies of the same or different
+magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or
+if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that
+their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain
+fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that
+together they compose one body or individual, which is
+distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.
+
+Axiom III.--In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a
+compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies,
+they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved
+from their position; consequently the individual will, with
+greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form.
+Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies,
+are called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over small
+superficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motion
+among one another, are called fluid.
+
+LEMMA IV.  If from a body or individual, compounded of
+several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same
+time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take
+their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before,
+without any change in its actuality (forma).
+
+Proof.--Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
+substance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
+individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but
+this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will
+(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,
+will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance
+and in respect of mode.  Q.E.D.
+
+LEMMA V.  If the parts composing an individual become greater
+or less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same
+mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still
+preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be
+changed.
+
+Proof.--The same as for the last Lemma.
+
+LEMMA VI.  If certain bodies composing an individual be
+compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction,
+for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they
+be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication
+in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its
+own nature without any change of its actuality.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the individual
+is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we
+spoke of as its actual being.
+
+LEMMA VII.  Furthermore, the individual thus composed
+preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at
+rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as
+each part retains its motion, and preserves its communication
+with other parts as before.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from the definition of an
+individual prefixed to Lemma iv.
+
+Note.--We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected
+in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding.
+Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies
+only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and
+rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple
+character.  If, however, we now conceive another individual
+composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find
+that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without
+losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied.  Each of its parts
+would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.)
+each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker
+or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its
+motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts.  If
+we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of
+individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be
+affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their
+actuality.  We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive
+the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all
+bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the
+individual as a whole.  I should feel bound to explain and
+demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a
+special treatise on body.  But I have already said that such is
+not my object; I have only touched on the question, because it
+enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.
+
+POSTULATES
+
+I.  The human body is composed of a number of individual
+parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself
+extremely complex.
+
+II.  Of the individual parts composing the human body some
+are fluid, some soft, some hard.
+
+III.  The individual parts composing the human body, and
+consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of
+ways by external bodies.
+
+IV.  The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
+number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,
+regenerated.
+
+V.  When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
+external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes
+the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression
+thereupon of the external body which impels it.
+
+VI.  The human body can move external bodies, and arrange
+them in a variety of ways.
+
+PROP. XIV.  The human mind is capable of perceiving a great
+number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable
+of receiving a great number of impressions.
+
+Proof.--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
+very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many
+ways of affecting external bodies.  But (II. xii.)  the human
+mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the
+human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
+things, and is so in proportion, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the
+human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of
+ideas.
+
+Proof.--The idea constituting the actual being of the human
+mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
+composed of a great number of complex individual parts.  But
+there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
+whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore
+(II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these
+numerous ideas of its component parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
+affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human
+body, and also the nature of the external body.
+
+Proof.--All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
+follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the
+nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of
+Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax.
+iv.) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of
+every mode, in which the human body is affected by external
+bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external
+body.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
+perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the
+nature of its own.
+
+Corollary II.--It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we
+have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our
+own body than the nature of external bodies.  I have amply
+illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.
+
+PROP. XVII.  If the human body is affected in a manner which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present
+to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
+exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for so long as the
+human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human
+mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body--that is (by
+the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually
+existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body.
+In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but
+postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the
+external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will
+regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
+affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--The mind is able to regard as present external
+bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even
+though they be no longer in existence or present.
+
+Proof.--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
+human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they
+change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii.,
+after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in
+a different manner from that which they followed before such
+change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new
+surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be
+refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
+towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they
+will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human
+body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
+take cognizance--that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard
+the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the
+fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces
+by their own spontaneous motion.  Wherefore, although the
+external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected,
+be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them
+as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
+that we regard as present many things which are not.  It is
+possible that the same result may be brought about by other
+causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated
+one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out
+the true cause.  Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the
+truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
+rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
+controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human
+body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.).
+Furthermore (II. vii.  Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly
+understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of
+Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the
+idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.  The
+former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and
+only  implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter
+indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature
+of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body
+lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even
+though he no longer exists.  Further, to retain the usual
+phraseology,  the modifications of the human body, of which the
+ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call
+the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of
+things.  When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say
+that it imagines.  I will here draw attention to the fact, in
+order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the
+mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error.  The mind
+does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as
+it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the
+existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it.  If
+the mind, while imagining non--existent things as present to it,
+is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this
+power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its
+nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of
+imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is (I. Def.
+vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  If the human body has once been affected by two or
+more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines
+any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
+
+Proof.--The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,
+because the human body is affected and disposed by the
+impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is
+affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
+external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so
+disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,
+it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
+the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the
+other.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We now clearly see what Memory is.  It is simply a
+certain association of ideas involving the nature of things
+outside the human body, which association arises in the mind
+according to the order and association of the modifications
+(affectiones) of the human body.  I say, first, it is an
+association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of
+things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the
+nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the
+human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve
+the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.  I say,
+secondly, that this association arises according to the order and
+association of the modifications of the human body, in order to
+distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from
+the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things
+through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same.
+And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from
+the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the
+thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first;
+for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a
+Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple,
+which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question,
+nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man
+has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the
+man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the
+fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to
+another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things
+in his body.  For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the
+tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought
+of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c.  Thus every man
+will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has
+been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images
+of things in this or that manner.
+
+PROP. XIX.  The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does
+not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications
+whereby the body is affected.
+
+Proof.--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
+human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
+he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing
+actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
+stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
+continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas
+is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);
+this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
+as affected by the ideas of very many particular things.  Thus
+God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in
+so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
+far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by
+II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body.
+But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far
+as  he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human
+mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently
+(II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing;
+therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in
+God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to
+God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human
+body.
+
+Proof.--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore
+(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of
+thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of
+the human mind (II. xi.).  Further, this idea or knowledge of the
+mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but
+in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual
+thing (II. ix.).  But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
+ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;
+therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is
+referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
+the body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXI.  This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the
+same way as the mind is united to the body.
+
+Proof.--That the mind is united to the body we have shown from
+the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and
+xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be
+united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner
+as the mind is united to the body.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from
+what we have said in the note to II. vii.  We there showed that
+the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.),
+are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute
+of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the
+idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing,
+which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,
+thought.  The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are
+in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same
+power of thinking.  Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that
+is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality
+(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of
+thought without reference to the object; if a man knows
+anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at
+the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to
+infinity.  But I will treat of this hereafter.
+
+PROP. XXII.  The human mind perceives not only the modifications
+of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.
+
+Proof.--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
+in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,
+as the ideas of the said modifications.  This is proved in the
+same way as II. xx.  But the ideas of the modifications of the
+body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far
+as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the
+ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
+knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
+will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not
+only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
+modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  The mind does not know itself, except in so far as
+it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.
+
+Proof.--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in
+God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same
+manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body.  But since (II.
+xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
+(II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
+human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
+human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human
+mind thus far has no knowledge of itself.  Further the ideas of
+the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the
+nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.),
+they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge
+of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but
+(by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
+mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has
+knowledge of itself.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The human mind does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
+
+Proof.--The parts composing the human body do not belong to
+the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate
+their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.
+after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as
+individuals without relation to the human body.  The parts of the
+human body are highly complex individuals  (Post. i.), whose
+parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in
+any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
+latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after
+Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.
+iii.)  the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,
+inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea
+of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the
+order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.).  We may affirm
+the same thing of each part of each individual composing the
+human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the
+human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many
+ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the
+human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the
+nature of the human mind (II. xiii); therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge
+of the human body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  The idea of each modification of the human body does
+not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
+
+Proof.--We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
+human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as
+that external body conditions the human body in a given manner.
+But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
+no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
+in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the
+idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to
+the said external body.  Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the
+external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the
+modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the
+modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  The human mind does not perceive any external body
+as actually existing, except through the ideas of the
+modifications of its own body.
+
+Proof.--If the human body is in no way affected by a given
+external body, then  (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
+body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the
+idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
+any manner perceive its existence.  But, in so far as the human
+body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far
+(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--In so far as the human mind imagines an external
+body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.
+
+Proof.--When the human mind regards external bodies through
+the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it
+imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine
+external bodies as actually existing.  Therefore (by II. xxv.),
+in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
+adequate knowledge of them.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  The idea of each modification of the human body
+does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
+
+Proof.--Every idea of a modification of the human body
+involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human
+body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.).  But,
+inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
+in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The ideas of the modifications of the human body,
+in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not
+clear and distinct, but confused.
+
+Proof.--The ideas of the modifications of the human body
+involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies
+(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human
+body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes
+(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,
+consequently, the human body as a whole are affected.   But (by
+II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
+also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas.  These ideas of
+modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind
+alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,
+confused ideas.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind
+is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in
+itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the
+idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the
+modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred
+to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  The idea of the idea of each modification of the
+human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human
+mind.
+
+Proof.--The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
+xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,
+in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is
+(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
+adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not
+adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not
+involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
+perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an
+adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,
+of its own body, and of external bodies.  For the mind does not
+know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
+modifications of body (II. xxiii.).  It only perceives its own
+body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only
+perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so
+far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate
+knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.
+xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a
+fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and
+note).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
+only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
+external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common
+order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from
+without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to
+regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from
+within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,
+to understand their points of agreement, difference, and
+contrast.  Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it
+regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.
+
+PROP. XXX.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of our body.
+
+Proof.--The duration of our body does not depend on its
+essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.
+xxi.).  But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
+by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
+operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these
+last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.
+The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
+nature, or the constitution of things.  Now, however a thing may
+be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,
+in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
+he has the idea of the human body only.  (II. ix. Coroll.)
+Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
+very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
+the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this
+knowledge is very inadequate to our mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of particular things external to ourselves.
+
+Proof.--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
+conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a
+fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must
+likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity.  (I.
+xxviii.)  As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
+this common property of particular things, we have only a very
+inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a
+similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
+things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
+of the duration thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that all particular things are
+contingent and perishable.  For we can have no adequate idea of
+their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
+understand by the contingency and perishableness of things.  (I.
+xxxiii., Note i.)  For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing
+is contingent.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
+are true.
+
+Proof.--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
+their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are
+all true.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes
+them to be called false.
+
+Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
+mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality
+of falsehood.  Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.
+xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).
+Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to
+be called false.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
+perfect, is true.
+
+Proof.--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
+perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea
+is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the
+essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
+an idea is true.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,
+which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.
+
+Proof.--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
+to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in
+simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to
+be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
+ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in
+the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
+confused ideas involve.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists
+in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light
+on the subject I will give an example.  For instance, men are
+mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up
+of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the
+causes by which they are conditioned.  Their idea of freedom,
+therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their
+actions.  As for their saying that human actions depend on the
+will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond
+thereto.  What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none
+of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
+dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
+either laughter or disgust.  So, again, when we look at the sun,
+we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;
+this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
+that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true
+distance or the cause of the fancy.  For although we afterwards
+learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
+the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near;
+for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are
+ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
+our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said
+body is affected thereby.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
+necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
+
+Proof.--All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
+are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)
+adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,
+except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
+xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
+follow by the same necessity (II. vi.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,
+above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.
+
+Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
+constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,
+the essence of B.  Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either
+exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.
+Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Those things, which are common to all, and which
+are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived
+except adequately.
+
+Proof.--Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and
+which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the
+whole.  I say A cannot be conceived except adequately.  For the
+idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii.
+Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,
+and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the
+human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the
+nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that
+is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be
+adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in
+so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.
+Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A
+adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as
+it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any
+external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary--Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or
+notions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree
+in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be
+adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  That, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human
+body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in
+the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.
+
+Proof.--If A be that, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human
+body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each
+external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of
+A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of
+the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given
+external bodies.  Let it now be granted, that the human body is
+affected by an external body through that, which it has in common
+therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve
+the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the
+idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property
+A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the
+idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he
+constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to
+perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has
+more in common with other bodies.
+
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which
+are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident.  For when we say
+that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are
+therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that
+an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not
+in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by
+the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as
+he constitutes the essence of the human mind.
+
+Note I.--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,
+which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our
+ratiocination.  But there are other causes of certain axioms or
+notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
+method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more
+useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at
+all.  Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all
+men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
+are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are
+ill--founded.  Again we should discern whence the notions called
+secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on
+which they are founded, and other points of interest connected
+with these questions.  But I have decided to pass over the
+subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
+treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
+too great prolixity.  Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything
+necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence
+are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,
+Thing, Something.  These terms arose from the fact, that the
+human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming
+a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the
+II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number
+be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this
+number of images, of which the body is capable of forming
+distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become
+entirely confused one with another.  This being so, it is evident
+(from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind
+can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body
+can form images simultaneously.  When the images become quite
+confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies
+confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as
+it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of
+Being, Thing, &c.  The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact
+that images are not always equally vivid, and from other
+analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for
+the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
+consider one only.  All may be reduced to this, that these terms
+represent ideas in the highest degree confused.  From similar
+causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,
+horse, dog, &c.  They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many
+images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the
+human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed
+utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small
+differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and
+their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
+which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
+them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said
+individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses
+by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
+particular individuals.  For, as we have said, it is unable to
+imagine the definite number of individuals.  We must, however,
+bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
+men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the
+point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and
+which the mind most easily imagines or remembers.  For instance,
+those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of
+man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect
+stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other
+attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
+instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two--footed animal
+without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
+everyone will form general images of things according to the
+habit of his body.
+
+It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,
+who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed
+of them, so many controversies should have arisen.
+
+Note II.--From all that has been said above it is clear, that
+we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)
+From particular things represented to our intellect
+fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
+(II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by
+the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.[4]
+
+[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
+
+(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard
+certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
+concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things
+(II. xviii. note).  I shall call both these ways of regarding
+things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
+(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and
+adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll.,
+xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of
+the second kind.  Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,
+as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we
+will call intuition.  This kind of knowledge proceeds from an
+adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of
+God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.  I will
+illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example.
+Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to
+the third as the second is to the first.  Tradesmen without
+hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the
+product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the
+rule which they received from a master without any proof, or
+because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or
+by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the
+seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property
+of proportionals.
+
+But with very simple numbers there is no need of this.  For
+instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the
+fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we
+infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio,
+which the first bears to the second.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of
+falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily
+true.
+
+Proof.--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the
+foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate
+and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only
+source of falsity (II. xxxv.).  Furthermore, we assigned to the
+second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are
+adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.
+xxxiv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not
+knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true
+from the false.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident.  He, who knows how
+to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea
+of true and false.  That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the
+true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that
+he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing
+perceived.
+
+Proof.--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,
+in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind
+(II. xi. Coroll.).  Let us suppose that there is in God, in so
+far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,
+A.  The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be
+referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,
+whereof the proof is of universal application).  But the idea A
+is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed
+through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must
+be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi.
+Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,
+which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate
+idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time
+have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that
+is, obviously, he must be assured.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
+the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing
+proposition is in itself sufficiently plain.  No one, who has a
+true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
+certainty.  For to have a true idea is only another expression
+for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.  No one,
+indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
+something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
+thinking--namely, the very act of understanding.  And who, I ask,
+can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
+understand it?  In other words, who can know that he is sure of a
+thing, unless he be first sure of that thing?  Further, what can
+there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
+standard of truth?  Even as light displays both itself and
+darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
+
+I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
+questions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false
+idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
+true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
+(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
+consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
+advantage over him who has only false ideas.  Further, how comes
+it that men have false ideas?  Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
+that he has ideas which agree with their objects?  These
+questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
+answered.  The difference between a true idea and a false idea is
+plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to
+the latter as being is to not--being.  The causes of falsity I
+have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the
+note.  From what is there stated, the difference between a man
+who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made
+apparent.  As for the last question--as to how a man can be sure
+that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just
+pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises
+from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with
+its object--in other words, that truth is its own standard.  We
+may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is
+part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.);
+therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as
+necessarily true as the ideas of God.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  It is not in the nature of reason to regard things
+as contingent, but as necessary.
+
+Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly
+(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves--that
+is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that it is only through our
+imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
+future or the past, as contingent.
+
+Note.--How this way of looking at things arises, I will
+briefly explain.  We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)
+that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even
+though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which
+exclude their existence and presence.  Further (II. xviii.), we
+showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two
+external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards
+imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway
+remember the other--that is, it will regard both as present to
+itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence
+and presence.  Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from
+the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than
+others, some more quickly, some at equal speed.  Thus, let us
+suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in
+the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that
+today he again sees Peter in the morning.  It is evident, from
+II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he
+will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the
+sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other
+words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his
+imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he
+will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon--that
+is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation
+to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the
+evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by
+imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past
+time.  If it should at any time happen, that on some other
+evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on
+the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening
+sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the
+child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,
+not both together.  His imagination will therefore waver; and,
+with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first
+one, then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future,
+neither of them as certain, but both as contingent.  This
+wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
+be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
+relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may
+imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time
+present, past, or future.
+
+Corollary II.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive
+things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis
+specie).
+
+Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as
+contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.).  Reason perceives this
+necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it
+is in itself.  But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very
+necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the
+nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.
+We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.
+xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.
+xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:
+which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,
+under a certain form of eternity.
+
+PROP. XLV.  Every idea of every body, or of every particular
+thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.
+
+Proof.--The idea of a particular thing actually existing
+necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
+said thing (II. viii.).  Now particular things cannot be
+conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
+have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
+attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
+must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
+attributes of those ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,
+existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
+certain form of quantity.  I am speaking of the very nature of
+existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
+follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
+necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.).  I am speaking, I repeat, of
+the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in
+God.  For although each particular thing be conditioned by
+another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force
+whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
+the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).
+
+PROP. XLVI.  The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of
+God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.
+
+Proof.--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
+whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea
+thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),
+will involve God's eternal and infinite essence.  Wherefore,
+that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
+of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the
+whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
+eternal and infinite essence of God.
+
+Proof.--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
+xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
+external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
+existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
+knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
+eternity of God are known to all.  Now as all things are in God,
+and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
+many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
+third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,
+and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to
+speak in Part V.  Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as
+they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine
+God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the
+name God with images of things that they are in the habit of
+seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they
+are, men, and continually affected by external bodies.  Many
+errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do
+not apply names to things rightly.  For instance, when a man says
+that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its
+circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly
+attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that
+assigned by mathematicians.  So again, when men make mistakes in
+calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and
+another on the paper.  If we could see into their minds, they do
+not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that
+they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the
+paper.  If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in
+error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I
+lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a
+neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.
+Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do
+not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret
+the meaning of others.  For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly
+contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of
+the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider
+mistaken and absurd in their opponents.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  In the mind there is no absolute or free will;
+but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which
+has also been determined by another cause, and this last by
+another cause, and so on to infinity.
+
+Proof.--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
+xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.
+xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute
+faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
+must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by
+another cause, and this last by another, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind
+no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.
+Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
+entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
+such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.
+Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to
+this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to
+this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul.  The cause
+which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in
+the Appendix to Part I.  But, before I proceed further, I would
+here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the
+faculty, not the desire.  I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby
+the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,
+wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.
+After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general
+notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular
+instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether
+volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.
+We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any
+affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as
+it is an idea, involves.  On which subject see the following
+proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should
+suggest itself.  For by ideas I do not mean images such as are
+formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but
+the conceptions of thought.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
+negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
+involves.
+
+Proof.--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
+or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this
+or that affirmation, and this or that negation.  Now let us
+conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
+whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a
+triangle are equal to two right angles.  This affirmation
+involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
+the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.  It is the same
+thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as
+it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.  Further,
+this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
+of a triangle.  Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be
+conceived, without the idea of a triangle.  Again, this idea of a
+triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its
+three interior angles are equal to two right angles.  Wherefore,
+and vice versâ, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be
+conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation
+belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing
+besides.  What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have
+selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,
+that it is nothing but an idea.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Will and understanding are one and the same.
+
+Proof.--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
+individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note).  But a
+particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
+(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
+one and the same.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
+assigned for error.  For we have shown above, that falsity
+consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas
+which are fragmentary and confused.  Wherefore, a false idea,
+inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty.  When we
+say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he
+has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
+but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is
+false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his
+imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note).  Thus, although the
+man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say
+that he is certain.  For by certainty we mean something positive
+(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
+
+However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
+explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and
+I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced
+against our doctrine.  Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
+I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
+advantages, which follow therefrom.  I say "some," for they will
+be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
+part.
+
+I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
+make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
+the mind, and the images of things which we imagine.  It is
+further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
+words, whereby we signify things.  These three--namely, images,
+words, and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused
+together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
+and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
+necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for
+philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.  Those
+who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
+contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas
+of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not
+ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
+our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
+pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not
+see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
+affirmation or negation.  Again, those who confuse words with
+ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that
+they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or
+deny.  This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who
+reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no
+wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly
+understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not
+consist in the image of anything, nor in words.  The essence of
+words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no
+wise involve the conception of thought.
+
+
+These few words on this subject will suffice: I will
+therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised
+against our doctrine.  Of these, the first is advanced by those,
+who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,
+and that therefore it is different therefrom.  The reason for
+their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the
+understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
+increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
+negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do
+not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
+faculty of understanding.  The will is thus distinguished from
+the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
+Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
+especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
+before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
+by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
+perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.
+
+For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not
+therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not
+deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does
+exist.  Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by
+experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and
+different from the faculty of understanding.  Thirdly, it may be
+objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more
+reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to
+need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power
+than for affirming, that what is false is true.  We have,
+however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than
+another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so
+also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this
+also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and
+the will.  Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from
+free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are
+equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?  Will he
+perish of hunger and thirst?  If I say that he would, I shall
+seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather
+than an actual man.  If I say that he would not, he would then
+determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
+faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.  Other objections
+might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
+everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
+task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
+possible.
+
+To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will
+has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding
+be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
+has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
+forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
+should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
+for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
+infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
+affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the
+same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
+infinite number of bodies.  If it be said that there is an
+infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
+that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
+consequently, by any faculty of volition.  But, it may still be
+urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
+them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
+perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
+already.  This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
+it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
+entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
+understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
+which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
+We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we
+explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which is
+common to all such volitions.
+
+As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
+universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
+wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
+into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
+what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
+infinite number of individuals.
+
+To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a
+free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that
+anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that
+he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.
+Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a
+perception, and not free will.  In order to illustrate the point,
+let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing
+else.  Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the
+horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything
+which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will
+necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to
+doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof.  We
+have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I
+do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,
+while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his
+judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it
+about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that
+he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we
+suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
+
+Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as
+actual perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's
+imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
+xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
+perception, make any affirmation.  For what is the perception of
+a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?  If the
+mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
+regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons
+for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
+the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
+precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
+perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
+inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
+existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the
+subject.
+
+I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third
+objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is
+predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is
+common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate
+essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the
+abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the
+same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting
+the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular
+affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas.  For
+instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,
+differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much
+as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.
+
+Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal
+power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and
+to affirm that that which is false is true.  These two
+affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
+one another as being and not--being; for there is nothing
+positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
+falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
+
+We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when
+we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
+and abstractions with realities.  As for the fourth objection, I
+am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
+described  (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
+a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from
+him) would die of hunger and thirst.  If I am asked, whether such
+an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
+answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be
+considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider
+children, fools, madmen, &c.
+
+It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
+doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
+from what has been said.  The doctrine is good,
+
+1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
+decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so
+much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and
+more understand God.  Such a doctrine not only completely
+tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest
+happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of
+God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
+us.  We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
+estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God
+with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as
+for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
+service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
+
+2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct
+ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which
+are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature.  For it
+shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or
+frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the
+eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from
+the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.
+
+3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches
+us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to
+be angry with any.  Further, as it tells us that each should be
+content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any
+womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the
+guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as
+I will show in Part III.
+
+4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
+commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and
+led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do
+whatsoever things are best.
+
+I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of
+this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a
+close.  I think I have therein explained the nature and
+properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
+considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient
+clearness.  I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
+excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
+to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.
+
+
+
+
+PART III.
+
+ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+
+
+Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be
+treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural
+phenomena following nature's general laws.  They appear to
+conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a
+kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
+nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,
+and that he is determined solely by himself.  They attribute
+human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in
+general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which
+accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,
+abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human
+mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked
+upon as a seer.  Still there has been no lack of very excellent
+men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),
+who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way
+of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind.  But no one,
+so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the
+emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their
+restraint.
+
+I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he
+believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,
+strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at
+the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain
+to absolute dominion over them.  However, in my opinion, he
+accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own
+great intellect, as I will show in the proper place.  For the
+present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or
+deride human emotions than understand them.  Such persons will,
+doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of
+human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth
+with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as
+repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.  However,
+such is my plan.  Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be
+set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and
+everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action;
+that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to
+pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and
+always the same; so that there should be one and the same method
+of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,
+through nature's universal laws and rules.  Thus the passions of
+hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow
+from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to
+certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and
+possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the
+properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself
+affords us delight.  I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and
+strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I
+employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the
+mind.  I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the
+same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and
+solids.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS
+
+I.  By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect
+can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  By an inadequate or
+partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its
+effect cannot be understood.
+
+II.  I say that we act when anything takes place, either within
+us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that
+is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature
+something takes place within us or externally to us, which can
+through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.
+On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something
+when that something takes place within us, or follows from our
+nature externally, we being only the partial cause.
+
+III.  By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby
+the active power of the said body is increased or diminished,
+aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.
+
+N.B.  If we can be the adequate cause of any of these
+modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I
+call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.
+
+
+POSTULATES
+
+I.  The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its
+power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other
+ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or
+less.
+
+N.B.  This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and
+Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.
+
+II.  The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,
+retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.),
+and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II.
+xvii.).
+
+PROP. I.  Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain
+cases passive.  In so far as it has adequate ideas it is
+necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it
+is necessarily passive.
+
+Proof.--In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and
+some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note).
+Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in
+God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.
+Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise
+(by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he
+contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as
+he, at the same time, contains the minds of other things.  Again,
+from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36);
+of this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not
+inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as
+affected by the given idea (II. ix.).  But of that effect whereof
+God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is
+adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in
+question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.).  Therefore our
+mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in
+certain cases necessarily active; this was our first point.
+Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is
+adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the
+mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together
+with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of
+such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not
+an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the
+mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases
+necessarily passive; this was our second point.  Therefore our
+mind, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind is more or less
+liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate
+ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as
+it possesses adequate ideas.
+
+PROP. II.  Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind
+determine body to motion or rest or any state different from
+these, if such there be.
+
+Proof.--All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by
+virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his
+being displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.).  That,
+therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of
+thought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.), it
+is not body.  This was our first point.  Again, the motion and
+rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been
+determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and
+absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring
+from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of
+extension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.); that is,
+it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought.  This
+was our second point.  Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
+II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing,
+conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under
+the attribute of extension.  Thus it follows that the order or
+concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived
+under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of
+states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in
+nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the
+mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we
+proved II. xii.
+
+Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no
+further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is
+proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the
+question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it
+is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in
+motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending
+solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought.  However,
+no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the
+body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what
+the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far
+as she is regarded as extension.  No one hitherto has gained such
+an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can
+explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact
+that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far
+transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things
+in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake:
+these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole
+laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.
+
+Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the
+body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the
+body, nor how quickly it can move it.  Thus, when men say that
+this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which
+latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without
+meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are
+ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at
+it.
+
+But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means
+whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate,
+experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit
+state to think, the body remains inert.  Moreover, we have
+experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or
+are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly,
+we say depend on the mind's decree.  But, as to the first point,
+I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach,
+that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted
+for thinking?  For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind
+simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of
+thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake.  Again, I
+think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the
+mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given
+subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for
+being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is
+the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.
+
+But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the
+laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be
+able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of
+that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the
+human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be
+capable of building a single temple.  However, I have just
+pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the
+body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration
+of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things
+being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would
+never have believed possible except under the direction of mind:
+such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and
+wondered at by their performers when awake.  I would further call
+attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses
+in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to
+repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under
+whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow.
+As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be
+much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they
+are to speak.  Experience abundantly shows that men can govern
+anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything
+more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many
+believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we
+moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be
+controlled by the thought of something else frequently
+remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what
+we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be
+allayed with the remembrance of anything else.  However, unless
+such persons had proved by experience that we do many things
+which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when
+assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the
+worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we
+are free in all things.  Thus an infant believes that of its own
+free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely
+desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires
+to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from
+the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he
+would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a
+garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe
+that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they
+are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk.
+Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men
+believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious
+of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those
+actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the
+dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and
+therefore vary according to the varying state of the body.
+Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who
+are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;
+those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this
+way or that.  All these considerations clearly show that a mental
+decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are
+simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call
+decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the
+attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is
+regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the
+laws of motion and rest.  This will appear yet more plainly in
+the sequel.  For the present I wish to call attention to another
+point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind,
+unless we have a remembrance of having done so.  For instance, we
+cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so.
+Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or
+forget a thing at will.  Therefore the freedom of the mind must
+in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering
+something which it remembers.  But when we dream that we speak,
+we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we
+do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the
+body.  Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we
+seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby
+we keep silence when awake concerning something we know.  Lastly,
+we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something,
+which we should not dare to do when awake.
+
+Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two
+sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?
+If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must
+necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is
+believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination
+or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an
+idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II.
+xlix.).  Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind
+by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.
+Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or
+act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream
+with their eyes open.
+
+PROP. III.  The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate
+ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on
+inadequate ideas.
+
+Proof.--The first element, which constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent
+body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many
+other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II.
+xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.).  Whatsoever therefore
+follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate
+cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily
+follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea.  But
+in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is
+necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow
+solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only
+passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to
+the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving
+negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,
+which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself
+without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are
+attributed to individual things in the same way that they are
+attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be
+perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.
+
+PROP. IV.  Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external
+to itself.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the definition
+of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not
+negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the
+thing, but does not take it away.  So long therefore as we regard
+only the thing itself, without taking into account external
+causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could
+destroy it.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in
+the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the
+other.
+
+Proof.--If they could agree together or co--exist in the same
+object, there would then be in the said object something which
+could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is
+absurd, therefore things, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours
+to persist in its own being.
+
+Proof.--Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of
+God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.);
+that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given
+determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts;
+now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be
+destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but
+contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its
+existence (III. v.).  Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so
+far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own
+being.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VII.  The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence
+of the thing in question.
+
+Proof.--From the given essence of any thing certain
+consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any
+power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as
+determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,
+or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it
+acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or
+endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,
+is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in
+question.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist
+in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite
+time.
+
+Proof.--If it involved a limited time, which should determine
+the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that
+power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist
+beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed;
+but this (III. iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore the endeavour wherewith
+a thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise,
+since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already
+exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some
+external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.
+
+PROP. IX.  The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct
+ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to
+persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this
+endeavour it is conscious.
+
+Proof.--The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and
+inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so
+far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the
+latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for
+an indefinite time (III. viii.).  Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is
+necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the
+modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)
+conscious of its own endeavour.
+
+Note.--This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is
+called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it
+is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's
+essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those
+results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus
+been determined to perform.
+
+Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference,
+except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so
+far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly
+be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.
+It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we
+strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we
+deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be
+good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or
+desire it.
+
+PROP. X.  An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,
+cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated
+therein (III. v.).  Therefore neither can the idea of such a
+thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II.
+ix. Coroll.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing
+cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.
+xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it
+follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the
+endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea,
+which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our
+mind, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XI.  Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders
+the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or
+diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II.
+xiv.
+
+Note.--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,
+and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection,
+sometimes to a state of lesser perfection.  These passive states
+of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.
+By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall
+signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater
+perfection.  By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the
+mind passes to a lesser perfection.  Further, the emotion of
+pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call
+stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of
+pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.
+But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are
+attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected
+than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike
+affected.  What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to
+Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other
+primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other
+emotions arise from these three.  But, before I go further, I
+should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this
+part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is
+contrary to another.  In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the
+idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the
+existence of body, so long as the body itself exists.  Again, it
+follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii.,
+that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the
+fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.
+Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of
+the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends
+on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.
+Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its
+power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to
+affirm the present existence of the body.  Now the cause, why the
+mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the
+mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases
+to exist.  For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the
+existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;
+therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the
+existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but
+(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes
+the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,
+and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the
+essence of our mind.
+
+PROP. XII.  The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive
+those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the
+body.
+
+Proof.--So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and
+consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an
+external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,
+the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature
+of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives
+things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,
+the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of
+activity (III. Post. i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind's
+power of thinking is for that period increased or helped.  Thus
+(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine
+such things.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  When the mind conceives things which diminish or
+hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as
+possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the
+first--named things.
+
+Proof.--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind
+alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or
+constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue
+to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which
+excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as
+I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is
+diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something
+else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived:
+therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour
+to conceive or remember the latter.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from
+conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of
+itself and of the body.
+
+Note.--From what has been said we may clearly understand the
+nature of Love and Hate.  Love is nothing else but pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing
+else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  We
+further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,
+and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who
+hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.
+But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.
+
+PROP. XIV.  If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at
+the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one
+of these two, be also affected by the other.
+
+Proof.--If the human body has once been affected by two bodies
+at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it
+will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.).  But the
+mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than
+the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore,
+if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been
+once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever
+it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by
+the other.
+
+PROP. XV.  Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,
+pain, or desire.
+
+Proof.--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously
+affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor
+diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either
+increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.).  From the
+foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is
+afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which
+(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of
+action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which
+does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.
+xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain.  Thus the
+former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but
+accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.  In the same way
+also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the
+cause of desire.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing
+with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate
+it.
+
+Proof.--For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that
+the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with
+the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),
+according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or
+diminished, &c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the
+mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.
+Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may
+love or hate the same.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or
+hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
+merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy.  We should
+refer to the same category those objects, which affect us
+pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other
+objects which affect us in the same way.  This I will show in the
+next Prop.  I am aware that certain authors, who were the first
+to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to
+signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I
+think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known
+or manifest qualities.
+
+PROP. XVI.  Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given
+object has some point of resemblance with another object which is
+wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the
+point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said
+emotions, we shall still regard the first--named object with love
+or hate.
+
+Proof.--The point of resemblance was in the object (by
+hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus
+(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it
+will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and
+consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point
+of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of
+pleasure or pain.  Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although
+the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the
+first--named object with love or hate.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect
+us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing
+which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of
+pleasure, we shall hate the first--named thing, and at the same
+time we shall love it.
+
+Proof.--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause
+of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with
+this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive
+that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is
+wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we
+shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it
+(III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two
+contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the
+emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination
+(II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from
+the other, except as greater differs from less.  But we must bear
+in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which
+give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the
+other accidentally.  I have done this, in order that they might
+be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny
+that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an
+object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions.  The human
+body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts
+of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.
+after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by
+one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same
+thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different
+ways affect one and the same part of the body.  Hence we can
+easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of
+many and conflicting emotions.
+
+PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully
+by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing
+present.
+
+Proof.--So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,
+he will regard that thing as present, even though it be
+non--existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as
+past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the
+image of time past or future (II. xliv. note).  Wherefore the
+image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether
+it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that
+is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is
+identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or
+present.  Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,
+whether the image be of a thing past or future.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either
+have been or shall be affected thereby.  For instance, according
+as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has
+recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,
+or will harm us.  For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its
+existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which
+excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)
+the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way
+as if the thing were actually present.  However, as it generally
+happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so
+long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in
+doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the
+emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so
+constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other
+things, until men become assured of the issue.
+
+Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what is
+meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and
+Disappointment.[5]  Hope is nothing else but an inconstant
+pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,
+whereof we do not yet know the issue.  Fear, on the other hand,
+is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something
+concerning which we are in doubt.  If the element of doubt be
+removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear
+becomes Despair.  In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from
+the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.
+Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past
+whereof we have doubted the issue.  Disappointment is the Pain
+opposed to Joy.
+
+[5] Conscientiæ morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
+
+PROP. XIX.  He who conceives that the object of his love is
+destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved
+he will feel pleasure.
+
+Proof.--The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive
+those things which increase or help the body's power of activity
+(III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which
+it loves.  But conception is helped by those things which
+postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered
+by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);
+therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of
+an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the
+object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind
+pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the
+existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental
+endeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully.  He,
+therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
+will feel pain, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  He who conceives that the object of his hate is
+destroyed will also feel pleasure.
+
+Proof.--The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those
+things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's
+power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III.
+xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the
+existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing,
+which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the
+aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects
+the mind pleasurably.  Thus he who conceives that the object of
+his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXI.  He who conceives, that the object of his love is
+affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected
+pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will
+be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or
+less in the thing loved.
+
+Proof.--The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which
+postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's
+endeavour to conceive the said object.  But pleasure postulates
+the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in
+proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is
+(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore
+the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental
+endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover
+pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion
+may have been greater in the object of love.  This was our first
+point.  Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it
+is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to
+the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who
+conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,
+will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said
+emotion is greater or less in the object of love.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects
+some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards
+that thing.  Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an
+object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred
+towards it.
+
+Proof.--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of
+our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we
+conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or
+pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come
+to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore
+(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object
+of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with
+love or hatred towards him.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we
+may define as pain arising from another's hurt.  What term we can
+use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.
+
+We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on
+another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures
+another, we will call Indignation.  We must further remark, that
+we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown
+in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto
+regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles
+ourselves (as I will show presently).  Thus, we bestow approval
+on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,
+contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
+painfully affected, will feel pleasure.  Contrariwise, if he
+thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel
+pain.  Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according
+as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.
+
+Proof.--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully
+affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the
+strength of the pain (III. xi. note).  Therefore, he (III. xx.)
+who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully
+affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the
+amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred.  This
+was our first point.  Again, pleasure postulates the existence of
+the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as
+the pleasure is greater or less.  If anyone imagines that an
+object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception
+(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other
+words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and
+without any mental conflict.  For (as I am about to show in Prop.
+xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to
+himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like
+manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary
+circumstances.  But here we are regarding hatred only.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an
+object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also.  If we
+conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall
+feel love towards him.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xxii., which see.
+
+Note.--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
+to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so
+far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's
+hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.
+
+PROP. XXV.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
+concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to
+affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.  Contrariwise,
+we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
+painfully ourselves or the loved object.
+
+Proof.--That, which we conceive to affect an object of our
+love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or
+painfully (III. xxi.).  But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
+far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
+pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it
+endeavours to regard them as present.  And, contrariwise (III.
+xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as
+affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
+concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
+we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
+hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
+contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
+which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
+
+Proof.--This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the
+foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.
+
+Note.--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may
+easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,
+contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object.  This feeling is
+called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of
+himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with
+his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that
+fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting
+them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to
+conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines
+his own power of action.  Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing
+from a man thinking too highly of himself.  Again, the pleasure
+which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called
+over--esteem.  Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too
+little of a man is called disdain.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is
+like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,
+to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a
+like emotion (affectus).
+
+Proof.--The images of things are modifications of the human
+body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to
+us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas
+involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature
+of the external bodies as present.  If, therefore, the nature of
+the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the
+idea which we form of the external body will involve a
+modification of our own body similar to the modification of the
+external body.  Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to
+ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will
+express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.
+Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be
+affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
+emotion.  If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we
+shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not
+similar, emotion.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note I.--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to
+pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is
+referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else
+but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we
+conceive that others have the like desire.
+
+Corollary I.--If we conceive that anyone, whom we have
+hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something
+similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
+If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the
+same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
+
+Proof.--This is proved from the last proposition in the same
+manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.
+
+Corollary II.--We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
+its misery affects us painfully.
+
+Proof.--If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice
+in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
+
+Corollary III.--We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,
+a thing which we pity.
+
+Proof.--That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,
+affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);
+therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which
+removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in
+other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we
+shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall
+endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note II.--This will or appetite for doing good, which arises
+from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is
+called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from
+compassion.  Concerning love or hate towards him who has done
+good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like
+ourselves, see III. xxii. note.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
+to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
+whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
+conduce to pain.
+
+Proof.--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that
+which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other
+words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as
+possible as present or actually existing.  But the endeavour of
+the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
+simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power
+of action.  (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.
+Coroll.).  Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
+existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the
+same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first
+point.  Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed
+to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
+hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.).  We shall,
+therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy
+the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may
+not regard it as present; this was our second point.  Wherefore
+whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
+men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
+from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
+
+[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
+whom we regard without any particular emotion.
+
+
+Proof.--From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate
+anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).
+That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel
+pleasure or pain at the thing's presence.  And so we shall
+endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with
+pleasure, etc.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
+in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
+eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit
+certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it
+is generally called kindliness.  Furthermore I give the name of
+praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of
+another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame
+to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.
+
+PROP. XXX.  If anyone has done something which he conceives as
+affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
+accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he
+will regard himself with pleasure.  On the other hand, if he has
+done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
+he will regard himself with pain.
+
+Proof.--He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure
+or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with
+pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and
+xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby
+he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,
+that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other
+words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  And so mutatis
+mutandis in the case of pain.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question
+will be a species of love and hatred.  But, as the terms love and
+hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ
+other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause[7] we will style
+Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I
+mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's
+belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause[8] is called
+self--complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance.
+Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,
+wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist
+solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone
+endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives
+will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a
+vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,
+when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.
+
+[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
+"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.
+
+[8] See previous endnote.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates
+anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
+thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,
+&c.  On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from
+something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.
+
+Proof.--From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves
+anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): but
+we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new
+cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we
+shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.  Again, from the mere
+fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall
+ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).  If we assume
+that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously
+love it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subject
+to vacillation (III. xvii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it
+follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause
+others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself
+hates: as the poet says:  "As lovers let us share every hope
+and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the
+other leaves."[9]
+
+[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.
+
+"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
+
+  Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."
+
+
+Note.--This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes
+and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really
+ambition (see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone
+by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should
+live according to his own individual disposition: when such a
+desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone
+else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all
+become mutually hateful.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  If we conceive that anyone takes delight in
+something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour
+to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain
+possession thereof.
+
+Proof.--From the mere fact of our conceiving that another
+person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we
+shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight
+therein.  But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be
+prevented by another's delight in its object; we shall,
+therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.
+xxviii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We thus see that man's nature is generally so
+constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies
+those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his
+own love for the goods in their possession.  Further, we see that
+from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that
+men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and
+ambitious.  Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall
+find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more
+especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our
+life.  We find that children, whose body is continually, as it
+were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others
+laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate
+whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of
+whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the
+images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human
+body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by
+external causes to act in this or that manner.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  When we love a thing similar to ourselves we
+endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love
+us in return.
+
+Proof.--That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to
+conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.).  If the
+thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it
+pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.).  In
+other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it
+about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),
+that it should love us in return.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  The greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our
+complacency.
+
+Proof.--We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to
+bring about, that what we love should love us in return: in
+other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause.  Therefore, in
+proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected
+because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.--that is (III. xi.
+and note) the greater will be our pleasure.  But when we take
+pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something
+similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30);
+therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  If anyone conceives, that an object of his love
+joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he
+himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards
+the loved object and with envy towards his rival.
+
+Proof.--In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is
+well affected towards him, will be the strength of his
+self--approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of
+his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as
+far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound
+to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks
+that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).  But this
+endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the
+loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved
+object has joined to itself; therefore (III. xi. note) he will
+for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of
+the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his
+rival; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred
+towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.
+Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved
+object.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy
+is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a
+wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and
+hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.
+Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,
+in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont
+to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and
+also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained
+towards his rival.  If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate
+the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably
+affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is
+compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image
+of him whom he hates.  This condition generally comes into play
+in the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman
+whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not
+only because his own desire is restrained, but also because,
+being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the
+parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks
+from her.
+
+We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved
+with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives
+him pain as a lover, as I will now show.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  He who remembers a thing, in which he has once
+taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances
+as when he first took delight therein.
+
+Proof.--Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with
+the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of
+pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it,
+in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other
+words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the
+same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the
+aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.
+
+Proof.--For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be
+missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.  As
+he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or
+circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he
+conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence
+of the object of love, is called Regret.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or
+love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
+
+Proof.--Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of
+activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes
+or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in
+his own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said
+endeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are
+directed to removing that pain.  But (by the definition of pain),
+in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily
+opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity; therefore
+the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed
+to remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire or
+appetite in endeavouring to remove it.  Again, since pleasure
+(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it
+may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by
+pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his
+desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.
+
+Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain
+and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,
+appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be
+greater in proportion to the hatred or love.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,
+so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being
+equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,
+and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his
+former love.
+
+Proof.--If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more
+of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never
+loved it.  For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man
+endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);
+he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by
+affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is
+greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the
+endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his
+affection (III. xxxiii.).  Now these endeavours are constrained
+by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.
+xxiii.); wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause
+also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love
+has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by
+hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the
+object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater
+pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never
+loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former
+love was greater.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
+injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
+to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the
+same law, seek to benefit him.
+
+Proof.--To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as
+a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to
+remove or destroy him.  But if anything more painful, or, in
+other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater
+thereby--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not
+carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of
+his hate--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury
+(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)
+will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will
+therefore prevail over it, as we asserted.  The second part of
+this proof proceeds in the same manner.  Wherefore he who hates
+another, etc.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all
+that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our
+longings, whatsoever they may be.  By evil, I mean every kind of
+pain, especially that which frustrates our longings.  For I have
+shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because
+we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because
+we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink
+from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,
+judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,
+what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst.  Thus a
+miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of
+money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as
+glory, and fears nothing so much as shame.  To an envious man
+nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing
+more painful than another's success.  So every man, according to
+his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or
+useless.  The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that
+which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is
+called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear
+whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
+future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.).  But if the
+evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.
+Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the
+fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,
+fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared
+be very great.
+
+PROP. XL.  He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
+believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate
+that other in return.
+
+Proof.--He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will
+thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  But, by
+the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him
+who is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by
+some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea
+of his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred
+will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case
+(III. xxv.) rarely happens.  This reciprocation of hatred may
+also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure
+the object of our hate (III. xxxix.).  He therefore who conceives
+that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause
+of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or
+fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other
+words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I
+said above.
+
+Corollary I.--He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates
+him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  For, in so
+far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is
+determined to hate his enemy in return.  But, by the hypothesis,
+he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to
+conflicting hatred and love.
+
+Corollary II.--If a man conceives that one, whom he has
+hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from
+motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in
+kind.
+
+Proof.--He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the
+last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will
+endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;
+he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).
+Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury
+done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to
+repay it in kind.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called
+Anger; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves
+is called Revenge.
+
+PROP. XLI.  If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and
+believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love
+that other in return.  (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)
+
+Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as the
+preceding one.  See also the note appended thereto.
+
+Note.--If he believes that he has given just cause for the
+love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is
+what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its
+contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated
+by another.  (See note to preceding proposition.)  This
+reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him
+who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is
+called gratitude or thankfulness.  It thus appears that men are
+much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.
+
+Corollary.--He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he
+hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  This is
+proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding
+proposition.
+
+Note.--If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour
+to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty,
+especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary
+cause for hatred.
+
+PROP. XLII.  He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from
+motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the
+benefit is received without gratitude.
+
+Proof.--When a man loves something similar to himself, he
+endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be
+loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.).  Therefore he who has
+conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which
+he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from
+the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will
+endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or
+to regard it as actually existing.  But, by the hypothesis, he
+conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the
+said cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.
+xix.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can
+on the other hand be destroyed by love.
+
+Proof.--He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates
+him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former
+hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.).  But if, on the
+other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he
+will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,
+and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his
+emotion.  In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.
+xli.), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III.
+xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion
+from which it arises.  Therefore, if it be greater than that
+which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to
+affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better
+of it and banish the hatred from his mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
+into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not
+preceded it.
+
+Proof.--The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.
+of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was
+wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving
+feels pleasure.  To this pleasure involved in love is added the
+pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the
+pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea
+of the former object of hatred as cause.
+
+Note.--Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate
+anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying
+this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he
+should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor
+long to be ill for the sake of getting well.  For everyone will
+always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as
+far as he can.  If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a
+man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love
+him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him.  For
+the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the
+hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be
+continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,
+he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he
+might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in
+such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)
+is absurd.
+
+PROP. XLV.  If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself
+hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will
+hate that person.
+
+Proof.--The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him
+who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that
+anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as
+affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain;
+consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the
+idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he
+will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III.
+xiii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLVI.  If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully
+by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if
+the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said
+stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or
+nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the
+individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation
+whereto he belongs.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from III. xvi.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is
+destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a
+certain pain in us.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from III. xxvii.  For in so far as we
+conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,
+we ourselves feel pain.
+
+Note.--This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary
+to II. xvii.  Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not
+actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is
+affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the
+remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard
+it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing
+in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other
+things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not
+destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the
+said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising
+from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we
+remember that object of hatred.  For, as we have said, when the
+image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it
+involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard
+the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it
+actually did exist.  However, since he has joined to the image of
+the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this
+determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices
+afresh as often as the repetition takes place.  This is the cause
+of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in
+narrating dangers from which they have escaped.  For when men
+conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are
+determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by
+the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the
+danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure
+afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is
+destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain
+involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of
+another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we
+conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.
+
+Proof.--This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love
+and hatred (III. xiii. note).  For pleasure is called love
+towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in
+so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the
+other.  When this condition of causality is either wholly or
+partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part
+vanishes.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to
+be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if
+it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.
+
+Proof.--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)
+be perceived through itself without anything else.  If,
+therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we
+shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall
+do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the
+given emotion.  But if the thing which causes the emotion be
+conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.
+vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of
+the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred
+towards it will be less.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be
+free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards
+anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation
+of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.
+
+PROP. L.  Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
+or fear.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.
+
+Note.--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or
+fear are called good or evil omens.  Now, in so far as such omens
+are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of
+hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of
+pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them
+with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means
+towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles,
+or causes of that which we fear.  It follows, further, from III.
+xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily
+in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we
+fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or
+below their true value.  Hence there have arisen superstitions,
+whereby men are everywhere assailed.  However, I do not think it
+worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from
+hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions,
+that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope,
+as I will duly explain in the proper place.  Further, in so far
+as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred;
+thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we
+have said concerning love and hatred.
+
+PROP. LI.  Different men may be differently affected by the same
+object, and the same man may be differently affected at different
+times by the same object.
+
+Proof.--The human body is affected by external bodies in a
+variety of ways (II. Post. iii.).  Two men may therefore be
+differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.
+after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by
+one and the same object.  Further (by the same Post.) the human
+body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;
+consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected
+at different times by one and the same object.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We thus see that it is possible, that what one man
+loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may
+not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he
+once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.
+Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,
+what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it
+follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their
+emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we
+distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and
+style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.
+For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil
+which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into
+consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to
+benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of
+an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him
+daring.  Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an
+evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take
+into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of
+an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that
+he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.
+
+[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
+intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
+
+
+Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human
+judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his
+emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause
+pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,
+are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of
+things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that
+a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.  Thus we
+can easily understand what are Repentance and Self--complacency.
+Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as
+cause; Self--complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because
+men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).
+
+PROP. LII.  An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction
+with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property
+that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so
+long, as an object which we conceive to have some property
+peculiar to itself.
+
+Proof.--As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in
+conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.
+xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the
+contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another
+object.  And this is the case with the object, which we conceive
+to have no property that is not common to many.  For we thereupon
+assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not
+before seen in conjunction with other objects.  But when we
+suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we
+have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while
+regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to
+regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the
+contemplation of that object only.  Therefore an object, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This mental modification, or imagination of a
+particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called
+Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
+Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed
+in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to
+think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil.  If,
+however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or
+anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby
+regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;
+otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at,
+the emotion is called Horror.  Again, if it be the prudence,
+industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our
+love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when
+joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion.  We may in
+like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other
+emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able
+to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in
+ordinary speech.  Whence it is evident, that the names of the
+emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their
+ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their
+nature.
+
+To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from
+the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or
+fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears
+to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c.,
+we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),
+determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing.  But if from
+the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,
+we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause
+of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the
+thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities
+which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on
+the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more
+particularly to regard that which is therein.  As devotion
+springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision
+spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn
+from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.
+Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,
+in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other
+emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any
+recognized name.
+
+PROP. LIII.  When the mind regards itself and its own power of
+activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in
+proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and
+its own power of activity.
+
+Proof.--A man does not know himself except through the
+modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and
+xxiii.).  When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate
+itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or
+(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be
+greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able
+to conceive itself and its own power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--This pleasure is fostered more and more, in
+proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.
+For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more
+he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by
+the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)
+himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea
+of himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
+assert its power of activity.
+
+Proof.--The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual
+essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind
+obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not
+that which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind
+endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its
+power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LV.  When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
+pain thereat.
+
+Proof.--The essence of the mind only affirms that which the
+mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to
+conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last
+Prop.).  Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own
+weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting
+to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is
+checked in its endeavour----in other words (III. xi. note), it
+feels pain.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--This pain is more and more fostered, if a man
+conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the
+same way as the corollary to III. liii.
+
+Note.--This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,
+is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the
+contemplation of ourselves, is called self--love or
+self--complacency.  And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as
+often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of
+activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own
+exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and
+also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.
+Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.
+note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of
+their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues.  For whenever a
+man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.
+liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and
+he conceives them more distinctly--that is (II. xl. note), in
+proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard
+them as something special.  Therefore, a man will take most
+pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some
+quality which he denies to others.  But, if that which he affirms
+of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in
+general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the
+contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall
+short when compared with those of others.  This pain (III.
+xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
+construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he
+can, embellishing his own.
+
+It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred
+and envy, which latter is fostered by their education.  For
+parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely
+by the spur of honour and envy.  But, perhaps, some will scruple
+to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's
+virtues, and venerate their possessors.  In order to remove such
+doubts, I append the following corollary.
+
+Corollary.--No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his
+equal.
+
+Proof.--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.
+xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby
+a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is
+checked.  But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,
+which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a
+man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the
+same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to
+another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot
+be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue
+in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an
+one.  But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same
+nature as himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,
+we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,
+&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar
+to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more
+envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions
+for being courageous.
+
+PROP. LVI.  There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of
+desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as
+vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,
+hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we
+are affected.
+
+Proof.--Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions
+compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or
+passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive
+(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so
+far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is,
+we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we
+conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by
+an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the
+nature of an external body.  Wherefore the nature of every
+passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature
+of the object whereby we are affected be expressed.  Namely, the
+pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the
+nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the
+object B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore these
+two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the
+causes whence they arise are by nature different.  So again the
+emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature
+different from the pain arising from another object, and,
+similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,
+&c.
+
+Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,
+love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are
+affected.  Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any
+given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore,
+according as a man is affected through external causes by this or
+that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words,
+according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so
+will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one
+desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,
+as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.
+Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of
+pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown)
+there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects
+whereby we are affected.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last
+proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,
+drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of
+love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a
+manner varying according to the object, with which they are
+concerned.  For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,
+&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,
+venery, riches, and fame.  Furthermore, these emotions, in so far
+as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects
+wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries.  For
+temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose
+to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive
+states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the
+last--named emotions.  However, I cannot here explain the
+remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as
+the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary.
+It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the
+strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have
+a general definition of each emotion.  It is sufficient, I
+repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and
+the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the
+mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions.  Thus,
+though there is a great difference between various emotions of
+love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards
+children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us
+to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further
+the nature and origin of the emotions.
+
+PROP. LVII.  Any emotion of a given individual differs from the
+emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of
+the one individual differs from the essence of the other.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see
+after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.).  Nevertheless, we will
+prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.
+
+All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,
+as their definitions above given show.  But desire is each man's
+nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one
+individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature
+or essence of the other.  Again, pleasure and pain are passive
+states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to
+persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or
+hindered (III. xi. and note).  But by the endeavour to persist in
+its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in
+conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note);
+therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or
+appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every
+man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man
+differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the
+essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one
+individual only differs, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals
+which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of
+mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's
+emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human
+nature.  Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of
+procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire
+of the latter is human.  So also the lusts and appetites of
+insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the
+several natures.  Thus, although each individual lives content
+and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his
+being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is
+nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and
+hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of
+another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the
+essence of another.  Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
+proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
+which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
+philosopher, as I just mention here by the way.  Thus far I have
+treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is
+passive.  It remains to add a few words on those attributable to
+him in so far as he is active.
+
+PROP. LVIII.  Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities
+or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
+desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
+
+Proof.--When the mind conceives itself and its power of
+activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind
+necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or
+adequate idea (II. xliii.).  But the mind does conceive certain
+adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.).  Therefore it feels pleasure in
+so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it
+is active (III. i.).  Again, the mind, both in so far as it has
+clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,
+endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such
+an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);
+therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we
+understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LIX.  Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
+active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or
+desire.
+
+Proof.--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or
+pain, as their definitions, already given, show.  Now by pain we
+mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked
+(III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels
+pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is
+diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions
+can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but
+only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
+are attributable to the mind in that condition.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--All actions following from emotion, which are
+attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set
+down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into
+courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas).  By
+courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve
+his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.
+By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,
+solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to
+unite them to himself in friendship.  Those actions, therefore,
+which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to
+courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to
+highmindedness.  Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind
+in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c.,
+are varieties of highmindedness.
+
+I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their
+primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,
+which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,
+to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain.  It is evident from what I
+have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external
+causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds
+we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate.  But I
+have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting
+emotions, not all that might be given.  For, by proceeding in the
+same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to
+repentance, scorn, shame, &c.  I think everyone will agree from
+what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with
+another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise
+therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation.  However,
+for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most
+important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be
+more curious than profitable.  It remains to remark concerning
+love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a
+thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,
+acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another
+way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
+begins to conceive and desire something fresh.  For example, when
+we conceive something which generally delights us with its
+flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it.  But whilst we
+are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is
+otherwise disposed.  If, therefore, when the body is thus
+otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be
+stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be
+stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel
+repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the
+presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become
+odious.  This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or
+weariness.  For the rest, I have neglected the outward
+modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for
+instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these
+are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the
+mind.  Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be
+supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them,
+interpolating such observations as I think should here and there
+be added.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+I.  Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given
+modification of itself.
+
+Explanation.--We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of
+this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof;
+further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is
+determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
+persistence.  But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
+strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
+and desire.  For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or
+not, it remains one and the same appetite.  Thus, in order to
+avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
+explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it
+in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those
+endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms
+appetite, will, desire, or impulse.  I might, indeed, have said,
+that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived
+as determined to a particular activity; but from such a
+definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can
+be conscious of its desire or appetite.  Therefore, in order to
+imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,
+in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c.
+For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every
+disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be
+innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of
+thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,
+lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.
+By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours,
+impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each
+man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to
+another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and
+knows not where to turn.
+
+II.  Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
+perfection.
+
+III.  Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
+perfection.
+
+Explanation--I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection
+itself.  For, if man were born with the perfection to which he
+passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of
+pleasure.  This appears more clearly from the consideration of
+the contrary emotion, pain.  No one can deny, that pain consists
+in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less
+perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he
+partakes of perfection of any degree.  Neither can we say, that
+pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection.  For
+absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;
+wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition
+from a greater to a less perfection--in other words, it is an
+activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or
+constrained (cf. III. xi. note).  I pass over the definitions of
+merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these
+terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely
+kinds of pleasure or pain.
+
+IV.  Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
+the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in
+question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and
+note).
+
+Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,
+why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway
+falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the
+images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one
+follows the other.  This state of association is impossible, if
+the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand
+in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other
+causes to think of something else.
+
+Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is
+of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include
+wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include
+it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no
+positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but
+merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the
+mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the
+contemplation of another.
+
+I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary
+emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,
+pain, and desire.  I have spoken of wonder simply because it is
+customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three
+primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the
+objects of our wonder.  I am led by the same motive to add a
+definition of contempt.
+
+V.  Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
+so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those
+qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.
+III. lii. note).
+
+The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
+I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.
+
+VI.  Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+
+Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly the
+essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say
+that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
+object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
+as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
+they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
+properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
+to be very obscure.  It must, however, be noted, that when I say
+that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
+unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish
+consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I
+have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I
+mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is
+absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for
+love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by
+wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of
+the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the
+lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.
+
+VII.  Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+
+Explanation--These observations are easily grasped after what
+has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.
+also III. xiii. note).
+
+VIII.  Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
+
+IX.  Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which
+is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).
+
+X.  Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.
+
+Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.
+lii.) from the novelty of a thing.  If, therefore, it happens
+that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall
+cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion
+readily degenerates into simple love.
+
+XI.  Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
+presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we
+hate.
+
+Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we
+deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent
+rejoice (III. xx.).  But since we assume that man hates that
+which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not
+without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).
+
+XII.  Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue.
+
+XIII.  Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).
+
+Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that there is
+no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.
+For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of
+anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the
+existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this
+extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while
+dependent on hope, he fears for the issue.  Contrariwise he, who
+fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something
+which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the
+existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels
+pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will
+turn out as he desires (III. xx.).
+
+XIV.  Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something
+past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+
+XV.  Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or
+future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+
+Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair
+from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event
+has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives
+something past or future as present and regards it as such, or
+else because he conceives other things, which exclude the
+existence of the causes of his doubt.  For, although we can never
+be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.
+xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt
+concerning it.  For we have shown, that to feel no doubt
+concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it
+(II. xlix. note).  Thus it may happen that we are affected by the
+same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or
+future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I
+have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I
+refer the reader.
+
+XVI.  Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,
+which has had an issue beyond our hope.
+
+XVII.  Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of
+something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.
+
+XVIII.  Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has
+befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
+III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).
+
+Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there
+seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is
+used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in
+reference to a disposition.
+
+XIX.  Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
+
+XX.  Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to
+another.
+
+Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed in
+senses somewhat different from those usually assigned.  But my
+purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature
+of things.  I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my
+meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary
+signification.  One statement of my method will suffice. As for
+the cause of the above--named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,
+and III. xxii. note.
+
+XXI.  Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the
+love we bear him.
+
+XXII.  Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we
+hate him.
+
+Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and
+disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also
+be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+highly of a beloved object.  Contrariwise, disparagement may be
+defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+meanly of a hated object.  Cf. III. xxvi. note.
+
+XXIII.  Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be
+pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's
+evil fortune.
+
+Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by
+doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be
+thus defined:
+
+XXIV.  Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a
+man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at
+another's evil fortune.
+
+Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and
+xxxii.  These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain
+accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in
+itself or accidentally.  I now pass on to other emotions, which
+are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.
+
+XXV.  Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
+
+XXVI.  Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his
+own weakness of body or mind.
+
+Explanation--Self--complacency is opposed to humility, in so
+far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of
+our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe
+we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed
+to repentance, which we may thus define:
+
+XXVII.  Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some
+action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision
+of our mind.
+
+Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have set forth in
+III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.  Concerning
+the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.  This is
+perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
+nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
+called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are
+called right, are followed by pleasure.  We can easily gather
+from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on
+education.  Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,
+and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and
+also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought
+it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the
+latter with pleasure.  This is confirmed by experience.  For
+custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that
+which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some
+consider honourable others consider disgraceful.  According as
+each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given
+action or glories therein.
+
+XXVIII.  Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from
+self--love.
+
+Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality, for the
+latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride
+is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.  However, as
+partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or
+property of self--love, which may therefore be thus defined, love
+of self or self--approval, in so far as it leads a man to think
+too highly of himself.  To this emotion there is no contrary.
+For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred;
+I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he
+conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that.  For
+whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he
+imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,
+that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot
+do.  For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
+is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it
+impossible for him to do it.  However, if we consider such
+matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable
+that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen,
+that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should
+imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the
+world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him.  Again,
+a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in
+the present something in relation to a future time of which he is
+uncertain.  As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable
+to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do
+nothing but what is wicked and base, &c.  We may also say, that a
+man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive
+fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,
+venture.  We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an
+emotion which I will call self--abasement, for as from
+self--complacency springs pride, so from humility springs
+self--abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:
+
+XXIX.  Self--abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by
+reason of pain.
+
+Explanation--We are nevertheless generally accustomed to
+oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention
+to the effect of either emotion than to its nature.  We are wont
+to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who
+talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults,
+who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a
+style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station.  On
+the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who
+confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and
+who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.
+However, these emotions, humility and self--abasement, are
+extremely rare.  For human nature, considered in itself, strives
+against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence
+those, who are believed to be most self--abased and humble, are
+generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.
+
+XXX.  Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action
+of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
+
+[11] Gloria.
+
+XXXI.  Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of
+our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
+
+Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. xxx.  But we
+should here remark the difference which exists between shame and
+modesty.  Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are
+ashamed.  Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains
+a man from committing a base action.  Modesty is usually opposed
+to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will
+duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have
+remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to
+their nature.
+
+I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions
+arising from pleasure and pain.  I therefore proceed to treat of
+those which I refer to desire.
+
+XXXII.  Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,
+kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same
+time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude
+the existence of it.
+
+Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are by that very
+fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to
+contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something
+present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,
+is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the
+existence of that which we remember.  Thus when we remember
+something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that
+very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of
+pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once
+checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence
+of the thing in question.  Wherefore regret is, strictly
+speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from
+the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note).  But, as
+the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion
+down, among the emotions springing from desire.
+
+XXXIII.  Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us
+by our conception that others have the same desire.
+
+Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees others running
+away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again,
+he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws
+towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own
+were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another's
+emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of
+emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become
+customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that
+which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant.  As to the
+cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note.  The reason why
+this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.
+xxxii. and note.
+
+XXXIV.  Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing
+from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar
+feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.  Cf. III. xxxix.
+note and xl.
+
+XXXV.  Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.
+Cf. III. xxvii. note.
+
+XXXVI.  Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are
+induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.
+
+XXXVII.  Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through
+mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has
+injured us.  (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)
+
+XXXVIII.  Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is
+impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
+
+Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a
+passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his
+anger and revenge.
+
+XXXIX.  Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we
+dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.  Cf. III. xxxix. note.
+
+XL.  Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do
+something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
+
+XLI.  Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by
+the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
+
+Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the
+fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I
+do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.
+Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so
+far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion
+of daring.
+
+XLII.  Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of
+avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
+
+Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species of
+cowardice.  But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double
+fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a
+man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the
+evil.  I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of
+removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement.  I say
+wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be
+constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments
+him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may
+avert of the two.  On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and
+III. lii. note.  Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
+note.
+
+XLIII.  Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the
+desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining
+from that which should displease them.
+
+XLIV.  Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.
+
+Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions
+(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened;
+therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome.  For, so
+long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time
+necessarily bound by this.  "The best men," says Cicero, "are
+especially led by honour.  Even philosophers, when they write a
+book contemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.
+
+XLV.  Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living
+sumptuously.
+
+XLVI.  Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
+
+XLVII.  Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
+
+XLVIII.  Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual
+intercourse.
+
+Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is
+still called lust.  These last five emotions (as I have shown in
+III. lvi.) have on contraries.  For deference is a species of
+ambition.  Cf. III. xxix. note.
+
+Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,
+and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the
+mind.  It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an
+ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,
+drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear
+are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery.  For
+an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and
+drink at another man's expense.  An ambitious man will restrain
+himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are
+secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,
+from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those
+vices.  Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not.  For
+though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,
+cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain
+avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he
+cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,
+cease to be lustful.  In fact, these emotions are not so much
+concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the
+appetite and love of such.  Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to
+these emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I will
+speak presently.
+
+The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I
+pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the
+compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because
+many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is
+sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general
+knowledge of them.  However, it is established from the
+definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they
+all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there
+is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be
+called by a variety of names in accordance with its various
+relations and extrinsic tokens.  If we now direct our attention
+to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning
+the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the
+emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.
+
+
+GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+
+Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a
+confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or
+any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater
+or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is
+determined to think of one thing rather than another.
+
+Explanation--I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul
+is a confused idea.  For we have shown that the mind is only
+passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas.  (III.
+iii.)  I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its
+body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than
+before.  For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote
+rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll.
+ii.) than the nature of an external body.  But the idea which
+constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the
+disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its
+power of action or force for existence is increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered.  But it must be noted that, when
+I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not
+mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition
+of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of
+an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact,
+involves more or less of reality than before.
+
+And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.
+xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own
+body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very
+essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or
+less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own
+body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less
+reality than before.
+
+When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is
+increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed
+of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more
+or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its
+own body.  For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of
+thinking are measured by the excellence of the object.  Lastly, I
+have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to
+think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the
+nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the
+definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.
+
+
+
+
+PART IV:
+
+Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+
+Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I
+name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is
+not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much
+so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better
+for him, to follow that which is worse.  Why this is so, and what
+is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part
+of my treatise.  But, before I begin, it would be well to make a
+few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good
+and evil.
+
+When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has
+brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,
+not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks
+that he knows, the intention and aim of its author.  For
+instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not
+yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work
+is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will,
+on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is
+carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it.
+But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen
+before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he
+plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect.
+Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.
+
+But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out
+types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain
+types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that
+which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the
+thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree
+less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently
+been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.
+This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,
+which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or
+imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things
+natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they
+hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing
+without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types
+before herself.  Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,
+which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they
+have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has
+fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete.
+Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect
+or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true
+knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
+
+Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does
+not work with an end in view.  For the eternal and infinite
+Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as
+that whereby it exists.  For we have shown, that by the same
+necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.
+xvi.).  The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the
+reason why he acts, are one and the same.  Therefore, as he does
+not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the
+sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is
+neither origin nor end.  Wherefore, a cause which is called final
+is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered
+as the origin or cause of anything.  For example, when we say
+that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we
+mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of
+household life, had a desire to build a house.  Wherefore, the
+being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is
+nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the
+efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because
+men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.  They
+are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions
+and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are
+determined to any particular desire.  Therefore, the common
+saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and
+produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses
+treated of in the Appendix to Part I.  Perfection and
+imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or
+notions which we form from a comparison among one another of
+individuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def.
+vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.  For
+we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
+genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category
+of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.
+Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this
+category, and comparing them one with another, find that some
+possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,
+say that some are more perfect than others.  Again, in so far as
+we attribute to them anything implying negation--as term, end,
+infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
+they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call
+perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or
+because Nature has blundered.  For nothing lies within the scope
+of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity
+of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from
+the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily
+comes to pass.
+
+As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive
+quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of
+thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things
+one with another.  Thus one and the same thing can be at the same
+time good, bad, and indifferent.  For instance, music is good for
+him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is
+deaf, it is neither good nor bad.
+
+Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be
+retained.  For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
+type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful
+for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have
+indicated.
+
+In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
+certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the
+type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by
+"bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
+approaching the said type.  Again, we shall that men are more
+perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more
+or less nearly to the said type.  For it must be specially
+remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a
+greater perfection, or vice versâ, I do not mean that he is
+changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a
+horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a
+man, as by being changed into an insect.  What I mean is, that we
+conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is
+understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished.  Lastly,
+by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality--in
+other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and
+operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to
+its duration.  For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,
+because it has passed a longer time in existence.  The duration
+of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence
+of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence;
+but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will
+always be able to persist in existence with the same force
+wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all
+things are equal.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+I.  By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to
+us.
+
+II.  By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a
+hindrance
+to us in the attainment of any good.
+
+(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the
+end.)
+
+III.  Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while
+regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which
+necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.
+
+IV.  Particular things I call possible in so far as, while
+regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,
+whether such causes be determined for producing them.
+
+(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between
+possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need
+to distinguish them accurately.)
+
+V.  By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in
+different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as
+luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are
+contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
+
+VI.  What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,
+present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,
+which see.
+
+(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly
+conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit;
+that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred
+feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that
+which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance
+from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time
+of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer
+interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally
+distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the
+same moment of time.)
+
+VII.  By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a
+desire.
+
+VIII.  By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that
+is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a
+man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of
+effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
+
+
+AXIOM.
+
+
+There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is
+not another more powerful and strong.  Whatsoever thing be given,
+there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  No positive quality possessed by a false idea is
+removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being
+true.
+
+Proof.--Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge
+which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any
+positive quality on account of which they are called false (II.
+xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,
+they are true (II. xxxii.).  Wherefore, if the positive quality
+possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is
+true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be
+removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd.  Therefore, no
+positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition is more clearly understood from II.
+xvi. Coroll. ii.  For imagination is an idea, which indicates
+rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature
+of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly;
+whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err.  For
+instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant
+from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long
+as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true
+distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination;
+or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains
+tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected
+thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall
+still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us.  For, as we
+said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near
+us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the
+mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the
+body is affected thereby.  Thus, when the rays of the sun falling
+on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine
+the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its
+real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the
+mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition
+of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or
+diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at
+its presence.  It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an
+evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the
+contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will
+certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings;
+thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,
+in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,
+stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present
+existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.
+
+PROP. II.  We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of
+Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.
+
+Proof.--We are said to be passive, when something arises in
+us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is
+(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the
+laws of our nature.  We are passive therefore, in so far as we
+are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without
+other parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. III.  The force whereby a man persists in existing is
+limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external
+causes.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from the axiom of this part.  For,
+when man is given, there is something else--say A--more powerful;
+when A is given, there is something else--say B--more powerful than
+A, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by
+the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the
+power of external causes.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IV.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,
+save such as can be understood through his nature only as their
+adequate cause.
+
+Proof.--The power, whereby each particular thing, and
+consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of
+Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but
+in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence
+(III. vii.).  Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained
+through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power
+of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.
+xxxiv.).  This was our first point.  Again, if it were possible,
+that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood
+solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would
+not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this
+would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was
+either finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only,
+inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all
+changes which could spring from external causes; or of the
+infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be
+so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any
+changes save such as tended towards his own preservation.  But
+the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of
+which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).
+Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of
+undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
+through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as
+we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from
+the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the
+necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as
+affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature
+as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must
+be deducible.  It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is
+infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.  It
+is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any
+changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a
+prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order
+of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as
+the nature of things demands.
+
+PROP. V.  The power and increase of every passion, and its
+persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of
+an external cause compared with our own.
+
+Proof.--The essence of a passion cannot be explained through
+our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),
+the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in
+II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the
+rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes
+obstinately fixed to him.
+
+Proof.--The force and increase of any passion and its
+persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore
+(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man's power, &e.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VII.  An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by
+another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for
+controlling emotion.
+
+Proof.--Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is
+an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less
+force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the
+Emotions at the end of Part III.).  When, therefore, the mind is
+assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected
+with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or
+diminished.  Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives
+from its cause the force for persistence in its being; which
+force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.
+vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification
+contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.);
+wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a
+modification contrary to, and stronger than the former
+modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the
+emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
+stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy
+the existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be
+destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger
+emotion.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a
+modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that
+which we are undergoing.  For the emotion which we undergo can
+only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and
+stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition
+of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body
+contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we
+undergo.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but
+the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof.
+
+Proof.--We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or
+the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that
+is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or
+hinders, our power of activity.  Thus, in so far as we perceive
+that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or
+evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else
+but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows
+from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.).  But this
+idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united
+to body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction
+between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of
+the body, save in conception only.  Therefore the knowledge of
+good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we
+are conscious thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with
+us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive
+the cause to be with us.
+
+Proof.--Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the
+mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which
+indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of
+the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).  An emotion is
+therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition
+of the body.  But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so
+long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
+of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or
+more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the
+present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with
+us.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected
+by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as
+if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that
+this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the
+thing in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged,
+whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the
+image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other
+things which exclude the present existence of the future object:
+I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I
+purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of
+my work.
+
+Corollary.--The image of something past or future, that is, of
+a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time
+future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other
+conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present;
+consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is
+less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt
+towards something present.
+
+PROP. X.  Towards something future, which we conceive as close at
+hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that
+its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer
+interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have
+not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we
+conceive that it has long passed away.
+
+Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or
+not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the
+presence of the object less, than if its period of future
+existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long
+passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.)
+we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it
+follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a
+longer period than we can define in conception, though their
+dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they
+all affect us equally faintly.
+
+PROP. XI.  An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary
+is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion
+towards that which possible, or contingent, or non--necessary.
+
+Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,
+to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny
+a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be
+necessary (I. xxxiii. note. i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion
+towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal,
+more intense than an emotion that which is non--necessary.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XII.  An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is
+more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion
+towards a thing contingent.
+
+Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+affected by the conception of some further thing, which would
+assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the
+other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which
+exclude its present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive a
+thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things
+which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.),
+things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards
+something possible is more vehement.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.
+
+Proof.--Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,
+is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as
+future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the
+future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.
+x.).  Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of
+existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,
+nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as
+contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard
+as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the
+thing to be present with us.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know
+not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal,
+fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.
+
+Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the
+existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other
+hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its
+present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive it in relation
+to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls
+the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and
+note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II.
+xvii. Coroll.).  Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing
+contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is
+fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a
+thing past.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIV.  A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any
+emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is
+considered as an emotion.
+
+Proof.--An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its
+body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the
+general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no
+positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what
+is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by
+virtue of being true, restrain any emotion.  But, in so far as
+such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength
+for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to
+restrain the given emotion.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can
+be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from
+the emotions whereby we are assailed.
+
+Proof.--From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the
+Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the
+strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.).  But,
+inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of
+our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also
+present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must
+therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.);
+consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined
+solely by human power.  Again, the desires arising from the
+emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as
+the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and
+increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,
+which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it
+(IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be
+more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge
+of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,
+in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more
+easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is
+agreeable at the present moment.
+
+Proof.--Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,
+is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix.
+Coroll.).  But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of
+good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good
+at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong
+desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal
+application).  Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when
+concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or
+quenched, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and
+evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is
+contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire
+for things that are present.
+
+Proof.--This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop.
+from IV. xii. Coroll.
+
+Note.--I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved
+by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the
+true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul,
+and often yields to every kind of passion.  This state of things
+gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:[12]----
+"The better path I gaze at and approve,
+The worse--I follow."
+
+[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
+
+
+Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind,
+when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."  I
+have not written the above with the object of drawing the
+conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or
+that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his
+emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the
+infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can
+do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power.  I
+have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human
+infirmity.  The power of reason over the emotions I have settled
+to treat separately.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions
+being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.
+
+Proof.--Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions,
+i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist
+in his own being.  Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by
+the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the
+contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being
+felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising
+from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the
+power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must
+be defined by human power only.  Thus the former is the stronger
+of the two.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In these few remarks I have explained the causes of
+human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide
+by the precepts of reason.  It now remains for me to show what
+course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are
+in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are
+contrary thereto.  But, before I begin to prove my Propositions
+in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them
+briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my
+meaning.
+
+As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,
+that every man should love himself, should seek that which is
+useful to him--I mean, that which is really useful to him, should
+desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,
+and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to
+preserve his own being.  This is as necessarily true, as that a
+whole is greater than its part.  (Cf. III. iv.)
+
+Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance
+with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one
+endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with
+the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the
+foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own
+being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving
+his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its
+own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful
+to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and
+lastly, that suicides are weak--minded, and are overcome by
+external causes repugnant to their nature.  Further, it follows
+from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing
+without all external things for the preservation of our being or
+living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside
+ourselves.  Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our
+intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
+understand nothing besides itself.  There are, then, many things
+outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to
+be desired.  Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than
+those which are in entire agreement with our nature.  For if, for
+example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,
+they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them
+singly.
+
+Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than
+man--nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being
+can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points
+agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were,
+one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with
+one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their
+being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.
+Hence, men who are governed by reason--that is, who seek what is
+useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves
+nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
+and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their
+conduct.
+
+Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus
+briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater
+detail.  I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain
+the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every
+man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation
+of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.
+
+Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the
+case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I
+have hitherto proceeded.
+
+PROP. XIX.  Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily
+desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.
+
+Proof.--The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the
+emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks
+good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad.  Now this appetite is
+nothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of
+Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.).
+Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires
+the one, and shrinks from the other, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek
+what is useful to him--in other words, to preserve his own
+being--the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in
+proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that
+is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.
+
+Proof.--Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by
+man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely
+by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.
+Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his
+own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently
+(III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his
+own being, he is wanting in power.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or
+preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes
+external and foreign to his nature.  No one, I say, from the
+necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion
+from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which
+latter may be done in a variety of ways.  A man, for instance,
+kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists
+round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a
+sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart;
+or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's
+command, to open his own veins--that is, to escape a greater evil
+by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may
+so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may
+assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea
+cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the
+necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become
+non--existent, is as impossible as that something should be made
+out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little
+reflection.
+
+PROP. XXI.  No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and
+to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and
+to live--in other words, to actually exist.
+
+Proof.--The proof of this proposition, or rather the
+proposition itself, is self--evident, and is also plain from the
+definition of desire.  For the desire of living, acting, &c.,
+blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence
+of man--that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to
+preserve his own being.  Therefore, no one can desire, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  No virtue can be conceived as prior to this
+endeavour to preserve one's own being.
+
+Proof.--The effort for self--preservation is the essence of a
+thing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived
+as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be
+conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.
+Therefore no virtue, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--The effort for self--preservation is the first and
+only foundation of virtue.  For prior to this principle nothing
+can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular
+action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said
+to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in
+so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.
+
+Proof.--In so far as a man is determined to an action through
+having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.
+Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived
+solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which
+does not follow from his virtue.  But, in so far as he is
+determined for an action because he understands, he is active;
+that is, he does something, which is perceived through his
+essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us
+the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being
+(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with
+the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to
+one's self.
+
+Proof.--To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing
+else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature.  But
+we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore
+to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,
+to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and
+that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.
+Coroll.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of
+anything else.
+
+Proof.--The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the
+thing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not from the
+essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that
+everyone endeavours to preserve his being.  Moreover, this
+proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should
+endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,
+the last--named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,
+which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd.  Therefore no one,
+&c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so
+far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,
+save such things as are conducive to understanding.
+
+Proof.--The effort for self--preservation is nothing else but
+the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so
+far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for
+continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as
+necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of
+Appetite, III. ix. note).  But the essence of reason is nought
+else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly
+understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.); therefore
+(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing else but to understand.  Again, since this effort of the
+mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to
+preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this
+effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and
+single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand
+things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the
+other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able
+to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are
+conducive to understanding.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save
+such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are
+able to hinder us from understanding.
+
+Proof.--The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing
+beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,
+save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing
+Prop.).  But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess
+certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has
+adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in
+so far as it reasons.  Therefore we know nothing to be good or
+evil save such things as really conduce, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God,
+and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.
+
+Proof.--The mind is not capable of understanding anything
+higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely
+infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be
+conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest
+utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God.  Again,
+the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to
+the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously.  The
+mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand.  Now, as we
+have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is
+God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand
+or to know God.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  No individual thing, which is entirely different
+from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and
+absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has
+something in common with our nature.
+
+Proof.--The power of every individual thing, and consequently
+the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be
+determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.
+vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through
+which human nature is conceived.  Therefore our power of
+activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and
+consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other
+individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not
+by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely
+different from our own; and since we call good or evil that
+which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.
+xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our
+power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different
+from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXX.  A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality
+which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in
+so far as it is contrary to our nature.
+
+Proof.--We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.
+viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when
+it diminishes or checks our power of action.  Therefore, if
+anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in
+common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or
+check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.
+iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that
+quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand,
+in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),
+in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is
+contrary to our nature.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,
+it is necessarily good.
+
+Proof.--In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it
+cannot be bad for it.  It will therefore necessarily be either
+good or indifferent.  If it be assumed that it be neither good
+nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which
+tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the
+hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself;
+but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for
+us, and vice versâ, in proportion as a thing is more useful for
+us, so is it more in harmony with our nature.  For, in so far as
+it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be
+different therefrom or contrary thereto.  If different, it can
+neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be
+contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,
+contrary to what is good--in short, bad.  Nothing, therefore, can
+be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;
+and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony
+with our nature, and vice versâ.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  In so far as men are a prey to passion, they
+cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.
+
+Proof.--Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are
+understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or
+negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note);
+wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,
+cannot be said to be naturally in harmony.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This is also self--evident; for, if we say that white
+and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we
+absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect.  So, if
+we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both
+are finite--wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of
+their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power
+of external causes--we should certainly affirm that a man and a
+stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree
+only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really
+agree in no respect.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are
+assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states;
+and to this extent one and the same man is variable and
+inconstant.
+
+Proof.--The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained
+ solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i., ii.), but
+it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.), by the
+nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it
+follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there
+are external objects whereby we are affected (III. lvi.), and
+that men may be differently affected by one and the same
+object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly,
+that one and the same man may be differently affected towards
+the same object, and may therefore be variable and
+inconstant.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, they can be contrary one to another.
+
+Proof.--A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's
+feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to
+that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole
+possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and
+note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in
+III. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
+Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen
+also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should
+endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.
+xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another.  But the
+emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.);
+hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, can be contrary one to another.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives
+that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from
+this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,
+through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through
+agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way;
+if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be
+untrue.  But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we
+shall see that the discrepancy vanishes.  For the two men are not
+in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,
+that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one
+differing from the other.  For, in so far as each loves the same
+thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered
+thereby.  Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are
+at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the
+agreement in their natures.  The cause for their opposition lies,
+as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to
+differ.  For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved
+object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of
+the loved object as lost.  Hence the one man will be affected
+with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus
+they will be at variance one with another.  We can easily show in
+like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on
+differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,
+do they always necessarily agree in nature.
+
+Proof.--In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are
+passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at
+variance one with another.  But men are only said to be active,
+in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.);
+therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it
+is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely
+through human nature as its proximate cause.  But, since every
+man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,
+and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and
+further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem
+good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows
+that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human
+nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.
+Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with
+each man's nature.  Therefore, men in so far as they live in
+obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with
+another.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--There is no individual thing in nature, which is
+more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.
+For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony
+with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man.
+But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when
+he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this
+extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of
+another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual
+things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in
+obedience to reason.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary II.--As every man seeks most that which is useful to
+him, so are men most useful one to another.  For the more a man
+seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,
+the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the
+same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to
+act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in
+obedience to reason.  But men are most in natural harmony, when
+they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore
+(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to
+another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--What we have just shown is attested by experience so
+conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man
+is to man a God."  Yet it rarely happens that men live in
+obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that
+they are generally envious and troublesome one to another.
+Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so
+that the definition of man as a social animal has met with
+general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much
+more convenience than injury.  Let satirists then laugh their
+fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes
+praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them
+heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said,
+they will find that men can provide for their wants much more
+easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can
+they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not
+to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,
+to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts.  But I
+will treat of this more at length elsewhere.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  The highest good of those who follow virtue is
+common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.
+
+Proof.--To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason
+(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to
+reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;
+that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and
+can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of
+the same nature.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of
+those who follow after virtue were not common to all?  Would it
+not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in
+obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they
+agree in nature, would be at variance one with another?  To such
+an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but
+from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is
+common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of
+man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could
+neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure
+in this highest good.  For it belongs to the essence of the human
+mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal
+and infinite essence of God.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  The good which every man, who follows after
+virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,
+and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge
+of God.
+
+Proof.--Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.);
+therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily
+endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to
+reason.  But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided
+by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for
+himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which
+each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also
+for others.  Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.);
+now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),
+which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it
+(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of
+God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of
+virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good
+for himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+Another Proof.--The good, which a man desires for himself and
+loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love
+it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others
+should love it also; and as the good in question is common to
+all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,
+for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice
+therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in
+proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.
+
+Note I.--He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause
+others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the
+world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,
+and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight
+in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar
+impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what
+pleases themselves.  Again, as the highest good sought by men
+under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be
+possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love
+it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they
+delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed.  But he, who
+endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but
+courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent.
+Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in
+so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to
+Religion.  The desire of well--doing, which is engendered by a
+life according to reason, I call piety.  Further, the desire,
+whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate
+others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by
+honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according
+to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the
+gaining of friendship.  I have also shown in addition what are
+the foundations of a state; and the difference between true
+virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have
+said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in
+accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but
+man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to
+himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded
+by the general disposition of things rather than by his own
+nature considered solely in itself.
+
+[13] Honestas
+
+
+Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.
+of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the
+slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition
+and womanish pity than on sound reason.  The rational quest of
+what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
+associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,
+or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the
+same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.
+Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men
+have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.
+Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we
+may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,
+treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature
+is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from
+human emotions (III. lvii. note).  It remains for me to explain
+what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit.  On these points
+see the following note.
+
+Note II.--In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain
+praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.
+
+Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note:
+the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms.  But I
+must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature
+and in society.
+
+Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,
+consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions
+which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by
+sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is
+bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own
+disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to
+him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which
+he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.).  Now,
+if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain
+in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to
+his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.).  But seeing that they are a
+prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue
+(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and
+being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in
+need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note).  Wherefore, in order that
+men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is
+necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for
+the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure
+their fellow--men.  The way in which this end can be obtained, so
+that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.
+Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each
+other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.
+vii. and III. xxxix.  It is there shown, that an emotion can only
+be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to
+itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of
+incurring a greater injury themselves.
+
+On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps
+in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging
+injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also
+possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to
+pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in
+restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note).  Such a
+society established with laws and the power of preserving itself
+is called a State, while those who live under its protection are
+called citizens.  We may readily understand that there is in the
+state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced
+good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely
+of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with
+reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good
+or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.
+
+In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it
+can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on
+by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State
+authority.  Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is
+therefore punished by the right of the State only.  Obedience, on
+the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is
+thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages
+which a State provides.
+
+Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent
+master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be
+said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are
+common to all.  Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no
+wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that
+which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the
+state of nature answering to justice and injustice.  Such ideas
+are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common
+consent what belongs to one man and what to another.
+
+From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and
+injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes
+which display the nature of the mind.  But I have said enough.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to
+render it capable of being affected in an increased number of
+ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of
+ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is
+thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting
+other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise,
+whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is
+hurtful to man.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body
+increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.);
+therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it
+capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and
+is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body
+capable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is
+hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body
+mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a
+change in such proportion is bad.
+
+Proof.--The human body needs many other bodies for its
+preservation (II. Post. iv.).  But that which constitutes the
+specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts
+communicate their several motions one to another in a certain
+fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.).
+Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human
+body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the
+human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of
+being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in
+many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.).  Again,
+whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion
+causes the human body to assume another specific character, in
+other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the
+point is indeed self--evident), to be destroyed, and consequently
+totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of
+ways; therefore it is bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The extent to which such causes can injure or be of
+service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part.  But I
+would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,
+when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually
+among its several parts is changed.  For I do not venture to deny
+that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and
+other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to
+consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally
+different from its own.  There is no reason, which compels me to
+maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse;
+nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.
+It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I
+should hardly call him the same.  As I have heard tell of a
+certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and
+though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his
+past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he
+had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for
+a grown--up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue.  If
+this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A
+man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can
+only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy
+of other men.  However, I prefer to leave such questions
+undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for
+raising new issues.
+
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes
+men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever
+brings discord into a State is bad.
+
+Proof.--For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony
+also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is
+therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)
+whatsoever brings about discord is bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Pleasure in itself is not bad but good:
+contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.
+
+Proof.--Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the
+body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is
+emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or
+checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,
+&c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;
+contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.
+
+Proof.--Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,
+which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all
+parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.),
+the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a
+manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion
+of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),
+and cannot be excessive.  But Melancholy (see its Def. in the
+same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is
+referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or
+hindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV.
+xxxviii.) it is always bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other
+hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is
+bad.
+
+Proof.--Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is
+pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,
+consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the
+rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this
+emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body
+(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus
+rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other
+ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad.  Again, grief,
+which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.).  But, as its
+force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause
+compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees
+and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can,
+therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and
+preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's
+capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  Love and desire may be excessive.
+
+Proof.--Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an
+external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation,
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.
+note); hence love maybe excessive.  Again, the strength of
+desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises
+(III. xxxvii.).  Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's
+actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from
+the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become
+excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning
+stimulation.
+
+Note.--Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived
+more easily than it can be observed.  For the emotions, whereby
+we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the
+body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions
+are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation
+of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and
+although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions--and very few
+are found who are always assailed by one and the same--yet there
+are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately
+fixed.  We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,
+although it be not present, they think they have it before them;
+when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is
+delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with
+love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their
+mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are
+made objects of ridicule.  But when a miser thinks of nothing but
+gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but
+glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are
+generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated.  But,
+in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness,
+though they may not be reckoned among diseases.
+
+PROP. XLV.  Hatred can never be good.
+
+Proof.--When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.
+xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that
+is bad.  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+N.B.  Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred
+towards men.
+
+Corollary I.--Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and
+other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are
+bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.
+
+Corollary II.--Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is
+base, and in a State unjust.  This also is evident from III.
+xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.
+xxxvii. note.
+
+Note.--Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to
+be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference.  For
+laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so
+long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.).
+Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and
+gloomy superstition.  For why is it more lawful to satiate one's
+hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,
+and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else,
+save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,
+nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,
+which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the
+greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the
+perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we
+necessarily partake of the divine nature.  Therefore, to make use
+of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible
+(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is
+the part of a wise man.  I say it is the part of a wise man to
+refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
+drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
+plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
+and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
+his neighbour.  For the human body is composed of very numerous
+parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
+fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
+equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
+the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the
+mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
+simultaneously.  This way of life, then, agrees best with our
+principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there
+be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
+the best, and in every way to be commended.  There is no need for
+me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.
+
+PROP. XLVI.  He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,
+for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.
+
+Proof.--All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.);
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such
+emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to
+prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.).  But hatred is
+increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love
+(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.);
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is
+assuredly wretched.  But he, who strives to conquer hatred with
+love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands
+many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid.
+Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but
+through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow
+so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,
+that I have no need to prove them in detail.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves
+good.
+
+Proof.--Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.
+For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of
+the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without
+fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in
+themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive
+pleasure (IV. xliii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We may add, that these emotions show defective
+knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same
+reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of
+a want of mental power.  For although confidence and joy are
+pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,
+namely, hope and fear.  Wherefore the more we endeavour to be
+guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to
+free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate
+fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  The emotions of over--esteem and disparagement are
+always bad.
+
+Proof.--These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)
+are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)
+bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  Over--esteem is apt to render its object proud.
+
+Proof.--If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's
+sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be
+pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good
+which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and
+therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other
+words, we are apt to become proud.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. L.  Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,
+is in itself bad and useless.
+
+Proof.--Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and
+therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad.  The good effect which
+follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity
+from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the
+dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of
+reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for
+certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under
+the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from
+the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in
+accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not
+find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will
+he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human
+virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to
+rejoice.  We may add, that he, who is easily touched with
+compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does
+something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can
+never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly
+because we are easily deceived by false tears.  I am in this
+place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of
+reason.  He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by
+compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems
+unlike a man.
+
+PROP. LI.  Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree
+therewith and arise therefrom.
+
+Proof.--Approval is love towards one who has done good to
+another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.
+lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands;
+therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Another Proof.--He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.
+xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow
+his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will
+feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the
+benefactor.  Therefore he approves of him.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,
+xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark
+that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace
+punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said
+to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by
+hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.
+
+PROP. LII.  Self--approval may arise from reason, and that which
+arises from reason is the highest possible.
+
+Proof.--Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the
+Emotions, xxv.).  But a man's true power of action or virtue is
+reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and
+distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore
+self--approval arises from reason.  Again, when a man is
+contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly
+or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action
+(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of
+understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the
+highest possible self--approval arise.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Self--approval is in reality the highest object for
+which we can hope.  For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one
+endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior
+object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and
+strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary
+(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame
+becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life
+under disgrace is almost unendurable.
+
+PROP. LIII.  Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason.
+
+Proof.--Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of
+his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.).  But, in so
+far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to
+understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.).
+Wherefore, if a man in self--contemplation perceives any infirmity
+in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but
+(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked.
+But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by
+virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the
+knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this
+is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands
+himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because[14] his power of activity
+is aided.  Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a
+man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the
+contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.
+Q.E.D.
+
+[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which I
+have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
+'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
+
+PROP. LIV.  Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or
+infirm.
+
+Proof.--The first part of this proposition is proved like the
+foregoing one.  The second part is proved from the mere
+definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,
+xxvii.).  For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by
+evil desires; secondly, by pain.
+
+Note.--As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these
+two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and
+Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had
+better sin in that direction.  For, if all men who are a prey to
+emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,
+and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked
+together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant, when it
+is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who
+consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously
+commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence.  Indeed those who
+are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than
+others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become
+free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.
+
+PROP. LV.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance
+of self.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and
+xxix.
+
+PROP. LVI.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme
+infirmity of spirit.
+
+Proof.--The first foundation of virtue is self--preservation
+(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.).
+He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the
+foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues.
+Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of
+reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of
+reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.).
+Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and
+consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue;
+in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit.  Thus
+extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and
+the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.
+
+Note.--Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride;
+for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a
+painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful
+(IV. xviii.).
+
+PROP. LVII.  The proud man delights in the company of flatterers
+and parasites, but hates the company of the high--minded.
+
+Proof.--Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation
+of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this
+estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the
+means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight
+in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is
+too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the
+company of high--minded men, who value him according to his
+deserts.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the
+evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all
+the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity.
+I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may
+be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and,
+therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself
+superior to his fellows.  The dejection, which is the opposite
+quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior
+to his fellows.  Such being the ease, we can easily see that a
+proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes
+pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his
+bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.
+
+Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the
+dejected man very near akin to the proud man.  For, inasmuch as
+his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and
+other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other
+words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in
+contemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb,
+"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow--sufferers."
+Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he
+thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to
+envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's
+actions, with a view to fault--finding rather than correction, in
+order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory
+therein, though all the time with a dejected air.  These effects
+follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from
+the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.  I have already said that I call these and similar
+emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man.  The
+laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man
+is but a part.  I mention this, in passing, lest any should think
+that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds
+of men rather than the nature and properties of things.  For, as
+I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions
+and their properties as on the same footing with other natural
+phenomena.  Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and
+ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as
+other things which we admire, and which we delight to
+contemplate.  But I pass on to note those qualities in the
+emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon
+him.
+
+PROP. LVIII.  Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
+arise therefrom.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and
+also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.
+i.).
+
+Note--Empty honour, as it is styled, is self--approval,
+fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this
+good opinion ceases there ceases also the self--approval, in other
+words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note);
+consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,
+day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain
+his reputation.  For the populace is variable and inconstant, so
+that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.
+Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and
+readily represses the fame of others.  The object of the strife
+being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is
+seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every
+possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more
+proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to
+himself.  This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
+nothing.
+
+The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred
+from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance.  I
+will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,
+is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is
+really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same
+way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not
+mortified.  Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,
+he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no
+desire to live honourably.
+
+Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon
+concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the
+desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good
+or evil emotions.  But all, in so far as they are engendered in
+us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is
+evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be
+useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance
+of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.
+
+PROP. LIX.  To all the actions, whereto we are determined by
+emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined
+without emotion by reason.
+
+Proof.--To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.
+ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the
+necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone.  But pain is
+bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action
+(IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any
+action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance
+of reason.  Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a
+man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this
+extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we
+could not perform under the guidance of reason.  Lastly,
+pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for
+it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is
+increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in
+so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent
+of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his
+actions (III. iii., and note).
+
+Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to
+such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception
+of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,
+capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion
+wherein the mind is passive.  But all emotions are attributable
+to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.
+explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing
+else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Another Proof.--A given action is called bad, in so far as it
+arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.
+But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad
+(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same
+action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the
+action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,
+we may be led by reason (IV. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--An example will put this point in a clearer light.  The
+action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and
+in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his
+arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently
+downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper
+to the structure of the human body.  If, then, a man, moved by
+anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,
+this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one
+and the same action can be associated with various mental images
+of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of
+one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and
+distinct ideas.  Hence it is evident that every desire which
+springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become
+useless, if men could be guided by reason.  Let us now see why
+desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is
+called by us blind.
+
+PROP. LX.  Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not
+attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts
+thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.
+
+Proof.--Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a
+body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails
+over the remaining parts (IV. vi.).  This part will not endeavour
+to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of
+the body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary
+for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own
+powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd.  The said part, and,
+consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its
+condition.  Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind
+aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole.  If it
+be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so
+that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same
+manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to
+a man as a whole.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to
+one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being
+with out taking into consideration our health as a whole: to
+which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over
+us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.
+
+PROP. LXI.  Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
+
+Proof.--Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered
+absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by
+some given modification of itself.  Hence desire, which arises
+from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so
+far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are
+adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.).
+Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered
+in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able
+to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction.  Therefore,
+such desire cannot be excessive.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXII.  In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be
+of a thing future, past, or present.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of
+reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.
+xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same
+certitude (II. xliii. and note).  Wherefore, whether the thing be
+present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same
+necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether
+the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all
+cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always
+possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.);
+therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether
+the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the
+duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods
+of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same
+emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though
+it were present the good which it conceived as future;
+consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the
+present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would
+in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source
+of evil in the future, as we shall presently show.  However, we
+can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of
+things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II.
+xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not
+so powerfully affected by the future as by the present.  Hence
+such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely
+abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order
+of things and the connection of causes, with a view to
+determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather
+imaginary than real.  Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the
+desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the
+desire of things which are agreeable at the present time.  (Cf.
+IV. xvi.)
+
+PROP. LXIII.  He who is led by fear, and does good in order to
+escape evil, is not led by reason.
+
+Proof.--All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as
+active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and
+desire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does
+good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.
+
+Note.--Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at
+vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by
+reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape
+evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as
+wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if
+they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow--men.
+
+Corollary.--Under desire which springs from reason, we seek
+good directly, and shun evil indirectly.
+
+Proof.--Desire which springs from reason can only spring from
+a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III.
+lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive
+(IV. lxi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs
+from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under
+the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by
+implication shun evil.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a
+sick and a healthy man.  The sick man through fear of death eats
+what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes
+pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of
+life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to
+avoid it.  So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from
+hatred or anger but from love of the public well--being, is guided
+solely by reason.
+
+PROP. LXIV.  The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.
+
+Proof.--The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far
+as we are conscious thereof.  Now pain is the transition to a
+lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore
+cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi., and vii.);
+therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.)
+depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof
+(II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed
+only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.
+
+PROP. LXV.  Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the
+greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.
+
+Proof.--A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good
+is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to
+things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see
+preface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser
+good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only
+the greater good and the lesser evil.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the
+lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun
+the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.
+For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,
+and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the
+former and shun the latter.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXVI.  We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater
+good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,
+and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a
+greater evil in the future.[15]
+
+[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
+Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
+alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
+misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
+boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+
+
+Proof.--If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things
+future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same
+way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking
+merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,
+there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be
+assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we
+may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser
+good in the present, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a
+lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater
+good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,
+because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.  This
+Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the
+Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.
+
+Note.--If these statements be compared with what we have
+pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part
+up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a
+man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is
+led by reason.  The former, whether will or no, performs actions
+whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and
+only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance
+in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the
+former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose
+disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few
+observations.
+
+PROP. LXVII.  A free man thinks of death least of all things;
+and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
+
+Proof.--A free man is one who lives under the guidance of
+reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly
+desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words
+(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his
+being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore
+such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom
+is a meditation of life.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXVIII.  If men were born free, they would, so long as they
+remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
+
+Proof.--I call free him who is led solely by reason; he,
+therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only
+adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no
+conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being
+correlative) of good.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of
+this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as
+we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so
+far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the
+cause of man's existence.
+
+This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
+have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.
+For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save
+that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he
+provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God
+forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of
+good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,
+he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.
+Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in
+entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be
+nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that
+after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway
+began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his
+freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the
+patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of
+God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire
+for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have
+shown above (IV. xxxvii.).
+
+PROP. LXIX.  The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,
+when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
+
+Proof.--Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion
+contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining
+emotion (IV. vii.).  But blind daring and fear are emotions,
+which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.):
+hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring
+than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
+when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as
+in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of
+mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
+
+Note.--What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,
+I explained in III. lix. note.  By danger I mean everything,
+which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,
+&c.
+
+PROP. LXX.  The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,
+as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
+
+Proof.--Everyone judges what is good according to his
+disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who
+has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon
+it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the
+receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.).  But the free man only
+desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not
+repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,
+but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,
+and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
+importance.  Therefore the free man, lest he should become
+hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than
+reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving
+their favours.
+
+Note.--I say, as far as he can.  For though men be ignorant,
+yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human
+aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often
+necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay
+such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in
+declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of
+despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious
+motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for
+offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it.  Thus, in
+declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility
+and courtesy.
+
+PROP. LXXI.  Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to
+another.
+
+Proof.--Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,
+and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of
+friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,
+with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one
+to another.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire
+have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,
+rather than pure goodwill.  Moreover, ingratitude is not an
+emotion.  Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a
+man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c.
+He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,
+is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the
+gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal
+his thefts, or by any similar persons.  Contrariwise, such an one
+shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be
+corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.
+
+PROP. LXXII.  The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
+good faith.
+
+Proof.--If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a
+case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the
+danger of present death? Would not his plan of self--preservation
+completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by
+pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would
+persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason
+would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their
+forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any
+general laws, which is absurd.
+
+PROP. LXXIII.  The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in
+a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in
+solitude, where he is independent.
+
+Proof.--The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey
+through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to
+preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is
+(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,
+he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.
+ii.), to live according to the laws of his country.  Therefore
+the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to
+possess the general rights of citizenship.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--These and similar observations, which we have made on
+man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to
+courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note).  I do not
+think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of
+strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no
+man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no
+man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud.  These
+propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and
+religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.;
+namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every
+man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.
+We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.
+l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever
+first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity
+of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful
+and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,
+horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his
+own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.
+Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they
+really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such
+as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar
+emotions, which I have mentioned above.  Thus he endeavours, as
+we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on
+his way rejoicing.  How far human virtue is capable of attaining
+to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in
+the following Part.
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+
+What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life
+has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,
+but has been set forth piece--meal, according as I thought each
+Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.
+I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
+under leading heads.
+
+I.  All our endeavours or desires so follow from the
+necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either
+through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our
+being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived
+through itself without other individuals.
+
+II.  Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,
+that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to
+consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only
+referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things
+inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined
+not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to
+us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter
+passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,
+on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
+
+III.  Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
+by man's power or reason, are always good.  The rest may be
+either good or bad.
+
+IV.  Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect
+the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone
+man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed
+blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which
+arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the
+understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's
+attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of
+his nature.  Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the
+ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all
+his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate
+conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his
+intelligence.
+
+V.  Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational
+life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his
+enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by
+intelligence.  Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's
+perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational
+life, are alone called evil.
+
+VI.  As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are
+necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external
+causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal
+nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to
+conform to in almost infinite ways.
+
+VII.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if
+he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with
+his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,
+whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in
+harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate
+himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.
+
+VIII.  Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be
+capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the
+rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems
+safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good
+or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the
+rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we
+think best.  Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right
+of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.
+
+IX.  Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any
+given thing than other individuals of the same species;
+therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and
+the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful
+than his fellow--man who is led by reason.  Further, as we know
+not anything among individual things which is more excellent than
+a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his
+skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at
+last to live under the dominion of their own reason.
+
+X.  In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of
+hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are
+therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful
+than their fellows.
+
+XI.  Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and
+high--mindedness.
+
+XII.  It is before all things useful to men to associate
+their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds
+as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and
+generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.
+
+XIII.  But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.
+For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the
+guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and
+more prone to revenge than to sympathy.  No small force of
+character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to
+restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others.  But
+those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at
+vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than
+strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and
+others.  Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from
+misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes
+rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably
+endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and
+choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
+preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their
+father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as
+they may spite their parents.
+
+XIV.  Therefore, although men are generally governed in
+everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common
+brings many more advantages than drawbacks.  Wherefore it is
+better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive
+to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and
+friendship.
+
+XV.  Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are
+attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living.  For men
+brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is
+reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received
+customs of their society.  For winning love those qualities are
+especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.
+IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).
+
+XVI.  Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such
+harmony is insecure.  Further, fear arises from infirmity of
+spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the
+same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a
+certain resemblance to piety.
+
+XVII.  Men are also gained over by liberality, especially
+such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain
+life.  However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the
+power and the advantage of any private person.  For the riches of
+any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.
+Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited
+for him to be able to make all men his friends.  Hence providing
+for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and
+has regard only to the general advantage.
+
+XVIII.  In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our
+duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).
+
+XIX.  Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of
+generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort
+of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,
+readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a
+species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than
+harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).
+
+XX.  As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in
+harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not
+engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to
+beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the
+love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused
+by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.
+
+XXI.  Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by
+means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery.  None are
+more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be
+first, but are not.
+
+XXII.  There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety
+and religion.  Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet
+is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.
+note).
+
+XXIII.  Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such
+matters as cannot be hid.  Further, as shame is a species of
+pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.
+
+XXIV.  The remaining emotions of pain towards men are
+directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;
+and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance
+to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass
+judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's
+rights.
+
+XXV.  Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire
+of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to
+piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.).  But, if it spring
+from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under
+the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and
+seditions.  For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word
+or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,
+I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:
+not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called
+after his name, nor to give any cause for envy.  Further, in his
+conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and
+will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but
+he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way
+whereby it may be perfected.  Thus will men be stirred not by
+fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to
+endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to
+reason.
+
+XXVI.  Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature
+in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with
+ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,
+whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our
+advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or
+destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to
+our use as best we may.
+
+XXVII.  The advantage which we derive from things external to
+us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from
+observing them, and from recombining their elements in different
+forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this
+point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and
+nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their
+functions.  For, in proportion as the body is capable of being
+affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external
+bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind
+capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.).  But there seem to be
+very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due
+nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.
+For the human body is composed of very many parts of different
+nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so
+that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything
+that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the
+mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.
+
+XXVIII.  Now for providing these nourishments the strength of
+each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one
+another mutual aid.  But money has furnished us with a token for
+everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind
+of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly
+conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the
+idea of money as cause.
+
+XXIX.  This result is the fault only of those, who seek
+money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but
+because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring
+themselves to great splendour.  Certainly they nourish their
+bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they
+lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of
+their body.  But they who know the true use of money, and who fix
+the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,
+live content with little.
+
+XXX.  As, therefore, those things are good which assist the
+various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their
+functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid
+to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;
+it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.
+But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us
+pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit
+our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred
+to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore
+most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at
+hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become
+excessive.  Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most
+regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate
+what is future with emotions equally vivid.  (IV. xliv. note, and
+lx. note.)
+
+XXXI.  Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as
+good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.
+However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious
+take delight in my infirmity and trouble.  For the greater the
+pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection
+whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the
+divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated
+by a true regard for our advantage.  But contrariwise he, who is
+led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by
+reason.
+
+XXXII.  But human power is extremely limited, and is
+infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have
+not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those
+things which are without us.  Nevertheless, we shall bear with an
+equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims
+of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have
+done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not
+sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;
+remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we
+follow her order.  If we have a clear and distinct understanding
+of this, that part of our nature which is defined by
+intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will
+assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence
+will endeavour to persist.  For, in so far as we are intelligent
+beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,
+nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which
+is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding
+of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is
+in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.
+
+
+
+PART V:
+
+Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+
+At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which
+is concerned with the way leading to freedom.  I shall therefore
+treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the
+reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental
+Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much
+more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.  It is no part
+of my design to point out the method and means whereby the
+understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the
+body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of
+its functions.  The latter question lies in the province of
+Medicine, the former in the province of Logic.  Here, therefore,
+I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of
+reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its
+dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.
+That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have
+already shown.  Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions
+depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely
+govern them.  But these philosophers were compelled, by the
+protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
+that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and
+moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the
+example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house--dog
+and the other a hunting--dog.  For by long training it could be
+brought about, that the house--dog should become accustomed to
+hunt, and the hunting--dog to cease from running after hares.  To
+this opinion Descartes not a little inclines.  For he maintained,
+that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of
+the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the
+aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which
+are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which
+the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various
+ways.  He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst
+of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of
+the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the
+midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal
+spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different
+marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different
+external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;
+whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the
+gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once
+before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the
+gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
+determining them to the condition wherein they were, when
+repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.  He further
+asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature
+to a certain given motion of the gland.  For instance, whenever
+anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition
+causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in
+question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the
+mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,
+inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the
+animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would
+dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with
+the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to
+look at remote or very near objects.  Lastly, he maintained that,
+although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been
+united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole
+number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet
+it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
+other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de
+l'âme, I.50.  He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,
+that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power
+over its passions.  For passions as defined by him are
+"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are
+referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)
+are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement
+of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27).  But, seeing that we
+can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,
+to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely
+on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with
+sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our
+actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which
+we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an
+absolute dominion over our passions.  Such is the doctrine of
+this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his
+own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could
+hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man.  Indeed, I
+am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,
+that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from
+self--evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not
+clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to
+task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through
+occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which
+occult qualities are commonplace.  What does he understand, I
+ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and
+distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union
+with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like
+him to explain this union through its proximate cause.  But he
+had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,
+that he could not assign any particular cause of the union
+between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have
+recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.
+Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the
+mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it
+hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can
+be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the
+animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we
+have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again
+disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would
+follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given
+danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,
+yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended
+in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything
+except running away.  In truth, as there is no common standard of
+volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between
+the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;
+consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined
+by the strength of the other.  We may also add, that there is no
+gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it
+can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that
+all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the
+brain.  Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes
+concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have
+abundantly proved that his premisses are false.  Therefore, since
+the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the
+understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of
+the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all
+have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or
+distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those
+conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
+
+
+AXIOMS.
+
+I.  If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a
+change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of
+the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.
+
+II.  The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,
+in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence
+of its cause.
+
+(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
+and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or
+the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
+associated in the body.
+
+Proof.--The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.
+vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the
+order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and
+vii.) as the order and connection of ideas.  Wherefore, even as
+the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place
+according to the order and association of modifications of the
+body (II. xviii.), so vice versâ (III. ii.) the order and
+connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance
+with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are
+arranged and associated in the mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. II.  If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,
+from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other
+thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external
+cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these
+emotions, be destroyed.
+
+Proof.--That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,
+is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is
+removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;
+therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are
+destroyed.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. III.  An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a
+passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
+
+Proof.--An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by
+the general Def. of the Emotions).  If, therefore, we form a
+clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only
+be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to
+the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III.
+iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary--An emotion therefore becomes more under our
+control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in
+proportion as it is more known to us.
+
+PROP. IV.  There is no modification of the body, whereof we
+cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
+
+Proof.--Properties which are common to all things can only be
+conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and
+Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,
+whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
+we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.  For an
+emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general
+Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding
+Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.
+
+Note.--Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
+an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
+understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
+(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
+distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
+absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
+about, that he should become less subject to them.  To attain
+this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
+acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
+every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
+be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
+distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
+that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
+external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence
+it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
+destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
+are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
+being excessive (IV. lxi.).  For it must be especially remarked,
+that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
+that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.
+For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
+that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his own
+fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by
+reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
+does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives
+by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
+called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof).  In like
+manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
+they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
+accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
+adequate ideas.  For all desires, whereby we are determined to
+any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
+inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).  Than this remedy for the emotions
+(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in
+a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
+our power, can be devised.  For the mind has no other power save
+that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
+above (III. iii.).
+
+PROP. V.  An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
+and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
+conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
+
+Proof.--An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be
+free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be
+necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one
+towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).
+But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to
+conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes
+whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);
+therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply
+is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel
+towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,
+consequently, it is the greatest of all.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
+less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
+necessary.
+
+Proof.--The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
+xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an
+infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing
+Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less
+subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)
+feels less emotion towards the things themselves.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
+applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly
+and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the
+emotions, as experience also testifies.  For we see, that the
+pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as
+the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means
+have been preserved.  So also we see that no one pities an
+infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,
+because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.
+Whereas, if most people were born full--grown and only one here
+and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because
+infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and
+necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may
+note several other instances of the same sort.
+
+PROP. VII.  Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
+we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
+attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
+
+Proof.--We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the
+emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,
+being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the
+said thing (II. xvii.).  Wherefore, the emotion, which is
+referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a
+nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.
+vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
+controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
+external cause (IV. ix.).  But an emotion which springs from
+reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things
+(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always
+regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their
+present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
+manner (II. xxxviii.).  Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
+remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which
+are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external
+causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
+until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the
+emotion which springs from reason is more powerful.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VIII.  An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
+of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
+
+Proof.--Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
+(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
+number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
+becomes stronger.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note--This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.
+
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
+causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
+itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
+affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
+and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
+single cause.
+
+Proof.--An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
+hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);
+therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
+contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
+another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
+the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is
+unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.
+Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.
+vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less
+passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of
+several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
+emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few
+or of a single object: this was our second point.  Lastly, this
+emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to
+several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. X.  So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
+our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
+
+Proof.--The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that
+is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede
+the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.).  So long, therefore, as
+we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the
+mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.
+xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear
+and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.
+note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such
+cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of
+the body according to the intellectual order.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--By this power of rightly arranging and associating the
+bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily
+affected by evil emotions.  For (V. vii.) a greater force is
+needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and
+associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,
+are uncertain and unsettled.  The best we can do, therefore, so
+long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is
+to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,
+to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the
+particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
+that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that
+it may be always ready to our hand.  For instance, we have laid
+down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred
+should be overcome with love or high--mindedness, and not required
+with hatred in return.  Now, that this precept of reason may be
+always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think
+over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and
+in what manner and way they may be best warded off by
+high--mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with
+the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready
+for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.).  If we keep also
+in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
+which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
+further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result
+of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than
+everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such
+case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises
+therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and
+will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a
+grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be
+overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner
+than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand.  As
+is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii.  We should, in the same
+way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the
+ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and
+imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of
+resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.
+But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions
+we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
+individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order
+that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of
+pleasure.  For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
+pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for
+which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain
+it.  Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the
+fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
+through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do
+the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of
+gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving
+vent to their anger would fain appear wise.  Wherefore it is
+certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of
+honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily
+covet it.  This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common
+to all who are ill--used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.
+For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the
+misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely
+torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not
+only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches.  So,
+again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love
+think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock
+faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,
+directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.
+Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the
+love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of
+the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy
+which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise
+desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
+revel in a false show of freedom.  Whosoever will diligently
+observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
+difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for
+the most part, to direct his actions according to the
+commandments of reason.
+
+[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
+that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
+
+PROP. XI.  In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
+objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and
+occupies the mind more.
+
+Proof.--In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is
+referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can
+be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
+contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;
+therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in
+full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XII.  The mental images of things are more easily
+associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
+and distinctly understand, than with others.
+
+Proof.--Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,
+are either the common properties of things or deductions
+therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are
+consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.
+Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate
+other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
+something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of
+the said things should be more often associated with the images
+of these than with the images of something else.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as
+it is associated with a greater number of other images.
+
+Proof.--In proportion as an image is associated with a greater
+number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
+whereby it can be aroused.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIV.  The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
+modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of
+God.
+
+Proof.--There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind
+may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);
+wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred
+to the idea of God (I. xv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
+more understands himself and his emotions.
+
+Proof.--He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is
+(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the
+same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more
+understands himself and his emotions.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  This love towards God must hold the chief place in
+the mind.
+
+Proof.--For this love is associated with all the modifications
+of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);
+therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  God is without passions, neither is he affected by
+any emotion of pleasure or pain.
+
+Proof.--All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
+true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and
+therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without
+passions.  Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a
+lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of
+the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
+pleasure or pain.
+
+Corollary.--Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate
+anyone.  For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any
+emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,
+vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  No one can hate God.
+
+Proof.--The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect
+(II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,
+we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be
+no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
+
+Note.--It may be objected that, as we understand God as the
+cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause
+of pain.  But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the
+causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a
+passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore,
+in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to
+that extent feel pleasure.
+
+PROP. XIX.  He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should
+love him in return.
+
+Proof.--For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.
+xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
+consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is
+absurd (III. xxviii.).  Therefore, he who loves God, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion
+of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to
+God by the same bond of love.
+
+Proof.--This love towards God is the highest good which we can
+seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common
+to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice
+therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),
+it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of
+jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note);
+but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
+therein.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion
+directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be
+destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God
+is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as
+it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the
+body be destroyed also.  As to its nature, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
+
+I have now gone through all the remedies against the
+emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can
+do against them.  Whence it appears that the mind's power over
+the emotions consists:----
+
+I.  In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).
+
+II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the
+thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.
+ii. and V. iv. note).
+
+III.  In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions
+referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those
+referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner
+(V. vii.).
+
+IV.  In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]
+are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of
+things or to God (V. ix. xi.).
+
+[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus----emotions.
+
+
+V.  Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and
+associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and
+xii. xiii. xiv.).
+
+But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
+may be better understood, it should be specially observed that
+the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion
+of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is
+more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are
+comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,
+and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than
+by another.  For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
+comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.
+Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
+infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge
+only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
+whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it
+may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by
+its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active,
+whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,
+although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former
+mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas
+attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human
+infirmity.  Again, it must be observed, that spiritual
+unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to
+excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,
+and which we can never become masters of.  For no one is
+solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;
+neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in
+regard to things whereof no one can be really master.
+
+We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and
+distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge
+(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,
+possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy
+them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at
+any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind
+(V. xiv.).  Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable
+and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession
+(II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which
+are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to
+strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and
+deeply penetrate it.
+
+And now I have finished with all that concerns this present
+life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have
+briefly described all the remedies against the emotions.  And
+this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has
+attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the
+definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to
+Propositions i. and iii. of Part III.  It is now, therefore, time
+to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of
+the mind, without relation to the body.
+
+PROP. XXI.  The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
+is past, while the body endures.
+
+Proof.--The mind does not express the actual existence of its
+body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as
+actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and,
+consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine
+any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.
+Thus it
+cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.
+xvii. note),
+or remember things past, except while the body endures (see
+definition of Memory, II. xviii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,
+which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the
+form of eternity.
+
+Proof.--God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or
+that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.).  This
+essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the
+very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a
+certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must
+necessarily exist in God (II. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
+the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.
+
+Proof.--There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which
+expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,
+therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence
+of the human mind (II. xiii.).  But we have not assigned to the
+human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as
+it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained
+through duration, and may be defined by time--that is (II. viii.
+Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
+endures.  Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
+conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
+of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the
+essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This idea, which expresses the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode
+of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
+necessarily eternal.  Yet it is not possible that we should
+remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear
+no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in
+terms of time, or have any relation to time.  But,
+notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal.  For the
+mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no
+less than those things that it remembers.  For the eyes of the
+mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than
+proofs.  Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before
+the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the
+essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and
+that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or
+explained through duration.  Thus our mind can only be said to
+endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in
+so far as it involves the actual existence of the body.  Thus far
+only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
+time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The more we understand particular things, the more
+do we understand God.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.
+
+PROP. XXV.  The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
+virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
+
+Proof.--The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
+idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
+essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,
+in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
+understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or
+nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to
+understand things by the third kind of knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  In proportion as the mind is more capable of
+understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
+more to understand things by that kind.
+
+Proof--This is evident.  For, in so far as we conceive the
+mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of
+knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to
+conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
+the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable
+thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  From this third kind of knowledge arises the
+highest possible mental acquiescence.
+
+Proof.--The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.
+xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge
+(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind
+knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):
+consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge
+passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
+of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such
+pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own
+virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of
+knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The endeavour or desire to know things by the
+third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the
+second kind of knowledge.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident.  For whatsoever we
+understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
+itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that
+is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are
+referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)
+cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and
+are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from
+adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of
+knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of
+knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from
+the first, but from the second kind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
+eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the
+present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving
+the essence of the body under the form of eternity.
+
+Proof.--In so far as the mind conceives the present existence
+of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be
+determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of
+conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.).  But
+eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
+and explanation).  Therefore to this extent the mind has not the
+power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it
+possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to
+conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
+ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to
+conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
+xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to
+the essence of mind (II. xiii.).  Therefore this power of
+conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the
+mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as
+existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in
+God and following from the necessity of the divine nature.
+Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we
+conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the
+eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and
+note, which see.
+
+PROP. XXX.  Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body
+under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a
+knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived
+through God.
+
+Proof.--Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this
+involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.).  Therefore to
+conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things
+in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as
+real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the
+essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
+itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that
+extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
+its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
+
+Proof.--The mind does not conceive anything under the form of
+eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
+form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is
+eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so
+far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which
+knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,
+in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything
+which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in
+other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge
+(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind
+(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or
+formal cause of such knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in
+this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of
+himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and
+blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel.  But we must
+here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind
+is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of
+eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more
+readily explained and better understood, we will consider the
+mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to
+understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have
+done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so
+long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our
+premisses are plain.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of
+knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by
+the idea of God as cause.
+
+Proof.--From this kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,
+xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea
+of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the
+idea also of God as cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--From the third kind of knowledge necessarily
+arises the intellectual love of God.  From this kind of knowledge
+arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as
+we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we
+understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the
+intellectual love of God.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  The intellectual love of God, which arises from
+the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
+
+Proof.--The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.
+Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises
+therefrom is also necessarily eternal.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing
+Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of
+love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.
+of the last Prop.  Nor is there here any difference, except that
+the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we
+feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of
+God as eternal cause.  If pleasure consists in the transition to
+a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the
+mind being endowed with perfection itself.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  The mind is, only while the body endures, subject
+to those emotions which are attributable to passions.
+
+Proof.--Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind
+contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea
+indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than
+the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).
+Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,
+in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;
+therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,
+subject to emotions which are attributable to passions.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that no love save intellectual
+love is eternal.
+
+Note.--If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that
+they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that
+they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the
+imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after
+death.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  God loves himself with an infinite intellectual
+love.
+
+Proof.--God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.
+Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;
+and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of
+himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause:
+now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as
+intellectual love.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  The intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as
+he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the
+essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;
+in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.
+
+Proof.--This love of the mind must be referred to the
+activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is
+itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself
+accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.);
+that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity
+whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human
+mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;
+therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of
+the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves
+himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God
+towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God
+are identical.
+
+Note.--From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein
+our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in
+the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love
+towards men.  This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called
+Glory, and not undeservedly.  For whether this love be referred
+to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of
+spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really
+distinguished from glory.  In so far as it is referred to God, it
+is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,
+accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).
+
+Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in
+knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.
+xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner
+and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from
+the divine nature and constantly depends on God.  I have thought
+it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show
+by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I
+have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),
+is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which
+I have styled knowledge of the second kind.  For, although in
+Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and
+consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence
+and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate
+and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind
+so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual
+essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to
+this intellectual love, or which can take it away.
+
+Proof.--This intellectual love follows necessarily from the
+nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through
+the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).
+If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary
+to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;
+consequently, that, which should be able to take away this
+love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious
+absurdity.  Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular
+things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given
+time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  In proportion as the mind understands more things
+by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to
+those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
+
+Proof.--The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);
+therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by
+the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
+part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently
+(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not
+touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in
+other words, evil (IV. xxx.).  Thus, in proportion as the mind
+understands more things by the second and third kinds of
+knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains
+unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence we understand that point which I touched on in
+IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;
+namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the
+mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,
+consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more.  Again,
+since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind
+can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which
+we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of
+little importance when compared with the part which endures.  But
+I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part
+is eternal.
+
+Proof.--He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which
+are evil (IV. xxxviii.)--that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions
+which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he
+possesses the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,
+and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the
+modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;
+whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected
+with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute
+the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man
+will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number
+of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a
+nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great
+knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or
+chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely
+fear death.  But, in order that this may be understood more
+clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of
+perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the
+better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.
+
+For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a
+corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness,
+if we have been able to live through the whole period of life
+with a sound mind in a sound body.  And, in reality, he, who, as
+in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very
+few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external
+causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely
+conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who
+has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,
+considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of
+God, and of things.  In this life, therefore, we primarily
+endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far
+as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into
+something else capable of very many activities, and referable to
+a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things;
+and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its
+imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison
+with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the
+last Proposition.
+
+PROP. XL.  In proportion as each thing possesses more of
+perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice
+versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
+
+Proof.--In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it
+possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.
+iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less
+passive.  This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove
+that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more
+perfect.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the part of the mind which
+endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.
+For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the
+understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.);
+the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.
+xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.
+and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it
+great or small, is more perfect than the latter.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set
+forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without
+relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other
+places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,
+is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another
+eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to
+infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the
+eternal and infinite intellect of God.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we
+should still consider as of primary importance piety and
+religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed
+to be attributable to courage and high--mindedness.
+
+Proof.--The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule
+of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's
+own true interest.  Now, while we determined what reason
+prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity,
+which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part.  Although
+we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we
+nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage
+and high--mindedness are of primary importance.  Therefore, even
+if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the
+aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The general belief of the multitude seems to be
+different.  Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so
+far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their
+rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the
+commandments of the divine law.  They therefore believe that
+piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to
+firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to
+lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,
+for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but
+also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after
+death, that they are induced to live according to the divine
+commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry
+them.
+
+If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the
+mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life
+remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of
+piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling
+everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey
+fortune rather than themselves.  Such a course appears to me not
+less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he
+can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to
+cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he
+sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer
+to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of
+reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth
+refuting.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue
+itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our
+lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able
+to control our lusts.
+
+Proof.--Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and
+note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.
+xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active;
+therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself.  This was our
+first point.  Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in
+this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand
+(V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power
+has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is
+it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or
+blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts.  And,
+since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in
+the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in
+blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,
+contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this
+blessedness itself.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I have thus completed all I wished to set forth
+touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's
+freedom.  Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how
+much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his
+lusts.  For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various
+ways by external causes without ever gaining the true
+acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were
+unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as
+he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
+
+Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
+scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
+himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
+necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
+acquiescence of his spirit.
+
+If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result
+seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered.  Needs
+must it be hard, since it is so seldom found.  How would it be
+possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without
+great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men
+neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are
+rare.
+
+
+End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+
+[1] "Affectiones"
+
+[2] "Forma"
+
+[3] "Animata"
+
+[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
+
+[5] Conscientiæ morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
+
+[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
+whom we regard without any particular emotion.
+
+[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
+"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.
+
+[8] See previous endnote.
+
+[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.
+
+  "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
+
+  Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."
+
+[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
+intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
+
+[11] Gloria.
+
+[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
+
+[13] Honestas
+
+[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which I
+have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
+'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
+
+[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
+Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
+alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
+misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
+boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+
+[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
+that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
+I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be
+obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholarship.
+
+[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus----emotions.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
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+The Project Gutenberg E-text of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+</TITLE>
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+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Ethics
+
+Author: Benedict de Spinoza
+
+Posting Date: May 28, 2009 [EBook #3800]
+Release Date: February, 2003
+First Posted: September 26, 2001
+Last Updated: December 11, 2017
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ETHICS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Tom Sharpe.  HTML version by Al Haines.
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+<BR><BR>
+
+<H1 ALIGN="center">
+The Ethics
+</H1>
+
+<H2 ALIGN="center">
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+</H2>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H3 ALIGN="center">
+by
+</H3>
+
+<H2 ALIGN="center">
+Benedict de Spinoza
+</H2>
+
+<BR><BR><BR>
+
+<H4 ALIGN="center">
+Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes
+</H4>
+
+<BR><BR><BR>
+
+<TABLE ALIGN="center" WIDTH="60%">
+<TR>
+<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="20%">
+<A HREF="#chap01">PART I</A>
+</TD>
+<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="20%">
+<A HREF="#chap02">PART II</A>
+</TD>
+<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="20%">
+<A HREF="#chap03">PART III</A>
+</TD>
+<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="20%">
+<A HREF="#chap04">PART IV</A>
+</TD>
+<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="20%">
+<A HREF="#chap05">PART V</A>
+</TD>
+</TR>
+
+</TABLE>
+
+<BR><BR><BR>
+
+<A NAME="chap01"></A>
+<H2 ALIGN="center">
+PART I. CONCERNING GOD.
+</H2>
+
+<H3 ALIGN="center">
+DEFINITIONS.
+</H3>
+
+<P>
+I.  By that which is self&mdash;caused, I mean that of which the
+essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
+conceivable as existent.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be
+limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a
+body is called finite because we always conceive another greater
+body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a
+body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+III.  By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a
+conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
+constituting the essence of substance.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+V.  By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or that
+which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than
+itself.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[1] "Affectiones"
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VI.  By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite&mdash;that is, a
+substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
+expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its
+kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
+attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
+contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves
+no negation.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VII.  That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
+necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is
+determined by itself alone.  On the other hand, that thing is
+necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by
+something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of
+existence or action.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VIII.  By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
+conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
+that which is eternal.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
+truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
+explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may
+be conceived without a beginning or end.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+AXIOMS.
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+I.  Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
+conceived through itself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+III.  From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;
+and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
+impossible that an effect can follow.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
+knowledge of a cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+V.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
+one by means of the other; the conception of one does not
+involve the conception of the other.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VI.  A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non&mdash;existing, its essence
+does not involve existence.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+PROPOSITIONS.
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+PROP. I.  Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. II.  Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
+nothing in common.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Also evident from Def. iii.  For each must exist in
+itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the
+conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. III.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
+cause of the other.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
+cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
+therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IV.  Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from
+the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
+substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else (Ax. i.),&mdash;that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing
+is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and
+its modifications.  Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
+understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one
+from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see
+Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. V.  There cannot exist in the universe two or more
+substances having the same nature or attribute.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If several distinct substances be granted, they must
+be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
+their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
+(Prop. iv.).  If only by the difference of their attributes, it
+will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
+identical attribute.  If by the difference of their
+modifications&mdash;as substance is naturally prior to its
+modifications (Prop. i.),&mdash;it follows that setting the
+modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is
+truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one
+substance different from another,&mdash;that is (by Prop. iv.), there
+cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VI.  One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;It is impossible that there should be in the universe
+two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have
+anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.
+iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be
+produced by the other.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that a substance cannot be
+produced by anything external to itself.  For in the universe
+nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as
+appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.).  Now (by the last
+Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,
+therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.
+Q.E.D.  This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the
+contradictory.  For, if substance be produced by an external
+cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its
+cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be
+substance.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VII.  Existence belongs to the nature of substances.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Substance cannot be produced by anything external
+(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause&mdash;that
+is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence
+belongs to its nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VIII.  Every substance is necessarily infinite.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;There can only be one substance with an identical
+attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);
+its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or
+infinite.  It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it
+would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which
+would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be
+two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd
+(Prop. v.).  It therefore exists as infinite.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note I.&mdash;As finite existence involves a partial negation, and
+infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given
+nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance
+is necessarily infinite.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note II.&mdash;No doubt it will be difficult for those who think
+about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them
+by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.
+vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the
+modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and
+are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence
+they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe
+in natural objects.  Those who are ignorant of true causes, make
+complete confusion&mdash;think that trees might talk just as well as
+men&mdash;that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;
+and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
+also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,
+readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long
+as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.  But, if
+people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no
+doubt about the truth of Prop. vii.  In fact, this proposition
+would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.  For, by
+substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself&mdash;that is, something of which the
+conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas
+modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a
+conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the
+thing in which they exist.  Therefore, we may have true ideas of
+non&mdash;existent modifications; for, although they may have no
+actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their
+essence is so involved in something external to themselves that
+they may through it be conceived.  Whereas the only truth
+substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in
+their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.
+Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and
+distinct&mdash;that is, a true&mdash;idea of a substance, but that he is not
+sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he
+said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it
+was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if
+anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same
+as saying that a false idea was true&mdash;in short, the height of
+absurdity.  It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
+existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth.  And
+we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning&mdash;that there
+is but one such substance.  I think that this may profitably be
+done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
+demonstration, we must premise:&mdash;&mdash;
+</P>
+
+<P>
+1.  The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
+expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined.  From
+this it follows that&mdash;&mdash;
+</P>
+
+<P>
+2.  No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
+individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature
+of the thing defined.  For instance, the definition of a triangle
+expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it
+does not imply any fixed number of triangles.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+3.  There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a
+cause why it should exist.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+4.  This cause of existence must either be contained in the
+nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated
+apart from such definition.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual
+things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the
+existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less.  For
+example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's
+sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have
+had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of
+these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of
+human existence in general; we must also show why there are
+exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be
+assigned for the existence of each individual.  Now this cause
+cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true
+definition of man does not involve any consideration of the
+number twenty.  Consequently, the cause for the existence of
+these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must
+necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may
+lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of
+several individuals must have an external cause.  And, as it has
+been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of
+substance, existence must necessarily be included in its
+definition; and from its definition alone existence must be
+deducible.  But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii.,
+iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances;
+therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same
+nature.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IX.  The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the
+number of its attributes (Def. iv.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. X.  Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
+conceived through itself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of
+substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,
+therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note&mdash;It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in
+fact, conceived as distinct&mdash;that is, one without the help of the
+other&mdash;yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two
+entities, or two different substances.  For it is the nature of
+substance that each of its attributes is conceived through
+itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
+simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;
+but each expresses the reality or being of substance.  It is,
+then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one
+substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each
+and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that
+its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its
+attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.
+Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite
+being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite
+attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and
+infinite essence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to
+distinguish different substances, let him read the following
+propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the
+universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a
+sign would be sought in vain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XI.  God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,
+of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
+necessarily exists.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God
+does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.
+But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd.  Therefore God necessarily
+exists.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Another proof.&mdash;Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason
+must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its
+non&mdash;existence&mdash;e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be
+granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not
+exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from
+existing, or annuls its existence.  This reason or cause must
+either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be
+external to it.  For instance, the reason for the non&mdash;existence
+of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it
+would involve a contradiction.  On the other hand, the existence
+of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its
+nature involves existence.  (See Prop. vii.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle
+does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the
+order of universal nature in extension.  From the latter it must
+follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
+impossible that it should exist.  So much is self&mdash;evident.  It
+follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or
+reason be granted which prevents its existence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
+existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
+certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist.  If such a
+reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the
+very nature of God, or be external to him&mdash;that is, drawn from
+another substance of another nature.  For if it were of the same
+nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist.  But
+substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God
+(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or
+to destroy his existence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
+existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine
+nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn
+from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction.  To
+make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and
+supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of
+God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be
+assigned which would annul his existence.  Therefore, God
+necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Another proof.&mdash;The potentiality of non&mdash;existence is a
+negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence
+is a power, as is obvious.  If, then, that which necessarily
+exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more
+powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously
+absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
+absolutely infinite necessarily exists also.  Now we exist either
+in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see
+Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.).  Therefore a being absolutely
+infinite&mdash;in other words, God (Def. vi.)&mdash;necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's
+existence à posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily
+followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence
+does not follow à priori.  For, as the potentiality of existence
+is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases
+in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength
+for existence.  Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as
+God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence,
+and hence he does absolutely exist.  Perhaps there will be many
+who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as
+they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from
+external causes.  Of such things, they see that those which
+quickly come to pass&mdash;that is, quickly come into existence&mdash;quickly
+also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of
+accomplishment&mdash;that is, not so easily brought into
+existence&mdash;those things which they conceive as more complicated.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here
+show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly,
+goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of
+universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I
+need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which
+come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of
+substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any
+external cause.  Things which are produced by external causes,
+whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever
+perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of
+their external cause;  and therefore their existence arises
+solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from
+their own.  Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by
+substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence
+of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is
+nothing else but its essence.  Thus, the perfection of a thing
+does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it.
+Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we
+cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the
+existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect&mdash;that is, of
+God.  For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and
+involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his
+existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question
+is given.  This, I think, will be evident to every moderately
+attentive reader.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XII.  No attribute of substance can be conceived from which
+it would follow that substance can be divided.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The parts into which substance as thus conceived would
+be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they
+will not.  If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will
+necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self&mdash;caused, and (by
+Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so
+that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one
+substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd.  Moreover, the parts
+(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and
+the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be
+conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be
+absurd.  If we adopt the second alternative&mdash;namely, that the
+parts will not retain the nature of substance&mdash;then, if the whole
+substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature
+of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is
+absurd.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIII.  Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If it could be divided, the parts into which it was
+divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite
+substance, or they would not.  If the former, we should have
+several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is
+absurd.  If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely
+infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also
+absurd.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;It follows, that no substance, and consequently no
+extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
+understood as follows.  The nature of substance can only be
+conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else
+can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii)
+involves a manifest contradiction.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIV.  Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no
+attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied
+(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any
+substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained
+by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
+attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,
+besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be
+conceived.  If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have
+to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this
+proof) is absurd.  Therefore, besides God no substance can be
+granted or conceived.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary I.&mdash;Clearly, therefore: 1.  God is one, that is (by
+Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and
+that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already
+indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary II.&mdash;It follows:  2.  That extension and thought
+are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents
+(affectiones) of the attributes of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XV.  Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can
+be, or be conceived.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Besides God, no substance is granted or can be
+conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which
+is in itself and is conceived through itself.  But modes (by Def.
+v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;
+wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only
+through it be conceived.  But substances and modes form the sum
+total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing
+can be, or be conceived.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
+mind, and is susceptible of passions.  How far such persons have
+strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
+said.  But these I pass over.  For all who have in anywise
+reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body.  Of this
+they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body
+a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a
+certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate
+such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite.  But meanwhile
+by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they
+show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart
+from the divine nature, and say it was created by God.  Wherefrom
+the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant;
+thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of
+their own words.  I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at
+any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop.
+viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything
+other than itself.  Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that
+besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.  Hence we
+drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the
+infinite attributes of God.  However, in order to explain more
+fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all
+start from the following points:&mdash;&mdash;
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
+as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
+infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God.  This
+they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
+two.  If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be
+conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be
+either finite or infinite.  If the former, then infinite
+substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd.  If
+the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another
+infinite, which is also absurd.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths,
+it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would
+equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part
+measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve
+times as great as the other.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn
+two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance
+apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the
+distance between the two lines will be continually increased,
+until at length it changes from definite to indefinable.  As
+these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity
+as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance
+must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain
+to the nature of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme
+perfection.  God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely
+perfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance,
+insofar as it is divisible, is passive.  It follows, therefore,
+that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who
+by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the
+divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto.  However, I
+think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered
+their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the
+hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such
+a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.)
+to be absurd.  Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all
+these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now
+discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion
+that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the
+notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that
+an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts
+therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that:
+infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of
+finite parts.  This is exactly what we have already proved (in
+Prop. xii.).  Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in
+reality recoiled upon themselves.  If, from this absurdity of
+theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended
+substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like
+a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,
+and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to
+deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to
+the circumference are equal.  For, taking extended substance,
+which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible
+(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it
+is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can
+be multiplied and divided.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of
+points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
+infinitely divided.  Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert
+that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it
+would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface
+of lines, and a line of points.  This must be admitted by all who
+know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who
+deny the possibility of a vacuum.  For if extended substance
+could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why
+should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others
+remaining joined together as before?  And why should all be so
+fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum?  Surely in the
+case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one
+can exist without the other, and can remain in its original
+condition.  As, then,  there does not exist a vacuum in nature
+(of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to
+prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be
+distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
+substance cannot be divided.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally
+so prone to divide quantity?  I answer, that quantity is
+conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially,
+as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by
+the intellect.  If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented
+in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall
+find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but
+if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and
+conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we
+shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is
+infinite, one, and indivisible.  This will be plain enough to all
+who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination,
+especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the
+same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as
+we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
+distinguished, not really, but modally.  For instance, water, in
+so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts
+to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is
+extended substance; from this point of view it is neither
+separated nor divisible.  Further, water, in so far as it is
+water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is
+substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in
+fact, founded on the same assumption as the first&mdash;namely, that
+matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed
+of parts.  Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be
+considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God
+(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could
+receive its modifications.  All things, I repeat, are in God, and
+all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the
+laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly
+show) from the necessity of his essence.  Wherefore it can in
+nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other
+than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the
+Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is
+granted to be infinite and eternal.  But enough of this for the
+present.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVI.  From the necessity of the divine nature must follow
+an infinite number of things in infinite ways&mdash;that is, all things
+which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
+remembers that from the given definition of any thing the
+intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily
+follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
+defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the
+definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in
+proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more
+reality.  Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
+attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite
+essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its
+nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
+can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must
+necessarily follow.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary I.&mdash;Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
+cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
+intellect.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary II.&mdash;It also follows that God is a cause in himself,
+and not through an accident of his nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary III.&mdash;It follows, thirdly, that God is the
+absolutely first cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVII.  God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and
+is not constrained by anyone.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
+the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
+solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things
+absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved
+(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived
+but that all things are in God.  Wherefore nothing can exist;
+outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to
+act.  Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
+and is not constrained by anyone.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary I.&mdash;It follows: 1.  That there can be no cause
+which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
+perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary II.&mdash;It follows: 2.  That God is the sole free
+cause.  For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature
+(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole
+necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the
+sole free cause.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
+as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have
+said follow from his nature&mdash;that is, which are in his power,
+should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him.  But
+this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
+that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its
+three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles;
+or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is
+absurd.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
+proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
+nature.  I know that there are many who think that they can show,
+that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature;
+for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can
+attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in
+ourselves.  Further, although they conceive God as actually
+supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring
+into existence everything which he actually understands, for they
+think that they would thus destroy God's power.  If, they
+contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he
+would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,
+would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to
+asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates
+nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute
+exercise of will, to create.  However, I think I have shown
+sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme
+power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things&mdash;that is,
+all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of
+ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as
+from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for
+eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right
+angles.  Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from
+all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state
+of activity.  This manner of treating the question attributes to
+God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect.  For,
+otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an
+infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able
+to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,
+according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render
+himself imperfect.  Wherefore, in order to establish that God is
+perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,
+that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power
+extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most
+repugnant to God's omnipotence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the
+will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain
+to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
+significance quite different from those they usually bear.  For
+intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
+would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
+intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with
+them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence
+between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
+constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.  This I will
+prove as follows.  If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it
+cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,
+posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,
+inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality
+(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.).  On the contrary, the truth and formal
+essence of things is as it is, because it exists by
+representation as such in the intellect of God.  Wherefore the
+intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
+God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
+essence and of their existence.  This seems to have been
+recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,
+God's will, and God's power, are one and the same.  As,
+therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,
+both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ
+from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its
+existence.  For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely
+in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence,
+but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
+therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but
+must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of
+one of them cease, the existence of the other will not
+necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be
+destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be
+destroyed also.  Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of
+the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ
+from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in
+respect to its existence.  Now the intellect of God is the cause
+both of the essence and the existence of our intellect;
+therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to
+constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in
+respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in
+anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before.  The
+reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone
+can easily see.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVIII.  God is the indwelling and not the transient cause
+of all things.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All things which are, are in God, and must be
+conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
+Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.
+This is our first point.  Further, besides God there can be no
+substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to
+God.  This is our second point.  God, therefore, is the
+indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIX.  God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)
+necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains
+to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its
+definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.).  Further,
+by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.
+iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance&mdash;in other
+words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should
+be involved in the attributes of substance.  Now eternity
+appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in
+Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the
+attributes, and thus all are eternal.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This proposition is also evident from the manner in
+which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is
+evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,
+like his essence, is an eternal truth.  Further (in Prop. xix. of
+my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the
+eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XX.  The existence of God and his essence are one and the
+same.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
+eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
+existence.  Therefore the same
+attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at
+the same time his eternal existence&mdash;in other words, that which
+constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his
+existence.  Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one
+and the same.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Coroll. I.&mdash;Hence it follows that God's existence, like his
+essence, is an eternal truth.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Coroll. II&mdash;Secondly, it follows that God, and all the
+attributes of God, are unchangeable.  For if they could be
+changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be
+changed in respect to essence&mdash;that is, obviously, be changed from
+true to false, which is absurd.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXI.  All things which follow from the absolute nature of
+any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in
+other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition
+to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow
+from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the
+same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or
+duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the
+attribute thought.  Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to
+be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its
+nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,
+it is supposed finite.  It cannot, however, be conceived as
+finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is
+not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
+the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);
+therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not
+constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)
+must necessarily exist.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the
+idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
+follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for
+it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,
+the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis.  Wherefore, if
+the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
+anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any
+example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from
+the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the
+said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
+point.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of
+the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration.  For
+if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of
+the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God,
+for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought,
+and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be
+about not to exist.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist
+unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond
+the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the
+latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to
+exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of
+God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,
+thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed
+therefrom.  Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or
+anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of
+some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but
+through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.
+Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of
+anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's
+absolute nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXII.  Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so
+far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily
+and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist
+necessarily and as infinite.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the preceding one.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIII.  Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
+infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature
+of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
+modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;A mode exists in something else, through which it must
+be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in
+God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode
+is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must
+necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of
+God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the
+infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.)
+eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely.  A
+mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must
+follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either
+immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some
+modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said
+attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily
+and as infinite.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIV.  The essence of things produced by God does not
+involve existence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is evident from Def. i.  For that of
+which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
+self&mdash;caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
+things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
+existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
+the being of things (essendi rerum).  For whether things exist,
+or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
+that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently,
+it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other.  God must
+be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
+appertain.  (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXV.  God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
+of things, but also of their essence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
+essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by
+Ax. iv.) be conceived without God.  This (by Prop. xv.) is
+absurd.  Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
+For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
+essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
+existence&mdash;in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
+in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself.  This
+will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Individual things are nothing but modifications of
+the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
+are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.  The proof appears
+from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVI.  A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
+manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that
+which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
+act.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;That by which things are said to be conditioned to act
+in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
+obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God
+by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.
+xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point.  Our second point is
+plainly to be inferred therefrom.  For if a thing, which has not
+been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part
+of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is
+absurd.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVII.  A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act
+in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is evident from the third axiom.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVIII.  Every individual thing, or everything which is
+finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be
+conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
+action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and
+has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in
+its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be
+conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also
+is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to
+infinity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
+thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,
+Coroll.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,
+cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God;
+for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any
+attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.).  It
+must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as
+the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for
+substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.
+and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the
+attributes of God.  But from God, or from any of his attributes,
+in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite
+and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow.  Wherefore it
+must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by
+God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
+modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence.  This is our first point.  Again, this
+cause or this modification (for the reason by which we
+established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be
+conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the
+same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
+namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
+nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
+nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
+follows:&mdash;1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
+things immediately produced by him.  I say absolutely, not after
+his kind, as is usually stated.  For the effects of God cannot
+either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.
+xxiv. Coroll.).  2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote
+cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing
+these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what
+follows from his absolute nature.  For, by a remote cause, we
+understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.
+But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that
+without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIX.  Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all
+things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular
+manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.).  But God cannot
+be called a thing contingent.  For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
+necessarily, and not contingently.  Further, the modes of the
+divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
+(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the
+divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
+conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.).  Further, God is not only the
+cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
+xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as
+conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).
+If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition
+themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
+themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
+the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also
+to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing
+that is contingent.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
+we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura
+naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata).  I say
+to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,
+from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature
+viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,
+and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
+substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other
+words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,
+in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which
+follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
+attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of
+God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
+and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXX.  Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
+infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
+modifications of God, and nothing else.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in
+other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect
+in representation must necessarily be granted in nature.  But in
+nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save
+God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in
+God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived.  Therefore
+the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
+comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
+and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXI.  The intellect in function, whether finite or
+infinite, as will, desire, love, &amp;c., should be referred to
+passive nature and not to active nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
+thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
+other modes, such as love, desire, &amp;c., and therefore (Def. v.)
+requiring to be conceived through absolute thought.  It must (by
+Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
+expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
+conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
+conceived.  It must therefore be referred to nature passive
+rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
+thinking.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
+admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:
+but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
+what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
+understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived.  For
+we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
+the act of understanding.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXII.  Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
+necessary cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
+intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
+nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
+other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
+and so on to infinity.  But if will be supposed infinite, it must
+also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
+being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his
+possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
+essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.).  Thus, however it be
+conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
+which it should be conditioned to exist and act.  Thus (Def.
+vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
+constrained cause.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Coroll. I.&mdash;Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
+according to freedom of the will.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Coroll. II.&mdash;It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
+stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
+rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
+conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
+manner.  For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
+which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
+And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
+number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
+said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
+number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
+that motion and rest act by free will.  Wherefore will no more
+appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
+in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
+we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
+and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
+manner.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIII.  Things could not have been brought into being by
+God in any manner or in any order different from that which has
+in fact obtained.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof&mdash;All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
+(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist
+and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.).  If things, therefore,
+could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
+to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have
+been different, God's nature would also have been able to be
+different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that
+different nature also would have perforce existed, and
+consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.
+This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd.  Therefore things
+could not have been brought into being by God in any other
+manner, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note I.&mdash;As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
+noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
+contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall
+attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the
+words necessary and impossible.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence
+or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing
+necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
+from a given efficient cause.  For similar reasons a thing is
+said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or
+definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
+is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but
+a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation
+to the imperfection of our knowledge.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or
+does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it
+does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt
+concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes
+us,&mdash;such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
+impossible.  Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note II.&mdash;It clearly follows from what we have said, that
+things have been brought into being by God in the highest
+perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a
+most perfect nature.  Nor does this prove any imperfection in
+God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection.  From its
+contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just
+shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
+brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
+God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute
+to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
+will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply
+because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very
+different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced.  They
+assign to him, in short, absolute free will.  However, I am also
+convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly
+weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
+such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
+but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge.  There is
+no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
+xvii.  But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
+that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of
+God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things
+could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
+different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what
+our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely
+on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is.  If
+it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.
+Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all
+eternity by God himself.  If it were otherwise, God would be
+convicted of imperfection or change.  But in eternity there is no
+such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely
+from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never
+could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist
+before his decrees, and would not exist without them.  But, it is
+said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had
+ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and
+her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in
+God.  But persons who say this must admit that God can change his
+decrees.  For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature
+and her order, different from those which he has ordained&mdash;in
+other words, if he had willed and conceived something different
+concerning nature&mdash;he would perforce have had a different
+intellect from that which he has, and also a different will.  But
+if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a
+different will, without any change in his essence or his
+perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the
+decrees which he has made concerning created things, and
+nevertheless remaining perfect?  For his intellect and will
+concerning things created and their order are the same, in
+respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that
+God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as
+they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's
+essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a
+different actual intellect and a different will, his essence
+would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at
+first, if things had been brought into being by God in a
+different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and
+will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have
+been different, which is absurd.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+As these things could not have been brought into being by God
+in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as
+the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection
+of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
+believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were
+in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he
+had understood them.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
+imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be
+called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the
+will of God.  If God had so willed, he might have brought it
+about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,
+and vice versâ.  What is such an assertion, but an open
+declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he
+wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should
+understand things differently from the way in which he does
+understand them?  This (as we have just shown) is the height of
+absurdity.  Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its
+employers, as follows:&mdash;All things depend on the power of God.
+In order that things should be different from what they are,
+God's will would necessarily have to be different.  But God's
+will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly
+demonstrated) from God's perfection.  Therefore neither can
+things be different.  I confess, that the theory which subjects
+all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that
+they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth
+than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all
+things with a view of promoting what is good.  For these latter
+persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not
+depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,
+or which he aims at as a definite goal.  This is only another
+name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter
+absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first
+and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of
+their existence.  I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting
+such wild theories.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIV.  God's power is identical with his essence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;From the sole necessity of the essence of God it
+follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all
+things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.).  Wherefore the power of God, by
+which he and all things are and act, is identical with his
+essence.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXV.  Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
+necessarily exists.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.)
+be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it
+necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVI.  There is no cause from whose nature some effect
+does not follow.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in
+a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is,
+(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given
+conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things,
+therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+APPENDIX:
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties
+of God.  I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:
+that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;
+that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;
+that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without
+him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all
+things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or
+absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power.
+I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the
+prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my
+demonstrations.  Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,
+which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the
+understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained
+it above.  I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these
+misconceptions before the bar of reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+All such opinions spring from the notion commonly
+entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,
+namely, with an end in view.  It is accepted as certain, that God
+himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
+that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship
+him).  I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
+why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
+prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and,
+lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about
+good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
+confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like.  However, this is
+not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of
+the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
+starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
+that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all
+have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they
+are conscious of such desire.  Herefrom it follows, first, that
+men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their
+volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance,
+of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire.
+Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that
+which is useful to them, and which they seek.  Thus it comes to
+pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of
+events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having
+no cause for further doubt.  If they cannot learn such causes
+from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering
+themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them
+personally to bring about the given event, and thus they
+necessarily judge other natures by their own.  Further, as they
+find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist
+them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance,
+eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for
+yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding
+fish, &amp;c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means
+for obtaining such conveniences.  Now as they are aware, that
+they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think
+they have cause for believing, that some other being has made
+them for their use.  As they look upon things as means, they
+cannot believe them to be self&mdash;created; but, judging from the
+means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they
+are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe
+endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted
+everything for human use.  They are bound to estimate the nature
+of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in
+accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that
+the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind
+man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.  Hence
+also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according
+to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God
+might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course
+of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and
+insatiable avarice.  Thus the prejudice developed into
+superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this
+reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain
+the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that
+nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to
+man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,
+and men are all mad together.  Consider, I pray you, the result:
+among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some
+hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &amp;c.: so they
+declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at
+some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in
+their worship.  Experience day by day protested and showed by
+infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of
+pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their
+inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such
+contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were
+ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of
+ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
+and start afresh.  They therefore laid down as an axiom, that
+God's judgments far transcend human understanding.  Such a
+doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the
+human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished
+another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and
+properties of figures without regard to their final causes.
+There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides
+mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed
+to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge
+of the truth.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I have now sufficiently explained my first point.  There is
+no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in
+view, and that final causes are mere human figments.  This, I
+think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and
+foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and
+also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in
+fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that
+everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with
+the utmost perfection.  However, I will add a few remarks, in
+order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly.  That
+which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versâ:
+it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that
+which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.  Passing
+over the questions of cause and priority as self&mdash;evident, it is
+plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most
+perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which
+requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in
+that respect, more imperfect.  But if those things which were
+made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his
+end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the
+first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:
+for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something
+which he lacks.  Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a
+distinction between the object of want and the object of
+assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for
+the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation.  They are
+unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God
+himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore
+driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those
+things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he
+desired them.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+We must not omit to notice that the followers of this
+doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final
+causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their
+theory&mdash;namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to
+ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of
+exhibiting their doctrine.  For example, if a stone falls from a
+roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate
+by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man;
+for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how
+could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent
+circumstances) have all happened together by chance?  Perhaps you
+will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was
+blowing, and the man was walking that way.  "But why," they will
+insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very
+time walking that way?"  If you again answer, that the wind had
+then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day
+before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had
+been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was
+the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?"
+So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at
+last you take refuge in the will of God&mdash;in other words, the
+sanctuary of ignorance.  So, again, when they survey the frame of
+the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the
+causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been
+fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural
+skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt
+another.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and
+strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,
+and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as
+an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the
+interpreters of nature and the gods.  Such persons know that,
+with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only
+available means for proving and preserving their authority would
+vanish also.  But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my
+third point.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is
+created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as
+the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to
+themselves, and to account those things the best of all which
+have the most beneficial effect on mankind.  Further, they were
+bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature
+of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,
+cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that
+they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and
+blame, sin and merit.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human
+nature; the former I will briefly explain here.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God
+they have called good, everything which hinders these objects
+they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not
+understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any
+way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their
+imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that
+there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things
+and their own nature.  When phenomena are of such a kind, that
+the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of
+imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say
+that they are well&mdash;ordered; if the contrary, that they are
+ill&mdash;ordered or confused.  Further, as things which are easily
+imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to
+confusion&mdash;as though there were any order in nature, except in
+relation to our imagination&mdash;and say that God has created all
+things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing
+imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God
+foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it
+should be most easily imagined.  If this be their theory, they
+would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an
+infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and
+very many others which confound its weakness.  But enough has
+been said on this subject.  The other abstract notions are
+nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
+differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant
+as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that
+everything was created for the sake of themselves; and,
+according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,
+healthy or rotten and corrupt.  For instance, if the motion which
+objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,
+the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary
+motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are
+styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,
+full&mdash;flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,
+rough or smooth, &amp;c.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,
+sound, or harmony.  In this last case, there are men lunatic
+enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in
+harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded
+themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to
+harmony&mdash;all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone
+judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather
+mistakes for things the forms of his imagination.  We need no
+longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we
+have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human
+bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they
+differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;
+what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what
+is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on.  I need not
+further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the
+subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well
+known.  It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;
+everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as
+palates."  All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things
+according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
+understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
+mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I
+have urged.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly
+given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate
+the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the
+imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were
+entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
+entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all
+arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily
+rebutted.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Many argue in this way.  If all things follow from a
+necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there
+so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things
+corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,
+confusion, evil, sin, &amp;c.  But these reasoners are, as I have
+said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be
+reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not
+more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human
+senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to
+mankind.  To those who ask why God did not so create all men,
+that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but
+this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of
+every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more
+strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to
+suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an
+infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if
+there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily
+dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.
+</P>
+
+<BR><BR><BR>
+
+<A NAME="chap02"></A>
+<H2 ALIGN="center">
+PART II.
+</H2>
+
+<H3 ALIGN="center">
+ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
+</H3>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+PREFACE
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
+necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and
+infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part
+i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
+infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
+us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
+and its highest blessedness.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+DEFINITIONS
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+DEFINITION I.  By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain
+determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is
+considered as an extended thing.  (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,
+Coroll.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+DEFINITION II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing
+that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,
+and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;
+in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
+without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is
+formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation.&mdash;I say conception rather than perception, because
+the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in
+respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an
+activity of the mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+DEFINITION IV.  By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so
+far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the
+object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation.&mdash;I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark
+which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and
+its object (ideatum).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+DEFINITION V.  Duration is the indefinite continuance of
+existing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation.&mdash;I say indefinite, because it cannot be
+determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or
+by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of
+the thing, but does not take it away.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+DEFINITION VI.  Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+DEFINITION VII.  By particular things, I mean things which are
+finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several
+individual things concur in one action, so as to be all
+simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so
+far, as one particular thing.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+AXIOMS
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+I.  The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that
+is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or
+that man does or does not exist.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  Man thinks.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+III.  Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
+the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
+individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &amp;c.  But the idea
+can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+V.  We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
+modes of thought.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+N.B.  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
+xiii.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+PROPOSITIONS
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+PROP. I.  Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
+thing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
+modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
+of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.).  God therefore possesses
+the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved
+in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
+Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
+which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
+vi.).  In other words, God is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we
+are able to conceive an infinite thinking being.  For, in
+proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
+thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
+perfection.  Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
+number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,
+in respect of thinking, infinite.  As, therefore, from the
+consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,
+thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the
+infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. II.  Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an
+extended thing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the last.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. III.  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
+essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his
+essence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
+infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
+thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
+and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.  Now all
+that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).
+Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and
+in God alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part i., Prop. xv.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;The multitude understand by the power of God the free
+will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
+latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent.  For
+it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
+reduce them to nothing.  Further, the power of God is very often
+likened to the power of kings.  But this doctrine we have refuted
+(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown
+(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as
+that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
+follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
+that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
+necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways.  We
+further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
+identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
+impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
+him as non&mdash;existent.  If we might pursue the subject further, I
+could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
+God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
+multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
+negation of power.  However, I am unwilling to go over the same
+ground so often.  I would only beg the reader again and again, to
+turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from
+Prop. xvi. to the end.  No one will be able to follow my meaning,
+unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of
+God with the human power and right of kings.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IV.  The idea of God, from which an infinite number of
+things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
+attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
+Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.).  Therefore the
+idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in
+infinite ways, can only be one.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. V.  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only
+in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far
+as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas
+both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own
+as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
+perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
+Part.  We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
+of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
+therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
+he is the object of his own idea.  Wherefore the actual being of
+ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
+ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
+xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
+nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
+(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
+of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
+of any attribute save thought.  Therefore the actual being of
+ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
+thinking thing, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VI.  The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in
+so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they
+are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other attribute.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
+any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
+attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
+any other.  Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
+in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
+they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence the actual being of things, which are not
+modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because
+that nature has prior knowledge of the things.  Things
+represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
+particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
+necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
+the attribute of thought.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VII.  The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
+order and connection of things.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.  For
+the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of
+the cause, whereof it is an effect.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
+realized power of action&mdash;that is, whatsoever follows from the
+infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
+follows without exception in the same order and connection from
+the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what
+has been pointed out above&mdash;namely, that whatsoever can be
+perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
+of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
+consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
+and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
+now through the other.  So, also, a mode of extension and the
+idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in
+two ways.  This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
+those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
+things understood by God are identical.  For instance, a circle
+existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
+also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
+different attributes.  Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
+attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
+under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
+and the same chain of causes&mdash;that is, the same things following
+in either case.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I said that God is the cause of an idea&mdash;for instance, of the
+idea of a circle,&mdash;in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
+circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
+actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
+proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
+through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
+consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
+of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
+attribute of thought only.  And, in so far as we consider things
+as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
+nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in
+the case of the other attributes.  Wherefore of things as they
+are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
+consists of infinite attributes.  I cannot for the present
+explain my meaning more clearly.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VIII.  The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
+not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
+the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
+are contained in the attributes of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is evident from the last; it is
+understood more clearly from the preceding note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
+except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
+God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,
+except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when
+particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they
+are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they
+are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,
+through which they are said to continue.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
+this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
+which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
+inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
+illustrate it as far as possible.  The nature of a circle is such
+that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the
+rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;
+thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle.  Yet
+none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far
+as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
+rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
+comprehended in the idea of the circle.  Let us grant that, from
+this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist.  The ideas of
+these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the
+idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of
+those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the
+remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IX.  The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
+existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
+by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
+(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus
+(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only
+as he is a thinking thing.  But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)
+in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
+is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so
+on to infinity.  Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by
+Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of
+causes.   Therefore of a given individual idea another individual
+idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that
+idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in
+so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of
+any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he
+has the idea of the object.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
+idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
+is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
+another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
+Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the
+same as the order and connection of things.  The knowledge,
+therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
+will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. X.  The being of substance does not appertain to the
+essence of man&mdash;in other words, substance does not constitute the
+actual being[2] of man.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[2] "Forma"
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The being of substance involves necessary existence
+(Part i., Prop. vii.).  If, therefore, the being of substance
+appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
+would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
+consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd
+(II. Ax. i.).  Therefore, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which
+it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same
+nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is
+not that which constitutes the actual being of man.  Again, the
+proposition is evident from the other properties of
+substance&mdash;namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
+immutable, indivisible, &amp;c., as anyone may see for himself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
+constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
+For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to
+the essence of man.  That essence therefore (by i.  15) is
+something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
+nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),
+or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
+manner.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
+conceived without God.  All men agree that God is the one and
+only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
+existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
+respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect
+to their being (secundum esse).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+At the same time many assert, that that, without which a
+thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
+thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
+appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
+things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
+probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines.  I think the
+cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the
+proper order of philosophic thinking.  The nature of God, which
+should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the
+order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be
+last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
+what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are
+considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to
+the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to
+the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in
+mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the
+knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are
+no help towards understanding the divine nature.  So that it is
+hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
+themselves freely.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+However, I pass over this point.  My intention her was only
+to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
+cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
+individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
+does not appertain to their essence.  I said that "I considered
+as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
+the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
+thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
+thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
+conceived."  (II. Def. ii.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XI.  The first element, which constitutes the actual being
+of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
+existing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)
+is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
+(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
+Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
+given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
+in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
+Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
+mind.  But not the idea of a non&mdash;existent thing, for then (II.
+viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
+therefore be the idea of something actually existing.  But not of
+an infinite thing.  For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
+always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
+absurdity.  Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
+actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
+existing.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
+the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human
+mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
+this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
+as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so
+far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we
+say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
+constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
+he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
+another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in
+part or inadequately.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
+will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;
+I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
+not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
+end.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XII.  Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,
+which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human
+mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of
+the said occurrence.  That is, if the object of the idea
+constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in
+that body without being perceived by the mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
+the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in
+so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said
+object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
+of anything.  Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
+constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is
+necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
+the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of
+the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words
+the mind perceives it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
+to be understood from II. vii., which see.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIII.  The object of the idea constituting the human mind
+is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which
+actually exists, and nothing else.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If indeed the body were not the object of the human
+mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
+God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but
+in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that
+is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body
+would not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the
+idea of the modifications of the body.  Therefore the object of
+the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as
+it actually exists (II. xi.).  Further, if there were any other
+object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as
+nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
+xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
+which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but
+(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea.  Wherefore the object of our
+mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
+united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind
+and body.  However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately
+or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the
+nature of our body.  The propositions we have advanced hitherto
+have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to
+other individual things, all of which, though in different
+degrees, are animated.[3]  For of everything there is necessarily
+an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as
+there is an idea of the human body; thus  whatever we have
+asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be
+asserted of the idea of everything else.  Still, on the other
+hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from
+the other, one being more excellent than another and containing
+more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent
+than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[3] "Animata"
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind
+differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is
+necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of
+the human body.  What this nature is, I am not able here to
+explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,
+that I should do so.  I will only say generally, that in
+proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
+many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
+the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for
+forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions
+of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
+concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it
+is the object for distinct comprehension.  We may thus recognize
+the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the
+cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,
+and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following
+propositions, deduce from what has been advanced.  Wherefore I
+have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my
+present statements.  In order to do so, I must premise a few
+propositions concerning the nature of bodies.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+AXIOM I.  All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+AXIOM II.  Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
+sometimes more quickly.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+LEMMA I.  Bodies are distinguished from one another in
+respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in
+respect of substance.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
+self&mdash;evident.  That bodies are not distinguished in respect of
+substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii.  It is brought
+out still more clearly from I. xv, note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+LEMMA II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
+conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).
+Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,
+and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+LEMMA III.  A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
+motion or rest by another body, which other body has been
+determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third
+again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
+(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to
+motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be
+determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
+(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
+motion or at rest.  And this body again can only have been set in
+motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to
+motion or rest.   This third body again by a fourth, and so on to
+infinity.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
+motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other
+body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a
+state of motion by some other body.  This is indeed self&mdash;evident.
+For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
+rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,
+I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is
+at rest.  If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
+this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no
+other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at
+rest.  If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
+long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
+concerning it, except that it is in motion.   If A is
+subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
+of A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to
+continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted
+from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
+cause determining A to a state of rest.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Axiom I.&mdash;All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
+body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected
+and the body affecting; so that one and the same body may be
+moved in different modes, according to the difference in the
+nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different
+bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Axiom II.&mdash;When a body in motion impinges on another body at
+rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to
+continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in
+the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
+body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
+of motion of incidence and the same plane.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
+which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and
+rest, quickness and slowness.  We now pass on to compound bodies.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Definition.&mdash;When any given bodies of the same or different
+magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or
+if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that
+their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain
+fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that
+together they compose one body or individual, which is
+distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Axiom III.&mdash;In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a
+compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies,
+they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved
+from their position; consequently the individual will, with
+greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form.
+Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies,
+are called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over small
+superficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motion
+among one another, are called fluid.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+LEMMA IV.  If from a body or individual, compounded of
+several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same
+time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take
+their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before,
+without any change in its actuality (forma).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
+substance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
+individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but
+this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will
+(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,
+will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance
+and in respect of mode.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+LEMMA V.  If the parts composing an individual become greater
+or less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same
+mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still
+preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be
+changed.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The same as for the last Lemma.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+LEMMA VI.  If certain bodies composing an individual be
+compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction,
+for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they
+be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication
+in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its
+own nature without any change of its actuality.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is self&mdash;evident, for the individual
+is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we
+spoke of as its actual being.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+LEMMA VII.  Furthermore, the individual thus composed
+preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at
+rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as
+each part retains its motion, and preserves its communication
+with other parts as before.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is evident from the definition of an
+individual prefixed to Lemma iv.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected
+in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding.
+Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies
+only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and
+rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple
+character.  If, however, we now conceive another individual
+composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find
+that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without
+losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied.  Each of its parts
+would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.)
+each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker
+or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its
+motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts.  If
+we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of
+individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be
+affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their
+actuality.  We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive
+the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all
+bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the
+individual as a whole.  I should feel bound to explain and
+demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a
+special treatise on body.  But I have already said that such is
+not my object; I have only touched on the question, because it
+enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+POSTULATES
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+I.  The human body is composed of a number of individual
+parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself
+extremely complex.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  Of the individual parts composing the human body some
+are fluid, some soft, some hard.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+III.  The individual parts composing the human body, and
+consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of
+ways by external bodies.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IV.  The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
+number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,
+regenerated.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+V.  When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
+external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes
+the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression
+thereupon of the external body which impels it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VI.  The human body can move external bodies, and arrange
+them in a variety of ways.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIV.  The human mind is capable of perceiving a great
+number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable
+of receiving a great number of impressions.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
+very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many
+ways of affecting external bodies.  But (II. xii.)  the human
+mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the
+human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
+things, and is so in proportion, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XV.  The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the
+human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of
+ideas.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The idea constituting the actual being of the human
+mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
+composed of a great number of complex individual parts.  But
+there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
+whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore
+(II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these
+numerous ideas of its component parts.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVI.  The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
+affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human
+body, and also the nature of the external body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
+follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the
+nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of
+Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax.
+iv.) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of
+every mode, in which the human body is affected by external
+bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external
+body.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary I.&mdash;Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
+perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the
+nature of its own.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary II.&mdash;It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we
+have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our
+own body than the nature of external bodies.  I have amply
+illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVII.  If the human body is affected in a manner which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present
+to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
+exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is self&mdash;evident, for so long as the
+human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human
+mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body&mdash;that is (by
+the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually
+existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body.
+In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but
+postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the
+external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will
+regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
+affected, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;The mind is able to regard as present external
+bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even
+though they be no longer in existence or present.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
+human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they
+change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii.,
+after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in
+a different manner from that which they followed before such
+change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new
+surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be
+refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
+towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they
+will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human
+body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
+take cognizance&mdash;that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard
+the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the
+fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces
+by their own spontaneous motion.  Wherefore, although the
+external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected,
+be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them
+as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
+that we regard as present many things which are not.  It is
+possible that the same result may be brought about by other
+causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated
+one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out
+the true cause.  Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the
+truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
+rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
+controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human
+body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.).
+Furthermore (II. vii.  Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly
+understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of
+Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the
+idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.  The
+former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and
+only  implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter
+indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature
+of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body
+lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even
+though he no longer exists.  Further, to retain the usual
+phraseology,  the modifications of the human body, of which the
+ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call
+the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of
+things.  When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say
+that it imagines.  I will here draw attention to the fact, in
+order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the
+mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error.  The mind
+does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as
+it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the
+existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it.  If
+the mind, while imagining non&mdash;existent things as present to it,
+is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this
+power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its
+nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of
+imagination depend solely on its own nature&mdash;that is (I. Def.
+vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVIII.  If the human body has once been affected by two or
+more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines
+any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,
+because the human body is affected and disposed by the
+impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is
+affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
+external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so
+disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,
+it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
+the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the
+other.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;We now clearly see what Memory is.  It is simply a
+certain association of ideas involving the nature of things
+outside the human body, which association arises in the mind
+according to the order and association of the modifications
+(affectiones) of the human body.  I say, first, it is an
+association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of
+things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the
+nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the
+human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve
+the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.  I say,
+secondly, that this association arises according to the order and
+association of the modifications of the human body, in order to
+distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from
+the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things
+through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same.
+And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from
+the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the
+thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first;
+for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a
+Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple,
+which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question,
+nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man
+has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the
+man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the
+fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to
+another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things
+in his body.  For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the
+tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought
+of war, &amp;c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &amp;c.  Thus every man
+will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has
+been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images
+of things in this or that manner.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIX.  The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does
+not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications
+whereby the body is affected.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
+human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
+he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing
+actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
+stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
+continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas
+is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);
+this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
+as affected by the ideas of very many particular things.  Thus
+God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in
+so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
+far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by
+II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body.
+But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far
+as  he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human
+mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently
+(II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing;
+therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XX.  The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in
+God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to
+God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human
+body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore
+(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of
+thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of
+the human mind (II. xi.).  Further, this idea or knowledge of the
+mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but
+in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual
+thing (II. ix.).  But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
+ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;
+therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is
+referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
+the body.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXI.  This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the
+same way as the mind is united to the body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;That the mind is united to the body we have shown from
+the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and
+xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be
+united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner
+as the mind is united to the body.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from
+what we have said in the note to II. vii.  We there showed that
+the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.),
+are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute
+of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the
+idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing,
+which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,
+thought.  The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are
+in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same
+power of thinking.  Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that
+is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality
+(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of
+thought without reference to the object; if a man knows
+anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at
+the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to
+infinity.  But I will treat of this hereafter.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXII.  The human mind perceives not only the modifications
+of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
+in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,
+as the ideas of the said modifications.  This is proved in the
+same way as II. xx.  But the ideas of the modifications of the
+body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far
+as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the
+ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
+knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
+will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not
+only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
+modifications.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIII.  The mind does not know itself, except in so far as
+it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in
+God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same
+manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body.  But since (II.
+xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
+(II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
+human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
+human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human
+mind thus far has no knowledge of itself.  Further the ideas of
+the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the
+nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.),
+they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge
+of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but
+(by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
+mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has
+knowledge of itself.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIV.  The human mind does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The parts composing the human body do not belong to
+the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate
+their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.
+after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as
+individuals without relation to the human body.  The parts of the
+human body are highly complex individuals  (Post. i.), whose
+parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in
+any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
+latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after
+Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.
+iii.)  the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,
+inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea
+of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the
+order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.).  We may affirm
+the same thing of each part of each individual composing the
+human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the
+human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many
+ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the
+human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the
+nature of the human mind (II. xiii); therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge
+of the human body.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXV.  The idea of each modification of the human body does
+not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
+human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as
+that external body conditions the human body in a given manner.
+But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
+no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
+in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the
+idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to
+the said external body.  Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the
+external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the
+modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the
+modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the external body.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVI.  The human mind does not perceive any external body
+as actually existing, except through the ideas of the
+modifications of its own body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If the human body is in no way affected by a given
+external body, then  (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
+body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the
+idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
+any manner perceive its existence.  But, in so far as the human
+body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far
+(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;In so far as the human mind imagines an external
+body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;When the human mind regards external bodies through
+the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it
+imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine
+external bodies as actually existing.  Therefore (by II. xxv.),
+in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
+adequate knowledge of them.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVII.  The idea of each modification of the human body
+does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Every idea of a modification of the human body
+involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human
+body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.).  But,
+inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
+in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &amp;c.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVIII.  The ideas of the modifications of the human body,
+in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not
+clear and distinct, but confused.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The ideas of the modifications of the human body
+involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies
+(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human
+body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes
+(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,
+consequently, the human body as a whole are affected.   But (by
+II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
+also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas.  These ideas of
+modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind
+alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,
+confused ideas.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind
+is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in
+itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the
+idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the
+modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred
+to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIX.  The idea of the idea of each modification of the
+human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human
+mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
+xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,
+in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is
+(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
+adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not
+adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not
+involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
+perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an
+adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,
+of its own body, and of external bodies.  For the mind does not
+know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
+modifications of body (II. xxiii.).  It only perceives its own
+body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only
+perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so
+far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate
+knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.
+xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a
+fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and
+note).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
+only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
+external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common
+order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from
+without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to
+regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from
+within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,
+to understand their points of agreement, difference, and
+contrast.  Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it
+regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXX.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of our body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The duration of our body does not depend on its
+essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.
+xxi.).  But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
+by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
+operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these
+last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.
+The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
+nature, or the constitution of things.  Now, however a thing may
+be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,
+in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
+he has the idea of the human body only.  (II. ix. Coroll.)
+Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
+very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
+the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this
+knowledge is very inadequate to our mind.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXI.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of particular things external to ourselves.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
+conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a
+fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must
+likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity.  (I.
+xxviii.)  As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
+this common property of particular things, we have only a very
+inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a
+similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
+things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
+of the duration thereof.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that all particular things are
+contingent and perishable.  For we can have no adequate idea of
+their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
+understand by the contingency and perishableness of things.  (I.
+xxxiii., Note i.)  For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing
+is contingent.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXII.  All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
+are true.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
+their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are
+all true.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIII.  There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes
+them to be called false.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
+mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality
+of falsehood.  Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.
+xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).
+Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to
+be called false.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIV.  Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
+perfect, is true.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
+perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea
+is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the
+essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
+an idea is true.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXV.  Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,
+which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
+to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in
+simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to
+be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
+ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in
+the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
+confused ideas involve.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists
+in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light
+on the subject I will give an example.  For instance, men are
+mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up
+of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the
+causes by which they are conditioned.  Their idea of freedom,
+therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their
+actions.  As for their saying that human actions depend on the
+will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond
+thereto.  What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none
+of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
+dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
+either laughter or disgust.  So, again, when we look at the sun,
+we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;
+this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
+that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true
+distance or the cause of the fancy.  For although we afterwards
+learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
+the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near;
+for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are
+ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
+our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said
+body is affected thereby.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVI.  Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
+necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
+are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)
+adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,
+except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
+xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
+follow by the same necessity (II. vi.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVII.  That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,
+above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
+constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,
+the essence of B.  Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either
+exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.
+Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Those things, which are common to all, and which
+are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived
+except adequately.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and
+which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the
+whole.  I say A cannot be conceived except adequately.  For the
+idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii.
+Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,
+and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the
+human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the
+nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that
+is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be
+adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in
+so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.
+Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A
+adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as
+it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any
+external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary&mdash;Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or
+notions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree
+in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be
+adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIX.  That, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human
+body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in
+the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If A be that, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human
+body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each
+external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of
+A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of
+the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given
+external bodies.  Let it now be granted, that the human body is
+affected by an external body through that, which it has in common
+therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve
+the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the
+idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property
+A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the
+idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he
+constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to
+perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has
+more in common with other bodies.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which
+are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is self&mdash;evident.  For when we say
+that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are
+therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that
+an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not
+in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by
+the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as
+he constitutes the essence of the human mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note I.&mdash;I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,
+which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our
+ratiocination.  But there are other causes of certain axioms or
+notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
+method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more
+useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at
+all.  Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all
+men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
+are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are
+ill&mdash;founded.  Again we should discern whence the notions called
+secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on
+which they are founded, and other points of interest connected
+with these questions.  But I have decided to pass over the
+subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
+treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
+too great prolixity.  Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything
+necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence
+are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,
+Thing, Something.  These terms arose from the fact, that the
+human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming
+a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the
+II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number
+be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this
+number of images, of which the body is capable of forming
+distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become
+entirely confused one with another.  This being so, it is evident
+(from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind
+can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body
+can form images simultaneously.  When the images become quite
+confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies
+confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as
+it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of
+Being, Thing, &amp;c.  The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact
+that images are not always equally vivid, and from other
+analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for
+the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
+consider one only.  All may be reduced to this, that these terms
+represent ideas in the highest degree confused.  From similar
+causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,
+horse, dog, &amp;c.  They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many
+images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the
+human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed
+utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small
+differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &amp;c.) and
+their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
+which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
+them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said
+individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses
+by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
+particular individuals.  For, as we have said, it is unable to
+imagine the definite number of individuals.  We must, however,
+bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
+men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the
+point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and
+which the mind most easily imagines or remembers.  For instance,
+those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of
+man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect
+stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other
+attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
+instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two&mdash;footed animal
+without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
+everyone will form general images of things according to the
+habit of his body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,
+who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed
+of them, so many controversies should have arisen.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note II.&mdash;From all that has been said above it is clear, that
+we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:&mdash;(1.)
+From particular things represented to our intellect
+fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
+(II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by
+the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.[4]
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard
+certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
+concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things
+(II. xviii. note).  I shall call both these ways of regarding
+things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
+(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and
+adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll.,
+xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of
+the second kind.  Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,
+as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we
+will call intuition.  This kind of knowledge proceeds from an
+adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of
+God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.  I will
+illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example.
+Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to
+the third as the second is to the first.  Tradesmen without
+hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the
+product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the
+rule which they received from a master without any proof, or
+because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or
+by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the
+seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property
+of proportionals.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+But with very simple numbers there is no need of this.  For
+instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the
+fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we
+infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio,
+which the first bears to the second.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLI.  Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of
+falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily
+true.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the
+foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate
+and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only
+source of falsity (II. xxxv.).  Furthermore, we assigned to the
+second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are
+adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.
+xxxiv.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLII.  Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not
+knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true
+from the false.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is self&mdash;evident.  He, who knows how
+to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea
+of true and false.  That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the
+true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLIII.  He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that
+he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing
+perceived.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,
+in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind
+(II. xi. Coroll.).  Let us suppose that there is in God, in so
+far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,
+A.  The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be
+referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,
+whereof the proof is of universal application).  But the idea A
+is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed
+through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must
+be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi.
+Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,
+which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate
+idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time
+have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that
+is, obviously, he must be assured.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
+the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing
+proposition is in itself sufficiently plain.  No one, who has a
+true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
+certainty.  For to have a true idea is only another expression
+for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.  No one,
+indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
+something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
+thinking&mdash;namely, the very act of understanding.  And who, I ask,
+can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
+understand it?  In other words, who can know that he is sure of a
+thing, unless he be first sure of that thing?  Further, what can
+there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
+standard of truth?  Even as light displays both itself and
+darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
+questions&mdash;namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false
+idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
+true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
+(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
+consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
+advantage over him who has only false ideas.  Further, how comes
+it that men have false ideas?  Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
+that he has ideas which agree with their objects?  These
+questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
+answered.  The difference between a true idea and a false idea is
+plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to
+the latter as being is to not&mdash;being.  The causes of falsity I
+have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the
+note.  From what is there stated, the difference between a man
+who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made
+apparent.  As for the last question&mdash;as to how a man can be sure
+that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just
+pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises
+from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with
+its object&mdash;in other words, that truth is its own standard.  We
+may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is
+part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.);
+therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as
+necessarily true as the ideas of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLIV.  It is not in the nature of reason to regard things
+as contingent, but as necessary.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly
+(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves&mdash;that
+is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary I.&mdash;Hence it follows, that it is only through our
+imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
+future or the past, as contingent.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;How this way of looking at things arises, I will
+briefly explain.  We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)
+that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even
+though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which
+exclude their existence and presence.  Further (II. xviii.), we
+showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two
+external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards
+imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway
+remember the other&mdash;that is, it will regard both as present to
+itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence
+and presence.  Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from
+the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than
+others, some more quickly, some at equal speed.  Thus, let us
+suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in
+the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that
+today he again sees Peter in the morning.  It is evident, from
+II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he
+will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the
+sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other
+words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his
+imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he
+will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon&mdash;that
+is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation
+to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the
+evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by
+imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past
+time.  If it should at any time happen, that on some other
+evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on
+the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening
+sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the
+child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,
+not both together.  His imagination will therefore waver; and,
+with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first
+one, then the other&mdash;that is, he will imagine them in the future,
+neither of them as certain, but both as contingent.  This
+wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
+be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
+relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may
+imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time
+present, past, or future.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary II.&mdash;It is in the nature of reason to perceive
+things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis
+specie).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as
+contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.).  Reason perceives this
+necessity of things (II. xli.) truly&mdash;that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it
+is in itself.  But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very
+necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the
+nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.
+We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.
+xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.
+xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:
+which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,
+under a certain form of eternity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLV.  Every idea of every body, or of every particular
+thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The idea of a particular thing actually existing
+necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
+said thing (II. viii.).  Now particular things cannot be
+conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
+have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
+attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
+must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
+attributes of those ideas&mdash;that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;By existence I do not here mean duration&mdash;that is,
+existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
+certain form of quantity.  I am speaking of the very nature of
+existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
+follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
+necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.).  I am speaking, I repeat, of
+the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in
+God.  For although each particular thing be conditioned by
+another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force
+whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
+the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLVI.  The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of
+God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
+whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea
+thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),
+will involve God's eternal and infinite essence.  Wherefore,
+that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
+of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the
+whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLVII.  The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
+eternal and infinite essence of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
+xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
+external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
+existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
+knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
+eternity of God are known to all.  Now as all things are in God,
+and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
+many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
+third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,
+and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to
+speak in Part V.  Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as
+they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine
+God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the
+name God with images of things that they are in the habit of
+seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they
+are, men, and continually affected by external bodies.  Many
+errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do
+not apply names to things rightly.  For instance, when a man says
+that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its
+circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly
+attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that
+assigned by mathematicians.  So again, when men make mistakes in
+calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and
+another on the paper.  If we could see into their minds, they do
+not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that
+they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the
+paper.  If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in
+error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I
+lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a
+neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.
+Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do
+not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret
+the meaning of others.  For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly
+contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of
+the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider
+mistaken and absurd in their opponents.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLVIII.  In the mind there is no absolute or free will;
+but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which
+has also been determined by another cause, and this last by
+another cause, and so on to infinity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
+xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.
+xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute
+faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
+must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by
+another cause, and this last by another, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind
+no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &amp;c.
+Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
+entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
+such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.
+Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to
+this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to
+this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul.  The cause
+which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in
+the Appendix to Part I.  But, before I proceed further, I would
+here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the
+faculty, not the desire.  I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby
+the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,
+wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.
+After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general
+notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular
+instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether
+volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.
+We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any
+affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as
+it is an idea, involves.  On which subject see the following
+proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should
+suggest itself.  For by ideas I do not mean images such as are
+formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but
+the conceptions of thought.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLIX.  There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
+negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
+involves.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
+or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this
+or that affirmation, and this or that negation.  Now let us
+conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
+whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a
+triangle are equal to two right angles.  This affirmation
+involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
+the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.  It is the same
+thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as
+it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.  Further,
+this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
+of a triangle.  Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be
+conceived, without the idea of a triangle.  Again, this idea of a
+triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its
+three interior angles are equal to two right angles.  Wherefore,
+and vice versâ, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be
+conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation
+belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing
+besides.  What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have
+selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,
+that it is nothing but an idea.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Will and understanding are one and the same.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
+individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note).  But a
+particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
+(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
+one and the same.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
+assigned for error.  For we have shown above, that falsity
+consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas
+which are fragmentary and confused.  Wherefore, a false idea,
+inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty.  When we
+say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he
+has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
+but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is
+false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his
+imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note).  Thus, although the
+man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say
+that he is certain.  For by certainty we mean something positive
+(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
+explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and
+I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced
+against our doctrine.  Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
+I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
+advantages, which follow therefrom.  I say "some," for they will
+be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
+part.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
+make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
+the mind, and the images of things which we imagine.  It is
+further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
+words, whereby we signify things.  These three&mdash;namely, images,
+words, and ideas&mdash;are by many persons either entirely confused
+together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
+and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
+necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for
+philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.  Those
+who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
+contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas
+of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not
+ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
+our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
+pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not
+see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
+affirmation or negation.  Again, those who confuse words with
+ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that
+they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or
+deny.  This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who
+reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no
+wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly
+understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not
+consist in the image of anything, nor in words.  The essence of
+words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no
+wise involve the conception of thought.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+These few words on this subject will suffice: I will
+therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised
+against our doctrine.  Of these, the first is advanced by those,
+who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,
+and that therefore it is different therefrom.  The reason for
+their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the
+understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
+increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
+negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do
+not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
+faculty of understanding.  The will is thus distinguished from
+the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
+Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
+especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
+before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
+by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
+perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not
+therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not
+deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does
+exist.  Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by
+experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and
+different from the faculty of understanding.  Thirdly, it may be
+objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more
+reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to
+need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power
+than for affirming, that what is false is true.  We have,
+however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than
+another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so
+also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this
+also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and
+the will.  Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from
+free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are
+equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?  Will he
+perish of hunger and thirst?  If I say that he would, I shall
+seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather
+than an actual man.  If I say that he would not, he would then
+determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
+faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.  Other objections
+might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
+everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
+task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
+possible.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will
+has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding
+be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
+has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
+forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
+should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
+for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
+infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
+affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the
+same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
+infinite number of bodies.  If it be said that there is an
+infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
+that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
+consequently, by any faculty of volition.  But, it may still be
+urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
+them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
+perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
+already.  This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
+it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
+entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
+understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
+which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
+We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we
+explain all particular volitions&mdash;in other words, that which is
+common to all such volitions.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
+universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
+wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
+into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
+what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
+infinite number of individuals.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a
+free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that
+anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that
+he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.
+Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a
+perception, and not free will.  In order to illustrate the point,
+let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing
+else.  Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the
+horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything
+which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will
+necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to
+doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof.  We
+have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I
+do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,
+while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his
+judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it
+about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that
+he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we
+suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as
+actual perception extends&mdash;that is, I grant that the mind's
+imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
+xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
+perception, make any affirmation.  For what is the perception of
+a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?  If the
+mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
+regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons
+for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
+the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
+precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
+perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
+inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
+existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the
+subject.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third
+objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is
+predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is
+common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate
+essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the
+abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the
+same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting
+the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular
+affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas.  For
+instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,
+differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much
+as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal
+power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and
+to affirm that that which is false is true.  These two
+affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
+one another as being and not&mdash;being; for there is nothing
+positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
+falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when
+we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
+and abstractions with realities.  As for the fourth objection, I
+am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
+described  (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
+a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from
+him) would die of hunger and thirst.  If I am asked, whether such
+an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
+answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be
+considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider
+children, fools, madmen, &amp;c.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
+doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
+from what has been said.  The doctrine is good,
+</P>
+
+<P>
+1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
+decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so
+much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and
+more understand God.  Such a doctrine not only completely
+tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest
+happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of
+God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
+us.  We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
+estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God
+with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as
+for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
+service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct
+ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which
+are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature.  For it
+shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or
+frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the
+eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from
+the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches
+us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to
+be angry with any.  Further, as it tells us that each should be
+content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any
+womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the
+guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as
+I will show in Part III.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
+commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and
+led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do
+whatsoever things are best.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of
+this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a
+close.  I think I have therein explained the nature and
+properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
+considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient
+clearness.  I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
+excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
+to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.
+</P>
+
+<BR><BR><BR>
+
+<A NAME="chap03"></A>
+<H2 ALIGN="center">
+PART III.
+</H2>
+
+<H3 ALIGN="center">
+ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
+</H3>
+
+<P>
+Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be
+treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural
+phenomena following nature's general laws.  They appear to
+conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a
+kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
+nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,
+and that he is determined solely by himself.  They attribute
+human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in
+general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which
+accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,
+abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human
+mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked
+upon as a seer.  Still there has been no lack of very excellent
+men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),
+who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way
+of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind.  But no one,
+so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the
+emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their
+restraint.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he
+believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,
+strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at
+the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain
+to absolute dominion over them.  However, in my opinion, he
+accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own
+great intellect, as I will show in the proper place.  For the
+present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or
+deride human emotions than understand them.  Such persons will,
+doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of
+human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth
+with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as
+repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.  However,
+such is my plan.  Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be
+set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and
+everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action;
+that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to
+pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and
+always the same; so that there should be one and the same method
+of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,
+through nature's universal laws and rules.  Thus the passions of
+hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow
+from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to
+certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and
+possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the
+properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself
+affords us delight.  I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and
+strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I
+employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the
+mind.  I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the
+same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and
+solids.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+DEFINITIONS
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+I.  By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect
+can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  By an inadequate or
+partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its
+effect cannot be understood.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  I say that we act when anything takes place, either within
+us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that
+is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature
+something takes place within us or externally to us, which can
+through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.
+On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something
+when that something takes place within us, or follows from our
+nature externally, we being only the partial cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+III.  By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby
+the active power of the said body is increased or diminished,
+aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+N.B.  If we can be the adequate cause of any of these
+modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I
+call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+POSTULATES
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+I.  The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its
+power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other
+ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or
+less.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+N.B.  This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and
+Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,
+retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.),
+and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II.
+xvii.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. I.  Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain
+cases passive.  In so far as it has adequate ideas it is
+necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it
+is necessarily passive.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and
+some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note).
+Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in
+God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.
+Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise
+(by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he
+contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as
+he, at the same time, contains the minds of other things.  Again,
+from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36);
+of this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not
+inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as
+affected by the given idea (II. ix.).  But of that effect whereof
+God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is
+adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in
+question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.).  Therefore our
+mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in
+certain cases necessarily active; this was our first point.
+Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is
+adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the
+mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together
+with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of
+such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not
+an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the
+mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases
+necessarily passive; this was our second point.  Therefore our
+mind, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that the mind is more or less
+liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate
+ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as
+it possesses adequate ideas.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. II.  Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind
+determine body to motion or rest or any state different from
+these, if such there be.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by
+virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his
+being displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.).  That,
+therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of
+thought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.), it
+is not body.  This was our first point.  Again, the motion and
+rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been
+determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and
+absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring
+from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of
+extension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.); that is,
+it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought.  This
+was our second point.  Therefore body cannot determine mind, &amp;c.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
+II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing,
+conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under
+the attribute of extension.  Thus it follows that the order or
+concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived
+under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of
+states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in
+nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the
+mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we
+proved II. xii.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no
+further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is
+proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the
+question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it
+is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in
+motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending
+solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought.  However,
+no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the
+body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what
+the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far
+as she is regarded as extension.  No one hitherto has gained such
+an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can
+explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact
+that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far
+transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things
+in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake:
+these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole
+laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the
+body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the
+body, nor how quickly it can move it.  Thus, when men say that
+this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which
+latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without
+meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are
+ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at
+it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means
+whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate,
+experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit
+state to think, the body remains inert.  Moreover, we have
+experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or
+are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly,
+we say depend on the mind's decree.  But, as to the first point,
+I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach,
+that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted
+for thinking?  For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind
+simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of
+thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake.  Again, I
+think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the
+mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given
+subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for
+being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is
+the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the
+laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be
+able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of
+that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the
+human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be
+capable of building a single temple.  However, I have just
+pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the
+body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration
+of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things
+being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would
+never have believed possible except under the direction of mind:
+such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and
+wondered at by their performers when awake.  I would further call
+attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses
+in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to
+repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under
+whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow.
+As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be
+much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they
+are to speak.  Experience abundantly shows that men can govern
+anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything
+more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many
+believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we
+moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be
+controlled by the thought of something else frequently
+remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what
+we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be
+allayed with the remembrance of anything else.  However, unless
+such persons had proved by experience that we do many things
+which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when
+assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the
+worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we
+are free in all things.  Thus an infant believes that of its own
+free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely
+desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires
+to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from
+the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he
+would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a
+garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe
+that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they
+are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk.
+Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men
+believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious
+of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those
+actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the
+dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and
+therefore vary according to the varying state of the body.
+Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who
+are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;
+those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this
+way or that.  All these considerations clearly show that a mental
+decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are
+simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call
+decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the
+attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is
+regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the
+laws of motion and rest.  This will appear yet more plainly in
+the sequel.  For the present I wish to call attention to another
+point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind,
+unless we have a remembrance of having done so.  For instance, we
+cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so.
+Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or
+forget a thing at will.  Therefore the freedom of the mind must
+in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering
+something which it remembers.  But when we dream that we speak,
+we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we
+do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the
+body.  Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we
+seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby
+we keep silence when awake concerning something we know.  Lastly,
+we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something,
+which we should not dare to do when awake.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two
+sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?
+If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must
+necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is
+believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination
+or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an
+idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II.
+xlix.).  Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind
+by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.
+Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or
+act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream
+with their eyes open.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. III.  The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate
+ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on
+inadequate ideas.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The first element, which constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent
+body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many
+other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II.
+xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.).  Whatsoever therefore
+follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate
+cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily
+follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea.  But
+in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is
+necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow
+solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only
+passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to
+the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving
+negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,
+which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself
+without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are
+attributed to individual things in the same way that they are
+attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be
+perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IV.  Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external
+to itself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is self&mdash;evident, for the definition
+of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not
+negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the
+thing, but does not take it away.  So long therefore as we regard
+only the thing itself, without taking into account external
+causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could
+destroy it.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. V.  Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in
+the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the
+other.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If they could agree together or co&mdash;exist in the same
+object, there would then be in the said object something which
+could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is
+absurd, therefore things, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VI.  Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours
+to persist in its own being.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of
+God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.);
+that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given
+determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts;
+now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be
+destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but
+contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its
+existence (III. v.).  Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so
+far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own
+being.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VII.  The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence
+of the thing in question.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;From the given essence of any thing certain
+consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any
+power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as
+determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,
+or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it
+acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or
+endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,
+is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in
+question.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VIII.  The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist
+in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite
+time.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If it involved a limited time, which should determine
+the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that
+power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist
+beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed;
+but this (III. iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore the endeavour wherewith
+a thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise,
+since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already
+exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some
+external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IX.  The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct
+ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to
+persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this
+endeavour it is conscious.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and
+inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so
+far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the
+latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for
+an indefinite time (III. viii.).  Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is
+necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the
+modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)
+conscious of its own endeavour.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is
+called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it
+is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's
+essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those
+results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus
+been determined to perform.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference,
+except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so
+far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly
+be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.
+It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we
+strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we
+deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be
+good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or
+desire it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. X.  An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,
+cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated
+therein (III. v.).  Therefore neither can the idea of such a
+thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II.
+ix. Coroll.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing
+cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.
+xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it
+follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the
+endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea,
+which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our
+mind, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XI.  Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders
+the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or
+diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II.
+xiv.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,
+and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection,
+sometimes to a state of lesser perfection.  These passive states
+of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.
+By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall
+signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater
+perfection.  By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the
+mind passes to a lesser perfection.  Further, the emotion of
+pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call
+stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of
+pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.
+But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are
+attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected
+than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike
+affected.  What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to
+Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other
+primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other
+emotions arise from these three.  But, before I go further, I
+should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this
+part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is
+contrary to another.  In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the
+idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the
+existence of body, so long as the body itself exists.  Again, it
+follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii.,
+that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the
+fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.
+Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of
+the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends
+on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.
+Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its
+power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to
+affirm the present existence of the body.  Now the cause, why the
+mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the
+mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases
+to exist.  For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the
+existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;
+therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the
+existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but
+(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes
+the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,
+and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the
+essence of our mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XII.  The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive
+those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the
+body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and
+consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an
+external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,
+the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature
+of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives
+things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,
+the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of
+activity (III. Post. i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind's
+power of thinking is for that period increased or helped.  Thus
+(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine
+such things.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIII.  When the mind conceives things which diminish or
+hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as
+possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the
+first&mdash;named things.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind
+alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or
+constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue
+to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which
+excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as
+I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is
+diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something
+else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived:
+therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour
+to conceive or remember the latter.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from
+conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of
+itself and of the body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;From what has been said we may clearly understand the
+nature of Love and Hate.  Love is nothing else but pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing
+else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  We
+further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,
+and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who
+hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.
+But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIV.  If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at
+the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one
+of these two, be also affected by the other.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If the human body has once been affected by two bodies
+at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it
+will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.).  But the
+mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than
+the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore,
+if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been
+once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever
+it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by
+the other.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XV.  Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,
+pain, or desire.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously
+affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor
+diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either
+increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.).  From the
+foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is
+afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which
+(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of
+action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which
+does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.
+xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain.  Thus the
+former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but
+accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.  In the same way
+also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the
+cause of desire.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing
+with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate
+it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that
+the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with
+the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),
+according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or
+diminished, &amp;c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the
+mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.
+Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may
+love or hate the same.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or
+hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
+merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy.  We should
+refer to the same category those objects, which affect us
+pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other
+objects which affect us in the same way.  This I will show in the
+next Prop.  I am aware that certain authors, who were the first
+to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to
+signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I
+think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known
+or manifest qualities.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVI.  Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given
+object has some point of resemblance with another object which is
+wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the
+point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said
+emotions, we shall still regard the first&mdash;named object with love
+or hate.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The point of resemblance was in the object (by
+hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus
+(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it
+will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and
+consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point
+of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of
+pleasure or pain.  Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although
+the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the
+first&mdash;named object with love or hate.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVII.  If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect
+us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing
+which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of
+pleasure, we shall hate the first&mdash;named thing, and at the same
+time we shall love it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause
+of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with
+this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive
+that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is
+wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we
+shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it
+(III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This disposition of the mind, which arises from two
+contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the
+emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination
+(II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from
+the other, except as greater differs from less.  But we must bear
+in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which
+give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the
+other accidentally.  I have done this, in order that they might
+be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny
+that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an
+object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions.  The human
+body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts
+of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.
+after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by
+one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same
+thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different
+ways affect one and the same part of the body.  Hence we can
+easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of
+many and conflicting emotions.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully
+by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing
+present.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,
+he will regard that thing as present, even though it be
+non&mdash;existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as
+past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the
+image of time past or future (II. xliv. note).  Wherefore the
+image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether
+it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that
+is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is
+identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or
+present.  Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,
+whether the image be of a thing past or future.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note I.&mdash;I call a thing past or future, according as we either
+have been or shall be affected thereby.  For instance, according
+as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has
+recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,
+or will harm us.  For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its
+existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which
+excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)
+the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way
+as if the thing were actually present.  However, as it generally
+happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so
+long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in
+doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the
+emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so
+constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other
+things, until men become assured of the issue.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note II.&mdash;From what has just been said, we understand what is
+meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and
+Disappointment.[5]  Hope is nothing else but an inconstant
+pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,
+whereof we do not yet know the issue.  Fear, on the other hand,
+is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something
+concerning which we are in doubt.  If the element of doubt be
+removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear
+becomes Despair.  In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from
+the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.
+Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past
+whereof we have doubted the issue.  Disappointment is the Pain
+opposed to Joy.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[5] Conscientiæ morsus&mdash;thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIX.  He who conceives that the object of his love is
+destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved
+he will feel pleasure.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive
+those things which increase or help the body's power of activity
+(III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which
+it loves.  But conception is helped by those things which
+postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered
+by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);
+therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of
+an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the
+object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind
+pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the
+existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental
+endeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully.  He,
+therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
+will feel pain, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XX.  He who conceives that the object of his hate is
+destroyed will also feel pleasure.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those
+things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's
+power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III.
+xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the
+existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing,
+which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the
+aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects
+the mind pleasurably.  Thus he who conceives that the object of
+his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXI.  He who conceives, that the object of his love is
+affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected
+pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will
+be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or
+less in the thing loved.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which
+postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's
+endeavour to conceive the said object.  But pleasure postulates
+the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in
+proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is
+(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore
+the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental
+endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover
+pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion
+may have been greater in the object of love.  This was our first
+point.  Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it
+is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to
+the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who
+conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,
+will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said
+emotion is greater or less in the object of love.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXII.  If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects
+some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards
+that thing.  Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an
+object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred
+towards it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of
+our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully&mdash;that is, if we
+conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or
+pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come
+to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore
+(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object
+of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with
+love or hatred towards him.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we
+may define as pain arising from another's hurt.  What term we can
+use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on
+another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures
+another, we will call Indignation.  We must further remark, that
+we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown
+in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto
+regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles
+ourselves (as I will show presently).  Thus, we bestow approval
+on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,
+contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIII.  He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
+painfully affected, will feel pleasure.  Contrariwise, if he
+thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel
+pain.  Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according
+as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In so far as an object of hatred is painfully
+affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the
+strength of the pain (III. xi. note).  Therefore, he (III. xx.)
+who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully
+affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the
+amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred.  This
+was our first point.  Again, pleasure postulates the existence of
+the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as
+the pleasure is greater or less.  If anyone imagines that an
+object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception
+(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other
+words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and
+without any mental conflict.  For (as I am about to show in Prop.
+xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to
+himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like
+manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary
+circumstances.  But here we are regarding hatred only.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIV.  If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an
+object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also.  If we
+conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall
+feel love towards him.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xxii., which see.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
+to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so
+far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's
+hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXV.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
+concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to
+affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.  Contrariwise,
+we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
+painfully ourselves or the loved object.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;That, which we conceive to affect an object of our
+love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or
+painfully (III. xxi.).  But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
+far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
+pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it
+endeavours to regard them as present.  And, contrariwise (III.
+xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as
+affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
+concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
+we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVI.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
+hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
+contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
+which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the
+foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may
+easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,
+contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object.  This feeling is
+called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of
+himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with
+his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that
+fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting
+them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to
+conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines
+his own power of action.  Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing
+from a man thinking too highly of himself.  Again, the pleasure
+which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called
+over&mdash;esteem.  Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too
+little of a man is called disdain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVII.  By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is
+like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,
+to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a
+like emotion (affectus).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The images of things are modifications of the human
+body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to
+us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas
+involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature
+of the external bodies as present.  If, therefore, the nature of
+the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the
+idea which we form of the external body will involve a
+modification of our own body similar to the modification of the
+external body.  Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to
+ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will
+express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.
+Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be
+affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
+emotion.  If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we
+shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not
+similar, emotion.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note I.&mdash;This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to
+pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is
+referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else
+but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we
+conceive that others have the like desire.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary I.&mdash;If we conceive that anyone, whom we have
+hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something
+similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
+If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the
+same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This is proved from the last proposition in the same
+manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary II.&mdash;We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
+its misery affects us painfully.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice
+in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary III.&mdash;We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,
+a thing which we pity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,
+affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);
+therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which
+removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in
+other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we
+shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall
+endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note II.&mdash;This will or appetite for doing good, which arises
+from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is
+called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from
+compassion.  Concerning love or hate towards him who has done
+good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like
+ourselves, see III. xxii. note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVIII.  We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
+to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
+whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
+conduce to pain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that
+which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other
+words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as
+possible as present or actually existing.  But the endeavour of
+the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
+simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power
+of action.  (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.
+Coroll.).  Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
+existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the
+same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first
+point.  Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed
+to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
+hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.).  We shall,
+therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy
+the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may
+not regard it as present; this was our second point.  Wherefore
+whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIX.  We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
+men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
+from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
+whom we regard without any particular emotion.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate
+anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).
+That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel
+pleasure or pain at the thing's presence.  And so we shall
+endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with
+pleasure, etc.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
+in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
+eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit
+certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it
+is generally called kindliness.  Furthermore I give the name of
+praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of
+another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame
+to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXX.  If anyone has done something which he conceives as
+affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
+accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he
+will regard himself with pleasure.  On the other hand, if he has
+done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
+he will regard himself with pain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure
+or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with
+pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and
+xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby
+he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,
+that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other
+words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  And so mutatis
+mutandis in the case of pain.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question
+will be a species of love and hatred.  But, as the terms love and
+hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ
+other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause[7] we will style
+Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I
+mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's
+belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause[8] is called
+self&mdash;complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance.
+Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,
+wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist
+solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone
+endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives
+will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a
+vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,
+when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
+"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[8] See previous endnote.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXI.  If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates
+anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
+thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,
+&amp;c.  On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from
+something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves
+anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): but
+we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new
+cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we
+shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.  Again, from the mere
+fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall
+ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).  If we assume
+that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously
+love it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subject
+to vacillation (III. xvii. note).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it
+follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause
+others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself
+hates: as the poet says:  "As lovers let us share every hope
+and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the
+other leaves."[9]
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.
+<BR><BR>
+"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
+<BR><BR>
+  Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."<BR>
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes
+and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really
+ambition (see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone
+by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should
+live according to his own individual disposition: when such a
+desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone
+else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all
+become mutually hateful.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXII.  If we conceive that anyone takes delight in
+something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour
+to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain
+possession thereof.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;From the mere fact of our conceiving that another
+person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we
+shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight
+therein.  But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be
+prevented by another's delight in its object; we shall,
+therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.
+xxviii.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;We thus see that man's nature is generally so
+constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies
+those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his
+own love for the goods in their possession.  Further, we see that
+from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that
+men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and
+ambitious.  Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall
+find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more
+especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our
+life.  We find that children, whose body is continually, as it
+were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others
+laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate
+whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of
+whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the
+images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human
+body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by
+external causes to act in this or that manner.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIII.  When we love a thing similar to ourselves we
+endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love
+us in return.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to
+conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.).  If the
+thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it
+pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.).  In
+other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it
+about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),
+that it should love us in return.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIV.  The greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our
+complacency.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to
+bring about, that what we love should love us in return: in
+other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause.  Therefore, in
+proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected
+because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.&mdash;that is (III. xi.
+and note) the greater will be our pleasure.  But when we take
+pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something
+similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30);
+therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXV.  If anyone conceives, that an object of his love
+joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he
+himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards
+the loved object and with envy towards his rival.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is
+well affected towards him, will be the strength of his
+self&mdash;approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of
+his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as
+far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound
+to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks
+that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).  But this
+endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the
+loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved
+object has joined to itself; therefore (III. xi. note) he will
+for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of
+the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his
+rival; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred
+towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.
+Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved
+object.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy
+is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a
+wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and
+hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.
+Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,
+in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont
+to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and
+also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained
+towards his rival.  If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate
+the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably
+affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is
+compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image
+of him whom he hates.  This condition generally comes into play
+in the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman
+whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not
+only because his own desire is restrained, but also because,
+being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the
+parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks
+from her.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved
+with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives
+him pain as a lover, as I will now show.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVI.  He who remembers a thing, in which he has once
+taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances
+as when he first took delight therein.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with
+the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of
+pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it,
+in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other
+words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the
+same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the
+aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be
+missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.  As
+he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or
+circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he
+conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence
+of the object of love, is called Regret.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVII.  Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or
+love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of
+activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes
+or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in
+his own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said
+endeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are
+directed to removing that pain.  But (by the definition of pain),
+in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily
+opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity; therefore
+the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed
+to remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire or
+appetite in endeavouring to remove it.  Again, since pleasure
+(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it
+may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by
+pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his
+desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain
+and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,
+appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be
+greater in proportion to the hatred or love.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVIII.  If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,
+so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being
+equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,
+and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his
+former love.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more
+of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never
+loved it.  For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man
+endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);
+he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by
+affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is
+greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the
+endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his
+affection (III. xxxiii.).  Now these endeavours are constrained
+by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.
+xxiii.); wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause
+also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love
+has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by
+hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the
+object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater
+pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never
+loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former
+love was greater.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIX.  He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
+injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
+to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the
+same law, seek to benefit him.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as
+a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to
+remove or destroy him.  But if anything more painful, or, in
+other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater
+thereby&mdash;and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not
+carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of
+his hate&mdash;he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury
+(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)
+will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will
+therefore prevail over it, as we asserted.  The second part of
+this proof proceeds in the same manner.  Wherefore he who hates
+another, etc.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all
+that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our
+longings, whatsoever they may be.  By evil, I mean every kind of
+pain, especially that which frustrates our longings.  For I have
+shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because
+we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because
+we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink
+from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,
+judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,
+what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst.  Thus a
+miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of
+money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as
+glory, and fears nothing so much as shame.  To an envious man
+nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing
+more painful than another's success.  So every man, according to
+his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or
+useless.  The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that
+which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is
+called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear
+whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
+future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.).  But if the
+evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.
+Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the
+fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,
+fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared
+be very great.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XL.  He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
+believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate
+that other in return.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will
+thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  But, by
+the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him
+who is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by
+some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea
+of his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred
+will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case
+(III. xxv.) rarely happens.  This reciprocation of hatred may
+also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure
+the object of our hate (III. xxxix.).  He therefore who conceives
+that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause
+of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or
+fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other
+words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I
+said above.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary I.&mdash;He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates
+him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  For, in so
+far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is
+determined to hate his enemy in return.  But, by the hypothesis,
+he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to
+conflicting hatred and love.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary II.&mdash;If a man conceives that one, whom he has
+hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from
+motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in
+kind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the
+last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will
+endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;
+he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).
+Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury
+done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to
+repay it in kind.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called
+Anger; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves
+is called Revenge.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLI.  If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and
+believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love
+that other in return.  (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is proved in the same way as the
+preceding one.  See also the note appended thereto.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;If he believes that he has given just cause for the
+love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is
+what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its
+contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated
+by another.  (See note to preceding proposition.)  This
+reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him
+who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is
+called gratitude or thankfulness.  It thus appears that men are
+much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he
+hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  This is
+proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding
+proposition.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour
+to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty,
+especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary
+cause for hatred.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLII.  He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from
+motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the
+benefit is received without gratitude.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;When a man loves something similar to himself, he
+endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be
+loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.).  Therefore he who has
+conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which
+he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from
+the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will
+endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or
+to regard it as actually existing.  But, by the hypothesis, he
+conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the
+said cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.
+xix.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLIII.  Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can
+on the other hand be destroyed by love.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates
+him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former
+hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.).  But if, on the
+other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he
+will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,
+and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his
+emotion.  In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.
+xli.), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III.
+xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion
+from which it arises.  Therefore, if it be greater than that
+which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to
+affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better
+of it and banish the hatred from his mind.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLIV.  Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
+into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not
+preceded it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.
+of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was
+wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving
+feels pleasure.  To this pleasure involved in love is added the
+pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the
+pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea
+of the former object of hatred as cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate
+anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying
+this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he
+should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor
+long to be ill for the sake of getting well.  For everyone will
+always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as
+far as he can.  If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a
+man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love
+him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him.  For
+the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the
+hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be
+continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,
+he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he
+might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in
+such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)
+is absurd.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLV.  If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself
+hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will
+hate that person.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him
+who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that
+anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as
+affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain;
+consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the
+idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he
+will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III.
+xiii. note).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLVI.  If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully
+by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if
+the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said
+stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or
+nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the
+individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation
+whereto he belongs.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This is evident from III. xvi.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLVII.  Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is
+destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a
+certain pain in us.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This is evident from III. xxvii.  For in so far as we
+conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,
+we ourselves feel pain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary
+to II. xvii.  Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not
+actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is
+affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the
+remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard
+it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing
+in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other
+things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not
+destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the
+said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising
+from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we
+remember that object of hatred.  For, as we have said, when the
+image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it
+involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard
+the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it
+actually did exist.  However, since he has joined to the image of
+the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this
+determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices
+afresh as often as the repetition takes place.  This is the cause
+of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in
+narrating dangers from which they have escaped.  For when men
+conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are
+determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by
+the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the
+danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure
+afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLVIII.  Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is
+destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain
+involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of
+another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we
+conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love
+and hatred (III. xiii. note).  For pleasure is called love
+towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in
+so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the
+other.  When this condition of causality is either wholly or
+partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part
+vanishes.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLIX.  Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to
+be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if
+it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)
+be perceived through itself without anything else.  If,
+therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we
+shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall
+do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the
+given emotion.  But if the thing which causes the emotion be
+conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.
+vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of
+the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred
+towards it will be less.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be
+free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards
+anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation
+of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. L.  Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
+or fear.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or
+fear are called good or evil omens.  Now, in so far as such omens
+are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of
+hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of
+pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them
+with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means
+towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles,
+or causes of that which we fear.  It follows, further, from III.
+xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily
+in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we
+fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or
+below their true value.  Hence there have arisen superstitions,
+whereby men are everywhere assailed.  However, I do not think it
+worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from
+hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions,
+that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope,
+as I will duly explain in the proper place.  Further, in so far
+as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred;
+thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we
+have said concerning love and hatred.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LI.  Different men may be differently affected by the same
+object, and the same man may be differently affected at different
+times by the same object.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The human body is affected by external bodies in a
+variety of ways (II. Post. iii.).  Two men may therefore be
+differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.
+after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by
+one and the same object.  Further (by the same Post.) the human
+body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;
+consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected
+at different times by one and the same object.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;We thus see that it is possible, that what one man
+loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may
+not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he
+once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.
+Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,
+what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it
+follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their
+emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we
+distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and
+style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.
+For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil
+which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into
+consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to
+benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of
+an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him
+daring.  Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an
+evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take
+into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of
+an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that
+he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
+intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human
+judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his
+emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause
+pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,
+are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of
+things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that
+a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.  Thus we
+can easily understand what are Repentance and Self&mdash;complacency.
+Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as
+cause; Self&mdash;complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because
+men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LII.  An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction
+with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property
+that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so
+long, as an object which we conceive to have some property
+peculiar to itself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in
+conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.
+xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the
+contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another
+object.  And this is the case with the object, which we conceive
+to have no property that is not common to many.  For we thereupon
+assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not
+before seen in conjunction with other objects.  But when we
+suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we
+have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while
+regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to
+regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the
+contemplation of that object only.  Therefore an object, &amp;c.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This mental modification, or imagination of a
+particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called
+Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
+Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed
+in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to
+think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil.  If,
+however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or
+anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby
+regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;
+otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &amp;c., be what we wonder at,
+the emotion is called Horror.  Again, if it be the prudence,
+industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our
+love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when
+joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion.  We may in
+like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other
+emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able
+to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in
+ordinary speech.  Whence it is evident, that the names of the
+emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their
+ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their
+nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from
+the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or
+fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears
+to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &amp;c.,
+we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),
+determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing.  But if from
+the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,
+we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause
+of wonder, love, fear, &amp;c., the mind then, by the presence of the
+thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities
+which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on
+the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more
+particularly to regard that which is therein.  As devotion
+springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision
+spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn
+from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.
+Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &amp;c.,
+in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other
+emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any
+recognized name.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LIII.  When the mind regards itself and its own power of
+activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in
+proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and
+its own power of activity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;A man does not know himself except through the
+modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and
+xxiii.).  When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate
+itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or
+(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be
+greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able
+to conceive itself and its own power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;This pleasure is fostered more and more, in
+proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.
+For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more
+he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by
+the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)
+himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea
+of himself.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
+assert its power of activity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual
+essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind
+obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not
+that which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind
+endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its
+power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LV.  When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
+pain thereat.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The essence of the mind only affirms that which the
+mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to
+conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last
+Prop.).  Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own
+weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting
+to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is
+checked in its endeavour&mdash;&mdash;in other words (III. xi. note), it
+feels pain.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;This pain is more and more fostered, if a man
+conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the
+same way as the corollary to III. liii.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,
+is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the
+contemplation of ourselves, is called self&mdash;love or
+self&mdash;complacency.  And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as
+often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of
+activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own
+exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and
+also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.
+Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.
+note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of
+their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues.  For whenever a
+man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.
+liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and
+he conceives them more distinctly&mdash;that is (II. xl. note), in
+proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard
+them as something special.  Therefore, a man will take most
+pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some
+quality which he denies to others.  But, if that which he affirms
+of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in
+general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the
+contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall
+short when compared with those of others.  This pain (III.
+xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
+construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he
+can, embellishing his own.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred
+and envy, which latter is fostered by their education.  For
+parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely
+by the spur of honour and envy.  But, perhaps, some will scruple
+to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's
+virtues, and venerate their possessors.  In order to remove such
+doubts, I append the following corollary.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his
+equal.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.
+xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby
+a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is
+checked.  But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,
+which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a
+man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the
+same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to
+another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot
+be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue
+in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an
+one.  But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same
+nature as himself.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,
+we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,
+&amp;c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar
+to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more
+envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions
+for being courageous.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LVI.  There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of
+desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as
+vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,
+hatred, hope, fear, &amp;c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we
+are affected.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions
+compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or
+passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive
+(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so
+far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is,
+we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we
+conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by
+an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the
+nature of an external body.  Wherefore the nature of every
+passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature
+of the object whereby we are affected be expressed.  Namely, the
+pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the
+nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the
+object B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore these
+two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the
+causes whence they arise are by nature different.  So again the
+emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature
+different from the pain arising from another object, and,
+similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,
+&amp;c.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,
+love, hatred, &amp;c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are
+affected.  Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any
+given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore,
+according as a man is affected through external causes by this or
+that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &amp;c., in other words,
+according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so
+will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one
+desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,
+as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.
+Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of
+pleasure, pain, love, &amp;c., consequently (by what has been shown)
+there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects
+whereby we are affected.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last
+proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,
+drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of
+love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a
+manner varying according to the object, with which they are
+concerned.  For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,
+&amp;c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,
+venery, riches, and fame.  Furthermore, these emotions, in so far
+as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects
+wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries.  For
+temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose
+to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive
+states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the
+last&mdash;named emotions.  However, I cannot here explain the
+remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as
+the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary.
+It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the
+strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have
+a general definition of each emotion.  It is sufficient, I
+repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and
+the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the
+mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions.  Thus,
+though there is a great difference between various emotions of
+love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards
+children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us
+to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further
+the nature and origin of the emotions.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LVII.  Any emotion of a given individual differs from the
+emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of
+the one individual differs from the essence of the other.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see
+after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.).  Nevertheless, we will
+prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,
+as their definitions above given show.  But desire is each man's
+nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one
+individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature
+or essence of the other.  Again, pleasure and pain are passive
+states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to
+persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or
+hindered (III. xi. and note).  But by the endeavour to persist in
+its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in
+conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note);
+therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or
+appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every
+man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man
+differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the
+essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one
+individual only differs, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals
+which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of
+mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's
+emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human
+nature.  Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of
+procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire
+of the latter is human.  So also the lusts and appetites of
+insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the
+several natures.  Thus, although each individual lives content
+and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his
+being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is
+nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and
+hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of
+another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the
+essence of another.  Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
+proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
+which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
+philosopher, as I just mention here by the way.  Thus far I have
+treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is
+passive.  It remains to add a few words on those attributable to
+him in so far as he is active.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LVIII.  Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities
+or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
+desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;When the mind conceives itself and its power of
+activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind
+necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or
+adequate idea (II. xliii.).  But the mind does conceive certain
+adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.).  Therefore it feels pleasure in
+so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it
+is active (III. i.).  Again, the mind, both in so far as it has
+clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,
+endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such
+an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);
+therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we
+understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LIX.  Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
+active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or
+desire.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or
+pain, as their definitions, already given, show.  Now by pain we
+mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked
+(III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels
+pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is
+diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions
+can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but
+only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
+are attributable to the mind in that condition.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;All actions following from emotion, which are
+attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set
+down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into
+courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas).  By
+courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve
+his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.
+By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,
+solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to
+unite them to himself in friendship.  Those actions, therefore,
+which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to
+courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to
+highmindedness.  Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind
+in danger, &amp;c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &amp;c.,
+are varieties of highmindedness.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their
+primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,
+which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,
+to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain.  It is evident from what I
+have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external
+causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds
+we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate.  But I
+have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting
+emotions, not all that might be given.  For, by proceeding in the
+same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to
+repentance, scorn, shame, &amp;c.  I think everyone will agree from
+what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with
+another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise
+therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation.  However,
+for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most
+important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be
+more curious than profitable.  It remains to remark concerning
+love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a
+thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,
+acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another
+way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
+begins to conceive and desire something fresh.  For example, when
+we conceive something which generally delights us with its
+flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it.  But whilst we
+are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is
+otherwise disposed.  If, therefore, when the body is thus
+otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be
+stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be
+stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel
+repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the
+presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become
+odious.  This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or
+weariness.  For the rest, I have neglected the outward
+modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for
+instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &amp;c., for these
+are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the
+mind.  Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be
+supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them,
+interpolating such observations as I think should here and there
+be added.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+I.  Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given
+modification of itself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation.&mdash;We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of
+this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof;
+further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is
+determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
+persistence.  But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
+strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
+and desire.  For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or
+not, it remains one and the same appetite.  Thus, in order to
+avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
+explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it
+in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those
+endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms
+appetite, will, desire, or impulse.  I might, indeed, have said,
+that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived
+as determined to a particular activity; but from such a
+definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can
+be conscious of its desire or appetite.  Therefore, in order to
+imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,
+in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &amp;c.
+For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every
+disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be
+innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of
+thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,
+lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.
+By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours,
+impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each
+man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to
+another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and
+knows not where to turn.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
+perfection.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+III.  Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
+perfection.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection
+itself.  For, if man were born with the perfection to which he
+passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of
+pleasure.  This appears more clearly from the consideration of
+the contrary emotion, pain.  No one can deny, that pain consists
+in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less
+perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he
+partakes of perfection of any degree.  Neither can we say, that
+pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection.  For
+absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;
+wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition
+from a greater to a less perfection&mdash;in other words, it is an
+activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or
+constrained (cf. III. xi. note).  I pass over the definitions of
+merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these
+terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely
+kinds of pleasure or pain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IV.  Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
+the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in
+question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and
+note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,
+why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway
+falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the
+images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one
+follows the other.  This state of association is impossible, if
+the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand
+in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other
+causes to think of something else.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is
+of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include
+wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include
+it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no
+positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but
+merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the
+mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the
+contemplation of another.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary
+emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,
+pain, and desire.  I have spoken of wonder simply because it is
+customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three
+primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the
+objects of our wonder.  I am led by the same motive to add a
+definition of contempt.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+V.  Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
+so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those
+qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.
+III. lii. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
+I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VI.  Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;This definition explains sufficiently clearly the
+essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say
+that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
+object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
+as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
+they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
+properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
+to be very obscure.  It must, however, be noted, that when I say
+that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
+unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish
+consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I
+have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I
+mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is
+absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for
+love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by
+wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of
+the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the
+lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VII.  Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;These observations are easily grasped after what
+has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.
+also III. xiii. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VIII.  Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IX.  Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which
+is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+X.  Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.
+lii.) from the novelty of a thing.  If, therefore, it happens
+that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall
+cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion
+readily degenerates into simple love.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XI.  Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
+presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we
+hate.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we
+deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent
+rejoice (III. xx.).  But since we assume that man hates that
+which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not
+without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XII.  Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XIII.  Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;From these definitions it follows, that there is
+no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.
+For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of
+anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the
+existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this
+extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while
+dependent on hope, he fears for the issue.  Contrariwise he, who
+fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something
+which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the
+existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels
+pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will
+turn out as he desires (III. xx.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XIV.  Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something
+past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XV.  Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or
+future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair
+from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event
+has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives
+something past or future as present and regards it as such, or
+else because he conceives other things, which exclude the
+existence of the causes of his doubt.  For, although we can never
+be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.
+xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt
+concerning it.  For we have shown, that to feel no doubt
+concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it
+(II. xlix. note).  Thus it may happen that we are affected by the
+same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or
+future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I
+have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I
+refer the reader.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XVI.  Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,
+which has had an issue beyond our hope.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XVII.  Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of
+something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XVIII.  Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has
+befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
+III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there
+seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is
+used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in
+reference to a disposition.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XIX.  Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XX.  Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to
+another.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;I am aware that these terms are employed in
+senses somewhat different from those usually assigned.  But my
+purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature
+of things.  I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my
+meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary
+signification.  One statement of my method will suffice. As for
+the cause of the above&mdash;named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,
+and III. xxii. note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXI.  Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the
+love we bear him.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXII.  Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we
+hate him.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Thus partiality is an effect of love, and
+disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also
+be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+highly of a beloved object.  Contrariwise, disparagement may be
+defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+meanly of a hated object.  Cf. III. xxvi. note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXIII.  Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be
+pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's
+evil fortune.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by
+doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be
+thus defined:
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXIV.  Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a
+man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at
+another's evil fortune.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and
+xxxii.  These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain
+accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in
+itself or accidentally.  I now pass on to other emotions, which
+are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXV.  Self&mdash;approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXVI.  Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his
+own weakness of body or mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Self&mdash;complacency is opposed to humility, in so
+far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of
+our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe
+we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed
+to repentance, which we may thus define:
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXVII.  Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some
+action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision
+of our mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;The causes of these emotions we have set forth in
+III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.  Concerning
+the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.  This is
+perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
+nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
+called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are
+called right, are followed by pleasure.  We can easily gather
+from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on
+education.  Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,
+and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and
+also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought
+it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the
+latter with pleasure.  This is confirmed by experience.  For
+custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that
+which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some
+consider honourable others consider disgraceful.  According as
+each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given
+action or glories therein.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXVIII.  Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from
+self&mdash;love.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Thus pride is different from partiality, for the
+latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride
+is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.  However, as
+partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or
+property of self&mdash;love, which may therefore be thus defined, love
+of self or self&mdash;approval, in so far as it leads a man to think
+too highly of himself.  To this emotion there is no contrary.
+For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self&mdash;hatred;
+I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he
+conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that.  For
+whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he
+imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,
+that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot
+do.  For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
+is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it
+impossible for him to do it.  However, if we consider such
+matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable
+that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen,
+that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should
+imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the
+world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him.  Again,
+a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in
+the present something in relation to a future time of which he is
+uncertain.  As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable
+to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do
+nothing but what is wicked and base, &amp;c.  We may also say, that a
+man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive
+fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,
+venture.  We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an
+emotion which I will call self&mdash;abasement, for as from
+self&mdash;complacency springs pride, so from humility springs
+self&mdash;abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXIX.  Self&mdash;abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by
+reason of pain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;We are nevertheless generally accustomed to
+oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention
+to the effect of either emotion than to its nature.  We are wont
+to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who
+talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults,
+who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a
+style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station.  On
+the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who
+confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and
+who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.
+However, these emotions, humility and self&mdash;abasement, are
+extremely rare.  For human nature, considered in itself, strives
+against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence
+those, who are believed to be most self&mdash;abased and humble, are
+generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXX.  Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action
+of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[11] Gloria.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+XXXI.  Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of
+our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;On this subject see the note to III. xxx.  But we
+should here remark the difference which exists between shame and
+modesty.  Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are
+ashamed.  Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains
+a man from committing a base action.  Modesty is usually opposed
+to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will
+duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have
+remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to
+their nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions
+arising from pleasure and pain.  I therefore proceed to treat of
+those which I refer to desire.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXII.  Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,
+kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same
+time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude
+the existence of it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;When we remember a thing, we are by that very
+fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to
+contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something
+present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,
+is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the
+existence of that which we remember.  Thus when we remember
+something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that
+very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of
+pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once
+checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence
+of the thing in question.  Wherefore regret is, strictly
+speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from
+the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note).  But, as
+the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion
+down, among the emotions springing from desire.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXIII.  Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us
+by our conception that others have the same desire.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;He who runs away, because he sees others running
+away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again,
+he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws
+towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own
+were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another's
+emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of
+emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become
+customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that
+which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant.  As to the
+cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note.  The reason why
+this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.
+xxxii. and note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXIV.  Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing
+from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar
+feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.  Cf. III. xxxix.
+note and xl.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXV.  Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.
+Cf. III. xxvii. note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXVI.  Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are
+induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXVII.  Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through
+mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has
+injured us.  (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXVIII.  Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is
+impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a
+passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his
+anger and revenge.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXIX.  Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we
+dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.  Cf. III. xxxix. note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XL.  Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do
+something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XLI.  Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by
+the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the
+fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I
+do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.
+Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so
+far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion
+of daring.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XLII.  Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of
+avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Consternation is, therefore, a species of
+cowardice.  But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double
+fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a
+man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the
+evil.  I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of
+removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement.  I say
+wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be
+constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments
+him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may
+avert of the two.  On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and
+III. lii. note.  Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
+note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XLIII.  Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the
+desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining
+from that which should displease them.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XLIV.  Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions
+(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened;
+therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome.  For, so
+long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time
+necessarily bound by this.  "The best men," says Cicero, "are
+especially led by honour.  Even philosophers, when they write a
+book contemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XLV.  Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living
+sumptuously.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XLVI.  Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XLVII.  Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XLVIII.  Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual
+intercourse.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is
+still called lust.  These last five emotions (as I have shown in
+III. lvi.) have on contraries.  For deference is a species of
+ambition.  Cf. III. xxix. note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,
+and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the
+mind.  It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an
+ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,
+drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear
+are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery.  For
+an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and
+drink at another man's expense.  An ambitious man will restrain
+himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are
+secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,
+from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those
+vices.  Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not.  For
+though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,
+cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain
+avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he
+cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,
+cease to be lustful.  In fact, these emotions are not so much
+concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &amp;c., as with the
+appetite and love of such.  Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to
+these emotions, but high&mdash;mindedness and valour, whereof I will
+speak presently.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I
+pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the
+compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because
+many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is
+sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general
+knowledge of them.  However, it is established from the
+definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they
+all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there
+is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be
+called by a variety of names in accordance with its various
+relations and extrinsic tokens.  If we now direct our attention
+to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning
+the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the
+emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a
+confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or
+any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater
+or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is
+determined to think of one thing rather than another.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Explanation&mdash;I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul
+is a confused idea.  For we have shown that the mind is only
+passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas.  (III.
+iii.)  I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its
+body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than
+before.  For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote
+rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll.
+ii.) than the nature of an external body.  But the idea which
+constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the
+disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its
+power of action or force for existence is increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered.  But it must be noted that, when
+I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not
+mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition
+of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of
+an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact,
+involves more or less of reality than before.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.
+xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own
+body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very
+essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or
+less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own
+body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less
+reality than before.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is
+increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed
+of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more
+or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its
+own body.  For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of
+thinking are measured by the excellence of the object.  Lastly, I
+have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to
+think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the
+nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the
+definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.
+</P>
+
+<BR><BR><BR>
+
+<A NAME="chap04"></A>
+<H2 ALIGN="center">
+PART IV:
+</H2>
+
+<H3 ALIGN="center">
+Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
+</H3>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+PREFACE
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I
+name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is
+not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much
+so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better
+for him, to follow that which is worse.  Why this is so, and what
+is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part
+of my treatise.  But, before I begin, it would be well to make a
+few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good
+and evil.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has
+brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,
+not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks
+that he knows, the intention and aim of its author.  For
+instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not
+yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work
+is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will,
+on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is
+carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it.
+But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen
+before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he
+plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect.
+Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out
+types of houses, buildings, towers, &amp;c., and to prefer certain
+types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that
+which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the
+thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree
+less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently
+been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.
+This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,
+which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or
+imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things
+natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they
+hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing
+without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types
+before herself.  Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,
+which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they
+have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has
+fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete.
+Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect
+or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true
+knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does
+not work with an end in view.  For the eternal and infinite
+Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as
+that whereby it exists.  For we have shown, that by the same
+necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.
+xvi.).  The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the
+reason why he acts, are one and the same.  Therefore, as he does
+not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the
+sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is
+neither origin nor end.  Wherefore, a cause which is called final
+is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered
+as the origin or cause of anything.  For example, when we say
+that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we
+mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of
+household life, had a desire to build a house.  Wherefore, the
+being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is
+nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the
+efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because
+men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.  They
+are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions
+and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are
+determined to any particular desire.  Therefore, the common
+saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and
+produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses
+treated of in the Appendix to Part I.  Perfection and
+imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or
+notions which we form from a comparison among one another of
+individuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def.
+vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.  For
+we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
+genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category
+of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.
+Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this
+category, and comparing them one with another, find that some
+possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,
+say that some are more perfect than others.  Again, in so far as
+we attribute to them anything implying negation&mdash;as term, end,
+infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
+they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call
+perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or
+because Nature has blundered.  For nothing lies within the scope
+of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity
+of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from
+the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily
+comes to pass.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive
+quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of
+thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things
+one with another.  Thus one and the same thing can be at the same
+time good, bad, and indifferent.  For instance, music is good for
+him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is
+deaf, it is neither good nor bad.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be
+retained.  For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
+type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful
+for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have
+indicated.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
+certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the
+type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by
+"bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
+approaching the said type.  Again, we shall that men are more
+perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more
+or less nearly to the said type.  For it must be specially
+remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a
+greater perfection, or vice versâ, I do not mean that he is
+changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a
+horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a
+man, as by being changed into an insect.  What I mean is, that we
+conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is
+understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished.  Lastly,
+by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality&mdash;in
+other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and
+operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to
+its duration.  For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,
+because it has passed a longer time in existence.  The duration
+of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence
+of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence;
+but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will
+always be able to persist in existence with the same force
+wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all
+things are equal.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+DEFINITIONS.
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+I.  By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to
+us.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a
+hindrance
+to us in the attainment of any good.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the
+end.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+III.  Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while
+regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which
+necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IV.  Particular things I call possible in so far as, while
+regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,
+whether such causes be determined for producing them.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between
+possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need
+to distinguish them accurately.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+V.  By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in
+different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as
+luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are
+contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VI.  What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,
+present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,
+which see.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly
+conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit;
+that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred
+feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that
+which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance
+from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time
+of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer
+interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally
+distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the
+same moment of time.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VII.  By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a
+desire.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VIII.  By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that
+is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a
+man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of
+effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+AXIOM.
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is
+not another more powerful and strong.  Whatsoever thing be given,
+there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+PROPOSITIONS.
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+PROP. I.  No positive quality possessed by a false idea is
+removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being
+true.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge
+which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any
+positive quality on account of which they are called false (II.
+xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,
+they are true (II. xxxii.).  Wherefore, if the positive quality
+possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is
+true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be
+removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd.  Therefore, no
+positive quality possessed by a false idea, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This proposition is more clearly understood from II.
+xvi. Coroll. ii.  For imagination is an idea, which indicates
+rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature
+of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly;
+whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err.  For
+instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant
+from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long
+as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true
+distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination;
+or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains
+tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected
+thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall
+still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us.  For, as we
+said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near
+us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the
+mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the
+body is affected thereby.  Thus, when the rays of the sun falling
+on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine
+the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its
+real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the
+mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition
+of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or
+diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at
+its presence.  It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an
+evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the
+contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will
+certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings;
+thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,
+in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,
+stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present
+existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. II.  We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of
+Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;We are said to be passive, when something arises in
+us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is
+(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the
+laws of our nature.  We are passive therefore, in so far as we
+are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without
+other parts.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. III.  The force whereby a man persists in existing is
+limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external
+causes.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This is evident from the axiom of this part.  For,
+when man is given, there is something else&mdash;say A&mdash;more powerful;
+when A is given, there is something else&mdash;say B&mdash;more powerful than
+A, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by
+the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the
+power of external causes.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IV.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,
+save such as can be understood through his nature only as their
+adequate cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The power, whereby each particular thing, and
+consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of
+Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but
+in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence
+(III. vii.).  Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained
+through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power
+of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.
+xxxiv.).  This was our first point.  Again, if it were possible,
+that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood
+solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would
+not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this
+would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was
+either finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only,
+inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all
+changes which could spring from external causes; or of the
+infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be
+so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any
+changes save such as tended towards his own preservation.  But
+the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of
+which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).
+Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of
+undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
+through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as
+we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from
+the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the
+necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as
+affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature
+as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must
+be deducible.  It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is
+infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.  It
+is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any
+changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a
+prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order
+of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as
+the nature of things demands.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. V.  The power and increase of every passion, and its
+persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of
+an external cause compared with our own.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The essence of a passion cannot be explained through
+our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),
+the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in
+II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VI.  The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the
+rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes
+obstinately fixed to him.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The force and increase of any passion and its
+persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore
+(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man's power, &amp;e.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VII.  An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by
+another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for
+controlling emotion.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is
+an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less
+force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the
+Emotions at the end of Part III.).  When, therefore, the mind is
+assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected
+with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or
+diminished.  Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives
+from its cause the force for persistence in its being; which
+force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.
+vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification
+contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.);
+wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a
+modification contrary to, and stronger than the former
+modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the
+emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
+stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy
+the existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be
+destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger
+emotion.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a
+modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that
+which we are undergoing.  For the emotion which we undergo can
+only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and
+stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition
+of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body
+contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we
+undergo.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VIII.  The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but
+the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or
+the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that
+is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or
+hinders, our power of activity.  Thus, in so far as we perceive
+that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or
+evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else
+but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows
+from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.).  But this
+idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united
+to body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction
+between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of
+the body, save in conception only.  Therefore the knowledge of
+good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we
+are conscious thereof.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with
+us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive
+the cause to be with us.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the
+mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which
+indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of
+the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).  An emotion is
+therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition
+of the body.  But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so
+long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
+of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or
+more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the
+present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with
+us.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected
+by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as
+if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that
+this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the
+thing in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged,
+whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the
+image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other
+things which exclude the present existence of the future object:
+I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I
+purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of
+my work.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;The image of something past or future, that is, of
+a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time
+future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other
+conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present;
+consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is
+less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt
+towards something present.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. X.  Towards something future, which we conceive as close at
+hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that
+its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer
+interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have
+not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we
+conceive that it has long passed away.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or
+not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the
+presence of the object less, than if its period of future
+existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long
+passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.)
+we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it
+follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a
+longer period than we can define in conception, though their
+dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they
+all affect us equally faintly.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XI.  An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary
+is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion
+towards that which possible, or contingent, or non&mdash;necessary.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,
+to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny
+a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be
+necessary (I. xxxiii. note. i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion
+towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal,
+more intense than an emotion that which is non&mdash;necessary.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XII.  An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is
+more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion
+towards a thing contingent.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+affected by the conception of some further thing, which would
+assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the
+other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which
+exclude its present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive a
+thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things
+which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.),
+things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards
+something possible is more vehement.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,
+is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as
+future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the
+future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.
+x.).  Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of
+existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,
+nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as
+contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard
+as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the
+thing to be present with us.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIII.  Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know
+not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal,
+fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the
+existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other
+hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its
+present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive it in relation
+to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls
+the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and
+note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II.
+xvii. Coroll.).  Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing
+contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is
+fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a
+thing past.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIV.  A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any
+emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is
+considered as an emotion.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its
+body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the
+general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no
+positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what
+is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by
+virtue of being true, restrain any emotion.  But, in so far as
+such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength
+for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to
+restrain the given emotion.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XV.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can
+be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from
+the emotions whereby we are assailed.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the
+Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the
+strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.).  But,
+inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of
+our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also
+present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must
+therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.);
+consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined
+solely by human power.  Again, the desires arising from the
+emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as
+the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and
+increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,
+which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it
+(IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be
+more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge
+of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVI.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,
+in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more
+easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is
+agreeable at the present moment.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,
+is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix.
+Coroll.).  But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of
+good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good
+at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong
+desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal
+application).  Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when
+concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or
+quenched, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVII.  Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and
+evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is
+contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire
+for things that are present.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop.
+from IV. xii. Coroll.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved
+by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the
+true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul,
+and often yields to every kind of passion.  This state of things
+gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:[12]&mdash;&mdash;
+"The better path I gaze at and approve,
+The worse&mdash;I follow."
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind,
+when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."  I
+have not written the above with the object of drawing the
+conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or
+that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his
+emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the
+infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can
+do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power.  I
+have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human
+infirmity.  The power of reason over the emotions I have settled
+to treat separately.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVIII.  Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions
+being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions,
+i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist
+in his own being.  Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by
+the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the
+contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being
+felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising
+from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the
+power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must
+be defined by human power only.  Thus the former is the stronger
+of the two.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;In these few remarks I have explained the causes of
+human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide
+by the precepts of reason.  It now remains for me to show what
+course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are
+in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are
+contrary thereto.  But, before I begin to prove my Propositions
+in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them
+briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my
+meaning.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,
+that every man should love himself, should seek that which is
+useful to him&mdash;I mean, that which is really useful to him, should
+desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,
+and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to
+preserve his own being.  This is as necessarily true, as that a
+whole is greater than its part.  (Cf. III. iv.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance
+with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one
+endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with
+the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the
+foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own
+being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving
+his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its
+own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful
+to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and
+lastly, that suicides are weak&mdash;minded, and are overcome by
+external causes repugnant to their nature.  Further, it follows
+from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing
+without all external things for the preservation of our being or
+living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside
+ourselves.  Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our
+intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
+understand nothing besides itself.  There are, then, many things
+outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to
+be desired.  Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than
+those which are in entire agreement with our nature.  For if, for
+example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,
+they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them
+singly.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than
+man&mdash;nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being
+can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points
+agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were,
+one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with
+one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their
+being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.
+Hence, men who are governed by reason&mdash;that is, who seek what is
+useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves
+nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
+and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their
+conduct.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus
+briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater
+detail.  I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain
+the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every
+man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation
+of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the
+case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I
+have hitherto proceeded.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIX.  Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily
+desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the
+emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks
+good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad.  Now this appetite is
+nothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of
+Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.).
+Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires
+the one, and shrinks from the other, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XX.  The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek
+what is useful to him&mdash;in other words, to preserve his own
+being&mdash;the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in
+proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that
+is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by
+man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely
+by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.
+Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his
+own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently
+(III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his
+own being, he is wanting in power.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or
+preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes
+external and foreign to his nature.  No one, I say, from the
+necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion
+from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which
+latter may be done in a variety of ways.  A man, for instance,
+kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists
+round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a
+sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart;
+or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's
+command, to open his own veins&mdash;that is, to escape a greater evil
+by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may
+so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may
+assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea
+cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the
+necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become
+non&mdash;existent, is as impossible as that something should be made
+out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little
+reflection.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXI.  No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and
+to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and
+to live&mdash;in other words, to actually exist.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The proof of this proposition, or rather the
+proposition itself, is self&mdash;evident, and is also plain from the
+definition of desire.  For the desire of living, acting, &amp;c.,
+blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence
+of man&mdash;that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to
+preserve his own being.  Therefore, no one can desire, &amp;c.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXII.  No virtue can be conceived as prior to this
+endeavour to preserve one's own being.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The effort for self&mdash;preservation is the essence of a
+thing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived
+as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be
+conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.
+Therefore no virtue, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;The effort for self&mdash;preservation is the first and
+only foundation of virtue.  For prior to this principle nothing
+can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIII.  Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular
+action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said
+to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in
+so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In so far as a man is determined to an action through
+having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.
+Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived
+solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which
+does not follow from his virtue.  But, in so far as he is
+determined for an action because he understands, he is active;
+that is, he does something, which is perceived through his
+essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIV.  To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us
+the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being
+(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with
+the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to
+one's self.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing
+else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature.  But
+we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore
+to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,
+to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and
+that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.
+Coroll.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXV.  No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of
+anything else.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the
+thing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not from the
+essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that
+everyone endeavours to preserve his being.  Moreover, this
+proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should
+endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,
+the last&mdash;named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,
+which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd.  Therefore no one,
+&amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVI.  Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so
+far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,
+save such things as are conducive to understanding.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The effort for self&mdash;preservation is nothing else but
+the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so
+far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for
+continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as
+necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of
+Appetite, III. ix. note).  But the essence of reason is nought
+else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly
+understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.); therefore
+(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing else but to understand.  Again, since this effort of the
+mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to
+preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this
+effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and
+single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand
+things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the
+other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able
+to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are
+conducive to understanding.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVII.  We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save
+such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are
+able to hinder us from understanding.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing
+beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,
+save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing
+Prop.).  But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess
+certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has
+adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in
+so far as it reasons.  Therefore we know nothing to be good or
+evil save such things as really conduce, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVIII.  The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God,
+and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind is not capable of understanding anything
+higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely
+infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be
+conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest
+utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God.  Again,
+the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to
+the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously.  The
+mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand.  Now, as we
+have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is
+God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand
+or to know God.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIX.  No individual thing, which is entirely different
+from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and
+absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has
+something in common with our nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The power of every individual thing, and consequently
+the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be
+determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.
+vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through
+which human nature is conceived.  Therefore our power of
+activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and
+consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other
+individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not
+by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely
+different from our own; and since we call good or evil that
+which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.
+xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our
+power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different
+from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXX.  A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality
+which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in
+so far as it is contrary to our nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.
+viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when
+it diminishes or checks our power of action.  Therefore, if
+anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in
+common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or
+check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.
+iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that
+quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand,
+in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),
+in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is
+contrary to our nature.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXI.  In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,
+it is necessarily good.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it
+cannot be bad for it.  It will therefore necessarily be either
+good or indifferent.  If it be assumed that it be neither good
+nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which
+tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the
+hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself;
+but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for
+us, and vice versâ, in proportion as a thing is more useful for
+us, so is it more in harmony with our nature.  For, in so far as
+it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be
+different therefrom or contrary thereto.  If different, it can
+neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be
+contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,
+contrary to what is good&mdash;in short, bad.  Nothing, therefore, can
+be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;
+and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony
+with our nature, and vice versâ.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXII.  In so far as men are a prey to passion, they
+cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are
+understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or
+negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note);
+wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,
+cannot be said to be naturally in harmony.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This is also self&mdash;evident; for, if we say that white
+and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we
+absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect.  So, if
+we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both
+are finite&mdash;wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of
+their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power
+of external causes&mdash;we should certainly affirm that a man and a
+stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree
+only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really
+agree in no respect.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIII.  Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are
+assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states;
+and to this extent one and the same man is variable and
+inconstant.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be
+explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i.,
+ii.), but it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.),
+by the nature of external causes
+in comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as
+many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are
+affected (III. lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and
+the same object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly,
+that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object,
+and may therefore be variable and inconstant.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIV.  In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, they can be contrary one to another.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's
+feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to
+that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole
+possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and
+note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in
+III. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
+Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen
+also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should
+endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.
+xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another.  But the
+emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.);
+hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, can be contrary one to another.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives
+that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from
+this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,
+through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through
+agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way;
+if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be
+untrue.  But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we
+shall see that the discrepancy vanishes.  For the two men are not
+in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,
+that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one
+differing from the other.  For, in so far as each loves the same
+thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered
+thereby.  Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are
+at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the
+agreement in their natures.  The cause for their opposition lies,
+as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to
+differ.  For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved
+object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of
+the loved object as lost.  Hence the one man will be affected
+with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus
+they will be at variance one with another.  We can easily show in
+like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on
+differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXV.  In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,
+do they always necessarily agree in nature.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are
+passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at
+variance one with another.  But men are only said to be active,
+in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.);
+therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it
+is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely
+through human nature as its proximate cause.  But, since every
+man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,
+and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and
+further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem
+good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows
+that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human
+nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.
+Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with
+each man's nature.  Therefore, men in so far as they live in
+obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with
+another.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary I.&mdash;There is no individual thing in nature, which is
+more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.
+For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony
+with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man.
+But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when
+he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this
+extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of
+another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual
+things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in
+obedience to reason.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary II.&mdash;As every man seeks most that which is useful to
+him, so are men most useful one to another.  For the more a man
+seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,
+the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the
+same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to
+act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in
+obedience to reason.  But men are most in natural harmony, when
+they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore
+(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to
+another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;What we have just shown is attested by experience so
+conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man
+is to man a God."  Yet it rarely happens that men live in
+obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that
+they are generally envious and troublesome one to another.
+Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so
+that the definition of man as a social animal has met with
+general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much
+more convenience than injury.  Let satirists then laugh their
+fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes
+praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them
+heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said,
+they will find that men can provide for their wants much more
+easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can
+they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not
+to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,
+to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts.  But I
+will treat of this more at length elsewhere.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVI.  The highest good of those who follow virtue is
+common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason
+(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to
+reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;
+that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and
+can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of
+the same nature.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of
+those who follow after virtue were not common to all?  Would it
+not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in
+obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they
+agree in nature, would be at variance one with another?  To such
+an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but
+from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is
+common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of
+man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could
+neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure
+in this highest good.  For it belongs to the essence of the human
+mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal
+and infinite essence of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVII.  The good which every man, who follows after
+virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,
+and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge
+of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.);
+therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily
+endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to
+reason.  But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided
+by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for
+himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which
+each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also
+for others.  Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.);
+now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),
+which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it
+(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of
+God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of
+virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good
+for himself.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Another Proof.&mdash;The good, which a man desires for himself and
+loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love
+it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others
+should love it also; and as the good in question is common to
+all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,
+for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice
+therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in
+proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note I.&mdash;He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause
+others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the
+world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,
+and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight
+in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar
+impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what
+pleases themselves.  Again, as the highest good sought by men
+under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be
+possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love
+it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they
+delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed.  But he, who
+endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but
+courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent.
+Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in
+so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to
+Religion.  The desire of well&mdash;doing, which is engendered by a
+life according to reason, I call piety.  Further, the desire,
+whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate
+others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by
+honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according
+to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the
+gaining of friendship.  I have also shown in addition what are
+the foundations of a state; and the difference between true
+virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have
+said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in
+accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but
+man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to
+himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded
+by the general disposition of things rather than by his own
+nature considered solely in itself.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[13] Honestas
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.
+of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the
+slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition
+and womanish pity than on sound reason.  The rational quest of
+what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
+associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,
+or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the
+same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.
+Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men
+have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.
+Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we
+may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,
+treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature
+is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from
+human emotions (III. lvii. note).  It remains for me to explain
+what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit.  On these points
+see the following note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note II.&mdash;In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain
+praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note:
+the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms.  But I
+must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature
+and in society.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,
+consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions
+which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by
+sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is
+bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own
+disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to
+him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which
+he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.).  Now,
+if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain
+in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to
+his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.).  But seeing that they are a
+prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue
+(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and
+being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in
+need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note).  Wherefore, in order that
+men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is
+necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for
+the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure
+their fellow&mdash;men.  The way in which this end can be obtained, so
+that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.
+Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each
+other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.
+vii. and III. xxxix.  It is there shown, that an emotion can only
+be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to
+itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of
+incurring a greater injury themselves.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps
+in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging
+injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also
+possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to
+pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in
+restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note).  Such a
+society established with laws and the power of preserving itself
+is called a State, while those who live under its protection are
+called citizens.  We may readily understand that there is in the
+state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced
+good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely
+of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with
+reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good
+or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it
+can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on
+by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State
+authority.  Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is
+therefore punished by the right of the State only.  Obedience, on
+the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is
+thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages
+which a State provides.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent
+master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be
+said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are
+common to all.  Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no
+wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that
+which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the
+state of nature answering to justice and injustice.  Such ideas
+are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common
+consent what belongs to one man and what to another.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and
+injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes
+which display the nature of the mind.  But I have said enough.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to
+render it capable of being affected in an increased number of
+ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of
+ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is
+thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting
+other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise,
+whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is
+hurtful to man.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body
+increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.);
+therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it
+capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and
+is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body
+capable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is
+hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIX.  Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body
+mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a
+change in such proportion is bad.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The human body needs many other bodies for its
+preservation (II. Post. iv.).  But that which constitutes the
+specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts
+communicate their several motions one to another in a certain
+fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.).
+Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human
+body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the
+human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of
+being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in
+many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.).  Again,
+whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion
+causes the human body to assume another specific character, in
+other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the
+point is indeed self&mdash;evident), to be destroyed, and consequently
+totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of
+ways; therefore it is bad.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;The extent to which such causes can injure or be of
+service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part.  But I
+would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,
+when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually
+among its several parts is changed.  For I do not venture to deny
+that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and
+other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to
+consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally
+different from its own.  There is no reason, which compels me to
+maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse;
+nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.
+It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I
+should hardly call him the same.  As I have heard tell of a
+certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and
+though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his
+past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he
+had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for
+a grown&mdash;up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue.  If
+this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A
+man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can
+only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy
+of other men.  However, I prefer to leave such questions
+undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for
+raising new issues.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes
+men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever
+brings discord into a State is bad.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony
+also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is
+therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)
+whatsoever brings about discord is bad.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLI.  Pleasure in itself is not bad but good:
+contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the
+body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is
+emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or
+checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,
+&amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLII.  Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;
+contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,
+which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all
+parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.),
+the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a
+manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion
+of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),
+and cannot be excessive.  But Melancholy (see its Def. in the
+same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is
+referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or
+hindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV.
+xxxviii.) it is always bad.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLIII.  Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other
+hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is
+bad.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is
+pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,
+consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the
+rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this
+emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body
+(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus
+rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other
+ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad.  Again, grief,
+which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.).  But, as its
+force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause
+compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees
+and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can,
+therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and
+preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's
+capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLIV.  Love and desire may be excessive.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an
+external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation,
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.
+note); hence love maybe excessive.  Again, the strength of
+desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises
+(III. xxxvii.).  Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's
+actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from
+the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become
+excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning
+stimulation.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived
+more easily than it can be observed.  For the emotions, whereby
+we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the
+body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions
+are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation
+of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and
+although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions&mdash;and very few
+are found who are always assailed by one and the same&mdash;yet there
+are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately
+fixed.  We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,
+although it be not present, they think they have it before them;
+when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is
+delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with
+love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their
+mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are
+made objects of ridicule.  But when a miser thinks of nothing but
+gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but
+glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are
+generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated.  But,
+in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &amp;c., are species of madness,
+though they may not be reckoned among diseases.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLV.  Hatred can never be good.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.
+xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that
+is bad.  Therefore, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+N.B.  Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred
+towards men.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary I.&mdash;Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and
+other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are
+bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary II.&mdash;Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is
+base, and in a State unjust.  This also is evident from III.
+xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.
+xxxvii. note.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to
+be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference.  For
+laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so
+long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.).
+Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and
+gloomy superstition.  For why is it more lawful to satiate one's
+hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,
+and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else,
+save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,
+nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,
+which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the
+greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the
+perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we
+necessarily partake of the divine nature.  Therefore, to make use
+of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible
+(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is
+the part of a wise man.  I say it is the part of a wise man to
+refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
+drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
+plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
+and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
+his neighbour.  For the human body is composed of very numerous
+parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
+fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
+equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
+the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the
+mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
+simultaneously.  This way of life, then, agrees best with our
+principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there
+be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
+the best, and in every way to be commended.  There is no need for
+me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLVI.  He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,
+for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &amp;c., towards him.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.);
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such
+emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to
+prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.).  But hatred is
+increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love
+(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.);
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is
+assuredly wretched.  But he, who strives to conquer hatred with
+love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands
+many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid.
+Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but
+through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow
+so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,
+that I have no need to prove them in detail.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLVII.  Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves
+good.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.
+For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of
+the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without
+fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in
+themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive
+pleasure (IV. xliii.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;We may add, that these emotions show defective
+knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same
+reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of
+a want of mental power.  For although confidence and joy are
+pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,
+namely, hope and fear.  Wherefore the more we endeavour to be
+guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to
+free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate
+fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLVIII.  The emotions of over&mdash;esteem and disparagement are
+always bad.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)
+are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)
+bad.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLIX.  Over&mdash;esteem is apt to render its object proud.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's
+sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be
+pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good
+which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and
+therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other
+words, we are apt to become proud.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. L.  Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,
+is in itself bad and useless.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and
+therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad.  The good effect which
+follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity
+from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the
+dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of
+reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for
+certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under
+the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from
+the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in
+accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not
+find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will
+he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human
+virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to
+rejoice.  We may add, that he, who is easily touched with
+compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does
+something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can
+never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly
+because we are easily deceived by false tears.  I am in this
+place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of
+reason.  He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by
+compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems
+unlike a man.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LI.  Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree
+therewith and arise therefrom.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Approval is love towards one who has done good to
+another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.
+lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands;
+therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Another Proof.&mdash;He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.
+xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow
+his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will
+feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the
+benefactor.  Therefore he approves of him.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,
+xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark
+that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace
+punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said
+to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by
+hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LII.  Self&mdash;approval may arise from reason, and that which
+arises from reason is the highest possible.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Self&mdash;approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the
+Emotions, xxv.).  But a man's true power of action or virtue is
+reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and
+distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore
+self&mdash;approval arises from reason.  Again, when a man is
+contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly
+or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action
+(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of
+understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the
+highest possible self&mdash;approval arise.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Self&mdash;approval is in reality the highest object for
+which we can hope.  For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one
+endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior
+object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and
+strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary
+(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame
+becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life
+under disgrace is almost unendurable.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LIII.  Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of
+his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.).  But, in so
+far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to
+understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.).
+Wherefore, if a man in self&mdash;contemplation perceives any infirmity
+in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but
+(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked.
+But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by
+virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the
+knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this
+is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands
+himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because[14] his power of activity
+is aided.  Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a
+man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the
+contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"&mdash;which I
+have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
+'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LIV.  Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or
+infirm.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The first part of this proposition is proved like the
+foregoing one.  The second part is proved from the mere
+definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,
+xxvii.).  For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by
+evil desires; secondly, by pain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these
+two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and
+Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had
+better sin in that direction.  For, if all men who are a prey to
+emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,
+and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked
+together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant, when it
+is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who
+consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously
+commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence.  Indeed those who
+are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than
+others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become
+free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LV.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance
+of self.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and
+xxix.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LVI.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme
+infirmity of spirit.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The first foundation of virtue is self&mdash;preservation
+(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.).
+He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the
+foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues.
+Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of
+reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of
+reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.).
+Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and
+consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue;
+in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit.  Thus
+extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and
+the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride;
+for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a
+painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful
+(IV. xviii.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LVII.  The proud man delights in the company of flatterers
+and parasites, but hates the company of the high&mdash;minded.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation
+of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this
+estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the
+means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight
+in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is
+too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the
+company of high&mdash;minded men, who value him according to his
+deserts.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the
+evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all
+the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity.
+I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may
+be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and,
+therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself
+superior to his fellows.  The dejection, which is the opposite
+quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior
+to his fellows.  Such being the ease, we can easily see that a
+proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes
+pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his
+bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the
+dejected man very near akin to the proud man.  For, inasmuch as
+his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and
+other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other
+words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in
+contemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb,
+"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow&mdash;sufferers."
+Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he
+thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to
+envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's
+actions, with a view to fault&mdash;finding rather than correction, in
+order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory
+therein, though all the time with a dejected air.  These effects
+follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from
+the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.  I have already said that I call these and similar
+emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man.  The
+laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man
+is but a part.  I mention this, in passing, lest any should think
+that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds
+of men rather than the nature and properties of things.  For, as
+I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions
+and their properties as on the same footing with other natural
+phenomena.  Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and
+ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as
+other things which we admire, and which we delight to
+contemplate.  But I pass on to note those qualities in the
+emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon
+him.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LVIII.  Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
+arise therefrom.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and
+also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.
+i.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note&mdash;Empty honour, as it is styled, is self&mdash;approval,
+fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this
+good opinion ceases there ceases also the self&mdash;approval, in other
+words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note);
+consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,
+day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain
+his reputation.  For the populace is variable and inconstant, so
+that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.
+Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and
+readily represses the fame of others.  The object of the strife
+being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is
+seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every
+possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more
+proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to
+himself.  This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
+nothing.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred
+from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance.  I
+will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,
+is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is
+really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same
+way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not
+mortified.  Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,
+he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no
+desire to live honourably.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon
+concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the
+desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good
+or evil emotions.  But all, in so far as they are engendered in
+us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is
+evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be
+useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance
+of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LIX.  To all the actions, whereto we are determined by
+emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined
+without emotion by reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.
+ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the
+necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone.  But pain is
+bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action
+(IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any
+action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance
+of reason.  Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a
+man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this
+extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we
+could not perform under the guidance of reason.  Lastly,
+pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for
+it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is
+increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in
+so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent
+of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his
+actions (III. iii., and note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to
+such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception
+of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,
+capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion
+wherein the mind is passive.  But all emotions are attributable
+to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.
+explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing
+else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &amp;c.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Another Proof.&mdash;A given action is called bad, in so far as it
+arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.
+But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad
+(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same
+action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the
+action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,
+we may be led by reason (IV. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;An example will put this point in a clearer light.  The
+action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and
+in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his
+arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently
+downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper
+to the structure of the human body.  If, then, a man, moved by
+anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,
+this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one
+and the same action can be associated with various mental images
+of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of
+one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and
+distinct ideas.  Hence it is evident that every desire which
+springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become
+useless, if men could be guided by reason.  Let us now see why
+desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is
+called by us blind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LX.  Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not
+attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts
+thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a
+body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails
+over the remaining parts (IV. vi.).  This part will not endeavour
+to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of
+the body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary
+for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own
+powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd.  The said part, and,
+consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its
+condition.  Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind
+aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole.  If it
+be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so
+that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same
+manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to
+a man as a whole.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to
+one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being
+with out taking into consideration our health as a whole: to
+which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over
+us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXI.  Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered
+absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by
+some given modification of itself.  Hence desire, which arises
+from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so
+far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are
+adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.).
+Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered
+in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able
+to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction.  Therefore,
+such desire cannot be excessive.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXII.  In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be
+of a thing future, past, or present.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of
+reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.
+xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same
+certitude (II. xliii. and note).  Wherefore, whether the thing be
+present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same
+necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether
+the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all
+cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always
+possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.);
+therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether
+the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the
+duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods
+of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same
+emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though
+it were present the good which it conceived as future;
+consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the
+present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would
+in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source
+of evil in the future, as we shall presently show.  However, we
+can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of
+things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II.
+xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not
+so powerfully affected by the future as by the present.  Hence
+such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely
+abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order
+of things and the connection of causes, with a view to
+determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather
+imaginary than real.  Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the
+desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the
+desire of things which are agreeable at the present time.  (Cf.
+IV. xvi.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXIII.  He who is led by fear, and does good in order to
+escape evil, is not led by reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as
+active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and
+desire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does
+good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at
+vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by
+reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape
+evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as
+wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if
+they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow&mdash;men.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Under desire which springs from reason, we seek
+good directly, and shun evil indirectly.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Desire which springs from reason can only spring from
+a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III.
+lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive
+(IV. lxi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs
+from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under
+the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by
+implication shun evil.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a
+sick and a healthy man.  The sick man through fear of death eats
+what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes
+pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of
+life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to
+avoid it.  So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from
+hatred or anger but from love of the public well&mdash;being, is guided
+solely by reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXIV.  The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far
+as we are conscious thereof.  Now pain is the transition to a
+lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore
+cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi., and vii.);
+therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.)
+depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof
+(II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed
+only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXV.  Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the
+greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good
+is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to
+things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see
+preface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser
+good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only
+the greater good and the lesser evil.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the
+lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun
+the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.
+For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,
+and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the
+former and shun the latter.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXVI.  We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater
+good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,
+and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a
+greater evil in the future.[15]
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
+Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
+alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
+misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
+boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things
+future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same
+way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking
+merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,
+there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be
+assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we
+may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser
+good in the present, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a
+lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater
+good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,
+because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.  This
+Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the
+Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;If these statements be compared with what we have
+pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part
+up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a
+man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is
+led by reason.  The former, whether will or no, performs actions
+whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and
+only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance
+in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the
+former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose
+disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few
+observations.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXVII.  A free man thinks of death least of all things;
+and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;A free man is one who lives under the guidance of
+reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly
+desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words
+(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his
+being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore
+such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom
+is a meditation of life.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXVIII.  If men were born free, they would, so long as they
+remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;I call free him who is led solely by reason; he,
+therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only
+adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no
+conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being
+correlative) of good.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of
+this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as
+we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so
+far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the
+cause of man's existence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
+have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.
+For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save
+that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he
+provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God
+forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of
+good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,
+he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.
+Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in
+entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be
+nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that
+after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway
+began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his
+freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the
+patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of
+God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire
+for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have
+shown above (IV. xxxvii.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXIX.  The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,
+when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion
+contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining
+emotion (IV. vii.).  But blind daring and fear are emotions,
+which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.):
+hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring
+than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
+when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as
+in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of
+mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,
+I explained in III. lix. note.  By danger I mean everything,
+which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,
+&amp;c.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXX.  The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,
+as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Everyone judges what is good according to his
+disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who
+has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon
+it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the
+receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.).  But the free man only
+desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not
+repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,
+but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,
+and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
+importance.  Therefore the free man, lest he should become
+hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than
+reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving
+their favours.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;I say, as far as he can.  For though men be ignorant,
+yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human
+aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often
+necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay
+such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in
+declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of
+despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious
+motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for
+offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it.  Thus, in
+declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility
+and courtesy.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXXI.  Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to
+another.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,
+and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of
+friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,
+with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one
+to another.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire
+have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,
+rather than pure goodwill.  Moreover, ingratitude is not an
+emotion.  Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a
+man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &amp;c.
+He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,
+is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the
+gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal
+his thefts, or by any similar persons.  Contrariwise, such an one
+shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be
+corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXXII.  The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
+good faith.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a
+case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the
+danger of present death? Would not his plan of self&mdash;preservation
+completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by
+pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would
+persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason
+would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their
+forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any
+general laws, which is absurd.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. LXXIII.  The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in
+a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in
+solitude, where he is independent.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey
+through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to
+preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is
+(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,
+he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.
+ii.), to live according to the laws of his country.  Therefore
+the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to
+possess the general rights of citizenship.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;These and similar observations, which we have made on
+man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to
+courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note).  I do not
+think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of
+strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no
+man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no
+man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud.  These
+propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and
+religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.;
+namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every
+man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.
+We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.
+l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever
+first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity
+of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful
+and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,
+horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his
+own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.
+Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they
+really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such
+as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar
+emotions, which I have mentioned above.  Thus he endeavours, as
+we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on
+his way rejoicing.  How far human virtue is capable of attaining
+to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in
+the following Part.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+APPENDIX.
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life
+has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,
+but has been set forth piece&mdash;meal, according as I thought each
+Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.
+I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
+under leading heads.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I.  All our endeavours or desires so follow from the
+necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either
+through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our
+being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived
+through itself without other individuals.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,
+that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to
+consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only
+referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things
+inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined
+not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to
+us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter
+passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,
+on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+III.  Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
+by man's power or reason, are always good.  The rest may be
+either good or bad.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IV.  Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect
+the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone
+man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed
+blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which
+arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the
+understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's
+attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of
+his nature.  Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the
+ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all
+his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate
+conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his
+intelligence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+V.  Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational
+life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his
+enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by
+intelligence.  Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's
+perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational
+life, are alone called evil.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VI.  As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are
+necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external
+causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal
+nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to
+conform to in almost infinite ways.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VII.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if
+he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with
+his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,
+whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in
+harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate
+himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+VIII.  Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be
+capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the
+rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems
+safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good
+or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the
+rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we
+think best.  Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right
+of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IX.  Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any
+given thing than other individuals of the same species;
+therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and
+the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful
+than his fellow&mdash;man who is led by reason.  Further, as we know
+not anything among individual things which is more excellent than
+a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his
+skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at
+last to live under the dominion of their own reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+X.  In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of
+hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are
+therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful
+than their fellows.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XI.  Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and
+high&mdash;mindedness.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XII.  It is before all things useful to men to associate
+their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds
+as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and
+generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XIII.  But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.
+For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the
+guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and
+more prone to revenge than to sympathy.  No small force of
+character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to
+restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others.  But
+those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at
+vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than
+strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and
+others.  Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from
+misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes
+rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably
+endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and
+choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
+preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their
+father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as
+they may spite their parents.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XIV.  Therefore, although men are generally governed in
+everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common
+brings many more advantages than drawbacks.  Wherefore it is
+better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive
+to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and
+friendship.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XV.  Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are
+attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living.  For men
+brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is
+reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received
+customs of their society.  For winning love those qualities are
+especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.
+IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XVI.  Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such
+harmony is insecure.  Further, fear arises from infirmity of
+spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the
+same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a
+certain resemblance to piety.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XVII.  Men are also gained over by liberality, especially
+such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain
+life.  However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the
+power and the advantage of any private person.  For the riches of
+any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.
+Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited
+for him to be able to make all men his friends.  Hence providing
+for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and
+has regard only to the general advantage.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XVIII.  In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our
+duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XIX.  Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of
+generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort
+of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,
+readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a
+species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than
+harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XX.  As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in
+harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not
+engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to
+beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the
+love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused
+by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXI.  Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by
+means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery.  None are
+more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be
+first, but are not.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXII.  There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety
+and religion.  Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet
+is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.
+note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXIII.  Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such
+matters as cannot be hid.  Further, as shame is a species of
+pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXIV.  The remaining emotions of pain towards men are
+directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;
+and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance
+to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass
+judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's
+rights.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXV.  Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire
+of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to
+piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.).  But, if it spring
+from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under
+the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and
+seditions.  For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word
+or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,
+I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:
+not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called
+after his name, nor to give any cause for envy.  Further, in his
+conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and
+will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but
+he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way
+whereby it may be perfected.  Thus will men be stirred not by
+fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to
+endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to
+reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXVI.  Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature
+in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with
+ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,
+whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our
+advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or
+destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to
+our use as best we may.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXVII.  The advantage which we derive from things external to
+us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from
+observing them, and from recombining their elements in different
+forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this
+point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and
+nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their
+functions.  For, in proportion as the body is capable of being
+affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external
+bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind
+capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.).  But there seem to be
+very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due
+nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.
+For the human body is composed of very many parts of different
+nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so
+that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything
+that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the
+mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXVIII.  Now for providing these nourishments the strength of
+each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one
+another mutual aid.  But money has furnished us with a token for
+everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind
+of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly
+conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the
+idea of money as cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXIX.  This result is the fault only of those, who seek
+money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but
+because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring
+themselves to great splendour.  Certainly they nourish their
+bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they
+lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of
+their body.  But they who know the true use of money, and who fix
+the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,
+live content with little.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXX.  As, therefore, those things are good which assist the
+various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their
+functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid
+to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;
+it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.
+But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us
+pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit
+our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred
+to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore
+most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at
+hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become
+excessive.  Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most
+regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate
+what is future with emotions equally vivid.  (IV. xliv. note, and
+lx. note.)
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXI.  Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as
+good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.
+However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious
+take delight in my infirmity and trouble.  For the greater the
+pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection
+whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the
+divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated
+by a true regard for our advantage.  But contrariwise he, who is
+led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by
+reason.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+XXXII.  But human power is extremely limited, and is
+infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have
+not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those
+things which are without us.  Nevertheless, we shall bear with an
+equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims
+of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have
+done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not
+sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;
+remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we
+follow her order.  If we have a clear and distinct understanding
+of this, that part of our nature which is defined by
+intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will
+assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence
+will endeavour to persist.  For, in so far as we are intelligent
+beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,
+nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which
+is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding
+of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is
+in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.
+</P>
+
+<BR><BR><BR>
+
+<A NAME="chap05"></A>
+<H4 ALIGN="center">
+PART V:
+</H4>
+
+<H3 ALIGN="center">
+Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom
+</H3>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+PREFACE
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which
+is concerned with the way leading to freedom.  I shall therefore
+treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the
+reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental
+Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much
+more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.  It is no part
+of my design to point out the method and means whereby the
+understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the
+body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of
+its functions.  The latter question lies in the province of
+Medicine, the former in the province of Logic.  Here, therefore,
+I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of
+reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its
+dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.
+That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have
+already shown.  Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions
+depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely
+govern them.  But these philosophers were compelled, by the
+protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
+that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and
+moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the
+example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house&mdash;dog
+and the other a hunting&mdash;dog.  For by long training it could be
+brought about, that the house&mdash;dog should become accustomed to
+hunt, and the hunting&mdash;dog to cease from running after hares.  To
+this opinion Descartes not a little inclines.  For he maintained,
+that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of
+the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the
+aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which
+are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which
+the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various
+ways.  He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst
+of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of
+the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the
+midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal
+spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different
+marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different
+external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;
+whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the
+gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once
+before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the
+gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
+determining them to the condition wherein they were, when
+repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.  He further
+asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature
+to a certain given motion of the gland.  For instance, whenever
+anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition
+causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in
+question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the
+mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,
+inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the
+animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would
+dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with
+the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to
+look at remote or very near objects.  Lastly, he maintained that,
+although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been
+united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole
+number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet
+it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
+other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de
+l'âme, I.50.  He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,
+that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power
+over its passions.  For passions as defined by him are
+"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are
+referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)
+are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement
+of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27).  But, seeing that we
+can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,
+to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely
+on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with
+sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our
+actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which
+we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an
+absolute dominion over our passions.  Such is the doctrine of
+this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his
+own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could
+hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man.  Indeed, I
+am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,
+that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from
+self&mdash;evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not
+clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to
+task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through
+occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which
+occult qualities are commonplace.  What does he understand, I
+ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and
+distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union
+with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like
+him to explain this union through its proximate cause.  But he
+had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,
+that he could not assign any particular cause of the union
+between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have
+recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.
+Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the
+mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it
+hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can
+be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the
+animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we
+have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again
+disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would
+follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given
+danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,
+yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended
+in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything
+except running away.  In truth, as there is no common standard of
+volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between
+the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;
+consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined
+by the strength of the other.  We may also add, that there is no
+gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it
+can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that
+all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the
+brain.  Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes
+concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have
+abundantly proved that his premisses are false.  Therefore, since
+the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the
+understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of
+the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all
+have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or
+distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those
+conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+AXIOMS.
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+I.  If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a
+change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of
+the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II.  The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,
+in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence
+of its cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<H4>
+PROPOSITIONS.
+</H4>
+
+<P>
+PROP. I.  Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
+and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or
+the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
+associated in the body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.
+vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the
+order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and
+vii.) as the order and connection of ideas.  Wherefore, even as
+the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place
+according to the order and association of modifications of the
+body (II. xviii.), so vice versâ (III. ii.) the order and
+connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance
+with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are
+arranged and associated in the mind.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. II.  If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,
+from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other
+thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external
+cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these
+emotions, be destroyed.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,
+is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is
+removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;
+therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are
+destroyed.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. III.  An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a
+passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by
+the general Def. of the Emotions).  If, therefore, we form a
+clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only
+be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to
+the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III.
+iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary&mdash;An emotion therefore becomes more under our
+control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in
+proportion as it is more known to us.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IV.  There is no modification of the body, whereof we
+cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Properties which are common to all things can only be
+conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and
+Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,
+whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
+we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.  For an
+emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general
+Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding
+Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
+an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
+understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
+(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
+distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
+absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
+about, that he should become less subject to them.  To attain
+this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
+acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
+every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
+be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
+distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
+that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
+external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence
+it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &amp;c. will be
+destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
+are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
+being excessive (IV. lxi.).  For it must be especially remarked,
+that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
+that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.
+For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
+that everyone desires his fellow&mdash;men to live after his own
+fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by
+reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
+does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives
+by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
+called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof).  In like
+manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
+they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
+accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
+adequate ideas.  For all desires, whereby we are determined to
+any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
+inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).  Than this remedy for the emotions
+(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in
+a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
+our power, can be devised.  For the mind has no other power save
+that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
+above (III. iii.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. V.  An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
+and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
+conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be
+free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be
+necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one
+towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).
+But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to
+conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes
+whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);
+therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply
+is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel
+towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,
+consequently, it is the greatest of all.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VI.  The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
+less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
+necessary.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
+xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an
+infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing
+Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less
+subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)
+feels less emotion towards the things themselves.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
+applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly
+and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the
+emotions, as experience also testifies.  For we see, that the
+pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as
+the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means
+have been preserved.  So also we see that no one pities an
+infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,
+because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.
+Whereas, if most people were born full&mdash;grown and only one here
+and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because
+infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and
+necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may
+note several other instances of the same sort.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VII.  Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
+we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
+attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the
+emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,
+being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the
+said thing (II. xvii.).  Wherefore, the emotion, which is
+referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a
+nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.
+vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
+controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
+external cause (IV. ix.).  But an emotion which springs from
+reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things
+(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always
+regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their
+present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
+manner (II. xxxviii.).  Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
+remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which
+are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external
+causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
+until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the
+emotion which springs from reason is more powerful.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. VIII.  An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
+of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
+(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
+number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
+becomes stronger.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note&mdash;This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
+causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
+itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
+affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
+and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
+single cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
+hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);
+therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
+contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
+another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
+the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is
+unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.
+Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.
+vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less
+passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of
+several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
+emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few
+or of a single object: this was our second point.  Lastly, this
+emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to
+several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. X.  So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
+our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that
+is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede
+the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.).  So long, therefore, as
+we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the
+mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.
+xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear
+and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.
+note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such
+cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of
+the body according to the intellectual order.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;By this power of rightly arranging and associating the
+bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily
+affected by evil emotions.  For (V. vii.) a greater force is
+needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and
+associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,
+are uncertain and unsettled.  The best we can do, therefore, so
+long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is
+to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,
+to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the
+particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
+that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that
+it may be always ready to our hand.  For instance, we have laid
+down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred
+should be overcome with love or high&mdash;mindedness, and not required
+with hatred in return.  Now, that this precept of reason may be
+always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think
+over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and
+in what manner and way they may be best warded off by
+high&mdash;mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with
+the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready
+for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.).  If we keep also
+in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
+which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
+further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result
+of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than
+everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such
+case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises
+therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and
+will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a
+grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be
+overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner
+than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand.  As
+is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii.  We should, in the same
+way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the
+ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and
+imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of
+resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.
+But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions
+we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
+individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order
+that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of
+pleasure.  For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
+pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for
+which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain
+it.  Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the
+fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
+through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do
+the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of
+gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving
+vent to their anger would fain appear wise.  Wherefore it is
+certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of
+honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily
+covet it.  This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common
+to all who are ill&mdash;used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.
+For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the
+misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely
+torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not
+only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches.  So,
+again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love
+think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock
+faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,
+directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.
+Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the
+love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of
+the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy
+which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise
+desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
+revel in a false show of freedom.  Whosoever will diligently
+observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
+difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for
+the most part, to direct his actions according to the
+commandments of reason.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
+that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XI.  In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
+objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and
+occupies the mind more.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is
+referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can
+be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
+contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;
+therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in
+full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XII.  The mental images of things are more easily
+associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
+and distinctly understand, than with others.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,
+are either the common properties of things or deductions
+therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are
+consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.
+Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate
+other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
+something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of
+the said things should be more often associated with the images
+of these than with the images of something else.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIII.  A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as
+it is associated with a greater number of other images.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In proportion as an image is associated with a greater
+number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
+whereby it can be aroused.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIV.  The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
+modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of
+God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind
+may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);
+wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred
+to the idea of God (I. xv.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XV.  He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
+more understands himself and his emotions.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is
+(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the
+same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more
+understands himself and his emotions.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVI.  This love towards God must hold the chief place in
+the mind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;For this love is associated with all the modifications
+of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);
+therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVII.  God is without passions, neither is he affected by
+any emotion of pleasure or pain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
+true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and
+therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without
+passions.  Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a
+lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of
+the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
+pleasure or pain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate
+anyone.  For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any
+emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,
+vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XVIII.  No one can hate God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect
+(II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,
+we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be
+no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;It may be objected that, as we understand God as the
+cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause
+of pain.  But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the
+causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a
+passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore,
+in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to
+that extent feel pleasure.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XIX.  He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should
+love him in return.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.
+xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
+consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is
+absurd (III. xxviii.).  Therefore, he who loves God, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XX.  This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion
+of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to
+God by the same bond of love.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This love towards God is the highest good which we can
+seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common
+to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice
+therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),
+it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of
+jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note);
+but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
+therein.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion
+directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be
+destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God
+is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as
+it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the
+body be destroyed also.  As to its nature, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I have now gone through all the remedies against the
+emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can
+do against them.  Whence it appears that the mind's power over
+the emotions consists:&mdash;&mdash;
+</P>
+
+<P>
+I.  In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the
+thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.
+ii. and V. iv. note).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+III.  In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions
+referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those
+referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner
+(V. vii.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+IV.  In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]
+are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of
+things or to God (V. ix. xi.).
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus&mdash;&mdash;emotions.
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P>
+V.  Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and
+associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and
+xii. xiii. xiv.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
+may be better understood, it should be specially observed that
+the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion
+of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is
+more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are
+comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,
+and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than
+by another.  For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
+comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.
+Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
+infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge
+only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
+whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it
+may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by
+its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active,
+whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,
+although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former
+mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas
+attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human
+infirmity.  Again, it must be observed, that spiritual
+unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to
+excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,
+and which we can never become masters of.  For no one is
+solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;
+neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &amp;c. arise, except in
+regard to things whereof no one can be really master.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and
+distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge
+(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,
+possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy
+them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at
+any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind
+(V. xiv.).  Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable
+and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession
+(II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which
+are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to
+strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and
+deeply penetrate it.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+And now I have finished with all that concerns this present
+life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have
+briefly described all the remedies against the emotions.  And
+this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has
+attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the
+definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to
+Propositions i. and iii. of Part III.  It is now, therefore, time
+to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of
+the mind, without relation to the body.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXI.  The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
+is past, while the body endures.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind does not express the actual existence of its
+body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as
+actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and,
+consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine
+any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.
+Thus it
+cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.
+xvii. note),
+or remember things past, except while the body endures (see
+definition of Memory, II. xviii. note).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXII.  Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,
+which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the
+form of eternity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or
+that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.).  This
+essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the
+very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a
+certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must
+necessarily exist in God (II. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIII.  The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
+the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which
+expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,
+therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence
+of the human mind (II. xiii.).  But we have not assigned to the
+human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as
+it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained
+through duration, and may be defined by time&mdash;that is (II. viii.
+Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
+endures.  Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
+conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
+of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the
+essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;This idea, which expresses the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode
+of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
+necessarily eternal.  Yet it is not possible that we should
+remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear
+no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in
+terms of time, or have any relation to time.  But,
+notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal.  For the
+mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no
+less than those things that it remembers.  For the eyes of the
+mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than
+proofs.  Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before
+the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the
+essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and
+that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or
+explained through duration.  Thus our mind can only be said to
+endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in
+so far as it involves the actual existence of the body.  Thus far
+only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
+time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIV.  The more we understand particular things, the more
+do we understand God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXV.  The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
+virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
+idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
+essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,
+in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
+understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or
+nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to
+understand things by the third kind of knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVI.  In proportion as the mind is more capable of
+understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
+more to understand things by that kind.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof&mdash;This is evident.  For, in so far as we conceive the
+mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of
+knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to
+conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
+the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable
+thereof.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVII.  From this third kind of knowledge arises the
+highest possible mental acquiescence.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.
+xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge
+(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind
+knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):
+consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge
+passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
+of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such
+pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own
+virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of
+knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXVIII.  The endeavour or desire to know things by the
+third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the
+second kind of knowledge.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This proposition is self&mdash;evident.  For whatsoever we
+understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
+itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that
+is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are
+referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)
+cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and
+are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from
+adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of
+knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of
+knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from
+the first, but from the second kind.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXIX.  Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
+eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the
+present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving
+the essence of the body under the form of eternity.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In so far as the mind conceives the present existence
+of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be
+determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of
+conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.).  But
+eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
+and explanation).  Therefore to this extent the mind has not the
+power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it
+possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to
+conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
+ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to
+conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
+xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to
+the essence of mind (II. xiii.).  Therefore this power of
+conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the
+mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as
+existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in
+God and following from the necessity of the divine nature.
+Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we
+conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the
+eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and
+note, which see.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXX.  Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body
+under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a
+knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived
+through God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this
+involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.).  Therefore to
+conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things
+in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as
+real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the
+essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
+itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that
+extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &amp;c.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXI.  The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
+its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind does not conceive anything under the form of
+eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
+form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is
+eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so
+far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which
+knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,
+in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything
+which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in
+other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge
+(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind
+(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or
+formal cause of such knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in
+this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of
+himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and
+blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel.  But we must
+here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind
+is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of
+eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more
+readily explained and better understood, we will consider the
+mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to
+understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have
+done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so
+long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our
+premisses are plain.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXII.  Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of
+knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by
+the idea of God as cause.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;From this kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,
+xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea
+of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the
+idea also of God as cause.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;From the third kind of knowledge necessarily
+arises the intellectual love of God.  From this kind of knowledge
+arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as
+we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we
+understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the
+intellectual love of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIII.  The intellectual love of God, which arises from
+the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.
+Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises
+therefrom is also necessarily eternal.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing
+Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of
+love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.
+of the last Prop.  Nor is there here any difference, except that
+the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we
+feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of
+God as eternal cause.  If pleasure consists in the transition to
+a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the
+mind being endowed with perfection itself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIV.  The mind is, only while the body endures, subject
+to those emotions which are attributable to passions.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind
+contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea
+indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than
+the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).
+Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,
+in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;
+therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,
+subject to emotions which are attributable to passions.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that no love save intellectual
+love is eternal.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that
+they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that
+they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the
+imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after
+death.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXV.  God loves himself with an infinite intellectual
+love.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.
+Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;
+and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of
+himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause:
+now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as
+intellectual love.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVI.  The intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as
+he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the
+essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;
+in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This love of the mind must be referred to the
+activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is
+itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself
+accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.);
+that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity
+whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human
+mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;
+therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of
+the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves
+himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God
+towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God
+are identical.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein
+our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in
+the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love
+towards men.  This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called
+Glory, and not undeservedly.  For whether this love be referred
+to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of
+spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really
+distinguished from glory.  In so far as it is referred to God, it
+is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,
+accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in
+knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.
+xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner
+and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from
+the divine nature and constantly depends on God.  I have thought
+it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show
+by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I
+have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),
+is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which
+I have styled knowledge of the second kind.  For, although in
+Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and
+consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence
+and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate
+and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind
+so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual
+essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVII.  There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to
+this intellectual love, or which can take it away.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;This intellectual love follows necessarily from the
+nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through
+the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).
+If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary
+to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;
+consequently, that, which should be able to take away this
+love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious
+absurdity.  Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &amp;c.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular
+things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given
+time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXVIII.  In proportion as the mind understands more things
+by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to
+those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);
+therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by
+the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
+part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently
+(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not
+touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in
+other words, evil (IV. xxx.).  Thus, in proportion as the mind
+understands more things by the second and third kinds of
+knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains
+unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &amp;c.
+Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Hence we understand that point which I touched on in
+IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;
+namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the
+mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,
+consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more.  Again,
+since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind
+can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which
+we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of
+little importance when compared with the part which endures.  But
+I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XXXIX.  He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part
+is eternal.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which
+are evil (IV. xxxviii.)&mdash;that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions
+which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he
+possesses the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,
+and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the
+modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;
+whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected
+with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute
+the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man
+will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number
+of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a
+nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great
+knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or
+chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely
+fear death.  But, in order that this may be understood more
+clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of
+perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the
+better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a
+corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness,
+if we have been able to live through the whole period of life
+with a sound mind in a sound body.  And, in reality, he, who, as
+in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very
+few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external
+causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely
+conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who
+has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,
+considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of
+God, and of things.  In this life, therefore, we primarily
+endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far
+as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into
+something else capable of very many activities, and referable to
+a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things;
+and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its
+imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison
+with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the
+last Proposition.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XL.  In proportion as each thing possesses more of
+perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice
+versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it
+possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.
+iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less
+passive.  This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove
+that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more
+perfect.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Corollary.&mdash;Hence it follows that the part of the mind which
+endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.
+For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the
+understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.);
+the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.
+xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.
+and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it
+great or small, is more perfect than the latter.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set
+forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without
+relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other
+places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,
+is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another
+eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to
+infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the
+eternal and infinite intellect of God.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLI.  Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we
+should still consider as of primary importance piety and
+religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed
+to be attributable to courage and high&mdash;mindedness.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule
+of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's
+own true interest.  Now, while we determined what reason
+prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity,
+which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part.  Although
+we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we
+nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage
+and high&mdash;mindedness are of primary importance.  Therefore, even
+if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the
+aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;The general belief of the multitude seems to be
+different.  Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so
+far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their
+rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the
+commandments of the divine law.  They therefore believe that
+piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to
+firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to
+lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,
+for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but
+also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after
+death, that they are induced to live according to the divine
+commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry
+them.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the
+mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life
+remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of
+piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling
+everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey
+fortune rather than themselves.  Such a course appears to me not
+less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he
+can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to
+cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he
+sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer
+to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of
+reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth
+refuting.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+PROP. XLII.  Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue
+itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our
+lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able
+to control our lusts.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Proof.&mdash;Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and
+note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.
+xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active;
+therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself.  This was our
+first point.  Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in
+this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand
+(V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power
+has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is
+it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or
+blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts.  And,
+since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in
+the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in
+blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,
+contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this
+blessedness itself.  Q.E.D.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Note.&mdash;I have thus completed all I wished to set forth
+touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's
+freedom.  Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how
+much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his
+lusts.  For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various
+ways by external causes without ever gaining the true
+acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were
+unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as
+he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
+scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
+himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
+necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
+acquiescence of his spirit.
+</P>
+
+<P>
+If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result
+seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered.  Needs
+must it be hard, since it is so seldom found.  How would it be
+possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without
+great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men
+neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are
+rare.
+</P>
+
+<BR><BR>
+
+<P CLASS="finis">
+End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza
+</P>
+
+<BR>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[1] "Affectiones"
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[2] "Forma"
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[3] "Animata"
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[5] Conscientiæ morsus&mdash;thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
+whom we regard without any particular emotion.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
+"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[8] See previous endnote.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.
+<BR><BR>
+  "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;<BR>
+<BR><BR>
+  Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."<BR>
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
+intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[11] Gloria.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[13] Honestas
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"&mdash;which I
+have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
+'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
+Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
+alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
+misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
+boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
+that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
+I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be
+obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholarship.
+</P>
+
+<P CLASS="footnote">
+[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus&mdash;&mdash;emotions.
+</P>
+
+<BR><BR><BR><BR>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Ethics
+
+Author: Benedict de Spinoza
+
+Posting Date: May 28, 2009 [EBook #3800]
+Release Date: February, 2003
+First Posted: September 26, 2001
+Last Updated: December 11, 2017
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ETHICS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Tom Sharpe.  HTML version by Al Haines.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+The Ethics
+
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+
+by
+
+Benedict de Spinoza
+
+
+
+
+Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+
+
+
+PART I. CONCERNING GOD.
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+
+I.  By that which is self--caused, I mean that of which the
+essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
+conceivable as existent.
+
+II.  A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be
+limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a
+body is called finite because we always conceive another greater
+body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a
+body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
+
+III.  By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a
+conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
+
+IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
+constituting the essence of substance.
+
+V.  By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or that
+which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than
+itself.
+
+[1] "Affectiones"
+
+VI.  By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a
+substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
+expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.
+
+Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its
+kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
+attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
+contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves
+no negation.
+
+VII.  That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
+necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is
+determined by itself alone.  On the other hand, that thing is
+necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by
+something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of
+existence or action.
+
+VIII.  By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
+conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
+that which is eternal.
+
+Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
+truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
+explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may
+be conceived without a beginning or end.
+
+
+AXIOMS.
+
+I.  Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else.
+
+II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
+conceived through itself.
+
+III.  From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;
+and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
+impossible that an effect can follow.
+
+IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
+knowledge of a cause.
+
+V.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
+one by means of the other; the conception of one does not
+involve the conception of the other.
+
+VI.  A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
+
+VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non--existing, its essence
+does not involve existence.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
+
+Proof.--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
+
+PROP. II.  Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
+nothing in common.
+
+Proof.--Also evident from Def. iii.  For each must exist in
+itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the
+conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.
+
+PROP. III.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
+cause of the other.
+
+Proof.--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
+cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
+therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IV.  Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from
+the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
+substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
+
+Proof.--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else (Ax. i.),--that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing
+is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and
+its modifications.  Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
+understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one
+from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see
+Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  There cannot exist in the universe two or more
+substances having the same nature or attribute.
+
+Proof.--If several distinct substances be granted, they must
+be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
+their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
+(Prop. iv.).  If only by the difference of their attributes, it
+will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
+identical attribute.  If by the difference of their
+modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its
+modifications (Prop. i.),--it follows that setting the
+modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is
+truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one
+substance different from another,--that is (by Prop. iv.), there
+cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
+
+Proof.--It is impossible that there should be in the universe
+two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have
+anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.
+iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be
+produced by the other.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that a substance cannot be
+produced by anything external to itself.  For in the universe
+nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as
+appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.).  Now (by the last
+Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,
+therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.
+Q.E.D.  This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the
+contradictory.  For, if substance be produced by an external
+cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its
+cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be
+substance.
+
+PROP. VII.  Existence belongs to the nature of substances.
+
+Proof.--Substance cannot be produced by anything external
+(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause--that
+is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence
+belongs to its nature.
+
+PROP. VIII.  Every substance is necessarily infinite.
+
+Proof.--There can only be one substance with an identical
+attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);
+its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or
+infinite.  It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it
+would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which
+would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be
+two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd
+(Prop. v.).  It therefore exists as infinite.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note I.--As finite existence involves a partial negation, and
+infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given
+nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance
+is necessarily infinite.
+
+Note II.--No doubt it will be difficult for those who think
+about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them
+by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.
+vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the
+modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and
+are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence
+they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe
+in natural objects.  Those who are ignorant of true causes, make
+complete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as
+men--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;
+and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
+also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,
+readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long
+as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.  But, if
+people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no
+doubt about the truth of Prop. vii.  In fact, this proposition
+would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.  For, by
+substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself--that is, something of which the
+conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas
+modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a
+conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the
+thing in which they exist.  Therefore, we may have true ideas of
+non--existent modifications; for, although they may have no
+actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their
+essence is so involved in something external to themselves that
+they may through it be conceived.  Whereas the only truth
+substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in
+their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.
+Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and
+distinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is not
+sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he
+said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it
+was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if
+anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same
+as saying that a false idea was true--in short, the height of
+absurdity.  It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
+existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth.  And
+we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that there
+is but one such substance.  I think that this may profitably be
+done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
+demonstration, we must premise:----
+
+1.  The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
+expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined.  From
+this it follows that----
+
+2.  No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
+individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature
+of the thing defined.  For instance, the definition of a triangle
+expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it
+does not imply any fixed number of triangles.
+
+3.  There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a
+cause why it should exist.
+
+4.  This cause of existence must either be contained in the
+nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated
+apart from such definition.
+
+It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual
+things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the
+existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less.  For
+example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's
+sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have
+had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of
+these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of
+human existence in general; we must also show why there are
+exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be
+assigned for the existence of each individual.  Now this cause
+cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true
+definition of man does not involve any consideration of the
+number twenty.  Consequently, the cause for the existence of
+these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must
+necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may
+lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of
+several individuals must have an external cause.  And, as it has
+been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of
+substance, existence must necessarily be included in its
+definition; and from its definition alone existence must be
+deducible.  But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii.,
+iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances;
+therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same
+nature.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IX.  The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the
+number of its attributes (Def. iv.).
+
+PROP. X.  Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
+conceived through itself.
+
+Proof.--An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of
+substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,
+therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note--It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in
+fact, conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of the
+other--yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two
+entities, or two different substances.  For it is the nature of
+substance that each of its attributes is conceived through
+itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
+simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;
+but each expresses the reality or being of substance.  It is,
+then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one
+substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each
+and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that
+its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its
+attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.
+Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite
+being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite
+attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and
+infinite essence.
+
+If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to
+distinguish different substances, let him read the following
+propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the
+universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a
+sign would be sought in vain.
+
+PROP. XI.  God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,
+of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
+necessarily exists.
+
+Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God
+does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.
+But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd.  Therefore God necessarily
+exists.
+
+Another proof.--Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason
+must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its
+non--existence--e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be
+granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not
+exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from
+existing, or annuls its existence.  This reason or cause must
+either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be
+external to it.  For instance, the reason for the non--existence
+of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it
+would involve a contradiction.  On the other hand, the existence
+of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its
+nature involves existence.  (See Prop. vii.)
+
+But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle
+does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the
+order of universal nature in extension.  From the latter it must
+follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
+impossible that it should exist.  So much is self--evident.  It
+follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or
+reason be granted which prevents its existence.
+
+If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
+existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
+certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist.  If such a
+reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the
+very nature of God, or be external to him--that is, drawn from
+another substance of another nature.  For if it were of the same
+nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist.  But
+substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God
+(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or
+to destroy his existence.
+
+As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
+existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine
+nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn
+from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction.  To
+make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and
+supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of
+God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be
+assigned which would annul his existence.  Therefore, God
+necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.
+
+Another proof.--The potentiality of non--existence is a
+negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence
+is a power, as is obvious.  If, then, that which necessarily
+exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more
+powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously
+absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
+absolutely infinite necessarily exists also.  Now we exist either
+in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see
+Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.).  Therefore a being absolutely
+infinite--in other words, God (Def. vi.)--necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's
+existence a posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily
+followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence
+does not follow a priori.  For, as the potentiality of existence
+is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases
+in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength
+for existence.  Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as
+God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence,
+and hence he does absolutely exist.  Perhaps there will be many
+who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as
+they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from
+external causes.  Of such things, they see that those which
+quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into existence--quickly
+also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of
+accomplishment--that is, not so easily brought into
+existence--those things which they conceive as more complicated.
+
+However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here
+show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly,
+goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of
+universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I
+need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which
+come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of
+substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any
+external cause.  Things which are produced by external causes,
+whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever
+perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of
+their external cause;  and therefore their existence arises
+solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from
+their own.  Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by
+substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence
+of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is
+nothing else but its essence.  Thus, the perfection of a thing
+does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it.
+Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we
+cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the
+existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is, of
+God.  For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and
+involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his
+existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question
+is given.  This, I think, will be evident to every moderately
+attentive reader.
+
+PROP. XII.  No attribute of substance can be conceived from which
+it would follow that substance can be divided.
+
+Proof.--The parts into which substance as thus conceived would
+be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they
+will not.  If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will
+necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self--caused, and (by
+Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so
+that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one
+substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd.  Moreover, the parts
+(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and
+the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be
+conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be
+absurd.  If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the
+parts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the whole
+substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature
+of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is
+absurd.
+
+PROP. XIII.  Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
+
+Proof.--If it could be divided, the parts into which it was
+divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite
+substance, or they would not.  If the former, we should have
+several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is
+absurd.  If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely
+infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also
+absurd.
+
+Corollary.--It follows, that no substance, and consequently no
+extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.
+
+Note.--The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
+understood as follows.  The nature of substance can only be
+conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else
+can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii)
+involves a manifest contradiction.
+
+PROP. XIV.  Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
+
+Proof.--As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no
+attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied
+(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any
+substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained
+by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
+attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,
+besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be
+conceived.  If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have
+to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this
+proof) is absurd.  Therefore, besides God no substance can be
+granted or conceived.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--Clearly, therefore: 1.  God is one, that is (by
+Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and
+that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already
+indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).
+
+Corollary II.--It follows:  2.  That extension and thought
+are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents
+(affectiones) of the attributes of God.
+
+PROP. XV.  Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can
+be, or be conceived.
+
+Proof.--Besides God, no substance is granted or can be
+conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which
+is in itself and is conceived through itself.  But modes (by Def.
+v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;
+wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only
+through it be conceived.  But substances and modes form the sum
+total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing
+can be, or be conceived.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
+mind, and is susceptible of passions.  How far such persons have
+strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
+said.  But these I pass over.  For all who have in anywise
+reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body.  Of this
+they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body
+a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a
+certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate
+such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite.  But meanwhile
+by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they
+show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart
+from the divine nature, and say it was created by God.  Wherefrom
+the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant;
+thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of
+their own words.  I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at
+any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop.
+viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything
+other than itself.  Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that
+besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.  Hence we
+drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the
+infinite attributes of God.  However, in order to explain more
+fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all
+start from the following points:----
+
+Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
+as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
+infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God.  This
+they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
+two.  If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be
+conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be
+either finite or infinite.  If the former, then infinite
+substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd.  If
+the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another
+infinite, which is also absurd.
+
+Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths,
+it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would
+equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part
+measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve
+times as great as the other.
+
+Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn
+two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance
+apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the
+distance between the two lines will be continually increased,
+until at length it changes from definite to indefinable.  As
+these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity
+as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance
+must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain
+to the nature of God.
+
+The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme
+perfection.  God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely
+perfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance,
+insofar as it is divisible, is passive.  It follows, therefore,
+that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.
+
+Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who
+by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the
+divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto.  However, I
+think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered
+their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the
+hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such
+a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.)
+to be absurd.  Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all
+these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now
+discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion
+that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the
+notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that
+an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts
+therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that:
+infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of
+finite parts.  This is exactly what we have already proved (in
+Prop. xii.).  Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in
+reality recoiled upon themselves.  If, from this absurdity of
+theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended
+substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like
+a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,
+and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to
+deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to
+the circumference are equal.  For, taking extended substance,
+which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible
+(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it
+is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can
+be multiplied and divided.
+
+So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of
+points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
+infinitely divided.  Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert
+that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it
+would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface
+of lines, and a line of points.  This must be admitted by all who
+know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who
+deny the possibility of a vacuum.  For if extended substance
+could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why
+should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others
+remaining joined together as before?  And why should all be so
+fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum?  Surely in the
+case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one
+can exist without the other, and can remain in its original
+condition.  As, then,  there does not exist a vacuum in nature
+(of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to
+prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be
+distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
+substance cannot be divided.
+
+If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally
+so prone to divide quantity?  I answer, that quantity is
+conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially,
+as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by
+the intellect.  If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented
+in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall
+find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but
+if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and
+conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we
+shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is
+infinite, one, and indivisible.  This will be plain enough to all
+who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination,
+especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the
+same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as
+we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
+distinguished, not really, but modally.  For instance, water, in
+so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts
+to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is
+extended substance; from this point of view it is neither
+separated nor divisible.  Further, water, in so far as it is
+water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is
+substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
+
+I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in
+fact, founded on the same assumption as the first--namely, that
+matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed
+of parts.  Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be
+considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God
+(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could
+receive its modifications.  All things, I repeat, are in God, and
+all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the
+laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly
+show) from the necessity of his essence.  Wherefore it can in
+nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other
+than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the
+Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is
+granted to be infinite and eternal.  But enough of this for the
+present.
+
+PROP. XVI.  From the necessity of the divine nature must follow
+an infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things
+which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
+
+Proof.--This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
+remembers that from the given definition of any thing the
+intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily
+follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
+defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the
+definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in
+proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more
+reality.  Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
+attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite
+essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its
+nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
+can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must
+necessarily follow.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
+cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
+intellect.
+
+Corollary II.--It also follows that God is a cause in himself,
+and not through an accident of his nature.
+
+Corollary III.--It follows, thirdly, that God is the
+absolutely first cause.
+
+PROP. XVII.  God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and
+is not constrained by anyone.
+
+Proof.--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
+the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
+solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things
+absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved
+(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived
+but that all things are in God.  Wherefore nothing can exist;
+outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to
+act.  Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
+and is not constrained by anyone.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--It follows: 1.  That there can be no cause
+which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
+perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.
+
+Corollary II.--It follows: 2.  That God is the sole free
+cause.  For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature
+(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole
+necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the
+sole free cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
+as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have
+said follow from his nature--that is, which are in his power,
+should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him.  But
+this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
+that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its
+three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles;
+or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is
+absurd.
+
+Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
+proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
+nature.  I know that there are many who think that they can show,
+that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature;
+for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can
+attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in
+ourselves.  Further, although they conceive God as actually
+supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring
+into existence everything which he actually understands, for they
+think that they would thus destroy God's power.  If, they
+contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he
+would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,
+would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to
+asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates
+nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute
+exercise of will, to create.  However, I think I have shown
+sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme
+power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things--that is,
+all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of
+ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as
+from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for
+eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right
+angles.  Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from
+all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state
+of activity.  This manner of treating the question attributes to
+God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect.  For,
+otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an
+infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able
+to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,
+according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render
+himself imperfect.  Wherefore, in order to establish that God is
+perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,
+that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power
+extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most
+repugnant to God's omnipotence.
+
+Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the
+will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain
+to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
+significance quite different from those they usually bear.  For
+intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
+would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
+intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with
+them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence
+between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
+constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.  This I will
+prove as follows.  If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it
+cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,
+posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,
+inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality
+(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.).  On the contrary, the truth and formal
+essence of things is as it is, because it exists by
+representation as such in the intellect of God.  Wherefore the
+intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
+God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
+essence and of their existence.  This seems to have been
+recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,
+God's will, and God's power, are one and the same.  As,
+therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,
+both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ
+from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its
+existence.  For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely
+in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
+
+For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence,
+but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
+therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but
+must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of
+one of them cease, the existence of the other will not
+necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be
+destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be
+destroyed also.  Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of
+the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ
+from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in
+respect to its existence.  Now the intellect of God is the cause
+both of the essence and the existence of our intellect;
+therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to
+constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in
+respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in
+anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before.  The
+reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone
+can easily see.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  God is the indwelling and not the transient cause
+of all things.
+
+Proof.--All things which are, are in God, and must be
+conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
+Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.
+This is our first point.  Further, besides God there can be no
+substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to
+God.  This is our second point.  God, therefore, is the
+indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIX.  God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.
+
+Proof.--God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)
+necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains
+to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its
+definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.).  Further,
+by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.
+iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other
+words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should
+be involved in the attributes of substance.  Now eternity
+appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in
+Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the
+attributes, and thus all are eternal.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition is also evident from the manner in
+which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is
+evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,
+like his essence, is an eternal truth.  Further (in Prop. xix. of
+my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the
+eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.
+
+PROP. XX.  The existence of God and his essence are one and the
+same.
+
+Proof.--God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
+eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
+existence.  Therefore the same
+attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at
+the same time his eternal existence--in other words, that which
+constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his
+existence.  Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one
+and the same.  Q.E.D.
+
+Coroll. I.--Hence it follows that God's existence, like his
+essence, is an eternal truth.
+
+Coroll. II--Secondly, it follows that God, and all the
+attributes of God, are unchangeable.  For if they could be
+changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be
+changed in respect to essence--that is, obviously, be changed from
+true to false, which is absurd.
+
+PROP. XXI.  All things which follow from the absolute nature of
+any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in
+other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
+
+Proof.--Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition
+to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow
+from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the
+same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or
+duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the
+attribute thought.  Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to
+be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its
+nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,
+it is supposed finite.  It cannot, however, be conceived as
+finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is
+not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
+the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);
+therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not
+constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)
+must necessarily exist.
+
+We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the
+idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
+follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for
+it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,
+the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis.  Wherefore, if
+the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
+anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any
+example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from
+the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the
+said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
+point.
+
+Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of
+the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration.  For
+if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of
+the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God,
+for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought,
+and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be
+about not to exist.
+
+Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist
+unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond
+the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the
+latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to
+exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of
+God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,
+thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed
+therefrom.  Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or
+anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of
+some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but
+through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.
+Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of
+anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's
+absolute nature.
+
+PROP. XXII.  Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so
+far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily
+and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist
+necessarily and as infinite.
+
+Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the preceding one.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
+infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature
+of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
+modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
+
+Proof.--A mode exists in something else, through which it must
+be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in
+God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode
+is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must
+necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of
+God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the
+infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.)
+eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely.  A
+mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must
+follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either
+immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some
+modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said
+attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily
+and as infinite.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The essence of things produced by God does not
+involve existence.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from Def. i.  For that of
+which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
+self--caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
+things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
+existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
+the being of things (essendi rerum).  For whether things exist,
+or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
+that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently,
+it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other.  God must
+be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
+appertain.  (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
+of things, but also of their essence.
+
+Proof.--If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
+essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by
+Ax. iv.) be conceived without God.  This (by Prop. xv.) is
+absurd.  Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
+For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
+essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
+existence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
+in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself.  This
+will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
+
+Corollary.--Individual things are nothing but modifications of
+the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
+are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.  The proof appears
+from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
+manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that
+which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
+act.
+
+Proof.--That by which things are said to be conditioned to act
+in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
+obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God
+by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.
+xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point.  Our second point is
+plainly to be inferred therefrom.  For if a thing, which has not
+been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part
+of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is
+absurd.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act
+in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from the third axiom.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  Every individual thing, or everything which is
+finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be
+conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
+action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and
+has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in
+its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be
+conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also
+is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to
+infinity.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
+thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,
+Coroll.).
+
+But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,
+cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God;
+for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any
+attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.).  It
+must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as
+the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for
+substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.
+and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the
+attributes of God.  But from God, or from any of his attributes,
+in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite
+and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow.  Wherefore it
+must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by
+God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
+modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence.  This is our first point.  Again, this
+cause or this modification (for the reason by which we
+established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be
+conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the
+same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
+namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
+nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
+nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
+follows:--1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
+things immediately produced by him.  I say absolutely, not after
+his kind, as is usually stated.  For the effects of God cannot
+either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.
+xxiv. Coroll.).  2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote
+cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing
+these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what
+follows from his absolute nature.  For, by a remote cause, we
+understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.
+But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that
+without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all
+things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular
+manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.).  But God cannot
+be called a thing contingent.  For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
+necessarily, and not contingently.  Further, the modes of the
+divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
+(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the
+divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
+conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.).  Further, God is not only the
+cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
+xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as
+conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).
+If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition
+themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
+themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
+the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also
+to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing
+that is contingent.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
+we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura
+naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata).  I say
+to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,
+from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature
+viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,
+and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
+substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other
+words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,
+in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
+
+By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which
+follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
+attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of
+God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
+and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXX.  Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
+infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
+modifications of God, and nothing else.
+
+Proof.--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in
+other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect
+in representation must necessarily be granted in nature.  But in
+nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save
+God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in
+God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived.  Therefore
+the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
+comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
+and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  The intellect in function, whether finite or
+infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to
+passive nature and not to active nature.
+
+Proof.--By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
+thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
+other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)
+requiring to be conceived through absolute thought.  It must (by
+Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
+expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
+conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
+conceived.  It must therefore be referred to nature passive
+rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
+thinking.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
+admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:
+but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
+what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
+understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived.  For
+we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
+the act of understanding.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
+necessary cause.
+
+Proof.--Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
+intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
+nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
+other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
+and so on to infinity.  But if will be supposed infinite, it must
+also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
+being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his
+possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
+essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.).  Thus, however it be
+conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
+which it should be conditioned to exist and act.  Thus (Def.
+vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
+constrained cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+Coroll. I.--Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
+according to freedom of the will.
+
+Coroll. II.--It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
+stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
+rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
+conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
+manner.  For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
+which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
+And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
+number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
+said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
+number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
+that motion and rest act by free will.  Wherefore will no more
+appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
+in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
+we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
+and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
+manner.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  Things could not have been brought into being by
+God in any manner or in any order different from that which has
+in fact obtained.
+
+Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
+(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist
+and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.).  If things, therefore,
+could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
+to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have
+been different, God's nature would also have been able to be
+different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that
+different nature also would have perforce existed, and
+consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.
+This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd.  Therefore things
+could not have been brought into being by God in any other
+manner, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note I.--As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
+noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
+contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall
+attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the
+words necessary and impossible.
+
+A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence
+or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing
+necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
+from a given efficient cause.  For similar reasons a thing is
+said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or
+definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
+is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but
+a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation
+to the imperfection of our knowledge.
+
+A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or
+does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it
+does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt
+concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes
+us,--such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
+impossible.  Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
+
+Note II.--It clearly follows from what we have said, that
+things have been brought into being by God in the highest
+perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a
+most perfect nature.  Nor does this prove any imperfection in
+God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection.  From its
+contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just
+shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
+brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
+God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute
+to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
+
+I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
+will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply
+because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very
+different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced.  They
+assign to him, in short, absolute free will.  However, I am also
+convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly
+weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
+such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
+but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge.  There is
+no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
+xvii.  But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
+that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of
+God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things
+could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
+different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what
+our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely
+on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is.  If
+it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.
+Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all
+eternity by God himself.  If it were otherwise, God would be
+convicted of imperfection or change.  But in eternity there is no
+such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely
+from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never
+could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist
+before his decrees, and would not exist without them.  But, it is
+said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had
+ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and
+her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in
+God.  But persons who say this must admit that God can change his
+decrees.  For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature
+and her order, different from those which he has ordained--in
+other words, if he had willed and conceived something different
+concerning nature--he would perforce have had a different
+intellect from that which he has, and also a different will.  But
+if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a
+different will, without any change in his essence or his
+perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the
+decrees which he has made concerning created things, and
+nevertheless remaining perfect?  For his intellect and will
+concerning things created and their order are the same, in
+respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.
+
+Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that
+God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as
+they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's
+essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a
+different actual intellect and a different will, his essence
+would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at
+first, if things had been brought into being by God in a
+different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and
+will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have
+been different, which is absurd.
+
+As these things could not have been brought into being by God
+in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as
+the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection
+of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
+believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were
+in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he
+had understood them.
+
+But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
+imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be
+called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the
+will of God.  If God had so willed, he might have brought it
+about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,
+and vice versa.  What is such an assertion, but an open
+declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he
+wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should
+understand things differently from the way in which he does
+understand them?  This (as we have just shown) is the height of
+absurdity.  Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its
+employers, as follows:--All things depend on the power of God.
+In order that things should be different from what they are,
+God's will would necessarily have to be different.  But God's
+will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly
+demonstrated) from God's perfection.  Therefore neither can
+things be different.  I confess, that the theory which subjects
+all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that
+they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth
+than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all
+things with a view of promoting what is good.  For these latter
+persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not
+depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,
+or which he aims at as a definite goal.  This is only another
+name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter
+absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first
+and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of
+their existence.  I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting
+such wild theories.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  God's power is identical with his essence.
+
+Proof.--From the sole necessity of the essence of God it
+follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all
+things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.).  Wherefore the power of God, by
+which he and all things are and act, is identical with his
+essence.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
+necessarily exists.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.)
+be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it
+necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  There is no cause from whose nature some effect
+does not follow.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in
+a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is,
+(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given
+conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things,
+therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.
+Q.E.D.
+
+
+APPENDIX:
+
+In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties
+of God.  I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:
+that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;
+that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;
+that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without
+him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all
+things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or
+absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power.
+I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the
+prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my
+demonstrations.  Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,
+which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the
+understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained
+it above.  I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these
+misconceptions before the bar of reason.
+
+All such opinions spring from the notion commonly
+entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,
+namely, with an end in view.  It is accepted as certain, that God
+himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
+that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship
+him).  I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
+why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
+prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and,
+lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about
+good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
+confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like.  However, this is
+not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of
+the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
+starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
+that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all
+have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they
+are conscious of such desire.  Herefrom it follows, first, that
+men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their
+volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance,
+of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire.
+Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that
+which is useful to them, and which they seek.  Thus it comes to
+pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of
+events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having
+no cause for further doubt.  If they cannot learn such causes
+from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering
+themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them
+personally to bring about the given event, and thus they
+necessarily judge other natures by their own.  Further, as they
+find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist
+them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance,
+eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for
+yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding
+fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means
+for obtaining such conveniences.  Now as they are aware, that
+they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think
+they have cause for believing, that some other being has made
+them for their use.  As they look upon things as means, they
+cannot believe them to be self--created; but, judging from the
+means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they
+are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe
+endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted
+everything for human use.  They are bound to estimate the nature
+of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in
+accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that
+the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind
+man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.  Hence
+also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according
+to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God
+might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course
+of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and
+insatiable avarice.  Thus the prejudice developed into
+superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this
+reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain
+the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that
+nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to
+man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,
+and men are all mad together.  Consider, I pray you, the result:
+among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some
+hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they
+declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at
+some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in
+their worship.  Experience day by day protested and showed by
+infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of
+pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their
+inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such
+contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were
+ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of
+ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
+and start afresh.  They therefore laid down as an axiom, that
+God's judgments far transcend human understanding.  Such a
+doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the
+human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished
+another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and
+properties of figures without regard to their final causes.
+There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides
+mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed
+to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge
+of the truth.
+
+I have now sufficiently explained my first point.  There is
+no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in
+view, and that final causes are mere human figments.  This, I
+think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and
+foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and
+also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in
+fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that
+everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with
+the utmost perfection.  However, I will add a few remarks, in
+order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly.  That
+which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versa:
+it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that
+which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.  Passing
+over the questions of cause and priority as self--evident, it is
+plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most
+perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which
+requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in
+that respect, more imperfect.  But if those things which were
+made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his
+end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the
+first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
+
+Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:
+for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something
+which he lacks.  Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a
+distinction between the object of want and the object of
+assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for
+the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation.  They are
+unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God
+himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore
+driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those
+things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he
+desired them.
+
+We must not omit to notice that the followers of this
+doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final
+causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their
+theory--namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to
+ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of
+exhibiting their doctrine.  For example, if a stone falls from a
+roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate
+by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man;
+for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how
+could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent
+circumstances) have all happened together by chance?  Perhaps you
+will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was
+blowing, and the man was walking that way.  "But why," they will
+insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very
+time walking that way?"  If you again answer, that the wind had
+then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day
+before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had
+been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was
+the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?"
+So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at
+last you take refuge in the will of God--in other words, the
+sanctuary of ignorance.  So, again, when they survey the frame of
+the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the
+causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been
+fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural
+skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt
+another.
+
+Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and
+strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,
+and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as
+an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the
+interpreters of nature and the gods.  Such persons know that,
+with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only
+available means for proving and preserving their authority would
+vanish also.  But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my
+third point.
+
+After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is
+created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as
+the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to
+themselves, and to account those things the best of all which
+have the most beneficial effect on mankind.  Further, they were
+bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature
+of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,
+cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that
+they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and
+blame, sin and merit.
+
+I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human
+nature; the former I will briefly explain here.
+
+Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God
+they have called good, everything which hinders these objects
+they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not
+understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any
+way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their
+imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that
+there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things
+and their own nature.  When phenomena are of such a kind, that
+the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of
+imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say
+that they are well--ordered; if the contrary, that they are
+ill--ordered or confused.  Further, as things which are easily
+imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to
+confusion--as though there were any order in nature, except in
+relation to our imagination--and say that God has created all
+things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing
+imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God
+foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it
+should be most easily imagined.  If this be their theory, they
+would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an
+infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and
+very many others which confound its weakness.  But enough has
+been said on this subject.  The other abstract notions are
+nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
+differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant
+as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that
+everything was created for the sake of themselves; and,
+according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,
+healthy or rotten and corrupt.  For instance, if the motion which
+objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,
+the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary
+motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
+
+Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are
+styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,
+full--flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,
+rough or smooth, &c.
+
+Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,
+sound, or harmony.  In this last case, there are men lunatic
+enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in
+harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded
+themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to
+harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone
+judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather
+mistakes for things the forms of his imagination.  We need no
+longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we
+have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human
+bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they
+differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;
+what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what
+is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on.  I need not
+further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the
+subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well
+known.  It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;
+everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as
+palates."  All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things
+according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
+understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
+mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I
+have urged.
+
+We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly
+given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate
+the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the
+imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were
+entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
+entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all
+arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily
+rebutted.
+
+Many argue in this way.  If all things follow from a
+necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there
+so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things
+corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,
+confusion, evil, sin, &c.  But these reasoners are, as I have
+said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be
+reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not
+more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human
+senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to
+mankind.  To those who ask why God did not so create all men,
+that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but
+this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of
+every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more
+strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to
+suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an
+infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
+
+Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if
+there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily
+dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.
+
+
+
+
+Part II.
+
+ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+
+I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
+necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and
+infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part
+i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
+infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
+us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
+and its highest blessedness.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS
+
+DEFINITION I.  By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain
+determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is
+considered as an extended thing.  (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,
+Coroll.)
+
+DEFINITION II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing
+that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,
+and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;
+in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
+without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
+
+DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is
+formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
+
+Explanation.--I say conception rather than perception, because
+the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in
+respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an
+activity of the mind.
+
+DEFINITION IV.  By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so
+far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the
+object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
+
+Explanation.--I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark
+which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and
+its object (ideatum).
+
+DEFINITION V.  Duration is the indefinite continuance of
+existing.
+
+Explanation.--I say indefinite, because it cannot be
+determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or
+by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of
+the thing, but does not take it away.
+
+DEFINITION VI.  Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.
+
+DEFINITION VII.  By particular things, I mean things which are
+finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several
+individual things concur in one action, so as to be all
+simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so
+far, as one particular thing.
+
+
+AXIOMS
+
+I.  The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that
+is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or
+that man does or does not exist.
+
+II.  Man thinks.
+
+III.  Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
+the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
+individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c.  But the idea
+can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
+
+IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
+
+V.  We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
+modes of thought.
+
+N.B.  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
+xiii.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS
+
+PROP. I.  Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
+thing.
+
+Proof.--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
+modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
+of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.).  God therefore possesses
+the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved
+in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
+Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
+which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
+vi.).  In other words, God is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we
+are able to conceive an infinite thinking being.  For, in
+proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
+thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
+perfection.  Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
+number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,
+in respect of thinking, infinite.  As, therefore, from the
+consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,
+thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the
+infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
+
+PROP. II.  Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an
+extended thing.
+
+Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the last.
+
+PROP. III.  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
+essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his
+essence.
+
+Proof.--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
+infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
+thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
+and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.  Now all
+that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).
+Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and
+in God alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part i., Prop. xv.)
+
+Note.--The multitude understand by the power of God the free
+will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
+latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent.  For
+it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
+reduce them to nothing.  Further, the power of God is very often
+likened to the power of kings.  But this doctrine we have refuted
+(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown
+(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as
+that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
+follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
+that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
+necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways.  We
+further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
+identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
+impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
+him as non--existent.  If we might pursue the subject further, I
+could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
+God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
+multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
+negation of power.  However, I am unwilling to go over the same
+ground so often.  I would only beg the reader again and again, to
+turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from
+Prop. xvi. to the end.  No one will be able to follow my meaning,
+unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of
+God with the human power and right of kings.
+
+PROP. IV.  The idea of God, from which an infinite number of
+things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
+
+Proof.--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
+attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
+Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.).  Therefore the
+idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in
+infinite ways, can only be one.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only
+in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far
+as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas
+both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own
+as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
+perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
+Part.  We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
+of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
+therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
+he is the object of his own idea.  Wherefore the actual being of
+ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
+ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
+xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
+nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
+(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
+of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
+of any attribute save thought.  Therefore the actual being of
+ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
+thinking thing, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in
+so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they
+are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other attribute.
+
+Proof.--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
+any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
+attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
+any other.  Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
+in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
+they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence the actual being of things, which are not
+modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because
+that nature has prior knowledge of the things.  Things
+represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
+particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
+necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
+the attribute of thought.
+
+PROP. VII.  The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
+order and connection of things.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.  For
+the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of
+the cause, whereof it is an effect.
+
+Corollary.--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
+realized power of action--that is, whatsoever follows from the
+infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
+follows without exception in the same order and connection from
+the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
+
+Note.--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what
+has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be
+perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
+of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
+consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
+and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
+now through the other.  So, also, a mode of extension and the
+idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in
+two ways.  This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
+those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
+things understood by God are identical.  For instance, a circle
+existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
+also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
+different attributes.  Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
+attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
+under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
+and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
+in either case.
+
+I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
+idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
+circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
+actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
+proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
+through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
+consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
+of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
+attribute of thought only.  And, in so far as we consider things
+as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
+nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in
+the case of the other attributes.  Wherefore of things as they
+are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
+consists of infinite attributes.  I cannot for the present
+explain my meaning more clearly.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
+not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
+the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
+are contained in the attributes of God.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
+understood more clearly from the preceding note.
+
+Corollary.--Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
+except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
+God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,
+except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when
+particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they
+are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they
+are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,
+through which they are said to continue.
+
+Note.--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
+this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
+which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
+inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
+illustrate it as far as possible.  The nature of a circle is such
+that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the
+rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;
+thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle.  Yet
+none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far
+as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
+rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
+comprehended in the idea of the circle.  Let us grant that, from
+this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist.  The ideas of
+these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the
+idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of
+those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the
+remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
+
+PROP. IX.  The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
+existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
+by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
+
+Proof.--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
+(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus
+(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only
+as he is a thinking thing.  But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)
+in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
+is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so
+on to infinity.  Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by
+Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of
+causes.   Therefore of a given individual idea another individual
+idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that
+idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in
+so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of
+any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he
+has the idea of the object.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
+idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
+is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
+another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
+Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the
+same as the order and connection of things.  The knowledge,
+therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
+will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. X.  The being of substance does not appertain to the
+essence of man--in other words, substance does not constitute the
+actual being[2] of man.
+
+[2] "Forma"
+
+
+Proof.--The being of substance involves necessary existence
+(Part i., Prop. vii.).  If, therefore, the being of substance
+appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
+would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
+consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd
+(II. Ax. i.).  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which
+it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same
+nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is
+not that which constitutes the actual being of man.  Again, the
+proposition is evident from the other properties of
+substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
+immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
+constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
+For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to
+the essence of man.  That essence therefore (by i.  15) is
+something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
+nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),
+or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
+manner.
+
+Note.--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
+conceived without God.  All men agree that God is the one and
+only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
+existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
+respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect
+to their being (secundum esse).
+
+At the same time many assert, that that, without which a
+thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
+thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
+appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
+things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
+probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines.  I think the
+cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the
+proper order of philosophic thinking.  The nature of God, which
+should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the
+order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be
+last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
+what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are
+considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to
+the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to
+the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in
+mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the
+knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are
+no help towards understanding the divine nature.  So that it is
+hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
+themselves freely.
+
+However, I pass over this point.  My intention her was only
+to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
+cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
+individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
+does not appertain to their essence.  I said that "I considered
+as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
+the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
+thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
+thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
+conceived."  (II. Def. ii.)
+
+PROP. XI.  The first element, which constitutes the actual being
+of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
+existing.
+
+Proof.--The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)
+is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
+(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
+Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
+given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
+in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
+Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
+mind.  But not the idea of a non--existent thing, for then (II.
+viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
+therefore be the idea of something actually existing.  But not of
+an infinite thing.  For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
+always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
+absurdity.  Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
+actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
+existing.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
+the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human
+mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
+this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
+as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so
+far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we
+say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
+constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
+he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
+another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in
+part or inadequately.
+
+Note.--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
+will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;
+I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
+not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
+end.
+
+PROP. XII.  Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,
+which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human
+mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of
+the said occurrence.  That is, if the object of the idea
+constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in
+that body without being perceived by the mind.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
+the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in
+so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said
+object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
+of anything.  Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
+constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is
+necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
+the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of
+the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words
+the mind perceives it.
+
+Note.--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
+to be understood from II. vii., which see.
+
+PROP. XIII.  The object of the idea constituting the human mind
+is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which
+actually exists, and nothing else.
+
+Proof.--If indeed the body were not the object of the human
+mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
+God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but
+in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that
+is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body
+would not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the
+idea of the modifications of the body.  Therefore the object of
+the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as
+it actually exists (II. xi.).  Further, if there were any other
+object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as
+nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
+xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
+which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but
+(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea.  Wherefore the object of our
+mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
+united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind
+and body.  However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately
+or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the
+nature of our body.  The propositions we have advanced hitherto
+have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to
+other individual things, all of which, though in different
+degrees, are animated.[3]  For of everything there is necessarily
+an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as
+there is an idea of the human body; thus  whatever we have
+asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be
+asserted of the idea of everything else.  Still, on the other
+hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from
+the other, one being more excellent than another and containing
+more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent
+than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
+
+[3] "Animata"
+
+
+Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind
+differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is
+necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of
+the human body.  What this nature is, I am not able here to
+explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,
+that I should do so.  I will only say generally, that in
+proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
+many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
+the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for
+forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions
+of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
+concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it
+is the object for distinct comprehension.  We may thus recognize
+the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the
+cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,
+and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following
+propositions, deduce from what has been advanced.  Wherefore I
+have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my
+present statements.  In order to do so, I must premise a few
+propositions concerning the nature of bodies.
+
+AXIOM I.  All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
+
+AXIOM II.  Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
+sometimes more quickly.
+
+LEMMA I.  Bodies are distinguished from one another in
+respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in
+respect of substance.
+
+Proof.--The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
+self--evident.  That bodies are not distinguished in respect of
+substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii.  It is brought
+out still more clearly from I. xv, note.
+
+LEMMA II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.
+
+Proof.--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
+conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).
+Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,
+and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
+
+LEMMA III.  A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
+motion or rest by another body, which other body has been
+determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third
+again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
+
+Proof.--Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
+(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to
+motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be
+determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
+(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
+motion or at rest.  And this body again can only have been set in
+motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to
+motion or rest.   This third body again by a fourth, and so on to
+infinity.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
+motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other
+body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a
+state of motion by some other body.  This is indeed self--evident.
+For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
+rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,
+I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is
+at rest.  If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
+this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no
+other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at
+rest.  If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
+long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
+concerning it, except that it is in motion.   If A is
+subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
+of A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to
+continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted
+from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
+cause determining A to a state of rest.
+
+Axiom I.--All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
+body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected
+and the body affecting; so that one and the same body may be
+moved in different modes, according to the difference in the
+nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different
+bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.
+
+Axiom II.--When a body in motion impinges on another body at
+rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to
+continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in
+the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
+body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
+of motion of incidence and the same plane.
+
+So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
+which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and
+rest, quickness and slowness.  We now pass on to compound bodies.
+
+Definition.--When any given bodies of the same or different
+magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or
+if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that
+their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain
+fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that
+together they compose one body or individual, which is
+distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.
+
+Axiom III.--In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a
+compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies,
+they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved
+from their position; consequently the individual will, with
+greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form.
+Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies,
+are called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over small
+superficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motion
+among one another, are called fluid.
+
+LEMMA IV.  If from a body or individual, compounded of
+several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same
+time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take
+their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before,
+without any change in its actuality (forma).
+
+Proof.--Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
+substance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
+individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but
+this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will
+(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,
+will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance
+and in respect of mode.  Q.E.D.
+
+LEMMA V.  If the parts composing an individual become greater
+or less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same
+mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still
+preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be
+changed.
+
+Proof.--The same as for the last Lemma.
+
+LEMMA VI.  If certain bodies composing an individual be
+compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction,
+for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they
+be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication
+in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its
+own nature without any change of its actuality.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the individual
+is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we
+spoke of as its actual being.
+
+LEMMA VII.  Furthermore, the individual thus composed
+preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at
+rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as
+each part retains its motion, and preserves its communication
+with other parts as before.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from the definition of an
+individual prefixed to Lemma iv.
+
+Note.--We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected
+in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding.
+Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies
+only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and
+rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple
+character.  If, however, we now conceive another individual
+composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find
+that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without
+losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied.  Each of its parts
+would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.)
+each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker
+or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its
+motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts.  If
+we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of
+individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be
+affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their
+actuality.  We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive
+the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all
+bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the
+individual as a whole.  I should feel bound to explain and
+demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a
+special treatise on body.  But I have already said that such is
+not my object; I have only touched on the question, because it
+enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.
+
+POSTULATES
+
+I.  The human body is composed of a number of individual
+parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself
+extremely complex.
+
+II.  Of the individual parts composing the human body some
+are fluid, some soft, some hard.
+
+III.  The individual parts composing the human body, and
+consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of
+ways by external bodies.
+
+IV.  The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
+number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,
+regenerated.
+
+V.  When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
+external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes
+the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression
+thereupon of the external body which impels it.
+
+VI.  The human body can move external bodies, and arrange
+them in a variety of ways.
+
+PROP. XIV.  The human mind is capable of perceiving a great
+number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable
+of receiving a great number of impressions.
+
+Proof.--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
+very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many
+ways of affecting external bodies.  But (II. xii.)  the human
+mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the
+human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
+things, and is so in proportion, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the
+human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of
+ideas.
+
+Proof.--The idea constituting the actual being of the human
+mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
+composed of a great number of complex individual parts.  But
+there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
+whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore
+(II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these
+numerous ideas of its component parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
+affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human
+body, and also the nature of the external body.
+
+Proof.--All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
+follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the
+nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of
+Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax.
+iv.) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of
+every mode, in which the human body is affected by external
+bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external
+body.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
+perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the
+nature of its own.
+
+Corollary II.--It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we
+have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our
+own body than the nature of external bodies.  I have amply
+illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.
+
+PROP. XVII.  If the human body is affected in a manner which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present
+to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
+exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for so long as the
+human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human
+mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body--that is (by
+the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually
+existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body.
+In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but
+postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the
+external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will
+regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
+affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--The mind is able to regard as present external
+bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even
+though they be no longer in existence or present.
+
+Proof.--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
+human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they
+change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii.,
+after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in
+a different manner from that which they followed before such
+change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new
+surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be
+refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
+towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they
+will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human
+body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
+take cognizance--that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard
+the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the
+fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces
+by their own spontaneous motion.  Wherefore, although the
+external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected,
+be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them
+as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
+that we regard as present many things which are not.  It is
+possible that the same result may be brought about by other
+causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated
+one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out
+the true cause.  Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the
+truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
+rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
+controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human
+body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.).
+Furthermore (II. vii.  Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly
+understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of
+Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the
+idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.  The
+former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and
+only  implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter
+indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature
+of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body
+lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even
+though he no longer exists.  Further, to retain the usual
+phraseology,  the modifications of the human body, of which the
+ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call
+the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of
+things.  When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say
+that it imagines.  I will here draw attention to the fact, in
+order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the
+mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error.  The mind
+does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as
+it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the
+existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it.  If
+the mind, while imagining non--existent things as present to it,
+is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this
+power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its
+nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of
+imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is (I. Def.
+vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  If the human body has once been affected by two or
+more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines
+any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
+
+Proof.--The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,
+because the human body is affected and disposed by the
+impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is
+affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
+external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so
+disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,
+it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
+the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the
+other.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We now clearly see what Memory is.  It is simply a
+certain association of ideas involving the nature of things
+outside the human body, which association arises in the mind
+according to the order and association of the modifications
+(affectiones) of the human body.  I say, first, it is an
+association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of
+things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the
+nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the
+human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve
+the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.  I say,
+secondly, that this association arises according to the order and
+association of the modifications of the human body, in order to
+distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from
+the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things
+through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same.
+And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from
+the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the
+thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first;
+for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a
+Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple,
+which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question,
+nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man
+has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the
+man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the
+fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to
+another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things
+in his body.  For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the
+tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought
+of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c.  Thus every man
+will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has
+been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images
+of things in this or that manner.
+
+PROP. XIX.  The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does
+not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications
+whereby the body is affected.
+
+Proof.--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
+human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
+he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing
+actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
+stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
+continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas
+is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);
+this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
+as affected by the ideas of very many particular things.  Thus
+God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in
+so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
+far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by
+II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body.
+But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far
+as  he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human
+mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently
+(II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing;
+therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in
+God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to
+God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human
+body.
+
+Proof.--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore
+(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of
+thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of
+the human mind (II. xi.).  Further, this idea or knowledge of the
+mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but
+in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual
+thing (II. ix.).  But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
+ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;
+therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is
+referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
+the body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXI.  This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the
+same way as the mind is united to the body.
+
+Proof.--That the mind is united to the body we have shown from
+the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and
+xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be
+united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner
+as the mind is united to the body.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from
+what we have said in the note to II. vii.  We there showed that
+the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.),
+are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute
+of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the
+idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing,
+which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,
+thought.  The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are
+in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same
+power of thinking.  Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that
+is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality
+(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of
+thought without reference to the object; if a man knows
+anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at
+the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to
+infinity.  But I will treat of this hereafter.
+
+PROP. XXII.  The human mind perceives not only the modifications
+of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.
+
+Proof.--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
+in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,
+as the ideas of the said modifications.  This is proved in the
+same way as II. xx.  But the ideas of the modifications of the
+body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far
+as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the
+ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
+knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
+will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not
+only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
+modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  The mind does not know itself, except in so far as
+it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.
+
+Proof.--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in
+God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same
+manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body.  But since (II.
+xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
+(II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
+human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
+human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human
+mind thus far has no knowledge of itself.  Further the ideas of
+the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the
+nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.),
+they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge
+of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but
+(by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
+mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has
+knowledge of itself.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The human mind does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
+
+Proof.--The parts composing the human body do not belong to
+the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate
+their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.
+after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as
+individuals without relation to the human body.  The parts of the
+human body are highly complex individuals  (Post. i.), whose
+parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in
+any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
+latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after
+Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.
+iii.)  the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,
+inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea
+of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the
+order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.).  We may affirm
+the same thing of each part of each individual composing the
+human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the
+human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many
+ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the
+human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the
+nature of the human mind (II. xiii); therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge
+of the human body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  The idea of each modification of the human body does
+not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
+
+Proof.--We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
+human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as
+that external body conditions the human body in a given manner.
+But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
+no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
+in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the
+idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to
+the said external body.  Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the
+external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the
+modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the
+modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  The human mind does not perceive any external body
+as actually existing, except through the ideas of the
+modifications of its own body.
+
+Proof.--If the human body is in no way affected by a given
+external body, then  (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
+body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the
+idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
+any manner perceive its existence.  But, in so far as the human
+body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far
+(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--In so far as the human mind imagines an external
+body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.
+
+Proof.--When the human mind regards external bodies through
+the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it
+imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine
+external bodies as actually existing.  Therefore (by II. xxv.),
+in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
+adequate knowledge of them.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  The idea of each modification of the human body
+does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
+
+Proof.--Every idea of a modification of the human body
+involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human
+body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.).  But,
+inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
+in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The ideas of the modifications of the human body,
+in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not
+clear and distinct, but confused.
+
+Proof.--The ideas of the modifications of the human body
+involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies
+(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human
+body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes
+(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,
+consequently, the human body as a whole are affected.   But (by
+II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
+also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas.  These ideas of
+modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind
+alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,
+confused ideas.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind
+is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in
+itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the
+idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the
+modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred
+to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  The idea of the idea of each modification of the
+human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human
+mind.
+
+Proof.--The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
+xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,
+in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is
+(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
+adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not
+adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not
+involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
+perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an
+adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,
+of its own body, and of external bodies.  For the mind does not
+know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
+modifications of body (II. xxiii.).  It only perceives its own
+body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only
+perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so
+far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate
+knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.
+xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a
+fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and
+note).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
+only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
+external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common
+order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from
+without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to
+regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from
+within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,
+to understand their points of agreement, difference, and
+contrast.  Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it
+regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.
+
+PROP. XXX.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of our body.
+
+Proof.--The duration of our body does not depend on its
+essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.
+xxi.).  But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
+by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
+operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these
+last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.
+The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
+nature, or the constitution of things.  Now, however a thing may
+be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,
+in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
+he has the idea of the human body only.  (II. ix. Coroll.)
+Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
+very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
+the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this
+knowledge is very inadequate to our mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of particular things external to ourselves.
+
+Proof.--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
+conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a
+fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must
+likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity.  (I.
+xxviii.)  As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
+this common property of particular things, we have only a very
+inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a
+similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
+things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
+of the duration thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that all particular things are
+contingent and perishable.  For we can have no adequate idea of
+their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
+understand by the contingency and perishableness of things.  (I.
+xxxiii., Note i.)  For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing
+is contingent.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
+are true.
+
+Proof.--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
+their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are
+all true.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes
+them to be called false.
+
+Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
+mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality
+of falsehood.  Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.
+xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).
+Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to
+be called false.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
+perfect, is true.
+
+Proof.--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
+perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea
+is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the
+essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
+an idea is true.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,
+which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.
+
+Proof.--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
+to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in
+simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to
+be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
+ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in
+the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
+confused ideas involve.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists
+in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light
+on the subject I will give an example.  For instance, men are
+mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up
+of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the
+causes by which they are conditioned.  Their idea of freedom,
+therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their
+actions.  As for their saying that human actions depend on the
+will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond
+thereto.  What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none
+of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
+dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
+either laughter or disgust.  So, again, when we look at the sun,
+we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;
+this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
+that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true
+distance or the cause of the fancy.  For although we afterwards
+learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
+the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near;
+for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are
+ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
+our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said
+body is affected thereby.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
+necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
+
+Proof.--All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
+are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)
+adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,
+except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
+xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
+follow by the same necessity (II. vi.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,
+above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.
+
+Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
+constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,
+the essence of B.  Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either
+exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.
+Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Those things, which are common to all, and which
+are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived
+except adequately.
+
+Proof.--Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and
+which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the
+whole.  I say A cannot be conceived except adequately.  For the
+idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii.
+Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,
+and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the
+human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the
+nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that
+is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be
+adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in
+so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.
+Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A
+adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as
+it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any
+external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary--Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or
+notions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree
+in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be
+adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  That, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human
+body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in
+the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.
+
+Proof.--If A be that, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human
+body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each
+external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of
+A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of
+the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given
+external bodies.  Let it now be granted, that the human body is
+affected by an external body through that, which it has in common
+therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve
+the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the
+idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property
+A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the
+idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he
+constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to
+perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has
+more in common with other bodies.
+
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which
+are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident.  For when we say
+that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are
+therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that
+an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not
+in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by
+the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as
+he constitutes the essence of the human mind.
+
+Note I.--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,
+which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our
+ratiocination.  But there are other causes of certain axioms or
+notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
+method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more
+useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at
+all.  Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all
+men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
+are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are
+ill--founded.  Again we should discern whence the notions called
+secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on
+which they are founded, and other points of interest connected
+with these questions.  But I have decided to pass over the
+subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
+treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
+too great prolixity.  Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything
+necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence
+are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,
+Thing, Something.  These terms arose from the fact, that the
+human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming
+a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the
+II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number
+be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this
+number of images, of which the body is capable of forming
+distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become
+entirely confused one with another.  This being so, it is evident
+(from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind
+can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body
+can form images simultaneously.  When the images become quite
+confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies
+confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as
+it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of
+Being, Thing, &c.  The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact
+that images are not always equally vivid, and from other
+analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for
+the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
+consider one only.  All may be reduced to this, that these terms
+represent ideas in the highest degree confused.  From similar
+causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,
+horse, dog, &c.  They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many
+images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the
+human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed
+utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small
+differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and
+their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
+which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
+them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said
+individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses
+by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
+particular individuals.  For, as we have said, it is unable to
+imagine the definite number of individuals.  We must, however,
+bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
+men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the
+point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and
+which the mind most easily imagines or remembers.  For instance,
+those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of
+man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect
+stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other
+attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
+instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two--footed animal
+without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
+everyone will form general images of things according to the
+habit of his body.
+
+It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,
+who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed
+of them, so many controversies should have arisen.
+
+Note II.--From all that has been said above it is clear, that
+we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)
+From particular things represented to our intellect
+fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
+(II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by
+the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.[4]
+
+[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
+
+(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard
+certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
+concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things
+(II. xviii. note).  I shall call both these ways of regarding
+things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
+(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and
+adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll.,
+xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of
+the second kind.  Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,
+as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we
+will call intuition.  This kind of knowledge proceeds from an
+adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of
+God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.  I will
+illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example.
+Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to
+the third as the second is to the first.  Tradesmen without
+hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the
+product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the
+rule which they received from a master without any proof, or
+because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or
+by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the
+seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property
+of proportionals.
+
+But with very simple numbers there is no need of this.  For
+instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the
+fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we
+infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio,
+which the first bears to the second.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of
+falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily
+true.
+
+Proof.--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the
+foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate
+and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only
+source of falsity (II. xxxv.).  Furthermore, we assigned to the
+second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are
+adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.
+xxxiv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not
+knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true
+from the false.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident.  He, who knows how
+to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea
+of true and false.  That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the
+true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that
+he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing
+perceived.
+
+Proof.--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,
+in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind
+(II. xi. Coroll.).  Let us suppose that there is in God, in so
+far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,
+A.  The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be
+referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,
+whereof the proof is of universal application).  But the idea A
+is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed
+through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must
+be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi.
+Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,
+which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate
+idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time
+have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that
+is, obviously, he must be assured.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
+the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing
+proposition is in itself sufficiently plain.  No one, who has a
+true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
+certainty.  For to have a true idea is only another expression
+for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.  No one,
+indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
+something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
+thinking--namely, the very act of understanding.  And who, I ask,
+can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
+understand it?  In other words, who can know that he is sure of a
+thing, unless he be first sure of that thing?  Further, what can
+there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
+standard of truth?  Even as light displays both itself and
+darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
+
+I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
+questions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false
+idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
+true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
+(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
+consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
+advantage over him who has only false ideas.  Further, how comes
+it that men have false ideas?  Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
+that he has ideas which agree with their objects?  These
+questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
+answered.  The difference between a true idea and a false idea is
+plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to
+the latter as being is to not--being.  The causes of falsity I
+have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the
+note.  From what is there stated, the difference between a man
+who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made
+apparent.  As for the last question--as to how a man can be sure
+that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just
+pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises
+from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with
+its object--in other words, that truth is its own standard.  We
+may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is
+part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.);
+therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as
+necessarily true as the ideas of God.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  It is not in the nature of reason to regard things
+as contingent, but as necessary.
+
+Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly
+(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves--that
+is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that it is only through our
+imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
+future or the past, as contingent.
+
+Note.--How this way of looking at things arises, I will
+briefly explain.  We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)
+that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even
+though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which
+exclude their existence and presence.  Further (II. xviii.), we
+showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two
+external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards
+imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway
+remember the other--that is, it will regard both as present to
+itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence
+and presence.  Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from
+the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than
+others, some more quickly, some at equal speed.  Thus, let us
+suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in
+the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that
+today he again sees Peter in the morning.  It is evident, from
+II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he
+will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the
+sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other
+words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his
+imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he
+will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon--that
+is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation
+to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the
+evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by
+imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past
+time.  If it should at any time happen, that on some other
+evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on
+the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening
+sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the
+child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,
+not both together.  His imagination will therefore waver; and,
+with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first
+one, then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future,
+neither of them as certain, but both as contingent.  This
+wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
+be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
+relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may
+imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time
+present, past, or future.
+
+Corollary II.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive
+things under a certain form of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis
+specie).
+
+Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as
+contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.).  Reason perceives this
+necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it
+is in itself.  But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very
+necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the
+nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.
+We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.
+xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.
+xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:
+which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,
+under a certain form of eternity.
+
+PROP. XLV.  Every idea of every body, or of every particular
+thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.
+
+Proof.--The idea of a particular thing actually existing
+necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
+said thing (II. viii.).  Now particular things cannot be
+conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
+have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
+attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
+must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
+attributes of those ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,
+existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
+certain form of quantity.  I am speaking of the very nature of
+existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
+follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
+necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.).  I am speaking, I repeat, of
+the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in
+God.  For although each particular thing be conditioned by
+another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force
+whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
+the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).
+
+PROP. XLVI.  The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of
+God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.
+
+Proof.--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
+whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea
+thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),
+will involve God's eternal and infinite essence.  Wherefore,
+that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
+of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the
+whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
+eternal and infinite essence of God.
+
+Proof.--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
+xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
+external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
+existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
+knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
+eternity of God are known to all.  Now as all things are in God,
+and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
+many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
+third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,
+and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to
+speak in Part V.  Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as
+they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine
+God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the
+name God with images of things that they are in the habit of
+seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they
+are, men, and continually affected by external bodies.  Many
+errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do
+not apply names to things rightly.  For instance, when a man says
+that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its
+circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly
+attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that
+assigned by mathematicians.  So again, when men make mistakes in
+calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and
+another on the paper.  If we could see into their minds, they do
+not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that
+they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the
+paper.  If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in
+error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I
+lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a
+neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.
+Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do
+not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret
+the meaning of others.  For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly
+contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of
+the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider
+mistaken and absurd in their opponents.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  In the mind there is no absolute or free will;
+but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which
+has also been determined by another cause, and this last by
+another cause, and so on to infinity.
+
+Proof.--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
+xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.
+xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute
+faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
+must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by
+another cause, and this last by another, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind
+no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.
+Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
+entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
+such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.
+Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to
+this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to
+this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul.  The cause
+which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in
+the Appendix to Part I.  But, before I proceed further, I would
+here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the
+faculty, not the desire.  I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby
+the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,
+wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.
+After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general
+notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular
+instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether
+volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.
+We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any
+affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as
+it is an idea, involves.  On which subject see the following
+proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should
+suggest itself.  For by ideas I do not mean images such as are
+formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but
+the conceptions of thought.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
+negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
+involves.
+
+Proof.--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
+or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this
+or that affirmation, and this or that negation.  Now let us
+conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
+whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a
+triangle are equal to two right angles.  This affirmation
+involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
+the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.  It is the same
+thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as
+it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.  Further,
+this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
+of a triangle.  Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be
+conceived, without the idea of a triangle.  Again, this idea of a
+triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its
+three interior angles are equal to two right angles.  Wherefore,
+and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be
+conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation
+belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing
+besides.  What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have
+selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,
+that it is nothing but an idea.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Will and understanding are one and the same.
+
+Proof.--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
+individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note).  But a
+particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
+(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
+one and the same.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
+assigned for error.  For we have shown above, that falsity
+consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas
+which are fragmentary and confused.  Wherefore, a false idea,
+inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty.  When we
+say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he
+has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
+but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is
+false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his
+imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note).  Thus, although the
+man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say
+that he is certain.  For by certainty we mean something positive
+(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
+
+However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
+explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and
+I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced
+against our doctrine.  Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
+I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
+advantages, which follow therefrom.  I say "some," for they will
+be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
+part.
+
+I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
+make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
+the mind, and the images of things which we imagine.  It is
+further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
+words, whereby we signify things.  These three--namely, images,
+words, and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused
+together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
+and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
+necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for
+philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.  Those
+who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
+contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas
+of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not
+ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
+our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
+pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not
+see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
+affirmation or negation.  Again, those who confuse words with
+ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that
+they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or
+deny.  This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who
+reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no
+wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly
+understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not
+consist in the image of anything, nor in words.  The essence of
+words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no
+wise involve the conception of thought.
+
+
+These few words on this subject will suffice: I will
+therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised
+against our doctrine.  Of these, the first is advanced by those,
+who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,
+and that therefore it is different therefrom.  The reason for
+their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the
+understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
+increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
+negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do
+not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
+faculty of understanding.  The will is thus distinguished from
+the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
+Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
+especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
+before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
+by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
+perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.
+
+For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not
+therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not
+deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does
+exist.  Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by
+experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and
+different from the faculty of understanding.  Thirdly, it may be
+objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more
+reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to
+need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power
+than for affirming, that what is false is true.  We have,
+however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than
+another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so
+also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this
+also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and
+the will.  Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from
+free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are
+equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?  Will he
+perish of hunger and thirst?  If I say that he would, I shall
+seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather
+than an actual man.  If I say that he would not, he would then
+determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
+faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.  Other objections
+might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
+everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
+task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
+possible.
+
+To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will
+has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding
+be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
+has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
+forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
+should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
+for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
+infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
+affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the
+same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
+infinite number of bodies.  If it be said that there is an
+infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
+that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
+consequently, by any faculty of volition.  But, it may still be
+urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
+them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
+perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
+already.  This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
+it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
+entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
+understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
+which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
+We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we
+explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which is
+common to all such volitions.
+
+As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
+universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
+wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
+into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
+what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
+infinite number of individuals.
+
+To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a
+free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that
+anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that
+he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.
+Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a
+perception, and not free will.  In order to illustrate the point,
+let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing
+else.  Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the
+horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything
+which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will
+necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to
+doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof.  We
+have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I
+do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,
+while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his
+judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it
+about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that
+he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we
+suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
+
+Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as
+actual perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's
+imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
+xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
+perception, make any affirmation.  For what is the perception of
+a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?  If the
+mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
+regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons
+for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
+the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
+precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
+perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
+inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
+existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the
+subject.
+
+I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third
+objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is
+predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is
+common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate
+essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the
+abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the
+same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting
+the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular
+affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas.  For
+instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,
+differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much
+as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.
+
+Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal
+power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and
+to affirm that that which is false is true.  These two
+affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
+one another as being and not--being; for there is nothing
+positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
+falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
+
+We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when
+we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
+and abstractions with realities.  As for the fourth objection, I
+am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
+described  (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
+a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from
+him) would die of hunger and thirst.  If I am asked, whether such
+an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
+answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be
+considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider
+children, fools, madmen, &c.
+
+It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
+doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
+from what has been said.  The doctrine is good,
+
+1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
+decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so
+much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and
+more understand God.  Such a doctrine not only completely
+tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest
+happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of
+God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
+us.  We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
+estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God
+with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as
+for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
+service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
+
+2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct
+ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which
+are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature.  For it
+shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or
+frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the
+eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from
+the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.
+
+3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches
+us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to
+be angry with any.  Further, as it tells us that each should be
+content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any
+womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the
+guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as
+I will show in Part III.
+
+4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
+commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and
+led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do
+whatsoever things are best.
+
+I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of
+this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a
+close.  I think I have therein explained the nature and
+properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
+considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient
+clearness.  I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
+excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
+to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.
+
+
+
+
+PART III.
+
+ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+
+
+Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be
+treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural
+phenomena following nature's general laws.  They appear to
+conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a
+kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
+nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,
+and that he is determined solely by himself.  They attribute
+human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in
+general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which
+accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,
+abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human
+mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked
+upon as a seer.  Still there has been no lack of very excellent
+men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),
+who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way
+of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind.  But no one,
+so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the
+emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their
+restraint.
+
+I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he
+believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,
+strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at
+the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain
+to absolute dominion over them.  However, in my opinion, he
+accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own
+great intellect, as I will show in the proper place.  For the
+present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or
+deride human emotions than understand them.  Such persons will,
+doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of
+human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth
+with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as
+repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.  However,
+such is my plan.  Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be
+set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and
+everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action;
+that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to
+pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and
+always the same; so that there should be one and the same method
+of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,
+through nature's universal laws and rules.  Thus the passions of
+hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow
+from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to
+certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and
+possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the
+properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself
+affords us delight.  I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and
+strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I
+employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the
+mind.  I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the
+same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and
+solids.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS
+
+I.  By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect
+can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  By an inadequate or
+partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its
+effect cannot be understood.
+
+II.  I say that we act when anything takes place, either within
+us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that
+is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature
+something takes place within us or externally to us, which can
+through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.
+On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something
+when that something takes place within us, or follows from our
+nature externally, we being only the partial cause.
+
+III.  By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby
+the active power of the said body is increased or diminished,
+aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.
+
+N.B.  If we can be the adequate cause of any of these
+modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I
+call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.
+
+
+POSTULATES
+
+I.  The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its
+power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other
+ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or
+less.
+
+N.B.  This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and
+Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.
+
+II.  The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,
+retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.),
+and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II.
+xvii.).
+
+PROP. I.  Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain
+cases passive.  In so far as it has adequate ideas it is
+necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it
+is necessarily passive.
+
+Proof.--In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and
+some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note).
+Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in
+God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.
+Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise
+(by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he
+contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as
+he, at the same time, contains the minds of other things.  Again,
+from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36);
+of this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not
+inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as
+affected by the given idea (II. ix.).  But of that effect whereof
+God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is
+adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in
+question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.).  Therefore our
+mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in
+certain cases necessarily active; this was our first point.
+Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is
+adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the
+mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together
+with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of
+such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not
+an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the
+mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases
+necessarily passive; this was our second point.  Therefore our
+mind, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind is more or less
+liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate
+ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as
+it possesses adequate ideas.
+
+PROP. II.  Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind
+determine body to motion or rest or any state different from
+these, if such there be.
+
+Proof.--All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by
+virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his
+being displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.).  That,
+therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of
+thought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.), it
+is not body.  This was our first point.  Again, the motion and
+rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been
+determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and
+absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring
+from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of
+extension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.); that is,
+it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought.  This
+was our second point.  Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
+II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing,
+conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under
+the attribute of extension.  Thus it follows that the order or
+concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived
+under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of
+states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in
+nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the
+mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we
+proved II. xii.
+
+Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no
+further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is
+proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the
+question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it
+is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in
+motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending
+solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought.  However,
+no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the
+body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what
+the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far
+as she is regarded as extension.  No one hitherto has gained such
+an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can
+explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact
+that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far
+transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things
+in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake:
+these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole
+laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.
+
+Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the
+body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the
+body, nor how quickly it can move it.  Thus, when men say that
+this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which
+latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without
+meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are
+ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at
+it.
+
+But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means
+whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate,
+experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit
+state to think, the body remains inert.  Moreover, we have
+experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or
+are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly,
+we say depend on the mind's decree.  But, as to the first point,
+I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach,
+that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted
+for thinking?  For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind
+simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of
+thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake.  Again, I
+think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the
+mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given
+subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for
+being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is
+the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.
+
+But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the
+laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be
+able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of
+that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the
+human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be
+capable of building a single temple.  However, I have just
+pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the
+body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration
+of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things
+being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would
+never have believed possible except under the direction of mind:
+such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and
+wondered at by their performers when awake.  I would further call
+attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses
+in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to
+repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under
+whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow.
+As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be
+much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they
+are to speak.  Experience abundantly shows that men can govern
+anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything
+more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many
+believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we
+moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be
+controlled by the thought of something else frequently
+remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what
+we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be
+allayed with the remembrance of anything else.  However, unless
+such persons had proved by experience that we do many things
+which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when
+assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the
+worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we
+are free in all things.  Thus an infant believes that of its own
+free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely
+desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires
+to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from
+the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he
+would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a
+garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe
+that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they
+are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk.
+Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men
+believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious
+of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those
+actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the
+dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and
+therefore vary according to the varying state of the body.
+Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who
+are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;
+those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this
+way or that.  All these considerations clearly show that a mental
+decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are
+simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call
+decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the
+attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is
+regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the
+laws of motion and rest.  This will appear yet more plainly in
+the sequel.  For the present I wish to call attention to another
+point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind,
+unless we have a remembrance of having done so.  For instance, we
+cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so.
+Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or
+forget a thing at will.  Therefore the freedom of the mind must
+in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering
+something which it remembers.  But when we dream that we speak,
+we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we
+do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the
+body.  Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we
+seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby
+we keep silence when awake concerning something we know.  Lastly,
+we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something,
+which we should not dare to do when awake.
+
+Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two
+sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?
+If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must
+necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is
+believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination
+or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an
+idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II.
+xlix.).  Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind
+by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.
+Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or
+act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream
+with their eyes open.
+
+PROP. III.  The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate
+ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on
+inadequate ideas.
+
+Proof.--The first element, which constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent
+body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many
+other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II.
+xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.).  Whatsoever therefore
+follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate
+cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily
+follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea.  But
+in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is
+necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow
+solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only
+passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to
+the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving
+negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,
+which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself
+without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are
+attributed to individual things in the same way that they are
+attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be
+perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.
+
+PROP. IV.  Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external
+to itself.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the definition
+of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not
+negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the
+thing, but does not take it away.  So long therefore as we regard
+only the thing itself, without taking into account external
+causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could
+destroy it.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in
+the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the
+other.
+
+Proof.--If they could agree together or co--exist in the same
+object, there would then be in the said object something which
+could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is
+absurd, therefore things, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours
+to persist in its own being.
+
+Proof.--Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of
+God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.);
+that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given
+determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts;
+now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be
+destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but
+contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its
+existence (III. v.).  Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so
+far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own
+being.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VII.  The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence
+of the thing in question.
+
+Proof.--From the given essence of any thing certain
+consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any
+power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as
+determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,
+or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it
+acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or
+endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,
+is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in
+question.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist
+in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite
+time.
+
+Proof.--If it involved a limited time, which should determine
+the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that
+power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist
+beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed;
+but this (III. iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore the endeavour wherewith
+a thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise,
+since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already
+exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some
+external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.
+
+PROP. IX.  The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct
+ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to
+persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this
+endeavour it is conscious.
+
+Proof.--The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and
+inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so
+far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the
+latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for
+an indefinite time (III. viii.).  Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is
+necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the
+modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)
+conscious of its own endeavour.
+
+Note.--This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is
+called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it
+is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's
+essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those
+results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus
+been determined to perform.
+
+Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference,
+except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so
+far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly
+be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.
+It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we
+strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we
+deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be
+good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or
+desire it.
+
+PROP. X.  An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,
+cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated
+therein (III. v.).  Therefore neither can the idea of such a
+thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II.
+ix. Coroll.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing
+cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.
+xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it
+follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the
+endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea,
+which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our
+mind, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XI.  Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders
+the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or
+diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II.
+xiv.
+
+Note.--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,
+and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection,
+sometimes to a state of lesser perfection.  These passive states
+of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.
+By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall
+signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater
+perfection.  By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the
+mind passes to a lesser perfection.  Further, the emotion of
+pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call
+stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of
+pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.
+But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are
+attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected
+than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike
+affected.  What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to
+Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other
+primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other
+emotions arise from these three.  But, before I go further, I
+should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this
+part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is
+contrary to another.  In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the
+idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the
+existence of body, so long as the body itself exists.  Again, it
+follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii.,
+that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the
+fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.
+Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of
+the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends
+on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.
+Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its
+power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to
+affirm the present existence of the body.  Now the cause, why the
+mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the
+mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases
+to exist.  For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the
+existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;
+therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the
+existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but
+(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes
+the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,
+and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the
+essence of our mind.
+
+PROP. XII.  The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive
+those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the
+body.
+
+Proof.--So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and
+consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an
+external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,
+the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature
+of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives
+things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,
+the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of
+activity (III. Post. i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind's
+power of thinking is for that period increased or helped.  Thus
+(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine
+such things.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  When the mind conceives things which diminish or
+hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as
+possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the
+first--named things.
+
+Proof.--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind
+alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or
+constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue
+to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which
+excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as
+I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is
+diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something
+else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived:
+therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour
+to conceive or remember the latter.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from
+conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of
+itself and of the body.
+
+Note.--From what has been said we may clearly understand the
+nature of Love and Hate.  Love is nothing else but pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing
+else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  We
+further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,
+and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who
+hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.
+But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.
+
+PROP. XIV.  If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at
+the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one
+of these two, be also affected by the other.
+
+Proof.--If the human body has once been affected by two bodies
+at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it
+will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.).  But the
+mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than
+the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore,
+if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been
+once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever
+it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by
+the other.
+
+PROP. XV.  Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,
+pain, or desire.
+
+Proof.--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously
+affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor
+diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either
+increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.).  From the
+foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is
+afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which
+(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of
+action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which
+does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.
+xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain.  Thus the
+former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but
+accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.  In the same way
+also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the
+cause of desire.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing
+with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate
+it.
+
+Proof.--For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that
+the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with
+the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),
+according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or
+diminished, &c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the
+mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.
+Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may
+love or hate the same.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or
+hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
+merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy.  We should
+refer to the same category those objects, which affect us
+pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other
+objects which affect us in the same way.  This I will show in the
+next Prop.  I am aware that certain authors, who were the first
+to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to
+signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I
+think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known
+or manifest qualities.
+
+PROP. XVI.  Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given
+object has some point of resemblance with another object which is
+wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the
+point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said
+emotions, we shall still regard the first--named object with love
+or hate.
+
+Proof.--The point of resemblance was in the object (by
+hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus
+(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it
+will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and
+consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point
+of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of
+pleasure or pain.  Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although
+the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the
+first--named object with love or hate.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect
+us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing
+which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of
+pleasure, we shall hate the first--named thing, and at the same
+time we shall love it.
+
+Proof.--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause
+of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with
+this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive
+that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is
+wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we
+shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it
+(III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two
+contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the
+emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination
+(II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from
+the other, except as greater differs from less.  But we must bear
+in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which
+give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the
+other accidentally.  I have done this, in order that they might
+be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny
+that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an
+object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions.  The human
+body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts
+of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.
+after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by
+one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same
+thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different
+ways affect one and the same part of the body.  Hence we can
+easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of
+many and conflicting emotions.
+
+PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully
+by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing
+present.
+
+Proof.--So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,
+he will regard that thing as present, even though it be
+non--existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as
+past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the
+image of time past or future (II. xliv. note).  Wherefore the
+image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether
+it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that
+is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is
+identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or
+present.  Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,
+whether the image be of a thing past or future.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either
+have been or shall be affected thereby.  For instance, according
+as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has
+recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,
+or will harm us.  For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its
+existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which
+excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)
+the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way
+as if the thing were actually present.  However, as it generally
+happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so
+long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in
+doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the
+emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so
+constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other
+things, until men become assured of the issue.
+
+Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what is
+meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and
+Disappointment.[5]  Hope is nothing else but an inconstant
+pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,
+whereof we do not yet know the issue.  Fear, on the other hand,
+is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something
+concerning which we are in doubt.  If the element of doubt be
+removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear
+becomes Despair.  In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from
+the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.
+Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past
+whereof we have doubted the issue.  Disappointment is the Pain
+opposed to Joy.
+
+[5] Conscientiae morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
+
+PROP. XIX.  He who conceives that the object of his love is
+destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved
+he will feel pleasure.
+
+Proof.--The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive
+those things which increase or help the body's power of activity
+(III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which
+it loves.  But conception is helped by those things which
+postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered
+by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);
+therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of
+an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the
+object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind
+pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the
+existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental
+endeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully.  He,
+therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
+will feel pain, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  He who conceives that the object of his hate is
+destroyed will also feel pleasure.
+
+Proof.--The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those
+things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's
+power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III.
+xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the
+existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing,
+which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the
+aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects
+the mind pleasurably.  Thus he who conceives that the object of
+his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXI.  He who conceives, that the object of his love is
+affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected
+pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will
+be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or
+less in the thing loved.
+
+Proof.--The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which
+postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's
+endeavour to conceive the said object.  But pleasure postulates
+the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in
+proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is
+(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore
+the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental
+endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover
+pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion
+may have been greater in the object of love.  This was our first
+point.  Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it
+is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to
+the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who
+conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,
+will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said
+emotion is greater or less in the object of love.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects
+some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards
+that thing.  Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an
+object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred
+towards it.
+
+Proof.--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of
+our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we
+conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or
+pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come
+to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore
+(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object
+of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with
+love or hatred towards him.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we
+may define as pain arising from another's hurt.  What term we can
+use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.
+
+We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on
+another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures
+another, we will call Indignation.  We must further remark, that
+we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown
+in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto
+regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles
+ourselves (as I will show presently).  Thus, we bestow approval
+on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,
+contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
+painfully affected, will feel pleasure.  Contrariwise, if he
+thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel
+pain.  Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according
+as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.
+
+Proof.--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully
+affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the
+strength of the pain (III. xi. note).  Therefore, he (III. xx.)
+who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully
+affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the
+amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred.  This
+was our first point.  Again, pleasure postulates the existence of
+the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as
+the pleasure is greater or less.  If anyone imagines that an
+object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception
+(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other
+words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and
+without any mental conflict.  For (as I am about to show in Prop.
+xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to
+himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like
+manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary
+circumstances.  But here we are regarding hatred only.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an
+object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also.  If we
+conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall
+feel love towards him.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xxii., which see.
+
+Note.--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
+to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so
+far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's
+hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.
+
+PROP. XXV.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
+concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to
+affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.  Contrariwise,
+we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
+painfully ourselves or the loved object.
+
+Proof.--That, which we conceive to affect an object of our
+love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or
+painfully (III. xxi.).  But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
+far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
+pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it
+endeavours to regard them as present.  And, contrariwise (III.
+xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as
+affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
+concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
+we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
+hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
+contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
+which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
+
+Proof.--This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the
+foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.
+
+Note.--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may
+easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,
+contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object.  This feeling is
+called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of
+himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with
+his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that
+fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting
+them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to
+conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines
+his own power of action.  Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing
+from a man thinking too highly of himself.  Again, the pleasure
+which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called
+over--esteem.  Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too
+little of a man is called disdain.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is
+like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,
+to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a
+like emotion (affectus).
+
+Proof.--The images of things are modifications of the human
+body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to
+us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas
+involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature
+of the external bodies as present.  If, therefore, the nature of
+the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the
+idea which we form of the external body will involve a
+modification of our own body similar to the modification of the
+external body.  Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to
+ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will
+express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.
+Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be
+affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
+emotion.  If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we
+shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not
+similar, emotion.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note I.--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to
+pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is
+referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else
+but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we
+conceive that others have the like desire.
+
+Corollary I.--If we conceive that anyone, whom we have
+hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something
+similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
+If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the
+same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
+
+Proof.--This is proved from the last proposition in the same
+manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.
+
+Corollary II.--We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
+its misery affects us painfully.
+
+Proof.--If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice
+in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
+
+Corollary III.--We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,
+a thing which we pity.
+
+Proof.--That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,
+affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);
+therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which
+removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in
+other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we
+shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall
+endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note II.--This will or appetite for doing good, which arises
+from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is
+called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from
+compassion.  Concerning love or hate towards him who has done
+good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like
+ourselves, see III. xxii. note.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
+to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
+whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
+conduce to pain.
+
+Proof.--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that
+which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other
+words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as
+possible as present or actually existing.  But the endeavour of
+the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
+simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power
+of action.  (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.
+Coroll.).  Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
+existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the
+same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first
+point.  Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed
+to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
+hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.).  We shall,
+therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy
+the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may
+not regard it as present; this was our second point.  Wherefore
+whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
+men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
+from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
+
+[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
+whom we regard without any particular emotion.
+
+
+Proof.--From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate
+anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).
+That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel
+pleasure or pain at the thing's presence.  And so we shall
+endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with
+pleasure, etc.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
+in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
+eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit
+certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it
+is generally called kindliness.  Furthermore I give the name of
+praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of
+another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame
+to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.
+
+PROP. XXX.  If anyone has done something which he conceives as
+affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
+accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he
+will regard himself with pleasure.  On the other hand, if he has
+done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
+he will regard himself with pain.
+
+Proof.--He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure
+or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with
+pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and
+xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby
+he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,
+that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other
+words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  And so mutatis
+mutandis in the case of pain.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question
+will be a species of love and hatred.  But, as the terms love and
+hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ
+other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause[7] we will style
+Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I
+mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's
+belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause[8] is called
+self--complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance.
+Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,
+wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist
+solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone
+endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives
+will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a
+vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,
+when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.
+
+[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
+"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.
+
+[8] See previous endnote.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates
+anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
+thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,
+&c.  On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from
+something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.
+
+Proof.--From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves
+anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): but
+we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new
+cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we
+shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.  Again, from the mere
+fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall
+ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).  If we assume
+that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously
+love it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subject
+to vacillation (III. xvii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it
+follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause
+others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself
+hates: as the poet says:  "As lovers let us share every hope
+and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the
+other leaves."[9]
+
+[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.
+
+"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
+
+  Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."
+
+
+Note.--This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes
+and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really
+ambition (see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone
+by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should
+live according to his own individual disposition: when such a
+desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone
+else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all
+become mutually hateful.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  If we conceive that anyone takes delight in
+something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour
+to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain
+possession thereof.
+
+Proof.--From the mere fact of our conceiving that another
+person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we
+shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight
+therein.  But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be
+prevented by another's delight in its object; we shall,
+therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.
+xxviii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We thus see that man's nature is generally so
+constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies
+those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his
+own love for the goods in their possession.  Further, we see that
+from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that
+men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and
+ambitious.  Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall
+find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more
+especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our
+life.  We find that children, whose body is continually, as it
+were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others
+laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate
+whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of
+whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the
+images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human
+body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by
+external causes to act in this or that manner.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  When we love a thing similar to ourselves we
+endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love
+us in return.
+
+Proof.--That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to
+conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.).  If the
+thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it
+pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.).  In
+other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it
+about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),
+that it should love us in return.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  The greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our
+complacency.
+
+Proof.--We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to
+bring about, that what we love should love us in return: in
+other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause.  Therefore, in
+proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected
+because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.--that is (III. xi.
+and note) the greater will be our pleasure.  But when we take
+pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something
+similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30);
+therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  If anyone conceives, that an object of his love
+joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he
+himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards
+the loved object and with envy towards his rival.
+
+Proof.--In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is
+well affected towards him, will be the strength of his
+self--approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of
+his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as
+far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound
+to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks
+that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).  But this
+endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the
+loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved
+object has joined to itself; therefore (III. xi. note) he will
+for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of
+the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his
+rival; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred
+towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.
+Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved
+object.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy
+is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a
+wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and
+hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.
+Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,
+in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont
+to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and
+also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained
+towards his rival.  If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate
+the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably
+affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is
+compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image
+of him whom he hates.  This condition generally comes into play
+in the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman
+whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not
+only because his own desire is restrained, but also because,
+being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the
+parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks
+from her.
+
+We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved
+with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives
+him pain as a lover, as I will now show.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  He who remembers a thing, in which he has once
+taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances
+as when he first took delight therein.
+
+Proof.--Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with
+the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of
+pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it,
+in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other
+words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the
+same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the
+aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.
+
+Proof.--For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be
+missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.  As
+he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or
+circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he
+conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence
+of the object of love, is called Regret.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or
+love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
+
+Proof.--Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of
+activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes
+or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in
+his own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said
+endeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are
+directed to removing that pain.  But (by the definition of pain),
+in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily
+opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity; therefore
+the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed
+to remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire or
+appetite in endeavouring to remove it.  Again, since pleasure
+(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it
+may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by
+pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his
+desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.
+
+Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain
+and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,
+appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be
+greater in proportion to the hatred or love.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,
+so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being
+equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,
+and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his
+former love.
+
+Proof.--If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more
+of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never
+loved it.  For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man
+endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);
+he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by
+affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is
+greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the
+endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his
+affection (III. xxxiii.).  Now these endeavours are constrained
+by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.
+xxiii.); wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause
+also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love
+has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by
+hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the
+object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater
+pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never
+loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former
+love was greater.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
+injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
+to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the
+same law, seek to benefit him.
+
+Proof.--To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as
+a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to
+remove or destroy him.  But if anything more painful, or, in
+other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater
+thereby--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not
+carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of
+his hate--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury
+(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)
+will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will
+therefore prevail over it, as we asserted.  The second part of
+this proof proceeds in the same manner.  Wherefore he who hates
+another, etc.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all
+that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our
+longings, whatsoever they may be.  By evil, I mean every kind of
+pain, especially that which frustrates our longings.  For I have
+shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because
+we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because
+we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink
+from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,
+judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,
+what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst.  Thus a
+miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of
+money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as
+glory, and fears nothing so much as shame.  To an envious man
+nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing
+more painful than another's success.  So every man, according to
+his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or
+useless.  The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that
+which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is
+called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear
+whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
+future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.).  But if the
+evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.
+Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the
+fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,
+fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared
+be very great.
+
+PROP. XL.  He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
+believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate
+that other in return.
+
+Proof.--He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will
+thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  But, by
+the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him
+who is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by
+some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea
+of his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred
+will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case
+(III. xxv.) rarely happens.  This reciprocation of hatred may
+also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure
+the object of our hate (III. xxxix.).  He therefore who conceives
+that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause
+of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or
+fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other
+words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I
+said above.
+
+Corollary I.--He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates
+him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  For, in so
+far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is
+determined to hate his enemy in return.  But, by the hypothesis,
+he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to
+conflicting hatred and love.
+
+Corollary II.--If a man conceives that one, whom he has
+hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from
+motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in
+kind.
+
+Proof.--He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the
+last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will
+endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;
+he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).
+Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury
+done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to
+repay it in kind.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called
+Anger; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves
+is called Revenge.
+
+PROP. XLI.  If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and
+believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love
+that other in return.  (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)
+
+Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as the
+preceding one.  See also the note appended thereto.
+
+Note.--If he believes that he has given just cause for the
+love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is
+what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its
+contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated
+by another.  (See note to preceding proposition.)  This
+reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him
+who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is
+called gratitude or thankfulness.  It thus appears that men are
+much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.
+
+Corollary.--He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he
+hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  This is
+proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding
+proposition.
+
+Note.--If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour
+to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty,
+especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary
+cause for hatred.
+
+PROP. XLII.  He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from
+motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the
+benefit is received without gratitude.
+
+Proof.--When a man loves something similar to himself, he
+endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be
+loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.).  Therefore he who has
+conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which
+he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from
+the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will
+endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or
+to regard it as actually existing.  But, by the hypothesis, he
+conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the
+said cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.
+xix.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can
+on the other hand be destroyed by love.
+
+Proof.--He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates
+him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former
+hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.).  But if, on the
+other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he
+will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,
+and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his
+emotion.  In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.
+xli.), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III.
+xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion
+from which it arises.  Therefore, if it be greater than that
+which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to
+affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better
+of it and banish the hatred from his mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
+into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not
+preceded it.
+
+Proof.--The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.
+of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was
+wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving
+feels pleasure.  To this pleasure involved in love is added the
+pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the
+pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea
+of the former object of hatred as cause.
+
+Note.--Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate
+anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying
+this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he
+should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor
+long to be ill for the sake of getting well.  For everyone will
+always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as
+far as he can.  If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a
+man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love
+him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him.  For
+the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the
+hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be
+continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,
+he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he
+might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in
+such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)
+is absurd.
+
+PROP. XLV.  If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself
+hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will
+hate that person.
+
+Proof.--The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him
+who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that
+anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as
+affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain;
+consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the
+idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he
+will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III.
+xiii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLVI.  If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully
+by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if
+the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said
+stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or
+nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the
+individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation
+whereto he belongs.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from III. xvi.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is
+destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a
+certain pain in us.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from III. xxvii.  For in so far as we
+conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,
+we ourselves feel pain.
+
+Note.--This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary
+to II. xvii.  Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not
+actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is
+affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the
+remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard
+it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing
+in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other
+things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not
+destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the
+said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising
+from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we
+remember that object of hatred.  For, as we have said, when the
+image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it
+involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard
+the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it
+actually did exist.  However, since he has joined to the image of
+the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this
+determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices
+afresh as often as the repetition takes place.  This is the cause
+of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in
+narrating dangers from which they have escaped.  For when men
+conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are
+determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by
+the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the
+danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure
+afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is
+destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain
+involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of
+another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we
+conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.
+
+Proof.--This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love
+and hatred (III. xiii. note).  For pleasure is called love
+towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in
+so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the
+other.  When this condition of causality is either wholly or
+partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part
+vanishes.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to
+be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if
+it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.
+
+Proof.--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)
+be perceived through itself without anything else.  If,
+therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we
+shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall
+do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the
+given emotion.  But if the thing which causes the emotion be
+conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.
+vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of
+the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred
+towards it will be less.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be
+free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards
+anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation
+of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.
+
+PROP. L.  Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
+or fear.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.
+
+Note.--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or
+fear are called good or evil omens.  Now, in so far as such omens
+are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of
+hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of
+pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them
+with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means
+towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles,
+or causes of that which we fear.  It follows, further, from III.
+xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily
+in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we
+fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or
+below their true value.  Hence there have arisen superstitions,
+whereby men are everywhere assailed.  However, I do not think it
+worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from
+hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions,
+that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope,
+as I will duly explain in the proper place.  Further, in so far
+as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred;
+thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we
+have said concerning love and hatred.
+
+PROP. LI.  Different men may be differently affected by the same
+object, and the same man may be differently affected at different
+times by the same object.
+
+Proof.--The human body is affected by external bodies in a
+variety of ways (II. Post. iii.).  Two men may therefore be
+differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.
+after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by
+one and the same object.  Further (by the same Post.) the human
+body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;
+consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected
+at different times by one and the same object.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We thus see that it is possible, that what one man
+loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may
+not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he
+once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.
+Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,
+what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it
+follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their
+emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we
+distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and
+style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.
+For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil
+which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into
+consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to
+benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of
+an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him
+daring.  Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an
+evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take
+into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of
+an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that
+he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.
+
+[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
+intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
+
+
+Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human
+judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his
+emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause
+pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,
+are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of
+things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that
+a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.  Thus we
+can easily understand what are Repentance and Self--complacency.
+Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as
+cause; Self--complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because
+men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).
+
+PROP. LII.  An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction
+with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property
+that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so
+long, as an object which we conceive to have some property
+peculiar to itself.
+
+Proof.--As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in
+conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.
+xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the
+contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another
+object.  And this is the case with the object, which we conceive
+to have no property that is not common to many.  For we thereupon
+assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not
+before seen in conjunction with other objects.  But when we
+suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we
+have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while
+regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to
+regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the
+contemplation of that object only.  Therefore an object, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This mental modification, or imagination of a
+particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called
+Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
+Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed
+in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to
+think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil.  If,
+however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or
+anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby
+regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;
+otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at,
+the emotion is called Horror.  Again, if it be the prudence,
+industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our
+love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when
+joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion.  We may in
+like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other
+emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able
+to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in
+ordinary speech.  Whence it is evident, that the names of the
+emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their
+ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their
+nature.
+
+To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from
+the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or
+fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears
+to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c.,
+we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),
+determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing.  But if from
+the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,
+we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause
+of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the
+thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities
+which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on
+the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more
+particularly to regard that which is therein.  As devotion
+springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision
+spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn
+from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.
+Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,
+in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other
+emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any
+recognized name.
+
+PROP. LIII.  When the mind regards itself and its own power of
+activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in
+proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and
+its own power of activity.
+
+Proof.--A man does not know himself except through the
+modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and
+xxiii.).  When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate
+itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or
+(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be
+greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able
+to conceive itself and its own power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--This pleasure is fostered more and more, in
+proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.
+For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more
+he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by
+the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)
+himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea
+of himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
+assert its power of activity.
+
+Proof.--The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual
+essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind
+obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not
+that which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind
+endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its
+power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LV.  When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
+pain thereat.
+
+Proof.--The essence of the mind only affirms that which the
+mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to
+conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last
+Prop.).  Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own
+weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting
+to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is
+checked in its endeavour----in other words (III. xi. note), it
+feels pain.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--This pain is more and more fostered, if a man
+conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the
+same way as the corollary to III. liii.
+
+Note.--This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,
+is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the
+contemplation of ourselves, is called self--love or
+self--complacency.  And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as
+often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of
+activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own
+exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and
+also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.
+Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.
+note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of
+their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues.  For whenever a
+man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.
+liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and
+he conceives them more distinctly--that is (II. xl. note), in
+proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard
+them as something special.  Therefore, a man will take most
+pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some
+quality which he denies to others.  But, if that which he affirms
+of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in
+general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the
+contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall
+short when compared with those of others.  This pain (III.
+xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
+construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he
+can, embellishing his own.
+
+It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred
+and envy, which latter is fostered by their education.  For
+parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely
+by the spur of honour and envy.  But, perhaps, some will scruple
+to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's
+virtues, and venerate their possessors.  In order to remove such
+doubts, I append the following corollary.
+
+Corollary.--No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his
+equal.
+
+Proof.--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.
+xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby
+a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is
+checked.  But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,
+which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a
+man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the
+same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to
+another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot
+be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue
+in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an
+one.  But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same
+nature as himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,
+we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,
+&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar
+to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more
+envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions
+for being courageous.
+
+PROP. LVI.  There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of
+desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as
+vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,
+hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we
+are affected.
+
+Proof.--Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions
+compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or
+passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive
+(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so
+far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is,
+we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we
+conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by
+an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the
+nature of an external body.  Wherefore the nature of every
+passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature
+of the object whereby we are affected be expressed.  Namely, the
+pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the
+nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the
+object B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore these
+two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the
+causes whence they arise are by nature different.  So again the
+emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature
+different from the pain arising from another object, and,
+similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,
+&c.
+
+Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,
+love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are
+affected.  Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any
+given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore,
+according as a man is affected through external causes by this or
+that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words,
+according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so
+will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one
+desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,
+as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.
+Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of
+pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown)
+there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects
+whereby we are affected.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last
+proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,
+drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of
+love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a
+manner varying according to the object, with which they are
+concerned.  For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,
+&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,
+venery, riches, and fame.  Furthermore, these emotions, in so far
+as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects
+wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries.  For
+temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose
+to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive
+states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the
+last--named emotions.  However, I cannot here explain the
+remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as
+the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary.
+It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the
+strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have
+a general definition of each emotion.  It is sufficient, I
+repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and
+the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the
+mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions.  Thus,
+though there is a great difference between various emotions of
+love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards
+children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us
+to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further
+the nature and origin of the emotions.
+
+PROP. LVII.  Any emotion of a given individual differs from the
+emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of
+the one individual differs from the essence of the other.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see
+after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.).  Nevertheless, we will
+prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.
+
+All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,
+as their definitions above given show.  But desire is each man's
+nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one
+individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature
+or essence of the other.  Again, pleasure and pain are passive
+states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to
+persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or
+hindered (III. xi. and note).  But by the endeavour to persist in
+its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in
+conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note);
+therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or
+appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every
+man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man
+differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the
+essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one
+individual only differs, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals
+which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of
+mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's
+emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human
+nature.  Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of
+procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire
+of the latter is human.  So also the lusts and appetites of
+insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the
+several natures.  Thus, although each individual lives content
+and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his
+being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is
+nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and
+hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of
+another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the
+essence of another.  Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
+proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
+which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
+philosopher, as I just mention here by the way.  Thus far I have
+treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is
+passive.  It remains to add a few words on those attributable to
+him in so far as he is active.
+
+PROP. LVIII.  Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities
+or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
+desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
+
+Proof.--When the mind conceives itself and its power of
+activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind
+necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or
+adequate idea (II. xliii.).  But the mind does conceive certain
+adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.).  Therefore it feels pleasure in
+so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it
+is active (III. i.).  Again, the mind, both in so far as it has
+clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,
+endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such
+an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);
+therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we
+understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LIX.  Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
+active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or
+desire.
+
+Proof.--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or
+pain, as their definitions, already given, show.  Now by pain we
+mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked
+(III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels
+pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is
+diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions
+can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but
+only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
+are attributable to the mind in that condition.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--All actions following from emotion, which are
+attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set
+down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into
+courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas).  By
+courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve
+his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.
+By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,
+solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to
+unite them to himself in friendship.  Those actions, therefore,
+which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to
+courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to
+highmindedness.  Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind
+in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c.,
+are varieties of highmindedness.
+
+I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their
+primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,
+which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,
+to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain.  It is evident from what I
+have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external
+causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds
+we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate.  But I
+have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting
+emotions, not all that might be given.  For, by proceeding in the
+same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to
+repentance, scorn, shame, &c.  I think everyone will agree from
+what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with
+another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise
+therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation.  However,
+for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most
+important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be
+more curious than profitable.  It remains to remark concerning
+love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a
+thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,
+acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another
+way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
+begins to conceive and desire something fresh.  For example, when
+we conceive something which generally delights us with its
+flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it.  But whilst we
+are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is
+otherwise disposed.  If, therefore, when the body is thus
+otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be
+stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be
+stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel
+repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the
+presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become
+odious.  This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or
+weariness.  For the rest, I have neglected the outward
+modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for
+instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these
+are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the
+mind.  Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be
+supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them,
+interpolating such observations as I think should here and there
+be added.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+I.  Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given
+modification of itself.
+
+Explanation.--We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of
+this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof;
+further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is
+determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
+persistence.  But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
+strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
+and desire.  For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or
+not, it remains one and the same appetite.  Thus, in order to
+avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
+explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it
+in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those
+endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms
+appetite, will, desire, or impulse.  I might, indeed, have said,
+that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived
+as determined to a particular activity; but from such a
+definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can
+be conscious of its desire or appetite.  Therefore, in order to
+imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,
+in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c.
+For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every
+disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be
+innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of
+thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,
+lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.
+By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours,
+impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each
+man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to
+another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and
+knows not where to turn.
+
+II.  Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
+perfection.
+
+III.  Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
+perfection.
+
+Explanation--I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection
+itself.  For, if man were born with the perfection to which he
+passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of
+pleasure.  This appears more clearly from the consideration of
+the contrary emotion, pain.  No one can deny, that pain consists
+in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less
+perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he
+partakes of perfection of any degree.  Neither can we say, that
+pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection.  For
+absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;
+wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition
+from a greater to a less perfection--in other words, it is an
+activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or
+constrained (cf. III. xi. note).  I pass over the definitions of
+merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these
+terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely
+kinds of pleasure or pain.
+
+IV.  Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
+the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in
+question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and
+note).
+
+Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,
+why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway
+falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the
+images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one
+follows the other.  This state of association is impossible, if
+the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand
+in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other
+causes to think of something else.
+
+Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is
+of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include
+wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include
+it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no
+positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but
+merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the
+mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the
+contemplation of another.
+
+I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary
+emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,
+pain, and desire.  I have spoken of wonder simply because it is
+customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three
+primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the
+objects of our wonder.  I am led by the same motive to add a
+definition of contempt.
+
+V.  Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
+so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those
+qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.
+III. lii. note).
+
+The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
+I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.
+
+VI.  Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+
+Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly the
+essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say
+that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
+object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
+as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
+they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
+properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
+to be very obscure.  It must, however, be noted, that when I say
+that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
+unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish
+consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I
+have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I
+mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is
+absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for
+love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by
+wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of
+the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the
+lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.
+
+VII.  Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+
+Explanation--These observations are easily grasped after what
+has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.
+also III. xiii. note).
+
+VIII.  Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
+
+IX.  Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which
+is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).
+
+X.  Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.
+
+Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.
+lii.) from the novelty of a thing.  If, therefore, it happens
+that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall
+cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion
+readily degenerates into simple love.
+
+XI.  Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
+presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we
+hate.
+
+Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we
+deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent
+rejoice (III. xx.).  But since we assume that man hates that
+which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not
+without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).
+
+XII.  Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue.
+
+XIII.  Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).
+
+Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that there is
+no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.
+For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of
+anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the
+existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this
+extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while
+dependent on hope, he fears for the issue.  Contrariwise he, who
+fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something
+which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the
+existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels
+pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will
+turn out as he desires (III. xx.).
+
+XIV.  Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something
+past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+
+XV.  Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or
+future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+
+Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair
+from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event
+has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives
+something past or future as present and regards it as such, or
+else because he conceives other things, which exclude the
+existence of the causes of his doubt.  For, although we can never
+be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.
+xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt
+concerning it.  For we have shown, that to feel no doubt
+concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it
+(II. xlix. note).  Thus it may happen that we are affected by the
+same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or
+future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I
+have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I
+refer the reader.
+
+XVI.  Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,
+which has had an issue beyond our hope.
+
+XVII.  Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of
+something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.
+
+XVIII.  Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has
+befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
+III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).
+
+Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there
+seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is
+used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in
+reference to a disposition.
+
+XIX.  Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
+
+XX.  Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to
+another.
+
+Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed in
+senses somewhat different from those usually assigned.  But my
+purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature
+of things.  I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my
+meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary
+signification.  One statement of my method will suffice. As for
+the cause of the above--named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,
+and III. xxii. note.
+
+XXI.  Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the
+love we bear him.
+
+XXII.  Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we
+hate him.
+
+Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and
+disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also
+be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+highly of a beloved object.  Contrariwise, disparagement may be
+defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+meanly of a hated object.  Cf. III. xxvi. note.
+
+XXIII.  Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be
+pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's
+evil fortune.
+
+Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by
+doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be
+thus defined:
+
+XXIV.  Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a
+man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at
+another's evil fortune.
+
+Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and
+xxxii.  These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain
+accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in
+itself or accidentally.  I now pass on to other emotions, which
+are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.
+
+XXV.  Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
+
+XXVI.  Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his
+own weakness of body or mind.
+
+Explanation--Self--complacency is opposed to humility, in so
+far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of
+our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe
+we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed
+to repentance, which we may thus define:
+
+XXVII.  Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some
+action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision
+of our mind.
+
+Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have set forth in
+III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.  Concerning
+the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.  This is
+perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
+nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
+called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are
+called right, are followed by pleasure.  We can easily gather
+from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on
+education.  Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,
+and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and
+also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought
+it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the
+latter with pleasure.  This is confirmed by experience.  For
+custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that
+which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some
+consider honourable others consider disgraceful.  According as
+each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given
+action or glories therein.
+
+XXVIII.  Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from
+self--love.
+
+Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality, for the
+latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride
+is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.  However, as
+partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or
+property of self--love, which may therefore be thus defined, love
+of self or self--approval, in so far as it leads a man to think
+too highly of himself.  To this emotion there is no contrary.
+For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred;
+I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he
+conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that.  For
+whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he
+imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,
+that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot
+do.  For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
+is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it
+impossible for him to do it.  However, if we consider such
+matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable
+that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen,
+that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should
+imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the
+world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him.  Again,
+a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in
+the present something in relation to a future time of which he is
+uncertain.  As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable
+to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do
+nothing but what is wicked and base, &c.  We may also say, that a
+man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive
+fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,
+venture.  We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an
+emotion which I will call self--abasement, for as from
+self--complacency springs pride, so from humility springs
+self--abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:
+
+XXIX.  Self--abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by
+reason of pain.
+
+Explanation--We are nevertheless generally accustomed to
+oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention
+to the effect of either emotion than to its nature.  We are wont
+to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who
+talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults,
+who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a
+style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station.  On
+the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who
+confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and
+who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.
+However, these emotions, humility and self--abasement, are
+extremely rare.  For human nature, considered in itself, strives
+against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence
+those, who are believed to be most self--abased and humble, are
+generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.
+
+XXX.  Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action
+of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
+
+[11] Gloria.
+
+XXXI.  Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of
+our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
+
+Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. xxx.  But we
+should here remark the difference which exists between shame and
+modesty.  Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are
+ashamed.  Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains
+a man from committing a base action.  Modesty is usually opposed
+to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will
+duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have
+remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to
+their nature.
+
+I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions
+arising from pleasure and pain.  I therefore proceed to treat of
+those which I refer to desire.
+
+XXXII.  Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,
+kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same
+time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude
+the existence of it.
+
+Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are by that very
+fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to
+contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something
+present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,
+is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the
+existence of that which we remember.  Thus when we remember
+something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that
+very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of
+pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once
+checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence
+of the thing in question.  Wherefore regret is, strictly
+speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from
+the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note).  But, as
+the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion
+down, among the emotions springing from desire.
+
+XXXIII.  Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us
+by our conception that others have the same desire.
+
+Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees others running
+away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again,
+he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws
+towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own
+were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another's
+emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of
+emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become
+customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that
+which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant.  As to the
+cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note.  The reason why
+this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.
+xxxii. and note.
+
+XXXIV.  Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing
+from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar
+feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.  Cf. III. xxxix.
+note and xl.
+
+XXXV.  Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.
+Cf. III. xxvii. note.
+
+XXXVI.  Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are
+induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.
+
+XXXVII.  Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through
+mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has
+injured us.  (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)
+
+XXXVIII.  Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is
+impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
+
+Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a
+passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his
+anger and revenge.
+
+XXXIX.  Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we
+dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.  Cf. III. xxxix. note.
+
+XL.  Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do
+something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
+
+XLI.  Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by
+the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
+
+Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the
+fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I
+do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.
+Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so
+far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion
+of daring.
+
+XLII.  Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of
+avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
+
+Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species of
+cowardice.  But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double
+fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a
+man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the
+evil.  I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of
+removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement.  I say
+wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be
+constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments
+him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may
+avert of the two.  On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and
+III. lii. note.  Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
+note.
+
+XLIII.  Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the
+desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining
+from that which should displease them.
+
+XLIV.  Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.
+
+Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions
+(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened;
+therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome.  For, so
+long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time
+necessarily bound by this.  "The best men," says Cicero, "are
+especially led by honour.  Even philosophers, when they write a
+book contemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.
+
+XLV.  Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living
+sumptuously.
+
+XLVI.  Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
+
+XLVII.  Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
+
+XLVIII.  Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual
+intercourse.
+
+Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is
+still called lust.  These last five emotions (as I have shown in
+III. lvi.) have on contraries.  For deference is a species of
+ambition.  Cf. III. xxix. note.
+
+Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,
+and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the
+mind.  It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an
+ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,
+drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear
+are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery.  For
+an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and
+drink at another man's expense.  An ambitious man will restrain
+himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are
+secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,
+from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those
+vices.  Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not.  For
+though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,
+cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain
+avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he
+cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,
+cease to be lustful.  In fact, these emotions are not so much
+concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the
+appetite and love of such.  Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to
+these emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I will
+speak presently.
+
+The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I
+pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the
+compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because
+many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is
+sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general
+knowledge of them.  However, it is established from the
+definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they
+all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there
+is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be
+called by a variety of names in accordance with its various
+relations and extrinsic tokens.  If we now direct our attention
+to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning
+the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the
+emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.
+
+
+GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+
+Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a
+confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or
+any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater
+or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is
+determined to think of one thing rather than another.
+
+Explanation--I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul
+is a confused idea.  For we have shown that the mind is only
+passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas.  (III.
+iii.)  I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its
+body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than
+before.  For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote
+rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll.
+ii.) than the nature of an external body.  But the idea which
+constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the
+disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its
+power of action or force for existence is increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered.  But it must be noted that, when
+I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not
+mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition
+of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of
+an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact,
+involves more or less of reality than before.
+
+And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.
+xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own
+body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very
+essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or
+less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own
+body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less
+reality than before.
+
+When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is
+increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed
+of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more
+or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its
+own body.  For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of
+thinking are measured by the excellence of the object.  Lastly, I
+have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to
+think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the
+nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the
+definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.
+
+
+
+
+PART IV:
+
+Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+
+Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I
+name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is
+not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much
+so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better
+for him, to follow that which is worse.  Why this is so, and what
+is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part
+of my treatise.  But, before I begin, it would be well to make a
+few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good
+and evil.
+
+When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has
+brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,
+not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks
+that he knows, the intention and aim of its author.  For
+instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not
+yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work
+is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will,
+on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is
+carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it.
+But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen
+before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he
+plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect.
+Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.
+
+But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out
+types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain
+types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that
+which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the
+thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree
+less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently
+been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.
+This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,
+which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or
+imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things
+natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they
+hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing
+without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types
+before herself.  Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,
+which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they
+have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has
+fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete.
+Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect
+or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true
+knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
+
+Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does
+not work with an end in view.  For the eternal and infinite
+Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as
+that whereby it exists.  For we have shown, that by the same
+necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.
+xvi.).  The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the
+reason why he acts, are one and the same.  Therefore, as he does
+not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the
+sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is
+neither origin nor end.  Wherefore, a cause which is called final
+is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered
+as the origin or cause of anything.  For example, when we say
+that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we
+mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of
+household life, had a desire to build a house.  Wherefore, the
+being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is
+nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the
+efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because
+men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.  They
+are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions
+and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are
+determined to any particular desire.  Therefore, the common
+saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and
+produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses
+treated of in the Appendix to Part I.  Perfection and
+imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or
+notions which we form from a comparison among one another of
+individuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def.
+vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.  For
+we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
+genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category
+of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.
+Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this
+category, and comparing them one with another, find that some
+possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,
+say that some are more perfect than others.  Again, in so far as
+we attribute to them anything implying negation--as term, end,
+infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
+they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call
+perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or
+because Nature has blundered.  For nothing lies within the scope
+of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity
+of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from
+the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily
+comes to pass.
+
+As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive
+quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of
+thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things
+one with another.  Thus one and the same thing can be at the same
+time good, bad, and indifferent.  For instance, music is good for
+him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is
+deaf, it is neither good nor bad.
+
+Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be
+retained.  For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
+type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful
+for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have
+indicated.
+
+In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
+certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the
+type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by
+"bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
+approaching the said type.  Again, we shall that men are more
+perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more
+or less nearly to the said type.  For it must be specially
+remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a
+greater perfection, or vice versa, I do not mean that he is
+changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a
+horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a
+man, as by being changed into an insect.  What I mean is, that we
+conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is
+understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished.  Lastly,
+by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality--in
+other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and
+operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to
+its duration.  For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,
+because it has passed a longer time in existence.  The duration
+of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence
+of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence;
+but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will
+always be able to persist in existence with the same force
+wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all
+things are equal.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+I.  By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to
+us.
+
+II.  By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a
+hindrance
+to us in the attainment of any good.
+
+(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the
+end.)
+
+III.  Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while
+regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which
+necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.
+
+IV.  Particular things I call possible in so far as, while
+regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,
+whether such causes be determined for producing them.
+
+(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between
+possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need
+to distinguish them accurately.)
+
+V.  By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in
+different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as
+luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are
+contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
+
+VI.  What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,
+present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,
+which see.
+
+(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly
+conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit;
+that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred
+feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that
+which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance
+from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time
+of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer
+interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally
+distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the
+same moment of time.)
+
+VII.  By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a
+desire.
+
+VIII.  By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that
+is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a
+man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of
+effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
+
+
+AXIOM.
+
+
+There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is
+not another more powerful and strong.  Whatsoever thing be given,
+there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  No positive quality possessed by a false idea is
+removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being
+true.
+
+Proof.--Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge
+which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any
+positive quality on account of which they are called false (II.
+xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,
+they are true (II. xxxii.).  Wherefore, if the positive quality
+possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is
+true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be
+removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd.  Therefore, no
+positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This proposition is more clearly understood from II.
+xvi. Coroll. ii.  For imagination is an idea, which indicates
+rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature
+of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly;
+whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err.  For
+instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant
+from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long
+as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true
+distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination;
+or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains
+tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected
+thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall
+still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us.  For, as we
+said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near
+us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the
+mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the
+body is affected thereby.  Thus, when the rays of the sun falling
+on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine
+the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its
+real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the
+mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition
+of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or
+diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at
+its presence.  It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an
+evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the
+contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will
+certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings;
+thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,
+in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,
+stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present
+existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.
+
+PROP. II.  We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of
+Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.
+
+Proof.--We are said to be passive, when something arises in
+us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is
+(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the
+laws of our nature.  We are passive therefore, in so far as we
+are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without
+other parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. III.  The force whereby a man persists in existing is
+limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external
+causes.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from the axiom of this part.  For,
+when man is given, there is something else--say A--more powerful;
+when A is given, there is something else--say B--more powerful than
+A, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by
+the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the
+power of external causes.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IV.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,
+save such as can be understood through his nature only as their
+adequate cause.
+
+Proof.--The power, whereby each particular thing, and
+consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of
+Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but
+in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence
+(III. vii.).  Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained
+through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power
+of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.
+xxxiv.).  This was our first point.  Again, if it were possible,
+that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood
+solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would
+not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this
+would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was
+either finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only,
+inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all
+changes which could spring from external causes; or of the
+infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be
+so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any
+changes save such as tended towards his own preservation.  But
+the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of
+which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).
+Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of
+undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
+through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as
+we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from
+the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the
+necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as
+affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature
+as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must
+be deducible.  It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is
+infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.  It
+is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any
+changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a
+prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order
+of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as
+the nature of things demands.
+
+PROP. V.  The power and increase of every passion, and its
+persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of
+an external cause compared with our own.
+
+Proof.--The essence of a passion cannot be explained through
+our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),
+the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in
+II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the
+rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes
+obstinately fixed to him.
+
+Proof.--The force and increase of any passion and its
+persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore
+(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man's power, &e.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VII.  An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by
+another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for
+controlling emotion.
+
+Proof.--Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is
+an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less
+force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the
+Emotions at the end of Part III.).  When, therefore, the mind is
+assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected
+with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or
+diminished.  Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives
+from its cause the force for persistence in its being; which
+force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.
+vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification
+contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.);
+wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a
+modification contrary to, and stronger than the former
+modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the
+emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
+stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy
+the existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be
+destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger
+emotion.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a
+modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that
+which we are undergoing.  For the emotion which we undergo can
+only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and
+stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition
+of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body
+contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we
+undergo.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but
+the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof.
+
+Proof.--We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or
+the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that
+is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or
+hinders, our power of activity.  Thus, in so far as we perceive
+that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or
+evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else
+but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows
+from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.).  But this
+idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united
+to body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction
+between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of
+the body, save in conception only.  Therefore the knowledge of
+good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we
+are conscious thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with
+us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive
+the cause to be with us.
+
+Proof.--Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the
+mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which
+indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of
+the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).  An emotion is
+therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition
+of the body.  But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so
+long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
+of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or
+more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the
+present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with
+us.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected
+by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as
+if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that
+this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the
+thing in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged,
+whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the
+image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other
+things which exclude the present existence of the future object:
+I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I
+purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of
+my work.
+
+Corollary.--The image of something past or future, that is, of
+a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time
+future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other
+conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present;
+consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is
+less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt
+towards something present.
+
+PROP. X.  Towards something future, which we conceive as close at
+hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that
+its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer
+interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have
+not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we
+conceive that it has long passed away.
+
+Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or
+not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the
+presence of the object less, than if its period of future
+existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long
+passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.)
+we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it
+follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a
+longer period than we can define in conception, though their
+dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they
+all affect us equally faintly.
+
+PROP. XI.  An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary
+is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion
+towards that which possible, or contingent, or non--necessary.
+
+Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,
+to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny
+a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be
+necessary (I. xxxiii. note. i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion
+towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal,
+more intense than an emotion that which is non--necessary.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XII.  An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is
+more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion
+towards a thing contingent.
+
+Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+affected by the conception of some further thing, which would
+assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the
+other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which
+exclude its present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive a
+thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things
+which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.),
+things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards
+something possible is more vehement.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.
+
+Proof.--Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,
+is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as
+future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the
+future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.
+x.).  Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of
+existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,
+nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as
+contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard
+as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the
+thing to be present with us.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know
+not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal,
+fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.
+
+Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the
+existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other
+hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its
+present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive it in relation
+to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls
+the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and
+note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II.
+xvii. Coroll.).  Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing
+contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is
+fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a
+thing past.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIV.  A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any
+emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is
+considered as an emotion.
+
+Proof.--An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its
+body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the
+general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no
+positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what
+is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by
+virtue of being true, restrain any emotion.  But, in so far as
+such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength
+for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to
+restrain the given emotion.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can
+be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from
+the emotions whereby we are assailed.
+
+Proof.--From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the
+Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the
+strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.).  But,
+inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of
+our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also
+present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must
+therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.);
+consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined
+solely by human power.  Again, the desires arising from the
+emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as
+the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and
+increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,
+which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it
+(IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be
+more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge
+of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,
+in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more
+easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is
+agreeable at the present moment.
+
+Proof.--Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,
+is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix.
+Coroll.).  But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of
+good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good
+at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong
+desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal
+application).  Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when
+concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or
+quenched, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and
+evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is
+contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire
+for things that are present.
+
+Proof.--This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop.
+from IV. xii. Coroll.
+
+Note.--I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved
+by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the
+true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul,
+and often yields to every kind of passion.  This state of things
+gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:[12]----
+"The better path I gaze at and approve,
+The worse--I follow."
+
+[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
+
+
+Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind,
+when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."  I
+have not written the above with the object of drawing the
+conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or
+that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his
+emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the
+infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can
+do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power.  I
+have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human
+infirmity.  The power of reason over the emotions I have settled
+to treat separately.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions
+being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.
+
+Proof.--Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions,
+i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist
+in his own being.  Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by
+the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the
+contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being
+felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising
+from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the
+power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must
+be defined by human power only.  Thus the former is the stronger
+of the two.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In these few remarks I have explained the causes of
+human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide
+by the precepts of reason.  It now remains for me to show what
+course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are
+in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are
+contrary thereto.  But, before I begin to prove my Propositions
+in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them
+briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my
+meaning.
+
+As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,
+that every man should love himself, should seek that which is
+useful to him--I mean, that which is really useful to him, should
+desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,
+and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to
+preserve his own being.  This is as necessarily true, as that a
+whole is greater than its part.  (Cf. III. iv.)
+
+Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance
+with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one
+endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with
+the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the
+foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own
+being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving
+his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its
+own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful
+to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and
+lastly, that suicides are weak--minded, and are overcome by
+external causes repugnant to their nature.  Further, it follows
+from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing
+without all external things for the preservation of our being or
+living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside
+ourselves.  Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our
+intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
+understand nothing besides itself.  There are, then, many things
+outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to
+be desired.  Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than
+those which are in entire agreement with our nature.  For if, for
+example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,
+they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them
+singly.
+
+Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than
+man--nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being
+can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points
+agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were,
+one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with
+one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their
+being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.
+Hence, men who are governed by reason--that is, who seek what is
+useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves
+nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
+and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their
+conduct.
+
+Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus
+briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater
+detail.  I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain
+the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every
+man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation
+of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.
+
+Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the
+case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I
+have hitherto proceeded.
+
+PROP. XIX.  Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily
+desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.
+
+Proof.--The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the
+emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks
+good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad.  Now this appetite is
+nothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of
+Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.).
+Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires
+the one, and shrinks from the other, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek
+what is useful to him--in other words, to preserve his own
+being--the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in
+proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that
+is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.
+
+Proof.--Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by
+man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely
+by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.
+Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his
+own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently
+(III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his
+own being, he is wanting in power.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or
+preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes
+external and foreign to his nature.  No one, I say, from the
+necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion
+from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which
+latter may be done in a variety of ways.  A man, for instance,
+kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists
+round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a
+sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart;
+or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's
+command, to open his own veins--that is, to escape a greater evil
+by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may
+so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may
+assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea
+cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the
+necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become
+non--existent, is as impossible as that something should be made
+out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little
+reflection.
+
+PROP. XXI.  No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and
+to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and
+to live--in other words, to actually exist.
+
+Proof.--The proof of this proposition, or rather the
+proposition itself, is self--evident, and is also plain from the
+definition of desire.  For the desire of living, acting, &c.,
+blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence
+of man--that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to
+preserve his own being.  Therefore, no one can desire, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  No virtue can be conceived as prior to this
+endeavour to preserve one's own being.
+
+Proof.--The effort for self--preservation is the essence of a
+thing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived
+as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be
+conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.
+Therefore no virtue, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--The effort for self--preservation is the first and
+only foundation of virtue.  For prior to this principle nothing
+can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular
+action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said
+to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in
+so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.
+
+Proof.--In so far as a man is determined to an action through
+having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.
+Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived
+solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which
+does not follow from his virtue.  But, in so far as he is
+determined for an action because he understands, he is active;
+that is, he does something, which is perceived through his
+essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us
+the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being
+(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with
+the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to
+one's self.
+
+Proof.--To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing
+else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature.  But
+we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore
+to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,
+to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and
+that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.
+Coroll.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of
+anything else.
+
+Proof.--The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the
+thing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not from the
+essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that
+everyone endeavours to preserve his being.  Moreover, this
+proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should
+endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,
+the last--named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,
+which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd.  Therefore no one,
+&c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so
+far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,
+save such things as are conducive to understanding.
+
+Proof.--The effort for self--preservation is nothing else but
+the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so
+far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for
+continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as
+necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of
+Appetite, III. ix. note).  But the essence of reason is nought
+else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly
+understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.); therefore
+(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing else but to understand.  Again, since this effort of the
+mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to
+preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this
+effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and
+single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand
+things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the
+other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able
+to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are
+conducive to understanding.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save
+such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are
+able to hinder us from understanding.
+
+Proof.--The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing
+beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,
+save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing
+Prop.).  But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess
+certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has
+adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in
+so far as it reasons.  Therefore we know nothing to be good or
+evil save such things as really conduce, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God,
+and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.
+
+Proof.--The mind is not capable of understanding anything
+higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely
+infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be
+conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest
+utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God.  Again,
+the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to
+the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously.  The
+mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand.  Now, as we
+have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is
+God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand
+or to know God.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  No individual thing, which is entirely different
+from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and
+absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has
+something in common with our nature.
+
+Proof.--The power of every individual thing, and consequently
+the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be
+determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.
+vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through
+which human nature is conceived.  Therefore our power of
+activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and
+consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other
+individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not
+by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely
+different from our own; and since we call good or evil that
+which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.
+xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our
+power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different
+from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXX.  A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality
+which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in
+so far as it is contrary to our nature.
+
+Proof.--We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.
+viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when
+it diminishes or checks our power of action.  Therefore, if
+anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in
+common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or
+check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.
+iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that
+quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand,
+in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),
+in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is
+contrary to our nature.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,
+it is necessarily good.
+
+Proof.--In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it
+cannot be bad for it.  It will therefore necessarily be either
+good or indifferent.  If it be assumed that it be neither good
+nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which
+tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the
+hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself;
+but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for
+us, and vice versa, in proportion as a thing is more useful for
+us, so is it more in harmony with our nature.  For, in so far as
+it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be
+different therefrom or contrary thereto.  If different, it can
+neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be
+contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,
+contrary to what is good--in short, bad.  Nothing, therefore, can
+be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;
+and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony
+with our nature, and vice versa.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  In so far as men are a prey to passion, they
+cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.
+
+Proof.--Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are
+understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or
+negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note);
+wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,
+cannot be said to be naturally in harmony.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This is also self--evident; for, if we say that white
+and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we
+absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect.  So, if
+we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both
+are finite--wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of
+their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power
+of external causes--we should certainly affirm that a man and a
+stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree
+only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really
+agree in no respect.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are
+assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states;
+and to this extent one and the same man is variable and
+inconstant.
+
+Proof.--The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained
+ solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i., ii.), but
+it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.), by the
+nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it
+follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there
+are external objects whereby we are affected (III. lvi.), and
+that men may be differently affected by one and the same
+object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly,
+that one and the same man may be differently affected towards
+the same object, and may therefore be variable and
+inconstant.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, they can be contrary one to another.
+
+Proof.--A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's
+feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to
+that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole
+possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and
+note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in
+III. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
+Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen
+also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should
+endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.
+xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another.  But the
+emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.);
+hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, can be contrary one to another.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives
+that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from
+this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,
+through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through
+agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way;
+if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be
+untrue.  But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we
+shall see that the discrepancy vanishes.  For the two men are not
+in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,
+that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one
+differing from the other.  For, in so far as each loves the same
+thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered
+thereby.  Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are
+at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the
+agreement in their natures.  The cause for their opposition lies,
+as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to
+differ.  For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved
+object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of
+the loved object as lost.  Hence the one man will be affected
+with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus
+they will be at variance one with another.  We can easily show in
+like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on
+differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,
+do they always necessarily agree in nature.
+
+Proof.--In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are
+passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at
+variance one with another.  But men are only said to be active,
+in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.);
+therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it
+is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely
+through human nature as its proximate cause.  But, since every
+man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,
+and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and
+further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem
+good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows
+that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human
+nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.
+Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with
+each man's nature.  Therefore, men in so far as they live in
+obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with
+another.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I.--There is no individual thing in nature, which is
+more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.
+For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony
+with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man.
+But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when
+he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this
+extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of
+another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual
+things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in
+obedience to reason.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary II.--As every man seeks most that which is useful to
+him, so are men most useful one to another.  For the more a man
+seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,
+the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the
+same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to
+act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in
+obedience to reason.  But men are most in natural harmony, when
+they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore
+(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to
+another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--What we have just shown is attested by experience so
+conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man
+is to man a God."  Yet it rarely happens that men live in
+obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that
+they are generally envious and troublesome one to another.
+Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so
+that the definition of man as a social animal has met with
+general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much
+more convenience than injury.  Let satirists then laugh their
+fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes
+praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them
+heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said,
+they will find that men can provide for their wants much more
+easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can
+they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not
+to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,
+to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts.  But I
+will treat of this more at length elsewhere.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  The highest good of those who follow virtue is
+common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.
+
+Proof.--To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason
+(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to
+reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;
+that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and
+can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of
+the same nature.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of
+those who follow after virtue were not common to all?  Would it
+not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in
+obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they
+agree in nature, would be at variance one with another?  To such
+an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but
+from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is
+common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of
+man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could
+neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure
+in this highest good.  For it belongs to the essence of the human
+mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal
+and infinite essence of God.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  The good which every man, who follows after
+virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,
+and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge
+of God.
+
+Proof.--Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.);
+therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily
+endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to
+reason.  But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided
+by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for
+himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which
+each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also
+for others.  Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.);
+now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),
+which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it
+(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of
+God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of
+virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good
+for himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+Another Proof.--The good, which a man desires for himself and
+loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love
+it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others
+should love it also; and as the good in question is common to
+all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,
+for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice
+therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in
+proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.
+
+Note I.--He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause
+others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the
+world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,
+and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight
+in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar
+impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what
+pleases themselves.  Again, as the highest good sought by men
+under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be
+possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love
+it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they
+delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed.  But he, who
+endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but
+courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent.
+Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in
+so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to
+Religion.  The desire of well--doing, which is engendered by a
+life according to reason, I call piety.  Further, the desire,
+whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate
+others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by
+honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according
+to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the
+gaining of friendship.  I have also shown in addition what are
+the foundations of a state; and the difference between true
+virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have
+said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in
+accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but
+man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to
+himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded
+by the general disposition of things rather than by his own
+nature considered solely in itself.
+
+[13] Honestas
+
+
+Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.
+of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the
+slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition
+and womanish pity than on sound reason.  The rational quest of
+what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
+associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,
+or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the
+same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.
+Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men
+have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.
+Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we
+may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,
+treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature
+is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from
+human emotions (III. lvii. note).  It remains for me to explain
+what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit.  On these points
+see the following note.
+
+Note II.--In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain
+praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.
+
+Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note:
+the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms.  But I
+must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature
+and in society.
+
+Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,
+consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions
+which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by
+sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is
+bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own
+disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to
+him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which
+he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.).  Now,
+if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain
+in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to
+his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.).  But seeing that they are a
+prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue
+(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and
+being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in
+need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note).  Wherefore, in order that
+men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is
+necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for
+the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure
+their fellow--men.  The way in which this end can be obtained, so
+that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.
+Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each
+other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.
+vii. and III. xxxix.  It is there shown, that an emotion can only
+be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to
+itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of
+incurring a greater injury themselves.
+
+On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps
+in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging
+injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also
+possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to
+pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in
+restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note).  Such a
+society established with laws and the power of preserving itself
+is called a State, while those who live under its protection are
+called citizens.  We may readily understand that there is in the
+state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced
+good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely
+of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with
+reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good
+or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.
+
+In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it
+can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on
+by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State
+authority.  Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is
+therefore punished by the right of the State only.  Obedience, on
+the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is
+thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages
+which a State provides.
+
+Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent
+master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be
+said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are
+common to all.  Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no
+wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that
+which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the
+state of nature answering to justice and injustice.  Such ideas
+are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common
+consent what belongs to one man and what to another.
+
+From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and
+injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes
+which display the nature of the mind.  But I have said enough.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to
+render it capable of being affected in an increased number of
+ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of
+ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is
+thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting
+other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise,
+whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is
+hurtful to man.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body
+increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.);
+therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it
+capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and
+is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body
+capable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is
+hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body
+mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a
+change in such proportion is bad.
+
+Proof.--The human body needs many other bodies for its
+preservation (II. Post. iv.).  But that which constitutes the
+specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts
+communicate their several motions one to another in a certain
+fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.).
+Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human
+body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the
+human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of
+being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in
+many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.).  Again,
+whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion
+causes the human body to assume another specific character, in
+other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the
+point is indeed self--evident), to be destroyed, and consequently
+totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of
+ways; therefore it is bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The extent to which such causes can injure or be of
+service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part.  But I
+would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,
+when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually
+among its several parts is changed.  For I do not venture to deny
+that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and
+other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to
+consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally
+different from its own.  There is no reason, which compels me to
+maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse;
+nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.
+It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I
+should hardly call him the same.  As I have heard tell of a
+certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and
+though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his
+past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he
+had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for
+a grown--up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue.  If
+this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A
+man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can
+only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy
+of other men.  However, I prefer to leave such questions
+undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for
+raising new issues.
+
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes
+men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever
+brings discord into a State is bad.
+
+Proof.--For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony
+also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is
+therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)
+whatsoever brings about discord is bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Pleasure in itself is not bad but good:
+contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.
+
+Proof.--Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the
+body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is
+emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or
+checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,
+&c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;
+contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.
+
+Proof.--Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,
+which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all
+parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.),
+the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a
+manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion
+of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),
+and cannot be excessive.  But Melancholy (see its Def. in the
+same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is
+referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or
+hindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV.
+xxxviii.) it is always bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other
+hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is
+bad.
+
+Proof.--Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is
+pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,
+consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the
+rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this
+emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body
+(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus
+rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other
+ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad.  Again, grief,
+which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.).  But, as its
+force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause
+compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees
+and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can,
+therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and
+preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's
+capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  Love and desire may be excessive.
+
+Proof.--Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an
+external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation,
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.
+note); hence love maybe excessive.  Again, the strength of
+desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises
+(III. xxxvii.).  Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's
+actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from
+the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become
+excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning
+stimulation.
+
+Note.--Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived
+more easily than it can be observed.  For the emotions, whereby
+we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the
+body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions
+are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation
+of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and
+although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions--and very few
+are found who are always assailed by one and the same--yet there
+are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately
+fixed.  We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,
+although it be not present, they think they have it before them;
+when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is
+delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with
+love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their
+mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are
+made objects of ridicule.  But when a miser thinks of nothing but
+gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but
+glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are
+generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated.  But,
+in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness,
+though they may not be reckoned among diseases.
+
+PROP. XLV.  Hatred can never be good.
+
+Proof.--When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.
+xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that
+is bad.  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+N.B.  Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred
+towards men.
+
+Corollary I.--Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and
+other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are
+bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.
+
+Corollary II.--Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is
+base, and in a State unjust.  This also is evident from III.
+xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.
+xxxvii. note.
+
+Note.--Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to
+be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference.  For
+laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so
+long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.).
+Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and
+gloomy superstition.  For why is it more lawful to satiate one's
+hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,
+and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else,
+save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,
+nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,
+which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the
+greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the
+perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we
+necessarily partake of the divine nature.  Therefore, to make use
+of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible
+(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is
+the part of a wise man.  I say it is the part of a wise man to
+refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
+drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
+plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
+and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
+his neighbour.  For the human body is composed of very numerous
+parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
+fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
+equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
+the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the
+mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
+simultaneously.  This way of life, then, agrees best with our
+principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there
+be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
+the best, and in every way to be commended.  There is no need for
+me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.
+
+PROP. XLVI.  He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,
+for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.
+
+Proof.--All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.);
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such
+emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to
+prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.).  But hatred is
+increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love
+(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.);
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is
+assuredly wretched.  But he, who strives to conquer hatred with
+love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands
+many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid.
+Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but
+through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow
+so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,
+that I have no need to prove them in detail.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves
+good.
+
+Proof.--Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.
+For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of
+the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without
+fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in
+themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive
+pleasure (IV. xliii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We may add, that these emotions show defective
+knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same
+reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of
+a want of mental power.  For although confidence and joy are
+pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,
+namely, hope and fear.  Wherefore the more we endeavour to be
+guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to
+free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate
+fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  The emotions of over--esteem and disparagement are
+always bad.
+
+Proof.--These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)
+are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)
+bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  Over--esteem is apt to render its object proud.
+
+Proof.--If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's
+sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be
+pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good
+which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and
+therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other
+words, we are apt to become proud.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. L.  Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,
+is in itself bad and useless.
+
+Proof.--Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and
+therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad.  The good effect which
+follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity
+from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the
+dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of
+reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for
+certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under
+the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from
+the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in
+accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not
+find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will
+he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human
+virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to
+rejoice.  We may add, that he, who is easily touched with
+compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does
+something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can
+never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly
+because we are easily deceived by false tears.  I am in this
+place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of
+reason.  He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by
+compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems
+unlike a man.
+
+PROP. LI.  Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree
+therewith and arise therefrom.
+
+Proof.--Approval is love towards one who has done good to
+another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.
+lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands;
+therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Another Proof.--He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.
+xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow
+his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will
+feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the
+benefactor.  Therefore he approves of him.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,
+xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark
+that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace
+punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said
+to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by
+hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.
+
+PROP. LII.  Self--approval may arise from reason, and that which
+arises from reason is the highest possible.
+
+Proof.--Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the
+Emotions, xxv.).  But a man's true power of action or virtue is
+reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and
+distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore
+self--approval arises from reason.  Again, when a man is
+contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly
+or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action
+(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of
+understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the
+highest possible self--approval arise.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Self--approval is in reality the highest object for
+which we can hope.  For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one
+endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior
+object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and
+strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary
+(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame
+becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life
+under disgrace is almost unendurable.
+
+PROP. LIII.  Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason.
+
+Proof.--Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of
+his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.).  But, in so
+far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to
+understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.).
+Wherefore, if a man in self--contemplation perceives any infirmity
+in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but
+(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked.
+But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by
+virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the
+knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this
+is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands
+himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because[14] his power of activity
+is aided.  Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a
+man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the
+contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.
+Q.E.D.
+
+[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which I
+have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
+'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
+
+PROP. LIV.  Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or
+infirm.
+
+Proof.--The first part of this proposition is proved like the
+foregoing one.  The second part is proved from the mere
+definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,
+xxvii.).  For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by
+evil desires; secondly, by pain.
+
+Note.--As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these
+two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and
+Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had
+better sin in that direction.  For, if all men who are a prey to
+emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,
+and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked
+together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant, when it
+is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who
+consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously
+commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence.  Indeed those who
+are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than
+others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become
+free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.
+
+PROP. LV.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance
+of self.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and
+xxix.
+
+PROP. LVI.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme
+infirmity of spirit.
+
+Proof.--The first foundation of virtue is self--preservation
+(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.).
+He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the
+foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues.
+Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of
+reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of
+reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.).
+Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and
+consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue;
+in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit.  Thus
+extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and
+the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.
+
+Note.--Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride;
+for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a
+painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful
+(IV. xviii.).
+
+PROP. LVII.  The proud man delights in the company of flatterers
+and parasites, but hates the company of the high--minded.
+
+Proof.--Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation
+of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this
+estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the
+means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight
+in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is
+too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the
+company of high--minded men, who value him according to his
+deserts.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the
+evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all
+the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity.
+I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may
+be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and,
+therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself
+superior to his fellows.  The dejection, which is the opposite
+quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior
+to his fellows.  Such being the ease, we can easily see that a
+proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes
+pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his
+bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.
+
+Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the
+dejected man very near akin to the proud man.  For, inasmuch as
+his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and
+other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other
+words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in
+contemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb,
+"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow--sufferers."
+Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he
+thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to
+envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's
+actions, with a view to fault--finding rather than correction, in
+order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory
+therein, though all the time with a dejected air.  These effects
+follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from
+the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.  I have already said that I call these and similar
+emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man.  The
+laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man
+is but a part.  I mention this, in passing, lest any should think
+that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds
+of men rather than the nature and properties of things.  For, as
+I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions
+and their properties as on the same footing with other natural
+phenomena.  Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and
+ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as
+other things which we admire, and which we delight to
+contemplate.  But I pass on to note those qualities in the
+emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon
+him.
+
+PROP. LVIII.  Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
+arise therefrom.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and
+also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.
+i.).
+
+Note--Empty honour, as it is styled, is self--approval,
+fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this
+good opinion ceases there ceases also the self--approval, in other
+words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note);
+consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,
+day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain
+his reputation.  For the populace is variable and inconstant, so
+that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.
+Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and
+readily represses the fame of others.  The object of the strife
+being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is
+seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every
+possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more
+proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to
+himself.  This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
+nothing.
+
+The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred
+from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance.  I
+will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,
+is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is
+really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same
+way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not
+mortified.  Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,
+he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no
+desire to live honourably.
+
+Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon
+concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the
+desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good
+or evil emotions.  But all, in so far as they are engendered in
+us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is
+evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be
+useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance
+of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.
+
+PROP. LIX.  To all the actions, whereto we are determined by
+emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined
+without emotion by reason.
+
+Proof.--To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.
+ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the
+necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone.  But pain is
+bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action
+(IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any
+action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance
+of reason.  Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a
+man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this
+extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we
+could not perform under the guidance of reason.  Lastly,
+pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for
+it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is
+increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in
+so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent
+of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his
+actions (III. iii., and note).
+
+Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to
+such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception
+of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,
+capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion
+wherein the mind is passive.  But all emotions are attributable
+to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.
+explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing
+else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Another Proof.--A given action is called bad, in so far as it
+arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.
+But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad
+(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same
+action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the
+action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,
+we may be led by reason (IV. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--An example will put this point in a clearer light.  The
+action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and
+in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his
+arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently
+downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper
+to the structure of the human body.  If, then, a man, moved by
+anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,
+this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one
+and the same action can be associated with various mental images
+of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of
+one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and
+distinct ideas.  Hence it is evident that every desire which
+springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become
+useless, if men could be guided by reason.  Let us now see why
+desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is
+called by us blind.
+
+PROP. LX.  Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not
+attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts
+thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.
+
+Proof.--Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a
+body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails
+over the remaining parts (IV. vi.).  This part will not endeavour
+to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of
+the body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary
+for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own
+powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd.  The said part, and,
+consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its
+condition.  Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind
+aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole.  If it
+be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so
+that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same
+manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to
+a man as a whole.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to
+one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being
+with out taking into consideration our health as a whole: to
+which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over
+us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.
+
+PROP. LXI.  Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
+
+Proof.--Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered
+absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by
+some given modification of itself.  Hence desire, which arises
+from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so
+far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are
+adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.).
+Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered
+in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able
+to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction.  Therefore,
+such desire cannot be excessive.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXII.  In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be
+of a thing future, past, or present.
+
+Proof.--Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of
+reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.
+xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same
+certitude (II. xliii. and note).  Wherefore, whether the thing be
+present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same
+necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether
+the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all
+cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always
+possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.);
+therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether
+the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the
+duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods
+of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same
+emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though
+it were present the good which it conceived as future;
+consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the
+present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would
+in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source
+of evil in the future, as we shall presently show.  However, we
+can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of
+things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II.
+xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not
+so powerfully affected by the future as by the present.  Hence
+such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely
+abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order
+of things and the connection of causes, with a view to
+determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather
+imaginary than real.  Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the
+desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the
+desire of things which are agreeable at the present time.  (Cf.
+IV. xvi.)
+
+PROP. LXIII.  He who is led by fear, and does good in order to
+escape evil, is not led by reason.
+
+Proof.--All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as
+active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and
+desire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does
+good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.
+
+Note.--Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at
+vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by
+reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape
+evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as
+wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if
+they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow--men.
+
+Corollary.--Under desire which springs from reason, we seek
+good directly, and shun evil indirectly.
+
+Proof.--Desire which springs from reason can only spring from
+a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III.
+lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive
+(IV. lxi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs
+from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under
+the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by
+implication shun evil.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a
+sick and a healthy man.  The sick man through fear of death eats
+what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes
+pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of
+life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to
+avoid it.  So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from
+hatred or anger but from love of the public well--being, is guided
+solely by reason.
+
+PROP. LXIV.  The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.
+
+Proof.--The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far
+as we are conscious thereof.  Now pain is the transition to a
+lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore
+cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi., and vii.);
+therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.)
+depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof
+(II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed
+only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.
+
+PROP. LXV.  Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the
+greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.
+
+Proof.--A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good
+is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to
+things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see
+preface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser
+good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only
+the greater good and the lesser evil.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the
+lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun
+the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.
+For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,
+and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the
+former and shun the latter.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXVI.  We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater
+good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,
+and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a
+greater evil in the future.[15]
+
+[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
+Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
+alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
+misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
+boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+
+
+Proof.--If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things
+future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same
+way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking
+merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,
+there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be
+assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we
+may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser
+good in the present, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a
+lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater
+good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,
+because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.  This
+Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the
+Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.
+
+Note.--If these statements be compared with what we have
+pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part
+up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a
+man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is
+led by reason.  The former, whether will or no, performs actions
+whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and
+only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance
+in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the
+former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose
+disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few
+observations.
+
+PROP. LXVII.  A free man thinks of death least of all things;
+and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
+
+Proof.--A free man is one who lives under the guidance of
+reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly
+desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words
+(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his
+being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore
+such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom
+is a meditation of life.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXVIII.  If men were born free, they would, so long as they
+remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
+
+Proof.--I call free him who is led solely by reason; he,
+therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only
+adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no
+conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being
+correlative) of good.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of
+this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as
+we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so
+far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the
+cause of man's existence.
+
+This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
+have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.
+For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save
+that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he
+provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God
+forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of
+good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,
+he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.
+Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in
+entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be
+nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that
+after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway
+began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his
+freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the
+patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of
+God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire
+for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have
+shown above (IV. xxxvii.).
+
+PROP. LXIX.  The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,
+when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
+
+Proof.--Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion
+contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining
+emotion (IV. vii.).  But blind daring and fear are emotions,
+which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.):
+hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring
+than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
+when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as
+in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of
+mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
+
+Note.--What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,
+I explained in III. lix. note.  By danger I mean everything,
+which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,
+&c.
+
+PROP. LXX.  The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,
+as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
+
+Proof.--Everyone judges what is good according to his
+disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who
+has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon
+it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the
+receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.).  But the free man only
+desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not
+repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,
+but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,
+and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
+importance.  Therefore the free man, lest he should become
+hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than
+reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving
+their favours.
+
+Note.--I say, as far as he can.  For though men be ignorant,
+yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human
+aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often
+necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay
+such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in
+declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of
+despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious
+motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for
+offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it.  Thus, in
+declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility
+and courtesy.
+
+PROP. LXXI.  Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to
+another.
+
+Proof.--Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,
+and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of
+friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,
+with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one
+to another.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire
+have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,
+rather than pure goodwill.  Moreover, ingratitude is not an
+emotion.  Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a
+man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c.
+He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,
+is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the
+gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal
+his thefts, or by any similar persons.  Contrariwise, such an one
+shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be
+corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.
+
+PROP. LXXII.  The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
+good faith.
+
+Proof.--If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a
+case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the
+danger of present death? Would not his plan of self--preservation
+completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by
+pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would
+persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason
+would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their
+forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any
+general laws, which is absurd.
+
+PROP. LXXIII.  The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in
+a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in
+solitude, where he is independent.
+
+Proof.--The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey
+through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to
+preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is
+(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,
+he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.
+ii.), to live according to the laws of his country.  Therefore
+the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to
+possess the general rights of citizenship.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--These and similar observations, which we have made on
+man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to
+courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note).  I do not
+think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of
+strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no
+man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no
+man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud.  These
+propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and
+religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.;
+namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every
+man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.
+We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.
+l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever
+first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity
+of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful
+and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,
+horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his
+own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.
+Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they
+really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such
+as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar
+emotions, which I have mentioned above.  Thus he endeavours, as
+we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on
+his way rejoicing.  How far human virtue is capable of attaining
+to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in
+the following Part.
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+
+What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life
+has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,
+but has been set forth piece--meal, according as I thought each
+Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.
+I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
+under leading heads.
+
+I.  All our endeavours or desires so follow from the
+necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either
+through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our
+being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived
+through itself without other individuals.
+
+II.  Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,
+that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to
+consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only
+referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things
+inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined
+not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to
+us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter
+passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,
+on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
+
+III.  Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
+by man's power or reason, are always good.  The rest may be
+either good or bad.
+
+IV.  Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect
+the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone
+man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed
+blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which
+arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the
+understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's
+attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of
+his nature.  Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the
+ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all
+his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate
+conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his
+intelligence.
+
+V.  Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational
+life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his
+enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by
+intelligence.  Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's
+perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational
+life, are alone called evil.
+
+VI.  As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are
+necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external
+causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal
+nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to
+conform to in almost infinite ways.
+
+VII.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if
+he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with
+his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,
+whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in
+harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate
+himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.
+
+VIII.  Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be
+capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the
+rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems
+safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good
+or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the
+rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we
+think best.  Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right
+of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.
+
+IX.  Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any
+given thing than other individuals of the same species;
+therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and
+the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful
+than his fellow--man who is led by reason.  Further, as we know
+not anything among individual things which is more excellent than
+a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his
+skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at
+last to live under the dominion of their own reason.
+
+X.  In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of
+hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are
+therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful
+than their fellows.
+
+XI.  Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and
+high--mindedness.
+
+XII.  It is before all things useful to men to associate
+their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds
+as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and
+generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.
+
+XIII.  But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.
+For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the
+guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and
+more prone to revenge than to sympathy.  No small force of
+character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to
+restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others.  But
+those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at
+vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than
+strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and
+others.  Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from
+misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes
+rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably
+endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and
+choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
+preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their
+father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as
+they may spite their parents.
+
+XIV.  Therefore, although men are generally governed in
+everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common
+brings many more advantages than drawbacks.  Wherefore it is
+better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive
+to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and
+friendship.
+
+XV.  Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are
+attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living.  For men
+brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is
+reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received
+customs of their society.  For winning love those qualities are
+especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.
+IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).
+
+XVI.  Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such
+harmony is insecure.  Further, fear arises from infirmity of
+spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the
+same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a
+certain resemblance to piety.
+
+XVII.  Men are also gained over by liberality, especially
+such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain
+life.  However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the
+power and the advantage of any private person.  For the riches of
+any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.
+Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited
+for him to be able to make all men his friends.  Hence providing
+for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and
+has regard only to the general advantage.
+
+XVIII.  In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our
+duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).
+
+XIX.  Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of
+generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort
+of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,
+readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a
+species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than
+harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).
+
+XX.  As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in
+harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not
+engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to
+beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the
+love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused
+by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.
+
+XXI.  Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by
+means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery.  None are
+more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be
+first, but are not.
+
+XXII.  There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety
+and religion.  Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet
+is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.
+note).
+
+XXIII.  Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such
+matters as cannot be hid.  Further, as shame is a species of
+pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.
+
+XXIV.  The remaining emotions of pain towards men are
+directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;
+and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance
+to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass
+judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's
+rights.
+
+XXV.  Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire
+of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to
+piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.).  But, if it spring
+from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under
+the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and
+seditions.  For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word
+or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,
+I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:
+not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called
+after his name, nor to give any cause for envy.  Further, in his
+conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and
+will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but
+he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way
+whereby it may be perfected.  Thus will men be stirred not by
+fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to
+endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to
+reason.
+
+XXVI.  Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature
+in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with
+ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,
+whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our
+advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or
+destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to
+our use as best we may.
+
+XXVII.  The advantage which we derive from things external to
+us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from
+observing them, and from recombining their elements in different
+forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this
+point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and
+nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their
+functions.  For, in proportion as the body is capable of being
+affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external
+bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind
+capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.).  But there seem to be
+very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due
+nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.
+For the human body is composed of very many parts of different
+nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so
+that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything
+that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the
+mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.
+
+XXVIII.  Now for providing these nourishments the strength of
+each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one
+another mutual aid.  But money has furnished us with a token for
+everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind
+of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly
+conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the
+idea of money as cause.
+
+XXIX.  This result is the fault only of those, who seek
+money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but
+because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring
+themselves to great splendour.  Certainly they nourish their
+bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they
+lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of
+their body.  But they who know the true use of money, and who fix
+the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,
+live content with little.
+
+XXX.  As, therefore, those things are good which assist the
+various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their
+functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid
+to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;
+it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.
+But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us
+pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit
+our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred
+to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore
+most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at
+hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become
+excessive.  Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most
+regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate
+what is future with emotions equally vivid.  (IV. xliv. note, and
+lx. note.)
+
+XXXI.  Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as
+good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.
+However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious
+take delight in my infirmity and trouble.  For the greater the
+pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection
+whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the
+divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated
+by a true regard for our advantage.  But contrariwise he, who is
+led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by
+reason.
+
+XXXII.  But human power is extremely limited, and is
+infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have
+not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those
+things which are without us.  Nevertheless, we shall bear with an
+equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims
+of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have
+done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not
+sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;
+remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we
+follow her order.  If we have a clear and distinct understanding
+of this, that part of our nature which is defined by
+intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will
+assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence
+will endeavour to persist.  For, in so far as we are intelligent
+beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,
+nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which
+is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding
+of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is
+in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.
+
+
+
+PART V:
+
+Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+
+At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which
+is concerned with the way leading to freedom.  I shall therefore
+treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the
+reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental
+Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much
+more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.  It is no part
+of my design to point out the method and means whereby the
+understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the
+body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of
+its functions.  The latter question lies in the province of
+Medicine, the former in the province of Logic.  Here, therefore,
+I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of
+reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its
+dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.
+That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have
+already shown.  Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions
+depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely
+govern them.  But these philosophers were compelled, by the
+protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
+that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and
+moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the
+example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house--dog
+and the other a hunting--dog.  For by long training it could be
+brought about, that the house--dog should become accustomed to
+hunt, and the hunting--dog to cease from running after hares.  To
+this opinion Descartes not a little inclines.  For he maintained,
+that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of
+the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the
+aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which
+are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which
+the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various
+ways.  He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst
+of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of
+the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the
+midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal
+spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different
+marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different
+external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;
+whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the
+gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once
+before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the
+gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
+determining them to the condition wherein they were, when
+repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.  He further
+asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature
+to a certain given motion of the gland.  For instance, whenever
+anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition
+causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in
+question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the
+mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,
+inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the
+animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would
+dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with
+the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to
+look at remote or very near objects.  Lastly, he maintained that,
+although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been
+united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole
+number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet
+it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
+other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de
+l'ame, I.50.  He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,
+that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power
+over its passions.  For passions as defined by him are
+"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are
+referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)
+are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement
+of the spirits." (Passions de l'ame, I.27).  But, seeing that we
+can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,
+to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely
+on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with
+sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our
+actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which
+we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an
+absolute dominion over our passions.  Such is the doctrine of
+this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his
+own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could
+hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man.  Indeed, I
+am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,
+that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from
+self--evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not
+clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to
+task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through
+occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which
+occult qualities are commonplace.  What does he understand, I
+ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and
+distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union
+with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like
+him to explain this union through its proximate cause.  But he
+had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,
+that he could not assign any particular cause of the union
+between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have
+recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.
+Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the
+mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it
+hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can
+be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the
+animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we
+have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again
+disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would
+follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given
+danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,
+yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended
+in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything
+except running away.  In truth, as there is no common standard of
+volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between
+the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;
+consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined
+by the strength of the other.  We may also add, that there is no
+gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it
+can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that
+all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the
+brain.  Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes
+concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have
+abundantly proved that his premisses are false.  Therefore, since
+the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the
+understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of
+the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all
+have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or
+distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those
+conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
+
+
+AXIOMS.
+
+I.  If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a
+change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of
+the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.
+
+II.  The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,
+in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence
+of its cause.
+
+(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
+and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or
+the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
+associated in the body.
+
+Proof.--The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.
+vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versa the
+order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and
+vii.) as the order and connection of ideas.  Wherefore, even as
+the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place
+according to the order and association of modifications of the
+body (II. xviii.), so vice versa (III. ii.) the order and
+connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance
+with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are
+arranged and associated in the mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. II.  If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,
+from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other
+thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external
+cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these
+emotions, be destroyed.
+
+Proof.--That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,
+is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is
+removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;
+therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are
+destroyed.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. III.  An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a
+passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
+
+Proof.--An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by
+the general Def. of the Emotions).  If, therefore, we form a
+clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only
+be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to
+the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III.
+iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary--An emotion therefore becomes more under our
+control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in
+proportion as it is more known to us.
+
+PROP. IV.  There is no modification of the body, whereof we
+cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
+
+Proof.--Properties which are common to all things can only be
+conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and
+Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,
+whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
+we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.  For an
+emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general
+Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding
+Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.
+
+Note.--Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
+an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
+understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
+(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
+distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
+absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
+about, that he should become less subject to them.  To attain
+this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
+acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
+every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
+be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
+distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
+that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
+external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence
+it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
+destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
+are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
+being excessive (IV. lxi.).  For it must be especially remarked,
+that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
+that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.
+For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
+that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his own
+fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by
+reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
+does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives
+by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
+called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof).  In like
+manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
+they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
+accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
+adequate ideas.  For all desires, whereby we are determined to
+any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
+inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).  Than this remedy for the emotions
+(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in
+a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
+our power, can be devised.  For the mind has no other power save
+that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
+above (III. iii.).
+
+PROP. V.  An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
+and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
+conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
+
+Proof.--An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be
+free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be
+necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one
+towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).
+But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to
+conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes
+whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);
+therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply
+is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel
+towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,
+consequently, it is the greatest of all.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
+less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
+necessary.
+
+Proof.--The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
+xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an
+infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing
+Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less
+subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)
+feels less emotion towards the things themselves.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
+applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly
+and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the
+emotions, as experience also testifies.  For we see, that the
+pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as
+the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means
+have been preserved.  So also we see that no one pities an
+infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,
+because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.
+Whereas, if most people were born full--grown and only one here
+and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because
+infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and
+necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may
+note several other instances of the same sort.
+
+PROP. VII.  Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
+we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
+attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
+
+Proof.--We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the
+emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,
+being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the
+said thing (II. xvii.).  Wherefore, the emotion, which is
+referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a
+nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.
+vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
+controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
+external cause (IV. ix.).  But an emotion which springs from
+reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things
+(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always
+regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their
+present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
+manner (II. xxxviii.).  Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
+remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which
+are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external
+causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
+until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the
+emotion which springs from reason is more powerful.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VIII.  An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
+of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
+
+Proof.--Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
+(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
+number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
+becomes stronger.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note--This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.
+
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
+causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
+itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
+affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
+and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
+single cause.
+
+Proof.--An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
+hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);
+therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
+contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
+another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
+the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is
+unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.
+Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.
+vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less
+passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of
+several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
+emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few
+or of a single object: this was our second point.  Lastly, this
+emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to
+several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. X.  So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
+our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
+
+Proof.--The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that
+is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede
+the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.).  So long, therefore, as
+we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the
+mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.
+xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear
+and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.
+note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such
+cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of
+the body according to the intellectual order.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--By this power of rightly arranging and associating the
+bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily
+affected by evil emotions.  For (V. vii.) a greater force is
+needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and
+associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,
+are uncertain and unsettled.  The best we can do, therefore, so
+long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is
+to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,
+to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the
+particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
+that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that
+it may be always ready to our hand.  For instance, we have laid
+down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred
+should be overcome with love or high--mindedness, and not required
+with hatred in return.  Now, that this precept of reason may be
+always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think
+over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and
+in what manner and way they may be best warded off by
+high--mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with
+the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready
+for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.).  If we keep also
+in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
+which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
+further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result
+of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than
+everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such
+case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises
+therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and
+will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a
+grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be
+overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner
+than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand.  As
+is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii.  We should, in the same
+way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the
+ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and
+imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of
+resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.
+But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions
+we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
+individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order
+that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of
+pleasure.  For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
+pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for
+which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain
+it.  Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the
+fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
+through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do
+the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of
+gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving
+vent to their anger would fain appear wise.  Wherefore it is
+certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of
+honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily
+covet it.  This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common
+to all who are ill--used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.
+For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the
+misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely
+torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not
+only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches.  So,
+again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love
+think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock
+faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,
+directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.
+Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the
+love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of
+the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy
+which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise
+desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
+revel in a false show of freedom.  Whosoever will diligently
+observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
+difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for
+the most part, to direct his actions according to the
+commandments of reason.
+
+[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
+that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
+
+PROP. XI.  In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
+objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and
+occupies the mind more.
+
+Proof.--In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is
+referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can
+be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
+contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;
+therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in
+full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XII.  The mental images of things are more easily
+associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
+and distinctly understand, than with others.
+
+Proof.--Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,
+are either the common properties of things or deductions
+therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are
+consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.
+Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate
+other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
+something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of
+the said things should be more often associated with the images
+of these than with the images of something else.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as
+it is associated with a greater number of other images.
+
+Proof.--In proportion as an image is associated with a greater
+number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
+whereby it can be aroused.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIV.  The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
+modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of
+God.
+
+Proof.--There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind
+may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);
+wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred
+to the idea of God (I. xv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
+more understands himself and his emotions.
+
+Proof.--He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is
+(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the
+same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more
+understands himself and his emotions.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  This love towards God must hold the chief place in
+the mind.
+
+Proof.--For this love is associated with all the modifications
+of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);
+therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  God is without passions, neither is he affected by
+any emotion of pleasure or pain.
+
+Proof.--All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
+true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and
+therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without
+passions.  Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a
+lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of
+the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
+pleasure or pain.
+
+Corollary.--Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate
+anyone.  For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any
+emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,
+vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  No one can hate God.
+
+Proof.--The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect
+(II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,
+we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be
+no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
+
+Note.--It may be objected that, as we understand God as the
+cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause
+of pain.  But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the
+causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a
+passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore,
+in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to
+that extent feel pleasure.
+
+PROP. XIX.  He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should
+love him in return.
+
+Proof.--For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.
+xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
+consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is
+absurd (III. xxviii.).  Therefore, he who loves God, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion
+of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to
+God by the same bond of love.
+
+Proof.--This love towards God is the highest good which we can
+seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common
+to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice
+therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),
+it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of
+jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note);
+but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
+therein.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion
+directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be
+destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God
+is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as
+it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the
+body be destroyed also.  As to its nature, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
+
+I have now gone through all the remedies against the
+emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can
+do against them.  Whence it appears that the mind's power over
+the emotions consists:----
+
+I.  In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).
+
+II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the
+thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.
+ii. and V. iv. note).
+
+III.  In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions
+referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those
+referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner
+(V. vii.).
+
+IV.  In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]
+are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of
+things or to God (V. ix. xi.).
+
+[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus----emotions.
+
+
+V.  Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and
+associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and
+xii. xiii. xiv.).
+
+But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
+may be better understood, it should be specially observed that
+the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion
+of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is
+more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are
+comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,
+and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than
+by another.  For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
+comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.
+Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
+infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge
+only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
+whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it
+may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by
+its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active,
+whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,
+although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former
+mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas
+attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human
+infirmity.  Again, it must be observed, that spiritual
+unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to
+excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,
+and which we can never become masters of.  For no one is
+solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;
+neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in
+regard to things whereof no one can be really master.
+
+We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and
+distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge
+(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,
+possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy
+them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at
+any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind
+(V. xiv.).  Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable
+and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession
+(II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which
+are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to
+strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and
+deeply penetrate it.
+
+And now I have finished with all that concerns this present
+life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have
+briefly described all the remedies against the emotions.  And
+this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has
+attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the
+definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to
+Propositions i. and iii. of Part III.  It is now, therefore, time
+to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of
+the mind, without relation to the body.
+
+PROP. XXI.  The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
+is past, while the body endures.
+
+Proof.--The mind does not express the actual existence of its
+body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as
+actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and,
+consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine
+any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.
+Thus it
+cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.
+xvii. note),
+or remember things past, except while the body endures (see
+definition of Memory, II. xviii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,
+which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the
+form of eternity.
+
+Proof.--God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or
+that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.).  This
+essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the
+very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a
+certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must
+necessarily exist in God (II. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
+the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.
+
+Proof.--There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which
+expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,
+therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence
+of the human mind (II. xiii.).  But we have not assigned to the
+human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as
+it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained
+through duration, and may be defined by time--that is (II. viii.
+Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
+endures.  Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
+conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
+of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the
+essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--This idea, which expresses the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode
+of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
+necessarily eternal.  Yet it is not possible that we should
+remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear
+no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in
+terms of time, or have any relation to time.  But,
+notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal.  For the
+mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no
+less than those things that it remembers.  For the eyes of the
+mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than
+proofs.  Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before
+the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the
+essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and
+that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or
+explained through duration.  Thus our mind can only be said to
+endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in
+so far as it involves the actual existence of the body.  Thus far
+only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
+time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The more we understand particular things, the more
+do we understand God.
+
+Proof.--This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.
+
+PROP. XXV.  The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
+virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
+
+Proof.--The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
+idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
+essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,
+in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
+understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or
+nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to
+understand things by the third kind of knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  In proportion as the mind is more capable of
+understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
+more to understand things by that kind.
+
+Proof--This is evident.  For, in so far as we conceive the
+mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of
+knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to
+conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
+the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable
+thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  From this third kind of knowledge arises the
+highest possible mental acquiescence.
+
+Proof.--The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.
+xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge
+(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind
+knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):
+consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge
+passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
+of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such
+pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own
+virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of
+knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The endeavour or desire to know things by the
+third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the
+second kind of knowledge.
+
+Proof.--This proposition is self--evident.  For whatsoever we
+understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
+itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that
+is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are
+referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)
+cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and
+are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from
+adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of
+knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of
+knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from
+the first, but from the second kind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
+eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the
+present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving
+the essence of the body under the form of eternity.
+
+Proof.--In so far as the mind conceives the present existence
+of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be
+determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of
+conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.).  But
+eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
+and explanation).  Therefore to this extent the mind has not the
+power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it
+possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to
+conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
+ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to
+conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
+xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to
+the essence of mind (II. xiii.).  Therefore this power of
+conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the
+mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as
+existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in
+God and following from the necessity of the divine nature.
+Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we
+conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the
+eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and
+note, which see.
+
+PROP. XXX.  Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body
+under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a
+knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived
+through God.
+
+Proof.--Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this
+involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.).  Therefore to
+conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things
+in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as
+real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the
+essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
+itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that
+extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
+its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
+
+Proof.--The mind does not conceive anything under the form of
+eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
+form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is
+eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so
+far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which
+knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,
+in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything
+which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in
+other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge
+(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind
+(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or
+formal cause of such knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in
+this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of
+himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and
+blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel.  But we must
+here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind
+is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of
+eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more
+readily explained and better understood, we will consider the
+mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to
+understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have
+done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so
+long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our
+premisses are plain.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of
+knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by
+the idea of God as cause.
+
+Proof.--From this kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,
+xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea
+of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the
+idea also of God as cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--From the third kind of knowledge necessarily
+arises the intellectual love of God.  From this kind of knowledge
+arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as
+we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we
+understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the
+intellectual love of God.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  The intellectual love of God, which arises from
+the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
+
+Proof.--The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.
+Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises
+therefrom is also necessarily eternal.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing
+Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of
+love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.
+of the last Prop.  Nor is there here any difference, except that
+the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we
+feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of
+God as eternal cause.  If pleasure consists in the transition to
+a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the
+mind being endowed with perfection itself.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  The mind is, only while the body endures, subject
+to those emotions which are attributable to passions.
+
+Proof.--Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind
+contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea
+indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than
+the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).
+Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,
+in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;
+therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,
+subject to emotions which are attributable to passions.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that no love save intellectual
+love is eternal.
+
+Note.--If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that
+they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that
+they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the
+imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after
+death.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  God loves himself with an infinite intellectual
+love.
+
+Proof.--God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.
+Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;
+and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of
+himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause:
+now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as
+intellectual love.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  The intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as
+he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the
+essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;
+in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.
+
+Proof.--This love of the mind must be referred to the
+activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is
+itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself
+accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.);
+that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity
+whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human
+mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;
+therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of
+the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves
+himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God
+towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God
+are identical.
+
+Note.--From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein
+our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in
+the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love
+towards men.  This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called
+Glory, and not undeservedly.  For whether this love be referred
+to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of
+spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really
+distinguished from glory.  In so far as it is referred to God, it
+is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,
+accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).
+
+Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in
+knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.
+xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner
+and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from
+the divine nature and constantly depends on God.  I have thought
+it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show
+by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I
+have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),
+is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which
+I have styled knowledge of the second kind.  For, although in
+Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and
+consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence
+and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate
+and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind
+so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual
+essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to
+this intellectual love, or which can take it away.
+
+Proof.--This intellectual love follows necessarily from the
+nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through
+the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).
+If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary
+to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;
+consequently, that, which should be able to take away this
+love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious
+absurdity.  Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular
+things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given
+time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  In proportion as the mind understands more things
+by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to
+those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
+
+Proof.--The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);
+therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by
+the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
+part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently
+(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not
+touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in
+other words, evil (IV. xxx.).  Thus, in proportion as the mind
+understands more things by the second and third kinds of
+knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains
+unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Hence we understand that point which I touched on in
+IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;
+namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the
+mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,
+consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more.  Again,
+since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind
+can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which
+we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of
+little importance when compared with the part which endures.  But
+I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part
+is eternal.
+
+Proof.--He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which
+are evil (IV. xxxviii.)--that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions
+which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he
+possesses the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,
+and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the
+modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;
+whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected
+with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute
+the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man
+will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number
+of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a
+nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great
+knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or
+chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely
+fear death.  But, in order that this may be understood more
+clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of
+perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the
+better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.
+
+For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a
+corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness,
+if we have been able to live through the whole period of life
+with a sound mind in a sound body.  And, in reality, he, who, as
+in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very
+few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external
+causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely
+conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who
+has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,
+considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of
+God, and of things.  In this life, therefore, we primarily
+endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far
+as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into
+something else capable of very many activities, and referable to
+a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things;
+and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its
+imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison
+with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the
+last Proposition.
+
+PROP. XL.  In proportion as each thing possesses more of
+perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice
+versa, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
+
+Proof.--In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it
+possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.
+iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less
+passive.  This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove
+that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more
+perfect.  Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.--Hence it follows that the part of the mind which
+endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.
+For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the
+understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.);
+the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.
+xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.
+and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it
+great or small, is more perfect than the latter.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set
+forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without
+relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other
+places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,
+is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another
+eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to
+infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the
+eternal and infinite intellect of God.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we
+should still consider as of primary importance piety and
+religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed
+to be attributable to courage and high--mindedness.
+
+Proof.--The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule
+of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's
+own true interest.  Now, while we determined what reason
+prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity,
+which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part.  Although
+we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we
+nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage
+and high--mindedness are of primary importance.  Therefore, even
+if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the
+aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--The general belief of the multitude seems to be
+different.  Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so
+far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their
+rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the
+commandments of the divine law.  They therefore believe that
+piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to
+firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to
+lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,
+for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but
+also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after
+death, that they are induced to live according to the divine
+commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry
+them.
+
+If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the
+mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life
+remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of
+piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling
+everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey
+fortune rather than themselves.  Such a course appears to me not
+less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he
+can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to
+cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he
+sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer
+to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of
+reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth
+refuting.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue
+itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our
+lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able
+to control our lusts.
+
+Proof.--Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and
+note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.
+xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active;
+therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself.  This was our
+first point.  Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in
+this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand
+(V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power
+has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is
+it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or
+blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts.  And,
+since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in
+the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in
+blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,
+contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this
+blessedness itself.  Q.E.D.
+
+Note.--I have thus completed all I wished to set forth
+touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's
+freedom.  Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how
+much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his
+lusts.  For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various
+ways by external causes without ever gaining the true
+acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were
+unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as
+he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
+
+Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
+scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
+himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
+necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
+acquiescence of his spirit.
+
+If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result
+seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered.  Needs
+must it be hard, since it is so seldom found.  How would it be
+possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without
+great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men
+neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are
+rare.
+
+
+End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+
+[1] "Affectiones"
+
+[2] "Forma"
+
+[3] "Animata"
+
+[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
+
+[5] Conscientiae morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
+
+[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
+whom we regard without any particular emotion.
+
+[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
+"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.
+
+[8] See previous endnote.
+
+[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.
+
+  "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
+
+  Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."
+
+[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
+intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
+
+[11] Gloria.
+
+[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
+
+[13] Honestas
+
+[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which I
+have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
+'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
+
+[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
+Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
+alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
+misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
+boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+
+[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
+that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
+I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be
+obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholarship.
+
+[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus----emotions.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
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+The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
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+Title:  The Ethics
+(Full Title In Latin:  Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
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+Author:  Benedict de Spinoza
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+Translator R. H. M. Elwes
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+This etext was produced by Tom Sharpe
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+please get the ethic10w.doc or ethic10w.zip file.
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+
+
+The Ethics
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+
+
+
+Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+
+
+
+PART I. CONCERNING GOD.
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+I.  By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the
+essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
+conceivable as existent.
+
+II.  A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be
+limited by another thing of the same nature ; for instance, a
+body is called finite because we always conceive another greater
+body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a
+body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
+
+III.  By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself : in other words, that of which a
+conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
+
+IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
+constituting the essence of substance.
+
+V.  By mode, I mean the modifications1 of substance, or that
+which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than
+itself.
+
+VI.  By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite-that is, a
+substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
+expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.
+    Explanation-I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its
+kind : for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
+attributes may be denied ; but that which is absolutely infinite,
+contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves
+no negation.
+
+VII.  That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
+necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is
+determined by itself alone.  On the other hand, that thing is
+necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by
+something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of
+existence or action.
+
+VIII.  By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
+conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
+that which is eternal.
+    Explanation-Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
+truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
+explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may
+be conceived without a beginning or end.
+
+
+AXIOMS.
+
+I.  Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else.
+
+II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
+conceived through itself.
+
+III.  From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows ;
+and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
+impossible that an effect can follow.
+
+IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
+knowledge of a cause.
+
+V.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
+one by means of the other ; the conception of one does not
+involve the conception of the other.
+
+VI.  A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
+
+VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence
+does not involve existence.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
+    Proof.-This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
+
+PROP. II.  Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
+nothing in common.
+    Proof.-Also evident from Def. iii.  For each must exist in
+itself, and be conceived through itself ; in other words, the
+conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.
+
+PROP. III.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
+cause of the other.
+    Proof.-If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
+cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
+therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IV.  Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from
+the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
+substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
+    Proof.-Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else (Ax. i.),-that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing
+is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and
+its modifications.  Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
+understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one
+from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see
+Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  There cannot exist in the universe two or more
+substances having the same nature or attribute.
+    Proof.-If several distinct substances be granted, they must
+be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
+their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
+(Prop. iv.).  If only by the difference of their attributes, it
+will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
+identical attribute.  If by the difference of their
+modifications-as substance is naturally prior to its
+modifications (Prop. i.),-it follows that setting the
+modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is
+truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one
+substance different from another,-that is (by Prop. iv.), there
+cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
+    Proof.-It is impossible that there should be in the universe
+two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have
+anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.
+iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be
+produced by the other.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that a substance cannot be
+produced by anything external to itself.  For in the universe
+nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as
+appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.).  Now (by the last
+Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,
+therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself. 
+Q.E.D.  This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the
+contradictory.  For, if substance be produced by an external
+cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its
+cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be
+substance.
+
+PROP. VII.  Existence belongs to the nature of substances.
+    Proof.-Substance cannot be produced by anything external
+(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause-that
+is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence
+belongs to its nature.
+
+PROP. VIII.  Every substance is necessarily infinite.
+    Proof.-There can only be one substance with an identical
+attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.) ;
+its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or
+infinite.  It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it
+would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which
+would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.) ; and there would be
+two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd
+(Prop. v.).  It therefore exists as infinite.  Q.E.D.
+    Note I.-As finite existence involves a partial negation, and
+infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given
+nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance
+is necessarily infinite.
+    Note II.-No doubt it will be difficult for those who think
+about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them
+by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.
+vii. : for such persons make no distinction between the
+modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and
+are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced ; hence
+they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe
+in natural objects.  Those who are ignorant of true causes, make
+complete confusion-think that trees might talk just as well as
+men-that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed ;
+and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
+also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,
+readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long
+as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.  But, if
+people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no
+doubt about the truth of Prop. vii.  In fact, this proposition
+would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.  For, by
+substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself-that is, something of which the
+conception requires not the conception of anything else ; whereas
+modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a
+conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the
+thing in which they exist.  Therefore, we may have true ideas of
+non-existent modifications ; for, although they may have no
+actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their
+essence is so involved in something external to themselves that
+they may through it be conceived.  Whereas the only truth
+substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in
+their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. 
+Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and
+distinct-that is, a true-idea of a substance, but that he is not
+sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he
+said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it
+was false (a little consideration will make this plain) ; or if
+anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same
+as saying that a false idea was true-in short, the height of
+absurdity.  It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
+existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth.  And
+we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning-that there
+is but one such substance.  I think that this may profitably be
+done at once ; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
+demonstration, we must premise :-
+    1.  The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
+expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined.  From
+this it follows that-
+    2.  No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
+individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature
+of the thing defined.  For instance, the definition of a triangle
+expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle : it
+does not imply any fixed number of triangles.
+    3.  There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a
+cause why it should exist.
+    4.  This cause of existence must either be contained in the
+nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated
+apart from such definition.
+    It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual
+things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the
+existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less.  For
+example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's
+sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have
+had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of
+these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of
+human existence in general ; we must also show why there are
+exactly twenty men, neither more nor less : for a cause must be
+assigned for the existence of each individual.  Now this cause
+cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true
+definition of man does not involve any consideration of the
+number twenty.  Consequently, the cause for the existence of
+these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must
+necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may
+lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of
+several individuals must have an external cause.  And, as it has
+been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of
+substance, existence must necessarily be included in its
+definition ; and from its definition alone existence must be
+deducible.  But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii.,
+iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances ;
+therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same
+nature.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IX.  The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the
+number of its attributes (Def. iv.).
+
+PROP. X.  Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
+conceived through itself.
+    Proof.-An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of
+substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,
+therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note-It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in
+fact, conceived as distinct-that is, one without the help of the
+other-yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two
+entities, or two different substances.  For it is the nature of
+substance that each of its attributes is conceived through
+itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
+simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other ;
+but each expresses the reality or being of substance.  It is,
+then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one
+substance : for nothing in nature is more clear than that each
+and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that
+its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its
+attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. 
+Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite
+being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite
+attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and
+infinite essence.
+    If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to
+distinguish different substances, let him read the following
+propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the
+universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a
+sign would be sought in vain.
+
+PROP. XI.  God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,
+of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
+necessarily exists.
+    Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God
+does not exist : then his essence does not involve existence. 
+But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd.  Therefore God necessarily
+exists.
+    Another proof.-Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason
+must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its
+non-existence-e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be
+granted for its existence ; if, on the contrary, it does not
+exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from
+existing, or annuls its existence.  This reason or cause must
+either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be
+external to it.  For instance, the reason for the non-existence
+of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it
+would involve a contradiction.  On the other hand, the existence
+of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its
+nature involves existence.  (See Prop. vii.)
+    But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle
+does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the
+order of universal nature in extension.  From the latter it must
+follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
+impossible that it should exist.  So much is self-evident.  It
+follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or
+reason be granted which prevents its existence.
+    If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
+existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
+certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist.  If such a
+reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the
+very nature of God, or be external to him-that is, drawn from
+another substance of another nature.  For if it were of the same
+nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist.  But
+substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God
+(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or
+to destroy his existence.
+    As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
+existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine
+nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn
+from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction.  To
+make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and
+supremely perfect is absurd ; therefore, neither in the nature of
+God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be
+assigned which would annul his existence.  Therefore, God
+necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.
+    Another proof.-The potentiality of non-existence is a
+negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence
+is a power, as is obvious.  If, then, that which necessarily
+exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more
+powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously
+absurd ; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
+absolutely infinite necessarily exists also.  Now we exist either
+in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see
+Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.).  Therefore a being absolutely
+infinite-in other words, God (Def. vi.)-necessarily exists. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's
+existence à posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily
+followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence
+does not follow à priori.  For, as the potentiality of existence
+is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases
+in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength
+for existence.  Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as
+God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence,
+and hence he does absolutely exist.  Perhaps there will be many
+who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as
+they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from
+external causes.  Of such things, they see that those which
+quickly come to pass-that is, quickly come into existence-quickly
+also disappear ; whereas they regard as more difficult of
+accomplishment-that is, not so easily brought into
+existence-those things which they conceive as more complicated.
+    However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here
+show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly,
+goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of
+universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise : I
+need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which
+come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of
+substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any
+external cause.  Things which are produced by external causes,
+whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever
+perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of
+their external cause ;  and therefore their existence arises
+solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from
+their own.  Contrrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by
+substance is due to no external cause ; wherefore the existence
+of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is
+nothing else but its essence.  Thus, the perfection of a thing
+does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. 
+Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it ; therefore we
+cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the
+existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect-that is, of
+God.  For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and
+involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his
+existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question
+is given.  This, I think, will be evident to every moderately
+attentive reader.
+
+PROP. XII.  No attribute of substance can be conceived from which
+it would follow that substance can be divided.
+    Proof.-The parts into which substance as thus conceived would
+be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they
+will not.  If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will
+necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self-caused, and (by
+Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so
+that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one
+substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd.  Moreover, the parts
+(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and
+the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be
+conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be
+absurd.  If we adopt the second alternative-namely, that the
+parts will not retain the nature of substance-then, if the whole
+substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature
+of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is
+absurd.
+
+PROP. XIII.  Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
+    Proof.-If it could be divided, the parts into which it was
+divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite
+substance, or they would not.  If the former, we should have
+several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is
+absurd.  If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely
+infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also
+absurd.
+    Corollary.-It follows, that no substance, and consequently no
+extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.
+    Note.-The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
+understood as follows.  The nature of substance can only be
+conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else
+can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii)
+involves a manifest contradiction.
+
+PROP. XIV.  Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
+    Proof.-As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no
+attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied
+(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.) ; if any
+substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained
+by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
+attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd ; therefore,
+besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be
+conceived.  If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have
+to be conceived as existent ; but this (by the first part of this
+proof) is absurd.  Therefore, besides God no substance can be
+granted or conceived.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-Clearly, therefore : 1.  God is one, that is (by
+Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and
+that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already
+indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).
+    Corollary II.-It follows :  2.  That extension and thought
+are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents
+(affectiones) of the attributes of God.
+
+PROP. XV.  Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can
+be, or be conceived.
+    Proof.-Besides God, no substance is granted or can be
+conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which
+is in itself and is conceived through itself.  But modes (by Def.
+v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance ;
+wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only
+through it be conceived.  But substances and modes form the sum
+total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing
+can be, or be conceived.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
+mind, and is susceptible of passions.  How far such persons have
+strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
+said.  But these I pass over.  For all who have in anywise
+reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body.  Of this
+they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body
+a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a
+certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate
+such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite.  But meanwhile
+by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they
+show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart
+from the divine nature, and say it was created by God.  Wherefrom
+the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant
+; thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of
+their own words.  I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at
+any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop.
+viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything
+other than itself.  Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that
+besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.  Hence we
+drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the
+infinite attributes of God.  However, in order to explain more
+fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all
+start from the following points :-
+    Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
+as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
+infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God.  This
+they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
+two.  If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be
+conceived to be divided into two parts ; each part will then be
+either finite or infinite.  If the former, then infinite
+substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd.  If
+the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another
+infinite, which is also absurd.
+    Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths,
+it will consist of an infinite number of such parts ; it would
+equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part
+measured only an inch : therefore, one infinity would be twelve
+times as great as the other.
+    Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn
+two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance
+apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the
+distance between the two lines will be continually increased,
+until at length it changes from definite to indefinable.  As
+these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity
+as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance
+must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain
+to the nature of God.
+    The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme
+perfection.  God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely
+perfect being, cannot be passive ; but extended substance,
+insofar as it is divisible, is passive.  It follows, therefore,
+that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.
+    Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who
+by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the
+divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto.  However, I
+think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered
+their propositions ; for all their arguments are founded on the
+hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such
+a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.)
+to be absurd.  Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all
+these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now
+discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion
+that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the
+notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that
+an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts
+: therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that
+infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of
+finite parts.  This is exactly what we have already proved (in
+Prop. xii.).  Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in
+reality recoiled upon themselves.  If, from this absurdity of
+theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended
+substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like
+a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,
+and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to
+deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to
+the circumference are equal.  For, taking extended substance,
+which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible
+(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it
+is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can
+be multiplied and divided.
+    So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of
+points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
+infinitely divided.  Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert
+that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it
+would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface
+of lines, and a line of points.  This must be admitted by all who
+know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who
+deny the possibility of a vacuum.  For if extended substance
+could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why
+should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others
+remaining joined together as before?  And why should all be so
+fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum?  Surely in the
+case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one
+can exist without the other, and can remain in its original
+condition.  As, then,  there does not exist a vacuum in nature
+(of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to
+prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be
+distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
+substance cannot be divided.
+    If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally
+so prone to divide quantity?  I answer, that quantity is
+conceived by us in two ways ; in the abstract and superficially,
+as we imagine it ; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by
+the intellect.  If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented
+in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall
+find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts ; but
+if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and
+conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we
+shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is
+infinite, one, and indivisible.  This will be plain enough to all
+who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination,
+especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the
+same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as
+we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
+distinguished, not really, but modally.  For instance, water, in
+so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts
+to be separated one from the other ; but not in so far as it is
+extended substance ; from this point of view it is neither
+separated nor divisible.  Further, water, in so far as it is
+water, is produced and corrupted ; but, in so far as it is
+substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
+    I think I have now answered the second argument ; it is, in
+fact, founded on the same assumption as the first-namely, that
+matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed
+of parts.  Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be
+considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God
+(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could
+receive its modifications.  All things, I repeat, are in God, and
+all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the
+laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly
+show) from the necessity of his essence.  Wherefore it can in
+nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other
+than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the
+Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is
+granted to be infinite and eternal.  But enough of this for the
+present.
+
+PROP. XVI.  From the necessity of the divine nature must follow
+an infinite number of things in infinite ways-that is, all things
+which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
+    Proof.-This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
+remembers that from the given definition of any thing the
+intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily
+follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
+defined) ; and it infers more properties in proportion as the
+definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in
+proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more
+reality.  Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
+attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite
+essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its
+nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
+can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must
+necessarily follow.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
+cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
+intellect.
+    Corollary II.-It also follows that God is a cause in himself,
+and not through an accident of his nature.
+    Corollary III.-It follows, thirdly, that God is the
+absolutely first cause.
+
+PROP. XVII.  God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and
+is not constrained by anyone.
+    Proof.-We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
+the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
+solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things
+absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways ; and we proved
+(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived
+; but that all things are in God.  Wherefore nothing can exist
+outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to
+act.  Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
+and is not constrained by anyone.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-It follows : 1.  That there can be no cause
+which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
+perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.
+    Corollary II.-It follows : 2.  That God is the sole free
+cause.  For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature
+(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole
+necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the
+sole free cause.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
+as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have
+said follow from his nature-that is, which are in his power,
+should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him.  But
+this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
+that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its
+three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles ;
+or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is
+absurd.
+    Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
+proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
+nature.  I know that there are many who think that they can show,
+that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature
+; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can
+attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in
+ourselves.  Further, although they conceive God as actually
+supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring
+into existence everything which he actually understands, for they
+think that they would thus destroy God's power.  If, they
+contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he
+would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,
+would clash with God's omnipotence ; therefore, they prefer to
+asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates
+nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute
+exercise of will, to create.  However, I think I have shown
+sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme
+power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things-that is,
+all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of
+ways, or always flow from the same necessity ; in the same way as
+from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for
+eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right
+angles.  Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from
+all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state
+of activity.  This manner of treating the question attributes to
+God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect.  For,
+otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an
+infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able
+to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,
+according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render
+himself imperfect.  Wherefore, in order to establish that God is
+perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,
+that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power
+extends ; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most
+repugnant to God's omnipotence.
+    Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the
+will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain
+to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
+significance quite different from those they usually bear.  For
+intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
+would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
+intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with
+them but the name ; there would be about as much correspondence
+between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
+constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.  This I will
+prove as follows.  If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it
+cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,
+posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,
+inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality
+(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.).  On the contrary, the truth and formal
+essence of things is as it is, because it exists by
+representation as such in the intellect of God.  Wherefore the
+intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
+God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
+essence and of their existence.  This seems to have been
+recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,
+God's will, and God's power, are one and the same.  As,
+therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,
+both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ
+from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its
+existence.  For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely
+in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
+    For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence,
+but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
+therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but
+must be different in existence ; and hence if the existence of
+one of them cease, the existence of the other will not
+necessarily cease also ; but if the essence of one could be
+destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be
+destroyed also.  Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of
+the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ
+from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in
+respect to its existence.  Now the intellect of God is the cause
+both of the essence and the existence of our intellect ;
+therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to
+constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in
+respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in
+anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before.  The
+reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone
+can easily see.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  God is the indwelling and not the transient cause
+of all things.
+    Proof.-All things which are, are in God, and must be
+conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
+Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him. 
+This is our first point.  Further, besides God there can be no
+substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to
+God.  This is our second point.  God, therefore, is the
+indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIX.  God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.
+    Proof.-God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)
+necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains
+to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its
+definition ; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.).  Further,
+by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.
+iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance-in other
+words, that which appertains to substance : that, I say, should
+be involved in the attributes of substance.  Now eternity
+appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in
+Prop. vii.) ; therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the
+attributes, and thus all are eternal.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition is also evident from the manner in
+which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God ; it is
+evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,
+like his essence, is an eternal truth.  Further (in Prop. xix. of
+my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the
+eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.
+
+PROP. XX.  The existence of God and his essence are one and the
+same.
+    Proof.-God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
+eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
+existence.  Therefore the same 
+attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at
+the same time his eternal existence-in other words, that which
+constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his
+existence.  Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one
+and the same.  Q.E.D.
+    Coroll. I.-Hence it follows that God's existence, like his
+essence, is an eternal truth.
+    Coroll. II-Secondly, it follows that God, and all the
+attributes of God, are unchangeable.  For if they could be
+changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be
+changed in respect to essence-that is, obviously, be changed from
+true to false, which is absurd.
+
+PROP. XXI.  All things which follow from the absolute nature of
+any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in
+other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
+    Proof.-Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition
+to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow
+from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the
+same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or
+duration ; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the
+attribute thought.  Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to
+be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its
+nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,
+it is supposed finite.  It cannot, however, be conceived as
+finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.) ; but it is
+not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
+the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite) ;
+therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not
+constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)
+must necessarily exist.
+    We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the
+idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
+follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for
+it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,
+the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis.  Wherefore, if
+the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
+anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any
+example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from
+the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the
+said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
+point.
+    Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of
+the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration.  For
+if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of
+the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God,
+for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought,
+and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be
+about not to exist.
+    Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist
+unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.) ; and beyond
+the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the
+latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to
+exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of
+God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,
+thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed
+therefrom.  Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or
+anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of
+some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but
+through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point. 
+Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of
+anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's
+absolute nature.
+
+PROP. XXII.  Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so
+far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily
+and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist
+necessarily and as infinite.
+    Proof.-The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the preceding one.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
+infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature
+of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
+modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
+    Proof.-A mode exists in something else, through which it must
+be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in
+God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode
+is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must
+necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of
+God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the
+infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.)
+eternity ; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely.  A
+mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must
+follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either
+immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some
+modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said
+attribute ; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily
+and as infinite.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The essence of things produced by God does not
+involve existence.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Def. i.  For that of
+which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
+self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
+things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
+existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
+the being of things (essendi rerum).  For whether things exist,
+or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
+that it involves neither existence nor duration ; consequently,
+it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other.  God must
+be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
+appertain.  (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
+of things, but also of their essence.
+    Proof.-If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
+essence of things ; and therefore the essence of things can (by
+Ax. iv.) be conceived without God.  This (by Prop. xv.) is
+absurd.  Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi. 
+For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
+essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
+existence-in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
+in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself.  This
+will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
+    Corollary.-Individual things are nothing but modifications of
+the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
+are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.  The proof appears
+from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
+manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God ; and that
+which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
+act.
+    Proof.-That by which things are said to be conditioned to act
+in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
+obvious) ; therefore both of its essence and of its existence God
+by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.
+xxv. and xvi.) ; this is our first point.  Our second point is
+plainly to be inferred therefrom.  For if a thing, which has not
+been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part
+of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is
+absurd.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act
+in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from the third axiom.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  Every individual thing, or everything which is
+finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be
+conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
+action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and
+has a conditioned existence ; and likewise this cause cannot in
+its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be
+conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also
+is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to
+infinity.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
+thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,
+Coroll.).
+    But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,
+cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God
+; for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any
+attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.).  It
+must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as
+the said attribute is considered as in some way modified ; for
+substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.
+and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the
+attributes of God.  But from God, or from any of his attributes,
+in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite
+and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow.  Wherefore it
+must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by
+God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
+modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence.  This is our first point.  Again, this
+cause or this modification (for the reason by which we
+established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be
+conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the
+same reason) ; and so on (for the same reason) to infinity. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
+namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
+nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
+nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
+follows :-1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
+things immediately produced by him.  I say absolutely, not after
+his kind, as is usually stated.  For the effects of God cannot
+either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.
+xxiv. Coroll.).  2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote
+cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing
+these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what
+follows from his absolute nature.  For, by a remote cause, we
+understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect. 
+But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that
+without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all
+things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular
+manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.).  But God cannot
+be called a thing contingent.  For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
+necessarily, and not contingently.  Further, the modes of the
+divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
+(Prop. xvi.) ; and they thus follow, whether we consider the
+divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
+conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.).  Further, God is not only the
+cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
+xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as
+conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.). 
+If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition
+themselves ; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
+themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
+the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also
+to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing
+that is contingent.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
+we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura
+naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata).  I say
+to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,
+from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature
+viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,
+and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
+substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other
+words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,
+in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
+    By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which
+follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
+attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of
+God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
+and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXX.  Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
+infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
+modifications of God, and nothing else.
+    Proof.-A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.) ; in
+other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect
+in representation must necessarily be granted in nature.  But in
+nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save
+God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in
+God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived.  Therefore
+the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
+comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
+and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  The intellect in function, whether finite or
+infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to
+passive nature and not to active nature.
+    Proof.-By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
+thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
+other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)
+requiring to be conceived through absolute thought.  It must (by
+Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
+expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
+conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
+conceived.  It must therefore be referred to nature passive
+rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
+thinking.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
+admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality :
+but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
+what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
+understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived.  For
+we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
+the act of understanding.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
+necessary cause.
+    Proof.-Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
+intellect ; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
+nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
+other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
+and so on to infinity.  But if will be supposed infinite, it must
+also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
+being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his
+possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
+essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.).  Thus, however it be
+conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
+which it should be conditioned to exist and act.  Thus (Def.
+vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
+constrained cause.  Q.E.D.
+    Coroll. I.-Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
+according to freedom of the will.
+    Coroll. II.-It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
+stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
+rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
+conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
+manner.  For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
+which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner. 
+And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
+number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
+said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
+number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
+that motion and rest act by free will.  Wherefore will no more
+appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
+in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
+we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
+and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
+manner.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  Things could not have been brought into being by
+God in any manner or in any order different from that which has
+in fact obtained.
+    Proof-All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
+(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist
+and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.).  If things, therefore,
+could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
+to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have
+been different, God's nature would also have been able to be
+different from what it now is ; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that
+different nature also would have perforce existed, and
+consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods. 
+This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd.  Therefore things
+could not have been brought into being by God in any other
+manner, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note I.-As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
+noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
+contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall
+attach to the word contingent ; but I will first explain the
+words necessary and impossible.
+    A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence
+or in respect to its cause ; for the existence of a thing
+necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
+from a given efficient cause.  For similar reasons a thing is
+said to be impossible ; namely, inasmuch as its essence or
+definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
+is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect ; but
+a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation
+to the imperfection of our knowledge.
+    A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or
+does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it
+does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt
+concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes
+us,-such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
+impossible.  Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
+    Note II.-It clearly follows from what we have said, that
+things have been brought into being by God in the highest
+perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a
+most perfect nature.  Nor does this prove any imperfection in
+God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection.  From its
+contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just
+shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
+brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
+God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute
+to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
+    I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
+will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply
+because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very
+different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced.  They
+assign to him, in short, absolute free will.  However, I am also
+convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly
+weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
+such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
+but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge.  There is
+no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
+xvii.  But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
+that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of
+God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things
+could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
+different order ; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what
+our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely
+on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is.  If
+it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. 
+Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all
+eternity by God himself.  If it were otherwise, God would be
+convicted of imperfection or change.  But in eternity there is no
+such thing as when, before, or after ; hence it follows solely
+from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never
+could have decreed anything but what is ; that God did not exist
+before his decrees, and would not exist without them.  But, it is
+said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had
+ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and
+her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in
+God.  But persons who say this must admit that God can change his
+decrees.  For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature
+and her order, different from those which he has ordained-in
+other words, if he had willed and conceived something different
+concerning nature-he would perforce have had a different
+intellect from that which he has, and also a different will.  But
+if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a
+different will, without any change in his essence or his
+perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the
+decrees which he has made concerning created things, and
+nevertheless remaining perfect?  For his intellect and will
+concerning things created and their order are the same, in
+respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.
+    Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that
+God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential ; as
+they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's
+essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a
+different actual intellect and a different will, his essence
+would also have been different ; and thus, as I concluded at
+first, if things had been brought into being by God in a
+different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and
+will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have
+been different, which is absurd.
+    As these things could not have been brought into being by God
+in any but the actual way and order which has obtained ; and as
+the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection
+of God ; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
+believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were
+in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he
+had understood them.
+    But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
+imperfection ; that which is in them, and which causes them to be
+called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the
+will of God.  If God had so willed, he might have brought it
+about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,
+and vice versâ.  What is such an assertion, but an open
+declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he
+wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should
+understand things differently from the way in which he does
+understand them?  This (as we have just shown) is the height of
+absurdity.  Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its
+employers, as follows :-All things depend on the power of God. 
+In order that things should be different from what they are,
+God's will would necessarily have to be different.  But God's
+will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly
+demonstrated) from God's perfection.  Therefore neither can
+things be different.  I confess, that the theory which subjects
+all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that
+they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth
+than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all
+things with a view of promoting what is good.  For these latter
+persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not
+depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,
+or which he aims at as a definite goal.  This is only another
+name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter
+absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first
+and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of
+their existence.  I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting
+such wild theories.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  God's power is identical with his essence.
+    Proof.-From the sole necessity of the essence of God it
+follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all
+things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.).  Wherefore the power of God, by
+which he and all things are and act, is identical with his
+essence.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
+necessarily exists.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.)
+be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it
+necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  There is no cause from whose nature some effect
+does not follow.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in
+a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.) ; that is,
+(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given
+conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things,
+therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+
+APPENDIX :
+    In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties
+of God.  I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one
+: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature
+; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so ;
+that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without
+him they could neither exist nor be conceived ; lastly, that all
+things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or
+absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. 
+I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the
+prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my
+demonstrations.  Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,
+which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the
+understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained
+it above.  I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these
+misconceptions before the bar of reason.
+    All such opinions spring from the notion commonly
+entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,
+namely, with an end in view.  It is accepted as certain, that God
+himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
+that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship
+him).  I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
+why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
+prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity ; and,
+lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about
+good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
+confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like.  However, this is
+not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of
+the human mind : it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
+starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
+that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all
+have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they
+are conscious of such desire.  Herefrom it follows, first, that
+men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their
+volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance,
+of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire. 
+Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that
+which is useful to them, and which they seek.  Thus it comes to
+pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of
+events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having
+no cause for further doubt.  If they cannot learn such causes
+from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering
+themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them
+personally to bring about the given event, and thus they
+necessarily judge other natures by their own.  Further, as they
+find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist
+them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance,
+eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for
+yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding
+fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means
+for obtaining such conveniences.  Now as they are aware, that
+they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think
+they have cause for believing, that some other being has made
+them for their use.  As they look upon things as means, they
+cannot believe them to be self-created ; but, judging from the
+means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they
+are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe
+endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted
+everything for human use.  They are bound to estimate the nature
+of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in
+accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that
+the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind
+man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.  Hence
+also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according
+to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God
+might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course
+of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and
+insatiable avarice.  Thus the prejudice developed into
+superstition, and took deep root in the human mind ; and for this
+reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain
+the final causes of things ; but in their endeavor to show that
+nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to
+man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,
+and men are all mad together.  Consider, I pray you, the result :
+among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some
+hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c. : so they
+declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at
+some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in
+their worship.  Experience day by day protested and showed by
+infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of
+pious and impious alike ; still they would not abandon their
+inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such
+contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were
+ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of
+ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
+and start afresh.  They therefore laid down as an axiom, that
+God's judgments far transcend human understanding.  Such a
+doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the
+human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished
+another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and
+properties of figures without regard to their final causes. 
+There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides
+mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed
+to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge
+of the truth.
+    I have now sufficiently explained my first point.  There is
+no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in
+view, and that final causes are mere human figments.  This, I
+think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and
+foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and
+also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in
+fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that
+everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with
+the utmost perfection.  However, I will add a few remarks, in
+order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly.  That
+which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versâ
+: it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that
+which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.  Passing
+over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is
+plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most
+perfect which is produced immediately by God ; the effect which
+requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in
+that respect, more imperfect.  But if those things which were
+made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his
+end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the
+first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
+    Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God :
+for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something
+which he lacks.  Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a
+distinction between the object of want and the object of
+assimilation ; still they confess that God made all things for
+the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation.  They are
+unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God
+himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore
+driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those
+things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he
+desired them.
+    We must not omit to notice that the followers of this
+doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final
+causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their
+theory-namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to
+ignorance ; thus showing that they have no other method of
+exhibiting their doctrine.  For example, if a stone falls from a
+roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate
+by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man
+; for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how
+could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent
+circumstances) have all happened together by chance?  Perhaps you
+will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was
+blowing, and the man was walking that way.  "But why," they will
+insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very
+time walking that way?"  If you again answer, that the wind had
+then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day
+before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had
+been invited by a friend, they will again insist : "But why was
+the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?"  
+So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at
+last you take refuge in the will of God-in other words, the
+sanctuary of ignorance.  So, again, when they survey the frame of
+the human body, they are amazed ; and being ignorant of the
+causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been
+fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural
+skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt
+another.
+    Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and
+strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,
+and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as
+an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the
+interpreters of nature and the gods.  Such persons know that,
+with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only
+available means for proving and preserving their authority would
+vanish also.  But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my
+third point.
+    After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is
+created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as
+the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to
+themselves, and to account those things the best of all which
+have the most beneficial effect on mankind.  Further, they were
+bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature
+of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,
+cold, beauty, deformity, and so on ; and from the belief that
+they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and
+blame, sin and merit.
+    I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human
+nature ; the former I will briefly explain here.
+    Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God
+they have called good, everything which hinders these objects
+they have styled bad ; and inasmuch as those who do not
+understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any
+way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their
+imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that
+there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things
+and their own nature.  When phenomena are of such a kind, that
+the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of
+imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say
+that they are well-ordered ; if the contrary, that they are
+ill-ordered or confused.  Further, as things which are easily
+imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to
+confusion-as though there were any order in nature, except in
+relation to our imagination-and say that God has created all
+things in order ; thus, without knowing it, attributing
+imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God
+foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it
+should be most easily imagined.  If this be their theory, they
+would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an
+infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and
+very many others which confound its weakness.  But enough has
+been said on this subject.  The other abstract notions are
+nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
+differently affected : though they are considered by the ignorant
+as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that
+everything was created for the sake of themselves ; and,
+according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,
+healthy or rotten and corrupt.  For instance, if the motion which
+objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,
+the objects causing it are styled beautiful ; if a contrary
+motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
+    Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are
+styled fragrant or fetid ; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,
+full-flavored or insipid ; if through our touch, hard or soft,
+rough or smooth, &c.
+    Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,
+sound, or harmony.  In this last case, there are men lunatic
+enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in
+harmony ; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded
+themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to
+harmony-all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone
+judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather
+mistakes for things the forms of his imagination.  We need no
+longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we
+have witnessed, and finally skepticism : for, although human
+bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they
+differ ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another ;
+what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another ; what
+is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on.  I need not
+further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the
+subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well
+known.  It is commonly said : "So many men, so many minds ;
+everyone is wise in his own way ; brains differ as completely as
+palates."  All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things
+according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
+understand : for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
+mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I
+have urged.
+    We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly
+given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate
+the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the
+imagination ; and, although they have names, as though they were
+entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
+entities imaginary rather than real ; and, therefore, all
+arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily
+rebutted.
+    Many argue in this way.  If all things follow from a
+necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there
+so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things
+corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,
+confusion, evil, sin, &c.  But these reasoners are, as I have
+said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be
+reckoned only from their own nature and power ; things are not
+more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human
+senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to
+mankind.  To those who ask why God did not so create all men,
+that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but
+this : because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of
+every degree of perfection from highest to lowest ; or, more
+strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to
+suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an
+infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
+    Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note ; if
+there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily
+dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.
+
+
+
+
+Part II.
+ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+    I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
+necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and
+infinite being ; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part
+i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
+infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
+us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
+and its highest blessedness.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS
+
+DEFINITION I.  By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain
+determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is
+considered as an extended thing.  (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,
+Coroll.)
+
+DEFINITION II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing
+that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,
+and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also ;
+in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
+without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
+
+DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is
+formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
+    Explanation.-I say conception rather than perception, because
+the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in
+respect to the object ; whereas conception seems to express an
+activity of the mind.
+
+DEFINITION IV.  By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so
+far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the
+object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
+    Explanation.-I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark
+which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and
+its object (ideatum).
+
+DEFINITION V.  Duration is the indefinite continuance of
+existing.
+    Explanation.-I say indefinite, because it cannot be
+determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or
+by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of
+the thing, but does not take it away.
+
+DEFINITION VI.  Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.
+
+DEFINITION VII.  By particular things, I mean things which are
+finite and have a conditioned existence ; but if several
+individual things concur in one action, so as to be all
+simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so
+far, as one particular thing.
+
+
+AXIOMS
+
+I.  The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that
+is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or
+that man does or does not exist.
+
+II.  Man thinks.
+
+III.  Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
+the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
+individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c.  But the idea
+can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
+
+IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
+
+V.  We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
+modes of thought.
+
+N.B.  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
+xiii.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS
+
+PROP. I.  Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
+thing.
+    Proof.-Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
+modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
+of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.).  God therefore possesses
+the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved
+in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. 
+Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
+which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
+vi.).  In other words, God is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we
+are able to conceive an infinite thinking being.  For, in
+proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
+thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
+perfection.  Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
+number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,
+in respect of thinking, infinite.  As, therefore, from the
+consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,
+thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the
+infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
+
+PROP. II.  Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an
+extended thing.
+    Proof.-The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the last.
+
+PROP. III.  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
+essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his
+essence.
+    Proof.-God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
+infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
+thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
+and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.  Now all
+that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.). 
+Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and
+in God alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part i., Prop. xv.)
+    Note.-The multitude understand by the power of God the free
+will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
+latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent.  For
+it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
+reduce them to nothing.  Further, the power of God is very often
+likened to the power of kings.  But this doctrine we have refuted
+(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown
+(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as
+that by which he understands himself ; in other words, as it
+follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
+that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
+necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways.  We
+further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
+identical with God's essence in action ; therefore it is as
+impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
+him as non-existent.  If we might pursue the subject further, I
+could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
+God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
+multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
+negation of power.  However, I am unwilling to go over the same
+ground so often.  I would only beg the reader again and again, to
+turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from
+Prop. xvi. to the end.  No one will be able to follow my meaning,
+unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of
+God with the human power and right of kings.
+
+PROP. IV.  The idea of God, from which an infinite number of
+things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
+    Proof.-Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
+attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.). 
+Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.).  Therefore the
+idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in
+infinite ways, can only be one.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only
+in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far
+as he is unfolded in any other attribute ; that is, the ideas
+both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own
+as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
+perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
+Part.  We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
+of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
+therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
+he is the object of his own idea.  Wherefore the actual being of
+ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing. 
+It may be differently proved as follows : the actual being of
+ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
+xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
+nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
+(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
+of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
+of any attribute save thought.  Therefore the actual being of
+ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
+thinking thing, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in
+so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they
+are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other attribute.
+    Proof.-Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
+any other (Part i., Prop. x.) ; wherefore the modes of each
+attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
+any other.  Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
+in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
+they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence the actual being of things, which are not
+modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because
+that nature has prior knowledge of the things.  Things
+represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
+particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
+necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
+the attribute of thought.
+
+PROP. VII.  The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
+order and connection of things.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.  For
+the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of
+the cause, whereof it is an effect.
+    Corollary.-Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
+realized power of action-that is, whatsoever follows from the
+infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
+follows without exception in the same order and connection from
+the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
+    Note.-Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what
+has been pointed out above-namely, that whatsoever can be
+perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
+of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance :
+consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
+and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
+now through the other.  So, also, a mode of extension and the
+idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in
+two ways.  This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
+those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
+things understood by God are identical.  For instance, a circle
+existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
+also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
+different attributes.  Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
+attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
+under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
+and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following
+in either case.
+    I said that God is the cause of an idea-for instance, of the
+idea of a circle,-in so far as he is a thinking thing ; and of a
+circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
+actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
+proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
+through another, and so on to infinity ; so that, so long as we
+consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
+of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
+attribute of thought only.  And, in so far as we consider things
+as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
+nature through the attributes of extension only ; and so on, in
+the case of the other attributes.  Wherefore of things as they
+are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
+consists of infinite attributes.  I cannot for the present
+explain my meaning more clearly.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
+not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
+the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
+are contained in the attributes of God.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from the last ; it is
+understood more clearly from the preceding note.
+    Corollary.-Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
+except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
+God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,
+except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists ; and when
+particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they
+are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they
+are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,
+through which they are said to continue.
+    Note.-If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
+this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
+which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
+inasmuch as it is unique ; however, I will endeavour to
+illustrate it as far as possible.  The nature of a circle is such
+that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the
+rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another
+; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle.  Yet
+none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far
+as the circle exists ; nor can the idea of any of these
+rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
+comprehended in the idea of the circle.  Let us grant that, from
+this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist.  The ideas of
+these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the
+idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of
+those rectangles ; wherefore they are distinguished from the
+remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
+
+PROP. IX.  The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
+existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
+by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
+    Proof.-The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
+(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part) ; thus
+(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only
+as he is a thinking thing.  But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)
+in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking ; and he
+is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so
+on to infinity.  Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by
+Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of
+causes.   Therefore of a given individual idea another individual
+idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that
+idea, is the cause ; and of this second idea God is the cause, in
+so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of
+any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he
+has the idea of the object.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
+idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
+is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
+another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.) ; but (by
+Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the
+same as the order and connection of things.  The knowledge,
+therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
+will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. X.  The being of substance does not appertain to the
+essence of man-in other words, substance does not constitute the
+actual being2 of man.
+    Proof.-The being of substance involves necessary existence
+(Part i., Prop. vii.).  If, therefore, the being of substance
+appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
+would necessarily be granted also (II.Def.ii.), and,
+consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd
+(II.Ax.i.).  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which
+it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same
+nature ; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is
+not that which constitutes the actual being of man.  Again, the
+proposition is evident from the other properties of
+substance-namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
+immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
+constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God. 
+For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to
+the essence of man.  That essence therefore (by i.  15) is
+something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
+nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),
+or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
+manner.
+    Note.-Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
+conceived without God.  All men agree that God is the one and
+only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
+existence ; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
+respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect
+to their being (secundum esse).
+    At the same time many assert, that that, without which a
+thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
+thing ; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
+appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
+things can be or be conceived without God ; or else, as is more
+probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines.  I think the
+cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the
+proper order of philosophic thinking.  The nature of God, which
+should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the
+order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be
+last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
+what they call the objects of sensation ; hence, while they are
+considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to
+the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to
+the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in
+mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the
+knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are
+no help towards understanding the divine nature.  So that it is
+hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
+themselves freely.
+    However, I pass over this point.  My intention her was only
+to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
+cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing :
+individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
+does not appertain to their essence.  I said that "I considered
+as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
+the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
+thing is necessarily removed also ; or that without which the
+thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
+conceived."  (II. Def. ii.)
+
+PROP. XI.  The first element, which constitutes the actual being
+of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
+existing.
+    Proof.-The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)
+is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
+(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
+Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
+given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
+in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom). 
+Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
+mind.  But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.
+viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist ; it must
+therefore be the idea of something actually existing.  But not of
+an infinite thing.  For an infinite thing (I.xxi., xxii.), must
+always necessarily exist ; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
+absurdity.  Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
+actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
+existing.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
+the infinite intellect of God ; thus when we say, that the human
+mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
+this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
+as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so
+far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind ; and when we
+say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
+constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
+he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
+another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in
+part or inadequately.
+    Note.-Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
+will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate ; 
+I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
+not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
+end.
+
+PROP. XII.  Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,
+which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human
+mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of
+the said occurrence.  That is, if the object of the idea
+constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in
+that body without being perceived by the mind.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
+the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in
+so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said
+object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
+of anything.  Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
+constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is
+necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
+the human mind ; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of
+the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words
+the mind perceives it.
+    Note.-This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
+to be understood from II. vii., which see.
+
+PROP. XIII.  The object of the idea constituting the human mind
+is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which
+actually exists, and nothing else.
+    Proof.-If indeed the body were not the object of the human
+mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
+God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but
+in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else ; that
+is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body
+would not be in our mind : now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the
+idea of the modifications of the body.  Therefore the object of
+the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as
+it actually exists (II. xi.).  Further, if there were any other
+object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as
+nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
+xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
+which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.) ; but
+(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea.  Wherefore the object of our
+mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
+united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind
+and body.  However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately
+or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the
+nature of our body.  The propositions we have advanced hitherto
+have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to
+other individual things, all of which, though in different
+degrees, are animated.3  For of everything there is necessarily
+an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as
+there is an idea of the human body ; thus  whatever we have
+asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be
+asserted of the idea of everything else.  Still, on the other
+hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from
+the other, one being more excellent than another and containing
+more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent
+than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
+    Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind
+differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is
+necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of
+the human body.  What this nature is, I am not able here to
+explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,
+that I should do so.  I will only say generally, that in
+proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
+many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
+the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for
+forming many simultaneous perceptions ; and the more the actions
+of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
+concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it
+is the object for distinct comprehension.  We may thus recognize
+the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the
+cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,
+and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following
+propositions, deduce from what has been advanced.  Wherefore I
+have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my
+present statements.  In order to do so, I must premise a few
+propositions concerning the nature of bodies.
+    AXIOM I.  All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
+    AXIOM II.  Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
+sometimes more quickly.
+    LEMMA I.  Bodies are distinguished from one another in
+respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in
+respect of substance.
+    Proof.-The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
+self-evident.  That bodies are not distinguished in respect of
+substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii.  It is brought
+out still more clearly from I. xv, note.
+    LEMMA II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.
+    Proof.-All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
+conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.). 
+Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,
+and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
+    LEMMA III.  A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
+motion or rest by another body, which other body has been
+determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third
+again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
+    Proof.-Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
+(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to
+motion and rest ; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be
+determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
+(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
+motion or at rest.  And this body again can only have been set in
+motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to
+motion or rest.   This third body again by a fourth, and so on to
+infinity.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
+motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other
+body ; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a
+state of motion by some other body.  This is indeed self-evident. 
+For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
+rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,
+I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is
+at rest.  If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
+this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no
+other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at
+rest.  If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
+long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
+concerning it, except that it is in motion.   If A is
+subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
+of A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to
+continued motion ; the state of rest therefore must have resulted
+from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
+cause determining A to a state of rest.
+    Axiom I.-All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
+body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected
+and the body affecting ; so that one and the same body may be
+moved in different modes, according to the difference in the
+nature of the bodies moving it ; on the other hand, different
+bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.
+    Axiom II.-When a body in motion impinges on another body at
+rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to
+continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in
+the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
+body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
+of motion of incidence and the same plane.
+    So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
+which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and
+rest, quickness and slowness.  We now pass on to compound bodies.
+    Definition.-When any given bodies of the same or different
+magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or
+if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that
+their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain
+fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that
+together they compose one body or individual, which is
+distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.
+    Axiom III.-In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a
+compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies,
+they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved
+from their position ; consequently the individual will, with
+greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form. 
+Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies,
+are called hard ; those, whose parts are in contact over small
+superficies, are called soft ; those, whose parts are in motion
+among one another, are called fluid.
+    LEMMA IV.  If from a body or individual, compounded of
+several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same
+time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take
+their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before,
+without any change in its actuality (forma).
+    Proof.-Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
+substance : that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
+individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies ; but
+this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will
+(by our hypothesis) be maintained ; the individual, therefore,
+will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance
+and in respect of mode.  Q.E.D.
+    LEMMA V.  If the parts composing an individual become greater
+or less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same
+mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still
+preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be
+changed.
+    Proof.-The same as for the last Lemma.
+    LEMMA VI.  If certain bodies composing an individual be
+compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction,
+for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they
+be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication
+in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its
+own nature without any change of its actuality.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for the individual
+is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we
+spoke of as its actual being.
+    LEMMA VII.  Furthermore, the individual thus composed
+preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at
+rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction ; so long as
+each part retains its motion, and preserves its communication
+with other parts as before.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from the definition of an
+individual prefixed to Lemma iv.
+    Note.-We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected
+in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding. 
+Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies
+only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and
+rest, speed and slowness ; that is, of bodies of the most simple
+character.  If, however, we now conceive another individual
+composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find
+that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without
+losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied.  Each of its parts
+would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.)
+each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker
+or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its
+motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts.  If
+we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of
+individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be
+affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their
+actuality.  We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive
+the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all
+bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the
+individual as a whole.  I should feel bound to explain and
+demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a
+special treatise on body.  But I have already said that such is
+not my object ; I have only touched on the question, because it
+enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.
+
+POSTULATES
+    I.  The human body is composed of a number of individual
+parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself
+extremely complex.
+    II.  Of the individual parts composing the human body some
+are fluid, some soft, some hard.
+    III.  The individual parts composing the human body, and
+consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of
+ways by external bodies.
+    IV.  The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
+number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,
+regenerated.
+    V.  When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
+external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes
+the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression
+thereupon of the external body which impels it.
+    VI.  The human body can move external bodies, and arrange
+them in a variety of ways.
+
+PROP. XIV.  The human mind is capable of perceiving a great
+number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable
+of receiving a great number of impressions.
+    Proof.-The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
+very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many
+ways of affecting external bodies.  But (II. xii.)  the human
+mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body ; the
+human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
+things, and is so in proportion, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the
+human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of
+ideas.
+    Proof.-The idea constituting the actual being of the human
+mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
+composed of a great number of complex individual parts.  But
+there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
+whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.)  ; therefore
+(II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these
+numerous ideas of its component parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
+affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human
+body, and also the nature of the external body.
+    Proof.-All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
+follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the
+nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of
+Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax.
+iv.) involves the nature of both bodies ; therefore, the idea of
+every mode, in which the human body is affected by external
+bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external
+body.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
+perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the
+nature of its own.
+    Corollary II.-It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we
+have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our
+own body than the nature of external bodies.  I have amply
+illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.
+
+PROP. XVII.  If the human body is affected in a manner which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present
+to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
+exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the
+human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human
+mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body-that is (by
+the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually
+existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body. 
+In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but
+postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the
+external body ; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will
+regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
+affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-The mind is able to regard as present external
+bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even
+though they be no longer in existence or present.
+    Proof.-When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
+human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they
+change the surface of the last named (Post. v.) ; hence (Ax. ii.,
+after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in
+a different manner from that which they followed before such
+change ; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new
+surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be
+refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
+towards those surfaces by external bodies ; consequently, they
+will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human
+body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
+take cognizance-that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard
+the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the
+fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces
+by their own spontaneous motion.  Wherefore, although the
+external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected,
+be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them
+as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
+that we regard as present many things which are not.  It is
+possible that the same result may be brought about by other
+causes ; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated
+one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out
+the true cause.  Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the
+truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
+rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
+controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human
+body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.). 
+Furthermore (II. vii.  Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly
+understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of
+Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the
+idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.  The
+former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and
+only  implies existence so long as Peter exists ; the latter
+indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature
+of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body
+lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even
+though he no longer exists.  Further, to retain the usual
+phraseology,  the modifications of the human body, of which the
+ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call
+the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of
+things.  When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say
+that it imagines.  I will here draw attention to the fact, in
+order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the
+mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error.  The mind
+does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as
+it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the
+existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it.  If
+the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it,
+is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this
+power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its
+nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of
+imagination depend solely on its own nature-that is (I. Def.
+vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  If the human body has once been affected by two or
+more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines
+any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
+    Proof.-The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,
+because the human body is affected and disposed by the
+impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is
+affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
+external body ; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so
+disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once ; therefore,
+it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
+the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the
+other.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We now clearly see what Memory is.  It is simply a
+certain association of ideas involving the nature of things
+outside the human body, which association arises in the mind
+according to the order and association of the modifications
+(affectiones) of the human body.  I say, first, it is an
+association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of
+things outside the human body : not of ideas which answer to the
+nature of the said things : ideas of the modifications of the
+human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve
+the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.  I say,
+secondly, that this association arises according to the order and
+association of the modifications of the human body, in order to
+distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from
+the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things
+through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same. 
+And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from
+the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the
+thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first
+; for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a
+Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple,
+which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question,
+nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man
+has often been affected by these two things ; that is, that the
+man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the
+fruit ; similarly every man will go on from one thought to
+another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things
+in his body.  For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the
+tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought
+of war, &c. ; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c.  Thus every man
+will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has
+been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images
+of things in this or that manner.
+
+PROP. XIX.  The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does
+not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications
+whereby the body is affected.
+    Proof.-The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
+human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
+he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing
+actually existing : or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
+stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
+continually regenerated ; and the order and connection of ideas
+is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.) ;
+this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
+as affected by the ideas of very many particular things.  Thus
+God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in
+so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
+far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind ; that is (by
+II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body. 
+But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far
+as  he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human
+mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently
+(II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing ;
+therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in
+God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to
+God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human
+body.
+    Proof.-Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.) ; therefore
+(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of
+thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of
+the human mind (II. xi.).  Further, this idea or knowledge of the
+mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but
+in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual
+thing (II. ix.).  But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
+ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes ;
+therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is
+referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
+the body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXI.  This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the
+same way as the mind is united to the body.
+    Proof.-That the mind is united to the body we have shown from
+the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and
+xiii.) ; and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be
+united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner
+as the mind is united to the body.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from
+what we have said in the note to II. vii.  We there showed that
+the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.),
+are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute
+of thought, now under the attribute of extension ; wherefore the
+idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing,
+which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,
+thought.  The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are
+in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same
+power of thinking.  Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that
+is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality
+(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of
+thought without reference to the object ; if a man knows
+anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at
+the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to
+infinity.  But I will treat of this hereafter.
+
+PROP. XXII.  The human mind perceives not only the modifications
+of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.
+    Proof.-The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
+in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,
+as the ideas of the said modifications.  This is proved in the
+same way as II. xx.  But the ideas of the modifications of the
+body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far
+as he constitutes the essence of the human mind ; therefore the
+ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
+knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
+will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not
+only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
+modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  The mind does not know itself, except in so far as
+it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.
+    Proof.-The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in
+God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same
+manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body.  But since (II.
+xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
+(II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
+human mind ; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
+human mind ; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human
+mind thus far has no knowledge of itself.  Further the ideas of
+the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the
+nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.),
+they agree with the nature of the mind ; wherefore the knowledge
+of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind ; but
+(by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
+mind itself ; wherefore the human mind thus far only has
+knowledge of itself.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The human mind does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
+    Proof.-The parts composing the human body do not belong to
+the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate
+their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.
+after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as
+individuals without relation to the human body.  The parts of the
+human body are highly complex individuals  (Post. i.), whose
+parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in
+any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
+latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after
+Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation ; therefore (II.
+iii.)  the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,
+inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea
+of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the
+order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.).  We may affirm
+the same thing of each part of each individual composing the
+human body ; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the
+human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many
+ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the
+human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the
+nature of the human mind (II. xiii) ; therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge
+of the human body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  The idea of each modification of the human body does
+not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
+    Proof.-We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
+human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as
+that external body conditions the human body in a given manner. 
+But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
+no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
+in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the
+idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to
+the said external body.  Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the
+external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the
+modification of the human body ; in other words, the idea of the
+modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  The human mind does not perceive any external body
+as actually existing, except through the ideas of the
+modifications of its own body.
+    Proof.-If the human body is in no way affected by a given
+external body, then  (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
+body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the
+idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
+any manner perceive its existence.  But, in so far as the human
+body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far
+(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-In so far as the human mind imagines an external
+body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.
+    Proof.-When the human mind regards external bodies through
+the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it
+imagines (see II. xvii. note) ; now the mind can only imagine
+external bodies as actually existing.  Therefore (by II. xxv.),
+in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
+adequate knowledge of them.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  The idea of each modification of the human body
+does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
+    Proof.-Every idea of a modification of the human body
+involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human
+body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.).  But,
+inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
+in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The ideas of the modifications of the human body,
+in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not
+clear and distinct, but confused.
+    Proof.-The ideas of the modifications of the human body
+involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies
+(II. xvi.) ; they must involve the nature not only of the human
+body but also of its parts ; for the modifications are modes
+(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,
+consequently, the human body as a whole are affected.   But (by
+II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
+also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas.  These ideas of
+modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind
+alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,
+confused ideas.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind
+is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in
+itself alone, clear and distinct ; as also is the case with the
+idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the
+modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred
+to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  The idea of the idea of each modification of the
+human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human
+mind.
+    Proof.-The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
+xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,
+in other words, does not adequately express its nature ; that is
+(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
+adequately ; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not
+adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not
+involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
+perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an
+adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,
+of its own body, and of external bodies.  For the mind does not
+know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
+modifications of body (II. xxiii.).  It only perceives its own
+body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only
+perceives external bodies through the same means ; thus, in so
+far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate
+knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.
+xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a
+fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and
+note).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
+only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
+external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common
+order of nature ; that is, whenever it is determined from
+without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to
+regard this or that ; not at such times as it is determined from
+within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,
+to understand their points of agreement, difference, and
+contrast.  Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it
+regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.
+
+PROP. XXX.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of our body.
+    Proof.-The duration of our body does not depend on its
+essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.
+xxi.).  But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
+by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
+operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these
+last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity. 
+The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
+nature, or the constitution of things.  Now, however a thing may
+be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,
+in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
+he has the idea of the human body only.  (II. ix. Coroll.) 
+Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
+very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
+the nature of the human mind ; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this
+knowledge is very inadequate to our mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of particular things external to ourselves.
+    Proof.-Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
+conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a
+fixed and definite relation ; this other particular thing must
+likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity.  (I.
+xxviii.)  As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
+this common property of particular things, we have only a very
+inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body ; we must draw a
+similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
+things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
+of the duration thereof.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that all particular things are
+contingent and perishable.  For we can have no adequate idea of
+their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
+understand by the contingency and perishableness of things.  (I.
+xxxiii., Note i.)  For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing
+is contingent.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
+are true.
+    Proof.-All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
+their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are
+all true.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes
+them to be called false.
+    Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
+mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality
+of falsehood.  Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.
+xxxii.) ; external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.). 
+Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to
+be called false.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
+perfect, is true.
+    Proof.-When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
+perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea
+is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the
+essence of our mind ; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
+an idea is true.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,
+which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.
+    Proof.-There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
+to be called false (II. xxxiii.) ; but falsity cannot consist in
+simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to
+be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
+ignorance and error are not identical ; wherefore it consists in
+the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
+confused ideas involve.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists
+in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light
+on the subject I will give an example.  For instance, men are
+mistaken in thinking themselves free ; their opinion is made up
+of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the
+causes by which they are conditioned.  Their idea of freedom,
+therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their
+actions.  As for their saying that human actions depend on the
+will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond
+thereto.  What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none
+of them know ; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
+dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
+either laughter or disgust.  So, again, when we look at the sun,
+we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet ;
+this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
+that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true
+distance or the cause of the fancy.  For although we afterwards 
+learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
+the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near
+; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are
+ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
+our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said
+body is affected thereby.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
+necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
+    Proof.-All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
+are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)
+adequate ; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,
+except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
+xxviii.) ; therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
+follow by the same necessity (II. vi.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,
+above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.
+    Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
+constitutes the essence of some particular thing ; for instance,
+the essence of B.  Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either
+exist or be conceived ; but this is against our hypothesis. 
+Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Those things, which are common to all, and which
+are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived
+except adequately.
+    Proof.-Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and
+which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the
+whole.  I say A cannot be conceived except adequately.  For the
+idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii.
+Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,
+and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the
+human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the
+nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies ; that
+is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be
+adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in
+so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind. 
+Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A
+adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as
+it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any
+external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary-Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or
+notions common to all men ; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree
+in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be
+adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  That, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human
+body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in
+the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.
+    Proof.-If A be that, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human
+body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each
+external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of
+A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of
+the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given
+external bodies.  Let it now be granted, that the human body is
+affected by an external body through that, which it has in common
+therewith, namely, A ; the idea of this modification will involve
+the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the
+idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property
+A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the
+idea of the human body ; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he
+constitutes the nature of the human mind ; therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to
+perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has
+more in common with other bodies.
+
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which
+are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident.  For when we say
+that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are
+therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that
+an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not
+in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by
+the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as
+he constitutes the essence of the human mind.
+    Note I.-I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,
+which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our
+ratiocination.  But there are other causes of certain axioms or
+notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
+method of ours ; for it would thus appear what notions are more
+useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at
+all.  Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all
+men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
+are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are
+ill-founded.  Again we should discern whence the notions called
+secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on
+which they are founded, and other points of interest connected
+with these questions.  But I have decided to pass over the
+subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
+treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
+too great prolixity.  Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything
+necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence
+are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,
+Thing, Something.  These terms arose from the fact, that the
+human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming
+a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the
+II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time ; if this number
+be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused ; if this
+number of images, of which the body is capable of forming
+distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become
+entirely confused one with another.  This being so, it is evident
+(from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind
+can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body
+can form images simultaneously.  When the images become quite
+confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies
+confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as
+it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of
+Being, Thing, &c.  The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact
+that images are not always equally vivid, and from other
+analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here ; for
+the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
+consider one only.  All may be reduced to this, that these terms
+represent ideas in the highest degree confused.  From similar
+causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,
+horse, dog, &c.  They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many
+images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the
+human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed
+utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small
+differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and
+their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
+which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
+them, agree ; for that is the point, in which each of the said
+individuals chiefly affected the body ; this the mind expresses
+by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
+particular individuals.  For, as we have said, it is unable to
+imagine the definite number of individuals.  We must, however,
+bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
+men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the
+point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and
+which the mind most easily imagines or remembers.  For instance,
+those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of
+man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect
+stature ; those who have been accustomed to regard some other
+attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
+instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal
+without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
+everyone will form general images of things according to the
+habit of his body.
+    It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,
+who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed
+of them, so many controversies should have arisen.
+    Note II.-From all that has been said above it is clear, that
+we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions :-(1.)
+From particular things represented to our intellect
+fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
+(II. xxix. Coroll.) ; I have settled to call such perceptions by
+the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.4 
+(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard
+certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
+concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things
+(II. xviii. note).  I shall call both these ways of regarding
+things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. 
+(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and
+adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll.,
+xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.) ; this I call reason and knowledge of
+the second kind.  Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,
+as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we
+will call intuition.  This kind of knowledge proceeds from an
+adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of
+God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.  I will
+illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. 
+Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to
+the third as the second is to the first.  Tradesmen without
+hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the
+product by the first ; either because they have not forgotten the
+rule which they received from a master without any proof, or
+because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or
+by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the
+seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property
+of proportionals.
+    But with very simple numbers there is no need of this.  For
+instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the
+fourth proportional is six ; and this is much clearer, because we
+infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio,
+which the first bears to the second.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of
+falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily
+true.
+    Proof.-To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the
+foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate
+and confused ; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only
+source of falsity (II. xxxv.).  Furthermore, we assigned to the
+second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are
+adequate ; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.
+xxxiv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not
+knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true
+from the false.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident.  He, who knows how
+to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea
+of true and false.  That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the
+true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that
+he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing
+perceived.
+    Proof.-A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,
+in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind
+(II. xi. Coroll.).  Let us suppose that there is in God, in so
+far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,
+A.  The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be
+referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,
+whereof the proof is of universal application).  But the idea A
+is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed
+through the human mind ; therefore, the idea of the idea A must
+be referred to God in the same manner ; that is (by II. xi.
+Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,
+which has the adequate idea A ; therefore he, who has an adequate
+idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time
+have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge ; that
+is, obviously, he must be assured.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
+the idea of an idea ; but we may remark that the foregoing
+proposition is in itself sufficiently plain.  No one, who has a
+true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
+certainty.  For to have a true idea is only another expression
+for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.  No one,
+indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
+something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
+thinking-namely, the very act of understanding.  And who, I ask,
+can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
+understand it?  In other words, who can know that he is sure of a
+thing, unless he be first sure of that thing?  Further, what can
+there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
+standard of truth?  Even as light displays both itself and
+darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
+    I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
+questions-namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false
+idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
+true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
+(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark) ;
+consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
+advantage over him who has only false ideas.  Further, how comes
+it that men have false ideas?  Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
+that he has ideas which agree with their objects?  These
+questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
+answered.  The difference between a true idea and a false idea is
+plain : from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to
+the latter as being is to not-being.  The causes of falsity I
+have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the
+note.  From what is there stated, the difference between a man
+who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made
+apparent.  As for the last question-as to how a man can be sure
+that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just
+pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises
+from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with
+its object-in other words, that truth is its own standard.  We
+may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is
+part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.) ;
+therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as
+necessarily true as the ideas of God.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  It is not in the nature of reason to regard things
+as contingent, but as necessary.
+    Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly
+(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves-that
+is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-Hence it follows, that it is only through our
+imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
+future or the past, as contingent.
+    Note.-How this way of looking at things arises, I will
+briefly explain.  We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)
+that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even
+though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which
+exclude their existence and presence.  Further (II. xviii.), we
+showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two
+external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards
+imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway
+remember the other-that is, it will regard both as present to
+itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence
+and presence.  Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from
+the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than
+others, some more quickly, some at equal speed.  Thus, let us
+suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in
+the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening ; then, that
+today he again sees Peter in the morning.  It is evident, from
+II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he
+will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the
+sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day ; in other
+words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his
+imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter ; with noon, he
+will imagine Paul ; and with evening, he will imagine Simon-that
+is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation
+to a future time ; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the
+evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by
+imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past
+time.  If it should at any time happen, that on some other
+evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on
+the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening
+sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together : for the
+child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,
+not both together.  His imagination will therefore waver ; and,
+with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first
+one, then the other-that is, he will imagine them in the future,
+neither of them as certain, but both as contingent.  This
+wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
+be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
+relation to time past or time present : consequently, we may
+imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time
+present, past, or future.
+    Corollary II.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive
+things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis
+specie).
+    Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as
+contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.).  Reason perceives this
+necessity of things (II. xli.) truly-that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it
+is in itself.  But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very
+necessity of the eternal nature of God ; therefore, it is in the
+nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. 
+We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.
+xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.
+xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing :
+which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,
+under a certain form of eternity.
+
+PROP. XLV.  Every idea of every body, or of every particular
+thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.
+    Proof.-The idea of a particular thing actually existing
+necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
+said thing (II. viii.).  Now particular things cannot be
+conceived without God (I. xv.) ; but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
+have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
+attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
+must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
+attributes of those ideas-that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-By existence I do not here mean duration-that is,
+existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
+certain form of quantity.  I am speaking of the very nature of
+existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
+follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
+necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.).  I am speaking, I repeat, of
+the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in
+God.  For although each particular thing be conditioned by
+another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force
+whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
+the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).
+
+PROP. XLVI.  The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of
+God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.
+    Proof.-The proof of the last proposition is universal ; and
+whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea
+thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),
+will involve God's eternal and infinite essence.  Wherefore,
+that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
+of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the
+whole ; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
+eternal and infinite essence of God.
+    Proof.-The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
+xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
+external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
+existing ; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
+knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
+eternity of God are known to all.  Now as all things are in God,
+and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
+many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
+third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,
+and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to
+speak in Part V.  Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as
+they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine
+God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the
+name God with images of things that they are in the habit of
+seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they
+are, men, and continually affected by external bodies.  Many
+errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do
+not apply names to things rightly.  For instance, when a man says
+that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its
+circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly
+attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that
+assigned by mathematicians.  So again, when men make mistakes in
+calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and
+another on the paper.  If we could see into their minds, they do
+not make a mistake ; they seem to do so, because we think, that
+they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the
+paper.  If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in
+error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I
+lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a
+neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. 
+Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do
+not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret
+the meaning of others.  For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly
+contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of
+the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider
+mistaken and absurd in their opponents.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  In the mind there is no absolute or free will ;
+but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which
+has also been determined by another cause, and this last by
+another cause, and so on to infinity.
+    Proof.-The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
+xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.
+xvii. Coroll. ii.) ; in other words, it cannot have an absolute
+faculty of positive or negative volition ; but (by I. xxviii.) it
+must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by
+another cause, and this last by another, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind
+no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c. 
+Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
+entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
+such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things. 
+Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to
+this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to
+this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul.  The cause
+which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in
+the Appendix to Part I.  But, before I proceed further, I would
+here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the
+faculty, not the desire.  I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby
+the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,
+wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing. 
+After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general
+notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular
+instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether
+volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. 
+We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any
+affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as
+it is an idea, involves.  On which subject see the following
+proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should
+suggest itself.  For by ideas I do not mean images such as are
+formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but
+the conceptions of thought.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
+negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
+involves.
+    Proof.-There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
+or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this
+or that affirmation, and this or that negation.  Now let us
+conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
+whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a
+triangle are equal to two right angles.  This affirmation
+involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
+the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.  It is the same
+thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as
+it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.  Further,
+this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
+of a triangle.  Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be
+conceived, without the idea of a triangle.  Again, this idea of a
+triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its
+three interior angles are equal to two right angles.  Wherefore,
+and vice versâ, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be
+conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation
+belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing
+besides.  What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have
+selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,
+that it is nothing but an idea.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Will and understanding are one and the same.
+    Proof.-Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
+individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note).  But a
+particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
+(by the foregoing Prop.) ; therefore, will and understanding are
+one and the same.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
+assigned for error.  For we have shown above, that falsity
+consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas
+which are fragmentary and confused.  Wherefore, a false idea,
+inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty.  When we
+say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he
+has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
+but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is
+false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his
+imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note).  Thus, although the
+man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say
+that he is certain.  For by certainty we mean something positive
+(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
+    However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
+explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and
+I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced
+against our doctrine.  Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
+I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
+advantages, which follow therefrom.  I say "some," for they will
+be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
+part.
+    I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
+make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
+the mind, and the images of things which we imagine.  It is
+further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
+words, whereby we signify things.  These three-namely, images,
+words, and ideas-are by many persons either entirely confused
+together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
+and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
+necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for
+philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.  Those
+who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
+contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas
+of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not
+ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
+our will ; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
+pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not
+see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
+affirmation or negation.  Again, those who confuse words with
+ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that
+they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or
+deny.  This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who
+reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no
+wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly
+understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not
+consist in the image of anything, nor in words.  The essence of
+words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no
+wise involve the conception of thought.
+
+    These few words on this subject will suffice : I will
+therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised
+against our doctrine.  Of these, the first is advanced by those,
+who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,
+and that therefore it is different therefrom.  The reason for
+their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the
+understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
+increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
+negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do
+not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
+faculty of understanding.  The will is thus distinguished from
+the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. 
+Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
+especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
+before assenting to things which we perceive ; this is confirmed
+by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
+perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.
+    For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not
+therefore admit that a winged horse exists ; that is, he is not
+deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does
+exist.  Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by
+experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and
+different from the faculty of understanding.  Thirdly, it may be
+objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more
+reality than another ; in other words, that we do not seem to
+need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power
+than for affirming, that what is false is true.  We have,
+however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than
+another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so
+also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others ; this
+also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and
+the will.  Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from
+free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are
+equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?  Will he
+perish of hunger and thirst?  If I say that he would, I shall
+seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather
+than an actual man.  If I say that he would not, he would then
+determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
+faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.  Other objections
+might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
+everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
+task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
+possible.
+    To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will
+has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding
+be meant only clear and distinct ideas ; but I deny that the will
+has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
+forming conceptions ; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
+should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling :
+for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
+infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
+affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the
+same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
+infinite number of bodies.  If it be said that there is an
+infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
+that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
+consequently, by any faculty of volition.  But, it may still be
+urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
+them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
+perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
+already.  This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
+it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
+entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
+understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
+which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. 
+We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we
+explain all particular volitions-in other words, that which is
+common to all such volitions.
+    As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
+universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
+wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
+into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding : for
+what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
+infinite number of individuals.
+    To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a
+free power of suspending our judgment : for, when we say that
+anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that
+he does not perceive the matter in question adequately. 
+Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a
+perception, and not free will.  In order to illustrate the point,
+let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing
+else.  Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the
+horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything
+which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will
+necessarily regard the horse as present : he will not be able to
+doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof.  We
+have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams ; and I
+do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,
+while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his
+judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it
+about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that
+he sees ; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we
+suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
+    Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as
+actual perception extends-that is, I grant that the mind's
+imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
+xvii. note) ; but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
+perception, make any affirmation.  For what is the perception of
+a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?  If the
+mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
+regard the same as present to itself : it would have no reasons
+for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
+the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
+precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
+perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
+inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
+existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the
+subject.
+    I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third
+objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is
+predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is
+common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate
+essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the
+abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the
+same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting
+the idea's essence : for, in this respect, particular
+affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas.  For
+instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,
+differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much
+as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.
+    Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal
+power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and
+to affirm that that which is false is true.  These two
+affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
+one another as being and not-being ; for there is nothing
+positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
+falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
+    We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when
+we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
+and abstractions with realities.  As for the fourth objection, I
+am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
+described  (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
+a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from
+him) would die of hunger and thirst.  If I am asked, whether such
+an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man ; I
+answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be
+considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider
+children, fools, madmen, &c.
+    It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
+doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
+from what has been said.  The doctrine is good,
+    1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
+decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so
+much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and
+more understand God.  Such a doctrine not only completely
+tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest
+happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of
+God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
+us.  We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
+estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God
+with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as
+for having endured the direst slavery ; as if virtue and the
+service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
+    2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct
+ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which
+are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature.  For it
+shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or
+frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the
+eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from
+the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.
+    3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches
+us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to
+be angry with any.  Further, as it tells us that each should be
+content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any
+womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the
+guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as
+I will show in Part III.
+    4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
+commonwealth ; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and
+led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do
+whatsoever things are best.
+    I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of
+this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a
+close.  I think I have therein explained the nature and
+properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
+considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient
+clearness.  I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
+excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
+to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.
+
+
+
+
+PART III.
+ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+
+    Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be
+treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural
+phenomena following nature's general laws.  They appear to
+conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a
+kingdom : for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
+nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,
+and that he is determined solely by himself.  They attribute
+human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in
+general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which
+accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,
+abuse : he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human
+mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked
+upon as a seer.  Still there has been no lack of very excellent
+men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),
+who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way
+of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind.  But no one,
+so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the
+emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their
+restraint.
+    I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he
+believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,
+strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at
+the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain
+to absolute dominion over them.  However, in my opinion, he
+accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own
+great intellect, as I will show in the proper place.  For the
+present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or
+deride human emotions than understand them.  Such persons will,
+doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of
+human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth
+with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as
+repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.  However,
+such is my plan.  Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be
+set down to a flaw therein ; for nature is always the same, and
+everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action ;
+that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to
+pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and
+always the same ; so that there should be one and the same method
+of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,
+through nature's universal laws and rules.  Thus the passions of
+hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow
+from this same necessity and efficacy of nature ; they answer to
+certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and
+possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the
+properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself
+affords us delight.  I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and
+strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I
+employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the
+mind.  I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the
+same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and
+solids.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS
+
+I.  By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect
+can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  By an inadequate or
+partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its
+effect cannot be understood.
+
+II.  I say that we act when anything takes place, either within
+us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause ; that
+is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature
+something takes place within us or externally to us, which can
+through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. 
+On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something
+when that something takes place within us, or follows from our
+nature externally, we being only the partial cause.
+
+III.  By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby
+the active power of the said body is increased or diminished,
+aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.
+
+N.B.  If we can be the adequate cause of any of these
+modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I
+call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.
+
+
+POSTULATES
+
+I.  The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its
+power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other
+ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or
+less.
+    N.B.  This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and
+Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.
+
+II.  The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,
+retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.),
+and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II.
+xvii.).
+
+PROP. I.  Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain
+cases passive.  In so far as it has adequate ideas it is
+necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it
+is necessarily passive.
+    Proof.-In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and
+some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note). 
+Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in
+God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.
+Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise
+(by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he
+contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as
+he, at the same time, contains the minds of other things.  Again,
+from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36) ;
+of this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not
+inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as
+affected by the given idea (II. ix.).  But of that effect whereof
+God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is
+adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in
+question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.).  Therefore our
+mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in
+certain cases necessarily active ; this was our first point. 
+Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is
+adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the
+mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together
+with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of
+such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not
+an adequate, but only a partial cause ; thus (III. Def. ii.) the
+mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases
+necessarily passive ; this was our second point.  Therefore our
+mind, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind is more or less
+liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate
+ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as
+it possesses adequate ideas.
+
+PROP. II.  Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind
+determine body to motion or rest or any state different from
+these, if such there be.
+    Proof.-All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by
+virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his
+being displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.).  That,
+therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of
+thought, and not a mode of extension ; that is (II. Def. i.), it
+is not body.  This was our first point.  Again, the motion and
+rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been
+determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and
+absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring
+from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of
+extension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.) ; that is,
+it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought.  This
+was our second point.  Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
+II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing,
+conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under
+the attribute of extension.  Thus it follows that the order or
+concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived
+under the one attribute or the other ; consequently the order of
+states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in
+nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the
+mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we
+proved II. xii.
+    Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no
+further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is
+proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the
+question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it
+is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in
+motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending
+solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought.  However,
+no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the
+body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what
+the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far
+as she is regarded as extension.  No one hitherto has gained such
+an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can
+explain all its functions ; nor need I call attention to the fact
+that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far
+transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things
+in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake :
+these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole
+laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.
+    Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the
+body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the
+body, nor how quickly it can move it.  Thus, when men say that
+this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which
+latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without
+meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are
+ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at
+it.
+    But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means
+whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate,
+experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit
+state to think, the body remains inert.  Moreover, we have
+experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or
+are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly,
+we say depend on the mind's decree.  But, as to the first point,
+I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach,
+that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted
+for thinking?  For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind
+simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of
+thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake.  Again, I
+think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the
+mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given
+subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for
+being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is
+the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.
+    But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the
+laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be
+able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of
+that kind, which are produced only by human art ; nor would the
+human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be
+capable of building a single temple.  However, I have just
+pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the
+body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration
+of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things
+being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would
+never have believed possible except under the direction of mind :
+such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and
+wondered at by their performers when awake.  I would further call
+attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses
+in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to
+repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under
+whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. 
+As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be
+much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they
+are to speak.  Experience abundantly shows that men can govern
+anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything
+more easily than their appetites ; when it comes about that many
+believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we
+moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be
+controlled by the thought of something else frequently
+remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what
+we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be
+allayed with the remembrance of anything else.  However, unless
+such persons had proved by experience that we do many things
+which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when
+assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the
+worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we
+are free in all things.  Thus an infant believes that of its own
+free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely
+desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires
+to run away ; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from
+the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he
+would willingly have withheld : thus, too, a delirious man, a
+garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe
+that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they
+are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. 
+Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men
+believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious
+of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those
+actions are determined ; and, further, it is plain that the
+dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and
+therefore vary according to the varying state of the body. 
+Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who
+are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish ;
+those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this
+way or that.  All these considerations clearly show that a mental
+decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are
+simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call
+decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the
+attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is
+regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the
+laws of motion and rest.  This will appear yet more plainly in
+the sequel.  For the present I wish to call attention to another
+point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind,
+unless we have a remembrance of having done so.  For instance, we
+cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so. 
+Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or
+forget a thing at will.  Therefore the freedom of the mind must
+in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering
+something which it remembers.  But when we dream that we speak,
+we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we
+do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the
+body.  Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we
+seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby
+we keep silence when awake concerning something we know.  Lastly,
+we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something,
+which we should not dare to do when awake.
+    Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two
+sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free? 
+If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must
+necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is
+believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination
+or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an
+idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II.
+xlix.).  Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind
+by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. 
+Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or
+act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream
+with their eyes open.
+
+PROP. III.  The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate
+ideas ; the passive states of the mind depend solely on
+inadequate ideas.
+    Proof.-The first element, which constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent
+body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many
+other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II.
+xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.).  Whatsoever therefore
+follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate
+cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily
+follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea.  But
+in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is
+necessarily passive : wherefore the activities of the mind follow
+solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only
+passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to
+the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving
+negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,
+which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself
+without other parts : I could thus show, that passive states are
+attributed to individual things in the same way that they are
+attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be
+perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.
+
+PROP. IV.  Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external
+to itself.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for the definition
+of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not
+negative it ; in other words, it postulates the essence of the
+thing, but does not take it away.  So long therefore as we regard
+only the thing itself, without taking into account external
+causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could
+destroy it.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in
+the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the
+other.
+    Proof.-If they could agree together or co-exist in the same
+object, there would then be in the said object something which
+could destroy it ; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is
+absurd, therefore things, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours
+to persist in its own being.
+    Proof.-Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of
+God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.)
+; that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given
+determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts ;
+now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be
+destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.) ; but
+contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its
+existence (III. v.).  Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so
+far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own
+being.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VII.  The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence
+of the thing in question.
+    Proof.-From the given essence of any thing certain
+consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any
+power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as
+determined (I. xxix.) ; wherefore the power of any given thing,
+or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it
+acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or
+endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,
+is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in
+question.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist
+in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite
+time.
+    Proof.-If it involved a limited time, which should determine
+the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that
+power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist
+beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed ;
+but this (III. iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore the endeavour wherewith
+a thing exists involves no definite time ; but, contrariwise,
+since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already
+exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some
+external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.
+
+PROP. IX.  The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct
+ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to
+persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this
+endeavour it is conscious.
+    Proof.-The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and
+inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so
+far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the
+latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for
+an indefinite time (III. viii.).  Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is
+necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the
+modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)
+conscious of its own endeavour.
+    Note.-This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is
+called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it
+is called appetite ; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's
+essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those
+results which tend to its preservation ; and which man has thus
+been determined to perform.
+    Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference,
+except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so
+far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly
+be thus defined : Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. 
+It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we
+strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we
+deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be
+good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or
+desire it.
+
+PROP. X.  An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,
+cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated
+therein (III. v.).  Therefore neither can the idea of such a
+thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II.
+ix. Coroll.) ; that is (II.xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing
+cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.
+xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it
+follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the
+endeavour to affirm the existence of our body : thus, an idea,
+which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our
+mind, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XI.  Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders
+the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or
+diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II.
+xiv.
+    Note.-Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,
+and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection,
+sometimes to a state of lesser perfection.  These passive states
+of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. 
+By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall
+signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater
+perfection.  By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the
+mind passes to a lesser perfection.  Further, the emotion of
+pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call
+stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of
+pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy. 
+But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are
+attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected
+than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike
+affected.  What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to
+Prop. ix. of this part ; beyond these three I recognize no other
+primary emotion ; I will show as I proceed, that all other
+emotions arise from these three.  But, before I go further, I
+should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this
+part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is
+contrary to another.  In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the
+idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the
+existence of body, so long as the body itself exists.  Again, it
+follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii.,
+that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the
+fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. 
+Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of
+the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends
+on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body. 
+Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its
+power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to
+affirm the present existence of the body.  Now the cause, why the
+mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the
+mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases
+to exist.  For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the
+existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist ;
+therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the
+existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist ; but
+(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes
+the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,
+and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the
+essence of our mind.
+
+PROP. XII.  The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive
+those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the
+body.
+    Proof.-So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and
+consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an
+external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,
+the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature
+of the said external body ; thus so long as the mind conceives
+things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,
+the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of
+activity (III. Post. i.) ; consequently (III. xi.) the mind's
+power of thinking is for that period increased or helped.  Thus
+(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine
+such things.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  When the mind conceives things which diminish or
+hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as
+possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the
+first-named things.
+    Proof.-So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind
+alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or
+constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof) ; nevertheless it will continue
+to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which
+excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.) ; that is (as
+I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is
+diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something
+else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived
+: therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour
+to conceive or remember the latter.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from
+conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of
+itself and of the body.
+    Note.-From what has been said we may clearly understand the
+nature of Love and Hate.  Love is nothing else but pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause : Hate is nothing
+else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  We
+further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,
+and to keep present to him, the object of his love ; while he who
+hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. 
+But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.
+
+PROP. XIV.  If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at
+the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one
+of these two, be also affected by the other.
+    Proof.-If the human body has once been affected by two bodies
+at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it
+will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.).  But the
+mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than
+the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.) ; therefore,
+if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been
+once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever
+it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by
+the other.
+
+PROP. XV.  Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,
+pain, or desire.
+    Proof.-Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously
+affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor
+diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either
+increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.).  From the
+foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is
+afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which
+(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of
+action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which
+does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.
+xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain.  Thus the
+former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but
+accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.  In the same way
+also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the
+cause of desire.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing
+with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate
+it.
+    Proof.-For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that
+the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with
+the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),
+according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or
+diminished, &c. ; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the
+mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.
+Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may
+love or hate the same.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or
+hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us
+; merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy.  We should
+refer to the same category those objects, which affect us
+pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other
+objects which affect us in the same way.  This I will show in the
+next Prop.  I am aware that certain authors, who were the first
+to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to
+signify thereby some occult qualities in things ; nevertheless I
+think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known
+or manifest qualities.
+
+PROP. XVI.  Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given
+object has some point of resemblance with another object which is
+wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the
+point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said
+emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love
+or hate.
+    Proof.-The point of resemblance was in the object (by
+hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus
+(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it
+will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and
+consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point
+of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of
+pleasure or pain.  Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although
+the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the
+first-named object with love or hate.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect
+us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing
+which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of
+pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same
+time we shall love it.
+    Proof.-The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause
+of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with
+this emotion, we shall hate it : further, inasmuch as we conceive
+that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is
+wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we
+shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it
+(III.xvi.) ; thus we shall both hate and love the same thing. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This disposition of the mind, which arises from two
+contrary emotions, is called vacillation ; it stands to the
+emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination
+(II. xliv. note) ; vacillation and doubt do not differ one from
+the other, except as greater differs from less.  But we must bear
+in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which
+give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the
+other accidentally.  I have done this, in order that they might
+be more easily deduced from what went before ; but I do not deny
+that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an
+object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions.  The human
+body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts
+of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.
+after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by
+one and the same body ; and contrariwise, as one and the same
+thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different
+ways affect one and the same part of the body.  Hence we can
+easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of
+many and conflicting emotions.
+
+PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully
+by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing
+present.
+    Proof.-So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,
+he will regard that thing as present, even though it be
+non-existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as
+past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the
+image of time past or future (II. xliv. note).  Wherefore the
+image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether
+it be referred to time past, time future, or time present ; that
+is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is
+identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or
+present.  Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the ssame,
+whether the image be of a thing past or future.  Q.E.D.
+    Note I.-I call a thing past or future, according as we either
+have been or shall be affected thereby.  For instance, according
+as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has
+recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,
+or will harm us.  For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its
+existence ; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which
+excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)
+the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way
+as if the thing were actually present.  However, as it generally
+happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so
+long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in
+doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note) ; it follows that the
+emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so
+constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other
+things, until men become assured of the issue.
+    Note II.-From what has just been said, we understand what is
+meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and
+Disappointment.5  Hope is nothing else but an inconstant
+pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,
+whereof we do not yet know the issue.  Fear, on the other hand,
+is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something
+concerning which we are in doubt.  If the element of doubt be
+removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear
+becomes Despair.  In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from
+the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared. 
+Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past
+whereof we have doubted the issue.  Disappointment is the Pain
+opposed to Joy.
+
+PROP. XIX.  He who conceives that the object of his love is
+destroyed will feel pain ; if he conceives that it is preserved
+he will feel pleasure.
+    Proof.-The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive
+those things which increase or help the body's power of activity
+(III. xii.) ; in other words (III. xii. note), those things which
+it loves.  But conception is helped by those things which
+postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered
+by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.) ;
+therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of
+an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the
+object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind
+pleasurably ; contrariwise those things, which exclude the
+existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental
+endeavour ; in other words, affect the mind painfully.  He,
+therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
+will feel pain, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  He who conceives that the object of his hate is
+destroyed will also feel pleasure.
+    Proof.-The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those
+things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's
+power of activity is diminished or constrained ; that is (III.
+xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the
+existence of what it hates ; therefore the image of a thing,
+which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the
+aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects
+the mind pleasurably.  Thus he who conceives that the object of
+his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXI.  He who conceives, that the object of his love is
+affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected
+pleasurably or painfully ; and the one or the other emotion will
+be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or
+less in the thing loved.
+    Proof.-The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which
+postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's
+endeavour to conceive the said object.  But pleasure postulates
+the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in
+proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater ; for it is
+(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection ; therefore
+the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental
+endeavour of the lover ; that is, it affects the lover
+pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion
+may have been greater in the object of love.  This was our first
+point.  Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it
+is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to
+the amount of pain (III. xi. note) ; therefore (III. xix.) he who
+conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,
+will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said
+emotion is greater or less in the object of love.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects
+some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards
+that thing.  Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an
+object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred
+towards it.
+    Proof.-He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of
+our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully-that is, if we
+conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or
+pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come
+to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause ; therefore
+(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object
+of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with
+love or hatred towards him.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we
+may define as pain arising from another's hurt.  What term we can
+use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.
+    We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on
+another, Approval ; and the hatred towards him who injures
+another, we will call Indignation.  We must further remark, that
+we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown
+in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto
+regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles
+ourselves (as I will show presently).  Thus, we bestow approval
+on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,
+contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
+painfully affected, will feel pleasure.  Contrariwise, if he
+thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel
+pain.  Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according
+as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.
+    Proof.-In so far as an object of hatred is painfully
+affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the
+strength of the pain (III. xi. note).  Therefore, he (III. xx.)
+who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully
+affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the
+amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred.  This
+was our first point.  Again, pleasure postulates the existence of
+the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as
+the pleasure is greater or less.  If anyone imagines that an
+object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception
+(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist ; in other
+words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and
+without any mental conflict.  For (as I am about to show in Prop.
+xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to
+himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like
+manner ; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary
+circumstances.  But here we are regarding hatred only.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an
+object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also.  If we
+conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall
+feel love towards him.
+    Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xxii., which see.
+    Note.-These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
+to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so
+far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's
+hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.
+
+PROP. XXV.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
+concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to
+affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.  Contrariwise,
+we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
+painfully ourselves or the loved object.
+    Proof.-That, which we conceive to affect an object of our
+love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or
+painfully (III. xxi.).  But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
+far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
+pleasurably ; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it
+endeavours to regard them as present.  And, contrariwise (III.
+xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as
+affect us painfully ; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
+concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
+we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
+hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully ; and,
+contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
+which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
+    Proof.-This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the
+foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.
+    Note.-Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may
+easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,
+contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object.  This feeling is
+called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of
+himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with
+his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that
+fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting
+them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to
+conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines
+his own power of action.  Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing
+from a man thinking too highly of himself.  Again, the pleasure
+which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called
+over-esteem.  Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too
+little of a man is called disdain.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is
+like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,
+to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a
+like emotion (affectus).
+    Proof.-The images of things are modifications of the human
+body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to
+us (II. xvii.) ; in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas
+involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature
+of the external bodies as present.  If, therefore, the nature of
+the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the
+idea which we form of the external body will involve a
+modification of our own body similar to the modification of the
+external body.  Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to
+ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will
+express a modification of our body similar to that emotion. 
+Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be
+affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
+emotion.  If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we
+shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not
+similar, emotion.  Q.E.D.
+    Note I.-This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to
+pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note) ; when it is
+referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else
+but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we
+conceive that others have the like desire.
+    Corollary I.-If we conceive that anyone, whom we have
+hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something
+similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him. 
+If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the
+same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
+    Proof.-This is proved from the last proposition in the same
+manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.
+    Corollary II.-We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
+its misery affects us painfully.
+    Proof.-If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice
+in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
+    Corollary III.-We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,
+a thing which we pity.
+    Proof.-That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,
+affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition)
+; therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which
+removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.) ; in
+other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we
+shall be determined for its destruction ; thus, we shall
+endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity.  Q.E.D.
+    Note II.-This will or appetite for doing good, which arises
+from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is
+called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from
+compassion.  Concerning love or hate towards him who has done
+good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like
+ourselves, see III. xxii. note.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
+to conduce to pleasure ; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
+whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
+conduce to pain.
+    Proof.-We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that
+which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.) ; in other
+words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as
+possible as present or actually existing.  But the endeavour of
+the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
+simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power
+of action.  (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.
+Coroll.).  Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
+existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the
+same thing) we desire and strive for it ; this was our first
+point.  Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed
+to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
+hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.).  We shall,
+therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy
+the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may
+not regard it as present ; this was our second point.  Wherefore
+whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
+men6 to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
+from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
+    Proof.-From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate
+anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.). 
+That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel
+pleasure or pain at the thing's presence.  And so we shall
+endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with
+pleasure, etc.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
+in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
+eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit
+certain things to our own or another's hurt : in other cases it
+is generally called kindliness.  Furthermore I give the name of
+praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of
+another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us ; but of blame
+to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.
+
+PROP. XXX.  If anyone has done something which he conceives as
+affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
+accompanied by the idea of himself as cause ; in other words, he
+will regard himself with pleasure.  On the other hand, if he has
+done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
+he will regard himself with pain.
+    Proof.-He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure
+or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with
+pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and
+xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby
+he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,
+that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause ; in other
+words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  And so mutatis
+mutandis in the case of pain.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause ; the pleasure and pain in question
+will be a species of love and hatred.  But, as the terms love and
+hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ
+other names for the emotions now under discussion : pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause7 we will style
+Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame : I
+mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's
+belief, that he is being praised or blamed : otherwise pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause8 is called
+self-complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance. 
+Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,
+wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist
+solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone
+endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives
+will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a
+vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,
+when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates
+anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
+thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,
+&c.  On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from
+something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.
+    Proof.-From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves
+anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.) : but
+we are assumed to love it already ; there is, therefore, a new
+cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered ; hence we
+shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.  Again, from the mere
+fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall
+ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).  If we assume
+that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously
+love it and shrink from it ; in other words, we shall be subject
+to vacillation (III. xvii. note).  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it
+follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause
+others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself
+hates : as the poet says :  "As lovers let us share every hope
+and every fear : ironhearted were he who should love what the
+other leaves."9
+    Note.-This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes
+and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really
+ambition (see III. xxix. note) ; wherefore we see that everyone
+by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should
+live according to his own individual disposition : when such a
+desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone
+else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all
+become mutually hateful.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  If we conceive that anyone takes delight in
+something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour
+to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain
+possession thereof.
+    Proof.-From the mere fact of our conceiving that another
+person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we
+shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight
+therein.  But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be
+prevented by another's delight in its object ; we shall,
+therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.
+xxviii.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We thus see that man's nature is generally so
+constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies
+those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his
+own love for the goods in their possession.  Further, we see that
+from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that
+men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and
+ambitious.  Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall
+find that she entirely confirms what we have said ; more
+especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our
+life.  We find that children, whose body is continually, as it
+were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others
+laughing or crying ; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate
+whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of
+whatever they conceive as delighting others : inasmuch as the
+images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human
+body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by
+external causes to act in this or that manner.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  When we love a thing similar to ourselves we
+endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love
+us in return.
+    Proof.-That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to
+conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.).  If the
+thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it
+pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.).  In
+other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it
+about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),
+that it should love us in return.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  The greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our
+complacency.
+    Proof.-We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to
+bring about, that what we love should love us in return : in
+other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause.  Therefore, in
+proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected
+because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.-that is (III. xi.
+and note) the greater will be our pleasure.  But when we take
+pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something
+similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30)
+; therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  If anyone conceives, that an object of his love
+joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he
+himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards
+the loved object and with envy towards his rival.
+    Proof.-In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is
+well affected towards him, will be the strength of his
+self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of
+his pleasure ; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as
+far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound
+to him : this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks
+that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).  But this
+endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the
+loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved
+object has joined to itself ; therefore (III. xi. note) he will
+for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of
+the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his
+rival ; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred
+towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.
+Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved
+object.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy
+is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a
+wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and
+hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied. 
+Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,
+in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont
+to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object ; and
+also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained
+towards his rival.  If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate
+the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably
+affected by one whom he himself hates : and also because he is
+compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image
+of him whom he hates.  This condition generally comes into play
+in the case of love for a woman : for he who thinks, that a woman
+whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not
+only because his own desire is restrained, but also because,
+being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the
+parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks
+from her.
+    We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved
+with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives
+him pain as a lover, as I will now show.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  He who remembers a thing, in which he has once
+taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances
+as when he first took delight therein.
+    Proof.-Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with
+the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of
+pleasure (III. xv.) ; he will, therefore, desire to possess it,
+in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight ; in other
+words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the
+same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the
+aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.
+    Proof.-For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be
+missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.  As
+he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or
+circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he
+conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence
+of the object of love, is called Regret.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or
+love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
+    Proof.-Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of
+activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes
+or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in
+his own being ; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said
+endeavour : thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are
+directed to removing that pain.  But (by the definition of pain),
+in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily
+opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity ; therefore
+the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed
+to remove it ; that is, the greater will be the desire or
+appetite in endeavouring to remove it.  Again, since pleasure
+(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it
+may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by
+pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his
+desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.
+    Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain
+and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,
+appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be
+greater in proportion to the hatred or love.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,
+so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being
+equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,
+and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his
+former love.
+    Proof.-If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more
+of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never
+loved it.  For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man
+endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.) ;
+he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by
+affecting it as far as he can pleasurably ; this endeavour is
+greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the
+endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his
+affection (III. xxxiii.).  Now these endeavours are constrained
+by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.
+xxiii.) ; wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause
+also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love
+has been greater ; that is, in addition to the pain caused by
+hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the
+object ; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater
+pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never
+loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former
+love was greater.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
+injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
+to himself ; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the
+same law, seek to benefit him.
+    Proof.-To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as
+a cause of pain ; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to
+remove or destroy him.  But if anything more painful, or, in
+other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater
+thereby-and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not
+carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of
+his hate-he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury
+(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)
+will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will
+therefore prevail over it, as we asserted.  The second part of
+this proof proceeds in the same manner.  Wherefore he who hates
+another, etc.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all
+that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our
+longings, whatsoever they may be.  By evil, I mean every kind of
+pain, especially that which frustrates our longings.  For I have
+shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because
+we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because
+we desire it : consequently we deem evil that which we shrink
+from ; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,
+judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,
+what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst.  Thus a
+miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of
+money the worst ; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as
+glory, and fears nothing so much as shame.  To an envious man
+nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing
+more painful than another's success.  So every man, according to
+his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or
+useless.  The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that
+which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is
+called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear
+whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
+future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.).  But if the
+evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness. 
+Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the
+fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,
+fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared
+be very great.
+
+PROP. XL.  He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
+believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate
+that other in return.
+    Proof.-He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will
+thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  But, by
+the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him
+who is his enemy ; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by
+some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea
+of his enemy ; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred
+will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame ; but this case
+(III. xxv.) rarely happens.  This reciprocation of hatred may
+also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure
+the object of our hate (III. xxxix.).  He therefore who conceives
+that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause
+of some evil or pain ; thus he will be affected with pain or
+fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause ; in other
+words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I
+said above.
+    Corollary I.-He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates
+him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  For, in so
+far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is
+determined to hate his enemy in return.  But, by the hypothesis,
+he nevertheless loves him : wherefore he will be a prey to
+conflicting hatred and love.
+    Corollary II.-If a man conceives that one, whom he has
+hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from
+motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in
+kind.
+    Proof.-He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the
+last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will
+endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully ;
+he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.). 
+Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury
+done to himself ; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to
+repay it in kind.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called
+Anger ; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves
+is called Revenge.
+
+PROP. XLI.  If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and
+believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love
+that other in return.  (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)
+    Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as the
+preceding one.  See also the note appended thereto.
+    Note.-If he believes that he has given just cause for the
+love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note) ; this is
+what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its
+contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated
+by another.  (See note to preceding proposition.)  This
+reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him
+who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is
+called gratitude or thankfulness.  It thus appears that men are
+much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.
+    Corollary.-He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he
+hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  This is
+proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding
+proposition.
+    Note.-If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour
+to injure him who loves him ; this emotion is called cruelty,
+especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary
+cause for hatred.
+
+PROP. XLII.  He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from
+motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the
+benefit is received without gratitude.
+    Proof.-When a man loves something similar to himself, he
+endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be
+loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.).  Therefore he who has
+conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which
+he feels of being loved in return ; that is (III. xxxiv.) from
+the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure ; hence he will
+endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or
+to regard it as actually existing.  But, by the hypothesis, he
+conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the
+said cause of honour : wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.
+xix.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can
+on the other hand be destroyed by love.
+    Proof.-He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates
+him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former
+hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.).  But if, on the
+other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he
+will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,
+and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his
+emotion.  In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.
+xli.), and not to affect him painfully ; this endeavour (III.
+xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion
+from which it arises.  Therefore, if it be greater than that
+which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to
+affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better
+of it and banish the hatred from his mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
+into love : and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not
+preceded it.
+    Proof.-The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.
+of this Part : for he who begins to love a thing, which he was
+wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving
+feels pleasure.  To this pleasure involved in love is added the
+pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the
+pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea
+of the former object of hatred as cause.
+    Note.-Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate
+anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying
+this greater pleasure ; that is, no one will desire that he
+should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor
+long to be ill for the sake of getting well.  For everyone will
+always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as
+far as he can.  If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a
+man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love
+him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him.  For
+the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the
+hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be
+continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,
+he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he
+might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health : in
+such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)
+is absurd.
+
+PROP. XLV.  If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself
+hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will
+hate that person.
+    Proof.-The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him
+who hates it (III. xl.) ; therefore the lover, in conceiving that
+anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as
+affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain ;
+consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the
+idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause ; that is, he
+will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III.
+xiii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLVI.  If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully
+by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if
+the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said
+stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or
+nation : the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the
+individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation
+whereto he belongs.
+    Proof.-This is evident from III. xvi.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is
+destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a
+certain pain in us.
+    Proof.-This is evident from III. xxvii.  For in so far as we
+conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,
+we ourselves feel pain.
+    Note.-This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary
+to II. xvii.  Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not
+actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is
+affected in the same manner ; wherefore, in so far as the
+remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard
+it with pain ; this determination, while the image of the thing
+in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other
+things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not
+destroyed : hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the
+said determination is checked : for this reason the joy arising
+from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we
+remember that object of hatred.  For, as we have said, when the
+image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it
+involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard
+the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it
+actually did exist.  However, since he has joined to the image of
+the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this
+determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices
+afresh as often as the repetition takes place.  This is the cause
+of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in
+narrating dangers from which they have escaped.  For when men
+conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are
+determined to fear it ; this determination is checked afresh by
+the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the
+danger when they escaped therefrom : this renders them secure
+afresh : therefore they rejoice afresh.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is
+destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain
+involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of
+another cause : and will be diminished in proportion as we
+conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.
+    Proof.-This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love
+and hatred (III. xiii. note).  For pleasure is called love
+towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in
+so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the
+other.  When this condition of causality is either wholly or
+partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part
+vanishes.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to
+be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if
+it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.
+    Proof.-A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)
+be perceived through itself without anything else.  If,
+therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we
+shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall
+do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the
+given emotion.  But if the thing which causes the emotion be
+conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.
+vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of
+the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred
+towards it will be less.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be
+free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards
+anything else : to this consideration we must add the imitation
+of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.
+
+PROP. L.  Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
+or fear.
+    Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.
+    Note.-Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or
+fear are called good or evil omens.  Now, in so far as such omens
+are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of
+hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of
+pleasure and pain ; consequently we, to this extent, regard them
+with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means
+towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles,
+or causes of that which we fear.  It follows, further, from III.
+xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily
+in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we
+fear ; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or
+below their true value.  Hence there have arisen superstitions,
+whereby men are everywhere assailed.  However, I do not think it
+worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from
+hope and fear ; it follows from the definition of these emotions,
+that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope,
+as I will duly explain in the proper place.  Further, in so far
+as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred
+; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we
+have said concerning love and hatred.
+
+PROP. LI.  Different men may be differently affected by the same
+object, and the same man may be differently affected at different
+times by the same object.
+    Proof.-The human body is affected by external bodies in a
+variety of ways (II. Post. iii.).  Two men may therefore be
+differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.
+after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by
+one and the same object.  Further (by the same Post.) the human
+body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another ;
+consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected
+at different times by one and the same object.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We thus see that it is possible, that what one man
+loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may
+not fear ; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he
+once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. 
+Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,
+what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it
+follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their
+emotions10, hence when we compare some with others, we
+distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and
+style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet. 
+For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil
+which I am accustomed to fear ; if I further take into
+consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to
+benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of
+an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him
+daring.  Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an
+evil which I am accustomed to despise ; and if I further take
+into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of
+an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that
+he is cowardly ; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.
+    Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human
+judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his
+emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause
+pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,
+are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of
+things alluded to in III. xxviii. ; we may readily conceive that
+a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.  Thus we
+can easily understand what are Repentance and Self-complacency. 
+Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as
+cause ; Self-complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because
+men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).
+
+PROP. LII.  An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction
+with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property
+that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so
+long, as an object which we conceive to have some property
+peculiar to itself.
+    Proof.-As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in
+conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.
+xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the
+contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another
+object.  And this is the case with the object, which we conceive
+to have no property that is not common to many.  For we thereupon
+assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not
+before seen in conjunction with other objects.  But when we
+suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we
+have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while
+regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to
+regarding instead thereof ; therefore it is determined to the
+contemplation of that object only.  Therefore an object, &c. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This mental modification, or imagination of a
+particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called
+Wonder ; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
+Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed
+in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to
+think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil.  If,
+however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or
+anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby
+regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration
+; otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at,
+the emotion is called Horror.  Again, if it be the prudence,
+industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our
+love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when
+joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion.  We may in
+like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other
+emotions, as associated with wonder ; and we should thus be able
+to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in
+ordinary speech.  Whence it is evident, that the names of the
+emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their
+ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their
+nature.
+    To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from
+the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or
+fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears
+to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c.,
+we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),
+determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing.  But if from
+the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,
+we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause
+of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the
+thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities
+which are not in it, than of those which are in it ; whereas, on
+the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more
+particularly to regard that which is therein.  As devotion
+springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision
+spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn
+from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. 
+Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,
+in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other
+emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any
+recognized name.
+
+PROP. LIII.  When the mind regards itself and its own power of
+activity, it feels pleasure : and that pleasure is greater in
+proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and
+its own power of activity.
+    Proof.-A man does not know himself except through the
+modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and
+xxiii.).  When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate
+itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or
+(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure ; and the pleasure will be
+greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able
+to conceive itself and its own power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-This pleasure is fostered more and more, in
+proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. 
+For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more
+he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by
+the idea of himself (III. xxix. note) ; thus he is (III. xxvii.)
+himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea
+of himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
+assert its power of activity.
+    Proof.-The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual
+essence thereof (III. vii.) ; but the essence of the mind
+obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do ; not
+that which it neither is nor can do ; therefore the mind
+endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its
+power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LV.  When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
+pain thereat.
+    Proof.-The essence of the mind only affirms that which the
+mind is, or can do ; in other words, it is the mind's nature to
+conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last
+Prop.).  Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own
+weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting
+to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is
+checked in its endeavour - in other words (III. xi. note), it
+feels pain.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-This pain is more and more fostered, if a man
+conceives that he is blamed by others ; this may be proved in the
+same way as the corollary to III. liii.
+    Note.-This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,
+is called humility ; the pleasure, which springs from the
+contemplation of ourselves, is called self-love or
+self-complacency.  And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as
+often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of
+activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own
+exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and
+also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another. 
+Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.
+note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of
+their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues.  For whenever a
+man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.
+liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and
+he conceives them more distinctly-that is (II. xl. note), in
+proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard
+them as something special.  Therefore, a man will take most
+pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some
+quality which he denies to others.  But, if that which he affirms
+of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in
+general, he will not be so greatly pleased : he will, on the
+contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall
+short when compared with those of others.  This pain (III.
+xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
+construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he
+can, embellishing his own.
+    It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred
+and envy, which latter is fostered by their education.  For
+parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely
+by the spur of honour and envy.  But, perhaps, some will scruple
+to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's
+virtues, and venerate their possessors.  In order to remove such
+doubts, I append the following corollary.
+    Corollary.-No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his
+equal.
+    Proof.-Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.
+xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby
+a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is
+checked.  But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,
+which cannot follow from his nature as it is given ; therefore a
+man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the
+same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to
+another's nature and foreign to his own ; hence his desire cannot
+be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue
+in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an
+one.  But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same
+nature as himself.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,
+we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,
+&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar
+to him, and not as common to our nature ; we, therefore, no more
+envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions
+for being courageous.
+
+PROP. LVI.  There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of
+desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as
+vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,
+hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we
+are affected.
+    Proof.-Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions
+compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or
+passive states (III. xi. note) ; now we are necessarily passive
+(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas ; and only in so
+far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.) ; that is,
+we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we
+conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by
+an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the
+nature of an external body.  Wherefore the nature of every
+passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature
+of the object whereby we are affected be expressed.  Namely, the
+pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the
+nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the
+object B, involves the nature of the object B ; wherefore these
+two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the
+causes whence they arise are by nature different.  So again the
+emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature
+different from the pain arising from another object, and,
+similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,
+&c.
+    Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,
+love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are
+affected.  Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any
+given modification of itself (III. ix. note) ; therefore,
+according as a man is affected through external causes by this or
+that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words,
+according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so
+will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one
+desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,
+as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose. 
+Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of
+pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown)
+there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects
+whereby we are affected.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last
+proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,
+drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of
+love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a
+manner varying according to the object, with which they are
+concerned.  For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,
+&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,
+venery, riches, and fame.  Furthermore, these emotions, in so far
+as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects
+wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries.  For
+temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose
+to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive
+states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the
+last-named emotions.  However, I cannot here explain the
+remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as
+the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary. 
+It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the
+strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have
+a general definition of each emotion.  It is sufficient, I
+repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and
+the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the
+mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions.  Thus,
+though there is a great difference between various emotions of
+love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards
+children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us
+to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further
+the nature and origin of the emotions.
+
+PROP. LVII.  Any emotion of a given individual differs from the
+emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of
+the one individual differs from the essence of the other.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see
+after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.).  Nevertheless, we will
+prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.
+    All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,
+as their definitions above given show.  But desire is each man's
+nature or essence (III. ix. note) ; therefore desire in one
+individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature
+or essence of the other.  Again, pleasure and pain are passive
+states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to
+persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or
+hindered (III. xi. and note).  But by the endeavour to persist in
+its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in
+conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note) ;
+therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or
+appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every
+man's nature ; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man
+differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the
+essence of the other ; consequently, any emotion of one
+individual only differs, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals
+which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of
+mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's
+emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human
+nature.  Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of
+procreation ; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire
+of the latter is human.  So also the lusts and appetites of
+insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the
+several natures.  Thus, although each individual lives content
+and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his
+being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is
+nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and
+hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of
+another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the
+essence of another.  Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
+proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
+which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
+philosopher, as I just mention here by the way.  Thus far I have
+treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is
+passive.  It remains to add a few words on those attributable to
+him in so far as he is active.
+
+PROP. LVIII.  Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities
+or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
+desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
+    Proof.-When the mind conceives itself and its power of
+activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.) : now the mind
+necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or
+adequate idea (II. xliii.).  But the mind does conceive certain
+adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.).  Therefore it feels pleasure in
+so far as it conceives adequate ideas ; that is, in so far as it
+is active (III. i.).  Again, the mind, both in so far as it has
+clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,
+endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.) ; but by such
+an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.) ;
+therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we
+understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LIX.  Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
+active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or
+desire.
+    Proof.-All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or
+pain, as their definitions, already given, show.  Now by pain we
+mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked
+(III. xi. and note) ; therefore, in so far as the mind feels
+pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is
+diminished or checked (III. i.) ; therefore, no painful emotions
+can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but
+only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
+are attributable to the mind in that condition.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-All actions following from emotion, which are
+attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set
+down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into
+courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas).  By
+courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve
+his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason. 
+By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,
+solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to
+unite them to himself in friendship.  Those actions, therefore,
+which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to
+courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to
+highmindedness.  Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind
+in danger, &c., are varieties of courage ; courtesy, mercy, &c.,
+are varieties of highmindedness.
+    I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their
+primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,
+which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,
+to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain.  It is evident from what I
+have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external
+causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds
+we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate.  But I
+have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting
+emotions, not all that might be given.  For, by proceeding in the
+same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to
+repentance, scorn, shame, &c.  I think everyone will agree from
+what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with
+another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise
+therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation.  However,
+for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most
+important ; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be
+more curious than profitable.  It remains to remark concerning
+love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a
+thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,
+acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another
+way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
+begins to conceive and desire something fresh.  For example, when
+we conceive something which generally delights us with its
+flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it.  But whilst we
+are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is
+otherwise disposed.  If, therefore, when the body is thus
+otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be
+stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be
+stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel
+repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the
+presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become
+odious.  This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or
+weariness.  For the rest, I have neglected the outward
+modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for
+instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these
+are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the
+mind.  Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be
+supplemented in a few points ; I will therefore repeat them,
+interpolating such observations as I think should here and there
+be added.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+I.  Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given
+modification of itself.
+    Explanation.-We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of
+this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof ;
+further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is
+determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
+persistence.  But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
+strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
+and desire.  For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or
+not, it remains one and the same appetite.  Thus, in order to
+avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
+explaining desire by appetite ; but I have take care to define it
+in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those
+endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms
+appetite, will, desire, or impulse.  I might, indeed, have said,
+that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived
+as determined to a particular activity ; but from such a
+definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can
+be conscious of its desire or appetite.  Therefore, in order to
+imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,
+in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c. 
+For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every
+disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be
+innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of
+thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,
+lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. 
+By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours,
+impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each
+man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to
+another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and
+knows not where to turn.
+
+II.  Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
+perfection.
+
+III.  Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
+perfection.
+    Explanation-I say transition : for pleasure is not perfection
+itself.  For, if man were born with the perfection to which he
+passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of
+pleasure.  This appears more clearly from the consideration of
+the contrary emotion, pain.  No one can deny, that pain consists
+in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less
+perfection itself : for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he
+partakes of perfection of any degree.  Neither can we say, that
+pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection.  For
+absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity ;
+wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition
+from a greater to a less perfection-in other words, it is an
+activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or
+constrained (cf. III. xi. note).  I pass over the definitions of
+merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these
+terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely
+kinds of pleasure or pain.
+
+IV.  Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
+the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in
+question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and
+note).
+    Explanation-In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,
+why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway
+falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the
+images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one
+follows the other.  This state of association is impossible, if
+the image of the thing be new ; the mind will then be at a stand
+in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other
+causes to think of something else.
+    Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is
+of the same nature as other conceptions ; hence, I do not include
+wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include
+it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no
+positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but
+merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the
+mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the
+contemplation of another.
+    I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary
+emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,
+pain, and desire.  I have spoken of wonder simply because it is
+customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three
+primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the
+objects of our wonder.  I am led by the same motive to add a
+definition of contempt.
+
+V.  Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
+so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those
+qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.
+III. lii. note).
+    The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
+I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.
+
+VI.  Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+    Explanation-This definition explains sufficiently clearly the
+essence of love ; the definition given by those authors who say
+that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
+object expresses a property, but not the essence of love ; and,
+as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
+they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
+properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
+to be very obscure.  It must, however, be noted, that when I say
+that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
+unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish
+consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I
+have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious) ; neither do I
+mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is
+absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand ; for
+love can be conceived without either of these desires ; but by
+wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of
+the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the
+lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.
+
+VII.  Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+    Explanation-These observations are easily grasped after what
+has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.
+also III. xiii. note).
+
+VIII.  Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
+
+IX.  Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which
+is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).
+
+X.  Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.
+    Explanation-Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.
+lii.) from the novelty of a thing.  If, therefore, it happens
+that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall
+cease to wonder at it ; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion
+readily degenerates into simple love.
+
+XI.  Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
+presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we
+hate.
+    Explanation-In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we
+deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent
+rejoice (III. xx.).  But since we assume that man hates that
+which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not
+without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).
+
+XII.  Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue.
+
+XIII.  Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).
+    Explanation-From these definitions it follows, that there is
+no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope. 
+For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of
+anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the
+existence of the said thing in the future ; therefore he, to this
+extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.) ; consequently, while
+dependent on hope, he fears for the issue.  Contrariwise he, who
+fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something
+which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the
+existence of the thing in question ; to this extent he feels
+pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will
+turn out as he desires (III. xx.).
+
+XIV.  Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something
+past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+
+XV.  Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or
+future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+    Explanation-Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair
+from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event
+has been removed : this comes to pass, because man conceives
+something past or future as present and regards it as such, or
+else because he conceives other things, which exclude the
+existence of the causes of his doubt.  For, although we can never
+be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.
+xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt
+concerning it.  For we have shown, that to feel no doubt
+concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it
+(II. xlix. note).  Thus it may happen that we are affected by the
+same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or
+future, as concerning the conception of a thing present ; this I
+have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I
+refer the reader.
+
+XVI.  Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,
+which has had an issue beyond our hope.
+
+XVII.  Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of
+something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.
+
+XVIII.  Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has
+befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
+III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).
+    Explanation-Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there
+seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is
+used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in
+reference to a disposition.
+
+XIX.  Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
+
+XX.  Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to
+another.
+    Explanation-I am aware that these terms are employed in
+senses somewhat different from those usually assigned.  But my
+purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature
+of things.  I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my
+meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary
+signification.  One statement of my method will suffice. As for
+the cause of the above-named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,
+and III. xxii. note.
+
+XXI.  Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the
+love we bear him.
+
+XXII.  Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we
+hate him.
+    Explanation-Thus partiality is an effect of love, and
+disparagement an effect of hatred : so that partiality may also
+be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+highly of a beloved object.  Contrariwise, disparagement may be
+defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+meanly of a hated object.  Cf. III. xxvi. note.
+
+XXIII.  Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be
+pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's
+evil fortune.
+    Explanation-Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by
+doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be
+thus defined :
+
+XXIV.  Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a
+man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at
+another's evil fortune.
+    Explanation-Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and
+xxxii.  These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain
+accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in
+itself or accidentally.  I now pass on to other emotions, which
+are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.
+
+XXV.  Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
+
+XXVI.  Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his
+own weakness of body or mind.
+    Explanation-Self-complacency is opposed to humility, in so
+far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of
+our own power of action ; but, in so far as we mean thereby
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe
+we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed
+to repentance, which we may thus define :
+
+XXVII.  Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some
+action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision
+of our mind.
+    Explanation-The causes of these emotions we have set forth in
+III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.  Concerning
+the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.  This is
+perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
+nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
+called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are
+called right, are followed by pleasure.  We can easily gather
+from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on
+education.  Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,
+and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and
+also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought
+it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the
+latter with pleasure.  This is confirmed by experience.  For
+custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that
+which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some
+consider honourable others consider disgraceful.  According as
+each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given
+action or glories therein.
+
+XXVIII.  Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from
+self-love.
+    Explanation-Thus pride is different from partiality, for the
+latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride
+is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.  However, as
+partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or
+property of self-love, which may therefore be thus defined, love
+of self or self-approval, in so far as it leads a man to think
+too highly of himself.  To this emotion there is no contrary. 
+For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self-hatred ;
+I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he
+conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that.  For
+whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he
+imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,
+that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot
+do.  For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
+is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it
+impossible for him to do it.  However, if we consider such
+matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable
+that a man may think too meanly of himself ; for it may happen,
+that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should
+imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the
+world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him.  Again,
+a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in
+the present something in relation to a future time of which he is
+uncertain.  As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable
+to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do
+nothing but what is wicked and base, &c.  We may also say, that a
+man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive
+fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,
+venture.  We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an
+emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as from
+self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs
+self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define :
+
+XXIX.  Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by
+reason of pain.
+    Explanation-We are nevertheless generally accustomed to
+oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention
+to the effect of either emotion than to its nature.  We are wont
+to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who
+talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults,
+who wishes to be first ; and lastly who goes through life with a
+style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station.  On
+the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who
+confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and
+who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire. 
+However, these emotions, humility and self-abasement, are
+extremely rare.  For human nature, considered in itself, strives
+against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.) ; hence
+those, who are believed to be most self-abased and humble, are
+generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.
+
+XXX.  Honour11 is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action
+of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
+
+XXXI.  Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of
+our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
+    Explanation-On this subject see the note to III. xxx.  But we
+should here remark the difference which exists between shame and
+modesty.  Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are
+ashamed.  Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains
+a man from committing a base action.  Modesty is usually opposed
+to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will
+duly show ; however, the names of the emotions (as I have
+remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to
+their nature.
+    I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions
+arising from pleasure and pain.  I therefore proceed to treat of
+those which I refer to desire.
+
+XXXII.  Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,
+kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same
+time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude
+the existence of it.
+    Explanation-When we remember a thing, we are by that very
+fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to
+contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something
+present ; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,
+is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the
+existence of that which we remember.  Thus when we remember
+something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that
+very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of
+pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once
+checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence
+of the thing in question.  Wherefore regret is, strictly
+speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from
+the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note).  But, as
+the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion
+down, among the emotions springing from desire.
+
+XXXIII.  Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us
+by our conception that others have the same desire.
+    Explanation-He who runs away, because he sees others running
+away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear ; or again,
+he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws
+towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own
+were burnt ; such an one can be said to imitate another's
+emotion, but not to emulate him ; not because the causes of
+emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become
+customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that
+which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant.  As to the
+cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note.  The reason why
+this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.
+xxxii. and note.
+
+XXXIV.  Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing
+from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar
+feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.  Cf. III. xxxix.
+note and xl.
+
+XXXV.  Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. 
+Cf. III. xxvii. note.
+
+XXXVI.  Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are
+induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.
+
+XXXVII.  Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through
+mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has
+injured us.  (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)
+
+XXXVIII.  Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is
+impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
+    Explanation-To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a
+passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his
+anger and revenge.
+
+XXXIX.  Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we
+dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.  Cf. III. xxxix. note.
+
+XL.  Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do
+something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
+
+XLI.  Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by
+the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
+    Explanation-Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the
+fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear ; hence I
+do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire. 
+Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so
+far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion
+of daring.
+
+XLII.  Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of
+avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
+    Explanation-Consternation is, therefore, a species of
+cowardice.  But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double
+fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a
+man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the
+evil.  I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of
+removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement.  I say
+wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be
+constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments
+him : whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may
+avert of the two.  On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and
+III. lii. note.  Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
+note.
+
+XLIII.  Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the
+desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining
+from that which should displease them.
+
+XLIV.  Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.
+    Explanation-Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions
+(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened ;
+therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome.  For, so
+long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time
+necessarily bound by this.  "The best men," says Cicero, "are
+especially led by honour.  Even philosophers, when they write a
+book contemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.
+
+XLV.  Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living
+sumptuously.
+
+XLVI.  Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
+
+XLVII.  Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
+
+XLVIII.  Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual
+intercourse.
+    Explanation-Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is
+still called lust.  These last five emotions (as I have shown in
+III. lvi.) have on contraries.  For deference is a species of
+ambition.  Cf. III. xxix. note.
+    Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,
+and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the
+mind.  It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an
+ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,
+drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear
+are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery.  For
+an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and
+drink at another man's expense.  An ambitious man will restrain
+himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are
+secret ; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,
+from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those
+vices.  Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not.  For
+though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,
+cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain
+avaricious ; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he
+cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,
+cease to be lustful.  In fact, these emotions are not so much
+concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the
+appetite and love of such.  Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to
+these emotions, but high-mindedness and valour, whereof I will
+speak presently.
+    The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I
+pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the
+compounding of the emotions already described ; secondly, because
+many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is
+sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general
+knowledge of them.  However, it is established from the
+definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they
+all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there
+is nothing besides these three ; wherefore each is wont to be
+called by a variety of names in accordance with its various
+relations and extrinsic tokens.  If we now direct our attention
+to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning
+the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the
+emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.
+
+
+GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+    Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a
+confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or
+any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater
+or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is
+determined to think of one thing rather than another.
+    Explanation-I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul
+is a confused idea.  For we have shown that the mind is only
+passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas.  (III.
+iii.)  I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its
+body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than
+before.  For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote
+rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll.
+ii.) than the nature of an external body.  But the idea which
+constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the
+disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its
+power of action or force for existence is increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered.  But it must be noted that, when
+I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not
+mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition
+of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of
+an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact,
+involves more or less of reality than before.
+    And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.
+xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own
+body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very
+essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or
+less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own
+body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less
+reality than before.
+    When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is
+increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed
+of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more
+or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its
+own body.  For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of
+thinking are measured by the excellence of the object.  Lastly, I
+have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to
+think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the
+nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the
+definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.
+
+
+
+
+PART IV :
+Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+    Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I
+name bondage : for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is
+not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune : so much
+so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better
+for him, to follow that which is worse.  Why this is so, and what
+is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part
+of my treatise.  But, before I begin, it would be well to make a
+few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good
+and evil.
+    When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has
+brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,
+not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks
+that he knows, the intention and aim of its author.  For
+instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not
+yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work
+is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect ; he will,
+on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is
+carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it. 
+But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen
+before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he
+plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. 
+Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.
+    But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out
+types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain
+types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that
+which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the
+thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree
+less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently
+been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer. 
+This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,
+which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or
+imperfect : for men are wont to form general ideas of things
+natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they
+hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing
+without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types
+before herself.  Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,
+which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they
+have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has
+fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete. 
+Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect
+or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true
+knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
+    Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does
+not work with an end in view.  For the eternal and infinite
+Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as
+that whereby it exists.  For we have shown, that by the same
+necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.
+xvi.).  The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the
+reason why he acts, are one and the same.  Therefore, as he does
+not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the
+sake of an end ; of his existence and of his action there is
+neither origin nor end.  Wherefore, a cause which is called final
+is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered
+as the origin or cause of anything.  For example, when we say
+that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we
+mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of
+household life, had a desire to build a house.  Wherefore, the
+being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is
+nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the
+efficient cause ; it is regarded as the primary cause, because
+men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.  They
+are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions
+and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are
+determined to any particular desire.  Therefore, the common
+saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and
+produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses
+treated of in the Appendix to Part I.  Perfection and
+imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or
+notions which we form from a comparison among one another of
+individuals of the same species ; hence I said above (II. Def.
+vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.  For
+we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
+genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category
+of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. 
+Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this
+category, and comparing them one with another, find that some
+possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,
+say that some are more perfect than others.  Again, in so far as
+we attribute to them anything implying negation-as term, end,
+infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
+they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call
+perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or
+because Nature has blundered.  For nothing lies within the scope
+of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity
+of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from
+the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily
+comes to pass.
+    As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive
+quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of
+thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things
+one with another.  Thus one and the same thing can be at the same
+time good, bad, and indifferent.  For instance, music is good for
+him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns ; for him that is
+deaf, it is neither good nor bad.
+    Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be
+retained.  For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
+type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful
+for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have
+indicated.
+    In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
+certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the
+type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves ; by
+"bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
+approaching the said type.  Again, we shall that men are more
+perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more
+or less nearly to the said type.  For it must be specially
+remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a
+greater perfection, or vice versâ, I do not mean that he is
+changed from one essence or reality to another ; for instance, a
+horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a
+man, as by being changed into an insect.  What I mean is, that we
+conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is
+understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished.  Lastly,
+by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality-in
+other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and
+operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to
+its duration.  For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,
+because it has passed a longer time in existence.  The duration
+of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence
+of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence ;
+but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will
+always be able to persist in existence with the same force
+wherewith it began to exist ; wherefore, in this respect, all
+things are equal.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+I.  By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to
+us.
+
+II.  By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a
+hindrance 
+to us in the attainment of any good. 
+    (Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the
+end.)
+
+III.  Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while
+regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which
+necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.
+
+IV.  Particular things I call possible in so far as, while
+regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,
+whether such causes be determined for producing them.
+    (In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between
+possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need
+to distinguish them accurately.)
+
+V.  By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in
+different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as
+luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are
+contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
+
+VI.  What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,
+present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,
+which see.
+    (But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly
+conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit
+; that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred
+feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that
+which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance
+from us, and all in the same plane ; so also objects, whose time
+of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer
+interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally
+distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the
+same moment of time.)
+
+VII.  By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a
+desire.
+
+VIII.  By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing ; that
+is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a
+man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of
+effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
+
+
+AXIOM.
+
+    There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is
+not another more powerful and strong.  Whatsoever thing be given,
+there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  No positive quality possessed by a false idea is
+removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being
+true.
+    Proof.-Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge
+which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any
+positive quality on account of which they are called false (II.
+xxxiii.) ; contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,
+they are true (II. xxxii.).  Wherefore, if the positive quality
+possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is
+true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be
+removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd.  Therefore, no
+positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition is more clearly understood from II.
+xvi. Coroll. ii.  For imagination is an idea, which indicates
+rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature
+of the external body ; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly ;
+whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err.  For
+instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant
+from us about two hundred feet ; in this judgment we err, so long
+as we are in ignorance of its true distance ; when its true
+distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination
+; or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains
+tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected
+thereby : wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall
+still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us.  For, as we
+said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near
+us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the
+mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the
+body is affected thereby.  Thus, when the rays of the sun falling
+on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine
+the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its
+real position ; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the
+mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition
+of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or
+diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at
+its presence.  It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an
+evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings ; but the
+contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will
+certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings
+; thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,
+in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,
+stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present
+existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.
+
+PROP. II.  We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of
+Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.
+    Proof.-We are said to be passive, when something arises in
+us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is
+(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the
+laws of our nature.  We are passive therefore, in so far as we
+are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without
+other parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. III.  The force whereby a man persists in existing is
+limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external
+causes.
+    Proof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part.  For,
+when man is given, there is something else-say A-more powerful ;
+when A is given, there is something else-say B-more powerful than
+A, and so on to infinity ; thus the power of man is limited by
+the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the
+power of external causes.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IV.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,
+save such as can be understood through his nature only as their
+adequate cause.
+    Proof.-The power, whereby each particular thing, and
+consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of
+Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.) ; not in so far as it is infinite, but
+in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence
+(III. vii.).  Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained
+through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power
+of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.
+xxxiv.).  This was our first point.  Again, if it were possible,
+that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood
+solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would
+not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist ; this
+would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was
+either finite or infinite ; namely, either of man's power only,
+inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all
+changes which could spring from external causes ; or of the
+infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be
+so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any
+changes save such as tended towards his own preservation.  But
+the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of
+which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things). 
+Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of
+undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
+through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as
+we have shown) necessarily exist ; such a result must follow from
+the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the
+necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as
+affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature
+as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must
+be deducible.  It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is
+infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.  It
+is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any
+changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a
+prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order
+of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as
+the nature of things demands.
+
+PROP. V.  The power and increase of every passion, and its
+persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of
+an external cause compared with our own.
+    Proof.-The essence of a passion cannot be explained through
+our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),
+the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in
+II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the
+rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes
+obstinately fixed to him.
+    Proof.-The force and increase of any passion and its
+persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.) ; therefore
+(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man's power, &e.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VII.  An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by
+another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for
+controlling emotion.
+    Proof.-Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is
+an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less
+force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the
+Emotions at the end of Part III.).  When, therefore, the mind is
+assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected
+with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or
+diminished.  Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives
+from its cause the force for persistence in its being ; which
+force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.
+vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification
+contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.) ;
+wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a
+modification contrary to, and stronger than the former
+modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the
+emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
+stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy
+the existence of the former emotion ; thus an emotion cannot be
+destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger
+emotion.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a
+modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that
+which we are undergoing.  For the emotion which we undergo can
+only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and
+stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition
+of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body
+contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we
+undergo.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but
+the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof.
+    Proof.-We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or
+the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that
+is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or
+hinders, our power of activity.  Thus, in so far as we perceive
+that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or
+evil ; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else
+but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows
+from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.).  But this
+idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united
+to body (II. xxi.) ; that is, there is no real distinction
+between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of
+the body, save in conception only.  Therefore the knowledge of
+good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we
+are conscious thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with
+us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive
+the cause to be with us.
+    Proof.-Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the
+mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which
+indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of
+the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).  An emotion is
+therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition
+of the body.  But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so
+long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
+of the external object ; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or
+more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the
+present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with
+us.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected
+by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as
+if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that
+this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the
+thing in question itself  ; for the thing's nature is unchanged,
+whether we have conceived it or not ; I did not deny that the
+image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other
+things which exclude the present existence of the future object :
+I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I
+purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of
+my work.
+    Corollary.-The image of something past or future, that is, of
+a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time
+future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other
+conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present
+; consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is
+less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt
+towards something present.
+
+PROP. X.  Towards something future, which we conceive as close at
+hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that
+its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer
+interval ; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have
+not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we
+conceive that it has long passed away.
+    Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or
+not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the
+presence of the object less, than if its period of future
+existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long
+passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.)
+we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it
+follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a
+longer period than we can define in conception, though their
+dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they
+all affect us equally faintly.
+
+PROP. XI.  An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary
+is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion
+towards that which possible, or contingent, or non-necessary.
+    Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,
+to that extent, affirm its existence ; on the other hand we deny
+a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be
+necessary I. xxxiii. note. i.) ; wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion
+towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal,
+more intense than an emotion that which is non-necessary.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XII.  An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is
+more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion
+towards a thing contingent.
+    Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+affected by the conception of some further thing, which would
+assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.) ; but, on the
+other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which
+exclude its present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive a
+thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things
+which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.),
+things which promote hope or fear : wherefore an emotion towards
+something possible is more vehement.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.
+    Proof.-Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,
+is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as
+future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the
+future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.
+x.).  Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of
+existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present ; it is,
+nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as
+contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard
+as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the
+thing to be present with us.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know
+not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal,
+fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.
+    Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the
+existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other
+hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its
+present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive it in relation
+to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls
+the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and
+note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II.
+xvii. Coroll.).  Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing
+contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is
+fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a
+thing past.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIV.  A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any
+emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is
+considered as an emotion.
+    Proof.-An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its
+body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the
+general Definition of the Emotions) ; therefore it has no
+positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what
+is true ; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by
+virtue of being true, restrain any emotion.  But, in so far as
+such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength
+for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to
+restrain the given emotion.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can
+be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from
+the emotions whereby we are assailed.
+    Proof.-From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the
+Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the
+strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.).  But,
+inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of
+our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also
+present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must
+therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.)
+; consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined
+solely by human power.  Again, the desires arising from the
+emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as
+the said emotions are more vehement ; wherefore their force and
+increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,
+which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it
+(IV. iii.) ; hence the desires arising from like emotions may be
+more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge
+of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,
+in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more
+easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is
+agreeable at the present moment.
+    Proof.-Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,
+is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix.
+Coroll.).  But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of
+good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good
+at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong
+desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal
+application).  Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when
+concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or
+quenched, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and
+evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is
+contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire
+for things that are present.
+    Proof.-This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop.
+from IV. xii. Coroll.
+    Note.-I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved
+by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the
+true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul,
+and often yields to every kind of passion.  This state of things
+gave rise to the exclamation of the poet :12-
+"The better path I gaze at and approve, 
+The worse-I follow."
+    Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind,
+when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."  I
+have not written the above with the object of drawing the
+conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or
+that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his
+emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the
+infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can
+do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power.  I
+have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human
+infirmity.  The power of reason over the emotions I have settled
+to treat separately.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions
+being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.
+    Proof.-Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions,
+i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist
+in his own being.  Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by
+the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped ; on the
+contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being
+felt, diminished or hindered ; hence the force of desire arising
+from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the
+power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must
+be defined by human power only.  Thus the former is the stronger
+of the two.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In these few remarks I have explained the causes of
+human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide
+by the precepts of reason.  It now remains for me to show what
+course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are
+in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are
+contrary thereto.  But, before I begin to prove my Propositions
+in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them
+briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my
+meaning.
+    As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,
+that every man should love himself, should seek that which is
+useful to him-I mean, that which is really useful to him, should
+desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,
+and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to
+preserve his own being.  This is as necessarily true, as that a
+whole is greater than its part.  (Cf. III. iv.)
+    Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance
+with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one
+endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with
+the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the
+foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own
+being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving
+his own being ; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its
+own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful
+to us, for the sake of which we should desire it ; thirdly and
+lastly, that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by
+external causes repugnant to their nature.  Further, it follows
+from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing
+without all external things for the preservation of our being or
+living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside
+ourselves.  Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our
+intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
+understand nothing besides itself.  There are, then, many things
+outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to
+be desired.  Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than
+those which are in entire agreement with our nature.  For if, for
+example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,
+they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them
+singly.
+    Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than
+man-nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being
+can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points
+agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were,
+one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with
+one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their
+being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all. 
+Hence, men who are governed by reason-that is, who seek what is
+useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves
+nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
+and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their
+conduct.
+    Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus
+briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater
+detail.  I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain
+the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every
+man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation
+of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.
+    Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the
+case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I
+have hitherto proceeded.
+
+PROP. XIX.  Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily
+desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.
+    Proof.-The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the
+emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof ; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks
+good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad.  Now this appetite is
+nothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of
+Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.). 
+Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires
+the one, and shrinks from the other, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek
+what is useful to him-in other words, to preserve his own
+being-the more is he endowed with virtue ; on the contrary, in
+proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that
+is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.
+    Proof.-Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by
+man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely
+by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being. 
+Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his
+own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently
+(III.iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his
+own being, he is wanting in power.  Q.E.D.  
+    Note.-No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or
+preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes
+external and foreign to his nature.  No one, I say, from the
+necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion
+from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself : which
+latter may be done in a variety of ways.  A man, for instance,
+kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists
+round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a
+sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart ;
+or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's
+command, to open his own veins-that is, to escape a greater evil
+by incurring, a lesser ; or, lastly, latent external causes may
+so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may
+assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea
+cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the
+necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become
+non-existent, is as impossible as that something should be made
+out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little
+reflection.
+
+PROP. XXI.  No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and
+to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and
+to live-in other words, to actually exist.
+    Proof.-The proof of this proposition, or rather the
+proposition itself, is self-evident, and is also plain from the
+definition of desire.  For the desire of living, acting, &c.,
+blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence
+of man-that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to
+preserve his own being.  Therefore, no one can desire, &c. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  No virtue can be conceived as prior to this
+endeavour to preserve one's own being.
+    Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a
+thing (III. vii.) ; therefore, if any virtue could be conceived
+as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be
+conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. 
+Therefore no virtue, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-The effort for self-preservation is the first and
+only foundation of virtue.  For prior to this principle nothing
+can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular
+action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said
+to act in obedience to virtue ; he can only be so described, in
+so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.
+    Proof.-In so far as a man is determined to an action through
+having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.
+Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived
+solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which
+does not follow from his virtue.  But, in so far as he is
+determined for an action because he understands, he is active ;
+that is, he does something, which is perceived through his
+essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us
+the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being
+(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with
+the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to
+one's self.
+    Proof.-To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing
+else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature.  But
+we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.) : therefore
+to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,
+to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and
+that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.
+Coroll.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of
+anything else.
+    Proof.-The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the
+thing itself (III. vii.) ; from this alone, and not from the
+essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that
+everyone endeavours to preserve his being.  Moreover, this
+proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should
+endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,
+the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,
+which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd.  Therefore no one,
+&c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing further than to understand ; neither does the mind, in so
+far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,
+save such things as are conducive to understanding.
+    Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but
+the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so
+far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for
+continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as
+necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of
+Appetite, III. ix. note).  But the essence of reason is nought
+else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly
+understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.) ; therefore
+(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing else but to understand.  Again, since this effort of the
+mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to
+preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding ; this
+effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and
+single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand
+things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.) ; on the
+other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able
+to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are
+conducive to understanding.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save
+such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are
+able to hinder us from understanding.
+    Proof.-The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing
+beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,
+save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing
+Prop.).  But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess
+certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has
+adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in
+so far as it reasons.  Therefore we know nothing to be good or
+evil save such things as really conduce, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God,
+and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.
+    Proof.-The mind is not capable of understanding anything
+higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely
+infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be
+conceived ; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest
+utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God.  Again,
+the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to
+the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously.  The
+mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand.  Now, as we
+have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is
+God ; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand
+or to know God.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  No individual thing, which is entirely different
+from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and
+absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has
+something in common with our nature.
+    Proof.-The power of every individual thing, and consequently
+the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be
+determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.
+vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through
+which human nature is conceived.  Therefore our power of
+activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and
+consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other
+individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not
+by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely
+different from our own ; and since we call good or evil that
+which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.
+xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our
+power of activity ; therefore, that which is entirely different
+from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXX.  A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality
+which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in
+so far as it is contrary to our nature.
+    Proof.-We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.
+viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when
+it diminishes or checks our power of action.  Therefore, if
+anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in
+common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or
+check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.
+iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that
+quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand,
+in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),
+in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is
+contrary to our nature.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,
+it is necessarily good.
+    Proof.-In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it
+cannot be bad for it.  It will therefore necessarily be either
+good or indifferent.  If it be assumed that it be neither good
+nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which
+tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the
+hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself
+; but this (III. vi.) is absurd ; therefore, in so far as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for
+us, and vice versâ, in proportion as a thing is more useful for
+us, so is it more in harmony with our nature.  For, in so far as
+it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be
+different therefrom or contrary thereto.  If different, it can
+neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.) ; if contrary, it will be
+contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,
+contrary to what is good-in short, bad.  Nothing, therefore, can
+be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature ;
+and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony
+with our nature, and vice versâ.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  In so far as men are a prey to passion, they
+cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.
+    Proof.-Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are
+understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or
+negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note) ;
+wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,
+cannot be said to be naturally in harmony.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This is also self-evident ; for, if we say that white
+and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we
+absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect.  So, if
+we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both
+are finite-wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of
+their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power
+of external causes-we should certainly affirm that a man and a
+stone are in no respect alike ; therefore, things which agree
+only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really
+agree in no respect.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are
+assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states
+; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and
+inconstant.
+    Proof.-The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be
+explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i.,
+ii.), but it must be defined by 
+the power, that is (III. vii.), by the nature of external causes
+in 
+comparison with our own ; hence it follows, that there are as
+many kinds of 
+each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are
+affected 
+(III. lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and
+the same 
+object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature ; lastly,
+that one and 
+the same man may be differently affected towards the same object,
+and may 
+therefore be variable and inconstant.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, they can be contrary one to another.
+    Proof.-A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's
+feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to
+that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole
+possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and
+note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in
+III. lv. note) ; it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
+Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen
+also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should
+endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.
+xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another.  But the
+emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.)
+; hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, can be contrary one to another.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives
+that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves ; from
+this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,
+through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through
+agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way
+; if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be
+untrue.  But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we
+shall see that the discrepancy vanishes.  For the two men are not
+in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,
+that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one
+differing from the other.  For, in so far as each loves the same
+thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered
+thereby.  Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are
+at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the
+agreement in their natures.  The cause for their opposition lies,
+as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to
+differ.  For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved
+object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of
+the loved object as lost.  Hence the one man will be affected
+with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus
+they will be at variance one with another.  We can easily show in
+like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on
+differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,
+do they always necessarily agree in nature.
+    Proof.-In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are
+passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at
+variance one with another.  But men are only said to be active,
+in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.) ;
+therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it
+is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely
+through human nature as its proximate cause.  But, since every
+man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,
+and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.) ; and
+further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem
+good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.) ; it follows
+that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human
+nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.
+Coroll.) ; in other words, such things as are in harmony with
+each man's nature.  Therefore, men in so far as they live in
+obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with
+another.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-There is no individual thing in nature, which is
+more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. 
+For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony
+with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.) ; that is, obviously, man. 
+But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when
+he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this
+extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of
+another man (by the last Prop.) ; wherefore among individual
+things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in
+obedience to reason.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary II.-As every man seeks most that which is useful to
+him, so are men most useful one to another.  For the more a man
+seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,
+the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the
+same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to
+act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in
+obedience to reason.  But men are most in natural harmony, when
+they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.) ; therefore
+(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to
+another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-What we have just shown is attested by experience so
+conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone : "Man
+is to man a God."  Yet it rarely happens that men live in
+obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that
+they are generally envious and troublesome one to another. 
+Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so
+that the definition of man as a social animal has met with
+general assent ; in fact, men do derive from social life much
+more convenience than injury.  Let satirists then laugh their
+fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes
+praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them
+heap contempt on men and praises on beasts ; when all is said,
+they will find that men can provide for their wants much more
+easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can
+they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them : not
+to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,
+to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts.  But I
+will treat of this more at length elsewhere.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  The highest good of those who follow virtue is
+common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.
+    Proof.-To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason
+(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to
+reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.) ; therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God ;
+that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and
+can be possessed.  by all men equally, in so far as they are of
+the same nature.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of
+those who follow after virtue were not common to all?  Would it
+not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in
+obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they
+agree in nature, would be at variance one with another?  To such
+an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but
+from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is
+common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of
+man, in so far as defined by reason ; and that a man could
+neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure
+in this highest good.  For it belongs to the essence of the human
+mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal
+and infinite essence of God.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  The good which every man, who follows after
+virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,
+and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge
+of God.
+    Proof.-Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv ; Coroll. i.) ;
+therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily
+endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to
+reason.  But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided
+by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for
+himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.) ; wherefore the good, which
+each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also
+for others.  Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.)
+; now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),
+which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it
+(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived ; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of
+God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of
+virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good
+for himself.  Q.E.D.
+    Another Proof.-The good, which a man desires for himself and
+loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love
+it also (III. xxxi.) ; he will therefore endeavour that others
+should love it also ; and as the good in question is common to
+all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,
+for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice
+therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in
+proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.
+    Note I.-He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause
+others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the
+world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,
+and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight
+in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar
+impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what
+pleases themselves.  Again, as the highest good sought by men
+under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be
+possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love
+it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they
+delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed.  But he, who
+endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but
+courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent. 
+Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in
+so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to
+Religion.  The desire of well-doing, which is engendered by a
+life according to reason, I call piety.  Further, the desire,
+whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate
+others with himself in friendship, I call honour13 ; by
+honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according
+to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the
+gaining of friendship.  I have also shown in addition what are
+the foundations of a state ; and the difference between true
+virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have
+said ; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in
+accordance with reason ; while infirmity is nothing else but
+man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to
+himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded
+by the general disposition of things rather than by his own
+nature considered solely in itself.
+    Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.
+of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the
+slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition
+and womanish pity than on sound reason.  The rational quest of
+what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
+associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,
+or things, whose nature is different from our own ; we have the
+same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. 
+Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men
+have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. 
+Still I do not deny that beasts feel : what I deny is, that we
+may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,
+treating them in the way which best suits us ; for their nature
+is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from
+human emotions (III. lvii. note).  It remains for me to explain
+what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit.  On these points
+see the following note.
+    Note II.-In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain
+praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.
+    Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note
+: the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms.  But I
+must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature
+and in society.
+    Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,
+consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions
+which follow from the necessity of his own nature ; therefore by
+sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is
+bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own
+disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to
+him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which
+he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.).  Now,
+if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain
+in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to
+his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.).  But seeing that they are a
+prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue
+(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and
+being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in
+need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note).  Wherefore, in order that
+men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is
+necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for
+the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure
+their fellow-men.  The way in which this end can be obtained, so
+that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.
+Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each
+other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.
+vii. and III. xxxix.  It is there shown, that an emotion can only
+be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to
+itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of
+incurring a greater injury themselves.
+    On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps
+in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging
+injury, and pronouncing on good and evil ; and provided it also
+possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to
+pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in
+restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note).  Such a
+society established with laws and the power of preserving itself
+is called a State, while those who live under its protection are
+called citizens.  We may readily understand that there is in the
+state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced
+good or bad ; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely
+of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with
+reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good
+or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.
+    In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable ; it
+can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on
+by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State
+authority.  Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is
+therefore punished by the right of the State only.  Obedience, on
+the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is
+thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages
+which a State provides.
+    Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent
+master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be
+said to belong to one man rather than another : all things are
+common to all.  Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no
+wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that
+which belongs to him ; in other words, there is nothing in the
+state of nature answering to justice and injustice.  Such ideas
+are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common
+consent what belongs to one man and what to another.
+    From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and
+injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes
+which display the nature of the mind.  But I have said enough.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to
+render it capable of being affected in an increased number of
+ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of
+ways, is useful to man  ; and is so, in proportion as the body is
+thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting
+other bodies in an increased number of ways ; contrariwise,
+whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is
+hurtful to man.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body
+increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.) ;
+therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it
+capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) ; and
+is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body
+capable ; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is
+hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body
+mutually possess, is good ; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a
+change in such proportion is bad.
+    Proof.-The human body needs many other bodies for its
+preservation (II. Post. iv.).  But that which constitutes the
+specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts
+communicate their several motions one to another in a certain
+fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.). 
+Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human
+body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the
+human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of
+being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in
+many ways ; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.).  Again,
+whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion
+causes the human body to assume another specific character, in
+other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the
+point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and consequently
+totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of
+ways ; therefore it is bad.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The extent to which such causes can injure or be of
+service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part.  But I
+would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,
+when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually
+among its several parts is changed.  For I do not venture to deny
+that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and
+other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to
+consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally
+different from its own.  There is no reason, which compels me to
+maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse ;
+nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion. 
+It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I
+should hardly call him the same.  As I have heard tell of a
+certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and
+though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his
+past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he
+had written to be his own : indeed, he might have been taken for
+a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue.  If
+this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A
+man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can
+only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy
+of other men.  However, I prefer to leave such questions
+undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for
+raising new issues.
+
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes
+men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever
+brings discord into a State is bad.
+    Proof.-For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony
+also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is
+therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)
+whatsoever brings about discord is bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Pleasure in itself is not bad but good :
+contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.
+    Proof.-Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the
+body's power of activity is increased or helped ; pain is
+emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or
+checked ; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,
+&c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good ;
+contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.
+    Proof.-Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,
+which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all
+parts of the body being affected equally : that is (III. xi.),
+the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a
+manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion
+of motion and rest ; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),
+and cannot be excessive.  But Melancholy (see its Def. in the
+same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is
+referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or
+hindrance of the body's power of activity ; therefore (IV.
+xxxviii.) it is always bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  Stimulation may be excessive and bad ; on the other
+hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is
+bad.
+    Proof.-Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is
+pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,
+consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the
+rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note) ; the power of this
+emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body
+(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus
+rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other
+ways : therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad.  Again, grief,
+which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.).  But, as its
+force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause
+compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees
+and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.) ; we can,
+therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and
+preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's
+capabilities ; thus, to this extent, it will be good.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  Love and desire may be excessive.
+    Proof.-Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an
+external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.) ; therefore stimulation,
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.
+note) ; hence love maybe excessive.  Again, the strength of
+desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises
+(III. xxxvii.).  Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's
+actions (IV. vi.) ; so, therefore, can desire, which arises from
+the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become
+excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning
+stimulation.
+    Note.-Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived
+more easily than it can be observed.  For the emotions, whereby
+we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the
+body which is affected more than the rest ; hence the emotions
+are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation
+of one object, that it is unable to think of others ; and
+although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions-and very few
+are found who are always assailed by one and the same-yet there
+are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately
+fixed.  We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,
+although it be not present, they think they have it before them ;
+when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is
+delirious or mad ; nor are those persons who are inflamed with
+love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their
+mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are
+made objects of ridicule.  But when a miser thinks of nothing but
+gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but
+glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are
+generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated.  But,
+in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness,
+though they may not be reckoned among diseases.
+
+PROP. XLV.  Hatred can never be good.
+    Proof.-When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.
+xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that
+is bad.  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    N.B.  Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred
+towards men.
+    Corollary I.-Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and
+other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are
+bad ; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.
+    Corollary II.-Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is
+base, and in a State unjust.  This also is evident from III.
+xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.
+xxxvii. note.
+    Note.-Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to
+be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference.  For
+laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure ; therefore, so
+long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.). 
+Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and
+gloomy superstition.  For why is it more lawful to satiate one's
+hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,
+and have convinced myself as follows : No deity, nor anyone else,
+save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,
+nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,
+which axe signs of infirmity of spirit ; on the contrary, the
+greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the
+perfection whereto we pass ; in other words, the more must we
+necessarily partake of the divine nature.  Therefore, to make use
+of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible
+(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is
+the part of a wise man.  I say it is the part of a wise man to
+refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
+drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
+plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
+and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
+his neighbour.  For the human body is composed of very numerous
+parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
+fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
+equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
+the necessity of its own nature ; and, consequently, so that the
+mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
+simultaneously.  This way of life, then, agrees best with our
+principles, and also with general practice ; therefore, if there
+be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
+the best, and in every way to be commended.  There is no need for
+me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.
+
+PROP. XLVI.  He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,
+for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.
+    Proof.-All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.) ;
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such
+emotions (IV. xix.) ; consequently, he will also endeavour to
+prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.).  But hatred is
+increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love
+(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.) ;
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is
+assuredly wretched.  But he, who strives to conquer hatred with
+love, fights his battle in joy and confidence ; he withstands
+many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid. 
+Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but
+through increase in their powers ; all these consequences follow
+so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,
+that I have no need to prove them in detail.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves
+good.
+    Proof.-Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. 
+For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of
+the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without
+fear ; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in
+themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive
+pleasure (IV. xliii.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We may add, that these emotions show defective
+knowledge and an absence of power in the mind ; for the same
+reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of
+a want of mental power.  For although confidence and joy are
+pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,
+namely, hope and fear.  Wherefore the more we endeavour to be
+guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope ; we endeavour to
+free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate
+fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are
+always bad.
+    Proof.-These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)
+are repugnant to reason ; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)
+bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud.
+    Proof.-If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's
+sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be
+pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.) ; the good
+which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.) ; and
+therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly ; in other
+words, we are apt to become proud.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. L.  Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,
+is in itself bad and useless.
+    Proof.-Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and
+therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad.  The good effect which
+follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity
+from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the
+dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.) ; only at the dictation of
+reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for
+certain to be good (IV. xxvii.) ; thus, in a man who lives under
+the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from
+the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in
+accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not
+find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will
+he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human
+virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to
+rejoice.  We may add, that he, who is easily touched with
+compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does
+something which he afterwards regrets ; partly because we can
+never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly
+because we are easily deceived by false tears.  I am in this
+place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of
+reason.  He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by
+compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems
+unlike a man.
+
+PROP. LI.  Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree
+therewith and arise therefrom.
+    Proof.-Approval is love towards one who has done good to
+another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.) ; therefore it may be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.
+lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands ;
+therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Another Proof.-He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.
+xxxvii.) ; wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow
+his own endeavour to do good is aided ; in other words, he will
+feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the
+benefactor.  Therefore he approves of him.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,
+xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.) ; we may, however, remark
+that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace
+punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said
+to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by
+hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.
+
+PROP. LII.  Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which
+arises from reason is the highest possible.
+    Proof.-Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the
+Emotions, xxv.).  But a man's true power of action or virtue is
+reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and
+distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.) ; therefore
+self-approval arises from reason.  Again, when a man is
+contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly
+or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action
+(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of
+understanding ; therefore in such contemplation alone does the
+highest possible self-approval arise.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Self-approval is in reality the highest object for
+which we can hope.  For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one
+endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior
+object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and
+strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary
+(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame
+becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life
+under disgrace is almost unendurable.
+
+PROP. LIII.  Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason.
+    Proof.-Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of
+his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.).  But, in so
+far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to
+understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.). 
+Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives any infirmity
+in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but
+(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. 
+But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by
+virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the
+knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this
+is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands
+himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because14 his power of activity
+is aided.  Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a
+man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the
+contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LIV.  Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason  ; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or
+infirm.
+    Proof.-The first part of this proposition is proved like the
+foregoing one.  The second part is proved from the mere
+definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,
+xxvii.).  For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by
+evil desires ; secondly, by pain.
+    Note.-As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these
+two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and
+Fear, bring more good than harm ; hence, as we must sin, we had
+better sin in that direction.  For, if all men who are a prey to
+emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,
+and would fear nothing ; how then could they be joined and linked
+together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant, when it
+is not in fear ; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who
+consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously
+commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence.  Indeed those who
+are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than
+others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become
+free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.
+
+PROP. LV.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance
+of self.
+    Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and
+xxix.
+
+PROP. LVI.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme
+infirmity of spirit.
+    Proof.-The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation
+(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.). 
+He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the
+foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues. 
+Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of
+reason (IV. xxiv.) : now he, that acts under the guidance of
+reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.). 
+Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and
+consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue ;
+in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit.  Thus
+extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and
+the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.
+    Note.-Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride ;
+for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a
+painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful
+(IV. xviii.).
+
+PROP. LVII.  The proud man delights in the company of flatterers
+and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded.
+    Proof.-Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation
+of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.) ; this
+estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the
+means in his power (III. xiii. note) ; he will therefore delight
+in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is
+too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the
+company of high-minded men, who value him according to his
+deserts.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the
+evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all
+the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity. 
+I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may
+be called proud from his underestimation of other people ; and,
+therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself
+superior to his fellows.  The dejection, which is the opposite
+quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior
+to his fellows.  Such being the ease, we can easily see that a
+proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes
+pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his
+bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.
+    Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the
+dejected man very near akin to the proud man.  For, inasmuch as
+his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and
+other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other
+words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in
+contemplating other men's faults ; whence arises the proverb,
+"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers." 
+Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he
+thinks himself inferior to others ; hence none are so prone to
+envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's
+actions, with a view to fault-finding rather than correction, in
+order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory
+therein, though all the time with a dejected air.  These effects
+follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from
+the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.  I have already said that I call these and similar
+emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man.  The
+laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man
+is but a part.  I mention this, in passing, lest any should think
+that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds
+of men rather than the nature and properties of things.  For, as
+I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions
+and their properties as on the same footing with other natural
+phenomena.  Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and
+ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as
+other things which we admire, and which we delight to
+contemplate.  But I pass on to note those qualities in the
+emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon
+him.
+
+PROP. LVIII.  Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
+arise therefrom.
+    Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and
+also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.
+i.).
+    Note-Empty honour, as it is styled, is self- approval,
+fostered only by the good opinion of the populace ; when this
+good opinion ceases there ceases also the self-approval, in other
+words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note) ;
+consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,
+day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain
+his reputation.  For the populace is variable and inconstant, so
+that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away. 
+Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and
+readily represses the fame of others.  The object of the strife
+being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is
+seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every
+possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more
+proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to
+himself.  This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
+nothing.
+    The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred
+from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance.  I
+will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,
+is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is
+really imbued with the desire to live honourably ; in the same
+way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not
+mortified.  Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,
+he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no
+desire to live honourably.
+    Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon
+concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain ; as for the
+desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good
+or evil emotions.  But all, in so far as they are engendered in
+us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is
+evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be
+useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance
+of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.
+
+PROP. LIX.  To all the actions, whereto we are determined by
+emotion wherein the mind is passive ; we can be determined
+without emotion by reason.
+    Proof.-To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.
+ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the
+necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone.  But pain is
+bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action
+(IV. xli.) ; wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any
+action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance
+of reason.  Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a
+man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.) ; therefore to this
+extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we
+could not perform under the guidance of reason.  Lastly,
+pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for
+it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is
+increased or aided) ; nor is the mind passive therein, except in
+so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent
+of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his
+actions (III. iii., and note).
+    Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to
+such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception
+of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,
+capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion
+wherein the mind is passive.  But all emotions are attributable
+to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.
+explanation) ; and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing
+else but the attempt to act ; therefore, to all actions, &c. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Another Proof.-A given action is called bad, in so far as it
+arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. 
+But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad
+(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same
+action being sometimes good, sometimes bad ; wherefore to the
+action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,
+we may be led by reason (IV. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-An example will put this point in a clearer light.  The
+action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and
+in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his
+arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently
+downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper
+to the structure of the human body.  If, then, a man, moved by
+anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,
+this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one
+and the same action can be associated with various mental images
+of things ; therefore we may be determined to the performance of
+one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and
+distinct ideas.  Hence it is evident that every desire which
+springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become
+useless, if men could be guided by reason.  Let us now see why
+desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is
+called by us blind.
+
+PROP. LX.  Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not
+attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts
+thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.
+    Proof.-Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a
+body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails
+over the remaining parts (IV. vi.).  This part will not endeavour
+to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of
+the body may perform its office ; for this it would be necessary
+for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own
+powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd.  The said part, and,
+consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its
+condition.  Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind
+aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole.  If it
+be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so
+that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same
+manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to
+a man as a whole.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to
+one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being
+with out taking into consideration our health as a whole : to
+which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over
+us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.
+
+PROP. LXI.  Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
+    Proof.-Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered
+absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by
+some given modification of itself.  Hence desire, which arises
+from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so
+far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are
+adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). 
+Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered
+in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able
+to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction.  Therefore,
+such desire cannot be excessive.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXII.  In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be
+of a thing future, past, or present.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of
+reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.
+xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same
+certitude (II. xliii. and note).  Wherefore, whether the thing be
+present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same
+necessity and is affected with the same certitude ; and whether
+the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all
+cases be equally true (II. xli.) ; that is, it will always
+possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.) ;
+therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether
+the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the
+duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods
+of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same
+emotion as things present ; and the mind would desire as though
+it were present the good which it conceived as future ;
+consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the
+present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would
+in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source
+of evil in the future, as we shall presently show.  However, we
+can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of
+things (II. xxxi.) ; and the periods of their existence (II.
+xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not
+so powerfully affected by the future as by the present.  Hence
+such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely
+abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order
+of things and the connection of causes, with a view to
+determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather
+imaginary than real.  Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the
+desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the
+desire of things which are agreeable at the present time.  (Cf.
+IV. xvi.)
+
+PROP. LXIII.  He who is led by fear, and does good in order to
+escape evil, is not led by reason.
+    Proof.-All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as
+active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and
+desire (III. lix.) ; therefore, he who is led by fear, and does
+good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.
+    Note.-Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at
+vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by
+reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape
+evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as
+wretched as themselves ; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if
+they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men.
+    Corollary.-Under desire which springs from reason, we seek
+good directly, and shun evil indirectly.
+    Proof.-Desire which springs from reason can only spring from
+a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III.
+lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive
+(IV. lxi.), and not from pain ; wherefore this desire springs
+from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.) ; hence under
+the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by
+implication shun evil.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a
+sick and a healthy man.  The sick man through fear of death eats
+what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes
+pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of
+life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to
+avoid it.  So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from
+hatred or anger but from love of the public well-being, is guided
+solely by reason.
+
+PROP. LXIV.  The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.
+    Proof.-The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far
+as we are conscious thereof.  Now pain is the transition to a
+lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore
+cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi., and vii.) ;
+therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.)
+depends on inadequate ideas ; consequently the knowledge thereof
+(II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed
+only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.
+
+PROP. LXV.  Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the
+greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.
+    Proof.-A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good
+is in reality an evil ; for we apply the terms good and bad to
+things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see
+preface to this Part) ; therefore, evil is in reality a lesser
+good ; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only
+the greater good and the lesser evil.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the
+lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun
+the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil. 
+For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,
+and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the
+former and shun the latter.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXVI.  We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater
+good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,
+and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a
+greater evil in the future.15
+    Proof.-If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things
+future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same
+way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.) ; wherefore, looking
+merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,
+there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be
+assumed as present, or assumed as future ; hence (IV. lxv.) we
+may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser
+good in the present, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a
+lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater
+good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,
+because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.  This
+Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the
+Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.
+    Note.-If these statements be compared with what we have
+pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part
+up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a
+man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is
+led by reason.  The former, whether will or no, performs actions
+whereof he is utterly ignorant ; the latter is his own master and
+only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance
+in life, and therefore chiefly desires ; wherefore I call the
+former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose
+disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few
+observations.
+
+PROP. LXVII.  A free man thinks of death least of all things ;
+and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
+    Proof.-A free man is one who lives under the guidance of
+reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly
+desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words
+(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his
+being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage ; wherefore
+such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom
+is a meditation of life.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXVIII.  If men were born free, they would, so long as they
+remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
+    Proof.-I call free him who is led solely by reason ; he,
+therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only
+adequate ideas ; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no
+conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being
+correlative) of good.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of
+this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as
+we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God ; not in so
+far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the
+cause of man's existence.
+    This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
+have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. 
+For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save
+that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he
+provided solely for man's advantage ; it is stated that God
+forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of
+good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,
+he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. 
+Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in
+entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be
+nothing in nature which could be more useful to him ; but that
+after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway
+began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his
+freedom ; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the
+patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ ; that is, by the idea of
+God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire
+for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have
+shown above (IV. xxxvii.).
+
+PROP. LXIX.  The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,
+when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
+    Proof.-Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion
+contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining
+emotion (IV. vii.).  But blind daring and fear are emotions,
+which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.) :
+hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring
+than in checking fear (III. lix. note) ; in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
+when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as
+in combat ; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of
+mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
+    Note.-What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,
+I explained in III. lix. note.  By danger I mean everything,
+which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,
+&c.
+
+PROP. LXX.  The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,
+as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
+    Proof.-Everyone judges what is good according to his
+disposition (III. xxxix. note) ; wherefore an ignorant man, who
+has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon
+it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the
+receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.).  But the free man only
+desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not
+repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,
+but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,
+and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
+importance.  Therefore the free man, lest be should become
+hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than
+reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving
+their favours.
+    Note.-I say, as far as he can.  For though men be ignorant,
+yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human
+aid, the most excellent of all things : therefore it is often
+necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay
+such favours in kind ; we must, therefore, exercise caution in
+declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of
+despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious
+motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for
+offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it.  Thus, in
+declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility
+and courtesy.
+
+PROP. LXXI.  Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to
+another.
+    Proof.-Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,
+and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of
+friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,
+with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one
+to another.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire
+have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,
+rather than pure goodwill.  Moreover, ingratitude is not an
+emotion.  Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a
+man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c. 
+He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,
+is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the
+gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal
+his thefts, or by any similar persons.  Contrariwise, such an one
+shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be
+corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.
+
+PROP. LXXII.  The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
+good faith.
+    Proof.-If it be asked : What should a man's conduct be in a
+case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the
+danger of present death? Would not his plan of self-preservation
+completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by
+pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would
+persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason
+would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their
+forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any
+general laws, which is absurd.
+
+PROP. LXXIII.  The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in
+a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in
+solitude, where he is independent.
+    Proof.-The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey
+through fear (IV. lxiii.) : but, in so far as he endeavours to
+preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is
+(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,
+he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.
+ii.), to live according to the laws of his country.  Therefore
+the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to
+possess the general rights of citizenship.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-These and similar observations, which we have made on
+man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to
+courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note).  I do not
+think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of
+strength ; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no
+man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no
+man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud.  These
+propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and
+religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi. ;
+namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every
+man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself. 
+We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.
+l., and in other places ; namely, that the strong man has ever
+first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity
+of the divine nature ; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful
+and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,
+horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his
+own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. 
+Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they
+really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such
+as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar
+emotions, which I have mentioned above.  Thus he endeavours, as
+we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on
+his way rejoicing.  How far human virtue is capable of attaining
+to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in
+the following Part.
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+    What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life
+has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,
+but has been set forth piece-meal, according as I thought each
+Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it. 
+I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
+under leading heads.
+    I.  All our endeavours or desires so follow from the
+necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either
+through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our
+being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived
+through itself without other individuals.
+    II.  Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,
+that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to
+consist of adequate ideas : the remaining desires are only
+referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things
+inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined
+not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to
+us : wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter
+passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,
+on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
+    III.  Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
+by man's power or reason, are always good.  The rest may be
+either good or bad.
+    IV.  Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect
+the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone
+man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed
+blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which
+arises from the intuitive knowledge of God : now, to perfect the
+understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's
+attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of
+his nature.  Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the
+ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all
+his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate
+conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his
+intelligence.
+    V.  Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational
+life : and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his
+enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by
+intelligence.  Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's
+perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational
+life, are alone called evil.
+    VI.  As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are
+necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external
+causes ; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal
+nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to
+conform to in almost infinite ways.
+    VII.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+nature, or that he should not follow her general order ; but if
+he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with
+his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,
+whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in
+harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate
+himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.
+    VIII.  Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be
+capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the
+rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems
+safest to us ; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good
+or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the
+rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we
+think best.  Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right
+of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.
+    IX.  Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any
+given thing than other individuals of the same species ;
+therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and
+the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful
+than his fellow-man who is led by reason.  Further, as we know
+not anything among individual things which is more excellent than
+a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his
+skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at
+last to live under the dominion of their own reason.
+    X.  In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of
+hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are
+therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful
+than their fellows.
+    XI.  Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and
+high-mindedness.
+    XII.  It is before all things useful to men to associate
+their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds
+as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and
+generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.
+    XIII.  But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. 
+For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the
+guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and
+more prone to revenge than to sympathy.  No small force of
+character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to
+restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others.  But
+those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at
+vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than
+strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and
+others.  Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from
+misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes
+rather than among men ; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably
+endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and
+choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
+preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their
+father : suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as
+they may spite their parents.
+    XIV.  Therefore, although men are generally governed in
+everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common
+brings many more advantages than drawbacks.  Wherefore it is
+better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive
+to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and
+friendship.
+    XV.  Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are
+attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living.  For men
+brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is
+reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received
+customs of their society.  For winning love those qualities are
+especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.
+IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii. ; xlvi. note ; and lxxiii. note).
+    XVI.  Further, harmony is often the result of fear : but such
+harmony is insecure.  Further, fear arises from infirmity of
+spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason : the
+same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a
+certain resemblance to piety.
+    XVII.  Men are also gained over by liberality, especially
+such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain
+life.  However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the
+power and the advantage of any private person.  For the riches of
+any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call. 
+Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited
+for him to be able to make all men his friends.  Hence providing
+for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and
+has regard only to the general advantage.
+    XVIII.  In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our
+duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note ; lxxi. note).
+    XIX.  Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of
+generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort
+of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,
+readily passes into hate ; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a
+species of madness ; and then it promotes discord rather than
+harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).
+    XX.  As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in
+harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not
+engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to
+beget children and to train them up wisely ; and moreover, if the
+love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused
+by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.
+    XXI.  Furthermore, flattery begets harmony ; but only by
+means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery.  None are
+more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be
+first, but are not.
+    XXII.  There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety
+and religion.  Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet
+is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.
+note).
+    XXIII.  Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such
+matters as cannot be hid.  Further, as shame is a species of
+pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.
+    XXIV.  The remaining emotions of pain towards men are
+directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion
+; and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance
+to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass
+judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's
+rights.
+    XXV.  Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire
+of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to
+piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.).  But, if it spring
+from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under
+the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and
+seditions.  For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word
+or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,
+I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love :
+not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called
+after his name, nor to give any cause for envy.  Further, in his
+conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and
+will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity : but
+he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way
+whereby it may be perfected.  Thus will men be stirred not by
+fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to
+endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to
+reason.
+    XXVI.  Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature
+in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with
+ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship ; therefore,
+whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our
+advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or
+destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to
+our use as best we may.
+    XXVII.  The advantage which we derive from things external to
+us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from
+observing them, and from recombining their elements in different
+forms, is principally the preservation of the body ; from this
+point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and
+nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their
+functions.  For, in proportion as the body is capable of being
+affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external
+bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind
+capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.).  But there seem to be
+very few things of this kind in nature ; wherefore for the due
+nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature. 
+For the human body is composed of very many parts of different
+nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so
+that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything
+that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the
+mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.
+    XXVIII.  Now for providing these nourishments the strength of
+each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one
+another mutual aid.  But money has furnished us with a token for
+everything : hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind
+of the multitude is chiefly engrossed : nay, it can hardly
+conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the
+idea of money as cause.
+    XXIX.  This result is the fault only of those, who seek
+money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but
+because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring
+themselves to great splendour.  Certainly they nourish their
+bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they
+lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of
+their body.  But they who know the true use of money, and who fix
+the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,
+live content with little.
+    XXX.  As, therefore, those things are good which assist the
+various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their
+functions ; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid
+to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body ;
+it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good. 
+But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us
+pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit
+our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred
+to one part of the body more than to the other parts ; therefore
+most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at
+hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become
+excessive.  Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most
+regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate
+what is future with emotions equally vivid.  (IV. xliv. note, and
+lx. note.)
+    XXXI.  Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as
+good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. 
+However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious
+take delight in my infirmity and trouble.  For the greater the
+pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection
+whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the
+divine nature : no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated
+by a true regard for our advantage.  But contrariwise he, who is
+led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by
+reason.
+    XXXII.  But human power is extremely limited, and is
+infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes ; we have
+not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those
+things which are without us.  Nevertheless, we shall bear with an
+equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims
+of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have
+done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not
+sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely ;
+remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we
+follow her order.  If we have a clear and distinct understanding
+of this, that part of our nature which is defined by
+intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will
+assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence
+will endeavour to persist.  For, in so far as we are intelligent
+beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,
+nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which
+is true : wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding
+of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is
+in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.
+
+
+
+PART V :
+Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+    At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which
+is concerned with the way leading to freedom.  I shall therefore
+treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the
+reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental
+Freedom or Blessedness ; we shall then be able to see, how much
+more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.  It is no part
+of my design to point out the method and means whereby the
+understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the
+body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of
+its functions.  The latter question lies in the province of
+Medicine, the former in the province of Logic.  Here, therefore,
+I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of
+reason ; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its
+dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. 
+That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have
+already shown.  Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions
+depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely
+govern them.  But these philosophers were compelled, by the
+protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
+that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and
+moderate them : and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the
+example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog
+and the other a hunting-dog.  For by long training it could be
+brought about, that the house-dog should become accustomed to
+hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares.  To
+this opinion Descartes not a little inclines.  For he maintained,
+that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of
+the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the
+aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which
+are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which
+the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various
+ways.  He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst
+of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of
+the animal spirits : further, that this gland is suspended in the
+midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal
+spirits can impinge thereon ; and, again, that as many different
+marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different
+external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it ;
+whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the
+gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once
+before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the
+gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
+determining them to the condition wherein they were, when
+repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.  He further
+asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature
+to a certain given motion of the gland.  For instance, whenever
+anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition
+causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in
+question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the
+mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,
+inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the
+animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would
+dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with
+the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to
+look at remote or very near objects.  Lastly, he maintained that,
+although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been
+united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole
+number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet
+it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
+other thoughts ; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de
+l'âme, I.50.  He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,
+that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power
+over its passions.  For passions as defined by him are
+"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are
+referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)
+are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement
+of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27).  But, seeing that we
+can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,
+to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely
+on our own powers ; if, therefore, we determine our will with
+sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our
+actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which
+we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an
+absolute dominion over our passions.  Such is the doctrine of
+this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his
+own words) ; it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could
+hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man.  Indeed, I
+am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,
+that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from
+self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not
+clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to
+task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through
+occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which
+occult qualities are commonplace.  What does he understand, I
+ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and
+distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union
+with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like
+him to explain this union through its proximate cause.  But he
+had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,
+that he could not assign any particular cause of the union
+between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have
+recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God. 
+Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the
+mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it
+hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can
+be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the
+animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we
+have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again
+disjoined therefrom by physical causes ; in which case it would
+follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given
+danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,
+yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended
+in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything
+except running away.  In truth, as there is no common standard of
+volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between
+the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body ;
+consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined
+by the strength of the other.  We may also add, that there is no
+gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it
+can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that
+all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the
+brain.  Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes
+concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have
+abundantly proved that his premisses are false.  Therefore, since
+the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the
+understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of
+the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all
+have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or
+distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those
+conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
+
+
+AXIOMS.
+
+I.  If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a
+change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of
+the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.
+
+II.  The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,
+in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence
+of its cause.  
+    (This axiom is evident from III. vii.)
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
+and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or
+the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
+associated in the body.
+    Proof.-The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.
+vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the
+order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and
+vii.) as the order and connection of ideas.  Wherefore, even as
+the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place
+according to the order and association of modifications of the
+body (II. xviii.), so vice versâ (III. ii.) the order and
+connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance
+with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are
+arranged and associated in the mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. II.  If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,
+from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other
+thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external
+cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these
+emotions, be destroyed.
+    Proof.-That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,
+is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) ; wherefore, when this cause is
+removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it ;
+therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are
+destroyed.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. III.  An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a
+passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
+    Proof.-An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by
+the general Def. of the Emotions).  If, therefore, we form a
+clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only
+be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to
+the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note) ; therefore (III.
+iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary-An emotion therefore becomes more under our
+control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in
+proportion as it is more known to us.
+
+PROP. IV.  There is no modification of the body, whereof we
+cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
+    Proof.-Properties which are common to all things can only be
+conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.) ; therefore (II. xii. and
+Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,
+whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
+we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.  For an
+emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general
+Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding
+Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.
+    Note.-Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
+an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
+understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
+(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
+distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
+absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
+about, that he should become less subject to them.  To attain
+this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
+acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
+every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
+be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
+distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces : and thus
+that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
+external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts ; whence
+it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
+destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
+are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
+being excessive (IV. lxi.).  For it must be especially remarked,
+that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
+that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. 
+For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
+that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own
+fashion (III. xxxi. note) ; in a man, who is not guided by
+reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
+does not greatly differ from pride ; whereas in a man, who lives
+by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
+called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof).  In like
+manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
+they spring from inadequate ideas ; the same results are
+accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
+adequate ideas.  For all desires, whereby we are determined to
+any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
+inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).  Than this remedy for the emotions
+(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in
+a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
+our power, can be devised.  For the mind has no other power save
+that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
+above (III. iii.).
+
+PROP. V.  An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
+and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
+conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
+    Proof.-An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be
+free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be
+necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one
+towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.). 
+But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to
+conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes
+whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note) ;
+therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply
+is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel
+towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,
+consequently, it is the greatest of all.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
+less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
+necessary.
+    Proof.-The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
+xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an
+infinite chain of causes ; therefore (by the foregoing
+Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less
+subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)
+feels less emotion towards the things themselves.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
+applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly
+and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the
+emotions, as experience also testifies.  For we see, that the
+pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as
+the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means
+have been preserved.  So also we see that no one pities an
+infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,
+because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. 
+Whereas, if most people were born full-grown and only one here
+and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants ; because
+infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and
+necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature ; and we may
+note several other instances of the same sort.
+
+PROP. VII.  Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
+we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
+attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
+    Proof.-We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the
+emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,
+being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the
+said thing (II. xvii.).  Wherefore, the emotion, which is
+referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a
+nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.
+vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
+controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
+external cause (IV. ix.).  But an emotion which springs from
+reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things
+(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always
+regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their
+present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
+manner (II. xxxviii.).  Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
+remains the same ; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which
+are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external
+causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
+until they are no longer contrary to it ; to this extent the
+emotion which springs from reason is more powerful.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VIII.  An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
+of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
+    Proof.-Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
+(III. vii.) : therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
+number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
+becomes stronger.  Q.E.D.
+    Note-This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.
+
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
+causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
+itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
+affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
+and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
+single cause.
+    Proof.-An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
+hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) ;
+therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
+contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
+another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
+the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is
+unable to think of anything else ; this was our first point. 
+Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.
+vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less
+passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of
+several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
+emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few
+or of a single object : this was our second point.  Lastly, this
+emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to
+several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. X.  So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
+our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
+    Proof.-The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that
+is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede
+the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.).  So long, therefore, as
+we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the
+mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.
+xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear
+and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.
+note. ii. and II. xlvii. note) ; consequently we have in such
+cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of
+the body according to the intellectual order.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-By this power of rightly arranging and associating the
+bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily
+affected by evil emotions.  For (V. vii.) a greater force is
+needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and
+associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,
+are uncertain and unsettled.  The best we can do, therefore, so
+long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is
+to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,
+to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith16 to the
+particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
+that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that
+it may be always ready to our hand.  For instance, we have laid
+down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred
+should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not required
+with hatred in return.  Now, that this precept of reason may be
+always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think
+over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and
+in what manner and way they may be best warded off by
+high-mindedness : we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with
+the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready
+for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.).  If we keep also
+in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
+which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships ;
+further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result
+of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than
+everything else, act by the necessity of their nature : in such
+case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises
+therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and
+will be easily overcome ; or, if the anger which springs from a
+grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be
+overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner
+than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand.  As
+is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii.  We should, in the same
+way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear ; the
+ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and
+imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of
+resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them. 
+But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions
+we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
+individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order
+that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of
+pleasure.  For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
+pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for
+which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain
+it.  Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the
+fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
+through a morbidness of disposition ; with thoughts like these do
+the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of
+gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving
+vent to their anger would fain appear wise.  Wherefore it is
+certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of
+honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily
+covet it.  This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common
+to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. 
+For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the
+misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich ; whereby he merely
+torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not
+only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches.  So,
+again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love
+think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock
+faults of the fair sex ; all of which they consign to oblivion,
+directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. 
+Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the
+love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of
+the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy
+which arises from the true knowledge of them : he will in no wise
+desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
+revel in a false show of freedom.  Whosoever will diligently
+observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
+difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for
+the most part, to direct his actions according to the
+commandments of reason.
+
+PROP. XI.  In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
+objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and
+occupies the mind more.
+    Proof.-In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is
+referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can
+be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
+contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion
+; therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in
+full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XII.  The mental images of things are more easily
+associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
+and distinctly understand, than with others.
+    Proof.-Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,
+are either the common properties of things or deductions
+therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are
+consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us. 
+Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate
+other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
+something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of
+the said things should be more often associated with the images
+of these than with the images of something else.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as
+it is associated with a greater number of other images.
+    Proof.-In proportion as an image is associated with a greater
+number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
+whereby it can be aroused.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIV.  The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
+modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of
+God.
+    Proof.-There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind
+may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.) ;
+wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred
+to the idea of God (I. xv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
+more understands himself and his emotions.
+    Proof.-He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is
+(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God ; therefore
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the
+same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more
+understands himself and his emotions.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  This love towards God must hold the chief place in
+the mind.
+    Proof.-For this love is associated with all the modifications
+of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.) ;
+therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  God is without passions, neither is he affected by
+any emotion of pleasure or pain.
+    Proof.-All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
+true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate ; and
+therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without
+passions.  Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a
+lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.) ; therefore (by Def. of
+the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
+pleasure or pain.
+    Corollary.-Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate
+anyone.  For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any
+emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,
+vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  No one can hate God.
+    Proof.-The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect
+(II. xlvi. xlvii.) ; wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,
+we are active (III. iii.) ; consequently (III. lix.) there can be
+no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
+    Note.-It may be objected that, as we understand God as the
+cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause
+of pain.  But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the
+causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a
+passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.) ; therefore,
+in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to
+that extent feel pleasure.
+
+PROP. XIX.  He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should
+love him in return.
+    Proof.-For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.
+xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
+consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.) ; which is
+absurd (III. xxviii.).  Therefore, he who loves God, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion
+of envy or jealousy : contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to
+God by the same bond of love.
+    Proof.-This love towards God is the highest good which we can
+seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common
+to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice
+therein (IV. xxxvii.) ; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),
+it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of
+jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note)
+; but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
+therein.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion
+directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be
+destroyed ; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God
+is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as
+it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the
+body be destroyed also.  As to its nature, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
+    I have now gone through all the remedies against the
+emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can
+do against them.  Whence it appears that the mind's power over
+the emotions consists :-
+    I.  In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).
+    II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the
+thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.
+ii. and V. iv. note).
+    III.  In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions
+referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those
+referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner
+(V. vii.).
+    IV.  In the number of causes whereby those modifications17
+are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of
+things or to God (V. ix. xi.).
+    V.  Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and
+associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and
+xii. xiii. xiv.).
+    But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
+may be better understood, it should be specially observed that
+the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion
+of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is
+more troubled than another by the same emotion ; or when we are
+comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,
+and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than
+by another.  For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
+comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause. 
+Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
+infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge
+only : it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
+whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it
+may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by
+its activities : on the other hand, that mind is most active,
+whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,
+although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former
+mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas
+attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human
+infirmity.  Again, it must be observed, that spiritual
+unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to
+excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,
+and which we can never become masters of.  For no one is
+solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it ;
+neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in
+regard to things whereof no one can be really master.
+    We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and
+distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge
+(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,
+possesses over the emotions : if it does not absolutely destroy
+them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note) ; at
+any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind
+(V. xiv.).  Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable
+and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession
+(II. xlv.) ; neither can it be defiled with those faults which
+are inherent in ordinary love ; but it may grow from strength to
+strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and
+deeply penetrate it.
+    And now I have finished with all that concerns this present
+life : for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have
+briefly described all the remedies against the emotions.  And
+this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has
+attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the
+definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to
+Propositions i. and iii. of Part III.  It is now, therefore, time
+to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of
+the mind, without relation to the body.
+
+PROP. XXI.  The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
+is past, while the body endures.
+    Proof.-The mind does not express the actual existence of its
+body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as
+actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.) ; and,
+consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine
+any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. 
+Thus it
+cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.
+xvii. note),
+or remember things past, except while the body endures (see
+definition of Memory, II. xviii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,
+which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the
+form of eternity.
+    Proof.-God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or
+that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.).  This
+essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the
+very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a
+certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.) ; and this conception must
+necessarily exist in God (II. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
+the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.
+    Proof.-There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which
+expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,
+therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence
+of the human mind (II. xiii.).  But we have not assigned to the
+human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as
+it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained
+through duration, and may be defined by time-that is (II. viii.
+Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
+endures.  Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
+conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
+of God (last Prop.) ; this something, which appertains to the
+essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This idea, which expresses the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode
+of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
+necessarily eternal.  Yet it is not possible that we should
+remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear
+no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in
+terms of time, or have any relation to time.  But,
+notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal.  For the
+mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no
+less than those things that it remembers.  For the eyes of the
+mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than
+proofs.  Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before
+the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the
+essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and
+that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or
+explained through duration.  Thus our mind can only be said to
+endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in
+so far as it involves the actual existence of the body.  Thus far
+only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
+time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The more we understand particular things, the more
+do we understand God.
+    Proof.-This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.
+
+PROP. XXV.  The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
+virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
+    Proof.-The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
+idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
+essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.) ; and,
+in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
+understand God (by the last Prop.) ; therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest virtue of the mind, that is IV. Def. viii.) the power, or
+nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to
+understand things by the third kind of knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  In proportion as the mind is more capable of
+understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
+more to understand things by that kind.
+    Proof-This is evident.  For, in so far as we conceive the
+mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of
+knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to
+conceive things ; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
+the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable
+thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  From this third kind of knowledge arises the
+highest possible mental acquiescence.
+    Proof.-The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.
+xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge
+(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind
+knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.) :
+consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge
+passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
+of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such
+pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own
+virtue ; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of
+knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The endeavour or desire to know things by the
+third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the
+second kind of knowledge.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident.  For whatsoever we
+understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
+itself, or through that which is conceived through itself ; that
+is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are
+referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)
+cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and
+are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from
+adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of
+knowledge ; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of
+knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from
+the first, but from the second kind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
+eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the
+present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving
+the essence of the body under the form of eternity.
+    Proof.-In so far as the mind conceives the present existence
+of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be
+determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of
+conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.).  But
+eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
+and explanation).  Therefore to this extent the mind has not the
+power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it
+possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to
+conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
+ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to
+conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
+xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to
+the essence of mind (II. xiii.).  Therefore this power of
+conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the
+mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways ;
+either as existing
+in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and
+following
+from the necessity of the divine nature.  Whatsoever we conceive
+in this
+second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of
+eternity, and
+their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as
+we showed
+in II. xlv. and note, which see.
+
+PROP. XXX.  Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body
+under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a
+knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived
+through God.
+    Proof.-Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this
+involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.).  Therefore to
+conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things
+in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as
+real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the
+essence of God ; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
+itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that
+extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
+its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
+    Proof.-The mind does not conceive anything under the form of
+eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
+form of eternity (V. xxix.) ; that is, except in so far as it is
+eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.) ; therefore (by the last Prop.), in so
+far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which
+knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.) ; hence the mind,
+in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything
+which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in
+other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge
+(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind
+(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or
+formal cause of such knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in
+this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of
+himself and of God ; in other words, he will be more perfect and
+blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel.  But we must
+here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind
+is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of
+eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more
+readily explained and better understood, we will consider the
+mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to
+understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have
+done hitherto ; this we may do without any danger of error, so
+long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our
+premisses are plain.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of
+knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by
+the idea of God as cause.
+    Proof.-From this kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,
+xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea
+of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the
+idea also of God as cause.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-From the third kind of knowledge necessarily
+arises the intellectual love of God.  From this kind of knowledge
+arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God ; not in so far as
+we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we
+understand him to be eternal ; this is what I call the
+intellectual love of God.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  The intellectual love of God, which arises from
+the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
+    Proof.-The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.
+Ax. iii.) ; therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises
+therefrom is also necessarily eternal.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing
+Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of
+love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.
+of the last Prop.  Nor is there here any difference, except that
+the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we
+feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of
+God as eternal cause.  If pleasure consists in the transition to
+a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the
+mind being endowed with perfection itself.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  The mind is, only while the body endures, subject
+to those emotions which are attributable to passions.
+    Proof.-Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind
+contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note) ; yet this idea
+indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than
+the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). 
+Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,
+in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body ;
+therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,
+subject to emotions which are attributable to passions.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that no love save intellectual
+love is eternal.
+    Note.-If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that
+they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that
+they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the
+imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after
+death.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  God loves himself with an infinite intellectual
+love.
+    Proof.-God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.
+Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection ;
+and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of
+himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause
+: now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as
+intellectual love.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  The intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as
+he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the
+essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity ;
+in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.
+    Proof.-This love of the mind must be referred to the
+activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.) ; it is
+itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself
+accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.) ;
+that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity
+whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human
+mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself ;
+therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of
+the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves
+himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God
+towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God
+are identical.
+    Note.-From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein
+our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists : namely, in
+the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love
+towards men.  This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called
+Glory, and not undeservedly.  For whether this love be referred
+to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of
+spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really
+distinguished from glory.  In so far as it is referred to God, it
+is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,
+accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).
+    Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in
+knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.
+xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner
+and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from
+the divine nature and constantly depends on God.  I have thought
+it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show
+by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I
+have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),
+is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which
+I have styled knowledge of the second kind.  For, although in
+Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and
+consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence
+and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate
+and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind
+so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual
+essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to
+this intellectual love, or which can take it away.
+    Proof.-This intellectual love follows necessarily from the
+nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through
+the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.). 
+If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary
+to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true
+; consequently, that, which should be able to take away this
+love, would cause that which is true to be false ; an obvious
+absurdity.  Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular
+things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given
+time and place : of this, I think, no one can doubt.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  In proportion as the mind understands more things
+by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to
+those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
+    Proof.-The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.) ;
+therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by
+the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
+part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently
+(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not
+touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in
+other words, evil (IV. xxx.).  Thus, in proportion as the mind
+understands more things by the second and third kinds of
+knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains
+unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c. 
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence we understand that point which I touched on in
+IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part ;
+namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the
+mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,
+consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more.  Again,
+since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind
+can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which
+we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of
+little importance when compared with the part which endures.  But
+I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part
+is eternal.
+    Proof.-He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which
+are evil (IV. xxxviii.)-that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions
+which are contrary to our nature ; therefore (V. x.), he
+possesses the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,
+and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the
+modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God ;
+whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected
+with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute
+the chief part of the mind ; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man
+will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number
+of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a
+nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great
+knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or
+chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely
+fear death.  But, in order that this may be understood more
+clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of
+perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the
+better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.
+    For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a
+corpse, is called unhappy ; whereas it is set down to happiness,
+if we have been able to live through the whole period of life
+with a sound mind in a sound body.  And, in reality, he, who, as
+in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very
+few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external
+causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely
+conscious of itself, or of God, or of things ; whereas, he, who
+has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,
+considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of
+God, and of things.  In this life, therefore, we primarily
+endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far
+as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into
+something else capable of very many activities, and referable to
+a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things
+; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its
+imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison
+with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the
+last Proposition.
+
+PROP. XL.  In proportion as each thing possesses more of
+perfection, so is it more active, and less passive ; and, vice
+versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
+    Proof.-In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it
+possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.
+iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less
+passive.  This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove
+that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more
+perfect.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the part of the mind which
+endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. 
+For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the
+understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.)
+; the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.
+xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.
+and general Def. of the Emotions) ; therefore, the former, be it
+great or small, is more perfect than the latter.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set
+forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without
+relation to the body ; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other
+places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,
+is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another
+eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to
+infinity ; so that all taken together at once constitute the
+eternal and infinite intellect of God.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we
+should still consider as of primary importance piety and
+religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed
+to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness.
+    Proof.-The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule
+of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's
+own true interest.  Now, while we determined what reason
+prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity,
+which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part.  Although
+we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we
+nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage
+and high-mindedness are of primary importance.  Therefore, even
+if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the
+aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The general belief of the multitude seems to be
+different.  Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so
+far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their
+rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the
+commandments of the divine law.  They therefore believe that
+piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to
+firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to
+lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,
+for their piety and religion ; it is not only by this hope, but
+also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after
+death, that they are induced to live according to the divine
+commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry
+them.
+    If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the
+mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life
+remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of
+piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling
+everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey
+fortune rather than themselves.  Such a course appears to me not
+less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he
+can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to
+cram himself with poisons and deadly fare ; or if, because he
+sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer
+to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of
+reason ; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth
+refuting.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue
+itself  ; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our
+lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able
+to control our lusts.
+    Proof.-Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and
+note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.
+xxxii. Coroll.) ; therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active ;
+therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself.  This was our
+first point.  Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in
+this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand
+(V. xxxii.) ; that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power
+has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is
+it subject to those emotions which are evil ; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or
+blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts.  And,
+since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in
+the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in
+blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,
+contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this
+blessedness itself.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I have thus completed all I wished to set forth
+touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's
+freedom.  Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how
+much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his
+lusts.  For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various
+ways by external causes without ever gaining the true
+acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were
+unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as
+he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
+    Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
+scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
+himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
+necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
+acquiescence of his spirit.
+    If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result
+seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered.  Needs
+must it be hard, since it is so seldom found.  How would it be
+possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without
+great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men
+neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are
+rare.
+
+
+End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+1 "Affectiones"
+2 "Forma"
+3 "Animata"
+4 A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
+5 Conscientiæ morsus-thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
+6 By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
+whom we regard without any particular emotion.
+7 So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
+"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.
+8 See previous endnote.
+9 Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.
+    "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes ;
+      Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."
+10 This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
+intellect, as I have shown in II.xiii.note.
+11 Gloria.
+12 Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
+13 Honestas
+14 Land reads : "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"-which I
+have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
+`quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
+15 "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).  
+Bruder reads : "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
+alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
+misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
+boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+16 Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
+that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context. 
+I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be
+obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholarship.
+17 Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus - emotions.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+
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+The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+#11 in our series by Benedict de Spinoza
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+Title:  The Ethics
+(Full Title In Latin:  Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+Author:  Benedict de Spinoza
+
+Translator: R. H. M. Elwes
+
+Release Date: February, 2003  [EBook #3800]
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+The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
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+This etext was produced by Tom Sharpe
+This is the plain .txt file. . .for the Word file with hyperlinks,
+please get the ethic10w.doc or ethic10w.zip file.
+
+
+
+
+
+The Ethics
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+
+
+
+Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+
+
+
+PART I. CONCERNING GOD.
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+
+I.  By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the
+essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
+conceivable as existent.
+
+II.  A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be
+limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a
+body is called finite because we always conceive another greater
+body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a
+body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
+
+III.  By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a
+conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
+
+IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
+constituting the essence of substance.
+
+V.  By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or that
+which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than
+itself.
+
+[1] "Affectiones"
+
+VI.  By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite-that is, a
+substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
+expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.
+    Explanation-I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its
+kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
+attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
+contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves
+no negation.
+
+VII.  That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
+necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is
+determined by itself alone.  On the other hand, that thing is
+necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by
+something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of
+existence or action.
+
+VIII.  By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
+conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
+that which is eternal.
+    Explanation-Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
+truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
+explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may
+be conceived without a beginning or end.
+
+
+AXIOMS.
+
+I.  Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else.
+
+II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
+conceived through itself.
+
+III.  From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;
+and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
+impossible that an effect can follow.
+
+IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
+knowledge of a cause.
+
+V.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
+one by means of the other; the conception of one does not
+involve the conception of the other.
+
+VI.  A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
+
+VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence
+does not involve existence.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
+    Proof.-This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
+
+PROP. II.  Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
+nothing in common.
+    Proof.-Also evident from Def. iii.  For each must exist in
+itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the
+conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.
+
+PROP. III.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
+cause of the other.
+    Proof.-If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
+cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
+therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IV.  Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from
+the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
+substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
+    Proof.-Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
+something else (Ax. i.),-that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing
+is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and
+its modifications.  Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
+understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one
+from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see
+Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  There cannot exist in the universe two or more
+substances having the same nature or attribute.
+    Proof.-If several distinct substances be granted, they must
+be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
+their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
+(Prop. iv.).  If only by the difference of their attributes, it
+will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
+identical attribute.  If by the difference of their
+modifications-as substance is naturally prior to its
+modifications (Prop. i.),-it follows that setting the
+modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is
+truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one
+substance different from another,-that is (by Prop. iv.), there
+cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
+    Proof.-It is impossible that there should be in the universe
+two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have
+anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.
+iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be
+produced by the other.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that a substance cannot be
+produced by anything external to itself.  For in the universe
+nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as
+appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.).  Now (by the last
+Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,
+therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.
+Q.E.D.  This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the
+contradictory.  For, if substance be produced by an external
+cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its
+cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be
+substance.
+
+PROP. VII.  Existence belongs to the nature of substances.
+    Proof.-Substance cannot be produced by anything external
+(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause-that
+is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence
+belongs to its nature.
+
+PROP. VIII.  Every substance is necessarily infinite.
+    Proof.-There can only be one substance with an identical
+attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);
+its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or
+infinite.  It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it
+would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which
+would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be
+two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd
+(Prop. v.).  It therefore exists as infinite.  Q.E.D.
+    Note I.-As finite existence involves a partial negation, and
+infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given
+nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance
+is necessarily infinite.
+    Note II.-No doubt it will be difficult for those who think
+about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them
+by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.
+vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the
+modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and
+are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence
+they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe
+in natural objects.  Those who are ignorant of true causes, make
+complete confusion-think that trees might talk just as well as
+men-that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;
+and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
+also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,
+readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long
+as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.  But, if
+people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no
+doubt about the truth of Prop. vii.  In fact, this proposition
+would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.  For, by
+substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself-that is, something of which the
+conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas
+modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a
+conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the
+thing in which they exist.  Therefore, we may have true ideas of
+non-existent modifications; for, although they may have no
+actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their
+essence is so involved in something external to themselves that
+they may through it be conceived.  Whereas the only truth
+substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in
+their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.
+Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and
+distinct-that is, a true-idea of a substance, but that he is not
+sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he
+said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it
+was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if
+anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same
+as saying that a false idea was true-in short, the height of
+absurdity.  It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
+existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth.  And
+we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning-that there
+is but one such substance.  I think that this may profitably be
+done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
+demonstration, we must premise:--
+    1.  The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
+expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined.  From
+this it follows that--
+    2.  No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
+individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature
+of the thing defined.  For instance, the definition of a triangle
+expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it
+does not imply any fixed number of triangles.
+    3.  There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a
+cause why it should exist.
+    4.  This cause of existence must either be contained in the
+nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated
+apart from such definition.
+    It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual
+things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the
+existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less.  For
+example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's
+sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have
+had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of
+these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of
+human existence in general; we must also show why there are
+exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be
+assigned for the existence of each individual.  Now this cause
+cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true
+definition of man does not involve any consideration of the
+number twenty.  Consequently, the cause for the existence of
+these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must
+necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may
+lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of
+several individuals must have an external cause.  And, as it has
+been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of
+substance, existence must necessarily be included in its
+definition; and from its definition alone existence must be
+deducible.  But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii.,
+iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances;
+therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same
+nature.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IX.  The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the
+number of its attributes (Def. iv.).
+
+PROP. X.  Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
+conceived through itself.
+    Proof.-An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of
+substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,
+therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note-It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in
+fact, conceived as distinct-that is, one without the help of the
+other-yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two
+entities, or two different substances.  For it is the nature of
+substance that each of its attributes is conceived through
+itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
+simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;
+but each expresses the reality or being of substance.  It is,
+then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one
+substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each
+and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that
+its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its
+attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.
+Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite
+being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite
+attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and
+infinite essence.
+    If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to
+distinguish different substances, let him read the following
+propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the
+universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a
+sign would be sought in vain.
+
+PROP. XI.  God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,
+of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
+necessarily exists.
+    Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God
+does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.
+But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd.  Therefore God necessarily
+exists.
+    Another proof.-Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason
+must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its
+non-existence-e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be
+granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not
+exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from
+existing, or annuls its existence.  This reason or cause must
+either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be
+external to it.  For instance, the reason for the non-existence
+of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it
+would involve a contradiction.  On the other hand, the existence
+of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its
+nature involves existence.  (See Prop. vii.)
+    But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle
+does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the
+order of universal nature in extension.  From the latter it must
+follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
+impossible that it should exist.  So much is self-evident.  It
+follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or
+reason be granted which prevents its existence.
+    If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
+existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
+certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist.  If such a
+reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the
+very nature of God, or be external to him-that is, drawn from
+another substance of another nature.  For if it were of the same
+nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist.  But
+substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God
+(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or
+to destroy his existence.
+    As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
+existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine
+nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn
+from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction.  To
+make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and
+supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of
+God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be
+assigned which would annul his existence.  Therefore, God
+necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.
+    Another proof.-The potentiality of non-existence is a
+negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence
+is a power, as is obvious.  If, then, that which necessarily
+exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more
+powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously
+absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
+absolutely infinite necessarily exists also.  Now we exist either
+in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see
+Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.).  Therefore a being absolutely
+infinite-in other words, God (Def. vi.)-necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's
+existence à posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily
+followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence
+does not follow à priori.  For, as the potentiality of existence
+is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases
+in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength
+for existence.  Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as
+God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence,
+and hence he does absolutely exist.  Perhaps there will be many
+who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as
+they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from
+external causes.  Of such things, they see that those which
+quickly come to pass-that is, quickly come into existence-quickly
+also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of
+accomplishment-that is, not so easily brought into
+existence-those things which they conceive as more complicated.
+    However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here
+show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly,
+goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of
+universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I
+need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which
+come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of
+substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any
+external cause.  Things which are produced by external causes,
+whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever
+perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of
+their external cause;  and therefore their existence arises
+solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from
+their own.  Contrrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by
+substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence
+of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is
+nothing else but its essence.  Thus, the perfection of a thing
+does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it.
+Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we
+cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the
+existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect-that is, of
+God.  For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and
+involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his
+existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question
+is given.  This, I think, will be evident to every moderately
+attentive reader.
+
+PROP. XII.  No attribute of substance can be conceived from which
+it would follow that substance can be divided.
+    Proof.-The parts into which substance as thus conceived would
+be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they
+will not.  If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will
+necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self-caused, and (by
+Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so
+that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one
+substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd.  Moreover, the parts
+(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and
+the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be
+conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be
+absurd.  If we adopt the second alternative-namely, that the
+parts will not retain the nature of substance-then, if the whole
+substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature
+of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is
+absurd.
+
+PROP. XIII.  Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
+    Proof.-If it could be divided, the parts into which it was
+divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite
+substance, or they would not.  If the former, we should have
+several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is
+absurd.  If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely
+infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also
+absurd.
+    Corollary.-It follows, that no substance, and consequently no
+extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.
+    Note.-The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
+understood as follows.  The nature of substance can only be
+conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else
+can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii)
+involves a manifest contradiction.
+
+PROP. XIV.  Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
+    Proof.-As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no
+attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied
+(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any
+substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained
+by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
+attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,
+besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be
+conceived.  If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have
+to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this
+proof) is absurd.  Therefore, besides God no substance can be
+granted or conceived.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-Clearly, therefore: 1.  God is one, that is (by
+Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and
+that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already
+indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).
+    Corollary II.-It follows:  2.  That extension and thought
+are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents
+(affectiones) of the attributes of God.
+
+PROP. XV.  Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can
+be, or be conceived.
+    Proof.-Besides God, no substance is granted or can be
+conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which
+is in itself and is conceived through itself.  But modes (by Def.
+v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;
+wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only
+through it be conceived.  But substances and modes form the sum
+total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing
+can be, or be conceived.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
+mind, and is susceptible of passions.  How far such persons have
+strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
+said.  But these I pass over.  For all who have in anywise
+reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body.  Of this
+they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body
+a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a
+certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate
+such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite.  But meanwhile
+by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they
+show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart
+from the divine nature, and say it was created by God.  Wherefrom
+the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant;
+thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of
+their own words.  I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at
+any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop.
+viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything
+other than itself.  Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that
+besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.  Hence we
+drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the
+infinite attributes of God.  However, in order to explain more
+fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all
+start from the following points:--
+    Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
+as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
+infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God.  This
+they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
+two.  If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be
+conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be
+either finite or infinite.  If the former, then infinite
+substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd.  If
+the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another
+infinite, which is also absurd.
+    Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths,
+it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would
+equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part
+measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve
+times as great as the other.
+    Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn
+two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance
+apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the
+distance between the two lines will be continually increased,
+until at length it changes from definite to indefinable.  As
+these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity
+as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance
+must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain
+to the nature of God.
+    The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme
+perfection.  God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely
+perfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance,
+insofar as it is divisible, is passive.  It follows, therefore,
+that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.
+    Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who
+by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the
+divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto.  However, I
+think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered
+their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the
+hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such
+a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.)
+to be absurd.  Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all
+these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now
+discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion
+that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the
+notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that
+an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts
+therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that:
+infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of
+finite parts.  This is exactly what we have already proved (in
+Prop. xii.).  Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in
+reality recoiled upon themselves.  If, from this absurdity of
+theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended
+substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like
+a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,
+and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to
+deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to
+the circumference are equal.  For, taking extended substance,
+which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible
+(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it
+is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can
+be multiplied and divided.
+    So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of
+points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
+infinitely divided.  Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert
+that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it
+would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface
+of lines, and a line of points.  This must be admitted by all who
+know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who
+deny the possibility of a vacuum.  For if extended substance
+could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why
+should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others
+remaining joined together as before?  And why should all be so
+fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum?  Surely in the
+case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one
+can exist without the other, and can remain in its original
+condition.  As, then,  there does not exist a vacuum in nature
+(of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to
+prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be
+distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
+substance cannot be divided.
+    If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally
+so prone to divide quantity?  I answer, that quantity is
+conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially,
+as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by
+the intellect.  If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented
+in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall
+find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but
+if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and
+conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we
+shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is
+infinite, one, and indivisible.  This will be plain enough to all
+who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination,
+especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the
+same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as
+we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
+distinguished, not really, but modally.  For instance, water, in
+so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts
+to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is
+extended substance; from this point of view it is neither
+separated nor divisible.  Further, water, in so far as it is
+water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is
+substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
+    I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in
+fact, founded on the same assumption as the first-namely, that
+matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed
+of parts.  Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be
+considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God
+(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could
+receive its modifications.  All things, I repeat, are in God, and
+all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the
+laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly
+show) from the necessity of his essence.  Wherefore it can in
+nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other
+than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the
+Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is
+granted to be infinite and eternal.  But enough of this for the
+present.
+
+PROP. XVI.  From the necessity of the divine nature must follow
+an infinite number of things in infinite ways-that is, all things
+which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
+    Proof.-This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
+remembers that from the given definition of any thing the
+intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily
+follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
+defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the
+definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in
+proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more
+reality.  Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
+attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite
+essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its
+nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
+can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must
+necessarily follow.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
+cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
+intellect.
+    Corollary II.-It also follows that God is a cause in himself,
+and not through an accident of his nature.
+    Corollary III.-It follows, thirdly, that God is the
+absolutely first cause.
+
+PROP. XVII.  God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and
+is not constrained by anyone.
+    Proof.-We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
+the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
+solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things
+absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved
+(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived
+but that all things are in God.  Wherefore nothing can exist;
+outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to
+act.  Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
+and is not constrained by anyone.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-It follows: 1.  That there can be no cause
+which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
+perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.
+    Corollary II.-It follows: 2.  That God is the sole free
+cause.  For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature
+(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole
+necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the
+sole free cause.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
+as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have
+said follow from his nature-that is, which are in his power,
+should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him.  But
+this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
+that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its
+three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles;
+or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is
+absurd.
+    Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
+proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
+nature.  I know that there are many who think that they can show,
+that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature;
+for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can
+attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in
+ourselves.  Further, although they conceive God as actually
+supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring
+into existence everything which he actually understands, for they
+think that they would thus destroy God's power.  If, they
+contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he
+would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,
+would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to
+asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates
+nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute
+exercise of will, to create.  However, I think I have shown
+sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme
+power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things-that is,
+all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of
+ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as
+from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for
+eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right
+angles.  Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from
+all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state
+of activity.  This manner of treating the question attributes to
+God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect.  For,
+otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an
+infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able
+to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,
+according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render
+himself imperfect.  Wherefore, in order to establish that God is
+perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,
+that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power
+extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most
+repugnant to God's omnipotence.
+    Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the
+will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain
+to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
+significance quite different from those they usually bear.  For
+intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
+would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
+intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with
+them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence
+between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
+constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.  This I will
+prove as follows.  If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it
+cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,
+posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,
+inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality
+(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.).  On the contrary, the truth and formal
+essence of things is as it is, because it exists by
+representation as such in the intellect of God.  Wherefore the
+intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
+God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
+essence and of their existence.  This seems to have been
+recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,
+God's will, and God's power, are one and the same.  As,
+therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,
+both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ
+from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its
+existence.  For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely
+in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
+    For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence,
+but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
+therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but
+must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of
+one of them cease, the existence of the other will not
+necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be
+destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be
+destroyed also.  Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of
+the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ
+from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in
+respect to its existence.  Now the intellect of God is the cause
+both of the essence and the existence of our intellect;
+therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to
+constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in
+respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in
+anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before.  The
+reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone
+can easily see.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  God is the indwelling and not the transient cause
+of all things.
+    Proof.-All things which are, are in God, and must be
+conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
+Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.
+This is our first point.  Further, besides God there can be no
+substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to
+God.  This is our second point.  God, therefore, is the
+indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIX.  God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.
+    Proof.-God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)
+necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains
+to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its
+definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.).  Further,
+by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.
+iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance-in other
+words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should
+be involved in the attributes of substance.  Now eternity
+appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in
+Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the
+attributes, and thus all are eternal.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition is also evident from the manner in
+which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is
+evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,
+like his essence, is an eternal truth.  Further (in Prop. xix. of
+my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the
+eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.
+
+PROP. XX.  The existence of God and his essence are one and the
+same.
+    Proof.-God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
+eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
+existence.  Therefore the same
+attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at
+the same time his eternal existence-in other words, that which
+constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his
+existence.  Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one
+and the same.  Q.E.D.
+    Coroll. I.-Hence it follows that God's existence, like his
+essence, is an eternal truth.
+    Coroll. II-Secondly, it follows that God, and all the
+attributes of God, are unchangeable.  For if they could be
+changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be
+changed in respect to essence-that is, obviously, be changed from
+true to false, which is absurd.
+
+PROP. XXI.  All things which follow from the absolute nature of
+any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in
+other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
+    Proof.-Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition
+to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow
+from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the
+same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or
+duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the
+attribute thought.  Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to
+be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its
+nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,
+it is supposed finite.  It cannot, however, be conceived as
+finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is
+not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
+the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);
+therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not
+constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)
+must necessarily exist.
+    We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the
+idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
+follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for
+it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,
+the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis.  Wherefore, if
+the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
+anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any
+example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from
+the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the
+said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
+point.
+    Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of
+the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration.  For
+if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of
+the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God,
+for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought,
+and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be
+about not to exist.
+    Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist
+unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond
+the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the
+latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to
+exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of
+God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,
+thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed
+therefrom.  Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or
+anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of
+some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but
+through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.
+Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of
+anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's
+absolute nature.
+
+PROP. XXII.  Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so
+far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily
+and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist
+necessarily and as infinite.
+    Proof.-The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the preceding one.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
+infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature
+of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
+modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
+    Proof.-A mode exists in something else, through which it must
+be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in
+God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode
+is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must
+necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of
+God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the
+infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.)
+eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely.  A
+mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must
+follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either
+immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some
+modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said
+attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily
+and as infinite.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The essence of things produced by God does not
+involve existence.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Def. i.  For that of
+which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
+self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
+things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
+existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
+the being of things (essendi rerum).  For whether things exist,
+or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
+that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently,
+it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other.  God must
+be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
+appertain.  (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
+of things, but also of their essence.
+    Proof.-If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
+essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by
+Ax. iv.) be conceived without God.  This (by Prop. xv.) is
+absurd.  Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
+For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
+essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
+existence-in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
+in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself.  This
+will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
+    Corollary.-Individual things are nothing but modifications of
+the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
+are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.  The proof appears
+from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
+manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that
+which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
+act.
+    Proof.-That by which things are said to be conditioned to act
+in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
+obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God
+by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.
+xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point.  Our second point is
+plainly to be inferred therefrom.  For if a thing, which has not
+been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part
+of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is
+absurd.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act
+in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from the third axiom.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  Every individual thing, or everything which is
+finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be
+conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
+action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and
+has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in
+its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be
+conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also
+is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to
+infinity.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
+thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,
+Coroll.).
+    But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,
+cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God;
+for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any
+attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.).  It
+must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as
+the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for
+substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.
+and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the
+attributes of God.  But from God, or from any of his attributes,
+in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite
+and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow.  Wherefore it
+must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by
+God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
+modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence.  This is our first point.  Again, this
+cause or this modification (for the reason by which we
+established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be
+conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the
+same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
+namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
+nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
+nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
+follows:-1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
+things immediately produced by him.  I say absolutely, not after
+his kind, as is usually stated.  For the effects of God cannot
+either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.
+xxiv. Coroll.).  2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote
+cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing
+these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what
+follows from his absolute nature.  For, by a remote cause, we
+understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.
+But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that
+without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all
+things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular
+manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.).  But God cannot
+be called a thing contingent.  For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
+necessarily, and not contingently.  Further, the modes of the
+divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
+(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the
+divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
+conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.).  Further, God is not only the
+cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
+xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as
+conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).
+If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition
+themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
+themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
+the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also
+to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing
+that is contingent.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
+we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura
+naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata).  I say
+to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,
+from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature
+viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,
+and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
+substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other
+words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,
+in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
+    By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which
+follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
+attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of
+God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
+and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXX.  Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
+infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
+modifications of God, and nothing else.
+    Proof.-A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in
+other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect
+in representation must necessarily be granted in nature.  But in
+nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save
+God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in
+God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived.  Therefore
+the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
+comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
+and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  The intellect in function, whether finite or
+infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to
+passive nature and not to active nature.
+    Proof.-By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
+thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
+other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)
+requiring to be conceived through absolute thought.  It must (by
+Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
+expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
+conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
+conceived.  It must therefore be referred to nature passive
+rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
+thinking.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
+admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:
+but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
+what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
+understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived.  For
+we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
+the act of understanding.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
+necessary cause.
+    Proof.-Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
+intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
+nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
+other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
+and so on to infinity.  But if will be supposed infinite, it must
+also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
+being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his
+possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
+essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.).  Thus, however it be
+conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
+which it should be conditioned to exist and act.  Thus (Def.
+vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
+constrained cause.  Q.E.D.
+    Coroll. I.-Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
+according to freedom of the will.
+    Coroll. II.-It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
+stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
+rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
+conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
+manner.  For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
+which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
+And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
+number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
+said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
+number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
+that motion and rest act by free will.  Wherefore will no more
+appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
+in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
+we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
+and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
+manner.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  Things could not have been brought into being by
+God in any manner or in any order different from that which has
+in fact obtained.
+    Proof-All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
+(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist
+and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.).  If things, therefore,
+could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
+to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have
+been different, God's nature would also have been able to be
+different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that
+different nature also would have perforce existed, and
+consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.
+This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd.  Therefore things
+could not have been brought into being by God in any other
+manner, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note I.-As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
+noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
+contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall
+attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the
+words necessary and impossible.
+    A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence
+or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing
+necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
+from a given efficient cause.  For similar reasons a thing is
+said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or
+definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
+is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but
+a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation
+to the imperfection of our knowledge.
+    A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or
+does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it
+does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt
+concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes
+us,-such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
+impossible.  Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
+    Note II.-It clearly follows from what we have said, that
+things have been brought into being by God in the highest
+perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a
+most perfect nature.  Nor does this prove any imperfection in
+God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection.  From its
+contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just
+shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
+brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
+God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute
+to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
+    I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
+will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply
+because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very
+different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced.  They
+assign to him, in short, absolute free will.  However, I am also
+convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly
+weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
+such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
+but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge.  There is
+no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
+xvii.  But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
+that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of
+God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things
+could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
+different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what
+our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely
+on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is.  If
+it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.
+Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all
+eternity by God himself.  If it were otherwise, God would be
+convicted of imperfection or change.  But in eternity there is no
+such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely
+from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never
+could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist
+before his decrees, and would not exist without them.  But, it is
+said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had
+ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and
+her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in
+God.  But persons who say this must admit that God can change his
+decrees.  For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature
+and her order, different from those which he has ordained-in
+other words, if he had willed and conceived something different
+concerning nature-he would perforce have had a different
+intellect from that which he has, and also a different will.  But
+if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a
+different will, without any change in his essence or his
+perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the
+decrees which he has made concerning created things, and
+nevertheless remaining perfect?  For his intellect and will
+concerning things created and their order are the same, in
+respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.
+    Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that
+God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as
+they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's
+essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a
+different actual intellect and a different will, his essence
+would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at
+first, if things had been brought into being by God in a
+different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and
+will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have
+been different, which is absurd.
+    As these things could not have been brought into being by God
+in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as
+the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection
+of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
+believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were
+in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he
+had understood them.
+    But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
+imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be
+called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the
+will of God.  If God had so willed, he might have brought it
+about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,
+and vice versâ.  What is such an assertion, but an open
+declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he
+wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should
+understand things differently from the way in which he does
+understand them?  This (as we have just shown) is the height of
+absurdity.  Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its
+employers, as follows:-All things depend on the power of God.
+In order that things should be different from what they are,
+God's will would necessarily have to be different.  But God's
+will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly
+demonstrated) from God's perfection.  Therefore neither can
+things be different.  I confess, that the theory which subjects
+all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that
+they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth
+than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all
+things with a view of promoting what is good.  For these latter
+persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not
+depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,
+or which he aims at as a definite goal.  This is only another
+name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter
+absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first
+and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of
+their existence.  I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting
+such wild theories.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  God's power is identical with his essence.
+    Proof.-From the sole necessity of the essence of God it
+follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all
+things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.).  Wherefore the power of God, by
+which he and all things are and act, is identical with his
+essence.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
+necessarily exists.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.)
+be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it
+necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  There is no cause from whose nature some effect
+does not follow.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in
+a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is,
+(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given
+conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things,
+therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.
+Q.E.D.
+
+
+APPENDIX:
+    In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties
+of God.  I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:
+that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;
+that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;
+that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without
+him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all
+things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or
+absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power.
+I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the
+prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my
+demonstrations.  Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,
+which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the
+understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained
+it above.  I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these
+misconceptions before the bar of reason.
+    All such opinions spring from the notion commonly
+entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,
+namely, with an end in view.  It is accepted as certain, that God
+himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
+that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship
+him).  I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
+why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
+prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and,
+lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about
+good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
+confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like.  However, this is
+not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of
+the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
+starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
+that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all
+have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they
+are conscious of such desire.  Herefrom it follows, first, that
+men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their
+volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance,
+of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire.
+Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that
+which is useful to them, and which they seek.  Thus it comes to
+pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of
+events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having
+no cause for further doubt.  If they cannot learn such causes
+from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering
+themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them
+personally to bring about the given event, and thus they
+necessarily judge other natures by their own.  Further, as they
+find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist
+them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance,
+eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for
+yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding
+fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means
+for obtaining such conveniences.  Now as they are aware, that
+they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think
+they have cause for believing, that some other being has made
+them for their use.  As they look upon things as means, they
+cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the
+means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they
+are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe
+endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted
+everything for human use.  They are bound to estimate the nature
+of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in
+accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that
+the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind
+man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.  Hence
+also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according
+to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God
+might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course
+of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and
+insatiable avarice.  Thus the prejudice developed into
+superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this
+reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain
+the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that
+nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to
+man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,
+and men are all mad together.  Consider, I pray you, the result:
+among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some
+hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they
+declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at
+some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in
+their worship.  Experience day by day protested and showed by
+infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of
+pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their
+inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such
+contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were
+ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of
+ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
+and start afresh.  They therefore laid down as an axiom, that
+God's judgments far transcend human understanding.  Such a
+doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the
+human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished
+another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and
+properties of figures without regard to their final causes.
+There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides
+mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed
+to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge
+of the truth.
+    I have now sufficiently explained my first point.  There is
+no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in
+view, and that final causes are mere human figments.  This, I
+think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and
+foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and
+also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in
+fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that
+everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with
+the utmost perfection.  However, I will add a few remarks, in
+order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly.  That
+which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versâ:
+it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that
+which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.  Passing
+over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is
+plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most
+perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which
+requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in
+that respect, more imperfect.  But if those things which were
+made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his
+end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the
+first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
+    Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:
+for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something
+which he lacks.  Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a
+distinction between the object of want and the object of
+assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for
+the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation.  They are
+unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God
+himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore
+driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those
+things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he
+desired them.
+    We must not omit to notice that the followers of this
+doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final
+causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their
+theory-namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to
+ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of
+exhibiting their doctrine.  For example, if a stone falls from a
+roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate
+by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man;
+for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how
+could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent
+circumstances) have all happened together by chance?  Perhaps you
+will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was
+blowing, and the man was walking that way.  "But why," they will
+insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very
+time walking that way?"  If you again answer, that the wind had
+then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day
+before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had
+been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was
+the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?"
+So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at
+last you take refuge in the will of God-in other words, the
+sanctuary of ignorance.  So, again, when they survey the frame of
+the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the
+causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been
+fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural
+skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt
+another.
+    Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and
+strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,
+and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as
+an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the
+interpreters of nature and the gods.  Such persons know that,
+with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only
+available means for proving and preserving their authority would
+vanish also.  But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my
+third point.
+    After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is
+created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as
+the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to
+themselves, and to account those things the best of all which
+have the most beneficial effect on mankind.  Further, they were
+bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature
+of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,
+cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that
+they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and
+blame, sin and merit.
+    I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human
+nature; the former I will briefly explain here.
+    Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God
+they have called good, everything which hinders these objects
+they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not
+understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any
+way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their
+imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that
+there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things
+and their own nature.  When phenomena are of such a kind, that
+the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of
+imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say
+that they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are
+ill-ordered or confused.  Further, as things which are easily
+imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to
+confusion-as though there were any order in nature, except in
+relation to our imagination-and say that God has created all
+things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing
+imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God
+foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it
+should be most easily imagined.  If this be their theory, they
+would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an
+infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and
+very many others which confound its weakness.  But enough has
+been said on this subject.  The other abstract notions are
+nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
+differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant
+as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that
+everything was created for the sake of themselves; and,
+according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,
+healthy or rotten and corrupt.  For instance, if the motion which
+objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,
+the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary
+motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
+    Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are
+styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,
+full-flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,
+rough or smooth, &c.
+    Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,
+sound, or harmony.  In this last case, there are men lunatic
+enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in
+harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded
+themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to
+harmony-all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone
+judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather
+mistakes for things the forms of his imagination.  We need no
+longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we
+have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human
+bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they
+differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;
+what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what
+is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on.  I need not
+further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the
+subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well
+known.  It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;
+everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as
+palates."  All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things
+according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
+understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
+mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I
+have urged.
+    We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly
+given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate
+the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the
+imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were
+entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
+entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all
+arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily
+rebutted.
+    Many argue in this way.  If all things follow from a
+necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there
+so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things
+corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,
+confusion, evil, sin, &c.  But these reasoners are, as I have
+said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be
+reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not
+more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human
+senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to
+mankind.  To those who ask why God did not so create all men,
+that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but
+this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of
+every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more
+strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to
+suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an
+infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
+    Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if
+there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily
+dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.
+
+
+
+
+Part II.
+
+ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+    I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
+necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and
+infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part
+i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
+infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
+us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
+and its highest blessedness.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS
+
+DEFINITION I.  By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain
+determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is
+considered as an extended thing.  (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,
+Coroll.)
+
+DEFINITION II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing
+that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,
+and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;
+in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
+without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
+
+DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is
+formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
+    Explanation.-I say conception rather than perception, because
+the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in
+respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an
+activity of the mind.
+
+DEFINITION IV.  By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so
+far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the
+object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
+    Explanation.-I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark
+which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and
+its object (ideatum).
+
+DEFINITION V.  Duration is the indefinite continuance of
+existing.
+    Explanation.-I say indefinite, because it cannot be
+determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or
+by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of
+the thing, but does not take it away.
+
+DEFINITION VI.  Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.
+
+DEFINITION VII.  By particular things, I mean things which are
+finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several
+individual things concur in one action, so as to be all
+simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so
+far, as one particular thing.
+
+
+AXIOMS
+
+I.  The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that
+is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or
+that man does or does not exist.
+
+II.  Man thinks.
+
+III.  Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
+the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
+individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c.  But the idea
+can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
+
+IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
+
+V.  We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
+modes of thought.
+
+N.B.  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
+xiii.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS
+
+PROP. I.  Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
+thing.
+    Proof.-Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
+modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
+of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.).  God therefore possesses
+the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved
+in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
+Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
+which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
+vi.).  In other words, God is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we
+are able to conceive an infinite thinking being.  For, in
+proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
+thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
+perfection.  Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
+number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,
+in respect of thinking, infinite.  As, therefore, from the
+consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,
+thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the
+infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
+
+PROP. II.  Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an
+extended thing.
+    Proof.-The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the last.
+
+PROP. III.  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
+essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his
+essence.
+    Proof.-God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
+infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
+thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
+and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.  Now all
+that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).
+Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and
+in God alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part i., Prop. xv.)
+    Note.-The multitude understand by the power of God the free
+will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
+latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent.  For
+it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
+reduce them to nothing.  Further, the power of God is very often
+likened to the power of kings.  But this doctrine we have refuted
+(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown
+(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as
+that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
+follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
+that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
+necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways.  We
+further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
+identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
+impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
+him as non-existent.  If we might pursue the subject further, I
+could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
+God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
+multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
+negation of power.  However, I am unwilling to go over the same
+ground so often.  I would only beg the reader again and again, to
+turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from
+Prop. xvi. to the end.  No one will be able to follow my meaning,
+unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of
+God with the human power and right of kings.
+
+PROP. IV.  The idea of God, from which an infinite number of
+things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
+    Proof.-Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
+attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
+Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.).  Therefore the
+idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in
+infinite ways, can only be one.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only
+in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far
+as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas
+both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own
+as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
+perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
+Part.  We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
+of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
+therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
+he is the object of his own idea.  Wherefore the actual being of
+ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
+It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
+ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
+xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
+nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
+(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
+of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
+of any attribute save thought.  Therefore the actual being of
+ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
+thinking thing, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in
+so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they
+are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other attribute.
+    Proof.-Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
+any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
+attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
+any other.  Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
+in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
+they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
+other.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence the actual being of things, which are not
+modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because
+that nature has prior knowledge of the things.  Things
+represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
+particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
+necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
+the attribute of thought.
+
+PROP. VII.  The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
+order and connection of things.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.  For
+the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of
+the cause, whereof it is an effect.
+    Corollary.-Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
+realized power of action-that is, whatsoever follows from the
+infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
+follows without exception in the same order and connection from
+the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
+    Note.-Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what
+has been pointed out above-namely, that whatsoever can be
+perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
+of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
+consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
+and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
+now through the other.  So, also, a mode of extension and the
+idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in
+two ways.  This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
+those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
+things understood by God are identical.  For instance, a circle
+existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
+also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
+different attributes.  Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
+attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
+under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
+and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following
+in either case.
+    I said that God is the cause of an idea-for instance, of the
+idea of a circle,-in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
+circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
+actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
+proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
+through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
+consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
+of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
+attribute of thought only.  And, in so far as we consider things
+as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
+nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in
+the case of the other attributes.  Wherefore of things as they
+are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
+consists of infinite attributes.  I cannot for the present
+explain my meaning more clearly.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
+not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
+the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
+are contained in the attributes of God.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from the last; it is
+understood more clearly from the preceding note.
+    Corollary.-Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
+except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
+God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,
+except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when
+particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they
+are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they
+are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,
+through which they are said to continue.
+    Note.-If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
+this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
+which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
+inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
+illustrate it as far as possible.  The nature of a circle is such
+that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the
+rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;
+thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle.  Yet
+none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far
+as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
+rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
+comprehended in the idea of the circle.  Let us grant that, from
+this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist.  The ideas of
+these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the
+idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of
+those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the
+remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
+
+PROP. IX.  The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
+existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
+by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
+    Proof.-The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
+an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
+(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus
+(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only
+as he is a thinking thing.  But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)
+in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
+he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
+is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so
+on to infinity.  Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by
+Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of
+causes.   Therefore of a given individual idea another individual
+idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that
+idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in
+so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of
+any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he
+has the idea of the object.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
+idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
+is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
+another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
+Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the
+same as the order and connection of things.  The knowledge,
+therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
+will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. X.  The being of substance does not appertain to the
+essence of man-in other words, substance does not constitute the
+actual being[2] of man.
+
+[2] "Forma"
+
+    Proof.-The being of substance involves necessary existence
+(Part i., Prop. vii.).  If, therefore, the being of substance
+appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
+would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
+consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd
+(II. Ax. i.).  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which
+it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same
+nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is
+not that which constitutes the actual being of man.  Again, the
+proposition is evident from the other properties of
+substance-namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
+immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
+constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
+For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to
+the essence of man.  That essence therefore (by i.  15) is
+something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
+nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),
+or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
+manner.
+    Note.-Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
+conceived without God.  All men agree that God is the one and
+only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
+existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
+respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect
+to their being (secundum esse).
+    At the same time many assert, that that, without which a
+thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
+thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
+appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
+things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
+probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines.  I think the
+cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the
+proper order of philosophic thinking.  The nature of God, which
+should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the
+order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be
+last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
+what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are
+considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to
+the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to
+the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in
+mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the
+knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are
+no help towards understanding the divine nature.  So that it is
+hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
+themselves freely.
+    However, I pass over this point.  My intention her was only
+to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
+cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
+individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
+does not appertain to their essence.  I said that "I considered
+as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
+the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
+thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
+thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
+conceived."  (II. Def. ii.)
+
+PROP. XI.  The first element, which constitutes the actual being
+of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
+existing.
+    Proof.-The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)
+is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
+(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
+Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
+given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
+in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
+Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
+mind.  But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.
+viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
+therefore be the idea of something actually existing.  But not of
+an infinite thing.  For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
+always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
+absurdity.  Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
+actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
+existing.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
+the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human
+mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
+this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
+as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so
+far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we
+say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
+constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
+he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
+another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in
+part or inadequately.
+    Note.-Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
+will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;
+I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
+not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
+end.
+
+PROP. XII.  Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,
+which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human
+mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of
+the said occurrence.  That is, if the object of the idea
+constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in
+that body without being perceived by the mind.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
+the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in
+so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said
+object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
+of anything.  Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
+constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is
+necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
+the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of
+the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words
+the mind perceives it.
+    Note.-This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
+to be understood from II. vii., which see.
+
+PROP. XIII.  The object of the idea constituting the human mind
+is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which
+actually exists, and nothing else.
+    Proof.-If indeed the body were not the object of the human
+mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
+God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but
+in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that
+is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body
+would not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the
+idea of the modifications of the body.  Therefore the object of
+the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as
+it actually exists (II. xi.).  Further, if there were any other
+object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as
+nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
+xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
+which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but
+(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea.  Wherefore the object of our
+mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
+united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind
+and body.  However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately
+or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the
+nature of our body.  The propositions we have advanced hitherto
+have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to
+other individual things, all of which, though in different
+degrees, are animated.[3]  For of everything there is necessarily
+an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as
+there is an idea of the human body; thus  whatever we have
+asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be
+asserted of the idea of everything else.  Still, on the other
+hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from
+the other, one being more excellent than another and containing
+more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent
+than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
+
+[3] "Animata"
+
+    Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind
+differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is
+necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of
+the human body.  What this nature is, I am not able here to
+explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,
+that I should do so.  I will only say generally, that in
+proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
+many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
+the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for
+forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions
+of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
+concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it
+is the object for distinct comprehension.  We may thus recognize
+the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the
+cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,
+and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following
+propositions, deduce from what has been advanced.  Wherefore I
+have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my
+present statements.  In order to do so, I must premise a few
+propositions concerning the nature of bodies.
+    AXIOM I.  All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
+    AXIOM II.  Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
+sometimes more quickly.
+    LEMMA I.  Bodies are distinguished from one another in
+respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in
+respect of substance.
+    Proof.-The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
+self-evident.  That bodies are not distinguished in respect of
+substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii.  It is brought
+out still more clearly from I. xv, note.
+    LEMMA II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.
+    Proof.-All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
+conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).
+Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,
+and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
+    LEMMA III.  A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
+motion or rest by another body, which other body has been
+determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third
+again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
+    Proof.-Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
+(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to
+motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be
+determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
+(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
+motion or at rest.  And this body again can only have been set in
+motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to
+motion or rest.   This third body again by a fourth, and so on to
+infinity.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
+motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other
+body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a
+state of motion by some other body.  This is indeed self-evident.
+For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
+rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,
+I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is
+at rest.  If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
+this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no
+other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at
+rest.  If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
+long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
+concerning it, except that it is in motion.   If A is
+subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
+of A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to
+continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted
+from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
+cause determining A to a state of rest.
+    Axiom I.-All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
+body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected
+and the body affecting; so that one and the same body may be
+moved in different modes, according to the difference in the
+nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different
+bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.
+    Axiom II.-When a body in motion impinges on another body at
+rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to
+continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in
+the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
+body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
+of motion of incidence and the same plane.
+    So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
+which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and
+rest, quickness and slowness.  We now pass on to compound bodies.
+    Definition.-When any given bodies of the same or different
+magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or
+if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that
+their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain
+fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that
+together they compose one body or individual, which is
+distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.
+    Axiom III.-In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a
+compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies,
+they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved
+from their position; consequently the individual will, with
+greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form.
+Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies,
+are called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over small
+superficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motion
+among one another, are called fluid.
+    LEMMA IV.  If from a body or individual, compounded of
+several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same
+time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take
+their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before,
+without any change in its actuality (forma).
+    Proof.-Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
+substance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
+individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but
+this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will
+(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,
+will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance
+and in respect of mode.  Q.E.D.
+    LEMMA V.  If the parts composing an individual become greater
+or less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same
+mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still
+preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be
+changed.
+    Proof.-The same as for the last Lemma.
+    LEMMA VI.  If certain bodies composing an individual be
+compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction,
+for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they
+be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication
+in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its
+own nature without any change of its actuality.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for the individual
+is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we
+spoke of as its actual being.
+    LEMMA VII.  Furthermore, the individual thus composed
+preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at
+rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as
+each part retains its motion, and preserves its communication
+with other parts as before.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from the definition of an
+individual prefixed to Lemma iv.
+    Note.-We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected
+in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding.
+Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies
+only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and
+rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple
+character.  If, however, we now conceive another individual
+composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find
+that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without
+losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied.  Each of its parts
+would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.)
+each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker
+or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its
+motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts.  If
+we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of
+individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be
+affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their
+actuality.  We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive
+the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all
+bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the
+individual as a whole.  I should feel bound to explain and
+demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a
+special treatise on body.  But I have already said that such is
+not my object; I have only touched on the question, because it
+enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.
+
+POSTULATES
+    I.  The human body is composed of a number of individual
+parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself
+extremely complex.
+    II.  Of the individual parts composing the human body some
+are fluid, some soft, some hard.
+    III.  The individual parts composing the human body, and
+consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of
+ways by external bodies.
+    IV.  The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
+number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,
+regenerated.
+    V.  When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
+external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes
+the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression
+thereupon of the external body which impels it.
+    VI.  The human body can move external bodies, and arrange
+them in a variety of ways.
+
+PROP. XIV.  The human mind is capable of perceiving a great
+number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable
+of receiving a great number of impressions.
+    Proof.-The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
+very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many
+ways of affecting external bodies.  But (II. xii.)  the human
+mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the
+human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
+things, and is so in proportion, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the
+human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of
+ideas.
+    Proof.-The idea constituting the actual being of the human
+mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
+composed of a great number of complex individual parts.  But
+there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
+whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore
+(II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these
+numerous ideas of its component parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
+affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human
+body, and also the nature of the external body.
+    Proof.-All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
+follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the
+nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of
+Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax.
+iv.) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of
+every mode, in which the human body is affected by external
+bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external
+body.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
+perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the
+nature of its own.
+    Corollary II.-It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we
+have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our
+own body than the nature of external bodies.  I have amply
+illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.
+
+PROP. XVII.  If the human body is affected in a manner which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present
+to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
+exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the
+human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human
+mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body-that is (by
+the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually
+existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body.
+In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but
+postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the
+external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will
+regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
+affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-The mind is able to regard as present external
+bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even
+though they be no longer in existence or present.
+    Proof.-When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
+human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they
+change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii.,
+after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in
+a different manner from that which they followed before such
+change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new
+surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be
+refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
+towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they
+will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human
+body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
+take cognizance-that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard
+the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the
+fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces
+by their own spontaneous motion.  Wherefore, although the
+external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected,
+be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them
+as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
+that we regard as present many things which are not.  It is
+possible that the same result may be brought about by other
+causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated
+one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out
+the true cause.  Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the
+truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
+rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
+controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human
+body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.).
+Furthermore (II. vii.  Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly
+understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of
+Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the
+idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.  The
+former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and
+only  implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter
+indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature
+of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body
+lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even
+though he no longer exists.  Further, to retain the usual
+phraseology,  the modifications of the human body, of which the
+ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call
+the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of
+things.  When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say
+that it imagines.  I will here draw attention to the fact, in
+order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the
+mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error.  The mind
+does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as
+it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the
+existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it.  If
+the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it,
+is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this
+power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its
+nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of
+imagination depend solely on its own nature-that is (I. Def.
+vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  If the human body has once been affected by two or
+more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines
+any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
+    Proof.-The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,
+because the human body is affected and disposed by the
+impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is
+affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
+external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so
+disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,
+it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
+the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the
+other.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We now clearly see what Memory is.  It is simply a
+certain association of ideas involving the nature of things
+outside the human body, which association arises in the mind
+according to the order and association of the modifications
+(affectiones) of the human body.  I say, first, it is an
+association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of
+things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the
+nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the
+human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve
+the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.  I say,
+secondly, that this association arises according to the order and
+association of the modifications of the human body, in order to
+distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from
+the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things
+through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same.
+And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from
+the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the
+thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first;
+for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a
+Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple,
+which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question,
+nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man
+has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the
+man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the
+fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to
+another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things
+in his body.  For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the
+tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought
+of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of
+a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c.  Thus every man
+will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has
+been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images
+of things in this or that manner.
+
+PROP. XIX.  The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does
+not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications
+whereby the body is affected.
+    Proof.-The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
+human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
+he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing
+actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
+stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
+continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas
+is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);
+this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
+as affected by the ideas of very many particular things.  Thus
+God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in
+so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
+far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by
+II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body.
+But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far
+as  he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human
+mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently
+(II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing;
+therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in
+God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to
+God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human
+body.
+    Proof.-Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore
+(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of
+thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of
+the human mind (II. xi.).  Further, this idea or knowledge of the
+mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but
+in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual
+thing (II. ix.).  But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
+ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;
+therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is
+referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
+the body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXI.  This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the
+same way as the mind is united to the body.
+    Proof.-That the mind is united to the body we have shown from
+the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and
+xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be
+united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner
+as the mind is united to the body.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from
+what we have said in the note to II. vii.  We there showed that
+the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.),
+are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute
+of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the
+idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing,
+which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,
+thought.  The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are
+in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same
+power of thinking.  Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that
+is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality
+(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of
+thought without reference to the object; if a man knows
+anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at
+the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to
+infinity.  But I will treat of this hereafter.
+
+PROP. XXII.  The human mind perceives not only the modifications
+of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.
+    Proof.-The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
+in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,
+as the ideas of the said modifications.  This is proved in the
+same way as II. xx.  But the ideas of the modifications of the
+body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far
+as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the
+ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
+knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
+will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not
+only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
+modifications.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  The mind does not know itself, except in so far as
+it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.
+    Proof.-The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in
+God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same
+manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body.  But since (II.
+xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
+(II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
+human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind
+referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
+human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human
+mind thus far has no knowledge of itself.  Further the ideas of
+the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the
+nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.),
+they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge
+of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but
+(by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
+mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has
+knowledge of itself.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The human mind does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
+    Proof.-The parts composing the human body do not belong to
+the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate
+their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.
+after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as
+individuals without relation to the human body.  The parts of the
+human body are highly complex individuals  (Post. i.), whose
+parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in
+any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
+latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after
+Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.
+iii.)  the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,
+inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea
+of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the
+order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.).  We may affirm
+the same thing of each part of each individual composing the
+human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the
+human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many
+ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the
+human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the
+nature of the human mind (II. xiii); therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge
+of the human body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  The idea of each modification of the human body does
+not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
+    Proof.-We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
+human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as
+that external body conditions the human body in a given manner.
+But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
+no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
+in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the
+idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to
+the said external body.  Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the
+external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the
+modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the
+modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
+knowledge of the external body.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  The human mind does not perceive any external body
+as actually existing, except through the ideas of the
+modifications of its own body.
+    Proof.-If the human body is in no way affected by a given
+external body, then  (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
+body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the
+idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
+any manner perceive its existence.  But, in so far as the human
+body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far
+(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-In so far as the human mind imagines an external
+body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.
+    Proof.-When the human mind regards external bodies through
+the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it
+imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine
+external bodies as actually existing.  Therefore (by II. xxv.),
+in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
+adequate knowledge of them.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  The idea of each modification of the human body
+does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
+    Proof.-Every idea of a modification of the human body
+involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human
+body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.).  But,
+inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
+in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The ideas of the modifications of the human body,
+in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not
+clear and distinct, but confused.
+    Proof.-The ideas of the modifications of the human body
+involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies
+(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human
+body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes
+(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,
+consequently, the human body as a whole are affected.   But (by
+II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
+also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so
+far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas.  These ideas of
+modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind
+alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,
+confused ideas.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind
+is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in
+itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the
+idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the
+modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred
+to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  The idea of the idea of each modification of the
+human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human
+mind.
+    Proof.-The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
+xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,
+in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is
+(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
+adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not
+adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not
+involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
+perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an
+adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,
+of its own body, and of external bodies.  For the mind does not
+know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
+modifications of body (II. xxiii.).  It only perceives its own
+body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only
+perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so
+far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate
+knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.
+xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a
+fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and
+note).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
+only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
+external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common
+order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from
+without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to
+regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from
+within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,
+to understand their points of agreement, difference, and
+contrast.  Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it
+regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.
+
+PROP. XXX.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of our body.
+    Proof.-The duration of our body does not depend on its
+essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.
+xxi.).  But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
+by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
+operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these
+last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.
+The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
+nature, or the constitution of things.  Now, however a thing may
+be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,
+in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
+he has the idea of the human body only.  (II. ix. Coroll.)
+Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
+very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
+the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this
+knowledge is very inadequate to our mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
+duration of particular things external to ourselves.
+    Proof.-Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
+conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a
+fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must
+likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity.  (I.
+xxviii.)  As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
+this common property of particular things, we have only a very
+inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a
+similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
+things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
+of the duration thereof.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that all particular things are
+contingent and perishable.  For we can have no adequate idea of
+their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
+understand by the contingency and perishableness of things.  (I.
+xxxiii., Note i.)  For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing
+is contingent.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
+are true.
+    Proof.-All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
+their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are
+all true.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes
+them to be called false.
+    Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
+mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality
+of falsehood.  Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.
+xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).
+Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to
+be called false.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
+perfect, is true.
+    Proof.-When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
+perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea
+is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the
+essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
+an idea is true.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,
+which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.
+    Proof.-There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
+to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in
+simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to
+be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
+ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in
+the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
+confused ideas involve.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists
+in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light
+on the subject I will give an example.  For instance, men are
+mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up
+of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the
+causes by which they are conditioned.  Their idea of freedom,
+therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their
+actions.  As for their saying that human actions depend on the
+will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond
+thereto.  What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none
+of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
+dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
+either laughter or disgust.  So, again, when we look at the sun,
+we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;
+this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
+that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true
+distance or the cause of the fancy.  For although we afterwards
+learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
+the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near;
+for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are
+ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
+our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said
+body is affected thereby.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
+necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
+    Proof.-All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
+are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)
+adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,
+except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
+xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
+follow by the same necessity (II. vi.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,
+above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.
+    Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
+constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,
+the essence of B.  Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either
+exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.
+Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it
+constitute the essence of any particular thing.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Those things, which are common to all, and which
+are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived
+except adequately.
+    Proof.-Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and
+which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the
+whole.  I say A cannot be conceived except adequately.  For the
+idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii.
+Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,
+and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the
+human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the
+nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that
+is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be
+adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in
+so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.
+Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A
+adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as
+it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any
+external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary-Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or
+notions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree
+in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be
+adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  That, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human
+body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in
+the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.
+    Proof.-If A be that, which is common to and a property of the
+human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human
+body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each
+external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of
+A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of
+the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given
+external bodies.  Let it now be granted, that the human body is
+affected by an external body through that, which it has in common
+therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve
+the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the
+idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property
+A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the
+idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he
+constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.
+Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to
+perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has
+more in common with other bodies.
+
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which
+are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident.  For when we say
+that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are
+therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that
+an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not
+in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by
+the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as
+he constitutes the essence of the human mind.
+    Note I.-I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,
+which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our
+ratiocination.  But there are other causes of certain axioms or
+notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
+method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more
+useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at
+all.  Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all
+men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
+are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are
+ill-founded.  Again we should discern whence the notions called
+secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on
+which they are founded, and other points of interest connected
+with these questions.  But I have decided to pass over the
+subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
+treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
+too great prolixity.  Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything
+necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence
+are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,
+Thing, Something.  These terms arose from the fact, that the
+human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming
+a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the
+II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number
+be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this
+number of images, of which the body is capable of forming
+distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become
+entirely confused one with another.  This being so, it is evident
+(from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind
+can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body
+can form images simultaneously.  When the images become quite
+confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies
+confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as
+it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of
+Being, Thing, &c.  The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact
+that images are not always equally vivid, and from other
+analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for
+the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
+consider one only.  All may be reduced to this, that these terms
+represent ideas in the highest degree confused.  From similar
+causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,
+horse, dog, &c.  They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many
+images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the
+human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed
+utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small
+differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and
+their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
+which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
+them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said
+individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses
+by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
+particular individuals.  For, as we have said, it is unable to
+imagine the definite number of individuals.  We must, however,
+bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
+men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the
+point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and
+which the mind most easily imagines or remembers.  For instance,
+those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of
+man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect
+stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other
+attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
+instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal
+without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
+everyone will form general images of things according to the
+habit of his body.
+    It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,
+who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed
+of them, so many controversies should have arisen.
+    Note II.-From all that has been said above it is clear, that
+we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:-(1.)
+From particular things represented to our intellect
+fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
+(II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by
+the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.[4]
+
+[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
+
+(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard
+certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
+concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things
+(II. xviii. note).  I shall call both these ways of regarding
+things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
+(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and
+adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll.,
+xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of
+the second kind.  Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,
+as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we
+will call intuition.  This kind of knowledge proceeds from an
+adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of
+God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.  I will
+illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example.
+Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to
+the third as the second is to the first.  Tradesmen without
+hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the
+product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the
+rule which they received from a master without any proof, or
+because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or
+by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the
+seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property
+of proportionals.
+    But with very simple numbers there is no need of this.  For
+instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the
+fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we
+infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio,
+which the first bears to the second.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of
+falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily
+true.
+    Proof.-To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the
+foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate
+and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only
+source of falsity (II. xxxv.).  Furthermore, we assigned to the
+second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are
+adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.
+xxxiv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not
+knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true
+from the false.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident.  He, who knows how
+to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea
+of true and false.  That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the
+true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that
+he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing
+perceived.
+    Proof.-A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,
+in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind
+(II. xi. Coroll.).  Let us suppose that there is in God, in so
+far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,
+A.  The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be
+referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,
+whereof the proof is of universal application).  But the idea A
+is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed
+through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must
+be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi.
+Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,
+which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate
+idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time
+have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that
+is, obviously, he must be assured.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
+the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing
+proposition is in itself sufficiently plain.  No one, who has a
+true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
+certainty.  For to have a true idea is only another expression
+for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.  No one,
+indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
+something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
+thinking-namely, the very act of understanding.  And who, I ask,
+can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
+understand it?  In other words, who can know that he is sure of a
+thing, unless he be first sure of that thing?  Further, what can
+there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
+standard of truth?  Even as light displays both itself and
+darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
+    I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
+questions-namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false
+idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
+true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
+(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
+consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
+advantage over him who has only false ideas.  Further, how comes
+it that men have false ideas?  Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
+that he has ideas which agree with their objects?  These
+questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
+answered.  The difference between a true idea and a false idea is
+plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to
+the latter as being is to not-being.  The causes of falsity I
+have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the
+note.  From what is there stated, the difference between a man
+who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made
+apparent.  As for the last question-as to how a man can be sure
+that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just
+pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises
+from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with
+its object-in other words, that truth is its own standard.  We
+may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is
+part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.);
+therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as
+necessarily true as the ideas of God.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  It is not in the nature of reason to regard things
+as contingent, but as necessary.
+    Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly
+(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves-that
+is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-Hence it follows, that it is only through our
+imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
+future or the past, as contingent.
+    Note.-How this way of looking at things arises, I will
+briefly explain.  We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)
+that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even
+though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which
+exclude their existence and presence.  Further (II. xviii.), we
+showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two
+external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards
+imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway
+remember the other-that is, it will regard both as present to
+itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence
+and presence.  Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from
+the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than
+others, some more quickly, some at equal speed.  Thus, let us
+suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in
+the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that
+today he again sees Peter in the morning.  It is evident, from
+II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he
+will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the
+sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other
+words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his
+imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he
+will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon-that
+is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation
+to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the
+evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by
+imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past
+time.  If it should at any time happen, that on some other
+evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on
+the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening
+sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the
+child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,
+not both together.  His imagination will therefore waver; and,
+with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first
+one, then the other-that is, he will imagine them in the future,
+neither of them as certain, but both as contingent.  This
+wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
+be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
+relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may
+imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time
+present, past, or future.
+    Corollary II.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive
+things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis
+specie).
+    Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as
+contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.).  Reason perceives this
+necessity of things (II. xli.) truly-that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it
+is in itself.  But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very
+necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the
+nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.
+We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.
+xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.
+xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:
+which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,
+under a certain form of eternity.
+
+PROP. XLV.  Every idea of every body, or of every particular
+thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.
+    Proof.-The idea of a particular thing actually existing
+necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
+said thing (II. viii.).  Now particular things cannot be
+conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
+have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
+attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
+must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
+attributes of those ideas-that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
+infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-By existence I do not here mean duration-that is,
+existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
+certain form of quantity.  I am speaking of the very nature of
+existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
+follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
+necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.).  I am speaking, I repeat, of
+the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in
+God.  For although each particular thing be conditioned by
+another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force
+whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
+the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).
+
+PROP. XLVI.  The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of
+God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.
+    Proof.-The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
+whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea
+thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),
+will involve God's eternal and infinite essence.  Wherefore,
+that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
+of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the
+whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
+eternal and infinite essence of God.
+    Proof.-The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
+xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
+external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
+existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
+knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
+eternity of God are known to all.  Now as all things are in God,
+and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
+many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
+third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,
+and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to
+speak in Part V.  Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as
+they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine
+God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the
+name God with images of things that they are in the habit of
+seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they
+are, men, and continually affected by external bodies.  Many
+errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do
+not apply names to things rightly.  For instance, when a man says
+that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its
+circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly
+attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that
+assigned by mathematicians.  So again, when men make mistakes in
+calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and
+another on the paper.  If we could see into their minds, they do
+not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that
+they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the
+paper.  If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in
+error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I
+lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a
+neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.
+Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do
+not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret
+the meaning of others.  For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly
+contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of
+the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider
+mistaken and absurd in their opponents.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  In the mind there is no absolute or free will;
+but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which
+has also been determined by another cause, and this last by
+another cause, and so on to infinity.
+    Proof.-The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
+xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.
+xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute
+faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
+must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by
+another cause, and this last by another, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind
+no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.
+Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
+entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
+such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.
+Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to
+this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to
+this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul.  The cause
+which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in
+the Appendix to Part I.  But, before I proceed further, I would
+here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the
+faculty, not the desire.  I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby
+the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,
+wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.
+After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general
+notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular
+instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether
+volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.
+We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any
+affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as
+it is an idea, involves.  On which subject see the following
+proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should
+suggest itself.  For by ideas I do not mean images such as are
+formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but
+the conceptions of thought.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
+negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
+involves.
+    Proof.-There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
+or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this
+or that affirmation, and this or that negation.  Now let us
+conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
+whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a
+triangle are equal to two right angles.  This affirmation
+involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
+the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.  It is the same
+thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as
+it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.  Further,
+this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
+of a triangle.  Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be
+conceived, without the idea of a triangle.  Again, this idea of a
+triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its
+three interior angles are equal to two right angles.  Wherefore,
+and vice versâ, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be
+conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation
+belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing
+besides.  What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have
+selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,
+that it is nothing but an idea.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Will and understanding are one and the same.
+    Proof.-Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
+individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note).  But a
+particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
+(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
+one and the same.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
+assigned for error.  For we have shown above, that falsity
+consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas
+which are fragmentary and confused.  Wherefore, a false idea,
+inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty.  When we
+say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he
+has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
+but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is
+false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his
+imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note).  Thus, although the
+man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say
+that he is certain.  For by certainty we mean something positive
+(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
+    However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
+explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and
+I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced
+against our doctrine.  Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
+I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
+advantages, which follow therefrom.  I say "some," for they will
+be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
+part.
+    I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
+make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
+the mind, and the images of things which we imagine.  It is
+further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
+words, whereby we signify things.  These three-namely, images,
+words, and ideas-are by many persons either entirely confused
+together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
+and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
+necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for
+philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.  Those
+who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
+contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas
+of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not
+ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
+our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
+pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not
+see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
+affirmation or negation.  Again, those who confuse words with
+ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that
+they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or
+deny.  This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who
+reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no
+wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly
+understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not
+consist in the image of anything, nor in words.  The essence of
+words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no
+wise involve the conception of thought.
+
+    These few words on this subject will suffice: I will
+therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised
+against our doctrine.  Of these, the first is advanced by those,
+who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,
+and that therefore it is different therefrom.  The reason for
+their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the
+understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
+increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
+negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do
+not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
+faculty of understanding.  The will is thus distinguished from
+the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
+Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
+especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
+before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
+by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
+perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.
+    For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not
+therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not
+deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does
+exist.  Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by
+experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and
+different from the faculty of understanding.  Thirdly, it may be
+objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more
+reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to
+need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power
+than for affirming, that what is false is true.  We have,
+however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than
+another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so
+also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this
+also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and
+the will.  Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from
+free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are
+equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?  Will he
+perish of hunger and thirst?  If I say that he would, I shall
+seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather
+than an actual man.  If I say that he would not, he would then
+determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
+faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.  Other objections
+might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
+everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
+task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
+possible.
+    To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will
+has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding
+be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
+has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
+forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
+should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
+for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
+infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
+affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the
+same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
+infinite number of bodies.  If it be said that there is an
+infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
+that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
+consequently, by any faculty of volition.  But, it may still be
+urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
+them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
+perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
+already.  This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
+it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
+entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
+understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
+which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
+We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we
+explain all particular volitions-in other words, that which is
+common to all such volitions.
+    As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
+universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
+wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
+into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
+what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
+infinite number of individuals.
+    To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a
+free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that
+anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that
+he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.
+Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a
+perception, and not free will.  In order to illustrate the point,
+let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing
+else.  Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the
+horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything
+which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will
+necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to
+doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof.  We
+have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I
+do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,
+while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his
+judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it
+about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that
+he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we
+suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
+    Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as
+actual perception extends-that is, I grant that the mind's
+imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
+xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
+perception, make any affirmation.  For what is the perception of
+a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?  If the
+mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
+regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons
+for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
+the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
+precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
+perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
+inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
+existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the
+subject.
+    I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third
+objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is
+predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is
+common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate
+essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the
+abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the
+same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting
+the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular
+affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas.  For
+instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,
+differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much
+as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.
+    Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal
+power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and
+to affirm that that which is false is true.  These two
+affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
+one another as being and not-being; for there is nothing
+positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
+falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
+    We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when
+we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
+and abstractions with realities.  As for the fourth objection, I
+am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
+described  (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
+a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from
+him) would die of hunger and thirst.  If I am asked, whether such
+an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
+answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be
+considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider
+children, fools, madmen, &c.
+    It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
+doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
+from what has been said.  The doctrine is good,
+    1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
+decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so
+much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and
+more understand God.  Such a doctrine not only completely
+tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest
+happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of
+God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
+us.  We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
+estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God
+with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as
+for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
+service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
+    2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct
+ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which
+are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature.  For it
+shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or
+frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the
+eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from
+the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.
+    3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches
+us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to
+be angry with any.  Further, as it tells us that each should be
+content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any
+womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the
+guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as
+I will show in Part III.
+    4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
+commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and
+led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do
+whatsoever things are best.
+    I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of
+this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a
+close.  I think I have therein explained the nature and
+properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
+considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient
+clearness.  I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
+excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
+to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.
+
+
+
+
+PART III.
+
+ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+
+    Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be
+treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural
+phenomena following nature's general laws.  They appear to
+conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a
+kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
+nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,
+and that he is determined solely by himself.  They attribute
+human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in
+general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which
+accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,
+abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human
+mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked
+upon as a seer.  Still there has been no lack of very excellent
+men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),
+who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way
+of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind.  But no one,
+so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the
+emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their
+restraint.
+    I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he
+believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,
+strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at
+the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain
+to absolute dominion over them.  However, in my opinion, he
+accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own
+great intellect, as I will show in the proper place.  For the
+present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or
+deride human emotions than understand them.  Such persons will,
+doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of
+human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth
+with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as
+repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.  However,
+such is my plan.  Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be
+set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and
+everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action;
+that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to
+pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and
+always the same; so that there should be one and the same method
+of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,
+through nature's universal laws and rules.  Thus the passions of
+hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow
+from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to
+certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and
+possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the
+properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself
+affords us delight.  I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and
+strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I
+employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the
+mind.  I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the
+same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and
+solids.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS
+
+I.  By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect
+can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  By an inadequate or
+partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its
+effect cannot be understood.
+
+II.  I say that we act when anything takes place, either within
+us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that
+is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature
+something takes place within us or externally to us, which can
+through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.
+On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something
+when that something takes place within us, or follows from our
+nature externally, we being only the partial cause.
+
+III.  By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby
+the active power of the said body is increased or diminished,
+aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.
+
+N.B.  If we can be the adequate cause of any of these
+modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I
+call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.
+
+
+POSTULATES
+
+I.  The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its
+power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other
+ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or
+less.
+    N.B.  This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and
+Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.
+
+II.  The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,
+retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.),
+and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II.
+xvii.).
+
+PROP. I.  Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain
+cases passive.  In so far as it has adequate ideas it is
+necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it
+is necessarily passive.
+    Proof.-In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and
+some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note).
+Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in
+God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.
+Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise
+(by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he
+contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as
+he, at the same time, contains the minds of other things.  Again,
+from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36);
+of this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not
+inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as
+affected by the given idea (II. ix.).  But of that effect whereof
+God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is
+adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in
+question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.).  Therefore our
+mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in
+certain cases necessarily active; this was our first point.
+Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is
+adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the
+mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together
+with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of
+such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not
+an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the
+mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases
+necessarily passive; this was our second point.  Therefore our
+mind, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind is more or less
+liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate
+ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as
+it possesses adequate ideas.
+
+PROP. II.  Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind
+determine body to motion or rest or any state different from
+these, if such there be.
+    Proof.-All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by
+virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his
+being displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.).  That,
+therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of
+thought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.), it
+is not body.  This was our first point.  Again, the motion and
+rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been
+determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and
+absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring
+from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of
+extension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.); that is,
+it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought.  This
+was our second point.  Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
+II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing,
+conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under
+the attribute of extension.  Thus it follows that the order or
+concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived
+under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of
+states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in
+nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the
+mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we
+proved II. xii.
+    Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no
+further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is
+proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the
+question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it
+is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in
+motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending
+solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought.  However,
+no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the
+body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what
+the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far
+as she is regarded as extension.  No one hitherto has gained such
+an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can
+explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact
+that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far
+transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things
+in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake:
+these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole
+laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.
+    Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the
+body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the
+body, nor how quickly it can move it.  Thus, when men say that
+this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which
+latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without
+meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are
+ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at
+it.
+    But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means
+whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate,
+experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit
+state to think, the body remains inert.  Moreover, we have
+experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or
+are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly,
+we say depend on the mind's decree.  But, as to the first point,
+I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach,
+that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted
+for thinking?  For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind
+simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of
+thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake.  Again, I
+think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the
+mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given
+subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for
+being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is
+the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.
+    But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the
+laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be
+able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of
+that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the
+human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be
+capable of building a single temple.  However, I have just
+pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the
+body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration
+of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things
+being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would
+never have believed possible except under the direction of mind:
+such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and
+wondered at by their performers when awake.  I would further call
+attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses
+in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to
+repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under
+whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow.
+As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be
+much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they
+are to speak.  Experience abundantly shows that men can govern
+anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything
+more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many
+believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we
+moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be
+controlled by the thought of something else frequently
+remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what
+we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be
+allayed with the remembrance of anything else.  However, unless
+such persons had proved by experience that we do many things
+which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when
+assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the
+worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we
+are free in all things.  Thus an infant believes that of its own
+free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely
+desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires
+to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from
+the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he
+would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a
+garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe
+that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they
+are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk.
+Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men
+believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious
+of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those
+actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the
+dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and
+therefore vary according to the varying state of the body.
+Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who
+are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;
+those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this
+way or that.  All these considerations clearly show that a mental
+decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are
+simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call
+decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the
+attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is
+regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the
+laws of motion and rest.  This will appear yet more plainly in
+the sequel.  For the present I wish to call attention to another
+point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind,
+unless we have a remembrance of having done so.  For instance, we
+cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so.
+Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or
+forget a thing at will.  Therefore the freedom of the mind must
+in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering
+something which it remembers.  But when we dream that we speak,
+we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we
+do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the
+body.  Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we
+seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby
+we keep silence when awake concerning something we know.  Lastly,
+we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something,
+which we should not dare to do when awake.
+    Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two
+sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?
+If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must
+necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is
+believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination
+or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an
+idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II.
+xlix.).  Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind
+by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.
+Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or
+act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream
+with their eyes open.
+
+PROP. III.  The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate
+ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on
+inadequate ideas.
+    Proof.-The first element, which constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent
+body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many
+other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II.
+xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.).  Whatsoever therefore
+follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate
+cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily
+follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea.  But
+in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is
+necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow
+solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only
+passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to
+the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving
+negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,
+which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself
+without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are
+attributed to individual things in the same way that they are
+attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be
+perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.
+
+PROP. IV.  Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external
+to itself.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident, for the definition
+of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not
+negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the
+thing, but does not take it away.  So long therefore as we regard
+only the thing itself, without taking into account external
+causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could
+destroy it.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. V.  Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in
+the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the
+other.
+    Proof.-If they could agree together or co-exist in the same
+object, there would then be in the said object something which
+could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is
+absurd, therefore things, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours
+to persist in its own being.
+    Proof.-Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of
+God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.);
+that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given
+determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts;
+now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be
+destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but
+contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its
+existence (III. v.).  Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so
+far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own
+being.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VII.  The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence
+of the thing in question.
+    Proof.-From the given essence of any thing certain
+consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any
+power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as
+determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,
+or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it
+acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or
+endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,
+is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in
+question.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist
+in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite
+time.
+    Proof.-If it involved a limited time, which should determine
+the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that
+power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist
+beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed;
+but this (III. iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore the endeavour wherewith
+a thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise,
+since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already
+exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some
+external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.
+
+PROP. IX.  The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct
+ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to
+persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this
+endeavour it is conscious.
+    Proof.-The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and
+inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so
+far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the
+latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for
+an indefinite time (III. viii.).  Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is
+necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the
+modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)
+conscious of its own endeavour.
+    Note.-This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is
+called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it
+is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's
+essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those
+results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus
+been determined to perform.
+    Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference,
+except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so
+far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly
+be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.
+It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we
+strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we
+deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be
+good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or
+desire it.
+
+PROP. X.  An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,
+cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated
+therein (III. v.).  Therefore neither can the idea of such a
+thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II.
+ix. Coroll.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing
+cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.
+xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of
+the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it
+follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the
+endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea,
+which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our
+mind, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XI.  Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders
+the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or
+diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II.
+xiv.
+    Note.-Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,
+and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection,
+sometimes to a state of lesser perfection.  These passive states
+of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.
+By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall
+signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater
+perfection.  By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the
+mind passes to a lesser perfection.  Further, the emotion of
+pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call
+stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of
+pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.
+But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are
+attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected
+than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike
+affected.  What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to
+Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other
+primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other
+emotions arise from these three.  But, before I go further, I
+should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this
+part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is
+contrary to another.  In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the
+idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the
+existence of body, so long as the body itself exists.  Again, it
+follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii.,
+that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the
+fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.
+Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of
+the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends
+on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.
+Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its
+power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to
+affirm the present existence of the body.  Now the cause, why the
+mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the
+mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases
+to exist.  For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the
+existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;
+therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the
+existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but
+(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes
+the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,
+and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the
+essence of our mind.
+
+PROP. XII.  The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive
+those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the
+body.
+    Proof.-So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which
+involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
+regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and
+consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an
+external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,
+the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature
+of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives
+things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,
+the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of
+activity (III. Post. i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind's
+power of thinking is for that period increased or helped.  Thus
+(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine
+such things.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  When the mind conceives things which diminish or
+hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as
+possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the
+first-named things.
+    Proof.-So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind
+alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or
+constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue
+to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which
+excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as
+I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is
+diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something
+else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived:
+therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour
+to conceive or remember the latter.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from
+conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of
+itself and of the body.
+    Note.-From what has been said we may clearly understand the
+nature of Love and Hate.  Love is nothing else but pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing
+else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  We
+further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,
+and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who
+hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.
+But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.
+
+PROP. XIV.  If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at
+the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one
+of these two, be also affected by the other.
+    Proof.-If the human body has once been affected by two bodies
+at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it
+will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.).  But the
+mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than
+the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore,
+if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been
+once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever
+it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by
+the other.
+
+PROP. XV.  Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,
+pain, or desire.
+    Proof.-Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously
+affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor
+diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either
+increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.).  From the
+foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is
+afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which
+(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of
+action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which
+does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.
+xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain.  Thus the
+former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but
+accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.  In the same way
+also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the
+cause of desire.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing
+with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate
+it.
+    Proof.-For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that
+the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with
+the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),
+according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or
+diminished, &c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the
+mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.
+Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may
+love or hate the same.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or
+hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
+merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy.  We should
+refer to the same category those objects, which affect us
+pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other
+objects which affect us in the same way.  This I will show in the
+next Prop.  I am aware that certain authors, who were the first
+to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to
+signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I
+think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known
+or manifest qualities.
+
+PROP. XVI.  Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given
+object has some point of resemblance with another object which is
+wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the
+point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said
+emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love
+or hate.
+    Proof.-The point of resemblance was in the object (by
+hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus
+(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it
+will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and
+consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point
+of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of
+pleasure or pain.  Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although
+the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not
+the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the
+first-named object with love or hate.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect
+us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing
+which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of
+pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same
+time we shall love it.
+    Proof.-The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause
+of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with
+this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive
+that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is
+wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we
+shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it
+(III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This disposition of the mind, which arises from two
+contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the
+emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination
+(II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from
+the other, except as greater differs from less.  But we must bear
+in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which
+give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the
+other accidentally.  I have done this, in order that they might
+be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny
+that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an
+object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions.  The human
+body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts
+of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.
+after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by
+one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same
+thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different
+ways affect one and the same part of the body.  Hence we can
+easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of
+many and conflicting emotions.
+
+PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully
+by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing
+present.
+    Proof.-So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,
+he will regard that thing as present, even though it be
+non-existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as
+past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the
+image of time past or future (II. xliv. note).  Wherefore the
+image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether
+it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that
+is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is
+identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or
+present.  Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the ssame,
+whether the image be of a thing past or future.  Q.E.D.
+    Note I.-I call a thing past or future, according as we either
+have been or shall be affected thereby.  For instance, according
+as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has
+recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,
+or will harm us.  For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its
+existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which
+excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)
+the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way
+as if the thing were actually present.  However, as it generally
+happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so
+long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in
+doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the
+emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so
+constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other
+things, until men become assured of the issue.
+    Note II.-From what has just been said, we understand what is
+meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and
+Disappointment.[5]  Hope is nothing else but an inconstant
+pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,
+whereof we do not yet know the issue.  Fear, on the other hand,
+is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something
+concerning which we are in doubt.  If the element of doubt be
+removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear
+becomes Despair.  In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from
+the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.
+Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past
+whereof we have doubted the issue.  Disappointment is the Pain
+opposed to Joy.
+
+[5] Conscientiæ morsus-thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
+
+PROP. XIX.  He who conceives that the object of his love is
+destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved
+he will feel pleasure.
+    Proof.-The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive
+those things which increase or help the body's power of activity
+(III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which
+it loves.  But conception is helped by those things which
+postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered
+by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);
+therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of
+an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the
+object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind
+pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the
+existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental
+endeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully.  He,
+therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
+will feel pain, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  He who conceives that the object of his hate is
+destroyed will also feel pleasure.
+    Proof.-The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those
+things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's
+power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III.
+xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the
+existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing,
+which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the
+aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects
+the mind pleasurably.  Thus he who conceives that the object of
+his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXI.  He who conceives, that the object of his love is
+affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected
+pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will
+be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or
+less in the thing loved.
+    Proof.-The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which
+postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's
+endeavour to conceive the said object.  But pleasure postulates
+the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in
+proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is
+(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore
+the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental
+endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover
+pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion
+may have been greater in the object of love.  This was our first
+point.  Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it
+is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to
+the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who
+conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,
+will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said
+emotion is greater or less in the object of love.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects
+some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards
+that thing.  Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an
+object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred
+towards it.
+    Proof.-He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of
+our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully-that is, if we
+conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or
+pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come
+to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore
+(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object
+of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with
+love or hatred towards him.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we
+may define as pain arising from another's hurt.  What term we can
+use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.
+    We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on
+another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures
+another, we will call Indignation.  We must further remark, that
+we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown
+in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto
+regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles
+ourselves (as I will show presently).  Thus, we bestow approval
+on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,
+contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
+painfully affected, will feel pleasure.  Contrariwise, if he
+thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel
+pain.  Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according
+as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.
+    Proof.-In so far as an object of hatred is painfully
+affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the
+strength of the pain (III. xi. note).  Therefore, he (III. xx.)
+who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully
+affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the
+amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred.  This
+was our first point.  Again, pleasure postulates the existence of
+the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as
+the pleasure is greater or less.  If anyone imagines that an
+object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception
+(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other
+words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and
+without any mental conflict.  For (as I am about to show in Prop.
+xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to
+himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like
+manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary
+circumstances.  But here we are regarding hatred only.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an
+object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also.  If we
+conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall
+feel love towards him.
+    Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xxii., which see.
+    Note.-These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
+to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so
+far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's
+hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.
+
+PROP. XXV.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
+concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to
+affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.  Contrariwise,
+we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
+painfully ourselves or the loved object.
+    Proof.-That, which we conceive to affect an object of our
+love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or
+painfully (III. xxi.).  But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
+far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
+pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it
+endeavours to regard them as present.  And, contrariwise (III.
+xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as
+affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
+concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
+we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
+hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
+contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
+which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
+    Proof.-This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the
+foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.
+    Note.-Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may
+easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,
+contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object.  This feeling is
+called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of
+himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with
+his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that
+fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting
+them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to
+conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines
+his own power of action.  Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing
+from a man thinking too highly of himself.  Again, the pleasure
+which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called
+over-esteem.  Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too
+little of a man is called disdain.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is
+like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,
+to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a
+like emotion (affectus).
+    Proof.-The images of things are modifications of the human
+body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to
+us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas
+involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature
+of the external bodies as present.  If, therefore, the nature of
+the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the
+idea which we form of the external body will involve a
+modification of our own body similar to the modification of the
+external body.  Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to
+ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will
+express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.
+Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be
+affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
+emotion.  If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we
+shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not
+similar, emotion.  Q.E.D.
+    Note I.-This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to
+pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is
+referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else
+but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we
+conceive that others have the like desire.
+    Corollary I.-If we conceive that anyone, whom we have
+hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something
+similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
+If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the
+same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
+    Proof.-This is proved from the last proposition in the same
+manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.
+    Corollary II.-We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
+its misery affects us painfully.
+    Proof.-If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice
+in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
+    Corollary III.-We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,
+a thing which we pity.
+    Proof.-That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,
+affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);
+therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which
+removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in
+other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we
+shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall
+endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity.  Q.E.D.
+    Note II.-This will or appetite for doing good, which arises
+from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is
+called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from
+compassion.  Concerning love or hate towards him who has done
+good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like
+ourselves, see III. xxii. note.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
+to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
+whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
+conduce to pain.
+    Proof.-We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that
+which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other
+words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as
+possible as present or actually existing.  But the endeavour of
+the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
+simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power
+of action.  (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.
+Coroll.).  Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
+existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the
+same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first
+point.  Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed
+to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
+hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.).  We shall,
+therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy
+the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may
+not regard it as present; this was our second point.  Wherefore
+whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
+men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
+from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
+
+[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
+whom we regard without any particular emotion.
+
+    Proof.-From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate
+anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).
+That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel
+pleasure or pain at the thing's presence.  And so we shall
+endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with
+pleasure, etc.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
+in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
+eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit
+certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it
+is generally called kindliness.  Furthermore I give the name of
+praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of
+another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame
+to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.
+
+PROP. XXX.  If anyone has done something which he conceives as
+affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
+accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he
+will regard himself with pleasure.  On the other hand, if he has
+done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
+he will regard himself with pain.
+    Proof.-He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure
+or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with
+pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and
+xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby
+he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,
+that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other
+words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  And so mutatis
+mutandis in the case of pain.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the
+idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question
+will be a species of love and hatred.  But, as the terms love and
+hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ
+other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause[7] we will style
+Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I
+mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's
+belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause[8] is called
+self-complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance.
+Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,
+wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist
+solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone
+endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives
+will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a
+vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,
+when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.
+
+[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
+"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.
+
+[8] See previous endnote.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates
+anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
+thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,
+&c.  On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from
+something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.
+    Proof.-From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves
+anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): but
+we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new
+cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we
+shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.  Again, from the mere
+fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall
+ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).  If we assume
+that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously
+love it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subject
+to vacillation (III. xvii. note).  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it
+follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause
+others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself
+hates: as the poet says:  "As lovers let us share every hope
+and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the
+other leaves."[9]
+
+[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.
+    "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
+      Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."
+
+    Note.-This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes
+and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really
+ambition (see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone
+by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should
+live according to his own individual disposition: when such a
+desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone
+else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all
+become mutually hateful.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  If we conceive that anyone takes delight in
+something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour
+to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain
+possession thereof.
+    Proof.-From the mere fact of our conceiving that another
+person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we
+shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight
+therein.  But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be
+prevented by another's delight in its object; we shall,
+therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.
+xxviii.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We thus see that man's nature is generally so
+constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies
+those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his
+own love for the goods in their possession.  Further, we see that
+from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that
+men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and
+ambitious.  Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall
+find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more
+especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our
+life.  We find that children, whose body is continually, as it
+were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others
+laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate
+whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of
+whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the
+images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human
+body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by
+external causes to act in this or that manner.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  When we love a thing similar to ourselves we
+endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love
+us in return.
+    Proof.-That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to
+conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.).  If the
+thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it
+pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.).  In
+other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it
+about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),
+that it should love us in return.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  The greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our
+complacency.
+    Proof.-We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to
+bring about, that what we love should love us in return: in
+other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure
+accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause.  Therefore, in
+proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected
+because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.-that is (III. xi.
+and note) the greater will be our pleasure.  But when we take
+pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something
+similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30);
+therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a
+loved object to be affected, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  If anyone conceives, that an object of his love
+joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he
+himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards
+the loved object and with envy towards his rival.
+    Proof.-In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is
+well affected towards him, will be the strength of his
+self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of
+his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as
+far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound
+to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks
+that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).  But this
+endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the
+loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved
+object has joined to itself; therefore (III. xi. note) he will
+for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of
+the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his
+rival; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred
+towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.
+Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved
+object.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy
+is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a
+wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and
+hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.
+Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,
+in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont
+to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and
+also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained
+towards his rival.  If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate
+the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably
+affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is
+compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image
+of him whom he hates.  This condition generally comes into play
+in the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman
+whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not
+only because his own desire is restrained, but also because,
+being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the
+parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks
+from her.
+    We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved
+with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives
+him pain as a lover, as I will now show.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  He who remembers a thing, in which he has once
+taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances
+as when he first took delight therein.
+    Proof.-Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with
+the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of
+pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it,
+in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other
+words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the
+same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the
+aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.
+    Proof.-For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be
+missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.  As
+he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or
+circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he
+conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence
+of the object of love, is called Regret.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or
+love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
+    Proof.-Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of
+activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes
+or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in
+his own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said
+endeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are
+directed to removing that pain.  But (by the definition of pain),
+in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily
+opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity; therefore
+the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed
+to remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire or
+appetite in endeavouring to remove it.  Again, since pleasure
+(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it
+may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by
+pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his
+desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.
+    Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain
+and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,
+appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be
+greater in proportion to the hatred or love.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,
+so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being
+equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,
+and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his
+former love.
+    Proof.-If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more
+of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never
+loved it.  For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man
+endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);
+he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by
+affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is
+greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the
+endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his
+affection (III. xxxiii.).  Now these endeavours are constrained
+by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.
+xxiii.); wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause
+also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love
+has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by
+hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the
+object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater
+pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never
+loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former
+love was greater.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
+injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
+to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the
+same law, seek to benefit him.
+    Proof.-To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as
+a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to
+remove or destroy him.  But if anything more painful, or, in
+other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater
+thereby-and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not
+carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of
+his hate-he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury
+(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)
+will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will
+therefore prevail over it, as we asserted.  The second part of
+this proof proceeds in the same manner.  Wherefore he who hates
+another, etc.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all
+that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our
+longings, whatsoever they may be.  By evil, I mean every kind of
+pain, especially that which frustrates our longings.  For I have
+shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because
+we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because
+we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink
+from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,
+judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,
+what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst.  Thus a
+miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of
+money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as
+glory, and fears nothing so much as shame.  To an envious man
+nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing
+more painful than another's success.  So every man, according to
+his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or
+useless.  The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that
+which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is
+called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear
+whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
+future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.).  But if the
+evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.
+Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the
+fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,
+fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared
+be very great.
+
+PROP. XL.  He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
+believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate
+that other in return.
+    Proof.-He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will
+thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  But, by
+the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him
+who is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by
+some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea
+of his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred
+will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case
+(III. xxv.) rarely happens.  This reciprocation of hatred may
+also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure
+the object of our hate (III. xxxix.).  He therefore who conceives
+that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause
+of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or
+fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other
+words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I
+said above.
+    Corollary I.-He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates
+him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  For, in so
+far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is
+determined to hate his enemy in return.  But, by the hypothesis,
+he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to
+conflicting hatred and love.
+    Corollary II.-If a man conceives that one, whom he has
+hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from
+motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in
+kind.
+    Proof.-He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the
+last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will
+endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;
+he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).
+Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury
+done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to
+repay it in kind.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called
+Anger; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves
+is called Revenge.
+
+PROP. XLI.  If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and
+believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love
+that other in return.  (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)
+    Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as the
+preceding one.  See also the note appended thereto.
+    Note.-If he believes that he has given just cause for the
+love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is
+what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its
+contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated
+by another.  (See note to preceding proposition.)  This
+reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him
+who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is
+called gratitude or thankfulness.  It thus appears that men are
+much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.
+    Corollary.-He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he
+hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  This is
+proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding
+proposition.
+    Note.-If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour
+to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty,
+especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary
+cause for hatred.
+
+PROP. XLII.  He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from
+motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the
+benefit is received without gratitude.
+    Proof.-When a man loves something similar to himself, he
+endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be
+loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.).  Therefore he who has
+conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which
+he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from
+the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will
+endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or
+to regard it as actually existing.  But, by the hypothesis, he
+conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the
+said cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.
+xix.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can
+on the other hand be destroyed by love.
+    Proof.-He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates
+him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former
+hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.).  But if, on the
+other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he
+will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,
+and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his
+emotion.  In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.
+xli.), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III.
+xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion
+from which it arises.  Therefore, if it be greater than that
+which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to
+affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better
+of it and banish the hatred from his mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
+into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not
+preceded it.
+    Proof.-The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.
+of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was
+wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving
+feels pleasure.  To this pleasure involved in love is added the
+pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the
+pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea
+of the former object of hatred as cause.
+    Note.-Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate
+anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying
+this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he
+should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor
+long to be ill for the sake of getting well.  For everyone will
+always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as
+far as he can.  If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a
+man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love
+him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him.  For
+the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the
+hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be
+continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,
+he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he
+might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in
+such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)
+is absurd.
+
+PROP. XLV.  If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself
+hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will
+hate that person.
+    Proof.-The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him
+who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that
+anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as
+affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain;
+consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the
+idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he
+will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III.
+xiii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLVI.  If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully
+by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if
+the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said
+stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or
+nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the
+individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation
+whereto he belongs.
+    Proof.-This is evident from III. xvi.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is
+destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a
+certain pain in us.
+    Proof.-This is evident from III. xxvii.  For in so far as we
+conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,
+we ourselves feel pain.
+    Note.-This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary
+to II. xvii.  Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not
+actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is
+affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the
+remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard
+it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing
+in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other
+things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not
+destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the
+said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising
+from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we
+remember that object of hatred.  For, as we have said, when the
+image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it
+involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard
+the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it
+actually did exist.  However, since he has joined to the image of
+the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this
+determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices
+afresh as often as the repetition takes place.  This is the cause
+of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in
+narrating dangers from which they have escaped.  For when men
+conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are
+determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by
+the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the
+danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure
+afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is
+destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain
+involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of
+another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we
+conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.
+    Proof.-This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love
+and hatred (III. xiii. note).  For pleasure is called love
+towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in
+so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the
+other.  When this condition of causality is either wholly or
+partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part
+vanishes.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to
+be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if
+it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.
+    Proof.-A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)
+be perceived through itself without anything else.  If,
+therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we
+shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall
+do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the
+given emotion.  But if the thing which causes the emotion be
+conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.
+vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of
+the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred
+towards it will be less.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be
+free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards
+anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation
+of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.
+
+PROP. L.  Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
+or fear.
+    Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
+xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.
+    Note.-Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or
+fear are called good or evil omens.  Now, in so far as such omens
+are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of
+hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of
+pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them
+with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means
+towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles,
+or causes of that which we fear.  It follows, further, from III.
+xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily
+in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we
+fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or
+below their true value.  Hence there have arisen superstitions,
+whereby men are everywhere assailed.  However, I do not think it
+worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from
+hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions,
+that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope,
+as I will duly explain in the proper place.  Further, in so far
+as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred;
+thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we
+have said concerning love and hatred.
+
+PROP. LI.  Different men may be differently affected by the same
+object, and the same man may be differently affected at different
+times by the same object.
+    Proof.-The human body is affected by external bodies in a
+variety of ways (II. Post. iii.).  Two men may therefore be
+differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.
+after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by
+one and the same object.  Further (by the same Post.) the human
+body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;
+consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected
+at different times by one and the same object.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We thus see that it is possible, that what one man
+loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may
+not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he
+once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.
+Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,
+what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it
+follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their
+emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we
+distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and
+style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.
+For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil
+which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into
+consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to
+benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of
+an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him
+daring.  Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an
+evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take
+into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of
+an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that
+he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.
+
+[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
+intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
+
+    Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human
+judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his
+emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause
+pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,
+are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of
+things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that
+a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another
+with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.  Thus we
+can easily understand what are Repentance and Self-complacency.
+Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as
+cause; Self-complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because
+men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).
+
+PROP. LII.  An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction
+with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property
+that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so
+long, as an object which we conceive to have some property
+peculiar to itself.
+    Proof.-As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in
+conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.
+xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the
+contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another
+object.  And this is the case with the object, which we conceive
+to have no property that is not common to many.  For we thereupon
+assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not
+before seen in conjunction with other objects.  But when we
+suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we
+have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while
+regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to
+regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the
+contemplation of that object only.  Therefore an object, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This mental modification, or imagination of a
+particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called
+Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
+Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed
+in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to
+think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil.  If,
+however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or
+anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby
+regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;
+otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at,
+the emotion is called Horror.  Again, if it be the prudence,
+industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our
+love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when
+joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion.  We may in
+like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other
+emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able
+to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in
+ordinary speech.  Whence it is evident, that the names of the
+emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their
+ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their
+nature.
+    To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from
+the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or
+fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears
+to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c.,
+we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),
+determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing.  But if from
+the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,
+we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause
+of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the
+thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities
+which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on
+the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more
+particularly to regard that which is therein.  As devotion
+springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision
+spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn
+from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.
+Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,
+in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other
+emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any
+recognized name.
+
+PROP. LIII.  When the mind regards itself and its own power of
+activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in
+proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and
+its own power of activity.
+    Proof.-A man does not know himself except through the
+modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and
+xxiii.).  When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate
+itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or
+(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be
+greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able
+to conceive itself and its own power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-This pleasure is fostered more and more, in
+proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.
+For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more
+he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by
+the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)
+himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea
+of himself.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
+assert its power of activity.
+    Proof.-The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual
+essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind
+obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not
+that which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind
+endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its
+power of activity.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LV.  When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
+pain thereat.
+    Proof.-The essence of the mind only affirms that which the
+mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to
+conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last
+Prop.).  Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own
+weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting
+to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is
+checked in its endeavour--in other words (III. xi. note), it
+feels pain.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-This pain is more and more fostered, if a man
+conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the
+same way as the corollary to III. liii.
+    Note.-This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,
+is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the
+contemplation of ourselves, is called self-love or
+self-complacency.  And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as
+often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of
+activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own
+exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and
+also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.
+Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.
+note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of
+their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues.  For whenever a
+man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.
+liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and
+he conceives them more distinctly-that is (II. xl. note), in
+proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard
+them as something special.  Therefore, a man will take most
+pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some
+quality which he denies to others.  But, if that which he affirms
+of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in
+general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the
+contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall
+short when compared with those of others.  This pain (III.
+xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
+construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he
+can, embellishing his own.
+    It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred
+and envy, which latter is fostered by their education.  For
+parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely
+by the spur of honour and envy.  But, perhaps, some will scruple
+to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's
+virtues, and venerate their possessors.  In order to remove such
+doubts, I append the following corollary.
+    Corollary.-No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his
+equal.
+    Proof.-Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.
+xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby
+a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is
+checked.  But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,
+which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a
+man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the
+same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to
+another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot
+be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue
+in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an
+one.  But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same
+nature as himself.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,
+we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,
+&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar
+to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more
+envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions
+for being courageous.
+
+PROP. LVI.  There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of
+desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as
+vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,
+hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we
+are affected.
+    Proof.-Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions
+compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or
+passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive
+(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so
+far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is,
+we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we
+conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by
+an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the
+nature of an external body.  Wherefore the nature of every
+passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature
+of the object whereby we are affected be expressed.  Namely, the
+pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the
+nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the
+object B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore these
+two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the
+causes whence they arise are by nature different.  So again the
+emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature
+different from the pain arising from another object, and,
+similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,
+&c.
+    Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,
+love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are
+affected.  Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any
+given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore,
+according as a man is affected through external causes by this or
+that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words,
+according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so
+will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one
+desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,
+as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.
+Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of
+pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown)
+there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects
+whereby we are affected.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last
+proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,
+drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of
+love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a
+manner varying according to the object, with which they are
+concerned.  For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,
+&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,
+venery, riches, and fame.  Furthermore, these emotions, in so far
+as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects
+wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries.  For
+temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose
+to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive
+states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the
+last-named emotions.  However, I cannot here explain the
+remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as
+the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary.
+It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the
+strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have
+a general definition of each emotion.  It is sufficient, I
+repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and
+the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the
+mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions.  Thus,
+though there is a great difference between various emotions of
+love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards
+children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us
+to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further
+the nature and origin of the emotions.
+
+PROP. LVII.  Any emotion of a given individual differs from the
+emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of
+the one individual differs from the essence of the other.
+    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see
+after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.).  Nevertheless, we will
+prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.
+    All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,
+as their definitions above given show.  But desire is each man's
+nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one
+individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature
+or essence of the other.  Again, pleasure and pain are passive
+states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to
+persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or
+hindered (III. xi. and note).  But by the endeavour to persist in
+its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in
+conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note);
+therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or
+appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every
+man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man
+differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so
+far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the
+essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one
+individual only differs, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals
+which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of
+mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's
+emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human
+nature.  Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of
+procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire
+of the latter is human.  So also the lusts and appetites of
+insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the
+several natures.  Thus, although each individual lives content
+and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his
+being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is
+nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and
+hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of
+another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the
+essence of another.  Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
+proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
+which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
+philosopher, as I just mention here by the way.  Thus far I have
+treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is
+passive.  It remains to add a few words on those attributable to
+him in so far as he is active.
+
+PROP. LVIII.  Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities
+or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
+desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
+    Proof.-When the mind conceives itself and its power of
+activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind
+necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or
+adequate idea (II. xliii.).  But the mind does conceive certain
+adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.).  Therefore it feels pleasure in
+so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it
+is active (III. i.).  Again, the mind, both in so far as it has
+clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,
+endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such
+an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);
+therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we
+understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LIX.  Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
+active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or
+desire.
+    Proof.-All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or
+pain, as their definitions, already given, show.  Now by pain we
+mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked
+(III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels
+pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is
+diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions
+can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but
+only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
+are attributable to the mind in that condition.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-All actions following from emotion, which are
+attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set
+down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into
+courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas).  By
+courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve
+his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.
+By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,
+solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to
+unite them to himself in friendship.  Those actions, therefore,
+which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to
+courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to
+highmindedness.  Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind
+in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c.,
+are varieties of highmindedness.
+    I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their
+primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,
+which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,
+to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain.  It is evident from what I
+have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external
+causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds
+we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate.  But I
+have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting
+emotions, not all that might be given.  For, by proceeding in the
+same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to
+repentance, scorn, shame, &c.  I think everyone will agree from
+what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with
+another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise
+therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation.  However,
+for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most
+important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be
+more curious than profitable.  It remains to remark concerning
+love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a
+thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,
+acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another
+way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
+begins to conceive and desire something fresh.  For example, when
+we conceive something which generally delights us with its
+flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it.  But whilst we
+are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is
+otherwise disposed.  If, therefore, when the body is thus
+otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be
+stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be
+stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel
+repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the
+presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become
+odious.  This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or
+weariness.  For the rest, I have neglected the outward
+modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for
+instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these
+are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the
+mind.  Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be
+supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them,
+interpolating such observations as I think should here and there
+be added.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+I.  Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given
+modification of itself.
+    Explanation.-We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of
+this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof;
+further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is
+determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
+persistence.  But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
+strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
+and desire.  For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or
+not, it remains one and the same appetite.  Thus, in order to
+avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
+explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it
+in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those
+endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms
+appetite, will, desire, or impulse.  I might, indeed, have said,
+that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived
+as determined to a particular activity; but from such a
+definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can
+be conscious of its desire or appetite.  Therefore, in order to
+imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,
+in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c.
+For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every
+disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be
+innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of
+thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,
+lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.
+By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours,
+impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each
+man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to
+another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and
+knows not where to turn.
+
+II.  Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
+perfection.
+
+III.  Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
+perfection.
+    Explanation-I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection
+itself.  For, if man were born with the perfection to which he
+passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of
+pleasure.  This appears more clearly from the consideration of
+the contrary emotion, pain.  No one can deny, that pain consists
+in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less
+perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he
+partakes of perfection of any degree.  Neither can we say, that
+pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection.  For
+absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;
+wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition
+from a greater to a less perfection-in other words, it is an
+activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or
+constrained (cf. III. xi. note).  I pass over the definitions of
+merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these
+terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely
+kinds of pleasure or pain.
+
+IV.  Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
+the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in
+question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and
+note).
+    Explanation-In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,
+why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway
+falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the
+images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one
+follows the other.  This state of association is impossible, if
+the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand
+in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other
+causes to think of something else.
+    Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is
+of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include
+wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include
+it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no
+positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but
+merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the
+mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the
+contemplation of another.
+    I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary
+emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,
+pain, and desire.  I have spoken of wonder simply because it is
+customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three
+primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the
+objects of our wonder.  I am led by the same motive to add a
+definition of contempt.
+
+V.  Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
+so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those
+qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.
+III. lii. note).
+    The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
+I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.
+
+VI.  Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+    Explanation-This definition explains sufficiently clearly the
+essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say
+that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
+object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
+as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
+they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
+properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
+to be very obscure.  It must, however, be noted, that when I say
+that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
+unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish
+consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I
+have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I
+mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is
+absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for
+love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by
+wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of
+the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the
+lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.
+
+VII.  Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
+cause.
+    Explanation-These observations are easily grasped after what
+has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.
+also III. xiii. note).
+
+VIII.  Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
+something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
+
+IX.  Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which
+is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).
+
+X.  Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.
+    Explanation-Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.
+lii.) from the novelty of a thing.  If, therefore, it happens
+that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall
+cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion
+readily degenerates into simple love.
+
+XI.  Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
+presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we
+hate.
+    Explanation-In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we
+deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent
+rejoice (III. xx.).  But since we assume that man hates that
+which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not
+without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).
+
+XII.  Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue.
+
+XIII.  Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
+something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
+the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).
+    Explanation-From these definitions it follows, that there is
+no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.
+For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of
+anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the
+existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this
+extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while
+dependent on hope, he fears for the issue.  Contrariwise he, who
+fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something
+which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the
+existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels
+pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will
+turn out as he desires (III. xx.).
+
+XIV.  Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something
+past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+
+XV.  Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or
+future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
+    Explanation-Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair
+from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event
+has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives
+something past or future as present and regards it as such, or
+else because he conceives other things, which exclude the
+existence of the causes of his doubt.  For, although we can never
+be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.
+xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt
+concerning it.  For we have shown, that to feel no doubt
+concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it
+(II. xlix. note).  Thus it may happen that we are affected by the
+same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or
+future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I
+have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I
+refer the reader.
+
+XVI.  Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,
+which has had an issue beyond our hope.
+
+XVII.  Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of
+something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.
+
+XVIII.  Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has
+befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
+III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).
+    Explanation-Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there
+seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is
+used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in
+reference to a disposition.
+
+XIX.  Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
+
+XX.  Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to
+another.
+    Explanation-I am aware that these terms are employed in
+senses somewhat different from those usually assigned.  But my
+purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature
+of things.  I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my
+meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary
+signification.  One statement of my method will suffice. As for
+the cause of the above-named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,
+and III. xxii. note.
+
+XXI.  Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the
+love we bear him.
+
+XXII.  Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we
+hate him.
+    Explanation-Thus partiality is an effect of love, and
+disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also
+be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+highly of a beloved object.  Contrariwise, disparagement may be
+defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too
+meanly of a hated object.  Cf. III. xxvi. note.
+
+XXIII.  Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be
+pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's
+evil fortune.
+    Explanation-Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by
+doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be
+thus defined:
+
+XXIV.  Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a
+man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at
+another's evil fortune.
+    Explanation-Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and
+xxxii.  These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain
+accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in
+itself or accidentally.  I now pass on to other emotions, which
+are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.
+
+XXV.  Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
+
+XXVI.  Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his
+own weakness of body or mind.
+    Explanation-Self-complacency is opposed to humility, in so
+far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of
+our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby
+pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe
+we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed
+to repentance, which we may thus define:
+
+XXVII.  Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some
+action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision
+of our mind.
+    Explanation-The causes of these emotions we have set forth in
+III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.  Concerning
+the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.  This is
+perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
+nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
+called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are
+called right, are followed by pleasure.  We can easily gather
+from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on
+education.  Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,
+and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and
+also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought
+it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the
+latter with pleasure.  This is confirmed by experience.  For
+custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that
+which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some
+consider honourable others consider disgraceful.  According as
+each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given
+action or glories therein.
+
+XXVIII.  Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from
+self-love.
+    Explanation-Thus pride is different from partiality, for the
+latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride
+is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.  However, as
+partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or
+property of self-love, which may therefore be thus defined, love
+of self or self-approval, in so far as it leads a man to think
+too highly of himself.  To this emotion there is no contrary.
+For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self-hatred;
+I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he
+conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that.  For
+whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he
+imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,
+that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot
+do.  For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
+is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it
+impossible for him to do it.  However, if we consider such
+matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable
+that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen,
+that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should
+imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the
+world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him.  Again,
+a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in
+the present something in relation to a future time of which he is
+uncertain.  As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable
+to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do
+nothing but what is wicked and base, &c.  We may also say, that a
+man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive
+fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,
+venture.  We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an
+emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as from
+self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs
+self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:
+
+XXIX.  Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by
+reason of pain.
+    Explanation-We are nevertheless generally accustomed to
+oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention
+to the effect of either emotion than to its nature.  We are wont
+to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who
+talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults,
+who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a
+style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station.  On
+the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who
+confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and
+who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.
+However, these emotions, humility and self-abasement, are
+extremely rare.  For human nature, considered in itself, strives
+against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence
+those, who are believed to be most self-abased and humble, are
+generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.
+
+XXX.  Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action
+of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
+
+[11] Gloria.
+
+XXXI.  Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of
+our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
+    Explanation-On this subject see the note to III. xxx.  But we
+should here remark the difference which exists between shame and
+modesty.  Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are
+ashamed.  Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains
+a man from committing a base action.  Modesty is usually opposed
+to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will
+duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have
+remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to
+their nature.
+    I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions
+arising from pleasure and pain.  I therefore proceed to treat of
+those which I refer to desire.
+
+XXXII.  Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,
+kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same
+time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude
+the existence of it.
+    Explanation-When we remember a thing, we are by that very
+fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to
+contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something
+present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,
+is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the
+existence of that which we remember.  Thus when we remember
+something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that
+very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of
+pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once
+checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence
+of the thing in question.  Wherefore regret is, strictly
+speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from
+the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note).  But, as
+the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion
+down, among the emotions springing from desire.
+
+XXXIII.  Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us
+by our conception that others have the same desire.
+    Explanation-He who runs away, because he sees others running
+away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again,
+he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws
+towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own
+were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another's
+emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of
+emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become
+customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that
+which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant.  As to the
+cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note.  The reason why
+this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.
+xxxii. and note.
+
+XXXIV.  Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing
+from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar
+feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.  Cf. III. xxxix.
+note and xl.
+
+XXXV.  Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.
+Cf. III. xxvii. note.
+
+XXXVI.  Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are
+induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.
+
+XXXVII.  Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through
+mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has
+injured us.  (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)
+
+XXXVIII.  Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is
+impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
+    Explanation-To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a
+passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his
+anger and revenge.
+
+XXXIX.  Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we
+dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.  Cf. III. xxxix. note.
+
+XL.  Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do
+something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
+
+XLI.  Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by
+the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
+    Explanation-Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the
+fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I
+do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.
+Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so
+far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion
+of daring.
+
+XLII.  Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of
+avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
+    Explanation-Consternation is, therefore, a species of
+cowardice.  But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double
+fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a
+man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the
+evil.  I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of
+removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement.  I say
+wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be
+constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments
+him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may
+avert of the two.  On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and
+III. lii. note.  Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
+note.
+
+XLIII.  Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the
+desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining
+from that which should displease them.
+
+XLIV.  Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.
+    Explanation-Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions
+(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened;
+therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome.  For, so
+long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time
+necessarily bound by this.  "The best men," says Cicero, "are
+especially led by honour.  Even philosophers, when they write a
+book contemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.
+
+XLV.  Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living
+sumptuously.
+
+XLVI.  Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
+
+XLVII.  Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
+
+XLVIII.  Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual
+intercourse.
+    Explanation-Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is
+still called lust.  These last five emotions (as I have shown in
+III. lvi.) have on contraries.  For deference is a species of
+ambition.  Cf. III. xxix. note.
+    Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,
+and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the
+mind.  It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an
+ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,
+drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear
+are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery.  For
+an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and
+drink at another man's expense.  An ambitious man will restrain
+himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are
+secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,
+from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those
+vices.  Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not.  For
+though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,
+cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain
+avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he
+cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,
+cease to be lustful.  In fact, these emotions are not so much
+concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the
+appetite and love of such.  Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to
+these emotions, but high-mindedness and valour, whereof I will
+speak presently.
+    The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I
+pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the
+compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because
+many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is
+sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general
+knowledge of them.  However, it is established from the
+definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they
+all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there
+is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be
+called by a variety of names in accordance with its various
+relations and extrinsic tokens.  If we now direct our attention
+to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning
+the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the
+emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.
+
+
+GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS
+
+    Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a
+confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or
+any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater
+or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is
+determined to think of one thing rather than another.
+    Explanation-I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul
+is a confused idea.  For we have shown that the mind is only
+passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas.  (III.
+iii.)  I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its
+body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than
+before.  For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote
+rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll.
+ii.) than the nature of an external body.  But the idea which
+constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the
+disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its
+power of action or force for existence is increased or
+diminished, helped or hindered.  But it must be noted that, when
+I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not
+mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition
+of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of
+an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact,
+involves more or less of reality than before.
+    And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.
+xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own
+body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very
+essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or
+less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own
+body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less
+reality than before.
+    When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is
+increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed
+of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more
+or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its
+own body.  For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of
+thinking are measured by the excellence of the object.  Lastly, I
+have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to
+think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the
+nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the
+definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.
+
+
+
+
+PART IV:
+
+Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+    Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I
+name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is
+not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much
+so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better
+for him, to follow that which is worse.  Why this is so, and what
+is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part
+of my treatise.  But, before I begin, it would be well to make a
+few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good
+and evil.
+    When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has
+brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,
+not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks
+that he knows, the intention and aim of its author.  For
+instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not
+yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work
+is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will,
+on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is
+carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it.
+But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen
+before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he
+plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect.
+Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.
+    But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out
+types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain
+types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that
+which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the
+thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree
+less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently
+been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.
+This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,
+which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or
+imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things
+natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they
+hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing
+without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types
+before herself.  Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,
+which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they
+have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has
+fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete.
+Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect
+or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true
+knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
+    Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does
+not work with an end in view.  For the eternal and infinite
+Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as
+that whereby it exists.  For we have shown, that by the same
+necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.
+xvi.).  The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the
+reason why he acts, are one and the same.  Therefore, as he does
+not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the
+sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is
+neither origin nor end.  Wherefore, a cause which is called final
+is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered
+as the origin or cause of anything.  For example, when we say
+that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we
+mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of
+household life, had a desire to build a house.  Wherefore, the
+being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is
+nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the
+efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because
+men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.  They
+are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions
+and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are
+determined to any particular desire.  Therefore, the common
+saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and
+produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses
+treated of in the Appendix to Part I.  Perfection and
+imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or
+notions which we form from a comparison among one another of
+individuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def.
+vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.  For
+we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
+genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category
+of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.
+Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this
+category, and comparing them one with another, find that some
+possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,
+say that some are more perfect than others.  Again, in so far as
+we attribute to them anything implying negation-as term, end,
+infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
+they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call
+perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or
+because Nature has blundered.  For nothing lies within the scope
+of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity
+of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from
+the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily
+comes to pass.
+    As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive
+quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of
+thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things
+one with another.  Thus one and the same thing can be at the same
+time good, bad, and indifferent.  For instance, music is good for
+him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is
+deaf, it is neither good nor bad.
+    Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be
+retained.  For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
+type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful
+for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have
+indicated.
+    In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
+certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the
+type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by
+"bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
+approaching the said type.  Again, we shall that men are more
+perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more
+or less nearly to the said type.  For it must be specially
+remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a
+greater perfection, or vice versâ, I do not mean that he is
+changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a
+horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a
+man, as by being changed into an insect.  What I mean is, that we
+conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is
+understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished.  Lastly,
+by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality-in
+other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and
+operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to
+its duration.  For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,
+because it has passed a longer time in existence.  The duration
+of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence
+of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence;
+but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will
+always be able to persist in existence with the same force
+wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all
+things are equal.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+I.  By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to
+us.
+
+II.  By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a
+hindrance
+to us in the attainment of any good.
+    (Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the
+end.)
+
+III.  Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while
+regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which
+necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.
+
+IV.  Particular things I call possible in so far as, while
+regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,
+whether such causes be determined for producing them.
+    (In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between
+possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need
+to distinguish them accurately.)
+
+V.  By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in
+different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as
+luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are
+contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
+
+VI.  What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,
+present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,
+which see.
+    (But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly
+conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit;
+that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred
+feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that
+which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance
+from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time
+of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer
+interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally
+distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the
+same moment of time.)
+
+VII.  By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a
+desire.
+
+VIII.  By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that
+is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a
+man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of
+effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
+
+
+AXIOM.
+
+    There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is
+not another more powerful and strong.  Whatsoever thing be given,
+there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  No positive quality possessed by a false idea is
+removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being
+true.
+    Proof.-Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge
+which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any
+positive quality on account of which they are called false (II.
+xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,
+they are true (II. xxxii.).  Wherefore, if the positive quality
+possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is
+true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be
+removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd.  Therefore, no
+positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This proposition is more clearly understood from II.
+xvi. Coroll. ii.  For imagination is an idea, which indicates
+rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature
+of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly;
+whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err.  For
+instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant
+from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long
+as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true
+distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination;
+or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains
+tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected
+thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall
+still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us.  For, as we
+said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near
+us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the
+mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the
+body is affected thereby.  Thus, when the rays of the sun falling
+on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine
+the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its
+real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the
+mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition
+of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or
+diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at
+its presence.  It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an
+evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the
+contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will
+certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings;
+thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,
+in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,
+stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present
+existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.
+
+PROP. II.  We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of
+Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.
+    Proof.-We are said to be passive, when something arises in
+us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is
+(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the
+laws of our nature.  We are passive therefore, in so far as we
+are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without
+other parts.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. III.  The force whereby a man persists in existing is
+limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external
+causes.
+    Proof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part.  For,
+when man is given, there is something else-say A-more powerful;
+when A is given, there is something else-say B-more powerful than
+A, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by
+the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the
+power of external causes.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IV.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,
+save such as can be understood through his nature only as their
+adequate cause.
+    Proof.-The power, whereby each particular thing, and
+consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of
+Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but
+in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence
+(III. vii.).  Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained
+through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power
+of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.
+xxxiv.).  This was our first point.  Again, if it were possible,
+that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood
+solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would
+not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this
+would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was
+either finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only,
+inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all
+changes which could spring from external causes; or of the
+infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be
+so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any
+changes save such as tended towards his own preservation.  But
+the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of
+which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).
+Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of
+undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
+through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as
+we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from
+the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the
+necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as
+affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature
+as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must
+be deducible.  It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is
+infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.  It
+is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any
+changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a
+prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order
+of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as
+the nature of things demands.
+
+PROP. V.  The power and increase of every passion, and its
+persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of
+an external cause compared with our own.
+    Proof.-The essence of a passion cannot be explained through
+our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),
+the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in
+II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the
+rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes
+obstinately fixed to him.
+    Proof.-The force and increase of any passion and its
+persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external
+cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore
+(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man's power, &e.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VII.  An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by
+another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for
+controlling emotion.
+    Proof.-Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is
+an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less
+force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the
+Emotions at the end of Part III.).  When, therefore, the mind is
+assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected
+with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or
+diminished.  Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives
+from its cause the force for persistence in its being; which
+force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.
+vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification
+contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.);
+wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a
+modification contrary to, and stronger than the former
+modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the
+emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
+stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy
+the existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be
+destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger
+emotion.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a
+modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that
+which we are undergoing.  For the emotion which we undergo can
+only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and
+stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition
+of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body
+contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we
+undergo.
+
+PROP. VIII.  The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but
+the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof.
+    Proof.-We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or
+the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that
+is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or
+hinders, our power of activity.  Thus, in so far as we perceive
+that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or
+evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else
+but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows
+from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.).  But this
+idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united
+to body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction
+between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of
+the body, save in conception only.  Therefore the knowledge of
+good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we
+are conscious thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with
+us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive
+the cause to be with us.
+    Proof.-Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the
+mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which
+indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of
+the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).  An emotion is
+therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition
+of the body.  But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so
+long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
+of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or
+more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the
+present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with
+us.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected
+by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as
+if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that
+this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the
+thing in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged,
+whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the
+image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other
+things which exclude the present existence of the future object:
+I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I
+purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of
+my work.
+    Corollary.-The image of something past or future, that is, of
+a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time
+future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other
+conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present;
+consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is
+less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt
+towards something present.
+
+PROP. X.  Towards something future, which we conceive as close at
+hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that
+its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer
+interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have
+not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we
+conceive that it has long passed away.
+    Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or
+not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the
+presence of the object less, than if its period of future
+existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long
+passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.)
+we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it
+follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a
+longer period than we can define in conception, though their
+dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they
+all affect us equally faintly.
+
+PROP. XI.  An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary
+is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion
+towards that which possible, or contingent, or non-necessary.
+    Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,
+to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny
+a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be
+necessary (I. xxxiii. note. i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion
+towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal,
+more intense than an emotion that which is non-necessary.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XII.  An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is
+more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion
+towards a thing contingent.
+    Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+affected by the conception of some further thing, which would
+assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the
+other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which
+exclude its present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive a
+thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things
+which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.),
+things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards
+something possible is more vehement.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
+exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.
+    Proof.-Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,
+is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as
+future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the
+future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.
+x.).  Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of
+existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far
+fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,
+nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as
+contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard
+as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the
+thing to be present with us.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know
+not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal,
+fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.
+    Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
+not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the
+existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other
+hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its
+present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive it in relation
+to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls
+the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and
+note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II.
+xvii. Coroll.).  Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing
+contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is
+fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a
+thing past.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIV.  A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any
+emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is
+considered as an emotion.
+    Proof.-An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its
+body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the
+general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no
+positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what
+is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by
+virtue of being true, restrain any emotion.  But, in so far as
+such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength
+for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to
+restrain the given emotion.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can
+be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from
+the emotions whereby we are assailed.
+    Proof.-From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the
+Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the
+strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.).  But,
+inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of
+our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also
+present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must
+therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.);
+consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined
+solely by human power.  Again, the desires arising from the
+emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as
+the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and
+increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,
+which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it
+(IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be
+more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge
+of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,
+in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more
+easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is
+agreeable at the present moment.
+    Proof.-Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,
+is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix.
+Coroll.).  But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of
+good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good
+at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong
+desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal
+application).  Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when
+concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or
+quenched, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and
+evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is
+contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire
+for things that are present.
+    Proof.-This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop.
+from IV. xii. Coroll.
+    Note.-I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved
+by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the
+true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul,
+and often yields to every kind of passion.  This state of things
+gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:[12]--
+"The better path I gaze at and approve,
+The worse-I follow."
+
+[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
+
+    Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind,
+when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."  I
+have not written the above with the object of drawing the
+conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or
+that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his
+emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the
+infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can
+do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power.  I
+have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human
+infirmity.  The power of reason over the emotions I have settled
+to treat separately.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions
+being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.
+    Proof.-Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions,
+i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist
+in his own being.  Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by
+the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the
+contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being
+felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising
+from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the
+power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must
+be defined by human power only.  Thus the former is the stronger
+of the two.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In these few remarks I have explained the causes of
+human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide
+by the precepts of reason.  It now remains for me to show what
+course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are
+in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are
+contrary thereto.  But, before I begin to prove my Propositions
+in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them
+briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my
+meaning.
+    As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,
+that every man should love himself, should seek that which is
+useful to him-I mean, that which is really useful to him, should
+desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,
+and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to
+preserve his own being.  This is as necessarily true, as that a
+whole is greater than its part.  (Cf. III. iv.)
+    Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance
+with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one
+endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with
+the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the
+foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own
+being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving
+his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its
+own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful
+to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and
+lastly, that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by
+external causes repugnant to their nature.  Further, it follows
+from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing
+without all external things for the preservation of our being or
+living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside
+ourselves.  Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our
+intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
+understand nothing besides itself.  There are, then, many things
+outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to
+be desired.  Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than
+those which are in entire agreement with our nature.  For if, for
+example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,
+they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them
+singly.
+    Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than
+man-nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being
+can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points
+agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were,
+one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with
+one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their
+being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.
+Hence, men who are governed by reason-that is, who seek what is
+useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves
+nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
+and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their
+conduct.
+    Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus
+briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater
+detail.  I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain
+the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every
+man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation
+of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.
+    Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the
+case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I
+have hitherto proceeded.
+
+PROP. XIX.  Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily
+desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.
+    Proof.-The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the
+emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
+thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks
+good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad.  Now this appetite is
+nothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of
+Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.).
+Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires
+the one, and shrinks from the other, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek
+what is useful to him-in other words, to preserve his own
+being-the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in
+proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that
+is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.
+    Proof.-Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by
+man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely
+by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.
+Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his
+own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently
+(III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his
+own being, he is wanting in power.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or
+preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes
+external and foreign to his nature.  No one, I say, from the
+necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion
+from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which
+latter may be done in a variety of ways.  A man, for instance,
+kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists
+round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a
+sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart;
+or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's
+command, to open his own veins-that is, to escape a greater evil
+by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may
+so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may
+assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea
+cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the
+necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become
+non-existent, is as impossible as that something should be made
+out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little
+reflection.
+
+PROP. XXI.  No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and
+to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and
+to live-in other words, to actually exist.
+    Proof.-The proof of this proposition, or rather the
+proposition itself, is self-evident, and is also plain from the
+definition of desire.  For the desire of living, acting, &c.,
+blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence
+of man-that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to
+preserve his own being.  Therefore, no one can desire, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  No virtue can be conceived as prior to this
+endeavour to preserve one's own being.
+    Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a
+thing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived
+as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be
+conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.
+Therefore no virtue, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-The effort for self-preservation is the first and
+only foundation of virtue.  For prior to this principle nothing
+can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular
+action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said
+to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in
+so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.
+    Proof.-In so far as a man is determined to an action through
+having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.
+Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived
+solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which
+does not follow from his virtue.  But, in so far as he is
+determined for an action because he understands, he is active;
+that is, he does something, which is perceived through his
+essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us
+the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being
+(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with
+the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to
+one's self.
+    Proof.-To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing
+else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature.  But
+we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore
+to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,
+to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and
+that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.
+Coroll.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXV.  No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of
+anything else.
+    Proof.-The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
+persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the
+thing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not from the
+essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that
+everyone endeavours to preserve his being.  Moreover, this
+proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should
+endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,
+the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,
+which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd.  Therefore no one,
+&c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so
+far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,
+save such things as are conducive to understanding.
+    Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but
+the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so
+far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for
+continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as
+necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of
+Appetite, III. ix. note).  But the essence of reason is nought
+else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly
+understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.); therefore
+(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
+nothing else but to understand.  Again, since this effort of the
+mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to
+preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this
+effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and
+single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand
+things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the
+other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able
+to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are
+conducive to understanding.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save
+such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are
+able to hinder us from understanding.
+    Proof.-The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing
+beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,
+save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing
+Prop.).  But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess
+certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has
+adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in
+so far as it reasons.  Therefore we know nothing to be good or
+evil save such things as really conduce, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God,
+and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.
+    Proof.-The mind is not capable of understanding anything
+higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely
+infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be
+conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest
+utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God.  Again,
+the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to
+the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously.  The
+mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand.  Now, as we
+have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is
+God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand
+or to know God.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  No individual thing, which is entirely different
+from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and
+absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has
+something in common with our nature.
+    Proof.-The power of every individual thing, and consequently
+the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be
+determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.
+vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through
+which human nature is conceived.  Therefore our power of
+activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and
+consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other
+individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not
+by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely
+different from our own; and since we call good or evil that
+which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.
+xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our
+power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different
+from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXX.  A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality
+which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in
+so far as it is contrary to our nature.
+    Proof.-We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.
+viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when
+it diminishes or checks our power of action.  Therefore, if
+anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in
+common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or
+check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.
+iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that
+quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand,
+in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),
+in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is
+contrary to our nature.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,
+it is necessarily good.
+    Proof.-In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it
+cannot be bad for it.  It will therefore necessarily be either
+good or indifferent.  If it be assumed that it be neither good
+nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which
+tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the
+hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself;
+but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing
+is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for
+us, and vice versâ, in proportion as a thing is more useful for
+us, so is it more in harmony with our nature.  For, in so far as
+it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be
+different therefrom or contrary thereto.  If different, it can
+neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be
+contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,
+contrary to what is good-in short, bad.  Nothing, therefore, can
+be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;
+and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony
+with our nature, and vice versâ.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  In so far as men are a prey to passion, they
+cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.
+    Proof.-Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are
+understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or
+negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note);
+wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,
+cannot be said to be naturally in harmony.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white
+and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we
+absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect.  So, if
+we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both
+are finite-wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of
+their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power
+of external causes-we should certainly affirm that a man and a
+stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree
+only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really
+agree in no respect.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are
+assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states;
+and to this extent one and the same man is variable and
+inconstant.
+    Proof.-The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be
+explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i.,
+ii.), but it must be defined by
+the power, that is (III. vii.), by the nature of external causes
+in
+comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as
+many kinds of
+each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are
+affected
+(III. lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and
+the same
+object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly,
+that one and
+the same man may be differently affected towards the same object,
+and may
+therefore be variable and inconstant.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, they can be contrary one to another.
+    Proof.-A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's
+feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to
+that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole
+possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and
+note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in
+III. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
+Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen
+also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should
+endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.
+xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another.  But the
+emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.);
+hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are
+passions, can be contrary one to another.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives
+that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from
+this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,
+through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through
+agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way;
+if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be
+untrue.  But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we
+shall see that the discrepancy vanishes.  For the two men are not
+in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,
+that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one
+differing from the other.  For, in so far as each loves the same
+thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered
+thereby.  Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are
+at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the
+agreement in their natures.  The cause for their opposition lies,
+as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to
+differ.  For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved
+object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of
+the loved object as lost.  Hence the one man will be affected
+with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus
+they will be at variance one with another.  We can easily show in
+like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on
+differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,
+do they always necessarily agree in nature.
+    Proof.-In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are
+passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at
+variance one with another.  But men are only said to be active,
+in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.);
+therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it
+is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely
+through human nature as its proximate cause.  But, since every
+man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,
+and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and
+further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem
+good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows
+that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human
+nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.
+Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with
+each man's nature.  Therefore, men in so far as they live in
+obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with
+another.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary I.-There is no individual thing in nature, which is
+more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.
+For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony
+with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man.
+But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when
+he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this
+extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of
+another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual
+things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in
+obedience to reason.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary II.-As every man seeks most that which is useful to
+him, so are men most useful one to another.  For the more a man
+seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,
+the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the
+same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to
+act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in
+obedience to reason.  But men are most in natural harmony, when
+they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore
+(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to
+another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-What we have just shown is attested by experience so
+conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man
+is to man a God."  Yet it rarely happens that men live in
+obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that
+they are generally envious and troublesome one to another.
+Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so
+that the definition of man as a social animal has met with
+general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much
+more convenience than injury.  Let satirists then laugh their
+fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes
+praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them
+heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said,
+they will find that men can provide for their wants much more
+easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can
+they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not
+to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,
+to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts.  But I
+will treat of this more at length elsewhere.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  The highest good of those who follow virtue is
+common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.
+    Proof.-To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason
+(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to
+reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;
+that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and
+can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of
+the same nature.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of
+those who follow after virtue were not common to all?  Would it
+not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in
+obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they
+agree in nature, would be at variance one with another?  To such
+an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but
+from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is
+common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of
+man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could
+neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure
+in this highest good.  For it belongs to the essence of the human
+mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal
+and infinite essence of God.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  The good which every man, who follows after
+virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,
+and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge
+of God.
+    Proof.-Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
+are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.);
+therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily
+endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to
+reason.  But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided
+by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for
+himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which
+each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also
+for others.  Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the
+mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.);
+now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),
+which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it
+(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of
+God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of
+virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good
+for himself.  Q.E.D.
+    Another Proof.-The good, which a man desires for himself and
+loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love
+it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others
+should love it also; and as the good in question is common to
+all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,
+for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice
+therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in
+proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.
+    Note I.-He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause
+others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the
+world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,
+and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight
+in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar
+impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what
+pleases themselves.  Again, as the highest good sought by men
+under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be
+possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love
+it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they
+delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed.  But he, who
+endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but
+courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent.
+Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in
+so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to
+Religion.  The desire of well-doing, which is engendered by a
+life according to reason, I call piety.  Further, the desire,
+whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate
+others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by
+honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according
+to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the
+gaining of friendship.  I have also shown in addition what are
+the foundations of a state; and the difference between true
+virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have
+said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in
+accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but
+man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to
+himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded
+by the general disposition of things rather than by his own
+nature considered solely in itself.
+
+[13] Honestas
+
+    Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.
+of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the
+slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition
+and womanish pity than on sound reason.  The rational quest of
+what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
+associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,
+or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the
+same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.
+Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men
+have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.
+Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we
+may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,
+treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature
+is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from
+human emotions (III. lvii. note).  It remains for me to explain
+what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit.  On these points
+see the following note.
+    Note II.-In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain
+praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.
+    Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note:
+the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms.  But I
+must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature
+and in society.
+    Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,
+consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions
+which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by
+sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is
+bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own
+disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to
+him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which
+he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.).  Now,
+if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain
+in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to
+his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.).  But seeing that they are a
+prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue
+(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and
+being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in
+need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note).  Wherefore, in order that
+men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is
+necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for
+the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure
+their fellow-men.  The way in which this end can be obtained, so
+that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.
+Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each
+other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.
+vii. and III. xxxix.  It is there shown, that an emotion can only
+be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to
+itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of
+incurring a greater injury themselves.
+    On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps
+in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging
+injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also
+possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to
+pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in
+restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note).  Such a
+society established with laws and the power of preserving itself
+is called a State, while those who live under its protection are
+called citizens.  We may readily understand that there is in the
+state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced
+good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely
+of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with
+reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good
+or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.
+    In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it
+can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on
+by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State
+authority.  Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is
+therefore punished by the right of the State only.  Obedience, on
+the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is
+thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages
+which a State provides.
+    Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent
+master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be
+said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are
+common to all.  Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no
+wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that
+which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the
+state of nature answering to justice and injustice.  Such ideas
+are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common
+consent what belongs to one man and what to another.
+    From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and
+injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes
+which display the nature of the mind.  But I have said enough.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to
+render it capable of being affected in an increased number of
+ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of
+ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is
+thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting
+other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise,
+whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is
+hurtful to man.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body
+increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.);
+therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it
+capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and
+is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body
+capable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is
+hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body
+mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a
+change in such proportion is bad.
+    Proof.-The human body needs many other bodies for its
+preservation (II. Post. iv.).  But that which constitutes the
+specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts
+communicate their several motions one to another in a certain
+fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.).
+Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
+proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human
+body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the
+human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of
+being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in
+many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.).  Again,
+whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion
+causes the human body to assume another specific character, in
+other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the
+point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and consequently
+totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of
+ways; therefore it is bad.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The extent to which such causes can injure or be of
+service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part.  But I
+would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,
+when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually
+among its several parts is changed.  For I do not venture to deny
+that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and
+other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to
+consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally
+different from its own.  There is no reason, which compels me to
+maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse;
+nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.
+It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I
+should hardly call him the same.  As I have heard tell of a
+certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and
+though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his
+past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he
+had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for
+a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue.  If
+this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A
+man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can
+only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy
+of other men.  However, I prefer to leave such questions
+undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for
+raising new issues.
+
+PROP. XL.  Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes
+men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever
+brings discord into a State is bad.
+    Proof.-For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony
+also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is
+therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)
+whatsoever brings about discord is bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Pleasure in itself is not bad but good:
+contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.
+    Proof.-Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the
+body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is
+emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or
+checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,
+&c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;
+contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.
+    Proof.-Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,
+which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all
+parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.),
+the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a
+manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion
+of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),
+and cannot be excessive.  But Melancholy (see its Def. in the
+same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is
+referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or
+hindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV.
+xxxviii.) it is always bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIII.  Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other
+hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is
+bad.
+    Proof.-Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is
+pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,
+consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the
+rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this
+emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body
+(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus
+rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other
+ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad.  Again, grief,
+which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.).  But, as its
+force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause
+compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees
+and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can,
+therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and
+preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's
+capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIV.  Love and desire may be excessive.
+    Proof.-Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an
+external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation,
+accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.
+note); hence love maybe excessive.  Again, the strength of
+desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises
+(III. xxxvii.).  Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's
+actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from
+the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become
+excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning
+stimulation.
+    Note.-Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived
+more easily than it can be observed.  For the emotions, whereby
+we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the
+body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions
+are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation
+of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and
+although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions-and very few
+are found who are always assailed by one and the same-yet there
+are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately
+fixed.  We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,
+although it be not present, they think they have it before them;
+when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is
+delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with
+love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their
+mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are
+made objects of ridicule.  But when a miser thinks of nothing but
+gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but
+glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are
+generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated.  But,
+in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness,
+though they may not be reckoned among diseases.
+
+PROP. XLV.  Hatred can never be good.
+    Proof.-When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.
+xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that
+is bad.  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    N.B.  Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred
+towards men.
+    Corollary I.-Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and
+other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are
+bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.
+    Corollary II.-Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is
+base, and in a State unjust.  This also is evident from III.
+xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.
+xxxvii. note.
+    Note.-Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to
+be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference.  For
+laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so
+long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.).
+Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and
+gloomy superstition.  For why is it more lawful to satiate one's
+hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,
+and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else,
+save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,
+nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,
+which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the
+greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the
+perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we
+necessarily partake of the divine nature.  Therefore, to make use
+of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible
+(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is
+the part of a wise man.  I say it is the part of a wise man to
+refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
+drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
+plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
+and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
+his neighbour.  For the human body is composed of very numerous
+parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
+fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
+equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
+the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the
+mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
+simultaneously.  This way of life, then, agrees best with our
+principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there
+be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
+the best, and in every way to be commended.  There is no need for
+me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.
+
+PROP. XLVI.  He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,
+for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.
+    Proof.-All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.);
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such
+emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to
+prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.).  But hatred is
+increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love
+(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.);
+therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
+endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is
+assuredly wretched.  But he, who strives to conquer hatred with
+love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands
+many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid.
+Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but
+through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow
+so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,
+that I have no need to prove them in detail.
+
+PROP. XLVII.  Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves
+good.
+    Proof.-Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.
+For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of
+the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without
+fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in
+themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive
+pleasure (IV. xliii.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We may add, that these emotions show defective
+knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same
+reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of
+a want of mental power.  For although confidence and joy are
+pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,
+namely, hope and fear.  Wherefore the more we endeavour to be
+guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to
+free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate
+fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.
+
+PROP. XLVIII.  The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are
+always bad.
+    Proof.-These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)
+are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)
+bad.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XLIX.  Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud.
+    Proof.-If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's
+sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be
+pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good
+which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and
+therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other
+words, we are apt to become proud.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. L.  Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,
+is in itself bad and useless.
+    Proof.-Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and
+therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad.  The good effect which
+follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity
+from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the
+dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of
+reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for
+certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under
+the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from
+the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in
+accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not
+find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will
+he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human
+virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to
+rejoice.  We may add, that he, who is easily touched with
+compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does
+something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can
+never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly
+because we are easily deceived by false tears.  I am in this
+place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of
+reason.  He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by
+compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems
+unlike a man.
+
+PROP. LI.  Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree
+therewith and arise therefrom.
+    Proof.-Approval is love towards one who has done good to
+another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.
+lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands;
+therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Another Proof.-He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
+desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.
+xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow
+his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will
+feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the
+benefactor.  Therefore he approves of him.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,
+xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark
+that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace
+punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said
+to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by
+hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.
+
+PROP. LII.  Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which
+arises from reason is the highest possible.
+    Proof.-Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's
+contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the
+Emotions, xxv.).  But a man's true power of action or virtue is
+reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and
+distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore
+self-approval arises from reason.  Again, when a man is
+contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly
+or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action
+(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of
+understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the
+highest possible self-approval arise.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Self-approval is in reality the highest object for
+which we can hope.  For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one
+endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior
+object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and
+strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary
+(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame
+becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life
+under disgrace is almost unendurable.
+
+PROP. LIII.  Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason.
+    Proof.-Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of
+his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.).  But, in so
+far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to
+understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.).
+Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives any infirmity
+in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but
+(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked.
+But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by
+virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the
+knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this
+is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands
+himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because[14] his power of activity
+is aided.  Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a
+man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the
+contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.
+Q.E.D.
+
+[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"-which I
+have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
+`quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
+
+PROP. LIV.  Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from
+reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or
+infirm.
+    Proof.-The first part of this proposition is proved like the
+foregoing one.  The second part is proved from the mere
+definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,
+xxvii.).  For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by
+evil desires; secondly, by pain.
+    Note.-As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these
+two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and
+Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had
+better sin in that direction.  For, if all men who are a prey to
+emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,
+and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked
+together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant, when it
+is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who
+consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously
+commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence.  Indeed those who
+are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than
+others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become
+free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.
+
+PROP. LV.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance
+of self.
+    Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and
+xxix.
+
+PROP. LVI.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme
+infirmity of spirit.
+    Proof.-The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation
+(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.).
+He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the
+foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues.
+Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of
+reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of
+reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.).
+Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and
+consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue;
+in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit.  Thus
+extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and
+the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.
+    Note.-Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride;
+for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a
+painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful
+(IV. xviii.).
+
+PROP. LVII.  The proud man delights in the company of flatterers
+and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded.
+    Proof.-Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation
+of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this
+estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the
+means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight
+in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is
+too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the
+company of high-minded men, who value him according to his
+deserts.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the
+evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all
+the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity.
+I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may
+be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and,
+therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself
+superior to his fellows.  The dejection, which is the opposite
+quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising
+from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior
+to his fellows.  Such being the ease, we can easily see that a
+proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes
+pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his
+bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.
+    Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the
+dejected man very near akin to the proud man.  For, inasmuch as
+his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and
+other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other
+words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in
+contemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb,
+"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers."
+Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he
+thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to
+envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's
+actions, with a view to fault-finding rather than correction, in
+order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory
+therein, though all the time with a dejected air.  These effects
+follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from
+the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
+right angles.  I have already said that I call these and similar
+emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man.  The
+laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man
+is but a part.  I mention this, in passing, lest any should think
+that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds
+of men rather than the nature and properties of things.  For, as
+I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions
+and their properties as on the same footing with other natural
+phenomena.  Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and
+ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as
+other things which we admire, and which we delight to
+contemplate.  But I pass on to note those qualities in the
+emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon
+him.
+
+PROP. LVIII.  Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
+arise therefrom.
+    Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and
+also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.
+i.).
+    Note-Empty honour, as it is styled, is self-approval,
+fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this
+good opinion ceases there ceases also the self-approval, in other
+words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note);
+consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,
+day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain
+his reputation.  For the populace is variable and inconstant, so
+that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.
+Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and
+readily represses the fame of others.  The object of the strife
+being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is
+seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every
+possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more
+proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to
+himself.  This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
+nothing.
+    The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred
+from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance.  I
+will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,
+is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is
+really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same
+way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not
+mortified.  Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,
+he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no
+desire to live honourably.
+    Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon
+concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the
+desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good
+or evil emotions.  But all, in so far as they are engendered in
+us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is
+evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be
+useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance
+of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.
+
+PROP. LIX.  To all the actions, whereto we are determined by
+emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined
+without emotion by reason.
+    Proof.-To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.
+ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the
+necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone.  But pain is
+bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action
+(IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any
+action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance
+of reason.  Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a
+man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this
+extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we
+could not perform under the guidance of reason.  Lastly,
+pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for
+it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is
+increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in
+so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent
+of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his
+actions (III. iii., and note).
+    Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to
+such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception
+of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,
+capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion
+wherein the mind is passive.  But all emotions are attributable
+to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.
+explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing
+else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+    Another Proof.-A given action is called bad, in so far as it
+arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.
+But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad
+(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same
+action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the
+action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,
+we may be led by reason (IV. xix.).  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-An example will put this point in a clearer light.  The
+action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and
+in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his
+arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently
+downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper
+to the structure of the human body.  If, then, a man, moved by
+anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,
+this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one
+and the same action can be associated with various mental images
+of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of
+one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and
+distinct ideas.  Hence it is evident that every desire which
+springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become
+useless, if men could be guided by reason.  Let us now see why
+desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is
+called by us blind.
+
+PROP. LX.  Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not
+attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts
+thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.
+    Proof.-Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a
+body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails
+over the remaining parts (IV. vi.).  This part will not endeavour
+to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of
+the body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary
+for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own
+powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd.  The said part, and,
+consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its
+condition.  Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind
+aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole.  If it
+be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so
+that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same
+manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to
+a man as a whole.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to
+one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being
+with out taking into consideration our health as a whole: to
+which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over
+us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.
+
+PROP. LXI.  Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
+    Proof.-Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered
+absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
+conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by
+some given modification of itself.  Hence desire, which arises
+from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so
+far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far
+as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are
+adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.).
+Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered
+in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able
+to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction.  Therefore,
+such desire cannot be excessive.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXII.  In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be
+of a thing future, past, or present.
+    Proof.-Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of
+reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.
+xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same
+certitude (II. xliii. and note).  Wherefore, whether the thing be
+present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same
+necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether
+the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all
+cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always
+possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.);
+therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the
+dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether
+the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the
+duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods
+of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same
+emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though
+it were present the good which it conceived as future;
+consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the
+present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would
+in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source
+of evil in the future, as we shall presently show.  However, we
+can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of
+things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II.
+xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not
+so powerfully affected by the future as by the present.  Hence
+such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely
+abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order
+of things and the connection of causes, with a view to
+determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather
+imaginary than real.  Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the
+desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
+it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the
+desire of things which are agreeable at the present time.  (Cf.
+IV. xvi.)
+
+PROP. LXIII.  He who is led by fear, and does good in order to
+escape evil, is not led by reason.
+    Proof.-All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as
+active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and
+desire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does
+good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.
+    Note.-Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at
+vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by
+reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape
+evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as
+wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if
+they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men.
+    Corollary.-Under desire which springs from reason, we seek
+good directly, and shun evil indirectly.
+    Proof.-Desire which springs from reason can only spring from
+a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III.
+lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive
+(IV. lxi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs
+from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under
+the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by
+implication shun evil.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a
+sick and a healthy man.  The sick man through fear of death eats
+what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes
+pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of
+life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to
+avoid it.  So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from
+hatred or anger but from love of the public well-being, is guided
+solely by reason.
+
+PROP. LXIV.  The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.
+    Proof.-The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far
+as we are conscious thereof.  Now pain is the transition to a
+lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore
+cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi., and vii.);
+therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.)
+depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof
+(II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate.
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed
+only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.
+
+PROP. LXV.  Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the
+greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.
+    Proof.-A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good
+is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to
+things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see
+preface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser
+good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only
+the greater good and the lesser evil.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the
+lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun
+the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.
+For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,
+and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the
+former and shun the latter.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXVI.  We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater
+good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,
+and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a
+greater evil in the future.[15]
+
+[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
+Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
+alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
+misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
+boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+
+    Proof.-If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things
+future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same
+way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking
+merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,
+there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be
+assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we
+may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser
+good in the present, &c.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a
+lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater
+good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,
+because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.  This
+Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the
+Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.
+    Note.-If these statements be compared with what we have
+pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part
+up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a
+man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is
+led by reason.  The former, whether will or no, performs actions
+whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and
+only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance
+in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the
+former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose
+disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few
+observations.
+
+PROP. LXVII.  A free man thinks of death least of all things;
+and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
+    Proof.-A free man is one who lives under the guidance of
+reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly
+desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words
+(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his
+being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore
+such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom
+is a meditation of life.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. LXVIII.  If men were born free, they would, so long as they
+remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
+    Proof.-I call free him who is led solely by reason; he,
+therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only
+adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no
+conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being
+correlative) of good.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of
+this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as
+we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so
+far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the
+cause of man's existence.
+    This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
+have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.
+For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save
+that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he
+provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God
+forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of
+good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,
+he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.
+Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in
+entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be
+nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that
+after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway
+began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his
+freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the
+patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of
+God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire
+for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have
+shown above (IV. xxxvii.).
+
+PROP. LXIX.  The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,
+when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
+    Proof.-Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion
+contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining
+emotion (IV. vii.).  But blind daring and fear are emotions,
+which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.):
+hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring
+than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
+when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as
+in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of
+mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
+    Note.-What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,
+I explained in III. lix. note.  By danger I mean everything,
+which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,
+&c.
+
+PROP. LXX.  The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,
+as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
+    Proof.-Everyone judges what is good according to his
+disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who
+has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon
+it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the
+receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.).  But the free man only
+desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not
+repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,
+but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,
+and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
+importance.  Therefore the free man, lest he should become
+hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than
+reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving
+their favours.
+    Note.-I say, as far as he can.  For though men be ignorant,
+yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human
+aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often
+necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay
+such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in
+declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of
+despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious
+motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for
+offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it.  Thus, in
+declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility
+and courtesy.
+
+PROP. LXXI.  Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to
+another.
+    Proof.-Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,
+and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of
+friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,
+with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one
+to another.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire
+have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,
+rather than pure goodwill.  Moreover, ingratitude is not an
+emotion.  Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a
+man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c.
+He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,
+is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the
+gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal
+his thefts, or by any similar persons.  Contrariwise, such an one
+shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be
+corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.
+
+PROP. LXXII.  The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
+good faith.
+    Proof.-If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a
+case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the
+danger of present death? Would not his plan of self-preservation
+completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by
+pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would
+persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason
+would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their
+forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any
+general laws, which is absurd.
+
+PROP. LXXIII.  The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in
+a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in
+solitude, where he is independent.
+    Proof.-The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey
+through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to
+preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is
+(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,
+he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.
+xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.
+ii.), to live according to the laws of his country.  Therefore
+the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to
+possess the general rights of citizenship.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-These and similar observations, which we have made on
+man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to
+courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note).  I do not
+think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of
+strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no
+man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no
+man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud.  These
+propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and
+religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.;
+namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every
+man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.
+We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.
+l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever
+first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity
+of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful
+and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,
+horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his
+own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.
+Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they
+really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such
+as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar
+emotions, which I have mentioned above.  Thus he endeavours, as
+we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on
+his way rejoicing.  How far human virtue is capable of attaining
+to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in
+the following Part.
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+    What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life
+has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,
+but has been set forth piece-meal, according as I thought each
+Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.
+I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
+under leading heads.
+    I.  All our endeavours or desires so follow from the
+necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either
+through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our
+being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived
+through itself without other individuals.
+    II.  Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,
+that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to
+consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only
+referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things
+inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined
+not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to
+us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter
+passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,
+on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
+    III.  Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
+by man's power or reason, are always good.  The rest may be
+either good or bad.
+    IV.  Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect
+the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone
+man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed
+blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which
+arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the
+understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's
+attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of
+his nature.  Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the
+ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all
+his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate
+conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his
+intelligence.
+    V.  Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational
+life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his
+enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by
+intelligence.  Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's
+perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational
+life, are alone called evil.
+    VI.  As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are
+necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external
+causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal
+nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to
+conform to in almost infinite ways.
+    VII.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
+nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if
+he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with
+his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,
+whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in
+harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate
+himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.
+    VIII.  Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be
+capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the
+rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems
+safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good
+or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the
+rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we
+think best.  Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right
+of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.
+    IX.  Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any
+given thing than other individuals of the same species;
+therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and
+the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful
+than his fellow-man who is led by reason.  Further, as we know
+not anything among individual things which is more excellent than
+a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his
+skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at
+last to live under the dominion of their own reason.
+    X.  In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of
+hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are
+therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful
+than their fellows.
+    XI.  Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and
+high-mindedness.
+    XII.  It is before all things useful to men to associate
+their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds
+as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and
+generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.
+    XIII.  But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.
+For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the
+guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and
+more prone to revenge than to sympathy.  No small force of
+character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to
+restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others.  But
+those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at
+vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than
+strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and
+others.  Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from
+misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes
+rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably
+endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and
+choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
+preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their
+father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as
+they may spite their parents.
+    XIV.  Therefore, although men are generally governed in
+everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common
+brings many more advantages than drawbacks.  Wherefore it is
+better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive
+to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and
+friendship.
+    XV.  Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are
+attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living.  For men
+brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is
+reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received
+customs of their society.  For winning love those qualities are
+especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.
+IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).
+    XVI.  Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such
+harmony is insecure.  Further, fear arises from infirmity of
+spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the
+same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a
+certain resemblance to piety.
+    XVII.  Men are also gained over by liberality, especially
+such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain
+life.  However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the
+power and the advantage of any private person.  For the riches of
+any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.
+Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited
+for him to be able to make all men his friends.  Hence providing
+for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and
+has regard only to the general advantage.
+    XVIII.  In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our
+duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).
+    XIX.  Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of
+generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort
+of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,
+readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a
+species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than
+harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).
+    XX.  As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in
+harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not
+engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to
+beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the
+love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused
+by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.
+    XXI.  Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by
+means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery.  None are
+more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be
+first, but are not.
+    XXII.  There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety
+and religion.  Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet
+is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.
+note).
+    XXIII.  Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such
+matters as cannot be hid.  Further, as shame is a species of
+pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.
+    XXIV.  The remaining emotions of pain towards men are
+directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;
+and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance
+to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass
+judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's
+rights.
+    XXV.  Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire
+of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to
+piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.).  But, if it spring
+from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under
+the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and
+seditions.  For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word
+or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,
+I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:
+not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called
+after his name, nor to give any cause for envy.  Further, in his
+conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and
+will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but
+he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way
+whereby it may be perfected.  Thus will men be stirred not by
+fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to
+endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to
+reason.
+    XXVI.  Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature
+in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with
+ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,
+whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our
+advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or
+destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to
+our use as best we may.
+    XXVII.  The advantage which we derive from things external to
+us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from
+observing them, and from recombining their elements in different
+forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this
+point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and
+nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their
+functions.  For, in proportion as the body is capable of being
+affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external
+bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind
+capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.).  But there seem to be
+very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due
+nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.
+For the human body is composed of very many parts of different
+nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so
+that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything
+that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the
+mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.
+    XXVIII.  Now for providing these nourishments the strength of
+each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one
+another mutual aid.  But money has furnished us with a token for
+everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind
+of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly
+conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the
+idea of money as cause.
+    XXIX.  This result is the fault only of those, who seek
+money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but
+because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring
+themselves to great splendour.  Certainly they nourish their
+bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they
+lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of
+their body.  But they who know the true use of money, and who fix
+the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,
+live content with little.
+    XXX.  As, therefore, those things are good which assist the
+various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their
+functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid
+to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;
+it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.
+But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us
+pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit
+our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred
+to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore
+most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at
+hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become
+excessive.  Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most
+regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate
+what is future with emotions equally vivid.  (IV. xliv. note, and
+lx. note.)
+    XXXI.  Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as
+good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.
+However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious
+take delight in my infirmity and trouble.  For the greater the
+pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection
+whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the
+divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated
+by a true regard for our advantage.  But contrariwise he, who is
+led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by
+reason.
+    XXXII.  But human power is extremely limited, and is
+infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have
+not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those
+things which are without us.  Nevertheless, we shall bear with an
+equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims
+of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have
+done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not
+sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;
+remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we
+follow her order.  If we have a clear and distinct understanding
+of this, that part of our nature which is defined by
+intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will
+assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence
+will endeavour to persist.  For, in so far as we are intelligent
+beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,
+nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which
+is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding
+of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is
+in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.
+
+
+
+PART V:
+
+Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+    At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which
+is concerned with the way leading to freedom.  I shall therefore
+treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the
+reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental
+Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much
+more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.  It is no part
+of my design to point out the method and means whereby the
+understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the
+body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of
+its functions.  The latter question lies in the province of
+Medicine, the former in the province of Logic.  Here, therefore,
+I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of
+reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its
+dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.
+That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have
+already shown.  Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions
+depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely
+govern them.  But these philosophers were compelled, by the
+protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
+that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and
+moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the
+example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog
+and the other a hunting-dog.  For by long training it could be
+brought about, that the house-dog should become accustomed to
+hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares.  To
+this opinion Descartes not a little inclines.  For he maintained,
+that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of
+the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the
+aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which
+are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which
+the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various
+ways.  He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst
+of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of
+the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the
+midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal
+spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different
+marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different
+external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;
+whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the
+gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once
+before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the
+gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
+determining them to the condition wherein they were, when
+repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.  He further
+asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature
+to a certain given motion of the gland.  For instance, whenever
+anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition
+causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in
+question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the
+mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,
+inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the
+animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would
+dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with
+the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to
+look at remote or very near objects.  Lastly, he maintained that,
+although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been
+united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole
+number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet
+it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
+other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de
+l'âme, I.50.  He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,
+that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power
+over its passions.  For passions as defined by him are
+"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are
+referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)
+are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement
+of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27).  But, seeing that we
+can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,
+to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely
+on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with
+sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our
+actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which
+we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an
+absolute dominion over our passions.  Such is the doctrine of
+this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his
+own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could
+hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man.  Indeed, I
+am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,
+that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from
+self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not
+clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to
+task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through
+occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which
+occult qualities are commonplace.  What does he understand, I
+ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and
+distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union
+with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like
+him to explain this union through its proximate cause.  But he
+had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,
+that he could not assign any particular cause of the union
+between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have
+recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.
+Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the
+mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it
+hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can
+be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the
+animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we
+have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again
+disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would
+follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given
+danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,
+yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended
+in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything
+except running away.  In truth, as there is no common standard of
+volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between
+the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;
+consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined
+by the strength of the other.  We may also add, that there is no
+gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it
+can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that
+all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the
+brain.  Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes
+concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have
+abundantly proved that his premisses are false.  Therefore, since
+the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the
+understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of
+the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all
+have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or
+distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those
+conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
+
+
+AXIOMS.
+
+I.  If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a
+change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of
+the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.
+
+II.  The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,
+in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence
+of its cause.
+    (This axiom is evident from III. vii.)
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+
+PROP. I.  Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
+and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or
+the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
+associated in the body.
+    Proof.-The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.
+vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the
+order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and
+vii.) as the order and connection of ideas.  Wherefore, even as
+the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place
+according to the order and association of modifications of the
+body (II. xviii.), so vice versâ (III. ii.) the order and
+connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance
+with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are
+arranged and associated in the mind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. II.  If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,
+from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other
+thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external
+cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these
+emotions, be destroyed.
+    Proof.-That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,
+is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is
+removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;
+therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are
+destroyed.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. III.  An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a
+passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
+    Proof.-An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by
+the general Def. of the Emotions).  If, therefore, we form a
+clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only
+be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to
+the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III.
+iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary-An emotion therefore becomes more under our
+control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in
+proportion as it is more known to us.
+
+PROP. IV.  There is no modification of the body, whereof we
+cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
+    Proof.-Properties which are common to all things can only be
+conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and
+Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,
+whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
+Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
+we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.  For an
+emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general
+Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding
+Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.
+    Note.-Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
+an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
+understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
+(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
+distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
+absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
+about, that he should become less subject to them.  To attain
+this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
+acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
+every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
+be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
+distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
+that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
+external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence
+it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
+destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
+are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
+being excessive (IV. lxi.).  For it must be especially remarked,
+that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
+that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.
+For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
+that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own
+fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by
+reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
+does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives
+by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
+called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof).  In like
+manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
+they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
+accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
+adequate ideas.  For all desires, whereby we are determined to
+any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
+inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).  Than this remedy for the emotions
+(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in
+a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
+our power, can be devised.  For the mind has no other power save
+that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
+above (III. iii.).
+
+PROP. V.  An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
+and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
+conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
+    Proof.-An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be
+free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be
+necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one
+towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).
+But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to
+conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes
+whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);
+therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply
+is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel
+towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,
+consequently, it is the greatest of all.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VI.  The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
+less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
+necessary.
+    Proof.-The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
+xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an
+infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing
+Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less
+subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)
+feels less emotion towards the things themselves.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
+applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly
+and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the
+emotions, as experience also testifies.  For we see, that the
+pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as
+the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means
+have been preserved.  So also we see that no one pities an
+infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,
+because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.
+Whereas, if most people were born full-grown and only one here
+and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because
+infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and
+necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may
+note several other instances of the same sort.
+
+PROP. VII.  Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
+we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
+attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
+    Proof.-We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the
+emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,
+being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the
+said thing (II. xvii.).  Wherefore, the emotion, which is
+referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a
+nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.
+vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
+controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
+external cause (IV. ix.).  But an emotion which springs from
+reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things
+(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always
+regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their
+present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
+manner (II. xxxviii.).  Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
+remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which
+are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external
+causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
+until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the
+emotion which springs from reason is more powerful.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. VIII.  An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
+of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
+    Proof.-Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
+(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
+number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
+becomes stronger.  Q.E.D.
+    Note-This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.
+
+PROP. IX.  An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
+causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
+itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
+affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
+and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
+single cause.
+    Proof.-An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
+hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);
+therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
+contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
+another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
+the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is
+unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.
+Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.
+vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less
+passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of
+several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
+emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few
+or of a single object: this was our second point.  Lastly, this
+emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to
+several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. X.  So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
+our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
+    Proof.-The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that
+is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede
+the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.).  So long, therefore, as
+we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the
+mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.
+xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear
+and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.
+note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such
+cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of
+the body according to the intellectual order.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-By this power of rightly arranging and associating the
+bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily
+affected by evil emotions.  For (V. vii.) a greater force is
+needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and
+associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,
+are uncertain and unsettled.  The best we can do, therefore, so
+long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is
+to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,
+to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the
+particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
+that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that
+it may be always ready to our hand.  For instance, we have laid
+down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred
+should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not required
+with hatred in return.  Now, that this precept of reason may be
+always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think
+over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and
+in what manner and way they may be best warded off by
+high-mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with
+the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready
+for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.).  If we keep also
+in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
+which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
+further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result
+of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than
+everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such
+case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises
+therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and
+will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a
+grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be
+overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner
+than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand.  As
+is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii.  We should, in the same
+way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the
+ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and
+imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of
+resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.
+But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions
+we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
+individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order
+that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of
+pleasure.  For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
+pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for
+which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain
+it.  Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the
+fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
+through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do
+the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of
+gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving
+vent to their anger would fain appear wise.  Wherefore it is
+certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of
+honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily
+covet it.  This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common
+to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.
+For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the
+misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely
+torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not
+only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches.  So,
+again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love
+think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock
+faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,
+directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.
+Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the
+love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of
+the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy
+which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise
+desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
+revel in a false show of freedom.  Whosoever will diligently
+observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
+difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for
+the most part, to direct his actions according to the
+commandments of reason.
+
+[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
+that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
+
+PROP. XI.  In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
+objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and
+occupies the mind more.
+    Proof.-In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is
+referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can
+be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
+contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;
+therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in
+full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XII.  The mental images of things are more easily
+associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
+and distinctly understand, than with others.
+    Proof.-Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,
+are either the common properties of things or deductions
+therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are
+consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.
+Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate
+other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
+something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of
+the said things should be more often associated with the images
+of these than with the images of something else.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIII.  A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as
+it is associated with a greater number of other images.
+    Proof.-In proportion as an image is associated with a greater
+number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
+whereby it can be aroused.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XIV.  The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
+modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of
+God.
+    Proof.-There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind
+may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);
+wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred
+to the idea of God (I. xv.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XV.  He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
+more understands himself and his emotions.
+    Proof.-He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
+his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is
+(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the
+same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more
+understands himself and his emotions.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVI.  This love towards God must hold the chief place in
+the mind.
+    Proof.-For this love is associated with all the modifications
+of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);
+therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.
+Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XVII.  God is without passions, neither is he affected by
+any emotion of pleasure or pain.
+    Proof.-All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
+true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and
+therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without
+passions.  Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a
+lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of
+the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
+pleasure or pain.
+    Corollary.-Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate
+anyone.  For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any
+emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,
+vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.
+
+PROP. XVIII.  No one can hate God.
+    Proof.-The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect
+(II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,
+we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be
+no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of
+the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
+    Note.-It may be objected that, as we understand God as the
+cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause
+of pain.  But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the
+causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a
+passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore,
+in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to
+that extent feel pleasure.
+
+PROP. XIX.  He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should
+love him in return.
+    Proof.-For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.
+xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
+consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is
+absurd (III. xxviii.).  Therefore, he who loves God, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XX.  This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion
+of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to
+God by the same bond of love.
+    Proof.-This love towards God is the highest good which we can
+seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common
+to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice
+therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),
+it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of
+jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note);
+but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in
+proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
+therein.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion
+directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be
+destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God
+is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as
+it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the
+body be destroyed also.  As to its nature, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
+    I have now gone through all the remedies against the
+emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can
+do against them.  Whence it appears that the mind's power over
+the emotions consists:--
+    I.  In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).
+    II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the
+thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.
+ii. and V. iv. note).
+    III.  In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions
+referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those
+referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner
+(V. vii.).
+    IV.  In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]
+are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of
+things or to God (V. ix. xi.).
+
+[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus--emotions.
+
+    V.  Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and
+associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and
+xii. xiii. xiv.).
+    But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
+may be better understood, it should be specially observed that
+the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion
+of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is
+more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are
+comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,
+and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than
+by another.  For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
+comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.
+Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
+infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge
+only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
+whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it
+may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by
+its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active,
+whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,
+although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former
+mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas
+attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human
+infirmity.  Again, it must be observed, that spiritual
+unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to
+excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,
+and which we can never become masters of.  For no one is
+solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;
+neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in
+regard to things whereof no one can be really master.
+    We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and
+distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge
+(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,
+possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy
+them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at
+any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind
+(V. xiv.).  Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable
+and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession
+(II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which
+are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to
+strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and
+deeply penetrate it.
+    And now I have finished with all that concerns this present
+life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have
+briefly described all the remedies against the emotions.  And
+this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has
+attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the
+definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to
+Propositions i. and iii. of Part III.  It is now, therefore, time
+to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of
+the mind, without relation to the body.
+
+PROP. XXI.  The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
+is past, while the body endures.
+    Proof.-The mind does not express the actual existence of its
+body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as
+actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and,
+consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine
+any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.
+Thus it
+cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.
+xvii. note),
+or remember things past, except while the body endures (see
+definition of Memory, II. xviii. note).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXII.  Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,
+which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the
+form of eternity.
+    Proof.-God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or
+that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.).  This
+essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the
+very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a
+certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must
+necessarily exist in God (II. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIII.  The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
+the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.
+    Proof.-There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which
+expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,
+therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence
+of the human mind (II. xiii.).  But we have not assigned to the
+human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as
+it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained
+through duration, and may be defined by time-that is (II. viii.
+Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
+endures.  Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
+conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
+of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the
+essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-This idea, which expresses the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode
+of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
+necessarily eternal.  Yet it is not possible that we should
+remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear
+no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in
+terms of time, or have any relation to time.  But,
+notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal.  For the
+mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no
+less than those things that it remembers.  For the eyes of the
+mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than
+proofs.  Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before
+the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the
+essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and
+that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or
+explained through duration.  Thus our mind can only be said to
+endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in
+so far as it involves the actual existence of the body.  Thus far
+only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
+time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
+
+PROP. XXIV.  The more we understand particular things, the more
+do we understand God.
+    Proof.-This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.
+
+PROP. XXV.  The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
+virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
+    Proof.-The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
+idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
+essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,
+in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
+understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
+highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or
+nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to
+understand things by the third kind of knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVI.  In proportion as the mind is more capable of
+understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
+more to understand things by that kind.
+    Proof-This is evident.  For, in so far as we conceive the
+mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of
+knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to
+conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
+the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable
+thereof.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVII.  From this third kind of knowledge arises the
+highest possible mental acquiescence.
+    Proof.-The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.
+xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge
+(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind
+knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):
+consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge
+passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
+of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such
+pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own
+virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of
+knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXVIII.  The endeavour or desire to know things by the
+third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the
+second kind of knowledge.
+    Proof.-This proposition is self-evident.  For whatsoever we
+understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
+itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that
+is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are
+referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)
+cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and
+are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from
+adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of
+knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of
+knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from
+the first, but from the second kind.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXIX.  Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
+eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the
+present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving
+the essence of the body under the form of eternity.
+    Proof.-In so far as the mind conceives the present existence
+of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be
+determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of
+conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.).  But
+eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
+and explanation).  Therefore to this extent the mind has not the
+power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it
+possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to
+conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
+ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to
+conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
+xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to
+the essence of mind (II. xiii.).  Therefore this power of
+conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the
+mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body
+under the form of eternity.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways;
+either as existing
+in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and
+following
+from the necessity of the divine nature.  Whatsoever we conceive
+in this
+second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of
+eternity, and
+their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as
+we showed
+in II. xlv. and note, which see.
+
+PROP. XXX.  Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body
+under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a
+knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived
+through God.
+    Proof.-Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this
+involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.).  Therefore to
+conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things
+in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as
+real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the
+essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
+itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that
+extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+PROP. XXXI.  The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
+its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
+    Proof.-The mind does not conceive anything under the form of
+eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
+form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is
+eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so
+far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which
+knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,
+in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything
+which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in
+other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge
+(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind
+(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or
+formal cause of such knowledge.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in
+this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of
+himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and
+blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel.  But we must
+here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind
+is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of
+eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more
+readily explained and better understood, we will consider the
+mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to
+understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have
+done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so
+long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our
+premisses are plain.
+
+PROP. XXXII.  Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of
+knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by
+the idea of God as cause.
+    Proof.-From this kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,
+xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea
+of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the
+idea also of God as cause.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-From the third kind of knowledge necessarily
+arises the intellectual love of God.  From this kind of knowledge
+arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is
+(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as
+we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we
+understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the
+intellectual love of God.
+
+PROP. XXXIII.  The intellectual love of God, which arises from
+the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
+    Proof.-The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.
+Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises
+therefrom is also necessarily eternal.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing
+Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of
+love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.
+of the last Prop.  Nor is there here any difference, except that
+the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we
+feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of
+God as eternal cause.  If pleasure consists in the transition to
+a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the
+mind being endowed with perfection itself.
+
+PROP. XXXIV.  The mind is, only while the body endures, subject
+to those emotions which are attributable to passions.
+    Proof.-Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind
+contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea
+indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than
+the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).
+Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,
+in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;
+therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,
+subject to emotions which are attributable to passions.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that no love save intellectual
+love is eternal.
+    Note.-If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that
+they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that
+they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the
+imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after
+death.
+
+PROP. XXXV.  God loves himself with an infinite intellectual
+love.
+    Proof.-God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.
+Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;
+and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of
+himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause:
+now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as
+intellectual love.
+
+PROP. XXXVI.  The intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as
+he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the
+essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;
+in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is
+part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.
+    Proof.-This love of the mind must be referred to the
+activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is
+itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself
+accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.);
+that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity
+whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human
+mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;
+therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of
+the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves
+himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God
+towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God
+are identical.
+    Note.-From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein
+our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in
+the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love
+towards men.  This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called
+Glory, and not undeservedly.  For whether this love be referred
+to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of
+spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really
+distinguished from glory.  In so far as it is referred to God, it
+is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,
+accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is
+referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).
+    Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in
+knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.
+xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner
+and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from
+the divine nature and constantly depends on God.  I have thought
+it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show
+by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I
+have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),
+is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which
+I have styled knowledge of the second kind.  For, although in
+Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and
+consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence
+and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate
+and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind
+so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual
+essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.
+
+PROP. XXXVII.  There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to
+this intellectual love, or which can take it away.
+    Proof.-This intellectual love follows necessarily from the
+nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through
+the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).
+If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary
+to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;
+consequently, that, which should be able to take away this
+love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious
+absurdity.  Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular
+things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given
+time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.
+
+PROP. XXXVIII.  In proportion as the mind understands more things
+by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to
+those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
+    Proof.-The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);
+therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by
+the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
+part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently
+(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not
+touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in
+other words, evil (IV. xxx.).  Thus, in proportion as the mind
+understands more things by the second and third kinds of
+knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains
+unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.
+Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Hence we understand that point which I touched on in
+IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;
+namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the
+mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,
+consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more.  Again,
+since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest
+possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind
+can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which
+we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of
+little importance when compared with the part which endures.  But
+I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.
+
+PROP. XXXIX.  He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part
+is eternal.
+    Proof.-He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
+number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which
+are evil (IV. xxxviii.)-that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions
+which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he
+possesses the power of arranging and associating the
+modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,
+and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the
+modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;
+whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected
+with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute
+the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man
+will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number
+of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a
+nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great
+knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or
+chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely
+fear death.  But, in order that this may be understood more
+clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of
+perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the
+better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.
+    For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a
+corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness,
+if we have been able to live through the whole period of life
+with a sound mind in a sound body.  And, in reality, he, who, as
+in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very
+few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external
+causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely
+conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who
+has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,
+considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of
+God, and of things.  In this life, therefore, we primarily
+endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far
+as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into
+something else capable of very many activities, and referable to
+a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things;
+and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its
+imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison
+with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the
+last Proposition.
+
+PROP. XL.  In proportion as each thing possesses more of
+perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice
+versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
+    Proof.-In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it
+possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.
+iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less
+passive.  This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove
+that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more
+perfect.  Q.E.D.
+    Corollary.-Hence it follows that the part of the mind which
+endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.
+For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the
+understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.);
+the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.
+xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.
+and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it
+great or small, is more perfect than the latter.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set
+forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without
+relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other
+places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,
+is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another
+eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to
+infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the
+eternal and infinite intellect of God.
+
+PROP. XLI.  Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we
+should still consider as of primary importance piety and
+religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed
+to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness.
+    Proof.-The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule
+of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's
+own true interest.  Now, while we determined what reason
+prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity,
+which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part.  Although
+we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we
+nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage
+and high-mindedness are of primary importance.  Therefore, even
+if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the
+aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-The general belief of the multitude seems to be
+different.  Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so
+far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their
+rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the
+commandments of the divine law.  They therefore believe that
+piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to
+firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to
+lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,
+for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but
+also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after
+death, that they are induced to live according to the divine
+commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry
+them.
+    If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the
+mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life
+remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of
+piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling
+everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey
+fortune rather than themselves.  Such a course appears to me not
+less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he
+can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to
+cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he
+sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer
+to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of
+reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth
+refuting.
+
+PROP. XLII.  Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue
+itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our
+lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able
+to control our lusts.
+    Proof.-Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and
+note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.
+xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be
+referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active;
+therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself.  This was our
+first point.  Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in
+this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand
+(V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power
+has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is
+it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in
+proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or
+blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts.  And,
+since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in
+the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in
+blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,
+contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this
+blessedness itself.  Q.E.D.
+    Note.-I have thus completed all I wished to set forth
+touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's
+freedom.  Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how
+much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his
+lusts.  For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various
+ways by external causes without ever gaining the true
+acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were
+unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as
+he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
+    Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
+scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
+himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
+necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
+acquiescence of his spirit.
+    If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result
+seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered.  Needs
+must it be hard, since it is so seldom found.  How would it be
+possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without
+great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men
+neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are
+rare.
+
+
+End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+
+[1] "Affectiones"
+
+[2] "Forma"
+
+[3] "Animata"
+
+[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
+
+[5] Conscientiæ morsus-thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
+
+[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
+whom we regard without any particular emotion.
+
+[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
+"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.
+
+[8] See previous endnote.
+
+[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.
+    "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
+      Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."
+
+[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
+intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
+
+[11] Gloria.
+
+[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
+
+[13] Honestas
+
+[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"-which I
+have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
+`quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
+
+[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
+Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
+alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
+misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
+boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+
+[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
+that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
+I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be
+obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholarship.
+
+[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus--emotions.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+
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