summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/old/bnfts10.txt
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'old/bnfts10.txt')
-rw-r--r--old/bnfts10.txt7837
1 files changed, 7837 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/old/bnfts10.txt b/old/bnfts10.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd4e000
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/bnfts10.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,7837 @@
+Project Gutenberg's L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits, by Aubrey Stewart
+
+Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check
+the laws for your country before redistributing these files!!!
+
+Please take a look at the important information in this header.
+We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an
+electronic path open for the next readers.
+
+Please do not remove this.
+
+This should be the first thing seen when anyone opens the book.
+Do not change or edit it without written permission. The words
+are carefully chosen to provide users with the information they
+need about what they can legally do with the texts.
+
+
+**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts**
+
+**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971**
+
+*****These Etexts Are Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!*****
+
+Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and
+further information is included below, including for donations.
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a 501(c)(3)
+organization with EIN [Employee Identification Number] 64-6221541
+
+
+
+Title: L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits
+
+Author: Aubrey Stewart, M. A.
+
+Release Date: February, 2003 [Etext #3794]
+[Yes, we are about one year ahead of schedule]
+[The actual date this file first posted = 09/12/01]
+
+Edition: 10
+
+Language: English
+
+Project Gutenberg's L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits, by Aubrey Stewart
+*******This file should be named bnfts10.txt or bnfts10.zip*********
+
+Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, bnfts11.txt
+VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, bnfts10a.txt
+
+This etext was produced by Charles Franks, Robert Rowe and the
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+Project Gutenberg Etexts are usually created from multiple editions,
+all of which are in the Public Domain in the United States, unless a
+copyright notice is included. Therefore, we usually do NOT keep any
+of these books in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+We are now trying to release all our books one year in advance
+of the official release dates, leaving time for better editing.
+Please be encouraged to send us error messages even years after
+the official publication date.
+
+Please note neither this listing nor its contents are final til
+midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement.
+The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at
+Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. A
+preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment
+and editing by those who wish to do so.
+
+Most people start at our sites at:
+http://gutenberg.net
+http://promo.net/pg
+
+
+Those of you who want to download any Etext before announcement
+can surf to them as follows, and just download by date; this is
+also a good way to get them instantly upon announcement, as the
+indexes our cataloguers produce obviously take a while after an
+announcement goes out in the Project Gutenberg Newsletter.
+
+http://www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/etext03
+or
+ftp://ftp.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/etext03
+
+Or /etext02, 01, 00, 99, 98, 97, 96, 95, 94, 93, 92, 92, 91 or 90
+
+Just search by the first five letters of the filename you want,
+as it appears in our Newsletters.
+
+
+Information about Project Gutenberg (one page)
+
+We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work. The
+time it takes us, a rather conservative estimate, is fifty hours
+to get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright
+searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc. This
+projected audience is one hundred million readers. If our value
+per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $2
+million dollars per hour this year as we release fifty new Etext
+files per month, or 500 more Etexts in 2000 for a total of 3000+
+If they reach just 1-2% of the world's population then the total
+should reach over 300 billion Etexts given away by year's end.
+
+The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext
+Files by December 31, 2001. [10,000 x 100,000,000 = 1 Trillion]
+This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers,
+which is only about 4% of the present number of computer users.
+
+At our revised rates of production, we will reach only one-third
+of that goal by the end of 2001, or about 4,000 Etexts unless we
+manage to get some real funding.
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation has been created
+to secure a future for Project Gutenberg into the next millennium.
+
+We need your donations more than ever!
+
+As of July 12, 2001 contributions are only being solicited from people in:
+Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
+Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
+Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North
+Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
+Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
+Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
+
+We have filed in about 45 states now, but these are the only ones
+that have responded.
+
+As the requirements for other states are met,
+additions to this list will be made and fund raising
+will begin in the additional states. Please feel
+free to ask to check the status of your state.
+
+In answer to various questions we have received on this:
+
+We are constantly working on finishing the paperwork
+to legally request donations in all 50 states. If
+your state is not listed and you would like to know
+if we have added it since the list you have, just ask.
+
+While we cannot solicit donations from people in
+states where we are not yet registered, we know
+of no prohibition against accepting donations
+from donors in these states who approach us with
+an offer to donate.
+
+
+International donations are accepted,
+but we don't know ANYTHING about how
+to make them tax-deductible, or
+even if they CAN be made deductible,
+and don't have the staff to handle it
+even if there are ways.
+
+All donations should be made to:
+
+Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+PMB 113
+1739 University Ave.
+Oxford, MS 38655-4109
+
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a 501(c)(3)
+organization with EIN [Employee Identification Number] 64-6221541,
+and has been approved as a 501(c)(3) organization by the US Internal
+Revenue Service (IRS). Donations are tax-deductible to the maximum
+extent permitted by law. As the requirements for other states are met,
+additions to this list will be made and fund raising will begin in the
+additional states.
+
+We need your donations more than ever!
+
+You can get up to date donation information at:
+
+http://www.gutenberg.net/donation.html
+
+
+***
+
+If you can't reach Project Gutenberg,
+you can always email directly to:
+
+Michael S. Hart <hart@pobox.com>
+
+hart@pobox.com forwards to hart@prairienet.org and archive.org
+if your mail bounces from archive.org, I will still see it, if
+it bounces from prairienet.org, better resend later on. . . .
+
+Prof. Hart will answer or forward your message.
+
+We would prefer to send you information by email.
+
+
+***
+
+
+Example command-line FTP session:
+
+ftp ftp.ibiblio.org
+login: anonymous
+password: your@login
+cd pub/docs/books/gutenberg
+cd etext90 through etext99 or etext00 through etext02, etc.
+dir [to see files]
+get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip files]
+GET GUTINDEX.?? [to get a year's listing of books, e.g., GUTINDEX.99]
+GET GUTINDEX.ALL [to get a listing of ALL books]
+
+
+**The Legal Small Print**
+
+
+(Three Pages)
+
+***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START***
+Why is this "Small Print!" statement here? You know: lawyers.
+They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with
+your copy of this etext, even if you got it for free from
+someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our
+fault. So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement
+disclaims most of our liability to you. It also tells you how
+you may distribute copies of this etext if you want to.
+
+*BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT
+By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm
+etext, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept
+this "Small Print!" statement. If you do not, you can receive
+a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this etext by
+sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person
+you got it from. If you received this etext on a physical
+medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request.
+
+ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM ETEXTS
+This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etexts,
+is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor Michael S. Hart
+through the Project Gutenberg Association (the "Project").
+Among other things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright
+on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and
+distribute it in the United States without permission and
+without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth
+below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext
+under the "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark.
+
+Please do not use the "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark to market
+any commercial products without permission.
+
+To create these etexts, the Project expends considerable
+efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain
+works. Despite these efforts, the Project's etexts and any
+medium they may be on may contain "Defects". Among other
+things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
+intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged
+disk or other etext medium, a computer virus, or computer
+codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment.
+
+LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES
+But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below,
+[1] Michael Hart and the Foundation (and any other party you may
+receive this etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext) disclaims
+all liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including
+legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR
+UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT,
+INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE
+OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE
+POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+
+If you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of
+receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any)
+you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that
+time to the person you received it from. If you received it
+on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and
+such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement
+copy. If you received it electronically, such person may
+choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to
+receive it electronically.
+
+THIS ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS". NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS
+TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
+PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or
+the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the
+above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you
+may have other legal rights.
+
+INDEMNITY
+You will indemnify and hold Michael Hart, the Foundation,
+and its trustees and agents, and any volunteers associated
+with the production and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm
+texts harmless, from all liability, cost and expense, including
+legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of the
+following that you do or cause: [1] distribution of this etext,
+[2] alteration, modification, or addition to the etext,
+or [3] any Defect.
+
+DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm"
+You may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by
+disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this
+"Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg,
+or:
+
+[1] Only give exact copies of it. Among other things, this
+ requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the
+ etext or this "small print!" statement. You may however,
+ if you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable
+ binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form,
+ including any form resulting from conversion by word
+ processing or hypertext software, but only so long as
+ *EITHER*:
+
+ [*] The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable, and
+ does *not* contain characters other than those
+ intended by the author of the work, although tilde
+ (~), asterisk (*) and underline (_) characters may
+ be used to convey punctuation intended by the
+ author, and additional characters may be used to
+ indicate hypertext links; OR
+
+ [*] The etext may be readily converted by the reader at
+ no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent
+ form by the program that displays the etext (as is
+ the case, for instance, with most word processors);
+ OR
+
+ [*] You provide, or agree to also provide on request at
+ no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the
+ etext in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC
+ or other equivalent proprietary form).
+
+[2] Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this
+ "Small Print!" statement.
+
+[3] Pay a trademark license fee to the Foundation of 20% of the
+ gross profits you derive calculated using the method you
+ already use to calculate your applicable taxes. If you
+ don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are
+ payable to "Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation"
+ the 60 days following each date you prepare (or were
+ legally required to prepare) your annual (or equivalent
+ periodic) tax return. Please contact us beforehand to
+ let us know your plans and to work out the details.
+
+WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO?
+Project Gutenberg is dedicated to increasing the number of
+public domain and licensed works that can be freely distributed
+in machine readable form.
+
+The Project gratefully accepts contributions of money, time,
+public domain materials, or royalty free copyright licenses.
+Money should be paid to the:
+"Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+If you are interested in contributing scanning equipment or
+software or other items, please contact Michael Hart at:
+hart@pobox.com
+
+[Portions of this header are copyright (C) 2001 by Michael S. Hart
+and may be reprinted only when these Etexts are free of all fees.]
+[Project Gutenberg is a TradeMark and may not be used in any sales
+of Project Gutenberg Etexts or other materials be they hardware or
+software or any other related product without express permission.]
+
+*END THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.07/27/01*END*
+
+
+
+
+
+This etext was produced by Charles Franks, Robert Rowe and the
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+L. ANNAEUS SENECA
+
+ON BENEFITS.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+Seneca, the favourite classic of the early fathers of the church
+and of the Middle Ages, whom Jerome, Tertullian, and Augustine
+speak of as "Seneca noster," who was believed to have corresponded
+with St. Paul, and upon whom [Footnote: On the "De Clementia," an
+odd subject for the man who burned Servetus alive for differing
+with him.] Calvin wrote a commentary, seems almost forgotten in
+modern times. Perhaps some of his popularity may have been due to
+his being supposed to be the author of those tragedies which the
+world has long ceased to read, but which delighted a period that
+preferred Euripides to Aeschylus: while casuists must have found
+congenial matter in an author whose fantastic cases of conscience
+are often worthy of Sanchez or Escobar. Yet Seneca's morality is
+always pure, and from him we gain, albeit at second hand, an
+insight into the doctrines of the Greek philosophers, Zeno,
+Epicurus, Chrysippus, &c., whose precepts and system of religious
+thought had in cultivated Roman society taken the place of the old
+worship of Jupiter and Quirinus.
+
+Since Lodge's edition (fol. 1614), no complete translation of
+Seneca has been published in England, though Sir Roger L'Estrange
+wrote paraphrases of several Dialogues, which seem to have been
+enormously popular, running through more than sixteen editions. I
+think we may conjecture that Shakespeare had seen Lodge's
+translation, from several allusions to philosophy, to that
+impossible conception "the wise man," and especially from a passage
+in "All's Well that ends Well," which seems to breathe the very
+spirit of "De Beneficiis."
+
+ "'Tis pity--
+ That wishing well had not a body in it
+ Which might be felt: that we, the poorer born,
+ Whose baser stars do shut us up in wishes,
+ Might with effects of them follow our friends
+ And show what we alone must think; which never
+ Returns us thanks."
+
+ All's Well that ends Well," Act i. sc. 1.
+
+Though, if this will not fit the supposed date of that play, he may
+have taken the idea from "The Woorke of Lucius Annaeus Seneca
+concerning Benefyting, that is too say, the dooing, receyving, and
+requyting of good turnes, translated out of Latin by A. Golding. J.
+Day, London, 1578." And even during the Restoration, Pepys's ideal
+of virtuous and lettered seclusion is a country house in whose
+garden he might sit on summer afternoons with his friend, Sir W.
+Coventry, "it maybe, to read a chapter of Seneca." In sharp
+contrast to this is Vahlen's preface to the minor Dialogues, which
+he edited after the death of his friend Koch, who had begun that
+work, in which he remarks that "he has read much of this writer, in
+order to perfect his knowledge of Latin, for otherwise he neither
+admires his artificial subtleties of thought, nor his childish
+mannerisms of style" (Vahlen, preface, p. v., ed. 1879, Jena).
+
+Yet by the student of the history of Rome under the Caesars, Seneca
+is not to be neglected, because, whatever may be thought of the
+intrinsic merit of his speculations, he represents, more perhaps
+even than Tacitus, the intellectual characteristics of his age, and
+the tone of society in Rome--nor could we well spare the gossiping
+stories which we find imbedded in his graver dissertations. The
+following extract from Dean Merivale's "History of the Romans under
+the Empire" will show the estimate of him which has been formed by
+that accomplished writer:--
+
+"At Rome, we, have no reason, to suppose that Christianity was only
+the refuge of the afflicted and miserable; rather, if we may lay
+any stress on the documents above referred to, it was first
+embraced by persons in a certain grade of comfort and
+respectability; by persons approaching to what we should call the
+MIDDLE CLASSES in their condition, their education, and their moral
+views. Of this class Seneca himself was the idol, the oracle; he
+was, so to speak, the favourite preacher of the more intelligent
+and humane disciples of nature and virtue. Now the writings of
+Seneca show, in their way, a real anxiety among this class to raise
+the moral tone of mankind around them; a spirit of reform, a zeal
+for the conversion of souls, which, though it never rose, indeed,
+under the teaching of the philosophers, to boiling heat, still
+simmered with genial warmth on the surface of society. Far
+different as was their social standing-point, far different as were
+the foundations and the presumed sanctions of their teaching
+respectively, Seneca and St. Paul were both moral reformers; both,
+be it said with reverence, were fellow-workers in the cause of
+humanity, though the Christian could look beyond the proximate aims
+of morality and prepare men for a final development on which the
+Stoic could not venture to gaze. Hence there is so much in their
+principles, so much even in their language, which agrees together,
+so that the one has been thought, though it must be allowed without
+adequate reason, to have borrowed directly from the other.
+[Footnote: It is hardly necessary to refer to the pretended letters
+between St. Paul and Seneca. Besides the evidence from style, some
+of the dates they contain are quite sufficient to condemn them as
+clumsy forgeries. They are mentioned, but with no expression of
+belief in their genuineness, by Jerome and Augustine. See Jones,
+"On the Canon," ii. 80.]
+
+But the philosopher, be it remembered, discoursed to a large and
+not inattentive audience, and surely the soil was not all
+unfruitful on which his seed was scattered when he proclaimed that
+God dwells not in temples of wood and stone, nor wants the
+ministrations of human hands;[Footnote: Sen., Ep. 95, and in
+Lactantius, Inst. vi.] that He has no delight in the blood of
+victims:[Footnote: Ep. 116: "Colitur Deus non tauris sed pia et
+recta voluntate."] that He is near to all His creatures:[Footnote:
+Ep. 41, 73.] that His Spirit resides in men's hearts:[Footnote: Ep.
+46: "Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet."] that all men are truly His
+offspring:[Footnote: "De Prov," i.] that we are members of one
+body, which is God or Nature;[Footnote: Ep. 93, 95: "Membra sumus
+magni corporis."] that men must believe in God before they can
+approach Him:[Footnote: Ep. 95: "Primus Deorum cultus est Deos
+credere."] that the true service of God is to be like unto
+Him:[Footnote: Ep. 95: "Satis coluit quisquis imitatus est."] that
+all men have sinned, and none performed all the works of the
+law:[Footnote: Sen. de Ira. i. 14; ii. 27: "Quis est iste qui se
+profitetur omnibus legibus innocentem?"] that God is no respecter
+of nations, ranks, or conditions, but all, barbarian and Roman,
+bond and free, are alike under His all-seeing Providence.[Footnote:
+"De Benef.," iii. 18: "Virtus omnes admittit, libertinos, servos,
+reges." These and many other passages are collected by Champagny,
+ii. 546, after Fabricius and others, and compared with well-known
+texts of Scripture. The version of the Vulgate shows a great deal
+of verbal correspondence. M. Troplong remarks, after De Maistre,
+that Seneca has written a fine book on Providence, for which there
+was not even a name at Rome in the time of Cicero.--"L'Influence du
+Christianisme," &c., i., ch. 4.]
+
+"St. Paul enjoined submission and obedience even to the tyranny of
+Nero, and Seneca fosters no ideas subversive of political
+subjection. Endurance is the paramount virtue of the Stoic. To
+forms of government the wise man was wholly indifferent; they were
+among the external circumstances above which his spirit soared in
+serene self-contemplation. We trace in Seneca no yearning for a
+restoration of political freedom, nor does he even point to the
+senate, after the manner of the patriots of the day, as a
+legitimate check to the autocracy of the despot. The only mode, in
+his view, of tempering tyranny is to educate the tyrant himself in
+virtue. His was the self-denial of the Christians, but without
+their anticipated compensation. It seems impossible to doubt that
+in his highest flights of rhetoric--and no man ever recommended the
+unattainable with a finer grace--Seneca must have felt that he was
+labouring to build up a house without foundations; that his system,
+as Caius said of his style, was sand without lime. He was surely
+not unconscious of the inconsistency of his own position, as a
+public man and a minister, with the theories to which he had wedded
+himself; and of the impossibility of preserving in it the purity of
+his character as a philosopher or a man. He was aware that in the
+existing state of society at Rome, wealth was necessary to men high
+in station; wealth alone could retain influence, and a poor
+minister became at once contemptible. The distributor of the
+Imperial favours must have his banquets, his receptions, his slaves
+and freedmen; he must possess the means of attracting if not of
+bribing; he must not seem too virtuous, too austere, among an evil
+generation; in order to do good at all he must swim with the
+stream, however polluted it might be. All this inconsistency Seneca
+must have contemplated without blenching; and there is something
+touching in the serenity he preserved amidst the conflict that must
+have perpetually raged between his natural sense and his acquired
+principles. Both Cicero and Seneca were men of many weaknesses, and
+we remark them the more because both were pretenders to unusual
+strength of character; but while Cicero lapsed into political
+errors, Seneca cannot be absolved of actual crime. Nevertheless, if
+we may compare the greatest masters of Roman wisdom together, the
+Stoic will appear, I think, the more earnest of the two, the more
+anxious to do his duty for its own sake, the more sensible of the
+claims of mankind upon him for such precepts of virtuous living as
+he had to give. In an age of unbelief and compromise he taught that
+Truth was positive and Virtue objective. He conceived, what never
+entered Cicero's mind, the idea of improving his fellow-creatures;
+he had, what Cicero had not, a heart for conversion to
+Christianity."
+
+To this eloquent account of Seneca's position and of the tendency
+of his writings I have nothing to add. The main particulars of his
+life, his Spanish extraction (like that of Lacan and Martial), his
+father's treatises on Rhetoric, his mother Helvia, his brothers,
+his wealth, his exile in Corsica, his outrageous flattery of
+Claudius and his satiric poem on his death--"The Vision of
+Judgment," Merivale calls it, after Lord Byron--his position as
+Nero's tutor, and his death, worthy at once of a Roman and a Stoic,
+by the orders of that tyrant, may be read of in "The History of the
+Romans under the Empire," or in the article "Seneca" in the
+"Dictionary of Classical Biography," and need not be reproduced
+here: but I cannot resist pointing out how entirely Grote's view of
+the "Sophists" as a sort of established clergy, and Seneca's
+account of the various sects of philosophers as representing the
+religious thought of the time, is illustrated by his anecdote of
+Julia Augusta, the mother of Tiberius, better known to English
+readers as Livia the wife of Augustus, who in her first agony of
+grief at the loss of her first husband applied to his Greek
+philosopher, Areus, as to a kind of domestic chaplain, for
+spiritual consolation. ("Ad Marciam de Consolatione," ch. iv.)
+
+I take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to the Rev. J.
+E. B. Mayor, Professor of Latin in the University of Cambridge, for
+his kindness in finding time among his many and important literary
+labours for reading and correcting the proofs of this work.
+
+The text which I have followed for De Beneficiis is that of Gertz,
+Berlin (1876.).
+
+AUBREY STEWART
+
+London, March, 1887.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+BOOK I. The prevalence of ingratitude--How a benefit ought to be
+bestowed--The three Graces--Benefits are the chief bond of human
+society--What we owe in return for a benefit received--A benefit
+consists not of a thing but of the wish to do good--Socrates and
+Aeschines--What kinds of benefits should be bestowed, and in what
+manner--Alexander and the franchise of Corinth.
+
+BOOK II. Many men give through weakness of character--We ought to
+give before our friends ask--Many benefits are spoiled by the
+manner of the giver--Marius Nepos and Tiberius--Some benefits
+should be given secretly--We must not give what would harm the
+receiver--Alexander's gift of a city--Interchange of benefits like
+a game of ball--From whom ought one to receive a benefit?--
+Examples--How to receive a benefit--Ingratitude caused by self-
+love, by greed, or by jealousy--Gratitude and repayment not the
+same thing--Phidias and the statue
+
+BOOK III. Ingratitude--Is it worse to be ungrateful for kindness or
+not even to remember it?--Should ingratitude be punished by law?--
+Can a slave bestow a benefit?--Can a son bestow a benefit upon his
+father?--Examples
+
+BOOK IV. Whether the bestowal of benefits and the return of
+gratitude for them are desirable objects in themselves? Does God
+bestow benefits?--How to choose the man to be benefited--We ought
+not to look for any return--True gratitude--Of keeping one's
+promise--Philip and the soldier--Zeno
+
+BOOK V. Of being worsted in a contest of benefits--Socrates and
+Archelaus--Whether a man can be grateful to himself, or can bestow
+a benefit upon himself--Examples of ingratitude--Dialogue on
+ingratitude--Whether one should remind one's friends of what one
+has done for them--Caesar and the soldier--Tiberius.
+
+BOOK VI. Whether a benefit can be taken from one by force--
+Benefits depend upon thought--We are not grateful for the
+advantages which we receive from inanimate Nature, or from dumb
+animals--In order to lay me under an obligation you must benefit me
+intentionally--Cleanthes's story of the two slaves--Of benefits
+given in a mercenary spirit--Physicians and teachers bestow
+enormous benefits, yet are sufficiently paid by a moderate fee--
+Plato and the ferryman--Are we under an obligation to the sun and
+moon?--Ought we to wish that evil may befall our benefactors, in
+order that we may show our gratitude by helping them?
+
+BOOK VII. The cynic Demetrius--his rules of conduct--Of the truly
+wise man--Whether one who has done everything in his power to
+return a benefit has returned it--Ought one to return a benefit to
+a bad man?--The Pythagorean, and the shoemaker--How one ought to
+bear with the ungrateful.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+L. A. SENECA
+
+ON BENEFITS.
+
+
+DEDICATED TO
+
+AEBUTIUS LIBERALIS.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+I.
+
+
+Among the numerous faults of those who pass their lives recklessly
+and without due reflexion, my good friend Liberalis, I should say
+that there is hardly any one so hurtful to society as this, that we
+neither know how to bestow or how to receive a benefit. It follows
+from this that benefits are badly invested, and become bad debts:
+in these cases it is too late to complain of their not being
+returned, for they were thrown away when we bestowed them. Nor need
+we wonder that while the greatest vices are common, none is more
+common than ingratitude: for this I see is brought about by various
+causes. The first of these is, that we do not choose worthy persons
+upon whom to bestow our bounty, but although when we are about to
+lend money we first make a careful enquiry into the means and
+habits of life of our debtor, and avoid sowing seed in a worn-out
+or unfruitful soil, yet without any discrimination we scatter our
+benefits at random rather than bestow them. It is hard to say
+whether it is more dishonourable for the receiver to disown a
+benefit, or for the giver to demand a return of it: for a benefit
+is a loan, the repayment of which depends merely upon the good
+feeling of the debtor. To misuse a benefit like a spendthrift is
+most shameful, because we do not need our wealth but only our
+intention to set us free from the obligation of it; for a benefit
+is repaid by being acknowledged. Yet while they are to blame who do
+not even show so much gratitude as to acknowledge their debt, we
+ourselves are to blame no less. We find many men ungrateful, yet we
+make more men so, because at one time we harshly and reproachfully
+demand some return for our bounty, at another we are fickle and
+regret what we have given, at another we are peevish and apt to
+find fault with trifles. By acting thus we destroy all sense of
+gratitude, not only after we have given anything, but while we are
+in the act of giving it. Who has ever thought it enough to be asked
+for anything in an off-hand manner, or to be asked only once? Who,
+when he suspected that he was going to be asked for any thing, has
+not frowned, turned away his face, pretended to be busy, or
+purposely talked without ceasing, in order not to give his suitor a
+chance of preferring his request, and avoided by various tricks
+having to help his friend in his pressing need? and when driven
+into a corner, has not either put the matter off, that is, given a
+cowardly refusal, or promised his help ungraciously, with a wry
+face, and with unkind words, of which he seemed to grudge the
+utterance. Yet no one is glad to owe what he has not so much
+received from his benefactor, as wrung out of him. Who can be
+grateful for what has been disdainfully flung to him, or angrily
+cast at him, or been given him out of weariness, to avoid further
+trouble? No one need expect any return from those whom he has tired
+out with delays, or sickened with expectation. A benefit is
+received in the same temper in which it is given, and ought not,
+therefore, to be given carelessly, for a man thanks himself for
+that which he receives without the knowledge of the giver. Neither
+ought we to give after long delay, because in all good offices the
+will of the giver counts for much, and he who gives tardily must
+long have been unwilling to give at all. Nor, assuredly, ought we
+to give in offensive manner, because human nature is so constituted
+that insults sink deeper than kindnesses; the remembrance of the
+latter soon passes away, while that of the former is treasured in
+the memory; so what can a man expect who insults while he obliges?
+All the gratitude which he deserves is to be forgiven for helping
+us. On the other hand, the number of the ungrateful ought not to
+deter us from earning men's gratitude; for, in the first place,
+their number is increased by our own acts. Secondly, the sacrilege
+and indifference to religion of some men does not prevent even the
+immortal gods from continuing to shower their benefits upon us: for
+they act according to their divine nature and help all alike, among
+them even those who so ill appreciate their bounty. Let us take
+them for our guides as far as the weakness of our mortal nature
+permits; let us bestow benefits, not put them out at interest. The
+man who while he gives thinks of what he will get in return,
+deserves to be deceived. But what if the benefit turns out ill?
+Why, our wives and our children often disappoint our hopes, yet we
+marry--and bring up children, and are so obstinate in the face of
+experience that we fight after we have been beaten, and put to sea
+after we have been shipwrecked. How much more constancy ought we to
+show in bestowing benefits! If a man does not bestow benefits
+because he has not received any, he must have bestowed them in
+order to receive them in return, and he justifies ingratitude,
+whose disgrace lies in not returning benefits when able to do so.
+How many are there who are unworthy of the light of day? and
+nevertheless the sun rises. How many complain because they have
+been born? yet Nature is ever renewing our race, and even suffers
+men to live who wish that they had never lived. It is the property
+of a great and good mind to covet, not the fruit of good deeds, but
+good deeds themselves, and to seek for a good man even after having
+met with bad men. If there were no rogues, what glory would there
+be in doing good to many? As it is, virtue consists in bestowing
+benefits for which we are not certain of meeting with any return,
+but whose fruit is at once enjoyed by noble minds. So little
+influence ought this to have in restraining us from doing good
+actions, that even though I were denied the hope of meeting with a
+grateful man, yet the fear of not having my benefits returned would
+not prevent my bestowing them, because he who does not give,
+forestalls the vice of him who is ungrateful. I will explain what I
+mean. He who does not repay a benefit, sins more, but he who does
+not bestow one, sins earlier.
+
+ "If thou at random dost thy bounties waste,
+ Much must be lost, for one that's rightly placed."
+
+II. In the former verse you may blame two things, for one should
+not cast them at random, and it is not right to waste anything,
+much less benefits; for unless they be given with judgement, they
+cease to be benefits, and, may be called by any other name you
+please. The meaning of the latter verse is admirable, that one
+benefit rightly bestowed makes amends for the loss of many that
+have been lost. See, I pray you, whether it be not truer and more
+worthy of the glory of the giver, that we should encourage him to
+give, even though none of his gifts should be worthily placed.
+"Much must be lost." Nothing is lost because he who loses had
+counted the cost before. The book-keeping of benefits is simple: it
+is all expenditure; if any one returns it, that is clear gain; if
+he does not return it, it is not lost, I gave it for the sake of
+giving. No one writes down his gifts in a ledger, or like a
+grasping creditor demands repayment to the day and hour. A good man
+never thinks of such matters, unless reminded of them by some one
+returning his gifts; otherwise they become like debts owing to him.
+It is a base usury to regard a benefit as an investment. Whatever
+may have been the result of your former benefits, persevere in
+bestowing others upon other men; they will be all the better placed
+in the hands of the ungrateful, whom shame, or a favourable
+opportunity, or imitation of others may some day cause to be
+grateful. Do not grow weary, perform your duty, and act as becomes
+a good man. Help one man with money, another with credit, another
+with your favour; this man with good advice, that one with sound
+maxims. Even wild beasts feel kindness, nor is there any animal so
+savage that good treatment will not tame it and win love from it.
+The mouths of lions are handled by their keepers with impunity; to
+obtain their food fierce elephants become as docile as slaves: so
+that constant unceasing kindness wins the hearts even of creatures
+who, by their nature, cannot comprehend or weigh the value of a
+benefit. Is a man ungrateful for one benefit? perhaps he will not
+be so after receiving a second. Has he forgotten two kindnesses?
+perhaps by a third he may be brought to remember the former ones
+also.
+
+III. He who is quick to believe that he has thrown away his
+benefits, does really throw them away; but he who presses on and
+adds new benefits to his former ones, forces out gratitude even
+from a hard and forgetful breast. In the face of many kindnesses,
+your friend will not dare to raise his eyes; let him see you
+whithersoever he turns himself to escape from his remembrance of
+you; encircle him with your benefits. As for the power and property
+of these, I will explain it to you if first you will allow me to
+glance at a matter which does not belong to our subject, as to why
+the Graces are three in number, why they are sisters, why hand in
+hand, and why they are smiling and young, with a loose and
+transparent dress. Some writers think that there is one who bestows
+a benefit, one who receives it, and a third who returns it; others
+say that they represent the three sorts of benefactors, those who
+bestow, those who repay, and those who both receive and repay them.
+But take whichever you please to be true; what will this knowledge
+profit us? What is the meaning of this dance of sisters in a
+circle, hand in hand? It means that the course of a benefit is from
+hand to hand, back to the giver; that the beauty of the whole chain
+is lost if a single link fails, and that it is fairest when it
+proceeds in unbroken regular order. In the dance there is one.
+esteemed beyond the others, who represents the givers of benefits.
+Their faces are cheerful, as those of men who give or receive
+benefits are wont to be. They are young, because the memory of
+benefits ought not to grow old. They are virgins, because benefits
+are pure and untainted, and held holy by all; in benefits there
+should be no strict or binding conditions, therefore the Graces
+wear loose flowing tunics, which are transparent, because benefits
+love to be seen. People who are not under the influence of Greek
+literature may say that all this is a matter of course; but there
+can be no one who would think that the names which Hesiod has given
+them bear upon our subject. He named the eldest Aglaia, the middle
+one Euphrosyne, the third Thalia. Every one, according to his own
+ideas, twists the meaning of these names, trying to reconcile them
+with some system, though Hesiod merely gave his maidens their names
+from his own fancy. So Homer altered the name of one of them,
+naming her Pasithea, and betrothed her to a husband, in order that
+you may know that they are not vestal virgins. [Footnote: i.e. not
+vowed to chastity.]
+
+I could find another poet, in whose writings they are girded, and
+wear thick or embroidered Phrygian robes. Mercury stands with them
+for the same reason, not because argument or eloquence commends
+benefits, but because the painter chose to do so. Also Chrysippus,
+that man of piercing intellect who saw to the very bottom of truth,
+who speaks only to the point, and makes use of no more words than
+are necessary to express his meaning, fills his whole treatise with
+these puerilities, insomuch that he says but very little about the
+duties of giving, receiving, and returning a benefit, and has not
+so much inserted fables among these subjects, as he has inserted
+these subjects among a mass of fables. For, not to mention what
+Hecaton borrows from him, Chrysippus tells us that the three Graces
+are the daughters of Jupiter and Eurynome, that they are younger
+than the Hours, and rather more beautiful, and that on that account
+they are assigned as companions to Venus. He also thinks that the
+name of their mother bears upon the subject, and that she is named
+Eurynome because to distribute benefits requires a wide
+inheritance; as if the mother usually received her name after her
+daughters, or as if the names given by poets were true. In truth,
+just as with a 'nomenclator' audacity supplies the place of memory,
+and he invents a name for every one whose name he cannot recollect,
+so the poets think that it is of no importance to speak the truth,
+but are either forced by the exigencies of metre, or attracted by
+sweetness of sound, into calling every one by whatever name runs
+neatly into verse. Nor do they suffer for it if they introduce
+another name into the list, for the next poet makes them bear what
+name he pleases. That you may know that this is so, for instance
+Thalia, our present subject of discourse, is one of the Graces in
+Hesiod's poems, while in those of Homer she is one of the Muses.
+
+IV. But lest I should do the very thing which I am blaming, I will
+pass over all these matters, which are so far from the subject that
+they are not even connected with it. Only do you protect me, if any
+one attacks me for putting down Chrysippus, who, by Hercules, was a
+great man, but yet a Greek, whose intellect, too sharply pointed,
+is often bent and turned back upon itself; even when it seems to be
+in earnest it only pricks, but does not pierce. Here, however, what
+occasion is there for subtlety? We are to speak of benefits, and to
+define a matter which is the chief bond of human society; we are to
+lay down a rule of life, such that neither careless openhandedness
+may commend itself to us under the guise of goodness of heart, and
+yet that our circumspection, while it moderates, may not quench our
+generosity, a quality in which we ought neither to exceed nor to
+fall short. Men must be taught to be willing to give, willing to
+receive, willing to return; and to place before themselves the high
+aim, not merely of equalling, but even of surpassing those to whom
+they are indebted, both in good offices and in good feeling;
+because the man whose duty it is to repay, can never do so unless
+he out-does his benefactor; [Footnote: That is, he never comes up
+to his benefactor unless he leaves him behind: he can only make a
+dead heat of it by getting a start.] the one class must be taught
+to look for no return, the other to feel deeper gratitude. In this
+noblest of contests to outdo benefits by benefits, Chrysippus
+encourages us by bidding us beware lest, as the Graces are the
+daughters of Jupiter, to act ungratefully may not be a sin against
+them, and may not wrong those beauteous maidens. Do thou teach me
+how I may bestow more good things, and be more grateful to those
+who have earned my gratitude, and how the minds of both parties may
+vie with one another, the giver in forgetting, the receiver in
+remembering his debt. As for those other follies, let them be left
+to the poets, whose purpose is merely to charm the ear and to weave
+a pleasing story; but let those who wish to purify men's minds, to
+retain honour in their dealings, and to imprint on their minds
+gratitude for kindnesses, let them speak in sober earnest and act
+with all their strength; unless you imagine, perchance, that by
+such flippant and mythical talk, and such old wives' reasoning, it
+is possible for us to prevent that most ruinous consummation, the
+repudiation of benefits.
+
+V. However, while I pass over what is futile and irrelevant I must
+point out that the first thing which we have to learn is, what we
+owe in return for a benefit received. One man says that he owes the
+money which he has received, another that he owes a consulship, a
+priesthood, a province, and so on. These, however, are but the
+outward signs of kindnesses, not the kindnesses themselves. A
+benefit is not to be felt and handled, it is a thing which exists
+only in the mind. There is a great difference between the subject-
+matter of a benefit, and the benefit itself. Wherefore neither
+gold, nor silver, nor any of those things which are most highly
+esteemed, are benefits, but the benefit lies in the goodwill of him
+who gives them. The ignorant take notice only of that which comes
+before their eyes, and which can be owned and passed from hand to
+hand, while they disregard that which gives these things their
+value. The things which we hold in our hands, which we see with our
+eyes, and which our avarice hugs, are transitory, they may be taken
+from us by ill luck or by violence; but a kindness lasts even after
+the loss of that by means of which it was bestowed; for it is a
+good deed, which no violence can undo. For instance, suppose that I
+ransomed a friend from pirates, but another pirate has caught him
+and thrown him into prison. The pirate has not robbed him of my
+benefit, but has only robbed him of the enjoyment of it. Or suppose
+that I have saved a man's children from a shipwreck or a fire, and
+that afterwards disease or accident has carried them off; even when
+they are no more, the kindness which was done by means of them
+remains. All those things, therefore, which improperly assume the
+name of benefits, are means by which kindly feeling manifests
+itself. In other cases also, we find a distinction between the
+visible symbol and the matter itself, as when a general bestows
+collars of gold, or civic or mural crowns upon any one. What value
+has the crown in itself? or the purple-bordered robe? or the
+fasces? or the judgment-seat and car of triumph? None of these
+things is in itself an honour, but is an emblem of honour. In like
+manner, that which is seen is not a benefit--it is but the trace
+and mark of a benefit.
+
+VI. What, then, is a benefit? It is the art of doing a kindness
+which both bestows pleasure and gains it by bestowing it, and which
+does its office by natural and spontaneous impulse. It is not,
+therefore, the thing which is done or given, but the spirit in
+which it is done or given, that must be considered, because a
+benefit exists, not in that which is done or given, but in the mind
+of the doer or giver. How great the distinction between them is,
+you may perceive from this, that while a benefit is necessarily
+good, yet that which is done or given is neither good nor bad. The
+spirit in which they are given can exalt small things, can glorify
+mean ones, and can discredit great and precious ones; the objects
+themselves which are sought after have a neutral nature, neither
+good nor bad; all depends upon the direction given them by the
+guiding spirit from which things receive their shape. That which is
+paid or handed over is not the benefit itself, just as the honour
+which we pay to the gods lies not in the victims themselves,
+although they be fat and glittering with gold, [Footnote: Alluding
+to the practice of gilding the horns of the victims.] but in the
+pure and holy feelings of the worshippers.
+
+Thus good men are religious, though their offering be meal and
+their vessels of earthenware; whilst bad men will not escape from
+their impiety, though they pour the blood of many victims upon the
+altars.
+
+VII. If benefits consisted of things, and not of the wish to
+benefit, then the more things we received the greater the benefit
+would be. But this is not true, for sometimes we feel more
+gratitude to one who gives us trifles nobly, who, like Virgil's
+poor old soldier, "holds himself as rich as kings," if he has given
+us ever so little with a good will a man who forgets his own need
+when he sees mine, who has not only a wish but a longing to help,
+who thinks that he receives a benefit when he bestows one, who
+gives as though he would receive no return, receives a repayment as
+though he had originally given nothing, and who watches for and
+seizes an opportunity of being useful. On the other hand, as I said
+before, those gifts which are hardly wrung from the giver, or which
+drop unheeded from his hands, claim no gratitude from us, however
+great they may appear and may be. We prize much more what comes
+from a willing hand, than what comes from a full one. This man has
+given me but little, yet more he could not afford, while what that
+one has given is much indeed, but he hesitated, he put it off, he
+grumbled when he gave it, he gave it haughtily, or he proclaimed it
+aloud, and did it to please others, not to please the person to
+whom he gave it; he offered it to his own pride, not to me.
+
+VIII. As the pupils of Socrates, each in proportion to his means,
+gave him large presents, Aeschines, a poor pupil, said, "I can find
+nothing to give you which is worthy of you; I feel my poverty in
+this respect alone. Therefore I present you with the only thing I
+possess, myself. I pray that you may take this my present, such as
+it is, in good part, and may remember that the others, although
+they gave you much, yet left for themselves more than they gave."
+Socrates answered, "Surely you have bestowed a great present upon
+me, unless perchance you set a small value upon yourself. I will
+accordingly take pains to restore you to yourself a better man than
+when I received you." By this present Aeschines outdid Alcibiades,
+whose mind was as great as his Wealth, and all the splendour of the
+most wealthy youths of Athens.
+
+IX. You see how the mind even in the straitest circumstances finds
+the means of generosity. Aeschines seems to me to have said,
+"Fortune, it is in vain that you have made me poor; in spite of
+this I will find a worthy present for this man. Since I can give
+him nothing of yours, I will give him something of my own." Nor
+need you suppose that he held himself cheap; he made himself his
+own price. By a stroke of genius this youth discovered a means of
+presenting Socrates to himself. We must not consider how great
+presents are, but in what spirit they are given.
+
+A rich man is well spoken of if he is clever enough to render
+himself easy of access to men of immoderate ambition, and although
+he intends to do nothing to help them, yet encourages their
+unconscionable hopes; but he is thought the worse of if he be sharp
+of tongue, sour in appearance, and displays his wealth in an
+invidious fashion. For men respect and yet loathe a fortunate man,
+and hate him for doing what, if they had the chance, they would do
+themselves.
+
+ * * * * * * *
+
+Men nowadays no longer secretly, but openly outrage the wives of
+others, and allow to others access to their own wives. A match is
+thought countrified, uncivilized, in bad style, and to be protested
+against by all matrons, if the husband should forbid his wife to
+appear in public in a litter, and to be carried about exposed to
+the gaze of all observers. If a man has not made himself notorious
+by a LIAISON with some mistress, if he does not pay an annuity to
+some one else's wife, married women speak of him as a poor-spirited
+creature, a man given to low vice, a lover of servant girls. Soon
+adultery becomes the most respectable form of marriage, and
+widowhood and celibacy are commonly practised. No one takes a wife
+unless he takes her away from some one else. Now men vie with one
+another in wasting what they have stolen, and in collecting
+together what they have wasted with the keenest avarice; they
+become utterly reckless, scorn poverty in others, fear personal
+injury more than anything else, break the peace by their riots, and
+by violence and terror domineer over those who are weaker than
+themselves. No wonder that they plunder provinces and offer the
+seat of judgment for sale, knocking it down after an auction to the
+highest bidder, since it is the law of nations that you may sell
+what you have bought.
+
+X. However, my enthusiasm has carried me further than I intended,
+the subject being an inviting one. Let me, then, end by pointing
+out that the disgrace of these crimes does not belong especially to
+our own time. Our ancestors before us have lamented, and our
+children after us will lament, as we do, the ruin, of morality, the
+prevalence of vice, and the gradual deterioration of mankind; yet
+these things are really stationary, only moved slightly to and fro
+like the waves which at one time a rising tide washes further over
+the land, and at another an ebbing one restrains within a lower
+water mark. At one time the chief vice will be adultery, and
+licentiousness will exceed all bounds; at another time a rage for
+feasting will be in vogue, and men will waste their inheritance in
+the most shameful of all ways, by the kitchen; at another,
+excessive care for the body, and a devotion to personal beauty
+which implies ugliness of mind; at another time, injudiciously
+granted liberty will show itself in wanton recklessness and
+defiance of authority; sometimes there will be a reign of cruelty
+both in public and private, and the madness of the civil wars will
+come upon us, which destroy all that is holy and inviolable.
+Sometimes even drunkenness will be held in honour, and it will be a
+virtue to swallow most wine. Vices do not lie in wait for us in one
+place alone, but hover around us in changeful forms, sometimes even
+at variance one with another, so that in turn they win and lose the
+field; yet we shall always be obliged to pronounce the same verdict
+upon ourselves, that we are and always were evil, and, I
+unwillingly add, that we always shall be. There always will be
+homicides, tyrants, thieves, adulterers, ravishers, sacrilegious,
+traitors: worse than all these is the ungrateful man, except we
+consider that all these crimes flow from ingratitude, without which
+hardly any great wickedness has ever grown to full stature. Be sure
+that you guard against this as the greatest of crimes in yourself,
+but pardon it as the least of crimes in another. For all the injury
+which you suffer is this: you have lost the subject-matter of a
+benefit, not the benefit itself, for you possess unimpaired the
+best part of it, in that you have given it. Though we ought to be
+careful to bestow our benefits by preference upon those who are
+likely to show us gratitude for them, yet we must sometimes do what
+we have little hope will turn out well, and bestow benefits upon
+those who we not only think will prove ungrateful, but who we know
+have been so. For instance, if I should be able to save a man's
+children from a great danger with no risk to myself, I should not
+hesitate to do so. If a man be worthy I would defend him even with
+my blood, and would share his perils; if he be unworthy, and yet by
+merely crying for help I can rescue him from robbers, I would
+without reluctance raise the shout which would save a fellow-
+creature.
+
+XI. The next point to be defined is, what kind of benefits are to
+be given, and in what manner. First let us give what is necessary,
+next what is useful, and then what is pleasant, provided that they
+be lasting. We must begin with what is necessary, for those things
+which support life affect the mind very differently from, those
+which adorn and improve it. A man may be nice, and hard to please,
+in things which he can easily do without, of which he can say,
+"Take them back; I do not want them, I am satisfied with what I
+have." Sometimes, we wish not only to, return what we have
+received, but even to throw it away. Of necessary things, the first
+class consists of things without which we cannot live; the second,
+of things without which we ought not to live; and the third, of
+things without which we should not care to live. The first class
+are, to be saved from the hands of the enemy, from the anger of
+tyrants, from proscription, and the various other perils which
+beset human life. By averting any one of these, we shall earn
+gratitude proportionate to the greatness of the danger, for when
+men think of the greatness of the misery from which they have been
+saved, the terror which they have gone through enhances the value
+of our services. Yet we ought not to delay rescuing any one longer
+than we are obliged, solely in order to make his fears add weight
+to our services. Next come those things without which we can indeed
+live, but in such a manner that it would be better to die, such as
+liberty, chastity, or a good conscience. After these are what we
+have come to hold dear by connexion and relationship and long use
+and custom, such as our wives and children, our household gods, and
+so on, to which the mind so firmly attaches itself that separation
+from them seems worse than death.
+
+After these come useful things, which form a very wide and varied
+class; in which will be money, not in excess, but enough for living
+in a moderate style; public office, and, for the ambitious, due
+advancement to higher posts; for nothing can be more useful to a
+man than to be placed in a position in which he can benefit
+himself. All benefits beyond these are superfluous, and are likely
+to spoil those who receive them. In giving these we must be careful
+to make them acceptable by giving them at the appropriate time, or
+by giving things which are not common, but such as few people
+possess, or at any rate few possess in our times; or again, by
+giving things in such a manner, that though not naturally valuable,
+they become so by the time and place at which they are given. We
+must reflect what present will produce the most pleasure, what will
+most frequently come under the notice of the possessor of it, so
+that whenever he is with it he may be with us also; and in all
+cases we must be careful not to send useless presents, such as
+hunting weapons to a woman or old man, or books to a rustic, or
+nets to catch wild animals to a quiet literary man. On the other
+hand, we ought to be careful, while we wish to send what will
+please, that we do not send what will insultingly remind our
+friends of their failings, as, for example, if we send wine to a
+hard drinker or drugs to an invalid, for a present which contains
+an allusion to the shortcomings of the receiver, becomes an
+outrage.
+
+XII. If we have a free choice as to what to give, we should above
+all choose lasting presents, in order that our gift may endure as
+long as possible; for few are so grateful as to think of what they
+have received, even when they do not see it. Even the ungrateful
+remember us by our gifts, when they are always in their sight and
+do not allow themselves to be forgotten, but constantly obtrude and
+stamp upon the mind the memory of the giver. As we never ought to
+remind men of what we have given them, we ought all the more to
+choose presents that will be permanent; for the things themselves
+will prevent the remembrance of the giver from fading away. I would
+more willingly give a present of plate than of coined money, and
+would more willingly give statues than clothes or other things
+which are soon worn out. Few remain grateful after the present is
+gone: many more remember their presents only while they make use of
+them. If possible, I should like my present not to be consumed; let
+it remain in existence, let it stick to my friend and share his
+life. No one is so foolish as to need to be told not to send
+gladiators or wild beasts to one who has just given a public show,
+or not to send summer clothing in winter time, or winter clothing
+in summer. Common sense must guide our benefits; we must consider
+the time and the place, and the character of the receiver, which
+are the weights in the scale, which cause our gifts to be well or
+ill received. How far more acceptable a present is, if we give a
+man what he has not, than if we give him what he has plenty of! if
+we give him what he has long been searching for in vain, rather
+than what he sees everywhere! Let us make presents of things which
+are rare and scarce rather than costly, things which even a rich
+man will be glad of, just as common fruits, such as we tire of
+after a few days, please us if they have ripened before the usual
+season. People will also esteem things which no one else has given
+to them, or which we have given to no one else.
+
+XIII. When the
+conquest of the East had flattered Alexander of Macedon into
+believing himself to be more than man, the people of Corinth sent
+an embassy to congratulate him, and presented him with the
+franchise of their city. When Alexander smiled at this form of
+courtesy, one of the ambassadors said, "We have never enrolled any
+stranger among our citizens except Hercules and yourself."
+Alexander willingly accepted the proffered honour, invited the
+ambassadors to his table, and showed them other courtesies. He did
+not think of who offered the citizenship, but to whom they had
+granted it; and being altogether the slave of glory, though he knew
+neither its true nature or its limits, had followed in the
+footsteps of Hercules and Bacchus, and had not even stayed his
+march where they ceased; so that he glanced aside from the givers
+of this honour to him with whom he shared it, and fancied that the
+heaven to which his vanity aspired was indeed opening before him
+when he was made equal to Hercules. In what indeed did that frantic
+youth, whose only merit was his lucky audacity, resemble Hercules?
+Hercules conquered nothing for himself; he travelled throughout the
+world, not coveting for himself but liberating the countries which
+he conquered, an enemy to bad men, a defender of the good, a
+peacemaker both by sea and land; whereas the other was from his
+boyhood a brigand and desolator of nations, a pest to his friends
+and enemies alike, whose greatest joy was to be the terror of all
+mankind, forgetting that men fear not only the fiercest but also
+the most cowardly animals, because of their evil and venomous
+nature.
+
+XIV. Let us now return to our subject. He who bestows a benefit
+without discrimination, gives what pleases no one; no one considers
+himself to be under any obligation to the landlord of a tavern, or
+to be the guest of any one with whom he dines in such company as to
+be able to say, "What civility has he shown to me? no more than he
+has shown to that man, whom he scarcely knows, or to that other,
+who is both his personal enemy and a man of infamous character. Do
+you suppose that he wished to do me any honour? not so, he merely
+wished to indulge his own vice of profusion." If you wish men to be
+grateful for anything, give it but seldom; no one can bear to
+receive what you give to all the world. Yet let no one gather from
+this that I wish to impose any bonds upon generosity; let her go to
+what lengths she will, so that she go a steady course, not at
+random. It is possible to bestow gifts in such a manner that each
+of those who receive them, although he shares them with many
+others, may yet feel himself to be distinguished from the common
+herd. Let each man have some peculiarity about his gift which may
+make him consider himself more highly favoured than the rest. He
+may say, "I received the same present that he did, but I never
+asked for it." "I received the same present, but mine was given me
+after a few days, whereas he had earned it by long service."
+"Others have the same present, but it was not given to them with
+the same courtesy and gracious words with which it was given to
+me." "That man got it because he asked for it; I did not ask."
+"That man received it as well as I, but then he could easily return
+it; one has great expectations from a rich man, old and childless,
+as he is; whereas in giving the same present to me he really gave
+more, because he gave it without the hope of receiving any return
+for it." Just as a courtesan divides her favours among many men, so
+that no one of her friends is without some proof of her affection,
+so let him who wishes his benefits to be prized consider how he may
+at the same time gratify many men, and nevertheless give each one
+of them some especial mark of favour to distinguish him from the
+rest.
+
+XV. I am no advocate of slackness in giving benefits: the more and
+the greater they are, the more praise they will bring to the giver.
+Yet let them be given with discretion; for what is given carelessly
+and recklessly can please no one. Whoever, therefore, supposes that
+in giving this advice I wish to restrict benevolence and to confine
+it to narrower limits, entirely mistakes the object of my warning.
+What virtue do we admire more than benevolence? Which do we
+encourage more? Who ought to applaud it more than we Stoics, who
+preach the brotherhood of the human race? What then is it? Since no
+impulse of the human mind can be approved of, even though it
+springs from a right feeling, unless it be made into a virtue by
+discretion, I forbid generosity to degenerate into extravagance. It
+is, indeed, pleasant to receive a benefit with open arms, when
+reason bestows it upon the worthy, not when it is flung hither or
+thither thoughtlessly and at random; this alone we care to display
+and claim as our own. Can you call anything a benefit, if you feel
+ashamed to mention the person who gave it you? How far more
+grateful is a benefit, how far more deeply does it impress itself
+upon the mind, never to be forgotten, when we rejoice to think not
+so much of what it is, as from whom we have received it! Crispus
+Passienus was wont to say that some men's advice was to be
+preferred to their presents, some men's presents to their advice;
+and he added as an example, "I would rather have received advice
+from Augustus than a present; I would rather receive a present from
+Claudius than advice." I, however, think that one ought not to wish
+for a benefit from any man whose judgement is worthless. What then?
+Ought we not to receive what Claudius gives? We ought; but we ought
+to regard it as obtained from fortune, which may at any moment turn
+against us. Why do we separate this which naturally is connected?
+That is not a benefit, to which the best part of a benefit, that it
+be bestowed with judgment, is wanting: a really great sum of money,
+if it be given neither with discernment nor with good will, is no
+more a benefit than if it remained hoarded. There are, however,
+many things which we ought not to reject, yet for which we cannot
+feel indebted.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+I.
+
+
+Let us consider, most excellent Liberalis, what still remains of
+the earlier part of the subject; in what way a benefit should be
+bestowed. I think that I can point out the shortest way to this;
+let us give in the way in which we ourselves should like to
+receive. Above all we should give willingly, quickly, and without
+any hesitation; a benefit commands no gratitude if it has hung for
+a long time in the hands of the giver, if he seems unwilling to
+part with it, and gives it as though he were being robbed of it.
+Even though some delay should intervene, let us by all means in our
+power strive not to seem to have been in two minds about giving it
+at all. To hesitate is the next thing to refusing to give, and
+destroys all claim to gratitude. For just as the sweetest part of a
+benefit is the kindly feeling of the giver, it follows that one who
+has by his very delay proved that he gives unwillingly, must be
+regarded not as having given anything, but as having been unable to
+keep it from an importunate suitor. Indeed, many men are made
+generous by want of firmness. The most acceptable benefits are
+those which are waiting for us to take them, which are easy to be
+received, and offer themselves to us, so that the only delay is
+caused by the modesty of the receiver. The best thing of all is to
+anticipate a person's wishes; the next, to follow them; the former
+is the better course, to be beforehand with our friends by giving
+them what they want before they ask us for it, for the value of a
+gift is much enhanced by sparing an honest man the misery of asking
+for it with confusion and blushes. He who gets what he asked for
+does not get it for nothing, for indeed, as our austere ancestors
+thought, nothing is so dear as that which is bought by prayers. Men
+would be much more modest in their petitions to heaven, if these
+had to be made publicly; so that even when addressing the gods,
+before whom we can with all honour bend our knees, we prefer to
+pray silently and within ourselves.
+
+II. It is unpleasant, burdensome, and covers one with shame to have
+to say, "Give me." You should spare your friends, and those whom
+you wish to make your friends, from having to do this; however
+quick he may be, a man gives too late who gives what he has been
+asked for. We ought, therefore, to divine every man's wishes, and
+when we have discovered them, to set him free from the hard
+necessity of asking; you may be sure that a benefit which comes
+unasked will be delightful and will not be forgotten. If we do not
+succeed in anticipating our friends, let us at any rate cut them
+short when they ask us for anything, so that we may appear to be
+reminded of what we meant to do, rather than to have been asked to
+do it. Let us assent at once, and by our promptness make it appear
+that we meant to do so even before we were solicited. As in dealing
+with sick persons much depends upon when food is given, and plain
+water given at the right moment sometimes acts as a remedy, so a
+benefit, however slight and commonplace it may be, if it be
+promptly given without losing a moment of time, gains enormously in
+importance, and wins our gratitude more than a far more valuable
+present given after long waiting and deliberation. One who gives so
+readily must needs give with good will; he therefore gives
+cheerfully and shows his disposition in his countenance.
+
+III. Many who bestow immense benefits spoil them by their silence
+or slowness of speech, which gives them an air of moroseness, as
+they say "yes" with a face which seems to say "no." How much better
+is it to join kind words to kind actions, and to enhance the value
+of our gifts by a civil and gracious commendation of them! To cure
+your friend of being slow to ask a favour of you, you may join to
+your gift the familiar rebuke, "I am angry with you for not having
+long ago let me know what you wanted, for having asked for it so
+formally, or for having made interest with a third party." "I
+congratulate myself that you have been pleased to make trial of me;
+hereafter, if you want anything, ask for it as your right; however,
+for this time I pardon your want of manners." By so doing you will
+cause him to value your friendship more highly than that, whatever
+it may have been, which he came to ask of you. The goodness and
+kindness of a benefactor never appears so great as when on leaving
+him one says, "I have to-day gained much; I am more pleased at
+finding him so kind than if I had obtained many times more of this,
+of which I was speaking, by some other means; I never can make any
+adequate return to this man for his goodness."
+
+IV. Many, however, there are who, by harsh words and contemptuous
+manner, make their very kindnesses odious, for by speaking and
+acting disdainfully they make us sorry that they have granted our
+requests. Various delays also take place after we have obtained a
+promise; and nothing is more heartbreaking than to be forced to beg
+for the very thing which you already have been promised. Benefits
+ought to be bestowed at once, but from some persons it is easier to
+obtain the promise of them than to get them. One man has to be
+asked to remind our benefactor of his purpose; another, to bring it
+into effect; and thus a single present is worn away in passing
+through many hands, until hardly any gratitude is left for the
+original promiser, since whoever we are forced to solicit after the
+giving of the promise receives some of the gratitude which we owe
+to the giver. Take care, therefore, if you wish your gifts to be
+esteemed, that they reach those to whom they are promised entire,
+and, as the saying is, without any deduction. Let no one intercept
+them or delay them; for no one can take any share of the gratitude
+due for your gifts without robbing you of it.
+
+V. Nothing is more bitter than long uncertainty; some can bear to
+have their hopes extinguished better than to have them deferred. Yet
+many men are led by an unworthy vanity into this fault of putting
+off the accomplishment of their promises, merely in order to swell
+the crowd of their suitors, like the ministers of royalty, who
+delight in prolonging the display of their own arrogance, hardly
+thinking themselves possessed of power unless they let each man see
+for a long time how powerful they are. They do nothing promptly, or
+at one sitting; they are indeed swift to do mischief, but slow to do
+good. Be sure that the comic poet speaks the most absolute truth in
+the verses:--
+
+ "Know you not this? If you your gifts delay,
+ You take thereby my gratitude away."
+
+And the following lines, the expression of virtuous pain--a high-
+spirited man's misery,--
+
+ "What thou doest, do quickly;"
+
+and:--
+
+ "Nothing in the world
+ Is worth this trouble; I had rather you
+ Refused it to me now."
+
+When the mind begins through weariness to hate the promised
+benefit, or while it is wavering in expectation of it, how can it
+feel grateful for it? As the most refined cruelty is that which
+prolongs the torture, while to kill the victim at once is a kind of
+mercy, since the extremity of torture brings its own end with it--
+the interval is the worst part of the execution--so the shorter
+time a benefit hangs in the balance, the more grateful it is to the
+receiver. It is possible to look forward with anxious disquietude
+even to good things, and, seeing that most benefits consist in a
+release from some form of misery, a man destroys the value of the
+benefit which he confers, if he has the power to relieve us, and
+yet allows us to suffer or to lack pleasure longer than we need.
+Kindness always eager to do good, and one who acts by love
+naturally acts at once; he who does us good, but does it tardily
+and with long delays, does not do so from the heart. Thus he loses
+two most important things: time, and the proof of his good will to
+us; for a lingering consent is but a form of denial.
+
+VI. The manner in which things are said or done, my Liberalis,
+forms a very important part of every transaction. We gain much by
+quickness, and lose much by slowness. Just as in darts, the
+strength of the iron head remains the same, but there is an
+immeasureable difference between the blow of one hurled with the
+full swing of the arm and one which merely drops from the hand, and
+the same sword either grazes or pierces according as the blow is
+delivered; so, in like manner, that which is given is the same, but
+the manner in which it is given makes the difference. How sweet,
+how precious is a gift, when he who gives does not permit himself
+to be thanked, and when while he gives he forgets that he has
+given! To reproach a man at the very moment that you are doing him
+a service is sheer madness; it is to mix insult with your favours.
+We ought not to make our benefits burdensome, or to add any
+bitterness to them. Even if there be some subject upon which you
+wish to warn your friend, choose some other time for doing so.
+
+VII. Fabius Verrucosus used to compare a benefit bestowed by a
+harsh man in an offensive manner to a gritty loaf of bread, which a
+hungry man is obliged to receive, but which is painful to eat. When
+Marius Nepos of the praetorian guard asked Tiberius Caesar for help
+to pay his debts, Tiberius asked him for a list of his creditors;
+this is calling a meeting of creditors, not paying debts. When the
+list was made out, Tiberius wrote to Nepos telling him that he had
+ordered the money to be paid, and adding some offensive reproaches.
+The result of this was that Nepos owed no debts, yet received no
+kindness; Tiberius, indeed, relieved him from his creditors, but
+laid him under no obligation. Tiberius, however, had some design in
+doing so; I imagine he did not wish more of his friends to come to
+him with the same request. His mode of proceeding was, perhaps,
+successful in restraining men's extravagant desires by shame, but
+he who wishes to confer benefits must follow quite a different
+path. In all ways you should make your benefit as acceptable as
+possible by presenting it in the most attractive form; but the
+method of Tiberius is not to confer benefits, but to reproach.
+
+VIII. Moreover, if incidentally I should say what I think of this
+part of the subject, I do not consider that it is becoming even to
+an emperor to give merely in order to cover a man with shame. "And
+yet," we are told, "Tiberius did not even by this means attain his
+object; for after this a good many persons were found to make the
+same request. He ordered all of them to explain the reasons of
+their indebtedness before the senate, and when they did so, granted
+them certain definite sums of money." This is not an act of
+generosity, but a reprimand. You may call it a subsidy, or an
+imperial contribution; it is not a benefit, for the receiver cannot
+think of it without shame. I was summoned before a judge, and had
+to be tried at bar before I obtained what I asked for.
+
+IX. Accordingly, all writers on ethical philosophy tell us that
+some benefits ought to be given in secret, others in public. Those
+things which it is glorious to receive, such as military
+decorations or public offices, and whatever else gains in value the
+more widely it is known, should be conferred in public; on the
+other hand, when they do not promote a man or add to his social
+standing, but help him when in weakness, in want, or in disgrace,
+they should be given silently, and so as to be known only to those
+who profit by them.
+
+X. Sometimes even the person who is assisted must be deceived, in
+order that he may receive our bounty without knowing the source
+from whence it flows. It is said that Arcesilaus had a friend who
+was poor, but concealed his poverty; who was ill, yet tried to hide
+his disorder, and who had not money for the necessary expenses of
+existence. Without his knowledge, Arcesilaus placed a bag of money
+under his pillow, in order that this victim of false shame might
+rather seem to find what he wanted than to receive. "What," say
+you, "ought he not to know from whom he received it?" Yes; let him
+not know it at first, if it be essential to your kindness that he
+should not; afterwards I will do so much for him, and give him so
+much that he will perceive who was the giver of the former benefit;
+or, better still, let him not know that he has received any thing,
+provided I know that I have given it. "This," you say, "is to get
+too little return for one's goodness." True, if it be an investment
+of which you are thinking; but if a gift, it should be given in the
+way which will be of most service to the receiver. You should be
+satisfied with the approval of your own conscience; if not, you do
+not really delight in doing good, but in being seen to do good.
+"For all that," say you, "I wish him to know it." Is it a debtor
+that you seek for? "For all that, I wish him to know it." What!
+though it be more useful, more creditable, more pleasant for him
+not to know his benefactor, will you not consent to stand aside? "I
+wish him to know." So, then, you would not save a man's life in the
+dark? I do not deny that, whenever the matter admits of it, one
+ought to take into consideration the pleasure which we receive from
+the joy of the receiver of our kindness; but if he ought to have
+help and is ashamed to receive it--if what we bestow upon him pains
+him unless it be concealed--I forbear to make my benefits public.
+Why should I not refrain from hinting at my having given him
+anything, when the first and most essential rule is, never to
+reproach a man with what you have done for him, and not even to
+remind him of it. The rule for the giver and receiver of a benefit
+is, that the one should straightway forget that he has given, the
+other should never forget that he has received it.
+
+XI. A constant reference to one's own services wounds our friend's
+feelings. Like the man who was saved from the proscription under
+the triumvirate by one of Caesar's friends, and afterwards found it
+impossible to endure his preserver's arrogance, they wish to cry,
+"Give me back to Caesar." How long will you go on saying, "I saved
+you, I snatched you from the jaws of death?" This is indeed life,
+if I remember it by my own will, but death if I remember it at
+yours; I owe you nothing, if you saved me merely in order to have
+some one to point at. How long do you mean to lead me about? how
+long do you mean to forbid me to forget my adventure? If I had been
+a defeated enemy, I should have been led in triumph but once. We
+ought not to speak of the benefits which we have conferred; to
+remind men of them is to ask them to return them. We should not
+obtrude them, or recall the memory of them; you should only remind
+a man of what you have given him by giving him something else. We
+ought not even to tell others of our good deeds. He who confers a
+benefit should be silent, it should be told by the receiver; for
+otherwise you may receive the retort which was made to one who was
+everywhere boasting of the benefit which he had conferred: "You
+will not deny," said his victim, "that you have received a return
+for it?" "When?" asked he. "Often," said the other, "and in many
+places, that is, wherever and whenever you have told the story."
+What need is there for you to speak, and to take the place which
+belongs to another? There is a man who can tell the story in a way
+much more to your credit, and thus you will gain glory for not
+telling it your self. You would think me ungrateful if, through
+your own silence, no one is to know of your benefit. So far from
+doing this, even if any one tells the story in our presence, we
+ought to make answer, "He does indeed deserve much more than this,
+and I am aware that I have not hitherto done any great things for
+him, although I wish to do so." This should not be said jokingly,
+nor yet with that air by which some persons repel those whom they
+especially wish to attract. In addition to this, we ought to act
+with the greatest politeness towards such persons. If the farmer
+ceases his labours after he has put in the seed, he will lose what
+he has sown; it is only by great pains that seeds are brought to
+yield a crop; no plant will bear fruit unless it be tended with
+equal care from first to last, and the same rule is true of
+benefits. Can any benefits be greater than those which children
+receive from their parents? Yet these benefits are useless if they
+be deserted while young, if the pious care of the parents does not
+for a long time watch over the gift which they have bestowed. So it
+is with other benefits; unless you help them, you will lose them;
+to give is not enough, you must foster what you have given. If you
+wish those whom you lay under an obligation to be grateful to you,
+you must not merely confer benefits upon them, but you must also
+love them. Above all, as I said before, spare their ears; you will
+weary them if you remind them of your goodness, if you reproach
+them with it you will make them hate you. Pride ought above all
+things to be avoided when you confer a benefit. What need have you
+for disdainful airs, or swelling phrases? the act itself will exalt
+you. Let us shun vain boasting: let us be silent, and let our deeds
+speak for us. A benefit conferred with haughtiness not only wins no
+gratitude, but causes dislike.
+
+XII. Gaius Caesar granted Pompeius Pennus his life, that is, if not
+to take away life be to grant it; then, when Pompeius was set free
+and returning thanks to him, he stretched out his left foot to be
+kissed. Those who excuse this action, and say that it was not done
+through arrogance, say that he wished to show him a gilded, nay a
+golden slipper studded with pearls. "Well," say they, "what
+disgrace can there be in a man of consular rank kissing gold and
+pearls, and what part of Caesar's whole body was it less pollution
+to kiss?" So, then, that man, the object of whose life was to
+change a free state into a Persian despotism, was not satisfied
+when a senator, an aged man, a man who had filled the highest
+offices in the state, prostrated himself before him in the presence
+of all the nobles, just as the vanquished prostrate themselves
+before their conqueror! He discovered a place below his knees down
+to which he might thrust liberty. What is this but trampling upon
+the commonwealth, and that, too, with the left foot, though you may
+say that this point does not signify? It was not a sufficiently
+foul and frantic outrage for the emperor to sit at the trial of a
+consular for his life wearing slippers, he must needs push his
+shoes into a senator's face.
+
+XIII. O pride, the silliest fault of great good fortune! how
+pleasant it is to take nothing from thee! how dost thou turn all
+benefits into outrages! how dost thou delight in all excess! how
+ill all things become thee! The higher thou risest the lower thou
+art, and provest that the good things by which thou art so puffed
+up profit thee not; thou spoilest all that thou givest. It is worth
+while to inquire why it is that pride thus swaggers and changes the
+form and appearance of her countenance, so that she prefers a mask
+to her own face. It is pleasant to receive gifts when they are
+conferred in a kindly and gentle manner, when a superior in giving
+them does not exalt himself over me, but shows as much good feeling
+as possible, placing himself on a level with me, giving without
+parade, and choosing a time when I am glad of his help, rather than
+waiting till I am in the bitterest need. The only way by which you
+can prevail upon proud men not to spoil their gifts by their
+arrogance is by proving to them that benefits do not appear greater
+because they are bestowed with great pomp and circumstance; that no
+one will think them greater men for so doing, and that excessive
+pride is a mere delusion which leads men to hate even what they
+ought to love.
+
+XIV. There are some things which injure those who receive them,
+things which it is not a benefit to give but to withhold; we should
+therefore consider the usefulness of our gift rather than the wish
+of the petitioner to receive it; for we often long for hurtful
+things, and are unable to discern how ruinous they are, because our
+judgment is biassed by our feelings; when, however, the longing is
+past, when that frenzied impulse which masters our good sense has
+passed away, we abhor those who have given us hurtful gifts. As we
+refuse cold water to the sick, or swords to the grief-stricken or
+remorseful, and take from the insane whatever they might in their
+delirium use to their own destruction, so must we persist in
+refusing to give anything whatever that is hurtful, although our
+friends earnestly and humbly, nay, sometimes even most piteously
+beg for it. We ought to look at the end of our benefits as well
+as the beginning, and not merely to give what men are glad to
+receive, but what they will hereafter be glad to have received.
+There are many who say, "I know that this will do him no good, but
+what am I to do? he begs for it, I cannot withstand his entreaties.
+Let him see to it; he will blame himself, not me." Not so: you he
+will blame, and deservedly; when he comes to his right mind, when
+the frenzy which now excites him has left him, how can he help
+hating the man who has assisted him to harm and to endanger
+himself? It is a cruel kindness to allow one's self to be won over
+into granting that which injures those who beg for it. Just as it
+is the noblest of acts to save men from harm against their will, so
+it is but hatred, under the mask of civility, to grant what is
+harmful to those who ask for it. Let us confer benefits of such a
+kind, that the more they are made use of the better they please,
+and which never can turn into injuries. I never will give money to
+a man if I know that he will pay it to an adulteress, nor will I be
+found in connexion with any wicked act or plan; if possible, I will
+restrain men from crime; if not, at least I will never assist them
+in it. Whether my friend be driven into doing wrong by anger, or
+seduced from the path of safety by the heat of ambition, he shall
+never gain the means of doing mischief except from himself, nor
+will I enable him one day to say, "He ruined me out of love for
+me." Our friends often give us what our enemies wish us to receive;
+we are driven by the unseasonable fondness of the former into the
+ruin which the latter hope will befall us. Yet, often as it is the
+case, what can be more shameful than that there should be no
+difference between a benefit and hatred?
+
+XV. Let us never bestow gifts which may recoil upon us to our
+shame. As the sum total of friendship consists in making our
+friends equal to ourselves, we ought to consider the interests of
+both parties; I must give to him that wants, yet so that I do not
+want myself; I must help him who is perishing, yet so that I do not
+perish myself, unless by so doing I can save a great man or a great
+cause. I must give no benefit which it would disgrace me to ask
+for. I ought not to make a small benefit appear a great one, nor
+allow great benefits to be regarded as small; for although it
+destroys all feeling of gratitude to treat what you give like a
+creditor, yet you do not reproach a man, but merely set off your
+gift to the best advantage by letting him know what it is worth.
+Every man must consider what his resources and powers are, so that
+we may not give either more or less than we are able. We must also
+consider the character and position of the person to whom we give,
+for some men are too great to give small gifts, while others are
+too small to receive great ones. Compare, therefore, the character
+both of the giver and the receiver, and weigh that which you give
+between the two, taking care that what is given be neither too
+burdensome nor too trivial for the one to give, nor yet such as the
+receiver will either treat with disdain as too small, or think too
+great for him to deal with.
+
+XVI. Alexander, who was of unsound mind, and always full of
+magnificent ideas, presented somebody with a city. When the man to
+whom he gave it had reflected upon the scope of his own powers, he
+wished to avoid the jealousy which so great a present would excite,
+saying that the gift did not suit a man of his position. "I do not
+ask," replied Alexander, "what is becoming for you to receive, but
+what is becoming for me to give." This seems a spirited and kingly
+speech, yet really it is a most foolish one. Nothing is by itself a
+becoming gift for any one: all depends upon who gives it, to whom
+he gives it, when, for what reason, where, and so forth, without
+which details it is impossible to argue about it. Inflated
+creature! if it did not become him to receive this gift, it could
+not become thee to give it. There should be a proportion between
+men's characters and the offices which they fill; and as virtue in
+all cases should be our measure, he who gives too much acts as
+wrongly as he who gives too little. Even granting that fortune has
+raised you so high, that, where other men give cups, you give
+cities (which it would show a greater mind in you not to take than
+to take and squander), still there must be some of your friends who
+are not strong enough to put a city in their pockets.
+
+XVII. A certain cynic asked Antigonus for a talent. Antigonus
+answered that this was too much for a cynic to ask for. After this
+rebuff he asked for a penny. Antigonus answered that this was too
+little for a king to give. "This kind of hair-splitting" (you say)
+"is contemptible: he found the means of giving neither. In the
+matter of the penny he thought of the king, in that of the talent
+he thought of the cynic, whereas with respect to the cynic it would
+have been right to receive the penny, with respect to the king it
+would have been right to give the talent. Though there may be
+things which are too great for a cynic to receive, yet nothing is
+so small, that it does not become a gracious king to bestow it." If
+you ask me, I applaud Antigonus; for it is not to be endured that a
+man who despises money should ask for it. Your cynic has publicly
+proclaimed his hatred of money, and assumed the character of one
+who despises it: let him act up to his professions. It is most
+inconsistent for him to earn money by glorifying his poverty. I
+wish to use Chrysippus's simile of the game of ball, in which the
+ball must certainly fall by the fault either of the thrower or of
+the catcher; it only holds its course when it passes between the
+hands of two persons who each throw it and catch it suitably. It is
+necessary, however, for a good player to send the ball in one way
+to a comrade at a long distance, and in another to one at a short
+distance. So it is with a benefit: unless it be suitable both for
+the giver and the receiver, it will neither leave the one nor reach
+the other as it ought. If we have to do with a practised and
+skilled player, we shall throw the ball more recklessly, for
+however it may come, that quick and agile hand will send it back
+again; if we are playing with an unskilled novice, we shall not
+throw it so hard, but far more gently, guiding it straight into his
+very hands, and we shall run to meet it when it returns to us. This
+is just what we ought to do in conferring benefits; let us teach
+some men how to do so, and be satisfied if they attempt it, if they
+have the courage and the will to do so. For the most part, however,
+we make men ungrateful, and encourage them, to be so, as if our
+benefits were only great when we cannot receive any gratitude for
+them; just as some spiteful ball-players purposely put out their
+companion, of course to the ruin of the game, which cannot be
+carried on without entire agreement Many men are of so depraved a
+nature that they had rather lose the presents which they make than
+be thought to have received a return for them, because they are
+proud, and like to lay people under obligations: yet how much
+better and more kindly would it be if they tried to enable the
+others also to perform their parts, if they encouraged them in
+returning gratitude, put the best construction upon all their acts,
+received one who wished to thank them just as cordially as if he
+came to repay what he had received, and easily lent themselves to
+the belief that those whom they have laid under an obligation wish
+to repay it. We blame usurers equally when they press harshly for
+payment, and when they delay and make difficulties about taking
+back the money which they have lent; in the same way, it is just as
+right that a benefit should be returned, as it is wrong to ask any
+one to return it. The best man is he who gives readily, never asks
+for any return, and is delighted when the return is made, because,
+having really and truly forgotten what he gave, he receives it as
+though it were a present.
+
+XVIII. Some men not only give, but even receive benefit haughtily, a
+mistake into which we ought not to fall: for now let us cross over
+to the other side of the subject, and consider how men should behave
+when they receive benefits. Every function which is performed by two
+persons makes equal demands upon both: after you have considered
+what a father ought to be, you will perceive that there remains an
+equal task, that of considering what a son ought to be: a husband
+has certain duties, but those of a wife are no less important. Each
+of these give and take equally, and each require a similar rule of
+life, which, as Hecaton observes, is hard to follow: indeed, it is
+difficult for us to attain to virtue, or even to anything that comes
+near virtue: for we ought not only to act virtuously but to do so
+upon principle. We ought to follow this guide throughout our lives,
+and to do everything great and small according to its dictates:
+according as virtue prompts us we ought both to give and to
+receive. Now she will declare at the outset that we ought not to
+receive benefits from every man. "From whom, then, ought we to
+receive them?" To answer you briefly, I should say, from those to
+whom we have given them. Let us consider whether we ought not to be
+even more careful in choosing to whom we should owe than to whom we
+should give. For even supposing that no unpleasantness should
+result (and very much always does), still it is a great misery to
+be indebted to a man to whom you do not wish to be under an
+obligation; whereas it is most delightful to receive a benefit from
+one whom you can love even after he has wronged you, and when the
+pleasure which you feel in his friendship is justified by the
+grounds on which it is based. Nothing is more wretched for a modest
+and honourable man than to feel it to be his duty to love one whom
+it does not please him to love. I must constantly remind you that I
+do not speak of wise men, who take pleasure in everything that is
+their duty, who have their feelings under command, and are able to
+lay down whatever law they please to themselves and keep it, but
+that I speak of imperfect beings struggling to follow the right
+path, who often have trouble in bending their passions to their
+will. I must therefore choose the man from whom I will accept a
+benefit; indeed, I ought to be more careful in the choice of my
+creditor for a benefit than for money; for I have only to pay the
+latter as much as I received of him, land when I have paid it I am
+free from all obligation; but to the other I must both repay more,
+and even when I have repaid his kindness we remain connected, for
+when I have paid my debt I ought again to renew it, while our
+friendship endures unbroken. Thus, as I ought not to make an
+unworthy man my friend, so I ought not to admit an unworthy man
+into that most holy bond of gratitude for benefits, from which
+friendship arises. You reply, "I cannot always say 'No': sometimes
+I must receive a benefit even against my will. Suppose I were given
+something by a cruel and easily offended tyrant, who would take it
+as an affront if his bounty were slighted? am I not to accept it?
+Suppose it were offered by a pirate, or a brigand, or a king of the
+temper of a pirate or brigand. What ought I to do? Such a man is
+not a worthy object for me to owe a benefit to." When I say that
+you ought to choose, I except vis major and fear, which destroy all
+power of choice. If you are free, if it lies with you to decide
+whether you will or not, then you will turn over in your own mind
+whether you will take a gift from a man or not; but if your
+position makes it impossible for you to choose, then be assured
+that you do not receive a gift, you merely obey orders. No one
+incurs any obligation by receiving what it was not in his power to
+refuse; if you want to know whether I wish to take it, arrange
+matters so that I have the power of saying 'No.' "Yet suppose he
+gave you your life." It does not matter what the gift was, unless
+it be given and received with good will: you are not my preserver
+because you have saved my life. Poison sometimes acts as a
+medicine, yet it is not on that account regarded as wholesome. Some
+things benefit us but put us under no obligation: for instance a
+man who intended to kill a tyrant, cut with his sword a tumour from
+which he suffered: yet the tyrant did not show him gratitude
+because by wounding him he had healed a disease which surgeons had
+feared to meddle with.
+
+XIX. You see that the actual thing itself is not of much
+importance, because it is not regarded as a benefit at all, if you
+do good when you intended to do evil; in such a case the benefit is
+done by chance, the man did harm. I have seen a lion in the
+amphitheatre, who recognized one of the men who fought with wild
+beasts, who once had been his keeper, and protected him against the
+attacks of the other animals. Are we, then, to say that this
+assistance of the brute was a benefit? By no means, because it did
+not intend to do it, and did not do it with kindly intentions. You
+may class the lion and your tyrant together: each of them saved a
+man's life, yet neither conferred a benefit. Because it is not a
+benefit to be forced to receive one, neither is it a benefit to be
+under an obligation to a man to whom we do not wish to be indebted.
+You must first give me personal freedom of decision, and then your
+benefit.
+
+XX. The question has been raised, whether Marcus Brutus ought to
+have received his life from the hands of Julius Caesar, who, he had
+decided, ought to be put to death.
+
+As to the grounds upon which he put him to death, I shall discuss
+them elsewhere; for to my mind, though he was in other respects a
+great man, in this he seems to have been entirely wrong, and not to
+have followed the maxims of the Stoic philosophy. He must either
+have feared the name of "King," although a state thrives best under
+a good king, or he must have hoped that liberty could exist in a
+state where some had so much to gain by reigning, and others had so
+much to gain by becoming slaves. Or, again, he must have supposed
+that it would be possible to restore the ancient constitution after
+all the ancient manners had been lost, and that citizens could
+continue to possess equal rights, or laws remain inviolate, in a
+state in which he had seen so many thousands of men fighting to
+decide, not whether they should be slaves or free, but which master
+they should serve. How forgetful he seems to have been, both of
+human nature and of the history of his own country, in supposing
+that when one despot was destroyed another of the same temper would
+not take his place, though, after so many kings had perished by
+lightning and the sword, a Tarquin was found to reign! Yet Brutus
+did right in receiving his life from Caesar, though he was not
+bound thereby to regard Caesar as his father, since it was by a
+wrong that Caesar had come to be in a position to bestow this
+benefit. A man does not save your life who does not kill you; nor
+does he confer a benefit, but merely gives you your discharge. [The
+'discharge' alluded to is that which was granted to the beaten one
+of a pair of gladiators, when their duel was not to the death.]
+
+XXI. It seems to offer more opportunity for debate to consider what
+a captive ought to do, if a man of abominable vices offers him the
+price of his ransom? Shall I permit myself to be saved by a wretch?
+When safe, what recompense can I make to him? Am I to live with an
+infamous person? Yet, am I not to live with my preserver? I will
+tell you my opinion. I would accept money, even from such a person,
+if it were to save my life; yet I would only accept it as a loan,
+not as a benefit. I would repay him the money, and if I were ever
+able to preserve him from danger I would do so. As for friendship,
+which can only exist between equals, I would not condescend to be
+such a man's friend; nor would I regard him as my preserver, but
+merely as a money-lender, to whom I am only bound to repay what I
+borrowed from him.
+
+A man may be a worthy person for me to receive a benefit from, but
+it will hurt him to give it. For this reason I will not receive it,
+because he is ready to help me to his own prejudice, or even
+danger. Suppose that he is willing to plead for me in court, but by
+so doing will make the king his enemy. I should be his enemy, if,
+when he is willing to risk himself for me, if I were not to risk
+myself without him, which moreover is easier for me to do.
+
+As an instance of this, Hecaton calls the case of Arcesilaus silly,
+and not to the purpose. Arcesilaus, he says, refused to receive a
+large sum of money which was offered to him by a son, lest the son
+should offend his penurious father. What did he do deserving of
+praise, in not receiving stolen goods, in choosing not to receive
+them, instead of returning them? What proof of self-restraint is
+there in refusing to receive another man's property. If you want an
+instance of magnanimity, take the case of Julius Graecinus, whom
+Caius Caesar put to death merely on the ground that he was a better
+man than it suited a tyrant for anyone to be. This man, when he was
+receiving subscriptions from many of his friends to cover his
+expenses in exhibiting public games, would not receive a large sum
+which was sent him by Fabius Persicus; and when he was blamed for
+rejecting it by those who think more of what is given than of who
+gives it, he answered, "Am I to accept a present from a man when I
+would not accept his offer to drink a glass of wine with him?"
+
+When a consular named Rebilius, a man of equally bad character,
+sent a yet larger sum to Graecinus, and pressed him to receive it.
+"I must beg," answered he, "that you will excuse me. I did not take
+money from Persicus either." Ought we to call this receiving
+presents, or rather taking one's pick of the senate?
+
+XXII. When we have decided to accept, let us accept with
+cheerfulness, showing pleasure, and letting the giver see it, so
+that he may at once receive some return for his goodness: for as it
+is a good reason for rejoicing to see our friend happy, it is a
+better one to have made him so. Let us, therefore, show how
+acceptable a gift is by loudly expressing our gratitude for it; and
+let us do so, not only in the hearing of the giver, but everywhere.
+He who receives a benefit with gratitude, repays the first
+instalment of it.
+
+XXIII. There are some, who only like to receive benefits privately:
+they dislike having any witnesses and confidants. Such men, we may
+believe, have no good intentions. As a giver is justified in
+dwelling upon those qualities of his gift which will please the
+receiver, so a man, when he receives, should do so publicly; you
+should not take from a man what you are ashamed to owe him. Some
+return thanks to one stealthily, in a corner, in a whisper. This is
+not modesty, but a kind of denying of the debt: it is the part of
+an ungrateful man not to express his gratitude before witnesses.
+Some object to any accounts being kept between them and their
+benefactors, and wish no brokers to be employed or witnesses to be
+called, but merely to give their own signature to a receipt. Those
+men do the like, who take care to let as few persons as possible
+know of the benefits which they have received. They fear to receive
+them in public, in order that their success may be attributed
+rather to their own talents than to the help of others: they are
+very seldom to be found in attendance upon those to whom they owe
+their lives and their fortunes, and thus, while avoiding the
+imputation of servility, they incur that of ingratitude.
+
+XXIV. Some men speak in the most offensive terms of those to whom
+they owe most. There are men whom it is safer to affront than to
+serve, for their dislike leads them to assume the airs of persons
+who are not indebted to us: although nothing more is expected of
+them than that they should remember what they owe us, refreshing
+their memory from time to time, because no one can be grateful who
+forgets a kindness, and he who remembers it, by so doing proves his
+gratitude. We ought neither to receive benefits with a fastidious
+air, nor yet with a slavish humility: for if a man does not care
+for a benefit when it is freshly bestowed--a time at which all
+presents please us most--what will he do when its first charms have
+gone off? Others receive with an air of disdain, as much as to say.
+"I do not want it; but as you wish it so very much, I will allow
+you to give it to me." Others take benefits languidly, and leave
+the giver in doubt as to whether they know that they have received
+them; others barely open their lips in thanks, and would be less
+offensive if they said nothing. One ought to proportion one's
+thanks to the importance of the benefit received, and to use the
+phrases, "You have laid more of us than you think under an
+obligation," for everyone likes to find his good actions extend
+further than he expected. "You do not know what it is that you have
+done for me; but you ought to know how much more important it is
+than you imagine." It is in itself an expression of gratitude to
+speak of one's self as overwhelmed by kindness; or "I shall never
+be able to thank you sufficiently; but, at any rate, I will never
+cease to express everywhere my inability to thank you."
+
+XXV. By nothing did Furnius gain greater credit with Augustus, and
+make it easy for him to obtain anything else for which he might
+ask, than by merely saying, when at his request Augustus pardoned
+his father for having taken Antonius's side, "One wrong alone I
+have received at your hands, Caesar; you have forced me to live and
+to die owing you a greater debt of gratitude than I can ever
+repay." What can prove gratitude so well as that a man should never
+be satisfied, should never even entertain the hope of making any
+adequate return for what he has received? By these and similar
+expressions we must try not to conceal our gratitude, but to
+display it as clearly as possible. No words need be used; if we
+only feel as we ought, our thankfulness will be shown in our
+countenances. He who intends to be grateful, let him think how he
+shall repay a kindness while he is receiving it. Chrysippus says
+that such a man must watch for his opportunity, and spring forward
+whenever it offers, like one who has been entered for a race, and
+who stands at the starting-point waiting for the barriers to be
+thrown open; and even then he must use great exertions and great
+swiftness to catch the other, who has a start of him.
+
+XXVI. We must now consider what is the main cause of ingratitude.
+It is caused by excessive self-esteem, by that fault innate in all
+mortals, of taking a partial view of ourselves and our own acts, by
+greed, or by jealousy.
+
+Let us begin with the first of these. Every one is prejudiced in
+his own favour, from which it follows that he believes himself to
+have earned all that he receives, regards it as payment for his
+services, and does not think that he has been appraised at a
+valuation sufficiently near his own. "He has given me this," says
+he, "but how late, after how much toil? how much more might I have
+earned if I had attached myself to So and so, or to So and so? I
+did not expect this; I have been treated like one of the herd; did
+he really think that I only deserved so little? why, it would have
+been less insulting to have passed me over altogether."
+
+XXVII. The augur Cnaeus Lentulus, who, before his freedmen reduced
+him to poverty, was one of the richest of men, who saw himself in
+possession of a fortune of four hundred millions--I say advisedly,
+"saw," for he never did more than see it--was as barren and
+contemptible in intellect as he was in spirit. Though very
+avaricious, yet he was so poor a speaker that he found it easier to
+give men coins than words. This man, who owed all his prosperity to
+the late Emperor Augustus, to whom he had brought only poverty,
+encumbered with a noble name, when he had risen to be the chief man
+in Rome, both in wealth and influence, used sometimes to complain
+that Augustus had interrupted his legal studies, observing that he
+had not received anything like what he had lost by giving up the
+study of eloquence. Yet the truth was that Augustus, besides
+loading him with other gifts, had set him free from the necessity
+of making himself ridiculous by labouring at a profession in which
+he never could succeed.
+
+Greed does not permit any one to be grateful; for what is given is
+never equal to its base desires, and the more we receive the more
+we covet, for avarice is much more eager when it has to deal with
+great accumulations of wealth, just as the power of a flame is
+enormously greater in proportion to the size of the conflagration
+from which it springs. Ambition in like manner suffers no man to
+rest satisfied with that measure of public honours, to gain which
+was once the limit of his wildest hope; no one is thankful for
+becoming tribune, but grumbles at not being at once promoted to the
+post of praetor; nor is he grateful for this if the consulship does
+not follow; and even this does not satisfy him if he be consul but
+once. His greed ever stretches itself out further, and he does not
+understand the greatness of his success because he always looks
+forward to the point at which he aims, and never back towards that
+from which he started.
+
+XXVIII. A more violent and distressing vice than any of these is
+jealousy which disturbs us by suggesting comparisons. "He gave me
+this, but he gave more to that man, and he gave it to him before
+me;" after which he sympathises with no one, but pushes his own
+claims to the prejudice of every one else. How much more
+straightforward and modest is it to make the most of what we have
+received, knowing that no man is valued so highly by any one else
+as by his own, self! "I ought to have received more, but it was not
+easy for him to give more; he was obliged to distribute his
+liberality among many persons. This is only the beginning; let me
+be contented, and by my gratitude encourage him to show me more
+favour; he has not done as much as he ought, but he will do so the
+more frequently; he certainly preferred that man to me, but he has
+preferred me before many others; that man is not my equal either in
+virtue or in services, but he has some charm of his own: by
+complaining I shall not make myself deserve to receive more, but
+shall become unworthy of what I have received. More has been given
+to those most villainous men than has been given to me; well, what
+is that to the purpose? how seldom does Fortune show judgment in
+her choice? We complain every day of the success of bad men; very
+often the hail passes over the estates of the greatest villains and
+strikes down the crops of the best of men; every man has to take
+his chance, in friendship as well as in everything else." There is
+no benefit so great that spitefulness can pick no holes in it, none
+so paltry that it cannot be made more of by friendly
+interpretation. We shall never want a subject for complaint if we
+look at benefits on their wrong side.
+
+XXIX. See how unjustly the gifts of heaven are valued even by some
+who profess themselves philosophers, who complain that we are not
+as big as elephants, as swift as stags, as light as birds, as
+strong as bulls; that the skins of seals are stronger, of hinds
+prettier, of bears thicker, of beavers softer than ours; that dogs
+excel us in delicacy of scent, eagles in keenness of sight, crows
+in length of days, and many beasts in ease of swimming. And
+although nature itself does not allow some qualities, as for
+example strength and swiftness, to be combined in the same person,
+yet they call it a monstrous thing that men are not compounded of
+different and inconsistent good qualities, and call the gods
+neglectful of us because we have not been given health which even
+our vices cannot destroy, or knowledge of the future. They scarcely
+refrain from rising to such a pitch of impudence as to hate nature
+because we are below the gods, and not on an equality with them.
+How much better is it to turn to the contemplation of so many great
+blessings, and to be thankful that the gods have been pleased to
+give us a place second only to themselves in this most beautiful
+abode, and that they have appointed us to be the lords of the
+earth! Can any one compare us with the animals over whom we rule?
+Nothing has been denied us except what could not have been granted.
+In like manner, thou that takest an unfair view of the lot of
+mankind, think what blessings our Father has bestowed upon us, how
+far more powerful animals than ourselves we have broken to harness,
+how we catch those which are far swifter, how nothing that has life
+is placed beyond the reach of our weapons! We have received so many
+excellencies, so many crafts, above all our mind, which can pierce
+at once whatever it is directed against, which is swifter than the
+stars in their courses, for it arrives before them at the place
+which they will reach after many ages; and besides this, so many
+fruits of the earth, so much treasure, such masses of various
+things piled one upon another. You may go through the whole order
+of nature, and since you find no entire creature which you would
+prefer to be, you may choose from each, the special qualities which
+you would like to be given to yourself; then, if you rightly
+appreciate the partiality of nature for you, you cannot but confess
+yourself to be her spoiled child. So it is; the immortal gods have
+unto this day always held us most dear, and have bestowed upon us
+the greatest possible honour, a place nearest to themselves. We
+have indeed received great things, yet not too great.
+
+XXX. I have thought it necessary, my friend Liberalis, to state
+these facts, both because when speaking of small benefits one ought
+to make some mention of the greatest, and because also this
+shameless and hateful vice (of ingratitude), starting with these,
+transfers itself from them to all the rest. If a man scorn these,
+the greatest of all benefits, to whom will he feel gratitude, what
+gift will he regard as valuable or deserving to be returned: to
+whom will he be grateful for his safety or his life, if he denies
+that he has received from the gods that existence which he begs
+from them daily? He, therefore, who teaches men to be grateful,
+pleads the cause not only of men, but even of the gods, for though
+they, being placed above all desires, cannot be in want of
+anything, yet we can nevertheless offer them our gratitude.
+
+No one is justified in seeking an excuse for ingratitude in his own
+weakness or poverty, or in saying, "What am I to do, and how? When
+can I repay my debt to my superiors the lords of heaven and earth?"
+Avaricious as you are, it is easy for you to give them thanks,
+without expense; lazy though you be, you can do it without labour.
+At the same instant at which you received your debt towards them,
+if you wish to repay it, you have done as much as any one can do,
+for he returns a benefit who receives it with good will.
+
+XXXI. This paradox of the Stoic philosophy, that he returns a
+benefit who receives it with good will, is, in my opinion, either
+far from admirable, or else it is incredible. For if we look at
+everything merely from the point of view of our intentions, every
+man has done as much as he chose to do; and since filial piety,
+good faith, justice, and in short every virtue is complete within
+itself, a man may be grateful in intention even though he may not
+be able to lift a hand to prove his gratitude. Whenever a man
+obtains what he aimed at, he receives the fruit of his labour. When
+a man bestows a benefit, at what does he aim? clearly to be of
+service and afford pleasure to him upon whom he bestows it. If he
+does what he wishes, if his purpose reaches me and fills us each
+with joy, he has gained his object. He does not wish anything to be
+given to him in return, or else it becomes an exchange of
+commodities, not a bestowal of benefits. A man steers well who
+reaches the port for which he started: a dart hurled by a steady
+hand performs its duty if it hits the mark; one who bestows a
+benefit wishes it to be received with gratitude; he gets what he
+wanted if it be well received. "But," you say, "he hoped for some
+profit also." Then it was not a benefit, the property of which is
+to think nothing of any repayment. I receive what was given me in
+the same spirit in which it was given: then I have repaid it. If
+this be not true, then this best of deeds has this worst of
+conditions attached to it, that it depends entirely upon fortune
+whether I am grateful or not, for if my fortune is adverse I can
+make no repayment. The intention is enough. "What then? am I not to
+do whatever I may be able to repay it, and ought I not ever to be
+on the watch for an opportunity of filling the bosom [Footnote:
+Sinus, the fold of the toga over the breast, used as a pocket by
+the Romans. The great French actor Talma, when dressed for the
+first time in correct classical costume, indignantly asked where he
+was to put his snuff-box.] of him from whom I have received any
+kindness? True; but a benefit is in an evil plight if we cannot be
+grateful for it even when we are empty-handed.
+
+XXXII. "A man," it is argued, "who has received a benefit, however
+gratefully he may have received it, has not yet accomplished all
+his duty, for there remains the part of repayment; just as in
+playing at ball it is something to catch the ball cleverly and
+carefully, but a man is not called a good player unless he can
+handily and quickly send back the ball which he has caught." This
+analogy is imperfect; and why? Because to do this creditably
+depends upon the movement and activity of the body, and not upon
+the mind: and an act of which we judge entirely by the eye, ought
+to be all clearly displayed. But if a man caught the ball as he
+ought to do, I should not call him a bad player for not returning
+it, if his delay in returning it was not caused by his own fault.
+"Yet," say you, "although the player is not wanting in skill,
+because he did one part of his duty, and was able to do the other
+part, yet in such a case the game is imperfect, for its perfection
+lies in sending the ball backwards and forwards." I am unwilling to
+expose this fallacy further; let us think that it is the game, not
+the player that is imperfect: so likewise in the subject which we
+are discussing, the thing which is given lacks something, because
+another equal thing ought to be returned for it, but the mind of
+the giver lacks nothing, because it has found another mind equal to
+itself, and as far as intentions go, has effected what it wished.
+
+XXXIII. A man bestows a benefit upon me: I receive it just as he
+wished it to be received: then he gets at once what he wanted, and
+the only thing which he wanted, and therefore I have proved myself
+grateful. After this it remains for me to enjoy my own resources,
+with the addition of an advantage conferred upon me by one whom I
+have obliged; this advantage is not the remainder of an imperfect
+service, but an addition to a perfected service. [Footnote: Nothing
+is wanted to make a benefit, conferred from good motives, perfect:
+if it is returned, the gratitude is to be counted as net profit.]
+For example, Phidias makes a statue. Now the product of an art is
+one thing, and that of a trade is another. It is the business of
+the art to make the thing which he wished to make, and that of the
+trade to make it with a profit. Phidias has completed his work,
+even though he does not sell it. The product, therefore, of his
+work is threefold: there is the consciousness of having made it,
+which he receives when his work is completed; there is the fame
+which he receives; and thirdly, the advantage which he obtains by
+it, in influence, or by selling it, or otherwise. In like manner
+the first fruit of a benefit is the consciousness of it, which we
+feel when we have bestowed it upon the person whom we chose;
+secondly and thirdly there is the credit which we gain by doing so,
+and there are those things which we may receive in exchange for it.
+So when a benefit has been graciously received, the giver has
+already received gratitude, but has not yet received recompense for
+it: that which we owe in return is therefore something apart from
+the benefit itself, for we have paid for the benefit itself when we
+accept it in a grateful spirit.
+
+XXXIV. "What," say you, "can a man repay a benefit, though he does
+nothing?" He has taken the first step, he has offered you a good
+thing with good feeling, and, which is the characteristic of
+friendship, has placed you both on the same footing. In the next
+place, a benefit is not repaid in the same manner as a loan: you
+have no reason for expecting me to offer you any payment; the
+account between us depends upon the feelings alone. What I say will
+not appear difficult, although it may not at first accord with your
+ideas, if you will do me the favour to remember that there are more
+things than there are words to express them. There is an enormous
+mass of things without names, which we do not speak of under
+distinctive names of their own, but by the names of other things
+transferred to them. We speak of our own foot, of the foot of a
+couch, of a sail, or of a poem; we apply the word 'dog' to a hound,
+a fish, and a star. Because we have not enough words to assign a
+separate name to each thing, we borrow a name whenever we want one.
+Bravery is the virtue which rightly despises danger, or the science
+of repelling, sustaining, or inviting dangers: yet we call a brave
+man a gladiator, and we use the same word for a good-for-nothing
+slave, who is led by rashness to defy death. Economy is the science
+of avoiding unnecessary expenditure, or the art of using one's
+income with moderation: yet we call a man of mean and narrow mind,
+most economical, although there is an immeasurable distance between
+moderation and meanness. These things are naturally distinct, yet
+the poverty of our language compels us to call both these men
+economical, just as he who views slight accidents with rational
+contempt, and he who without reason runs into danger are alike
+called brave. Thus a benefit is both a beneficent action, and also
+is that which is bestowed by that action, such as money, a house,
+an office in the state: there is but one name for them both, though
+their force and power are widely different.
+
+XXXV. Wherefore, give me your attention, and you will soon perceive
+that I say nothing to which you can object. That benefit which
+consists of the action is repaid when we receive it graciously;
+that other, which consists of something material, we have not then
+repaid, but we hope to do so. The debt of goodwill has been
+discharged by a return of goodwill; the material debt demands a
+material return. Thus, although we may declare that he who has
+received a benefit with good-will has returned the favour, yet we
+counsel him to return to the giver something of the same kind as
+that which he has received. Some part of what we have said departs
+from the conventional line of thought, and then rejoins it by
+another path. We declare that a wise man cannot receive an injury;
+yet, if a man hits him with his fist, that man will be found guilty
+of doing him an injury. We declare that a fool can possess nothing;
+yet if a man stole anything from a fool, we should find that man
+guilty of theft. We declare that all men are mad, yet we do not
+dose all men with hellebore; but we put into the hands of these
+very persons, whom we call madmen, both the right of voting and of
+pronouncing judgment. Similarly, we say that a man who has received
+a benefit with good-will has returned the favour, yet we leave him
+in debt nevertheless--bound to repay it even though he has repaid
+it. This is not to disown benefits, but is an encouragement to us
+neither to fear to receive benefits, nor to faint under the too
+great burden of them. "Good things have been given to me; I have
+been preserved from starving; I have been saved from the misery of
+abject poverty; my life, and what is dearer than life, my liberty,
+has been preserved. How shall I be able to repay these favours?
+When will the day come upon which I can prove my gratitude to him?"
+When a man speaks thus, the day has already come. Receive a
+benefit, embrace it, rejoice, not that you have received it, but
+that you have to owe it and return it; then you will never be in
+peril of the great sin of being rendered ungrateful by mischance. I
+will not enumerate any difficulties to you, lest you should
+despair, and faint at the prospect of a long and laborious
+servitude. I do not refer you to the future; do it with what means
+you have at hand. You never will be grateful unless you are so
+straightway. What, then, will you do? You need not take up arms,
+yet perhaps you may have to do so; you need not cross the seas, yet
+it may be that you will pay your debt, even when the wind threatens
+to blow a gale. Do you wish to return the benefit? Then receive it
+graciously; you have then returned the favour--not, indeed, so that
+you can think yourself to have repaid it, but so that you can owe
+it with a quieter conscience.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III.
+
+I.
+
+
+Not to return gratitude for benefits, my AEbutius Liberalis, is
+both base in itself, and is thought base by all men; wherefore even
+ungrateful men complain of ingratitude, and yet what all condemn is
+at the same time rooted in all; and so far do men sometimes run
+into the other extreme that some of them become our bitterest
+enemies, not merely after receiving benefits from us, but because
+they have received them. I cannot deny that some do this out of
+sheer badness of nature; but more do so because lapse of time
+destroys their remembrance, for time gradually effaces what they
+felt vividly at the moment. I remember having had an argument with
+you about this class of persons, whom you wished to call forgetful
+rather than ungrateful, as if that which caused a man to be
+ungrateful was any excuse for his being so, or as if the fact of
+this happening to a man prevented his being ungrateful, when we
+know that it only happens to ungrateful men. There are many classes
+of the ungrateful, as there are of thieves or of homicides, who all
+have the same fault, though there is a great variety in its various
+forms. The man is ungrateful who denies that he has received a
+benefit; who pretends that he has not received it; who does not
+return it. The most ungrateful man of all is he who forgets it. The
+others, though they do not repay it, yet feel their debt, and
+possess some traces of worth, though obstructed by their bad
+conscience. They may by some means and at some time be brought to
+show their gratitude, if, for instance, they be pricked by shame,
+if they conceive some noble ambition such as occasionally rises
+even in the breasts of the wicked, if some easy opportunity of
+doing so offers; but the man from whom all recollection of the
+benefit has passed away can never become grateful. Which of the two
+do you call the worse--he who is ungrateful for kindness, or he who
+does not even remember it? The eyes which fear to look at the light
+are diseased, but those which cannot see it are blind. It is filial
+impiety not to love one's parents, but not to recognise them is
+madness.
+
+II. Who is so ungrateful as he who has so completely laid aside and
+cast away that which ought to be in the forefront of his mind and
+ever before him, that he knows it not? It is clear that if
+forgetfulness of a benefit steals over a man, he cannot have often
+thought about repaying it.
+
+In short, repayment requires gratitude, time, opportunity, and the
+help of fortune; whereas, he who remembers a benefit is grateful
+for it, and that too without expenditure. Since gratitude demands
+neither labour, wealth, nor good fortune, he who fails to render it
+has no excuse behind which to shelter himself; for he who places a
+benefit so far away that it is out of his sight, never could have
+meant to be grateful for it. Just as those tools which are kept in
+use, and are daily touched by the hand, are never in danger of
+growing rusty, while those which are not brought before our eyes,
+and lie as if superfluous, not being required for common use,
+collect dirt by the mere lapse of time, so likewise that which our
+thoughts frequently turn over and renew never passes from our
+memory, which only loses those things to which it seldom directs
+its eyes.
+
+III. Besides this, there are other causes which at times erase the
+greatest services from our minds. The first and most powerful of
+these is that, being always intent upon new objects of desire, we
+think, not of what we have, but of what we are striving to obtain.
+Those whose mind is fixed entirely upon what they hope to gain,
+regard with contempt all that is their own already. It follows that
+since men's eagerness for something new makes them undervalue
+whatever they have received, they do not esteem those from whom
+they have received it. As long as we are satisfied with the
+position we have gained, we love our benefactor, we look up to him,
+and declare that we owe our position entirely to him; then we begin
+to entertain other aspirations, and hurry forward to attain them
+after the manner of human beings, who when they have gained much
+always covet more; straightway all that we used to regard as
+benefits slip from our memory, and we no longer consider the
+advantages which we enjoy over others, but only the insolent
+prosperity of those who have outstripped us. Now no one can at the
+same time be both jealous and grateful, because those who are
+jealous are querulous and sad, while the grateful are joyous. In
+the next place, since none of us think of any time but the present,
+and but few turn back their thoughts to the past, it results that
+we forget our teachers, and all the benefits which we have obtained
+from them, because we have altogether left our childhood behind us:
+thus, all that was done for us in our youth perishes unremembered,
+because our youth itself is never reviewed. What has been is
+regarded by every one, not only as past, but as gone; and for the
+same reason, our memory is weak for what is about to happen in the
+future.
+
+IV. Here I must do Epicurus the justice to say that he constantly
+complains of our ingratitude for past benefits, because we cannot
+bring back again, or count among our present pleasures, those good
+things which we have received long ago, although no pleasures can
+be more undeniable than those which cannot be taken from us.
+Present good is not yet altogether complete, some mischance may
+interrupt it; the future is in suspense, and uncertain; but what is
+past is laid up in safety. How can any man feel gratitude for
+benefits, if he skips through his whole life entirely engrossed
+with the present and the future? It is remembrance that mates men
+grateful; and the more men hope, the less they remember.
+
+V. In the same way, my Liberalis, as some things remain in our
+memory as soon as they are learned, while to know others it is not
+enough to have learned them, for our knowledge slips away from us
+unless it be kept up--I allude to geometry and astronomy, and such
+other sciences as are Hard to remember because of their intricacy--
+so the greatness of some benefits prevents their being forgotten,
+while others, individually less, though many more in number, and
+bestowed at different times, pass from our minds, because, as I
+have stated above, we do not constantly think about them, and do
+not willingly recognize how much we owe to each of our benefactors.
+Listen to the words of those who ask for favours. There is not one
+of them who does not declare that his remembrance will be eternal,
+who does not vow himself your devoted servant and slave, or find,
+if he can, some even greater expression of humility with which to
+pledge himself. After a brief space of time these same men avoid
+their former expressions, thinking them abject, and scarcely
+befitting free-born men; afterwards they arrive at the same point
+to which, as I suppose, the worst and most ungrateful of men come--
+that is, they forget. So little does forgetfulness excuse
+ingratitude, that even the remembrance of a benefit may leave us
+ungrateful.
+
+VI. The question has been raised, whether this most odious vice
+ought to go unpunished; and whether the law commonly made use of in
+the schools, by which we can proceed against a man for ingratitude,
+ought to be adopted by the State also, since all men agree that it
+is just. "Why not?" you may say, "seeing that even cities cast in
+each other's teeth the services which they have performed to one
+another, and demand from the children some return for benefits
+conferred upon their fathers?" On the other hand, our ancestors,
+who were most admirable men, made demands upon their enemies alone,
+and both gave and lost their benefits with magnanimity. With the
+exception of Macedonia, no nation has ever established an action at
+law for ingratitude. And this is a strong argument against its
+being established, because all agree in blaming crime; and
+homicide, poisoning, parricide, and sacrilege are visited with
+different penalties in different countries, but everywhere with
+some penalty; whereas this most common vice is nowhere punished,
+though it is everywhere blamed. We do not acquit it; but as it
+would be most difficult to reckon accurately the penalty for so
+varying a matter, we condemn it only to be hated, and place it upon
+the list of those crimes which we refer for judgment to the gods.
+
+VII. Many arguments occur to me which prove that this vice ought
+not to come under the action of the law. First of all, the best
+part of a benefit is lost if the benefit can be sued for at law, as
+in the case of a loan, or of letting and hiring. Indeed, the finest
+part of a benefit is that we have given it without considering
+whether we shall lose it or not, that we have left all this to the
+free choice of him who receives it: if I call him before a judge,
+it begins to be not a benefit, but a loan. Next, though it is a
+most honourable thing to show gratitude, it ceases to be honourable
+if it be forced, for in that case no one will praise a grateful man
+any more than he praises him who restores the money which was
+deposited in his keeping, or who pays what he borrowed without the
+intervention of a judge. We should therefore spoil the two finest
+things in human life,--a grateful man and a beneficent man; for
+what is there admirable in one who does not give but merely lends a
+benefit, or in one who repays it, not because he wishes, but
+because he is forced to do so? There is no credit in being
+grateful, unless it is safe to be ungrateful. Besides this, all the
+courts would hardly be enough for the action of this one law. Who
+would not plead under it? Who would not be pleaded against? for
+every one exalts his own merits, every one magnifies even the
+smallest matters which he has bestowed upon another. Besides this,
+those things which form the subject of a judicial inquiry can be
+distinctly defined, and cannot afford unlimited licence to the
+judge; wherefore a good cause is in a better position if it before
+a judge than before an arbitrator, because the words of the law tie
+down a judge and define certain limits beyond which he may not
+pass, whereas the conscience of an arbitrator is free and not
+fettered by any rules, so that he can either give or take away,
+and can arrange his decision, not according to the precepts of law
+and justice, but just as his own kindly feeling or compassion may
+prompt him. An action for ingratitude would not bind a judge, but
+would place him in the position of an autocrat. It cannot be known
+what or how great a benefit is; all that would be really important
+would be, how indulgently the judge might interpret it. No law
+defines an ungrateful person, often, indeed, one who repays what he
+has received is ungrateful, and one who has not returned it is
+grateful. Even an unpractised judge can give his vote upon some
+matters; for instance, when the thing to be determined is whether
+something has or has not been done, when a dispute is terminated by
+the parties giving written bonds, or when the casting up of
+accounts decides between the disputants. When, however, motives
+have to be guessed at, when matters upon which wisdom alone can
+decide, are brought into court, they cannot be tried by a judge
+taken at random from the list of "select judges," [Footnote: See
+Smith's "Dict. of Antiq.," s. v] whom property and the inheritance
+of an equestrian fortune [Footnote: 400,000 sesterces] has placed
+upon the roll.
+
+VIII. Ingratitude, therefore, is not only matter unfit to be
+brought into court, but no judge could be found fit to try it; and
+this you will not be surprised at, if you examine the difficulties
+of any one who should attempt to prosecute a man upon such a
+charge. One man may have given a large sum of money, but he is rich
+and would not feel it; another may have given it at the cost of his
+entire inheritance. The sum given is the same in each case, but the
+benefit conferred is not the same. Add another instance: suppose
+that to redeem a debtor from slavery one man paid money from his
+own private means, while another man paid the same sum, but had to
+borrow it or beg for it, and allow himself to be laid under a great
+obligation to some one; would you rank the man who so easily
+bestowed his benefit on an equality with him who was obliged to
+receive a benefit himself before he could bestow it? Some benefits
+are great, not because of their amount, but because of the time at
+which they are bestowed; it is a benefit to give an estate whose
+fertility can bring down the price of corn, and it is a benefit to
+give a loaf of bread in time of famine; it is a benefit to give
+provinces through which flow vast navigable rivers, and it is a
+benefit, when men are parched with thirst, and can scarcely draw
+breath through their dry throats, to show them a spring of water.
+Who will compare these cases with one another, or weigh one against
+the other? It is hard to give a decision when it is not the thing
+given, but its meaning, which has to be considered; though what is
+given is the same, yet if it be given under different circumstances
+it has a different value. A man may have bestowed a benefit upon
+me, but unwillingly; he may have complained of having given it; he
+may have looked at me with greater haughtiness than he was wont to
+do; he may have been so slow in giving it, that he would have done
+me a greater service if he had promptly refused it. How could a
+judge estimate the value of these things, when words, hesitation,
+or looks can destroy all their claim to gratitude?
+
+IX. What, again, could he do, seeing that some things are called
+benefits because they are unduly coveted, whilst others are not
+benefits at all, according to this common valuation, yet are of
+even greater value, though not so showy? You call it a benefit to
+cause a man to be adopted as a member of a powerful city, to get
+him enrolled among the knights, or to defend one who is being tried
+for his life: what do you say of him who gives useful advice? of
+him who holds you back when you would rush into crime? of him who
+strikes the sword from the hands of the suicide? of him who by his
+power of consolation brings back to the duties of life one who was
+plunged in grief, and eager to follow those whom he had lost? of
+him who sits at the bedside of the sick man, and who, when health
+and recovery depend upon seizing the right moment, administers food
+in due season, stimulates the failing veins with wine, or calls in
+the physician to the dying man? Who can estimate the value of such
+services as these? who can bid us weigh dissimilar benefits one
+with another? "I gave you a house," says one. Yes, but I forewarned
+you that your own house would come down upon your head. "I gave you
+an estate," says he. True, but I gave a plank to you when
+shipwrecked. "I fought for you and received wounds for you," says
+another. But I saved your life by keeping silence. Since a benefit
+is both given and returned differently by different people, it is
+hard to make them balance.
+
+X. Besides this, no day is appointed for repayment of a benefit, as
+there is for borrowed money; consequently he who has not yet repaid
+a benefit may do so hereafter: for tell me, pray, within what time
+a man is to be declared ungrateful? The greatest benefits cannot be
+proved by evidence; they often lurk in the silent consciousness of
+two men only; are we to introduce the rule of not bestowing
+benefits without witnesses? Next, what punishment are we to appoint
+for the ungrateful? is there to be one only for all, though the
+benefits which they have received are different? or should the
+punishment be varying, greater or less according to the benefit
+which each has received? Are our valuations to be restricted to
+pecuniary fines? what are we to do, seeing that in some cases the
+benefit conferred is life, and things dearer than life? What
+punishment is to be assigned to ingratitude for these? One less
+than the benefit? That would be unjust. One equal to it; death?
+What could be more inhuman than to cause benefits to result in
+cruelty?
+
+XI. It may be argued, "Parents have certain privileges: these are
+regarded as exempt from the action of ordinary rules, and so also
+ought to be the case with other beneficent persons." Nay; mankind
+has assigned a peculiar sanctity to the position of parents,
+because it was advantageous that children should be reared, and
+people had to be tempted into undergoing the toil of doing so,
+because the issue of their experiment was doubtful. One cannot say
+to them, as one does to others who bestow benefits, "Choose the man
+to whom you give: you must only blame yourself if you are deceived;
+help the deserving." In rearing children nothing depends upon the
+judgment of those who rear them; it is a matter of hope: in order,
+therefore, that people may be more willing to embark upon this
+lottery, it was right that they should be given a certain
+authority; and since it is useful for youth to be governed, we have
+placed their parents in the position of domestic magistrates, under
+whose guardianship their lives may be ruled. Moreover, the position
+of parents differs from that of other benefactors, for their having
+given formerly to their children does not stand in the way of their
+giving now and hereafter; and also, there is no fear of their
+falsely asserting that they have given: with others one has to
+inquire not only whether they have received, but whether they have
+given; but the good deeds of parents are placed beyond doubt. In
+the next place, one benefit bestowed by parents is the same for
+all, and might be counted once for all; while the others which they
+bestow are of various kinds, unlike one to another, differing from
+one another by the widest possible intervals; they can therefore
+come under no regular rule, since it would be more just to leave
+them all unrewarded than to give the same reward to all.
+
+XII. Some benefits cost much to the givers, some are of much value
+to the receivers but cost the givers nothing. Some are bestowed
+upon friends, others on strangers: now although that which is given
+be the same, yet it becomes more when it is given to one with whom
+you are beginning to be acquainted through the benefits which you
+have previously conferred upon him. One man may give us help,
+another distinctions, a third consolation. You may find one who
+thinks nothing pleasanter or more important than to have some one
+to save him from distress; you may again find one who would rather
+be helped to great place than to security; while some consider
+themselves more indebted to those who save their lives than to
+those who save their honour. Each of these services will be held
+more or less important, according as the disposition of our judge
+inclines to one or the other of them. Besides this, I choose my
+creditors for myself, whereas I often receive benefits from those
+from whom I would not, and sometimes I am laid under an obligation
+without my knowledge. What will you do in such a case? When a man
+has received a benefit unknown to himself, and which, had he known
+of it, he would have refused to receive, will you call him
+ungrateful if he does not repay it, however he may have received
+it? Suppose that some one has bestowed a benefit upon me, and that
+the same man has afterwards done me some wrong; am I to be bound by
+his one bounty to endure with patience any wrong that he may do me,
+or will it be the same as if I had repaid it, because he himself
+has by the subsequent wrong cancelled his own benefit? How, in that
+case, would you decide which was the greater; the present which the
+man has received, or the injury which has been done him? Time would
+fail me if I attempted to discuss all the difficulties which would
+arise.
+
+XIII. It may be argued that "we render men less willing to confer
+benefits by not supporting the claim of those which have been
+bestowed to meet with gratitude, and by not punishing those who
+repudiate them." But you would find, on the other hand, that men
+would be far less willing to receive benefits, if by so doing they
+were likely to incur the danger of having to plead their cause in
+court, and having more difficulty in proving their integrity. This
+legislation would also render us less willing to give: for no one
+is willing to give to those who are unwilling to receive, but one
+who is urged to acts of kindness by his own good nature and by the
+beauty of charity, will give all the more freely to those who need
+make no return unless they choose. It impairs the credit of doing a
+service, if in doing it we are carefully protected from loss.
+
+XIV. "Benefits, then, will be fewer, but more genuine: well, what
+harm is there in restricting people from giving recklessly?" Even
+those who would have no legislation upon the subject follow this
+rule, that we ought to be somewhat careful in giving, and in
+choosing those upon whom we bestow favours. Reflect over and over
+again to whom you are giving: you will have no remedy at law, no
+means of enforcing repayment. You are mistaken if you suppose that
+the judge will assist you: no law will make full restitution to
+you, you must look only to the honour of the receiver. Thus only
+can benefits retain their influence, and thus only are they
+admirable: you dishonour them if you make them the grounds of
+litigation, "Pay what you owe" is a most just proverb; and one
+which carries with it the sanction of all nations; but in dealing
+with benefits it is most shameful. "Pay!" How is a man to pay who
+owes his life, his position, his safety, or his reason to another?
+None of the greatest benefits can be repaid. "Yet," it is said,
+"you ought to give in return for them something of equal value."
+This is just what I have been saying, that the grandeur of the act
+is ruined if we make our benefits commercial transactions. We ought
+hot to encourage ourselves in avarice, in discontent, or in
+quarrels; the human mind is prone enough to these by nature. As far
+as we are able, let us check it, and cut off the opportunities for
+which it seeks.
+
+XV. Would that we could indeed persuade men to
+receive back money which they have lent from those debtors only who
+are willing to pay! would that no agreement ever bound the buyer to
+the seller, and that their interests were not protected by sealed
+covenants and agreements, but rather by honour and a sense of
+justice! However, men prefer what is needful to what is truly best,
+and choose rather to force their creditors to keep faith with them
+than to trust that they will do so. Witnesses are called on both
+sides; the one, by calling in brokers, makes several names appear
+in his accounts as his debtors instead of one; the other is not
+content with the legal forms of question and answer unless he holds
+the other party by the hand. What a shameful admission of the
+dishonesty and wickedness of mankind! men trust more to our signet-
+rings than to our intentions. For what are these respectable men
+summoned? for what do they impress their seals? it is in order that
+the borrower may not deny that he has received what he has
+received. You regard these men, I suppose, as above bribes, as
+maintainers of the truth: well, these very men will not be
+entrusted with money except on the same terms. Would it not, then,
+be more honourable to be deceived by some than to suspect all men
+of dishonesty? To fill up the measure of avarice one thing only is
+lacking, that we should bestow no benefit without a surety. To
+help, to be of service, is the part of a generous and noble mind;
+he who gives acts like a god, he who demands repayment acts like a
+money-lender. Why then, by trying to protect the rights of the
+former class, should we reduce them to the level of the basest of
+mankind?
+
+XVI. "More men," our opponent argues, "will be ungrateful, if no
+legal remedy exists against ingratitude." Nay, fewer, because then
+benefits will be bestowed with more discrimination, In the next
+place, it is not advisable that it should be publicly known how
+many ungrateful men there are: for the number of sinners will do
+away with the disgrace of the sin, and a reproach which applies to
+all men will cease to be dishonourable. Is any woman ashamed of
+being divorced, now that some noble ladies reckon the years of
+their lives, not by the number of the consuls, but by that of their
+husbands, now that they leave their homes in order to marry others,
+and marry only in order to be divorced? Divorce was only dreaded as
+long as it was unusual; now that no gazette appears without it,
+women learn to do what they hear so much about. Can any one feel
+ashamed of adultery, now that things have come to such a pass that
+no woman keeps a husband at all unless it be to pique her lover?
+Chastity merely implies ugliness. Where will you find any woman so
+abject, so repulsive, as to be satisfied with a single pair of
+lovers, without having a different one for each hour of the day;
+nor is the day long enough for all of them, unless she has taken
+her airing in the grounds of one, and passes the night with
+another. A woman is frumpish and old-fashioned if she does not know
+that "adultery with one paramour is nick-named marriage." Just as
+all shame at these vices has disappeared since the vice itself
+became so widely spread, so if you made the ungrateful begin to
+count their own numbers, you would both make them more numerous,
+and enable them to be ungrateful with greater impunity.
+
+XVII. "What then? shall the ungrateful man go unpunished?" What
+then, I answer, shall we punish the undutiful, the malicious, the
+avaricious, the headstrong, and the cruel? Do you imagine that
+those things which are loathed are not punished, or do you suppose
+that any punishment is greater than the hate of all men? It is a
+punishment not to dare receive a benefit from anyone, not to dare
+to bestow one, to be, or to fancy that you are a mark for all men's
+eyes, and to lose all appreciation of so excellent and pleasant a
+matter. Do you call a man unhappy who has lost his sight, or whose
+hearing has been impaired by disease, and do you not call him
+wretched who has lost the power of feeling benefits? He fears the
+gods, the witnesses of all ingratitude; he is tortured by the
+thought of the benefit which he has misapplied, and, in fine, he is
+sufficiently punished by this great penalty, that, as I said
+before, he cannot enjoy the fruits of this most delightful act. On
+the other hand, he who takes pleasure in receiving a benefit,
+enjoys an unvarying and continuous happiness, which he derives from
+consideration, not of the thing given, but of the intention of the
+giver. A benefit gives perpetual joy to a grateful man, but pleases
+an ungrateful one only for a moment. Can the lives of such men be
+compared, seeing that the one is sad and gloomy--as it is natural
+that a denier of his debts and a defrauder should be, a man who
+does not give his parents, his nurses, or his teachers the honour
+which is their due--while the other is joyous, cheerful, on the
+watch for an opportunity of proving his gratitude, and gaining much
+pleasure from this frame of mind itself? Such a man has no wish to
+become bankrupt, but only to make the fullest and most copious
+return for benefits, and that not only to parents and friends, but
+also to more humble persons; for even if he receives a benefit from
+his own slave, he does not consider from whom he receives it, but
+what he receives.
+
+XVIII. It has, however, been doubted by Hecaton and some other
+writers, whether a slave can bestow a benefit upon his master. Some
+distinguish between benefits, duties, and services, calling those
+things benefits which are bestowed by a stranger--that is, by one
+who could discontinue them without blame--while duties are
+performed by our children, our wives, and those whom relationship
+prompts and orders to afford us help; and, thirdly, services are
+performed by slaves, whose position is such that nothing which they
+do for their master can give them any claim upon him. . . .
+
+Besides this, he who affirms that a slave does not sometimes confer
+a benefit upon his master is ignorant of the rights of man; for the
+question is, not what the station in life of the giver may be, but
+what his intentions are. The path of virtue is closed to no one, it
+lies open to all; it admits and invites all, whether they be free-
+born men, slaves or freed-men, kings or exiles; it requires no
+qualifications of family or of property, it is satisfied with a
+mere man. What, indeed, should we have to trust to for defence
+against sudden misfortunes, what could--a noble mind promise to
+itself to keep unshaken, if virtue could be lost together with
+prosperity? If a slave cannot confer a benefit upon his master,
+then no subject can confer a benefit upon his king, and no soldier
+upon his general; for so long as the man is subject to supreme
+authority, the form of authority can make no difference. If main
+force, or the fear of death and torture, can prevent a slave from
+gaining any title to his master's gratitude, they will also prevent
+the subjects of a king, or the soldiers of a general from doing so,
+for the same things may happen to either of these classes of men,
+though under different names.
+
+Yet men do bestow benefits upon their kings and their generals;
+therefore slaves can bestow benefits upon their masters. A slave
+can be just, brave, magnanimous; he can therefore bestow a benefit,
+for this is also the part of a virtuous man. So true is it that
+slaves can bestow benefits upon their masters, that the masters
+have often owed their lives to them.
+
+XIX. There is no doubt that a slave can bestow a benefit upon
+anyone; why, then, not upon his master? "Because," it is argued,
+"he cannot become his master's creditor if he gives him money. If
+this be not so, he daily lays his master under an obligation to
+him; he attends him when on a journey, he nurses him when sick, he
+works most laboriously at the cultivation of his estate; yet all
+these, which would be called benefits if done for us by anyone
+else, are merely called service when done by a slave. A benefit is
+that which some one bestows who has the option of withholding it:--
+now a slave has no power to refuse, so that he does not afford us
+his help, but obeys our orders, and cannot boast of having done
+what he could not leave undone." Even under these conditions I
+shall win the day, and will place a slave in such positions, that
+for many purposes he will be free; in the meanwhile, tell me, if I
+give you an instance of a slave fighting for his master's safety
+without regard to himself, pierced through with wounds, yet
+spending the last drops of his blood, and gaining time for his
+master to escape by the sacrifice of his life, will you say that
+this man did not bestow a benefit upon his master because he was a
+slave? If I give an instance of one who could not be bribed to
+betray his master's secrets by any of the offers of a tyrant, who
+was not terrified by any threats, nor overpowered by any tortures,
+but who, as far as he was able, placed his questioners upon a wrong
+scent, and, paid for his loyalty with his life; will you say that
+this man did not confer a benefit upon his master because he was a
+slave? Consider, rather, whether an example of virtue in a slave be
+not all the greater because it is rarer than in free men, and
+whether it be not all the more gratifying that, although to be
+commanded is odious, and all submission to authority is irksome,
+yet in some particular cases love for a master has been more
+powerful than men's general dislike to servitude. A benefit does
+not, therefore, cease to be a benefit because it is bestowed by a
+slave, but is all the greater on that account, because not even
+slavery could restrain him from bestowing it.
+
+XX. It is a mistake to imagine that slavery pervades a man's whole
+being; the better part of him is exempt from it: the body indeed is
+subjected and in the power of a master, but the mind is
+independent, and indeed is so free and wild, that it cannot be
+restrained even by this prison of the body, wherein it is confined,
+from following its own impulses, dealing with gigantic designs, and
+soaring into the infinite, accompanied by all the host of heaven.
+It is, therefore, only the body which misfortune hands over to a
+master, and which he buys and sells; this inward part cannot be
+transferred as a chattel. Whatever comes from this, is free;
+indeed, we are not allowed to order all things to be done, nor are
+slaves compelled to obey us in all things; they will not carry out
+treasonable orders, or lend their hands to an act of crime.
+
+XXI. There are some things which the law neither enjoins nor
+forbids; it is in these that a slave finds the means of bestowing
+benefits. As long as we only receive what is generally demanded
+from a slave, that is mere service; when more is given than a slave
+need afford us, it is a benefit; as soon as what he does begins to
+partake of the affection of a friend, it can no longer be called
+service. There are certain things with which a master is bound to
+provide his slave, such as food and clothing; no one calls this a
+benefit; but supposing that he indulges his slave, educates him
+above his station, teaches him arts which free-born men learn, that
+is a benefit. The converse is true in the case of the slave;
+anything which goes beyond the rules of a slave's duty, which is
+done of his own free will, and not in obedience to orders, is a
+benefit, provided it be of sufficient importance to be called by
+such a name if bestowed by any other person.
+
+XXII. It has pleased Chrysippus to define a slave as "a hireling
+for life." Just as a hireling bestows a benefit when he does more
+than he engaged himself to do, so when a slave's love for his
+master raises him above his condition and urges him to do something
+noble--something which would be a credit even to men more fortunate
+by birth--he surpasses the hopes of his master, and is a benefit
+found in the house. Do you think it is just that we should be angry
+with our slaves when they do less than their duty, and that we
+should not be grateful to them when they do more? Do you wish to
+know when their service is not a benefit? When the question can be
+asked, "What if he had refused to do it?" When he does that which
+he might have refused to do, we must praise his good will. Benefits
+and wrongs are opposites; a slave can bestow a benefit upon his
+master, if he can receive a wrong from his master. Now an official
+has been appointed to hear complaints of the wrongs done by masters
+to their slaves, whose duty it is to restrain cruelty and lust, or
+avarice in providing them with the necessaries of life. What
+follows, then? Is it the master who receives a benefit from his
+slave? nay, rather, it is one man who receives it from another.
+Lastly, he did all that lay in his power; he bestowed a benefit
+upon his master; it lies in your power to receive or not to receive
+it from a slave. Yet who is so exalted, that fortune may not make
+him need the aid even of the lowliest?
+
+XXIII. I shall now quote a number of instances of benefits, not all
+alike, some even contradictory. Some slaves have given their master
+life, some death; have saved him when perishing, or, as if that
+were not enough, have saved him by their own death; others have
+helped their master to die, some have saved his life by stratagem.
+Claudius Quadrigarius tells us in the eighteenth book of his
+"Annals," that when Grumentum was being besieged, and had been
+reduced to the greatest straits, two slaves deserted to the enemy,
+and did valuable service. Afterwards, when the city was taken, and
+the victors were rushing wildly in every direction, they ran before
+every one else along the streets, which they well knew, to the
+house in which they had been slaves, and drove their mistress
+before them; when they were asked who she might be, they answered
+that she was their mistress, and a most cruel one, and that they
+were leading her away for punishment. They led her outside the
+walls, and concealed her with the greatest care until the fighting
+was over; then, as the soldiery, satisfied with the sack of the
+city, quickly resumed the manners of Romans, they also returned to
+their own countrymen, and themselves restored their mistress to
+them. She manumitted each of them on the spot, and was not ashamed
+to receive her life from men over whom she had held the power of
+life and death. She might, indeed, especially congratulate herself
+upon this; for had she been saved otherwise, she would merely have
+received a common and hackneyed piece of kindness, whereas, by
+being saved as she was, she became a glorious legend, and an
+example to two cities. In the confusion of the captured city, when
+every one was thinking only of his own safety, all deserted her
+except these deserters; but they, that they might prove what had
+been their intentions in effecting that desertion, deserted again
+from the victors to the captive, wearing the masks of unnatural
+murderers.
+
+They thought--and this was the greatest part of the service which
+they rendered--they were content to seem to have murdered their
+mistress, if thereby their mistress might be saved from murder.
+Believe me, it is the mark of no slavish soul to purchase a noble
+deed by the semblance of crime.
+
+When Vettius, the praetor of the Marsi, was being led into the
+presence of the Roman general, his slave snatched a sword from the
+soldier who was dragging him along, and first slew his master. Then
+he said, "It is now time for me to look to myself; I have already
+set my master free," and with these words transfixed himself with
+one blow. Can you tell me of anyone who saved his master more
+gloriously?
+
+XXIV. When Caesar was besieging Corfinium, Domitius, who was shut
+up in the city, ordered a slave of his own, who was also a
+physician, to give him poison. Observing the man's hesitation, he
+said, "Why do you delay, as though the whole business was in your
+power? I ask for death with arms in my hands." Then the slave
+assented, and gave him a harmless drug to drink. When Domitius fell
+asleep after drinking this, the slave went to his son, and said,
+"Give orders for my being kept in custody until you learn from the
+result whether I have given your father poison or no." Domitius
+lived, and Caesar saved his life; but his slave had saved it
+before.
+
+XXV. During the civil war, a slave hid his master, who had been
+proscribed, put on his rings and clothes, met the soldiers who were
+searching for him, and, after declaring that he would not stoop to
+entreat them not to carry out their orders, offered his neck to
+their swords. What a noble spirit it shows in a slave to have been
+willing to die for his master, at a time when few were faithful
+enough to wish their master to live! to be found kind when the
+state was cruel, faithful when it was treacherous! to be eager for
+the reward of fidelity, though it was death, at a time when such
+rich rewards were offered for treachery!
+
+XXVI. I will not pass over the instances which our own age affords.
+In the reign of Tiberius Caesar, there was a common and almost
+universal frenzy for informing, which was more ruinous to the
+citizens of Rome than the whole civil war; the talk of drunkards,
+the frankness of jesters, was alike reported to the government;
+nothing was safe; every opportunity of ferocious punishment was
+seized, and men no longer waited to hear the fate of accused
+persons, since it was always the same. One Paulus, of the
+Praetorian guard, was at an entertainment, wearing a portrait of
+Tiberius Caesar engraved in relief upon a gem. It would be absurd
+for me to beat about the bush for some delicate way of explaining
+that he took up a chamber-pot, an action which was at once noticed
+by Maro, one of the most notorious informers of that time, and the
+slave of the man who was about to fall into the trap, who drew the
+ring from the finger of his drunken master. When Maro called the
+guests to witness that Paulus had dishonoured the portrait of the
+emperor, and was already drawing up an act of accusation, the slave
+showed the ring upon his own finger. Such a man no more deserves to
+be called a slave, than Maro deserved to be called a guest.
+
+XXVII. In the reign of Augustus men's own words were not yet able
+to ruin them, yet they sometimes brought them into trouble. A
+senator named Rufus, while at dinner, expressed a hope that Caesar
+would not return safe from a journey for which he was preparing,
+and added that all bulls and calves wished the same thing. Some of
+those present carefully noted these words. At daybreak, the slave
+who had stood at his feet during the dinner, told him what he had
+said in his cups, and urged him to be the first to go to Caesar,
+and denounce himself. Rufus followed this advice, met Caesar as he
+was going down to the forum, and, swearing that he was out of his
+mind the day before, prayed that what he had said might fall upon
+his own head and that of his children; he then begged Caesar pardon
+him, and to take him back into favour. When Caesar said that he
+would do so, he added, "No one will believe that you have taken me
+back into favour unless you make me a present of something;" and he
+asked for and obtained a sum of money so large, that it would have
+been a gift not to be slighted even if bestowed by an unoffended
+prince. Caesar added: "In future I will take care never to quarrel
+with you, for my own sake." Caesar acted honourably in pardoning
+him, and in being liberal as well as forgiving; no one can hear
+this anecdote without praising Caesar, but he must praise the slave
+first. You need not wait for me to tell you that the slave who did
+his master this service was set free; yet his master did not do
+this for nothing, for Caesar had already paid him the price of the
+slave's liberty.
+
+XXVIII. After so many instances, can we doubt that a master may
+sometimes receive a benefit from a slave? Why need the person of
+the giver detract from the thing which he gives? why should not the
+gift add rather to the glory of the giver. All men descend from the
+same original stock; no one is better born than another, except in
+so far as his disposition is nobler and better suited for the
+performance of good actions. Those who display portraits of their
+ancestors in their halls, and set up in the entrance to their
+houses the pedigree of their family drawn out at length, with many
+complicated collateral branches, are they not notorious rather than
+noble? The universe is the one parent of all, whether they trace
+their descent from this primary source through a glorious or a mean
+line of ancestors. Be not deceived when men who are reckoning up
+their genealogy, wherever an illustrious name is wanting, foist in
+that of a god in its place. You need despise no one, even though he
+bears a commonplace name, and owes little to fortune. Whether your
+immediate ancestors were freedmen, or slaves, or foreigners, pluck
+up your spirits boldly, and leap over any intervening disgraces of
+your pedigree; at its source, a noble origin awaits you. Why should
+our pride inflate us to such a degree that we think it beneath us
+to receive benefits from slaves, and think only of their position,
+forgetting their good deeds? You, the slave of lust, of gluttony,
+of a harlot, nay, who are owned as a joint chattel by harlots, can
+you call anyone else a slave? Call a man a slave? why, I pray you,
+whither are you being hurried by those bearers who carry your
+litter? whither are these men with their smart military-looking
+cloaks carrying you? is it not to the door of some door-keeper, or
+to the gardens of some one who has not even a subordinate office?
+and then you, who regard the salute of another man's slave as a
+benefit, declare that you cannot receive a benefit from your own
+slave. What inconsistency is this? At the same time you despise and
+fawn upon slaves, you are haughty and violent at home, while out of
+doors you are meek, and as much despised as you despise your
+slaves; for none abase themselves lower than those who
+unconscionably give themselves airs, nor are anymore prepared to
+trample upon others than those who have learned how to offer
+insults by having endured them.
+
+XXIX. I felt it my duty to say this, in order to crush the
+arrogance of men who are themselves at the mercy of fortune, and to
+claim the right of bestowing a benefit for slaves, in order that I
+may claim it also for sons. The question arises, whether children
+can ever bestow upon their parents greater benefits than those
+which they have received from them.
+
+It is granted that many sons become greater and more powerful than
+their parents, and also that they are better men. If this be true,
+they may give better gifts to their fathers than they have received
+from them, seeing that their fortune and their good nature are
+alike greater than that of their father. "Whatever a father
+receives from his son," our opponent will urge, "must in any case
+be lees than what the son received from him, because the son owes
+to his father the very power of giving. Therefore the father can
+never be surpassed in the bestowal of benefits, because the benefit
+which surpasses his own is really his." I answer, that some things
+derive their first origin from others, yet are greater than those
+others; and a thing may be greater than that from which it took its
+rise, although without that thing to start from it never could have
+grown so great. All things greatly outgrow their beginnings. Seeds
+are the causes of all things, and yet are the smallest part of the
+things which they produce. Look at the Rhine, or the Euphrates, or
+any other famous rivers; how small they are, if you only view them
+at the place from whence they take their rise? they gain all that
+makes them terrible and renowned as they flow along. Look at the
+trees which are tallest if you consider their height, and the
+broadest if you look at their thickness and the spread of their
+branches; compared with all this, how small a part of them is
+contained in the slender fibres of the root? Yet take away their
+roots, and no more groves will arise, nor great mountains be
+clothed with trees. Temples and cities are supported by their
+foundations; yet what is built as the foundation of the entire
+building lies out of sight. So it is in other matters; the
+subsequent greatness of a thing ever eclipses its origin. I could
+never have obtained anything without having previously received the
+boon of existence from my parents; yet it does not follow from this
+that whatever I obtain is less than that without which I could not
+obtain it. If my nurse had not fed me when I was a child, I should
+not have been able to conduct any of those enterprises which I now
+carry on, both with my head and with my hand, nor should I ever
+have obtained the fame which is due to my labours both in peace and
+war; would you on that account argue that the services of a nurse
+were more valuable than the most important undertakings? Yet is not
+the nurse as important as the father, since without the benefits
+which I have received from each of them alike, I should have been
+alike unable to effect anything? If I owe all that I now can do to
+my original beginning, I cannot regard my father or my grandfather
+as being this original beginning; there always will be a spring
+further back, from which the spring next below is derived. Yet no
+one will argue that I owe more to unknown and forgotten ancestors
+than to my father; though really I do owe them more, if I owe it to
+my ancestors that my father begat me.
+
+XXX. "Whatever I have bestowed upon my father," says my opponent,
+"however great it may be, yet is less valuable than what my father
+has bestowed upon me, because if he had not begotten me, it never
+could have existed at all." By this mode of reasoning, if a man has
+healed my father when ill, and at the point of death, I shall not
+be able to bestow anything upon him equivalent to what I have
+received from him; for had my father not been healed, he could not
+have begotten me. Yet think whether it be not nearer the truth to
+regard all that I can do, and all that I have done, as mine, due to
+my own powers and my own will? Consider what the fact of my birth
+is in itself; you will see that it is a small matter, the outcome
+of which is dubious, and that it may lead equally to good or to
+evil; no doubt it is the first step to everything, but because it
+is the first, it is not on that account more important than all the
+others. Suppose that I have saved my father's life, raised him to
+the highest honours, and made him the chief man in his city, that I
+have not merely made him illustrious by my own deeds, but have
+furnished him himself with an opportunity of performing great
+exploits, which is at once important, easy, and safe, as well as
+glorious; that I have loaded him with appointments, wealth, and all
+that attracts men's minds; still, even when I surpass all others, I
+am inferior to him. Now if you say, "You owe to your father the
+power of doing all this," I shall answer, "Quite true, if to do all
+this it is only necessary to be born; but if life is merely an
+unimportant factor in the art of living well, and if you have
+bestowed upon me only that which I have in common with wild beasts
+and the smallest, and some of the foulest of creatures, do not
+claim for yourself what did not come into being in consequence of
+the benefits which you bestowed, even though it could not have come
+into being without them."
+
+XXXI. Suppose, father, that I have saved your life, in return for
+the life which I received from you: in this case also I have
+outdone your benefit, because I have given life to one who
+understands what I have done, and because I understood what I was
+doing, since I gave you your life not for the sake of, or by the
+means of my own pleasure; for just as it is less terrible to die
+before one has time to fear death, so it is a much greater boon to
+preserve one's life than to receive it. I have given life to one
+who will at once enjoy it, you gave it to one who knew not if he
+should ever live; I have given life to one who was in fear of
+death, your gift of life merely enables me to die; I have given you
+a life complete, perfect; you begat me without intelligence, a
+burden upon others. Do you wish to know how far from a benefit it
+was to give life under such conditions? You should have exposed me
+as a child, for you did me a wrong in begetting me. What do I
+gather from this? That the cohabitation of a father and mother is
+the very least of benefits to their child, unless in addition this
+beginning of kindnesses be followed up by others, and confirmed by
+other services. It is not a good thing to live, but to live well.
+"But," say you, "I do live well." True, but I might have lived ill;
+so that your part in me is merely this, that I live. If you claim
+merit to yourself for giving me mere life, bare and helpless, and
+boast of it as a great boon, reflect that this you claim merit for
+giving me is a boon which I possess in common with flies and worms.
+In the next place, if I say no more than that I have applied myself
+to honourable pursuits, and have guided the course of my life along
+the path of rectitude, then you have received more from your
+benefit than you gave; for you gave me to myself ignorant and
+unlearned, and I have returned to you a son such as you would wish
+to have begotten.
+
+XXXII. My father supported me. If I repay this kindness, I give him
+more than I received, because he has the pleasure, not only of
+being supported, but of being supported by a son, and receives more
+delight from my filial devotion than from the food itself, whereas
+the food which he used to give me merely affected my body. What? if
+any man rises so high as to become famous among nations for his
+eloquence, his justice, or his military skill, if much of the
+splendour of his renown is shed upon his father also, and by its
+clear light dispels the obscurity of his birth, does not such a man
+confer an inestimable benefit upon his parents? Would anyone have
+heard of Aristo and Gryllus except through Xenophon and Plato,
+their sons? Socrates keeps alive the memory of Sophroniscus. It
+would take long to recount the other men whose names survive for no
+other reason than that the admirable qualities of their sons have
+handed them down to posterity. Did the father of Marcus Agrippa, of
+whom nothing was known, even after Agrippa became famous, confer
+the greater benefit upon his son, or was that greater which Agrippa
+conferred upon his father when he gained the glory, unique in the
+annals of war, of a naval crown, and when he raised so many vast
+buildings in Rome, which not only surpassed all former grandeur,
+but have been surpassed by none since? Did Octavius confer a
+greater benefit upon his son, or the Emperor Augustus upon his
+father, obscured as he was by the intervention of an adoptive
+father? What joy would he have experienced, if, after the putting
+down of the civil war, he had seen his son ruling the state in
+peace and security? He would not have recognized the good which he
+had himself bestowed, and would hardly have believed, when he
+looked back upon himself, that so great a man could have been born
+in his house. Why should I go on to speak of others who would now
+be forgotten, if the glory of their sons had not raised them from
+obscurity, and kept them in the light until this day? In the next
+place, as we are not considering what son may have given back to
+his father greater benefits than he received from him, but whether
+a son can give back greater benefits, even if the examples which I
+have quoted are not sufficient, and such benefits do not outweigh
+the benefits bestowed by the parents, if no age has produced. an
+actual example, still it is not in the nature of things impossible.
+Though no solitary act can outweigh the deserts of a parent, yet
+many such acts combined by one son may do so.
+
+XXXIII. Scipio, while under seventeen years of age, rode among the
+enemy in battle, and saved his father's life. Was it not enough,
+that in order to reach his father he despised so many dangers when
+they were pressing hardest upon the greatest generals, that he, a
+novice in his first battle, made his way through so many obstacles,
+over the bodies of so many veteran soldiers, and showed strength
+and courage beyond his years? Add to this, that he also defended
+his father in court, and saved him from a plot of his powerful
+enemies, that he heaped upon him a second and a third consulship
+and other posts which were coveted even by consulars, that when his
+father was poor he bestowed upon him the plunder which he took by
+military licence, and that he made him rich with the spoils of the
+enemy, which is the greatest honour of a soldier. If even this did
+not repay his debt, add to it that he caused him to be constantly
+employed in the government of provinces and in special commands,
+add, that after he had destroyed the greatest cities, and became
+without a rival either in the east or in the west, the acknowledged
+protector and second founder of the Roman Empire, he bestowed upon
+one who was already of noble birth the higher title of "the father
+of Scipio;" can we doubt that the commonplace benefit of his birth
+was outdone by his exemplary conduct, and by the valour which was
+at once the glory and the protection of his country? Next, if this
+be not enough, suppose that a son were to rescue his father from
+the torture, or to undergo it in his stead. You can suppose the
+benefits returned by the son as great as you please, whereas the
+gift he received from his father was of one sort only, was easily
+performed, and was a pleasure to the giver; that he must
+necessarily have given the same thing to many others, even to some
+to whom he knows not that he has given it, that he had a partner in
+doing so, and that he had in view the law, patriotism, the rewards
+bestowed upon fathers of families by the state, the maintenance of
+his house and family: everything rather than him to whom he was
+giving life. What? supposing that any one were to learn philosophy
+and teach it to his father, could it be any longer disputed that
+the son had given him something greater than he had received from
+him, having returned to his father a happy life, whereas he had
+received from him merely life?
+
+XXXIV. "But," says our opponent, "whatever you do, whatever you are
+able to give to your father, is part of his benefit bestowed upon
+you." So it is the benefit of my teacher that I have become
+proficient in liberal studies; yet we pass on from those who taught
+them to us, at any rate from those who taught us the alphabet; and
+although no one can learn anything without them, yet it does not
+follow that whatsoever success one subsequently obtains, one is
+still inferior to those teachers. There is a great difference
+between the beginning of a thing and its final development; the
+beginning is not equal to the thing at its greatest, merely upon
+the ground that, without the beginning, it could never have become
+so great.
+
+XXXV. It is now time for me to bring forth something, so to speak,
+from my own mint. So long as there is something better than the
+benefit which a man bestows, he may be outdone. A father gives life
+to his son; there is something better than life; therefore a father
+may be outdone, because there is something better than the benefit
+which he has bestowed. Still further, he who has given any one his
+life, if he be more than once saved from peril of death by him, has
+received a greater benefit than he bestowed. Now, a father has
+given life to his son: if, therefore, he be more than once saved
+from peril by his son, he can receive a greater benefit than he
+gave. A benefit becomes greater to the receiver in proportion to
+his need of it. Now he who is alive needs life more than he who has
+not been born, seeing that such a one can have no need at all;
+consequently a father, if his life is saved by his son, receives a
+greater benefit than his son received from him by being born. It is
+said, "The benefits conferred by fathers cannot be outdone by those
+returned by their sons." Why? "Because the son received life from
+his father, and had he not received it, he could not have returned
+any benefits at all." A father has this in common with all those
+who have given any men their lives; it is impossible that these men
+could repay the debt if they had not received their life. Then I
+suppose one cannot overpay one's debt to a physician, for a
+physician gives life as well as a father; or to a sailor who has
+saved us when shipwrecked? Yet the benefits bestowed by these and
+by all the others who give us life in whatever fashion, can be
+outdone: consequently those of our fathers can be outdone. If any
+one bestows upon me a benefit which requires the help of benefits
+from many other persons, whereas I give him what requires no one to
+help it out, I have given more than I have received; now a father
+gave to his son a life which, without many accessories to preserve
+it, would perish; whereas a son, if he gives life to his father,
+gives him a life which requires no assistance to make it lasting;
+therefore the father who receives life from his son, receives a
+greater benefit than he himself bestowed upon his son.
+
+XXXVI. These considerations do not destroy the respect due to
+parents, or make their children behave worse to them, nay, better;
+for virtue is naturally ambitious, and wishes to outstrip those who
+are before it. Filial piety will be all the more eager, if, in
+returning a father's benefits, it can hope to outdo them; nor will
+this be against the will or the pleasure of the father, since in
+many contests it is to our advantage to be outdone. How does this
+contest become so desirable? How comes it to be such happiness to
+parents that they should confess themselves outdone by the benefits
+bestowed by their children? Unless we decide the matter thus, we
+give children an excuse, and make them less eager to repay their
+debt, whereas we ought to spur them on, saying, "Noble youths, give
+your attention to this! You are invited to contend in an honourable
+strife between parents and children, as to which party has received
+more than it has given. Your fathers have not necessarily won the
+day because they are first in the field: only take courage, as
+befits you, and do not give up the contest; you will conquer if you
+wish to do so. In this honourable warfare you will have no lack of
+leaders who will encourage you to perform deeds like their own, and
+bid you follow in their footsteps upon a path by which victory has
+often before now been won over parents.
+
+XXXVII. AEneas conquered his father in well doing, for he himself
+had been but a light and a safe burden for him when he was a child,
+yet he bore his father, when heavy with age, through the midst of
+the. enemy's lines and the crash of the city which was falling
+around him, albeit the devout old man, who bore the sacred images
+and the household gods in his hands, pressed him with more than his
+own weight; nevertheless (what cannot filial piety accomplish!)
+AEneas bore him safe through the blazing city, and placed him in
+safety, to be worshipped as one of the founders of the Roman
+Empire. Those Sicilian youths outdid their parents whom they bore
+away safe, when Aetna, roused to unusual fury, poured fire over
+cities and fields throughout a great part of the island. It is
+believed that the fires parted, and that the flames retired on
+either side, so as to leave a passage for these youths to pass
+through, who certainly deserved to perform their daring task in
+safety. Antigonus outdid his father when, after having conquered
+the enemy in a great battle, he transferred the fruits of it to
+him, and handed over to him the empire of Cyprus. This is true
+kingship, to choose not to be a king when you might. Manlius
+conquered his father, imperious [Footnote: There is an allusion to
+the surname of both the father and the son, "Imperiosus" given them
+on account of their severity.] though he was, when, in spite of his
+having previously been banished for a time by his father on,
+account of his dulness and stupidity as a boy, he came to an
+interview which he had demanded with the tribune of the people, who
+had filed an action against his father. The tribune had granted him
+the interview, hoping that he would betray his hated father, and
+believed that he had earned the gratitude of the youth, having,
+amongst other matters, reproached old Manlius with sending him into
+exile, treating it as a very serious accusation; but the youth,
+having caught him alone, drew a sword which he had hidden in his
+robe, and said, "Unless you swear to give up your suit against my
+father, I will run you through with this sword. It is in your power
+to decide how my father shall be freed from his prosecutor." The
+tribune swore, and kept his oath; he related the reason of his
+abandonment of his action to an assembly at the Rostra. No other
+man was ever permitted to put down a tribune with impunity.
+
+XXXVIII. There are instances without number of men who have saved
+their parents from danger, have raised them from the lowest to the
+highest station, and, taking them from the nameless mass of the
+lower classes, have given them a name glorious throughout all ages.
+By no force of words, by no power of genius, can one rightly
+express how desirable, how admirable, how never to be erased from
+human memory it is to be able to say, "I obeyed my parents, I gave
+way to them, I was submissive to their authority whether it was
+just, or unjust and harsh; the only point in which I resisted them
+was, not to be conquered by them in benefits." Continue this
+struggle, I beg of you, and even though weary, yet re-form your
+ranks. Happy are they who conquer, happy they who are conquered.
+What can be more glorious than the youth who can say to himself--it
+would not be right to say it to another--"I have conquered my
+father with benefits"? What is more fortunate than that old man who
+declares everywhere to everyone that he has been conquered in
+benefits by his son? What, again, is more blissful than to be
+overcome in such a contest?"
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IV.
+
+I.
+
+
+Of all the matters which we have discussed, Aebutius Liberalis,
+there is none more essential, or which, as Sallust says, ought to
+be stated with more care than that which is now before us: whether
+the bestowal of benefits and the return of gratitude for them are
+desirable objects in themselves. Some men are found who act
+honourably from commercial motives, and who do not care for
+unrewarded virtue, though it can confer no glory if it brings any
+profit. What can be more base than for a man to consider what it
+costs him to be a good man, when virtue neither allures by gain nor
+deters by loss, and is so far from bribing any one with hopes and
+promises, that on the other hand she bids them spend money upon
+herself, and often consists in voluntary gifts? We must go to her,
+trampling what is merely useful under our feet: whithersoever she
+may call us or send us we must go, without any regard for our
+private fortunes, sometimes without sparing even our own blood, nor
+must we ever refuse to obey any of her commands. "What shall I
+gain," says my opponent, "if I do this bravely and gratefully?" You
+will gain the doing of it--the deed itself is your gain. Nothing
+beyond this is promised. If any advantage chances to accrue to you,
+count it as something extra. The reward of honourable dealings lies
+in themselves. If honour is to be sought after for itself, since a
+benefit is honourable, it follows that because both of these are of
+the same nature, their conditions must also be the same. Now it has
+frequently and satisfactorily been proved, that honour ought to be
+sought after for itself alone.
+
+II. In this part of the subject we oppose the Epicureans, an
+effeminate and dreamy sect who philosophize in their own paradise,
+amongst whom virtue is the handmaid of pleasures, obeys them, is
+subject to them, and regards them as superior to itself. You say,
+"there is no pleasure without virtue." But wherefore is it superior
+to virtue? Do you imagine that the matter in dispute between them
+is merely one of precedence? Nay, it is virtue itself and its
+powers which are in question. It cannot be virtue if it can follow;
+the place of virtue is first, she ought to lead, to command, to
+stand in the highest rank; you bid her look for a cue to follow.
+"What," asks our opponent, "does that matter to you? I also declare
+that happiness is impossible without virtue. Without virtue I
+disapprove of and condemn the very pleasures which I pursue, and to
+which I have surrendered myself. The only matter in dispute is
+this, whether virtue be the cause of the highest good, or whether
+it be itself the highest good." Do you suppose, though this be the
+only point in question, that it is a mere matter of precedence? It
+is a confusion and obvious blindness to prefer the last to the
+first. I am not angry at virtue being placed below pleasure, but at
+her being mixed up at all with pleasure, which she despises, whose
+enemy she is, and from which she separates herself as far as
+possible, being more at home with labour and sorrow, which are
+manly troubles, than with your womanish good things.
+
+III. It was necessary to insert this argument, my Liberalis,
+because it is the part of virtue to bestow those benefits which we
+are now discussing, and it is most disgraceful to bestow benefits
+for any other purpose than that they should be free gifts. If we
+give with the hope of receiving a return, we should give to the
+richest men, not to the most deserving: whereas we prefer a
+virtuous poor man to an unmannerly rich one. That is not a benefit,
+which takes into consideration the fortune of the receiver.
+Moreover, if our only motive for benefiting others was our own
+advantage, those who could most easily distribute benefits, such as
+rich and powerful men, or kings, and persons who do not stand in
+need of the help of others, ought never to do so at all; the gods
+would not bestow upon us the countless blessings which they pour
+upon us unceasingly by night and by day, for their own nature
+suffices them in all respects, and renders them complete, safe, and
+beyond the reach of harm; they will, therefore, never bestow a
+benefit upon any one, if self and self interest be the only cause
+for the bestowal of benefits. To take thought, not where your
+benefit will be best bestowed, but where it may be most profitably
+placed at interest, from whence you will most easily get it back,
+is not bestowal of benefits, but usury. Now the gods have nothing
+to do with usury; it follows, therefore, that they cannot be
+liberal; for if the only reason for giving is the advantage of the
+giver, since God cannot hope to receive any advantages from us,
+there is no cause why God should give anything.
+
+IV. I know what answer may be made to this. "True; therefore God
+does not bestow benefits, but, free from care and unmindful of us,
+He turns away from our world and either does something else, or
+else does nothing, which Epicurus thought the greatest possible
+happiness, and He is not affected either by benefits or by
+injuries." The man who says this cannot surely hear the voices of
+worshippers, and of those who all around him are raising their
+hands to heaven and praying for the success both of their private
+affairs and those of the state; which certainly would not be the
+case, all men would not agree in this madness of appealing to deaf
+and helpless gods, unless we knew that their benefits are sometimes
+bestowed upon us unasked, sometimes in answer to our prayers, and
+that they give us both great and seasonable gifts, which shield us
+from the most terrible dangers. Who is there so poor, so uncared
+for, born to sorrow by so unkind a fate, as never to have felt the
+vast generosity of the Gods? Look even at those who complain and
+are discontented with their lot; you will find that they are not
+altogether without a share in the bounty of heaven, that there is
+no one upon whom something has not been shed from that most
+gracious fount. Is the gift which is bestowed upon all alike, at
+their birth, not enough? However unequally the blessings of after
+life may be dealt out to us, did nature give us too little when she
+gave us herself?
+
+V. It is said, "God does not bestow benefits." Whence, then, comes
+all that you possess, that you give or refuse to give, that you
+hoard or steal? whence come these innumerable delights of our eyes,
+our ears, and our minds? whence the plenty which provides us even
+with luxury--for it is not our bare necessities alone against which
+provision is made; we are loved so much as actually to be pampered--
+whence so many trees bearing various fruits, so many wholesome
+herbs, so many different sorts of food distributed throughout the
+year, so that even the slothful may find sustenance in the chance
+produce of the earth? Then, too, whence come the living creatures
+of all kinds, some inhabiting the dry land, others the waters,
+others alighting from the sky, that every part of nature may pay us
+some tribute; the rivers which encircle our meadows with most
+beauteous bends, the others which afford a passage to merchant
+fleets as they flow on, wide and navigable, some of which in summer
+time are subject to extraordinary overflowings in order that lands
+lying parched under a glowing sun may suddenly be watered by the
+rush of a midsummer torrent?
+
+What of the fountains of medicinal waters? What of the bursting
+forth of warm waters upon the seashore itself? Shall I
+
+ "Tell of the seas round Italy that flow,
+ Which laves her shore above, and which below;
+ Or of her lakes, unrivalled Larius, thee,
+ Or thee, Benacus, roaring like a sea?"
+
+VI. If any one gave you a few acres, you would say that you had
+received a benefit; can you deny that the boundless extent of the
+earth is a benefit? If any one gave you money, and filled your
+chest, since you think that so important, you would call that a
+benefit. God has buried countless mines in the earth, has poured
+out from the earth countless rivers, rolling sands of gold; He has
+concealed in every place huge masses of silver, copper and iron,
+and has bestowed upon you the means of discovering them, placing
+upon the surface of the earth signs of the treasures hidden below;
+and yet do you say that you have received no benefit? If a house
+were given you, bright with marble, its roof beautifully painted
+with colours and gilding, you would call it no small benefit. God
+has built for you a huge mansion that fears no fire or ruin, in
+which you see no flimsy veneers, thinner than the very saw with
+which they are cut, but vast blocks of most precious stone, all
+composed of those various and different substances whose paltriest
+fragments you admire so much; he has built a roof which glitters in
+one fashion by day, and in another by night; and yet do you say
+that you have received no benefit? When you so greatly prize what
+you possess, do you act the part of an ungrateful man, and think
+that there is no one to whom you are indebted for them? Whence
+comes the breath which you draw? the light by which you arrange and
+perform all the actions of your life? the blood by whose
+circulation your vital warmth is maintained? those meats which
+excite your palate by their delicate flavour after your hunger is
+appeased? those provocatives which rouse you when wearied with
+pleasure? that repose in which you are rotting and mouldering? Will
+you not, if you are grateful, say--
+
+ "'Tis to a god that this repose I owe,
+ For him I worship, as a god below.
+ Oft on his altar shall my firstlings bleed,
+ See, by his bounty here with rustic reed
+ I play the airs I love the livelong day,
+ The while my oxen round about me stray."
+
+The true God is he who has placed, not a few oxen, but all the
+herds on their pastures throughout the world; who furnishes food to
+the flocks wherever they wander; who has ordained the alternation
+of summer and winter pasturage, and has taught us not merely to
+play upon a reed, and to reduce to some order a rustic and artless
+song, but who has invented so many arts and varieties of voice, so
+many notes to make music, some with our own breath, some with
+instruments. You cannot call our inventions our own any more than
+you call our growth our own, or the various bodily functions which
+correspond to each stage of our lives; at one time comes the loss
+of childhood's teeth, at another, when our age is advancing and
+growing into robuster manhood, puberty and the last wisdom-tooth
+marks the end of our youth. "We have implanted in us the seeds of
+all ages, of all arts, and God our master brings forth our
+intellects from obscurity.
+
+VII. "Nature," says my opponent, "gives me all this." Do you not
+perceive when you say this that you merely speak of God under
+another name? for what is nature but God and divine reason, which
+pervades the universe and all its parts? You may address the author
+of our world by as many different titles as you please; you may
+rightly call him Jupiter, Best and Greatest, and the Thunderer, or
+the Stayer, so called, not because, as the historians tell us, he
+stayed the flight of the Roman army in answer to the prayer of
+Romulus, but because all things continue in their stay through his
+goodness. If you were to call this same personage Fate, you would
+not lie; for since fate is nothing more than a connected chain of
+causes, he is the first cause of all upon which all the rest
+depend. You will also be right in applying to him any names that
+you please which express supernatural strength and power: he may
+have as many titles as he has attributes.
+
+VIII. Our school regards him as Father Liber, and Hercules, and
+Mercurius: he is Father Liber because he is the parent of all, who
+first discovered the power of seed, and our being led by pleasure
+to plant it; he is Hercules, because his might is unconquered, and
+when it is wearied after completing its labours, will retire into
+fire; he is Mercurius, because in him is reasoning, and numbers,
+and system, and knowledge. Whither-soever you turn yourself you
+will see him meeting you: nothing is void of him, he himself fills
+his own work. Therefore, most ungrateful of mortals, it is in vain
+that you declare yourself indebted, not to God, but to nature,
+because there can be no God without nature, nor any nature without
+God; they are both the same thing, differing only in their
+functions. If you were to say that you owe to Annaeus or to Lucius
+what you received from Seneca, you would not change your creditor,
+but only his name, because he remains the same man whether you use
+his first, second, or third name. So whether you speak of nature,
+fate, or fortune, these are all names of the same God, using his
+power in different ways. So likewise justice, honesty, discretion,
+courage, frugality, are all the good qualities of one and the same
+mind; if you are pleased with any one of these, you are pleased
+with that mind.
+
+IX. However, not to drift aside into a distinct controversy, God
+bestows upon us very many and very great benefits without hope of
+receiving any return; since he does not require any offering from
+us, and we are not capable of bestowing anything upon him:
+wherefore, a benefit is desirable in itself. In it the advantage of
+the receiver is all that is taken into consideration: we study this
+without regarding our own interests. "Yet," argues our opponent,
+"you say that we ought to choose with care the persons upon whom we
+bestow benefits, because neither do husbandmen sow seed in the
+sand: now if this be true, we follow our own interest in bestowing
+benefits, just as much as in ploughing and sowing: for sowing is
+not desirable in itself. Besides this you inquire where and how you
+ought to bestow a benefit, which would not need to be done if the
+bestowal of a benefit was desirable in itself: because in whatever
+place and whatever manner it might be bestowed, it still would be
+a benefit." We seek to do honourable acts, solely because they are
+honourable; yet even though we need think of nothing else, we
+consider to whom we shall do them, and when, and how; for in these
+points the act has its being. In like manner, when I choose upon
+whom I shall bestow a benefit, and when I aim at making it a
+benefit; because if it were bestowed upon a base person, it could
+neither be a benefit nor an honourable action.
+
+X. To restore what has been entrusted to one is desirable in
+itself; yet I shall not always restore it, nor shall I do so in any
+place or at any time you please. Sometimes it makes no difference
+whether I deny that I have received it, or return it openly. I
+shall consider the interests of the person to whom I am to return
+it, and shall deny that I have received a deposit, which would
+injure him if returned. I shall act in the same manner in bestowing
+a benefit: I shall consider when to give it, to whom, in what
+manner, and on what grounds. Nothing ought to be done without a
+reason: a benefit is not truly so, if it be bestowed without a
+reason, since reason accompanies all honorable action. How often do
+we hear men reproaching themselves for some thoughtless gift, and
+saying, "I had rather have thrown it away than have given it to
+him!" What is thoughtlessly given away is lost in the most
+discreditable manner, and it is much worse to have bestowed a
+benefit badly than to have received no return for it; that we
+receive no return is the fault of another; that we did not choose
+upon whom we should bestow it, is our own. In choosing a fit
+person, I shall not, as you expect, pay the least attention to
+whether I am likely to get any return from him, for I choose one
+who will be grateful, not one who will return my goodness, and it
+often happens that the man who makes no return is grateful, while
+he who returns a benefit is ungrateful for it. I value men by their
+hearts alone, and, therefore, I shall pass over a rich man if he be
+unworthy, and give to a good man though he be poor; for he will be
+grateful however destitute he may be, since whatever he may lose,
+his heart will still be left him.
+
+XI. I do not fish for gain, for pleasure, or for credit, by
+bestowing benefits: satisfied in doing so with pleasing one man
+alone, I shall give in order to do my duty. Duty, however, leaves
+one some choice; do you ask me, how I am to choose? I shall choose
+an honest, plain, man, with a good memory, and grateful for
+kindness; one who keeps his hands off other men's goods, yet does
+not greedily hold to his own, and who is kind to others; when I
+have chosen such a man, I shall have acted to my mind, although
+fortune may have bestowed upon him no means of returning my
+kindness. If my own advantage and mean calculation made me liberal,
+if I did no one any service except in order that he might in turn
+do a service to me, I should never bestow a benefit upon one who
+was setting out for distant and foreign countries, never to return;
+I should not bestow a benefit upon one who was so ill as to be past
+hope of recovery, nor should I do so when I myself was failing,
+because I should not live long enough to receive any return. Yet,
+that you may know that to do good is desirable in itself, we afford
+help to strangers who put into our harbour only to leave it
+straightway; we give a ship and fit it out for a shipwrecked
+stranger to sail back in to his own country. He leaves us hardly
+knowing who it was who saved him, and, as he will never return to
+our presence, he hands over his debt of gratitude to the gods, and
+beseeches them to fulfil it for him: in the meanwhile we rejoice in
+the barren knowledge that we have done a good action. What? when we
+stand upon the extreme verge of life, and make our wills, do we not
+assign to others benefits from which we ourselves shall receive no
+advantage? How much time we waste, how long we consider in secret
+how much property we are to leave, and to whom! What then? does it
+make any difference to us to whom we leave our property, seeing
+that we cannot expect any return from any one? Yet we never give
+anything with more care, we never take such pains in deciding upon
+our verdict, as when, without any views of personal advantage, we
+think only of what is honourable, for we are bad judges of our duty
+as long as our view of it is distorted by hope and fear, and that
+most indolent of vices, pleasure: but when death has shut off all
+these, and brought us as incorrupt judges to pronounce sentence, we
+seek for the most worthy men to leave our property to, and we never
+take more scrupulous care than in deciding what is to be done with
+what does not concern us. Yet, by Hercules, then there steals over
+us a great satisfaction as we think, "I shall make this man richer,
+and by bestowing wealth upon that man I shall add lustre to his
+high position." Indeed, if we never give without expecting some
+return, we must all die without making our wills.
+
+XII. It may be said, "You define a benefit as a loan which cannot
+be repaid: now a loan is not a desirable thing in itself." When we
+speak of a loan, we make use of a figure, or comparison, just as we
+speak of law as; the standard of right and wrong, although a
+standard is not a thing to be desired for its own sake. I have
+adopted this phrase in order to illustrate my subject: when I speak
+of a loan, I must be understood to mean something resembling a
+loan. Do you wish to know how it differs from one? I add the words
+"which cannot be repaid," whereas every loan both can and ought to
+be repaid. It is so far from being right to bestow a benefit for
+one's own advantage, that often, as I have explained, it is one's
+duty to bestow it when it involves one's own loss and risk: for
+instance, if I assist a man when beset by robbers, so that he gets
+away from them safely, or help some victim of power, and bring upon
+myself the party spite of a body of influential men, very, probably
+incurring myself the same disgrace from which I saved him, although
+I might have taken the other side, and looked on with safety at
+struggles with which I have nothing to do: if I were to give bail
+for one who has been condemned, and when my friend's goods were
+advertised for sale I were to give a bond to the effect that I
+would make restitution to the creditors, if, in order to save a
+proscribed person I myself run the risk of being proscribed. No
+one, when about to buy a villa at Tusculum or Tibur, for a summer
+retreat, because of the health of the locality, considers how many
+years' purchase he gives for it; this must be looked to by the man
+who makes a profit by it. The same is true with benefits; when you
+ask what return I get for them, I answer, the consciousness of a
+good action. "What return does one get for benefits?" Pray tell me
+what return one gets for righteousness, innocence, magnanimity,
+chastity, temperance? If you wish for anything beyond these
+virtues, you do not wish for the virtues themselves. For what does
+the order of the universe bring round the seasons? for what does
+the sun make the day now longer and now shorter? all these things
+are benefits, for they take place for our good. As it is the duty
+of the universe to maintain the round of the seasons, as it is the
+duty of the sun to vary the points of his rising and setting, and
+to do all these things by which we profit, without any reward, so
+is it the duty of man, amongst other things, to bestow benefits.
+Wherefore then does he give? He gives for fear that he should not
+give, lest he might lose an opportunity of doing a good action.
+
+XIII. You Epicureans take pleasure in making a study of dull
+torpidity, in seeking for a repose which differs little from sound
+sleep, in lurking beneath the thickest shade, in amusing with the
+feeblest possible trains of thought that sluggish condition of your
+languid minds which you term tranquil contemplation, and in
+stuffing with food and drink, in the recesses of your gardens, your
+bodies which are pallid with want of exercise; we Stoics, on the
+other hand, take pleasure in bestowing benefits, even though they
+cost us labour, provided that they lighten the labours of others;
+though they lead us into danger, provided that they save others,
+though they straiten our means, if they alleviate the poverty and
+distresses of others. What difference does it make to me whether I
+receive benefits or not? even if I receive them, it is still my
+duty to bestow them. A benefit has in view the advantage of him
+upon whom we bestow it, not our own; otherwise we merely bestow it
+upon ourselves. Many things, therefore, which are of the greatest
+possible use to others lose all claim to gratitude by being paid
+for. Merchants are of use to cities, physicians to invalids,
+dealers to slaves; yet all these have no claim to the gratitude of
+those whom they benefit, because they seek their own advantage
+through that of others. That which is bestowed with a view to
+profit is not a benefit. "I will give this in order that I may get
+a return for it" is the language of a broker.
+
+XIV. I should not call a woman modest, if she rebuffed her lover in
+order to increase his passion, or because she feared the law or her
+husband; as Ovid says:
+
+ "She that denies, because she does not dare
+ To yield, in spirit grants her lover's prayer."
+
+Indeed, the woman who owes her chastity, not to her own virtue, but
+to fear, may rightly be classed as a sinner. In the same manner, he
+who merely gave in order that he might receive, cannot be said to
+have given. Pray, do we bestow benefits upon animals when we feed
+them for our use or for our table? do we bestow benefits upon trees
+when we tend them that they may not suffer from drought or from
+hardness of ground? No one is moved by righteousness and goodness
+of heart to cultivate an estate, or to do any act in which the
+reward is something apart from the act itself; but he is moved to
+bestow benefits, not by low and grasping motives, but by a kind and
+generous mind, which even after it has given is willing to give
+again, to renew its former bounties by fresh ones, which thinks
+only of how much good it can do the man to whom it gives; whereas
+to do any one a service because it is our interest to do so is a
+mean action, which deserves no praise, no credit. What grandeur is
+there in loving oneself, sparing oneself, gaining profit for
+oneself? The true love of giving calls us away from all this,
+forcibly leads us to put up with loss, and foregoes its own
+interest, deriving its greatest pleasure from the mere act of doing
+good.
+
+XV. Can we doubt that the converse of a benefit is an injury? As
+the infliction of injuries is a thing to be avoided, so is the
+bestowal of benefits to be desired for its own sake. In the former,
+the disgrace of crime outweighs all the advantages which incite us
+to commit it; while we are urged to the latter course by the
+appearance of honour, in itself a powerful incentive to action,
+which attends it.
+
+I should not lie if I were to affirm that every one takes pleasure
+in the benefits which he has bestowed, that everyone loves best to
+see the man whom he has most largely benefited. Who does not thinks
+that to have bestowed one benefit is a reason for bestowing a
+second? and would this be so, if the act of giving did not itself
+give us pleasure? How often you may hear a man say, "I cannot bear
+to desert one whose life I have preserved, whom I have saved from
+danger. True, he asks me to plead his cause against men of great
+influence. I do not wish to do so, yet what am I to do? I have
+already helped him once, nay twice." Do you not perceive how very
+powerful this instinct must be, if it leads us to bestow benefits
+first because it is right to do so, and afterwards because we have
+already bestowed somewhat? Though at the outset a man may have had
+no claim upon us, we yet continue to give to him because we have
+already given to him. So untrue is it that we are urged to bestow
+benefits by our own interest, that even when our benefits prove
+failures we continue to nurse them and encourage them out of sheer
+love of benefiting, which has a natural weakness even for what has
+been ill-bestowed, like that which we feel for our vicious
+children.
+
+XVI. These same adversaries of ours admit that they are grateful,
+yet not because it is honourable, but because it is profitable to
+be so. This can be proved to be untrue all the more easily, because
+it can be established by the same arguments by which we have
+established that to bestow a benefit is desirable for its own sake.
+All our arguments start from this settled point, that honour is
+pursued for no reason except because it is honour. Now, who will
+venture to raise the question whether it be honourable to be
+grateful? who does not loathe the ungrateful man, useless as he is
+even to himself? How do you feel when any one is spoken of as being
+ungrateful for great benefits conferred upon him by a friend? Is it
+as though he had done something base, or had merely neglected to do
+something useful and likely to be profitable to himself? I imagine
+that you think him a bad man, and one who deserves punishment, not
+one who needs a guardian; and this would not be the case, unless
+gratitude were desirable in itself and honourable. Other qualities,
+it may be, manifest their importance less clearly, and require an
+explanation to prove whether they be honourable or no; this is
+openly proved to be so in the sight of all, and is too beautiful
+for anything to obscure or dim its glory. What is more
+praiseworthy, upon what are all men more universally agreed, than
+to return gratitude for good offices?
+
+XVII. Pray tell me, what is it that urges us to do so? Is it
+profit? Why, unless a man despises profit, he is not grateful. Is
+it ambition? why, what is there to boast of in having paid what you
+owe? Is it fear? The ungrateful man feels none, for against this
+one crime we have provided no law, as though nature had taken
+sufficient precautions against it. Just as there is no law which
+bids parents love and indulge their children, seeing that it is
+superfluous to force us into the path which we naturally take, just
+as no one needs to be urged to love himself, since self-love begins
+to act upon him as soon as he is born, so there is no law bidding
+us to seek that which is honourable in itself; for such things
+please us by their very nature, and so attractive is virtue that
+the disposition even of bad men leads them to approve of good
+rather than of evil. Who is there who does not wish to appear
+beneficent, who does not even when steeped in crime and wrong-doing
+strive after the appearance of goodness, does not put some show of
+justice upon even his most intemperate acts, and endeavour to seem
+to have conferred a benefit even upon those whom he has injured?
+Consequently, men allow themselves to be thanked by those whom they
+have ruined, and pretend to be good and generous, because they
+cannot prove themselves so; and this they never would do were it
+not that a love of honour for its own sake forces them to seek a
+reputation quite at variance with their real character, and to
+conceal their baseness, a quality whose fruits we covet, though we
+regard it itself with dislike and shame. No one has ever so far
+rebelled against the laws of nature and put off human feeling as to
+act basely for mere amusement. Ask any of those who live by robbery
+whether he would not rather obtain what he steals and plunders by
+honest means; the man whose trade is highway robbery and the murder
+of travellers would rather find his booty than take it by force;
+you will find no one who would not prefer to enjoy the fruits of
+wickedness without acting wickedly. Nature bestows upon us all this
+immense advantage, that the light of virtue shines into the minds
+of all alike; even those who do not follow her, behold her.
+
+XVIII. A proof that gratitude is desirable for itself lies in the
+fact that ingratitude is to be avoided for itself, because no vice
+more powerfully rends asunder and destroys the union of the human
+race. To what do we trust for safety, if not in mutual good offices
+one to another? It is by the interchange of benefits alone that we
+gain some measure of protection for our lives, and of safety
+against sudden disasters. Taken singly, what should we be? a prey
+and quarry for wild beasts, a luscious and easy banquet; for while
+all other animals have sufficient strength to protect themselves,
+and those which are born to a wandering solitary life are armed,
+man is covered by a soft skin, has no powerful teeth or claws with
+which to terrify other creatures, but weak and naked by himself is
+made strong by union.
+
+God has bestowed upon him two gifts, reason and union, which raise
+him from weakness to the highest power; and so he, who if taken
+alone would be inferior to every other creature, possesses supreme
+dominion. Union has given him sovereignty over all animals; union
+has enabled a being born upon the earth to assume power over a
+foreign element, and bids him be lord of the sea also; it is union
+which has checked the inroads of disease, provided supports for our
+old age, and given us relief from pain; it is union which makes us
+strong, and to which we look for protection against the caprices of
+fortune. Take away union, and you will rend asunder the association
+by which the human race preserves its existence; yet you will take
+it away if you succeed in proving that ingratitude is not to be
+avoided for itself, but because something is to be feared for it;
+for how many are there who can with safety be ungrateful? In fine,
+I call every man ungrateful who is merely made grateful by fear.
+
+XIX. No sane man fears the gods; for it is madness to fear what is
+beneficial, and no man loves those whom he fears. You, Epicurus,
+ended by making God unarmed; you stripped him of all weapons, of
+all power, and, lest anyone should fear him, you banished him out
+of the world. There is no reason why you should fear this being,
+cut off as he is, and separated from the sight and touch of mortals
+by a vast and impassable wall; he has no power either of rewarding
+or of injuring us; he dwells alone half-way between our heaven and
+that of another world, without the society either of animals, of
+men, or of matter, avoiding the crash of worlds as they fall in
+ruins above and around him, but neither hearing our prayers nor
+interested in us. Yet you wish to seem to worship this being just
+as a father, with a mind, I suppose, full of gratitude; or, if you
+do not wish to seem grateful, why should you worship him, since you
+have received no benefit from him, but have been put together
+entirely at random and by chance by those atoms and mites of yours?
+"I worship him," you answer, "because of his glorious majesty and
+his unique nature." Granting that you do this, you clearly do it
+without the attraction of any reward, or any hope; there is
+therefore something which is desirable for itself, whose own worth
+attracts you, that is, honour. Now what is more honourable than
+gratitude? the means of practising this virtue are as extensive as
+life itself.
+
+XX. "Yet," argues he, "there is also a certain amount of profit
+inherent in this virtue." In what virtue is there not? But that
+which we speak of as desirable for itself is such, that although it
+may possess some attendant advantages, yet it would be desirable
+even if stripped of all these. It is profitable to be grateful; yet
+I will be grateful even though it harm me. What is the aim of the
+grateful man? is it that his gratitude may win for him more friends
+and more benefits? What then? If a man is likely to meet with
+affronts by showing his gratitude, if he knows that far from
+gaining anything by it, he must lose much even of what he has
+already acquired, will he not cheerfully act to his own
+disadvantage? That man is ungrateful who, in returning a kindness,
+looks forward to a second gift--who hopes while he repays. I call
+him ungrateful who sits at the bedside of a sick man because he is
+about to make a will, when he is at leisure to think of
+inheritances and legacies. Though he may do everything which a good
+and dutiful friend ought to do, yet, if any hope of gain be
+floating in his mind, he is a mere legacy-hunter, and is angling
+for an inheritance. Like the birds which feed upon carcases, which
+come close to animals weakened by disease, and watch till they
+fall, so these men are attracted by death and hover around a
+corpse.
+
+XXI. A grateful mind is attracted only by a sense of the beauty of
+its purpose. Do you wish to know this to be so, and that it is not
+bribed by ideas of profit? There are two classes of grateful men: a
+man is called grateful who has made some return for what he
+received; this man may very possibly display himself in this
+character, he has something to boast of, to refer to. We also call
+a man grateful who receives a benefit with goodwill, and owes it to
+his benefactor with goodwill; yet this man's gratitude lies
+concealed within his own mind. What profit can accrue to him from
+this latent feeling? yet this man, even though he is not able to do
+anything more than this, is grateful; he loves his benefactor, he
+feels his debt to him, he longs to repay his kindness; whatever
+else you may find wanting, there is nothing wanting in the man. He
+is like a workman who has not the tools necessary for the practice
+of his craft, or like a trained singer whose voice cannot be heard
+through the noise of those who interrupt him. I wish to repay a
+kindness: after this there still remains something for me to do,
+not in order that I may become grateful, but that I may discharge
+my debt; for, in many cases, he who returns a kindness is
+ungrateful for it, and he who does not return it is grateful. Like
+all other virtues, the whole value of gratitude lies in the spirit
+in which it is done; so, if this man's purpose be loyal, any
+shortcomings on his part are due not to himself, but to fortune. A
+man who is silent may, nevertheless, be eloquent; his hands may be
+folded or even bound, and he may yet be strong; just as a pilot is
+a pilot even when upon dry land, because his knowledge is complete,
+and there is nothing wanting to it, though there may be obstacles
+which prevent his making use of it. In the same way, a man is
+grateful who only wishes to be so, and who has no one but himself
+who can bear witness to his frame of mind. I will go even further
+than this: a man sometimes is grateful when he appears to be
+ungrateful, when ill-judging report has declared him to be so. Such
+a man can look to nothing but his own conscience, which can please
+him even when overwhelmed by calumny, which contradicts the mob and
+common rumour, relies only upon itself, and though it beholds a
+vast crowd of the other way of thinking opposed to it, does not
+count heads, but wins by its own vote alone. Should it see its own
+good faith meet with the punishment due to treachery, it will not
+descend from its pedestal, and will remain superior to its
+punishment. "I have," it says, "what I wished, what I strove for. I
+do not regret it, nor shall I do so; nor shall fortune, however
+unjust she may be, ever hear me say, 'What did I want? What now is
+the use of having meant well?'" A good conscience is of value on
+the rack, or in the fire; though fire be applied to each of our
+limbs, gradually encircle our living bodies, and burst our heart,
+yet if our heart be filled with a good conscience, it will rejoice
+in the fire which will make its good faith shine before the world.
+
+XXII. Now let that question also which has been already stated be
+again brought forward; Why is it that we should wish to be grateful
+when we are dying, that we should carefully weigh the various
+services rendered us by different individuals, and carefully review
+our whole life, that we may not seem to have forgotten any
+kindness? Nothing then remains for us to hope for; yet when on the
+very threshold, we wish to depart from human life as full of
+gratitude as possible. There is in truth an immense reward for this
+thing merely in doing it, and what is honourable has great power to
+attract men's minds, which are overwhelmed by its beauty and
+carried off their balance, enchanted by its brilliancy and
+splendour. "Yet," argues our adversary, "from it many advantages
+take their rise, and good men obtain a safer life and love, and the
+good opinion of the better class, while their days are spent in
+greater security when accompanied by innocence and gratitude."
+
+Indeed, nature would have been most unjust had she rendered this
+great blessing miserable, uncertain, and fruitless. But consider
+this point, whether you would make your way to that virtue, to
+which it is generally safe and easy to attain, even though the path
+lay over rocks and precipices, and were beset with fierce beasts
+and venomous serpents. A virtue is none the less to be desired for
+its own sake, because it has some adventitious profit connected
+with it: indeed, in most cases the noblest virtues are accompanied
+by many extraneous advantages, but it is the virtues that lead the
+way, and these merely follow in their train.
+
+XXIII. Can we doubt that the climate of this abode of the human
+race is regulated by the motion of the sun and moon in their
+orbits? that our bodies are sustained, the hard earth loosened,
+excessive moisture reduced, and the surly bonds of winter broken by
+the heat of the one, and that crops are brought to ripeness by the
+effectual all-pervading warmth of the other? that the fertility of
+the human race corresponds to the courses of the moon? that the sun
+by its revolution marks out the year, and that the moon, moving in
+a smaller orbit, marks out the months? Yet, setting aside all this,
+would not the sun be a sight worthy to be contemplated and
+worshipped, if he did no more than rise and set? would not the moon
+be worth looking at, even if it passed uselessly through the
+heavens? Whose attention is not arrested by the universe itself,
+when by night it pours forth its fires and glitters with
+innumerable stars? Who, while he admires them, thinks of their
+being of use to him? Look at that great company gliding over our
+heads, how they conceal their swift motion under the semblance of a
+fixed and immovable work. How much takes place in that night which
+you make use of merely to mark and count your days! What a mass of
+events is being prepared in that silence! What a chain of destiny
+their unerring path is forming! Those which you imagine to be
+merely strewn about for ornament are really one and all at work.
+Nor is there any ground for your belief that only seven stars
+revolve, and that the rest remain still: we understand the orbits
+of a few, but countless divinities, further removed from our sight,
+come and go; while the greater part of those whom our sight reaches
+move in a mysterious manner and by an unknown path.
+
+XXIV. What then? would you not be captivated by the sight of such a
+stupendous work, even though it did not cover you, protect you,
+cherish you, bring you into existence and penetrate you with its
+spirit? Though these heavenly bodies are of the very first
+importance to us, and are, indeed, essential to our life, yet we
+can think of nothing but their glorious majesty, and similarly all
+virtue, especially that of gratitude, though it confers great
+advantages upon us, does not wish to be loved for that reason; it
+has something more in it than this, and he who merely reckons it
+among useful things does not perfectly comprehend it. A man, you
+say, is grateful because it is to his advantage to be so. If this
+be the case, then his advantage will be the measure of his
+gratitude. Virtue will not admit a covetous lover; men must
+approach her with open purse. The ungrateful man thinks, "I did
+wish to be grateful, but I fear the expense and danger and insults
+to which I should expose myself: I will rather consult my own
+interest." Men cannot be rendered grateful and ungrateful by the
+same line of reasoning: their actions are as distinct as their
+purposes. The one is ungrateful, although it is wrong, because it
+is his interest; the other is grateful, although it is not his
+interest, because it is right.
+
+XXV. It is our aim to live in harmony with the scheme of the
+universe, and to follow the example of the gods. Yet in all their
+acts the gods have no object in view other than the act itself,
+unless you suppose that they obtain a reward for their work in the
+smoke of burnt sacrifices and the scent of incense. See what great
+things they do every day, how much they divide amongst us, with how
+great crops they fill the earth, how they move the seas with
+convenient winds to carry us to all shores, how by the fall of
+sudden showers they soften the ground, renew the dried-up springs
+of fountains, and call them into new life by unseen supplies of
+water. All this they do without reward, without any advantage
+accruing to themselves. Let our line of conduct, if it would not
+depart from its model, preserve this direction, and let us not act
+honourably because we are hired to do so. We ought to feel ashamed
+that any benefit should have a price: we pay nothing for the gods.
+
+XXVI. "If," our adversary may say, "you wish to imitate the gods,
+then bestow benefits upon the ungrateful as well as the grateful;
+for the sun rises upon the wicked as well as the good, the seas are
+open even to pirates." By this question he really asks whether a
+good man would bestow a benefit upon an ungrateful person, knowing
+him to be ungrateful. Allow me here to introduce a short
+explanation, that we may not be taken in by a deceitful question.
+Understand that according to the system of the Stoics there are two
+classes of ungrateful persons. One man is ungrateful because he is
+a fool; a fool is a bad man; a man who is bad possesses every vice:
+therefore he is ungrateful. In the same way we speak of all bad men
+as dissolute, avaricious, luxurious, and spiteful, not because each
+man has all these vices in any great or remarkable degree, but
+because he might have them; they are in him, even though they be
+not seen. The second form of ungrateful person is he who is
+commonly meant by the term, one who is inclined by nature to this
+vice. In the case of him who has the vice of ingratitude just as he
+has every other, a wise man will bestow a benefit, because if he
+sets aside all such men there will be no one left for him to bestow
+it on. As for the ungrateful man who habitually misapplies benefits
+and acts so by choice, he will no more bestow a benefit upon him
+than he would lend money to a spendthrift, or place a deposit in
+the hands of one who had already often refused to many persons to
+give up the property with which they had entrusted him.
+
+XXVII. We call some men timid because they are fools: in this they
+are like the bad men who are steeped in all vices without
+distinction. Strictly speaking, we call those persons timid who are
+alarmed even at unmeaning noises. A fool possesses all vices, but
+he is not equally inclined by nature to all; one is prone to
+avarice, another to luxury, and another to insolence. Those
+persons, therefore, are mistaken, who ask the Stoics, "What do you
+say, then? is Achilles timid? Aristides, who received a name for
+justice, is he unjust? Fabius, who 'by delays retrieved the day,'
+is he rash? Does Decius fear death? Is Mucius a traitor? Camillus a
+betrayer?" We do not mean that all vices are inherent in all men in
+the same way in which some especial ones are noticeable in certain
+men, but we declare that the bad man and the fool possess all
+vices; we do not even acquit them of fear when they are rash, or of
+avarice when they are extravagant. Just as a man has all his
+senses, yet all men have not on that account as keen a sight as
+Lynceus, so a man that is a fool has not all vices in so active and
+vigorous a form as some persons have spine of them, yet he has them
+all. All vices exist in all of them, yet all are not prominent in
+each individual. One man is naturally prone to avarice, another is
+the slave of wine, a third of lust; or, if not yet enslaved by
+these passions, he is so fashioned by nature that this is the
+direction in which his character would probably lead him.
+Therefore, to return to my original proposition, every bad man is
+ungrateful, because he has the seeds of every villainy in him; but
+he alone is rightly so called who is naturally inclined to this
+vice. Upon such a person as this, therefore, I shall not bestow a
+benefit. One who betrothed his daughter to an ill-tempered man from
+whom many women had sought a divorce, would be held to have
+neglected her interests; a man would be thought a bad father if he
+entrusted the care of his patrimony to one who had lost his own
+family estate, and it would be the act of a madman to make a will
+naming as the guardian of one's son a man who had already defrauded
+other wards. So will that man be said to bestow benefits as badly
+as possible, who chooses ungrateful persons, in whose hands they
+will perish.
+
+XXVIII. "The gods," it may be said, "bestow much, even upon the
+ungrateful." But what they bestow they had prepared for the good,
+and the bad have their share as well, because they cannot be
+separated. It is better to benefit the bad as well, for the sake of
+benefiting the good, than to stint the good for fear of benefiting
+the bad. Therefore the gods have created all that you speak of, the
+day, the sun, the alternations of winter and summer, the
+transitions through spring and autumn from one extreme to the
+other, showers, drinking fountains, and regularly blowing winds for
+the use of all alike; they could not except individuals from the
+enjoyment of them. A king bestows honours upon those who deserve
+them, but he gives largesse to the undeserving as well. The thief,
+the bearer of false witness, and the adulterer, alike receive the
+public grant of corn, and all are placed on the register without
+any examination as to character; good and bad men share alike in
+all the other privileges which a man receives, because he is a
+citizen, not because he is a good man. God likewise has bestowed
+certain gifts upon the entire human race, from which no one is shut
+out. Indeed, it could not be arranged that the wind which was fair
+for good men should be foul for bad ones, while it is for the good
+of all men that the seas should be open for traffic and the kingdom
+of mankind be enlarged; nor could any law be appointed for the
+showers, so that they should not fall upon the fields of wicked and
+evil men. Some things are given to all alike: cities are founded
+for good and bad men alike; works of genius reach, by publication,
+even unworthy men; medicine points out the means of health even to
+the wicked; no one has checked the making up of wholesome remedies
+for fear that the undeserving should be healed. You must seek for
+examination and preference of individuals in such things as are
+bestowed separately upon those who are thought to deserve them; not
+in these, which admit the mob to share them without distinction.
+There is a great difference between not shutting a man out and
+choosing him. Even a thief receives justice; even murderers enjoy
+the blessings of peace; even those who have plundered others can
+recover their own property; assassins and private bravoes are
+defended against the common enemy by the city wall; the laws
+protect even those who have sinned most deeply against them. There
+are some things which no man could obtain unless they were given to
+all; you need not, therefore, cavil about those matters in which
+all mankind is invited to share. As for things which men receive or
+not at my discretion, I shall not bestow them upon one whom I know
+to be ungrateful.
+
+XXIX. "Shall we, then," argues he, "not give our advice to an
+ungrateful man when he is at a loss, or refuse him a drink of water
+when he is thirsty, or not show him the path when he has lost his
+way? or would you do him these services and yet not give him
+anything?" Here I will draw a distinction, or at any rate endeavour
+to do so. A benefit is a useful service, yet all useful service is
+not a benefit; for some are so trifling as not to claim the title
+of benefits. To produce a benefit two conditions must concur.
+First, the importance of the thing given; for some things fall
+short of the dignity of a benefit. Who ever called a hunch of bread
+a benefit, or a farthing dole tossed to a beggar, or the means of
+lighting a fire? yet sometimes these are of more value than the
+most costly benefits; still their cheapness detracts from their
+value even when, by the exigency of time, they are rendered
+essential. The next condition, which is the most important of all,
+must necessarily be present, namely, that I should confer the
+benefit for the sake of him whom I wish to receive it, that I
+should judge him worthy of it, bestow it of my own free will, and
+receive pleasure from my own gift, none of which conditions are
+present in the cases of which we have just now spoken; for we do
+not bestow such things as those upon these who are worthy of them,
+but we give them carelessly, as trifles, and do not give them so
+much to a man as to humanity.
+
+XXX. I shall not deny that sometimes I would give even to the
+unworthy, out of respect for others; as, for instance, in
+competition for public offices, some of the basest of men are
+preferred on account of their noble birth, to industrious men of no
+family, and that for good reasons; for the memory of great virtues
+is sacred, and more men will take pleasure in being good, if the
+respect felt for good men does not cease with their lives. What
+made Cicero's son a consul, except his father? What lately brought
+Cinna [Footnote: See Seneca on "Clemency," book i., ch. ix.] out of
+the camp of the enemy and raised him to the consulate? What made
+Sextus Pompeius and the other Pompeii consuls, unless it was the
+greatness of one man, who once was raised so high that, by his very
+fall, he sufficiently exalted all his relatives. What lately made
+Fabius Persicus a member of more than one college of priests,
+though even profligates avoided his kiss? Was it not Verrucosus,
+and Allobrogicus, and the three hundred who to serve their country
+blocked the invader's path with the force of a single family? It is
+our duty to respect the virtuous, not only when present with us,
+but also when removed from our sight: as they have made it their
+study not to bestow their benefits upon one age alone, but to leave
+them existing after they themselves have passed away, so let us not
+confine our gratitude to a single age. If a man has begotten great
+men, he deserves to receive benefits, whatever he himself may be:
+he has given us worthy men. If a man descends from glorious
+ancestors, whatever he himself may be, let him find refuge under
+the shadow of his ancestry. As mean places are lighted up by the
+rays of the sun, so let the degenerate shine in the light of their
+forefathers.
+
+XXXI. In this place, my Liberalis, I wish to speak in defence of
+the gods. We sometimes say, "What could Providence mean by placing
+an Arrhidaeus upon the throne?" Do you suppose that the crown was
+given to Arrhidaeus? nay, it was given to his father and his
+brother. Why did Heaven bestow the empire of the world upon Caius
+Caesar, the most bloodthirsty of mankind, who was wont to order
+blood to be shed in his presence as freely as if he wished to drink
+of it? Why, do you suppose that it was given to him? It was given
+to his father, Germanicus, to his grandfather, his great
+grandfather, and to others before them, no less illustrious men,
+though they lived as private citizens on a footing of equality with
+others. Why, when you yourself were making Mamercus Scaurus consul,
+were you ignorant of his vices? did he himself conceal them? did he
+wish to appear decent?
+
+Did you admit a man who was so openly filthy to the fasces and the
+tribunal? Yes, it was because you were thinking of the great old
+Scaurus, the chief of the Senate, and were unwilling that his
+descendant should be despised.
+
+XXXII. It is probable that the gods act in the same manner, that
+they show greater indulgence to some for the sake of their parents
+and their ancestry, and to others for the sake of their children
+and grandchildren, and a long line of descendants beyond them; for
+they know the whole course of their works, and have constant access
+to the knowledge of all that shall hereafter pass through their
+hands. These things come upon us from the unknown future, and the
+gods have foreseen and are familiar with the events by which we are
+startled. "Let these men," says Providence, "be kings, because
+their ancestors were good kings, because they regarded
+righteousness and temperance as the highest rule of life, because
+they did not devote the state to themselves, but devoted themselves
+to the state. Let these others reign, because some one of their
+ancestors before them was a good man, who bore a soul superior to
+fortune, who preferred to be conquered rather than to conquer in
+civil strife, because it was more to the advantage of the state.
+[Footnote: Gertz, "Stud. Crit," p. 159, note.] It was not possible
+to make a sufficient return to him for this during so long a time;
+let this other, therefore, out of regard for him, be chief of the
+people, not because he knows how, or is capable, but because the
+other has earned it for him. This man is misshapen, loathsome to
+look upon, and will disgrace the insignia of his office. Men will
+presently blame me, calling me blind and reckless, not knowing upon
+whom I am conferring what ought to be given to the greatest and
+noblest of men; but I know that, in giving this dignity to one man,
+I am paying an old debt to another. How should the men of to-day
+know that ancient hero, who so resolutely avoided the glory which
+pressed upon him, who went into danger with the same look which
+other men wear when they have escaped from danger, who never
+regarded his own interest as apart from that of the commonwealth?"
+"Where," you ask, "or who is he? whence does he come?" "You know
+him not; it lies with me to balance the debit and credit account in
+such cases as these; I know how much I owe to each man; I repay
+some after a long interval, others beforehand, according as my
+opportunities and the exigencies of my social system permit." I
+shall, therefore, sometimes bestow somewhat upon an ungrateful man,
+though not for his own sake.
+
+XXXIII. "What," argues he, "if you do not know whether your man be
+ungrateful or grateful--will you wait until you know, or will you
+not lose the opportunity of bestowing a benefit? To wait is a long
+business--for, as Plato says, it is hard to form an opinion about
+the human mind,--not to wait, is rash." To this objector we shall
+answer, that we never should wait for absolute knowledge of the
+whole case, since the discovery of truth is an arduous task, but
+should proceed in the direction in which truth appeared to direct
+us. All our actions proceed in this direction: it is thus that we
+sow seed, that we sail upon the sea, that we serve in the army,
+marry, and bring up children. The result of all these actions is
+uncertain, so we take that course from which we believe that good
+results may be hoped for. Who can guarantee a harvest to the sower,
+a harbour to the sailor, victory to the soldier, a modest wife to
+the husband, dutiful children to the father? We proceed in the way
+in which reason, not absolute truth, directs us. Wait, do nothing
+that will not turn out well, form no opinion until you have
+searched but the truth, and your life will pass in absolute in
+action. Since it is only the appearance of truth, not truth itself,
+which leads me hither or thither, I shall confer benefits upon the
+man who apparently will be grateful.
+
+XXXIV. "Many circumstances," argues he, "may arise which may enable
+a bad man to steal into the place of a good one, or may cause a
+good man to be disliked as though he were a bad one; for
+appearances, to which we trust, are deceptive." Who denies it? Yet
+I can find nothing else by which to guide my opinion. I must follow
+these tracks in my search after truth, for I have none more
+trustworthy than these; I will take pains to weigh the value of
+these with all possible care, and will not hastily give my assent
+to them. For instance, in a battle, it may happen that my hand may
+be deceived by some mistake into turning my weapon against my
+comrade, and sparing my enemy as though he were on my side; but
+this will not often take place, and will not take place through any
+fault of mine, for my object is to strike the enemy, and defend my
+countryman. If I know a man to be ungrateful, I shall not bestow a
+benefit upon him. But the man has passed himself off as a good man
+by some trick, and has imposed upon me. Well, this is not at all
+the fault of the giver, who gave under the impression that his
+friend was grateful. "Suppose," asks he, "that you were to promise
+to bestow a benefit, and afterwards were to learn that your man was
+ungrateful, would you bestow it or not? If you do, you do wrong
+knowingly, for you give to one to whom you ought not; if you
+refuse, you do wrong likewise, for you do not give to him to whom
+you promised to give. This case upsets your consistency, and that
+proud assurance of yours that the wise man never regrets his
+actions, or amends what he has done, or alters his plans." The wise
+man never changes his plans while the conditions under which he
+formed them remain the same; therefore, he never feels regret,
+because at the time nothing better than what he did could have been
+done, nor could any better decision have been arrived at than that
+which was made; yet he begins everything with the saving clause,
+"If nothing shall occur to the contrary." This is the reason why we
+say that all goes well with him, and that nothing happens contrary
+to his expectation, because he bears in mind the possibility of
+something happening to prevent the realization of his projects. It
+is an imprudent confidence to trust that fortune will be on our
+side. The wise man considers both sides: he knows how great is the
+power of errors, how uncertain human affairs are, how many
+obstacles there are to the success of plans. Without committing
+himself, he awaits the doubtful and capricious issue of events, and
+weighs certainty of purpose against uncertainty of result. Here
+also, however, he is protected by that saving clause, without which
+he decides upon nothing, and begins nothing.
+
+XXXV. When I promise to bestow a benefit, I promise it, unless
+something occurs which makes it my duty not to do so. What if, for
+example, my country orders me to give to her what I had promised to
+my friend? or if a law be passed forbidding any one to do what I
+had promised to do for him? Suppose that I have promised you my
+daughter in marriage, that then you turn out to be a foreigner, and
+that I have no right of intermarriage with foreigners; in this
+case, the law, by which I am forbidden to fulfil my promise, forms
+my defence. I shall be treacherous, and hear myself blamed for
+inconsistency, only if I do not fulfil, my promise when all
+conditions remain the same as when I made it; otherwise, any change
+makes me free to reconsider the entire case, and absolves me from
+my promise. I may have promised to plead a cause; afterwards it
+appears that this cause is designed to form a precedent for an
+attack upon my father. I may have promised to leave my country, and
+travel abroad; then news comes that the road is beset with robbers.
+I was going to an appointment at some particular place; but my
+son's illness, or my wife's confinement, prevented me. All
+conditions must be the same as they were when I made the promise,
+if you mean to hold me bound in honour to fulfil it. Now what
+greater change can take place than that I should discover you to be
+a bad and ungrateful man? I shall refuse to an unworthy man that
+which I had intended to give him supposing him to be worthy, and I
+shall also have reason to be angry with him for the trick which he
+has put upon me.
+
+XXXVI. I shall nevertheless look into the matter, and consider what
+the value of the thing promised may be. If it be trifling, I shall
+give it, not because you are worthy of it, but because I promised
+it, and I shall not give it as a present, but merely in order to
+make good my words and give myself a twitch of the ear. I will
+punish my own rashness in promising by the loss of what I gave.
+"See how grieved you are; mind you take more care what you say in
+future." As the saying is, I will take tongue money from you. If
+the matter be important, I will not, as Maecenas said, let ten
+million sesterces reproach me. I will weigh the two sides of the
+question one against the other: there is something in abiding by
+what you have promised; on the other hand, there is a great deal in
+not bestowing a benefit upon one who is unworthy of it. Now, how
+great is this benefit? If it is a trifling one, let us wink and let
+it pass; but if it will cause me much loss or much shame to give
+it, I had rather excuse myself once for refusing it than have to do
+so ever after for giving it. The whole point, I repeat, depends
+upon how much the thing given is worth: let the terms of my promise
+be appraised. Not only shall I refuse to give what I may have
+promised rashly, but I shall also demand back again what I may have
+wrongly bestowed: a man must be mad who keeps a promise made under
+a mistake.
+
+XXXVII. Philip, king of the Macedonians, had a hardy soldier whose
+services he had found useful in many campaigns. From time to time
+he made this man presents of part of the plunder as the reward of
+his valour, and used to excite his greedy spirit by his frequent
+gifts. This man was cast by shipwreck upon the estate of a certain
+Macedonian, who as soon as he heard the news hastened to him,
+restored his breath, removed him to his own farmhouse, gave up his
+own bed to him, nursed him out of his weakened and half-dead
+condition, took care of him at his own expense for thirty days,
+restored him to health and gave him a sum of money for his journey,
+as the man kept constantly saying, "If only I can see my chief, I
+will repay your kindness." He told Philip of his shipwreck, said
+nothing about the help which he had received, and at once demanded
+that a certain man's estate should be given to him. The man was a
+friend of his: it was that very man by whom he had been rescued and
+restored to health. Sometimes, especially in time of war, kings
+bestow many gifts with their eyes shut. One just man cannot deal
+with such a mass of armed selfishness. It is not possible for any
+one to be at the same time a good man and a good general. How are
+so many thousands of insatiable men to be satiated? What would they
+have, if every man had his own? Thus Philip reasoned with himself
+while he ordered the man to be put in possession of the property
+which he asked for. However, the other, when driven out of his
+estate, did not, like a peasant, endure his wrongs in silence,
+thankful that he himself was not given away also, but sent a sharp
+and outspoken letter to Philip, who, on reading it, was so much
+enraged that he straightway ordered Pausanias to restore the
+property to its former owner, and to brand that wickedest of
+soldiers, that most ungrateful of guests, that greediest of
+shipwrecked men, with letters bearing witness to his ingratitude.
+He, indeed, deserved to have the letters not merely branded but
+carved in his flesh, for having reduced his host to the condition
+in which he himself had been when he lay naked and shipwrecked upon
+the beach; still, let us see within what limits one ought to keep
+in punishing him. Of course what he had so villainously seized
+ought to be taken from him. But who would be affected by the
+spectacle of his punishment? The crime which he had committed would
+prevent his being pitied even by any humane person.
+
+XXXVIII. Will Philip then give you a thing because he has promised
+to give it, even though he ought not to do so, even though he will
+commit a wrong by doing so, nay, a crime, even though by this one
+act he will make it impossible for shipwrecked men to reach the
+shore? There is no inconsistency in giving up an intention which we
+have discovered to be wrong and have condemned as wrong; we ought
+candidly to admit, "I thought that it was something different; I
+have been deceived." It is mere pride and folly to persist, "what I
+once have said, be it what it may, shall remain unaltered and
+settled." There is no disgrace in altering one's plans according to
+circumstances. Now, if Philip had left this man in possession of
+that seashore which he obtained by his shipwreck, would he not have
+practically pronounced sentence of banishment against all
+unfortunates for the future? "Rather," says Philip, "do thou carry
+upon thy forehead of brass those letters, that they may be
+impressed upon the eyes of all throughout my kingdom. Go, let men
+see how sacred a thing is the table of hospitality; show them your
+face, that upon it they may read the decree which prevents its
+being a capital crime to give refuge to the unfortunate under one's
+roof. The order will be more certainly respected by this means than
+if I had inscribed it upon tablets of brass."
+
+XXXIX. "Why then," argues our adversary, "did your Stoic
+philosopher Zeno, when he had promised a loan of five hundred
+denarii to some person, whom he afterwards discovered to be of
+doubtful character, persist in lending it, because of his promise,
+though his friends dissuaded him from doing so?" In the first place
+a loan is on a different footing to a benefit. Even when we have
+lent money to an undesirable person we can recall it; I can demand
+payment upon a certain day, and if he becomes bankrupt, I can
+obtain my share of his property; but a benefit is lost utterly and
+instantly. Besides, the one is the act of a bad man, the other that
+of a bad father of a family. In the next place, if the sum had been
+a larger one, not even Zeno would have persisted in lending it. It
+was five hundred denarii; the sort of sum of which one says, "May
+he spend it in sickness," and it was worth paying so much to avoid
+breaking his promise. I shall go out to supper, even though the
+weather be cold, because I have promised to go; but I shall not if
+snow be falling. I shall leave my bed to go to a betrothal feast,
+although I may be suffering from indigestion; but I shall not do so
+if I am feverish. I will become bail for you, because I promised;
+but not if you wish me to become bail in some transaction of
+uncertain issue, if you expose me to forfeiting my money to the
+state. There runs through all these cases, I argue, an implied
+exception; if I am able, provided it is right for me to do so, if
+these things be so and so. Make the position the same when you ask
+me to fulfil my promise, as it was when I gave it, and it will be
+mere fickleness to disappoint you; but if something new has taken
+place in the meanwhile, why should you wonder at my intentions
+being changed when the conditions under which I gave the promise
+are changed? Put everything back as it was, and I shall be the same
+as I was. We enter into recognizances to appear, yet if we fail to
+do so an action will not in all cases lie against us, for we are
+excused for making default if forced to do so by a power which we
+cannot resist.
+
+XL. You may take the same answer to the question as to whether we
+ought in all cases to show gratitude for kindness, and whether a
+benefit ought in all cases to be repaid. It is my duty to show a
+grateful mind, but in some cases my own poverty, in others the
+prosperity of the friend to whom I owe some return, will not permit
+me to give it. What, for instance, am I, a poor man, to give to a
+king or a rich man in return for his kindness, especially as some
+men regard it as a wrong to have their benefits repaid, and are
+wont to pile one benefit upon another? In dealing with such
+persons, what more can I do than wish to repay them? Yet I ought
+not to refuse to receive a new benefit, because I have not repaid
+the former one. I shall take it as freely as it is given, and will
+offer myself to my friend as a wide field for the exercise of his
+good nature: he who is unwilling to receive new benefits must be
+dissatisfied with what he has already received. Do you say, "I
+shall not be able to return them?" What is that to the purpose? I
+am willing enough to do so if opportunity or means were given me.
+He gave it to me, of course, having both opportunity and means: is
+he a good man or a bad one? if he is a good man, I have a good case
+against him, and I will not plead if he be a bad one. Neither do I
+think it right to insist on making repayment, even though it be
+against the will of those whom we repay, and to press it upon them
+however reluctant they may be; it is not repayment to force an
+unwilling man to resume what you were once willing to take. Some
+people, if any trifling present be sent to them, afterwards send
+back something else for no particular reason, and then declare that
+they are under no obligation; to send something back at once, and
+balance one present by another, is the next thing to refusing to
+receive it. On some occasions I shall not return a benefit, even
+though I be able to do so. When? When by so doing I shall myself
+lose more than he will gain, or if he would not notice any
+advantage to himself in receiving that which it would be a great
+loss to me to return. The man who is always eager to repay under
+all circumstances, has not the feeling of a grateful man, but of a
+debtor; and, to put it shortly, he who is too eager to repay, is
+unwilling to be in his friend's debt; he who is unwilling, and yet
+is in his friend's debt, is ungrateful.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK V.
+
+I.
+
+
+In the preceding books I seem to have accomplished the object which
+I proposed to myself, since in them I have discussed how a benefit
+ought to be bestowed, and how it ought to be received. These are
+the limits of this action; when I dwell upon it further I am not
+obeying the orders, but the caprices of my subject which ought to
+be followed whither it leads, not whither it allures us to wander;
+for now and then something will arise, which, although it is all
+but unconnected with the subject, instead of being a necessary part
+of it, still thrills the mind with a certain charm. However, since
+you wish it to be so, let us go on, after having completed our
+discussion of the heads of the subject itself, to investigate those
+matters which, if you wish for truth, I must call adjacent to it,
+not actually connected with it; to examine which carefully is not
+one worth one's while, and yet is not labour in vain. No praise,
+however, which I can give to benefits does justice to you, Aebutius
+Liberalis, a man of excellent disposition and naturally inclined to
+bestow them. Never have I seen any one esteem even the most
+trifling services more kindly; indeed, your good-nature goes so far
+as to regard whatever benefit is bestowed upon anyone as bestowed
+upon yourself; you are prepared to pay even what is owed by the
+ungrateful, that no one may regret having bestowed benefits. You
+yourself are so far from any boastfulness, you are so eager at once
+to free those whom you serve from any feeling of obligation to you,
+that you like, when giving anything to any one, to seem not so much
+to be giving a present as returning one; and therefore what you
+give in this manner will all the more fully he repaid to you: for,
+as a rule, benefits come to one who does not demand repayment of
+them; and just as glory follows those who avoid it, so men receive
+a more plentiful harvest in return for benefits bestowed upon those
+who had it in their power to be ungrateful. With you there is no
+reason why those who have received benefits from you should not ask
+for fresh ones; nor would you refuse to bestow others, to overlook
+and conceal what you have given, and to add to it more and greater
+gifts, since it is the aim of all the best men and the noblest
+dispositions to bear with an ungrateful man until you make him
+grateful. Be not deceived in pursuing this plan; vice, if you do
+not too soon begin to hate it, will yield to virtue.
+
+II. Thus it is that you are especially pleased with what you think
+the grandly-sounding phrase, "It is disgraceful to be worsted in a
+contest of benefits." Whether this be true or not deserves to be
+investigated, and it means something quite different from what you
+imagine; for it is never disgraceful to be worsted in any
+honourable contest, provided that you do not throw down your arms,
+and that even when conquered you wish to conquer. All men do not
+strive for a good object with the same strength, resources, and
+good fortune, upon which depend at all events the issues of the
+most admirable projects, though we ought to praise the will itself
+which makes an effort in the right direction. Even though another
+passes it by with swifter pace, yet the palm of victory does not,
+as in publicly-exhibited races, declare which is the better man;
+though even in the games chance frequently brings an inferior man
+to the front. As far as loyalty of feeling goes, which each man
+wishes to be possessed in the fullest measure on his own side, if
+one of the two be the more powerful, if he have at his disposal all
+the resources which he wishes to use, and be favoured by fortune in
+his most ambitious efforts, while the other, although equally
+willing, can only return less than he receives, or perhaps can make
+no return at all, but still wishes to do so and is entirely devoted
+to this object; then the latter is no more conquered than he who
+dies in arms, whom the enemy found it easier to slay than to turn
+back. To be conquered, which you consider disgraceful, cannot
+happen to a good man; for he will never surrender, never give up
+the contest, to the last day of his life he will stand prepared and
+in that posture he will die, testifying that though he has received
+much, yet that he had the will to repay as much as he had received.
+
+III. The Lacedaemonians forbid their young men to contend in the
+pancratium, or with the caestus, in which games the defeated party
+has to acknowledge himself beaten. The winner of a race is he who
+first reaches the goal; he outstrips the others in swiftness, but
+not in courage. The wrestler who has been thrown three times loses
+the palm of victory, but does not yield it up. Since the
+Lacedaemonians thought it of great importance that their countrymen
+should be invincible, they kept them away from those contests in
+which victory is assigned, not by the judge, or by the issue of the
+contest itself, but by the voice of the vanquished begging the
+victor to spare him as he falls. This attribute of never being
+conquered, which they so jealously guard among their citizens, can
+be attained by all men through virtue and goodwill, because even
+when all else is vanquished, the mind remains unconquered. For this
+cause no one speaks of the three hundred Fabii as conquered, but
+slaughtered. Regulus was taken captive by the Carthaginians, not
+conquered; and so were all other men who have not yielded in spirit
+when overwhelmed by the strength and weight of angry fortune.
+
+So is it with benefits. A man may have received more than he gave,
+more valuable ones, more frequently bestowed; yet is he not
+vanquished. It may be that, if you compare the benefits with one
+another, those which he has received will outweigh those which he
+has bestowed; but if you compare the giver and the receiver, whose
+intentions also ought to be considered apart, neither will prove
+the victor. It often happens that even when one combatant is
+pierced with many wounds, while the other is only slightly injured,
+yet they are said to have fought a drawn battle, although the
+former may appear to be the worse man.
+
+IV. No one, therefore, can be conquered in a contest of benefits,
+if he knows how to owe a debt, if he wishes to make a return for
+what he has received, and raises himself to the same level with his
+friend in spirit, though he cannot do so in material gifts. As long
+as he remains in this temper of mind, as long as he has the wish to
+declare by proofs that he has a grateful mind, what difference does
+it make upon which side we can count the greater number of
+presents? You are able to give much; I can do nothing but receive.
+Fortune abides with you, goodwill alone with me; yet I am as much
+on an equality with you as naked or lightly armed men are with a
+large body armed to the teeth. No one, therefore, is worsted by
+benefits, because each man's gratitude is to be measured by his
+will. If it be disgraceful to be worsted in a contest of benefits,
+you ought not to receive a benefit from very powerful men whose
+kindness you cannot return, I mean such as princes and kings, whom
+fortune has placed in such a station that they can give away much,
+and can only receive very little and quite inadequate returns for
+what they give. I have spoken of kings and princes, who alone can
+cause works to be accomplished, and whose superlative power depends
+upon the obedience and services of inferiors; but some there are,
+free from all earthly lusts, who are scarcely affected by any human
+objects of desire, upon whom fortune herself could bestow nothing.
+I must be worsted in a contest of benefits with Socrates, or with
+Diogenes, who walked naked through the treasures of Macedonia,
+treading the king's wealth under his feet. In good sooth, he must
+then rightly have seemed, both to himself and to all others whose
+eyes were keen enough to perceive the real truth, to be superior
+even to him at whose feet all the world lay. He was far more
+powerful, far richer even than Alexander, who then possessed
+everything; for there was more that Diogenes could refuse to
+receive than that Alexander was able to give.
+
+V. It is not disgraceful to be worsted by these men, for I am not
+the less brave because you pit me against an invulnerable enemy,
+nor does fire not burn because you throw into it something over
+which flames have no power, nor does iron lose its power of
+cutting, though you may wish to cut up a stone which is hard,
+impervious to blows, and of such a nature that hard tools are
+blunted upon it. I give you the same answer about gratitude. A man
+is not disgracefully worsted in a contest of benefits if he lays
+himself under an obligation to such persons as these, whose
+enormous wealth or admirable virtue shut out all possibility of
+their benefits being returned. As a rule we are worsted by our
+parents; for while we have them with us, we regard them as severe,
+and do not understand what they do for us. When our age begins to
+bring us a little sense, and we gradually perceive that they
+deserve our love for those very things which used to prevent our
+loving them, their advice, their punishments, and the careful watch
+which they used to keep over our youthful recklessness, they are
+taken from us. Few live to reap any real fruit from children; most
+men feel their sons only as a burden. Yet there is no disgrace in
+being worsted by one's parent in bestowing benefits; how should
+there be, seeing that there is no disgrace in being worsted by
+anyone. We are equal to some men, and yet not equal; equal in
+intention, which is all that they care for, which is all that we
+promise to be, but unequal in fortune. And if fortune prevents any
+one from repaying a kindness, he need not, therefore, blush, as
+though he were vanquished; there is no disgrace in failing to reach
+your object, provided you attempt to reach it. It often is
+necessary, that before making any return for the benefits which we
+have received, we should ask for new ones; yet, if so, we shall not
+refrain from asking for them, nor shall we do so as though
+disgraced by so doing, because, even if we do not repay the debt,
+we shall owe it; because, even if something from without befalls us
+to prevent our repaying it, it will not be our fault if we are not
+grateful. We can neither be conquered in intention, nor can we be
+disgraced by yielding to what is beyond our strength to contend
+with.
+
+VI. Alexander, the king of the Macedonians, used to boast that he
+had never been worsted by anybody in a contest of benefits. If so,
+it was no reason why, in the fulness of his pride, he should
+despise the Macedonians, Greeks, Carians, Persians, and other
+tribes of whom his army was composed, nor need he imagine that it
+was this that gave him an empire reaching from a corner of Thrace
+to the shore of the unknown sea. Socrates could make the same
+boast, and so could Diogenes, by whom Alexander was certainly
+surpassed; for was he not surpassed on the day when, swelling as he
+was beyond the limits of merely human pride, he beheld one to whom
+he could give nothing, from whom he could take nothing? King
+Archelaus invited Socrates to come to him. Socrates is reported to
+have answered that he should be sorry to go to one who would bestow
+benefits upon him, since he should not be able to make him an
+adequate return for them. In the first place, Socrates was at
+liberty not to receive them; next, Socrates himself would have been
+the first to bestow a benefit, for he would have come when invited,
+and would have given to Archelaus that for which Archelaus could
+have made no return to Socrates. Even if Archelaus were to give
+Socrates gold and silver, if he learned in return for them to
+despise gold and silver, would not Socrates be able to repay
+Archelaus? Could Socrates receive from him as much value as he
+gave, in displaying to him a man skilled in the knowledge of life
+and of death, comprehending the true purpose of each? Suppose that
+he had found this king, as it were, groping his way in the clear
+sunlight, and had taught him the secrets of nature, of which he was
+so ignorant, that when there was an eclipse of the sun, he up his
+palace, and shaved his son's head, [Footnote: Gertz very reasonably
+conjectures that he shaved his own head which reading would require
+a very trifling alteration of the text.] which men are wont to do
+in times of mourning and distress. What a benefit it would have
+been if he had dragged the terror-stricken king out of his hiding-
+place, and bidden him be of good cheer, saying, "This is not a
+disappearance of the sun, but a conjunction of two heavenly bodies;
+for the moon, which proceeds along a lower path, has placed her
+disk beneath the sun, and hidden it by the interposition of her own
+mass. Sometimes she only hides a small portion of the sun's disk,
+because she only grazes it in passing; sometimes she hides more, by
+placing more of herself before it; and sometimes she shuts it out
+from our sight altogether, if she passes in an exactly even course
+between the sun and the earth. Soon, however, their own swift
+motion will draw these two bodies apart; soon the earth will
+receive back again the light of day. And this system will continue
+throughout centuries, having certain days, known beforehand, upon
+which the sun cannot display all rays, because of the intervention
+of the moon. Wait only for a short time; he will soon emerge, he
+will soon leave that seeming cloud, and freely shed abroad his
+light without any hindrances." Could Socrates not have made an
+adequate return to Archelaus, if he had taught him to reign? as
+though Socrates would not benefit him sufficiently, merely by
+enabling him to bestow a benefit upon Socrates. Why, then, did
+Socrates say this? Being a joker and a speaker in parables--a man
+who turned all, especially the great, into ridicule--he preferred
+giving him a satirical refusal, rather than an obstinate or haughty
+one, and therefore said that he did not wish to receive benefits
+from one to whom he could not return as much as he received. He
+feared, perhaps, that he might be forced to receive something which
+he did not wish, he feared that it might be something unfit for
+Socrates to receive. Some one may say, "He ought to have said that
+he did not wish to go." But by so doing he would have excited
+against himself the anger of an arrogant king, who wished
+everything connected with himself to be highly valued. It makes no
+difference to a king whether you be unwilling to give anything to
+him or to accept anything from him; he is equally incensed at
+either rebuff, and to be treated with disdain is more bitter to a
+proud spirit than not to be feared. Do you wish to know what
+Socrates really meant? He, whose freedom of speech could not be
+borne even by a free state, was not willing of his own choice to
+become a slave.
+
+VII. I think that we have sufficiently discussed this part of the
+subject, whether it be disgraceful to be worsted in a contest of
+benefits. Whoever asks this question must know that men are not
+wont to bestow benefits upon themselves, for evidently it could not
+be disgraceful to be worsted by oneself. Yet some of the Stoics
+debate this question, whether any one can confer a benefit upon
+himself, and whether one ought to return one's own kindness to
+oneself. This discussion has been raised in consequence of our
+habit of saying, "I am thankful to myself," "I can complain of no
+one but myself," "I am angry with myself," "I will punish myself,"
+"I hate myself," and many other phrases of the same sort, in which
+one speaks of oneself as one would of some other person. "If," they
+argue, "I can injure myself, why should I not be able also to
+bestow a benefit upon myself? Besides this, why are those things
+not called benefits when I bestow them upon myself which would be
+called benefits if I bestowed them upon another? If to receive a
+certain thing from another would lay me under an obligation to him,
+how is it that if I give it to myself, I do not contract an
+obligation to myself? why should I be ungrateful to my own self,
+which is no less disgraceful than it is to be mean to oneself, or
+hard and cruel to oneself, or neglectful of oneself? The procurer
+is equally odious whether he prostitutes others or himself. We
+blame a flatterer, and one who imitates another man's mode of
+speech, or is prepared to give praise whether it be deserved or
+not; we ought equally to blame one who humours himself and looks up
+to himself, and so to speak is his own flatterer. Vices are not
+only hateful when outwardly practised, but also when they are
+repressed within the mind. Whom would you admire more than he who
+governs himself and has himself under command? It is easier to rule
+savage nations, impatient of foreign control, than to restrain
+one's own mind and keep it under one's own control. Plato, it is
+argued, was grateful to Socrates for having been taught by him; why
+should not Socrates be grateful to himself for having taught
+himself? Marcus Cato said, "Borrow from yourself whatever you
+lack;" why, then, if I can lend myself anything, should I be unable
+to give myself anything? The instances in which usage divides us
+into two persons are innumerable; we are wont to say, "Let me
+converse with myself," and, "I will give myself a twitch of the
+ear;" [Footnote: See book iv. ch. xxxvi.] and if it be true that
+one can do so, then a man ought to be grateful to himself, just as
+he is angry with himself; as he blames himself, SO he ought to
+praise himself; since he can impoverish himself, he can also enrich
+himself. Injuries and benefits are the converse of one another: if
+we say of a man, 'he has done himself an injury,' we can also say
+'he has bestowed upon himself a benefit?'
+
+VIII. It is natural that a man should first incur an obligation,
+and then that he should return gratitude for it; a debtor cannot
+exist without a creditor, any more than a husband without a wife,
+or a son without a father; someone must give in order that some one
+may receive. Just as no one carries himself, although he moves his
+body and transports it from place to place; as no one, though he
+may have made a speech in his own defence, is said to have stood by
+himself, or erects a statue to himself as his own patron; as no
+sick man, when by his own care he has regained his health, asks
+himself for a fee; so in no transaction, even when a man does what
+is useful to himself, need he return thanks to himself, because
+there is no one to whom he can return them. Though I grant that a
+man can bestow a benefit upon himself, yet at the same time that he
+gives it, he also receives it; though I grant that a man may
+receive a benefit from himself, yet he receives it at the same time
+that he gives it. The exchange takes place within doors, as they
+say, and the transfer is made at once, as though the debt were a
+fictitious one; for he who gives is not a different person to he
+who receives, but one and the same. The word "to owe" has no
+meaning except as between two persons; how then can it apply to one
+man who incurs an obligation, and by the same act frees himself
+from it? In a disk or a ball there is no top or bottom, no
+beginning or end, because the relation of the parts is changed when
+it moves, what was behind coming before, and what went down on one
+side coming up on the other, so that all the parts, in whatever
+direction they may move, come back to the same position. Imagine
+that the same thing takes place in a man; into however many pieces
+you may divide him, he remains one. If he strikes himself, he has
+no one to call to account for the insult; if he binds himself and
+locks himself up, he cannot demand damages; if he bestows a benefit
+upon himself, he straightway returns it to the giver. It is said
+that there is no waste in nature, because everything which is taken
+from nature returns to her again, and nothing can perish, because
+it cannot fall out of nature, but goes round again to the point
+from whence it started. You ask, "What connection has this
+illustration with the subject?" I will tell you. Imagine yourself
+to be ungrateful, the benefit bestowed upon you is not lost, he who
+gave it has it; suppose that you are unwilling to receive it, it
+still belongs to you before it is returned. You cannot lose
+anything, because what you take away from yourself, you
+nevertheless gain yourself. The matter revolves in a circle within
+yourself; by receiving you give, by giving you receive.
+
+IX. "It is our duty," argues our adversary, "to bestow benefits
+upon ourselves, therefore we ought also to be grateful to
+ourselves." The original axiom, upon which the inference depends,
+is untrue, for no one bestows benefits upon himself, but obeys the
+dictates of his nature, which disposes him to affection for
+himself, and which makes him take the greatest pains to avoid
+hurtful things, and to follow after those things which are
+profitable to him. Consequently, the man who gives to himself is
+not generous, nor is he who pardons himself forgiving, nor is he
+who is touched by his own misfortunes tender-hearted; it is natural
+to do those things to oneself which when done to others become
+generosity, clemency, and tenderness of heart. A benefit is a
+voluntary act, but to do good to oneself is an instinctive one. The
+more benefits a man bestows, the more beneficent he is, yet who
+ever was praised for having been of service to himself? or for
+having rescued himself from brigands? No one bestows a benefit upon
+himself any more than he bestows hospitality upon himself; no one
+gives himself anything, any more than he lends himself anything. If
+each man bestows benefits upon himself, is always bestowing them,
+and bestows them without any cessation, then it is impossible for
+him to make any calculation of the number of his benefits; when
+then can he show his gratitude, seeing that by the very act of
+doing so he would bestow a benefit? for what distinction can you
+draw between giving himself a benefit or receiving a benefit for
+himself, when the whole transaction takes place in the mind of the
+same man? Suppose that I have freed myself from danger, then I have
+bestowed a benefit upon myself; suppose I free myself a second
+time, by so doing do I bestow or repay a benefit? In the next
+place, even if I grant the primary axiom, that we can bestow
+benefits upon ourselves, I do not admit that which follows; for
+even if we can do so, we ought not to do so. Wherefore? Because we
+receive a return for them at once. It is right for me to receive a
+benefit, then to lie under an obligation, then to repay it; now
+here there is no time for remaining under an obligation, because we
+receive the return without any delay. No one really gives except to
+another, no one owes except to another, no one repays except to
+another. An act which always requires two persons cannot take place
+within the mind of one.
+
+X. A benefit means the affording of something useful, and the word
+AFFORDING implies other persons. Would not a man be thought mad if
+he said that he had sold something to himself, because selling
+means alienation, and the transferring of a thing and of one's
+rights in that thing to another person? Yet giving, like selling
+anything, consists in making it pass away from you, handing over
+what you yourself once owned into the keeping of some one else.
+
+If this be so, no one ever gave himself a benefit, because no one
+gives to himself; if not, two opposites coalesce, so that it
+becomes the same thing to give and to receive. Yet there is a great
+difference between giving and receiving; how should there not be,
+seeing that these words are the converse of one another? Still, if
+any one can give himself a benefit, there can be no difference
+between giving and receiving. I said a little before that some
+words apply only to other persons, and are so constituted that
+their whole meaning lies apart from ourselves; for instance, I am a
+brother, but a brother of some other man, for no one is his own
+brother; I am an equal, but equal to somebody else, for who is
+equal to himself? A thing which is compared to another thing is
+unintelligible without that other thing; a thing which is joined to
+something else does not exist apart from it; so that which is given
+does not exist without the other person, nor can a benefit have any
+existence without another person. This is clear from the very
+phrase which describes it, 'to do good,' yet no one does good to
+himself, any more than he favours himself or is on his own side. I
+might enlarge further upon this subject and give many examples. Why
+should benefits not be included among those acts which require two
+persons to perform them? Many honourable, most admirable and highly
+virtuous acts cannot take place without a second person. Fidelity
+is praised and held to be one of the chief blessings known among
+men, yet was any one ever on that account said to have kept faith
+with himself?
+
+XI. I come now to the last part of this subject. The
+man who returns a kindness ought to expend something, just as he
+who repays expends money; but the man who returns a kindness to
+himself expends nothing, just as he who receives a benefit from
+himself gains nothing. A benefit and gratitude for it must pass to
+and fro between two persons; their interchange cannot take place
+within one man. He who returns a kindness does good in his turn to
+him from whom he has received something; but the man who returns
+his own kindness, to whom does he do good? To himself? Is there any
+one who does not regard the returning of a kindness, and the
+bestowal of a benefit, as distinct acts? 'He who returns a kindness
+to himself does good to himself.' Was any man ever unwilling to do
+this, even though he were ungrateful? nay, who ever was ungrateful
+from any other motive than this? "If," it is argued, "we are right
+in thanking ourselves, we ought to return our own kindness;" yet we
+say, "I am thankful to myself for having refused to marry that
+woman," or "for having refused to join a partnership with that
+man." When we speak thus, we are really praising ourselves, and
+make use of the language of those who return thanks to approve our
+own acts. A benefit is something which, when given, may or may not
+be returned. Now, he who gives a benefit to himself must needs
+receive what he gives; therefore, this is not a benefit. A benefit
+is received at one time, and is returned at another; (but when a
+man bestows a benefit upon himself, he both receives it and returns
+it at the same time). In a benefit, too, what we commend and admire
+is, that a man has for the time being forgotten his own interests,
+in order that he may do good to another; that he has deprived
+himself of something, in order to bestow it upon another. Now, he
+who bestows a benefit upon himself does not do this. The bestowal
+of a benefit is an act of companionship--it wins some man's
+friendship, and lays some man under an obligation; but to bestow it
+upon oneself is no act of companionship--it wins no man's
+friendship, lays no man under an obligation, raises no man's hopes,
+or leads him to say, "This man must be courted; he bestowed a
+benefit upon that person, perhaps he will bestow one upon me also."
+A benefit is a thing which one gives not for one's own sake, but
+for the sake of him to whom it is given; but he who bestows a
+benefit upon himself, does so for his own sake; therefore, it is
+not a benefit.
+
+XII. Now I seem to you not to have made good what I said at the
+beginning of this book. You say that I am far from doing what is
+worth any one's while; nay, that in real fact I have thrown away
+all my trouble. Wait, and soon you will be able to say this more
+truly, for I shall lead you into covert lurking-places, from which
+when you have escaped, you will have gained nothing except that you
+will have freed yourself from difficulties with which you need
+never have hampered yourself. What is the use of laboriously
+untying knots which you yourself have tied, in order that you might
+untie them? Yet, just as some knots are tied in fun and for
+amusement, so that a tyro may find difficulty in untying them,
+which knots he who tied them can loose without any trouble, because
+he knows the joinings and the difficulties of them, and these
+nevertheless afford us some pleasure, because they test the
+sharpness of our wits, and engross, our attention; so also these
+questions, which seem subtle and tricky, prevent our intellects
+becoming careless and lazy, for they ought at one time to have a
+field given them to level, in order that they may wander about it,
+and at another to have some dark and rough passage thrown in their
+way for them to creep through, and make their way with caution. It
+is said by our opponent that no one is ungrateful; and this is
+supported by the following arguments: "A benefit is that which does
+good; but, as you Stoics say, no one can do good to a bad man;
+therefore, a bad man does not receive a benefit. (If he does not
+receive it, he need not return it; therefore, no bad man is
+ungrateful.) Furthermore, a benefit is an honourable and
+commendable thing. No honourable or commendable thing can find any
+place with a bad man; therefore, neither can a benefit. If he
+cannot receive one, he need not repay one; therefore, he does not
+become ungrateful. Moreover, as you say, a good man does everything
+rightly; if he does everything rightly, he cannot be ungrateful. A
+good man returns a benefit, a bad man does not receive one. If this
+be so, no man, good or bad, can be ungrateful. Therefore, there is
+no such thing in nature as an ungrateful man: the word is
+meaningless." We Stoics have only one kind of good, that which is
+honourable. This cannot come to a bad man, for he would cease to be
+bad if virtue entered into him; but as long as he is bad, no one
+can bestow a benefit upon him, because good and bad are contraries,
+and cannot exist together. Therefore, no one can do good to such a
+man, because whatever he receives is corrupted by his vicious way
+of using it. Just as the stomach, when disordered by disease and
+secreting bile, changes all the food which it receives, and turns
+every kind of sustenance into a source of pain, so whatever you
+entrust to an ill-regulated mind becomes to it a burden, an
+annoyance, and a source of misery. Thus the most prosperous and the
+richest men have the most trouble; and the more property they have
+to perplex them, the less likely they are to find out what they
+really are. Nothing, therefore, can reach bad men which would do
+them good; nay, nothing which would not do them harm. They change
+whatever falls to their lot into their own evil nature; and things
+which elsewhere would, if given to better men, be both beautiful
+and profitable, are ruinous to them. They cannot, therefore, bestow
+benefits, because no one can give what he does not possess, and,
+therefore, they lack the pleasure of doing good to others.
+
+XIII. But, though this be so, yet even a bad man can receive some
+things which resemble benefits, and he will be ungrateful if he
+does not return them. There are good things belonging to the mind,
+to the body, and to fortune. A fool or a bad man is debarred from
+the first--those, that is, of the mind; but he is admitted to a
+share in the two latter, and, if he does not return them, he is
+ungrateful. Nor does this follow from our (Stoic) system alone the
+Peripatetics, also, who widely extend the boundaries of human
+happiness, declare that trifling benefits reach bad men, and that
+he who does not return them is ungrateful. We therefore do not
+agree that things which do not tend to improve the mind should be
+called benefits, yet do not deny that these things are convenient
+and desirable. Such things as these a bad man may bestow upon a
+good man, or may receive from him--such, for example, as money,
+clothes, public office, or life; and, if he makes no return for
+these, he will come under the denomination of ungrateful. "But how
+can you call a man ungrateful for not returning that which you say
+is not a benefit?" Some things, on account of their similarity, are
+included under the same designation, although they do not really
+deserve it. Thus we speak of a silver or golden box; ["The original
+word is 'pyx,' which means a box made of box-wood."] thus we call a
+man illiterate, although he may not be utterly ignorant, but only
+not acquainted with the higher branches of literature; thus, seeing
+a badly-dressed ragged man we say that we have seen a naked man.
+These things of which we spoke are not benefits, but they possess
+the appearance of benefits. "Then, just as they are quasi-benefits,
+so your man is quasi-ungrateful, not really ungrateful." This is
+untrue, because both he who gives and he who receives them speaks
+of them as benefits; so he who fails to return the semblance of a
+real benefit is as much an ungrateful man as he who mixes a
+sleeping draught, believing it to be poison, is a poisoner.
+
+XIV. Cleanthes speaks more impetuously than this. "Granted," says
+he, "that what he received was not a benefit, yet he is ungrateful,
+because he would not have returned a benefit if he had received
+one." So he who carries deadly weapons and has intentions of
+robbing and murdering, is a brigand even before he has dipped his
+hands in blood; his wickedness consists and is shown in action, but
+does not begin thereby. Men are punished for sacrilege, although no
+one's hands can reach to the gods. "How," asks our opponent, "can
+any one be ungrateful to a bad man, since a bad man cannot bestow a
+benefit?" In the same way, I answer, because that which he received
+was not a benefit, but was called one; if any one receives from a
+bad man any of those things which are valued by the ignorant, and
+of which bad men often possess great store, it becomes his duty to
+make a return in the same kind, and to give back as though they
+were truly good those things which he received as though they were
+truly good. A man is said to be in debt, whether he owes gold
+pieces or leather marked with a state stamp, such as the
+Lacedaemonians used, which passes for coined money. Pay your debts
+in that kind in which you incurred them. You have nothing to do
+with the definition of benefits, or with the question whether so
+great and noble a name ought to be degraded by applying it to such
+vulgar and mean matters as these, nor do we seek for truth that we
+may use it to the disadvantage of others; do you adjust your minds
+to the semblance of truth, and while you are learning what is
+really honourable, respect everything to which the name of honour
+is applied.
+
+XV. "In the same way," argues our adversary, "that your school
+proves that no one is ungrateful, you afterwards prove that all men
+are ungrateful. For, as you say, all fools are bad men; he who has
+one vice has all vices; all men are both fools and bad men;
+therefore all men are ungrateful." Well, what then? Are they not?
+Is not this the universal reproach of the human race? is there not
+a general complaint that benefits are thrown away, and that there
+are very few men who do not requite their benefactors with the
+basest ingratitude? Nor need you suppose that what we say is merely
+the grumbling of men who think every act wicked and depraved which
+falls short of an ideal standard of righteousness. Listen! I know
+not who it is who speaks, yet the voice with which he condemns
+mankind proceeds, not from the schools of philosophers, but from
+the midst of the crowd:
+
+ "Host is not safe from guest;
+ Father-in-law from son; but seldom love
+ Exists 'twixt brothers; wives long to destroy
+ Their husbands; husbands long to slay their wives."
+
+This goes even further: according to this, crimes take the place of
+benefits, and men do not shrink from shedding the blood of those
+for whom they ought to shed their own; we requite benefits by steel
+and poison. We call laying violent hands upon our own country, and
+putting down its resistance by the fasces of its own lictors,
+gaining power and great place; every man thinks himself to be in a
+mean and degraded position if he has not raised himself above the
+constitution; the armies which are received from the state are
+turned against her, and a general now says to his men, "Fight
+against your wives, fight against your children, march in arms
+against your altars, your hearths and homes!" Yes, [Footnote: I
+believe, in spite of Gertz, that this is part of the speech of the
+Roman general, and that the conjecture of Muretus, "without the
+command of the senate," gives better sense.] you, who even when
+about to triumph ought not to enter the city at the command of the
+senate, and who have often, when bringing home a victorious army,
+been given an audience outside the walls, you now, after
+slaughtering your countrymen, stained with the blood of your
+kindred, march into the city with standards erect. "Let liberty,"
+say you, "be silent amidst the ensigns of war, and now that wars
+are driven far away and no ground for terror remains, let that
+people which conquered and civilized all nations be beleaguered
+within its own walls, and shudder at the sight of its own eagles."
+
+XVI. Coriolanus was ungrateful, and became dutiful late, and after
+repenting of his crime; he did indeed lay down his arms, but only
+in the midst of his unnatural warfare. Catilina was ungrateful; he
+was not satisfied with taking his country captive without
+overturning it, without despatching the hosts of the Allobroges
+against it, without bringing an enemy from beyond the Alps to glut
+his old inborn hatred, and to offer Roman generals as sacrifices
+which had been long owing to the tombs of the Gaulish dead. Caius
+Marius was ungrateful, when, after being raised from the ranks to
+the consulship, he felt that he would not have wreaked his
+vengeance upon fortune, and would sink to his original obscurity,
+unless he slaughtered Romans as freely as he had slaughtered the
+Cimbri, and not merely gave the signal, but was himself the signal
+for civil disasters and butcheries. Lucius Sulla was ungrateful,
+for he saved his country by using remedies worse than the perils
+with which it was threatened, when he marched through human blood
+all the way from the citadel of Praeneste to the Colline Gate,
+fought more battles and caused more slaughter afterwards within the
+city, and most cruelly after the victory was won, most wickedly
+after quarter had been promised them, drove two legions into a
+corner and put them to the sword, and, great gods! invented a
+proscription by which he who slew a Roman citizen received
+indemnity, a sum of money, everything but a civic crown! Cnaeus
+Pompeius was ungrateful, for the return which he made to his
+country for three consulships, three triumphs, and the innumerable
+public offices into most of which he thrust himself when under age,
+was to lead others also to lay hands upon her under the pretext of
+thus rendering his own power less odious; as though what no one
+ought to do became right if more than one person did it. Whilst he
+was coveting extraordinary commands, arranging the provinces so as
+to have his own choice of them, and dividing the whole state with a
+third person, [Footnote: Crassus.] in such a manner as to leave
+two-thirds of it in the possession of his own family, [Footnote:
+Pompey was married to Caesar's daughter. Cf. Virg., "Aen.," vi.,
+831, sq., and Lucan's beautiful verses, "Phars.," i., 114.] he
+reduced the Roman people to such a condition that they could only
+save themselves by submitting to slavery. The foe and conqueror
+[Footnote: Seneca is careful to avoid the mention of Caesar's name,
+which might have given offence to the emperors under whom he lived,
+who used the name as a title.] of Pompeius was himself ungrateful;
+he brought war from Gaul and Germany to Rome, and he, the friend of
+the populace, the champion of the commons, pitched his camp in the
+Circus Flaminus, nearer to the city than Porsena's camp had been.
+He did, indeed, use the cruel privileges of victory with
+moderation; as was said at the time, he protected his countrymen,
+and put to death no man who was not in arms. Yet what credit is
+there in this? Others used their arms more cruelly, but flung them
+away when glutted with blood, while he, though he soon sheathed the
+sword, never laid it aside. Antonius was ungrateful to his
+dictator, who he declared was rightly slain, and whose murderers he
+allowed to depart to their commands in the provinces; as for his
+country, after it had been torn to pieces by so many proscriptions,
+invasions, and civil wars, he intended to subject it to kings, not
+even of Roman birth, and to force that very state to pay tribute to
+eunuchs, [Footnote: The allusion is to Antonius's connection with
+Cleopatra. Cf. Virg. "Aen.," viii., 688.] which had itself restored
+sovereign rights, autonomy, and immunities, to the Achaeans, the
+Rhodians, and the people of many other famous cities.
+
+XVII. The day would not be long enough for me to enumerate those
+who have pushed their ingratitude so far as to ruin their native
+land. It would be as vast a task to mention how often the state has
+been ungrateful to its best and most devoted lovers, although it
+has done no less wrong than it has suffered. It sent Camillus and
+Scipio into exile; even after the death of Catiline it exiled
+Cicero, destroyed his house, plundered his property, and did
+everything which Catiline would have done if victorious; Rutilius
+found his virtue rewarded with a hiding-place in Asia; to Cato the
+Roman people refused the praetorship, and persisted in refusing the
+consulship. We are ungrateful in public matters; and if every man
+asks himself, you will find that there is no one who has not some
+private ingratitude to complain of. Yet it is impossible that all
+men should complain, unless all were deserving of complaint,
+therefore all men are ungrateful. Are they ungrateful alone? nay,
+they are also all covetous, all spiteful, and all cowardly,
+especially those who appear daring; and, besides this, all men fawn
+upon the great, and all are impious. Yet you need not be angry with
+them; pardon them, for they are all mad. I do not wish to recall
+you to what is not proved, or to say, "See how ungrateful is youth!
+what young man, even if of innocent life, does not long for his
+father's death? even if moderate in his desires, does not look
+forward to it? even if dutiful, does not think about it? How few
+there are who fear the death even of the best of wives, who do not
+even calculate the probabilities of it. Pray, what litigant, after
+having been successfully defended, retains any remembrance of so
+great a benefit for more than a few days?" All agree that no one
+dies without complaining. Who on his last day dares to say,
+
+ "I've lived, I've done the task which Fortune set me."
+
+Who does not leave the world with reluctance, and with
+lamentations? Yet it is the part of an ungrateful man not to be
+satisfied with the past. Your days will always be few if you count
+them. Reflect that length of time is not the greatest of blessings;
+make the best of your time, however short it may be; even if the
+day of your death be postponed, your happiness will not be
+increased, for life is merely made longer, not pleasanter, by
+delay. How much better is it to be thankful for the pleasures which
+one has received, not to reckon up the years of others, but to set
+a high value upon one's own, and score them to one's credit,
+saying, "God thought me worthy of this; I am satisfied with it; he
+might have given me more, but this, too, is a benefit." Let us be
+grateful towards both gods and men, grateful to those who have
+given us anything, and grateful even to those who have given
+anything to our relatives.
+
+XVIII. "You render me liable to an infinite debt of gratitude,"
+says our opponent, "when you say 'even to those who have given any
+thing to our relations,' so fix some limit. He who bestows a
+benefit upon the son, according to you, bestows it likewise upon
+the father: this is the first question I wish to raise. In the next
+place I should like to have a clear definition of whether a
+benefit, if it be bestowed upon your friend's father as well as
+upon himself, is bestowed also upon his brother? or upon his uncle?
+or his grandfather? or his wife and his father-in-law? tell me
+where I am to stop, how far I am to follow out the pedigree of the
+family?"
+
+SENECA. If I cultivate your land, I bestow a benefit upon you; if I
+extinguish your house when burning, or prop it so as to save it
+from falling, I shall bestow a benefit upon you; if I heal your
+slave, I shall charge it to you; if I save your son's life, will
+you not thereby receive a benefit from me?
+
+XIX. THE ADVERSARY. Your instances are not to the purpose, for he
+who cultivates my land, does not benefit the land, but me; he who
+props my house so that it does not fall, does this service to me,
+for the house itself is without feeling, and as it has none, it is
+I who am indebted to him; and he who cultivates my land does so
+because he wishes to oblige me, not to oblige the land. I should
+say the same of a slave; he is a chattel owned by me; he is saved
+for my advantage, therefore I am indebted for him. My son is
+himself capable of receiving a benefit; so it is he who receives
+it; I am gratified at a benefit which comes so near to myself, but
+am not laid under any obligation.
+
+SE. Still I should like you, who say that you are under no
+obligation, to answer me this. The good health, the happiness, and
+the inheritance of a son are connected with his father; his father
+will be more happy if he keeps his son safe, and more unhappy if he
+loses him. What follows, then? when a man is made happier by me and
+is freed from the greatest danger of unhappiness, does he not
+receive a benefit?
+
+AD. No, because there are some things which are bestowed upon
+others, and yet flow from them so as to reach ourselves; yet we
+must ask the person upon whom it was bestowed for repayment; as for
+example, money must be sought from the man to whom it was lent,
+although it may, by some means, have come into my hands. There is
+no benefit whose advantages do not extend to the receiver's nearest
+friends, and sometimes even to those less intimately connected with
+him; yet we do not enquire whither the benefit has proceeded from
+him to whom it was first given, but where it was first placed. You
+must demand repayment from the defendant himself personally.
+
+SE. Well, but I pray you, do you not say, "you have preserved my
+son for me; had he perished, I could not have survived him?" Do you
+not owe a benefit for the life of one whose safety you value above
+your own? Moreover, should I save your son's life, you would fall
+down before my knees, and would pay vows to heaven as though you
+yourself had been saved; you would say, "It makes no difference
+whether you have saved mine or me; you have saved us both, yet me
+more than him." Why do you say this, if you do not receive a
+benefit?
+
+A.D. Because, if my son were to contract a loan, I should pay his
+creditor, yet I should not, therefore, be indebted to him; or if my
+son were taken in adultery, I should blush, yet I should not,
+therefore, be an adulterer. I say that I am under an obligation to
+you for saving my son, not because I really am, but because I am
+willing to constitute myself your debtor of my own free will. On
+the other hand I have derived from his safety the greatest possible
+pleasure and advantage, and I have escaped that most dreadful blow,
+the loss of my child. True, but we are not now discussing whether
+you have done me any good or not, but whether you have bestowed a
+benefit upon me; for animals, stones, and herbs can do one good,
+but do not bestow benefits, which can only be given by one who
+wishes well to the receiver. Now you do not wish well to the
+father, but only to the son; and sometimes you do not even know the
+father. So when you have said, "Have I not bestowed a benefit upon
+the father by saving the son?" you ought to meet this with, "Have
+I, then, bestowed a benefit upon a father whom I do not know, whom
+I never thought of?" And what will you say when, as is sometimes the
+case, you hate the father, and yet save his son? Can you be thought
+to have bestowed a benefit upon one whom you hated most bitterly
+while you were bestowing it?
+
+However, if I were to lay aside the bickering of dialogue, and
+answer you as a lawyer, I should say that you ought to consider the
+intention of the giver, you must regard his benefit as bestowed
+upon the person upon whom he meant to bestow it. If he did it in
+honour of the father, then the father received the benefit; if he
+thought only of the son, then the father is not laid under any
+obligation: by the benefit which was conferred upon the son, even
+though the father derives pleasure from it. Should he, however,
+have an opportunity, he will himself wish to give you something,
+yet not as though he were forced to repay a debt, but rather as if
+he had grounds for beginning an exchange of favours. No return for
+a benefit ought to be demanded from the father of the receiver; if
+he does you any kindness in return for it, he should be regarded
+as, a righteous man, but not as a grateful one. For there is no end
+to it; if I bestow a benefit on the receiver's father, do I
+likewise bestow it upon his mother, his grandfather, his maternal
+uncle, his children, relations, friends, slaves, and country?
+Where, then, does a benefit begin to stop? for there follows it
+this endless chain of people, to whom it is hard to assign bounds,
+because they join it by degrees, and are always creeping on towards
+it.
+
+XX. A common question is, "Two brothers are at variance. If I save
+the life of one, do I confer a benefit upon the other, who will be
+sorry that his hated brother did not perish?" There can be no doubt
+that it is a benefit to do good to a man, even against that man's
+will, just as he, who against his own will does a man good, does
+not bestow a benefit upon him. "Do you," asks our adversary, "call
+that by which he is displeased and hurt a benefit?" Yes; many
+benefits have a harsh and forbidding appearance, such as cutting or
+burning to cure disease, or confining with chains. We must not
+consider whether a man is grieved at receiving a benefit, but
+whether he ought to rejoice: a coin is not bad because it is
+refused by a savage who is unacquainted with its proper stamp. A
+man receives a benefit even though he hates what is done, provided
+that it does him good, and that the giver bestowed it in order to
+do him good. It makes no difference if he receives a good thing in
+a bad spirit. Consider the converse of this. Suppose that a man
+hates his brother, though it is to his advantage to have a brother,
+and I kill this brother, this is not a benefit, though he may say
+that it is, and be glad of it. Our most artful enemies are those
+whom we thank for the wrongs which they do us.
+
+"I understand; a thing which does good is a benefit, a thing which
+does harm is not a benefit. Now I will suggest to you an act which
+neither does good nor harm, and yet is a benefit. Suppose that I
+find the corpse of some one's father in a wilderness, and bury it,
+then I certainly have done him no good, for what difference could
+it make to him in what manner his body decayed? Nor have I done any
+good to his son, for what advantage does he gain by my act?" I will
+tell you what he gains. He has by my means performed a solemn and
+necessary rite; I have performed a service for his father which he
+would have wished, nay, which it would have been his duty to have
+performed himself. Yet this act is not a benefit, if I merely
+yielded to those feelings of pity and kindliness which would make
+me bury any corpse whatever, but only if I recognized this body,
+and buried it, with the thought in my mind that I was doing this
+service to the son; but, by merely throwing earth over a dead
+stranger, I lay no one under an obligation for an act performed on
+general principles of humanity.
+
+It may be asked, "Why are you so careful in inquiring upon whom you
+bestow benefits, as though some day you meant to demand repayment
+of them? Some say that repayment should never be demanded; and they
+give the following reasons. An unworthy man will not repay the
+benefit which he has received, even if it be demanded of him, while
+a worthy man will do so of his own accord. Consequently, if you
+have bestowed it upon a good man, wait; do not outrage him by
+asking him for it, as though of his own accord he never would repay
+it. If you have bestowed it upon a bad man, suffer for it, but do
+not spoil your benefit by turning it into a loan. Moreover the law,
+by not authorizing you, forbids you, by implication, to demand the
+repayment of a benefit." All this is nonsense. As long as I am in
+no pressing need, as long as I am not forced by poverty, I will
+lose my benefits rather than ask for repayment; but if the lives of
+my children were at stake, if my wife were in danger, if my regard
+for the welfare of my country and for my own liberty were to force
+me to adopt a course which I disliked, I should overcome my
+delicacy, and openly declare that I had done all that I could to
+avoid the necessity of receiving help from an ungrateful man; the
+necessity of obtaining repayment of one's benefit will in the end
+overcome one's delicacy about asking for it. In the next place,
+when I bestow a benefit upon a good man, I do so with the intention
+of never demanding repayment, except in case of absolute necessity.
+
+XXI. "But," argues he, "by not authorizing you, the law forbids you
+to exact repayment." There are many things which are not enforced
+by any law or process, but which the conventions of society, which
+are stronger than any law, compel us to observe. There is no law
+forbidding us to divulge our friend's secrets; there is no law
+which bids us keep faith even with an enemy; pray what law is there
+which binds us to stand by what we have promised? There is none.
+Nevertheless I should remonstrate with one who did not keep a
+secret, and I should be indignant with one who pledged his word and
+broke it. "But," he argues, "you are turning a benefit into a
+loan." By no means, for I do not insist upon repayment, but only
+demand it; nay, I do not even demand it, but remind my friend of
+it. Even the direst need will not bring me to apply for help to one
+with whom I should have to undergo a long struggle.
+
+If there be any one so ungrateful that it is not sufficient to
+remind him of his debt, I should pass him over, and think that he
+did not deserve to be made grateful by force. A money-lender does
+not demand repayment from his debtors if he knows they have become
+bankrupt, and, to their shame, have nothing but shame left to lose;
+and I, like him, should pass over those who are openly and
+obstinately ungrateful, and would demand repayment only from those
+who were likely to give it me, not from those from whom I should
+have to extort it by force.
+
+XXII. There are many who cannot deny that they have received a
+benefit, yet cannot return it--men who are not good enough to be
+termed grateful, nor yet bad enough to be termed ungrateful; but
+who are dull and sluggish, backward debtors, though not defaulters.
+Such men as these I should not ask for repayment, but forcibly
+remind them of it, and, from a state of indifference, bring them
+back to their duty. They would at once reply, "Forgive me; I did
+not know, by Hercules, that you missed this, or I would have
+offered it of my own accord, I beg that you will not think me
+ungrateful; I remember your goodness to me." Why need I hesitate to
+make such men as these better to themselves and to me? I would
+prevent any one from doing wrong, if I were able; much more would I
+prevent a friend, both lest he should do wrong, and lest he should
+do wrong to me in particular. I bestow a second benefit upon him by
+not permitting him to be ungrateful; and I should not reproach him
+harshly with what I had done for him, but should speak as gently as
+I could. In order to afford him an opportunity of returning my
+kindness, I should refresh his remembrance of it, and ask for a
+benefit; he would understand that I was asking for repayment.
+Sometimes I would make use of somewhat severe language, if I had
+any hope that by it he might be amended; though I would not
+irritate a hopelessly ungrateful man, for fear that I might turn
+him into an enemy. If we spare the ungrateful even the affront of
+reminding them of their conduct, we shall render them' more
+backward in returning benefits; and although some might be cured of
+their evil ways, and be made into good men, if their consciences
+were stung by remorse, yet we shall allow them to perish for want
+of a word of warning, with which a father sometimes corrects his
+son, a wife brings back to herself an erring husband, or a man
+stimulates the wavering fidelity of his friend.
+
+XXIII. To awaken some men, it is only necessary to stir them, not
+to strike them; in like manner, with some men, the feeling of
+honour about returning a benefit is not extinct, but slumbering.
+Let us rouse it. "Do not," they will say, "make the kindness you
+have done me into a wrong: for it is a wrong, if you do not demand
+some return from me, and so make me ungrateful. What if I do not
+know what sort of repayment you wish for? if I am so occupied by
+business, and my attention is so much diverted to other subjects
+that I have not been able to watch for an opportunity of serving
+you? Point out to me what I can do for you, what you wish me to do.
+Why do you despair, before making a trial of me? Why are you in
+such haste to lose both your benefit and your friend? How can you
+tell whether I do not wish, or whether I do not know how to repay
+you: whether it be in intention or in opportunity that I am
+wanting? Make a trial of me." I would therefore remind him of what
+I had done, without bitterness, not in public, or in a reproachful
+manner, but so that he may think that he himself has remembered it
+rather than that it has been recalled to him.
+
+XXIV. One of Julius Caesar's veterans was once pleading before him
+against his neighbours, and the cause was going against him. "Do
+you remember, general," said he, "that in Spain you dislocated your
+ankle near the river Sucro [Footnote: Xucar]?" When Caesar said
+that he remembered it, he continued, "Do you remember that when,
+during the excessive heat, you wished to rest under a tree which
+afforded very little shade, as the ground in which that solitary
+tree grew was rough and rocky, one of your comrades spread his
+cloak under you?" Caesar answered, "Of course, I remember; indeed,
+I was perishing with thirst; and since was unable to walk to the
+nearest spring, I would have crawled thither on my hands and knees,
+had not my comrade, a brave and active man, brought me water in his
+helmet." "Could you, then, my general, recognize that man or that
+helmet?" Caesar replied that he could not remember the helmet, but
+that he could remember the man well; and he added, I fancy in anger
+at being led away to this old story in the midst of a judicial
+enquiry, "At any rate, you are not he." "I do not blame you,
+Caesar," answered the man, "for not recognizing me; for when this
+took place, I was unwounded; but afterwards, at the battle of
+Munda, my eye was struck out, and the bones of my skull crushed.
+Nor would you recognize that helmet if you saw it, for it was split
+by a Spanish sword." Caesar would not permit this man to be
+troubled with lawsuits, and presented his old soldier with the
+fields through which a village right of way had given rise to the
+dispute.
+
+XXV. In this case, what ought he to have done? Because his
+commander's memory was confused by a multitude of incidents, and
+because his position as the leader of vast armies did not permit
+him to notice individual soldiers, ought the man not to have asked
+for a return for the benefit which he had conferred? To act as he
+did is not so much to ask for a return as to take it when it lies
+in a convenient position ready for us, although we have to stretch
+out our hands in order to receive it. I shall therefore ask for the
+return of a benefit, whenever I am either reduced to great straits,
+or where by doing so I shall act to the advantage of him from whom
+I ask it. Tiberius Caesar, when some one addressed him with the
+words, "Do you remember . . . .?" answered, before the man could
+mention any further proofs of former acquaintance, "I do not
+remember what I was." Why should it not be forbidden to demand of
+this man repayment of former favours? He had a motive for
+forgetting them: he denied all knowledge of his friends and
+comrades, and wished men only to see, to think, and to speak of him
+as emperor. He regarded his old friend as an impertinent meddler.
+
+We ought to be even more careful to choose a favorable opportunity
+when we ask for a benefit to be repaid to us than when we ask for
+one to be bestowed upon us. We must be temperate in our language,
+so that the grateful may not take offence, or the ungrateful
+pretend to do so. If we lived among wise men, it would be our duty
+to wait in silence until our benefits were returned. Yet even to
+wise men it would be better to give some hint of what our position
+required. We ask for help even from the gods themselves, from whose
+knowledge nothing is hid, although our prayers cannot alter their
+intentions towards us, but can only recall them to their minds.
+Homer's priest, [Il. i. 39 sqq.] I say, recounts even to the gods
+his duteous conduct and his pious care of their altars. The second
+best form of virtue is to be willing and able to take advice.[Hes.
+Op. 291.] A horse who is docile and prompt to obey can be guided
+hither and thither by the slightest movement of the reins. Very few
+men are led by their own reason: those who come next to the best
+are those who return to the right path in consequence of advice;
+and these we must not deprive of their guide. When our eyes are
+covered they still possess sight; but it is the light of day which,
+when admitted to them, summons them to perform their duty: tools
+lie idle, unless the workman uses them to take part in his work.
+Similarly men's minds contain a good feeling, which, however, lies
+torpid, either through luxury and disuse, or through ignorance of
+its duties. This we ought to render useful, and not to get into a
+passion with it, and leave it in its wrong doing, but bear with it
+patiently, just as schoolmasters bear patiently with the blunders
+of forgetful scholars; for as by the prompting of a word or two
+their memory is often recalled to the text of the speech which they
+have to repeat, so men's goodwill can be brought to return kindness
+by reminding them of it.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK VI.
+
+I.
+
+
+There are some things, my most excellent Liberalis, which lie
+completely outside of our actual life, and which we only inquire
+into in order to exercise our intellects, while others both give us
+pleasure while we are discovering them, and are of use when
+discovered. I will place all these in your hands; you, at your own
+discretion, may order them either to be investigated thoroughly, or
+to be reserved, and be used as agreeable interludes. Something will
+be gained even by those which you dismiss at once, for it is
+advantageous even to know what subjects are not worth learning. I
+shall be guided, therefore, by your face: according to its
+expression, I shall deal with some questions at greater length, and
+drive others out of court, and put an end to them at once.
+
+II. It is a question whether a benefit can be taken away from one
+by force. Some say that it cannot, because it is not a thing, but
+an act. A gift is not the same as the act of giving, any more than
+a sailor is the same as the act of sailing. A sick man and a
+disease are not the same thing, although no one can be ill without
+disease; and, similarly, a benefit itself is one thing, and what
+any of us receive through a benefit is another. The benefit itself
+is incorporeal, and never becomes invalid; but its subject-matter
+changes owners, and passes from hand to hand. So, when you take
+away from anyone what you have given him, you take away the
+subject-matter only of the benefit, not the benefit itself. Nature
+herself cannot recall what she has given. She may cease to bestow
+benefits, but cannot take them away: a man who dies, yet has lived;
+a man who becomes blind, nevertheless has seen. She can cut off her
+blessings from us in the future, but she cannot prevent our having
+enjoyed them in the past. We are frequently not able to enjoy a
+benefit for long, but the benefit is not thereby destroyed. Let
+Nature struggle as hard as she please, she cannot give herself
+retrospective action. A man may lose his house, his money, his
+property--everything to which the name of benefit can be given--
+yet the benefit itself will remain firm and unmoved; no power can
+prevent his benefactor's having bestowed them, or his having
+received them.
+
+III. I think that a fine passage in Rabirius's poem, where M.
+Antonius, seeing his fortune deserting him, nothing left him except
+the privilege of dying, and even that only on condition that he
+used it promptly, exclaims,
+
+ "What I have given, that I now possess!"
+
+How much he might have possessed, had he chosen! These are riches
+to be depended upon, which through all the turmoil of human life
+will remain steadfast; and the greater they are, the less envy they
+will attract. Why are you sparing of your property, as though it
+were your own? You are but the manager of it. All those treasures,
+which make you swell with pride, and soar above mere mortals, till
+you forget the weakness of your nature; all that which you lock up
+in iron-grated treasuries, and guard in arms, which you win from
+other men with their lives, and defend at the risk of your own; for
+which you launch fleets to dye the sea with blood, and shake the
+walls of cities, not knowing what arrows fortune may be preparing
+for you behind your back; to gain which you have so often violated
+all the ties of relationship, of friendship, and of colleagueship,
+till the whole world lies crushed between the two combatants: all
+these are not yours; they are a kind of deposit, which is on the
+point of passing into other hands: your enemies, or your heirs, who
+are little better, will seize upon them. "How," do you ask, "can
+you make them your own?" "By giving them away." Do, then, what is
+best for your own interests, and gain a sure enjoyment of them,
+which cannot be taken from you, making them at once more certainly
+yours, and more honorable to you. That which you esteem so highly,
+that by which you think that you are made rich and powerful, owns
+but the shabby title of "house," "slave," or "money;" but when you
+have given it away, it becomes a benefit.
+
+IV. "You admit," says our adversary, "that we sometimes are under
+no obligation to him from whom we have received a benefit. In that
+case it has been taken by force." Nay, there are many things which
+would cause us to cease to feel gratitude for a benefit, not
+because the benefit has been taken from me, but because it has been
+spoiled. Suppose that a man has defended me in a lawsuit, but has
+forcibly outraged my wife; he has not taken away the benefit which
+he conferred upon me, but by balancing it with an equivalent wrong,
+he has set me free from my debt; indeed, if he has injured me more
+than he had previously benefited me, he not only puts an end to my
+gratitude, but makes me free to revenge myself upon him, and to
+complain of him, when the wrong outweighs the benefit; in such a
+case the benefit is not taken away, but is overcome. Why, are not
+some fathers so cruel and so wicked that it is right and proper for
+their sons to turn away from them, and disown them? Yet, pray, have
+they taken away the life which they gave? No, but their unnatural
+conduct in later years has destroyed all the gratitude which was
+due to them for their original benefit. In these cases it is not a
+benefit itself, but the gratitude owing for a benefit which is
+taken away, and the result is, not that one does not possess the
+benefit, but that one is not laid under any obligation by it. It is
+as though a man were to lend me money, and then burn my house down;
+the advantage of the loan is balanced by the damage which he has
+caused: I do not repay him, and yet I am not in his debt. In like
+manner any one who may have acted kindly and generously to me, and
+who afterwards has shown himself haughty, insulting, and cruel,
+places me in just the same position as though I never had received
+anything from him: he has murdered his own benefits. Though the
+lease may remain in force, still a man does not continue to be a
+tenant if his landlord tramples down his crops, or cuts down his
+orchard; their contract is at an end, not because the landlord has
+received the rent which was agreed upon, but because he has made it
+impossible that he should receive it. So, too, a creditor often has
+to pay money to his debtor, should he have taken more property from
+him in other transactions than he claims as having lent him. The
+judge does not sit merely to decide between debtor and creditor,
+when he says, "You did lend the man money; but then, what followed?
+You have driven away his cattle, you have murdered his slave, you
+have in your possession plate which you have not paid for. After
+valuing what each has received, I order you, who came to this court
+as a creditor, to leave it as a debtor." In like manner a balance
+is struck between benefits and injuries. In many cases, I repeat, a
+benefit is not taken away from him who receives it, and yet it lays
+him under no obligation, if the giver has repented of giving it,
+called himself unhappy because he gave it, sighed or made a wry
+face while he gave it; if he thought that he was throwing it away
+rather than giving it, if he gave it to please himself, or to
+please any one except me, the receiver; if he persistently makes
+himself offensive by boasting of what he has done, if he brags of
+his gift everywhere, and makes it a misery to me, then indeed the
+benefit remains in my hands, but I owe him nothing for it, just as
+sums of money to which a creditor has no legal right are owed to
+him, but cannot be claimed by him;
+
+V. Though you have bestowed a benefit upon me, yet you have since
+done me a wrong; the benefit demanded gratitude, the wrong required
+vengeance: the result is that I do not owe you gratitude, nor do
+you owe me compensation--each is cancelled by the other. When we
+say, "I returned him his benefit," we do not mean that we restored
+to him the very thing which we had received, but something else in
+its place. To return is to give back one thing instead of another,
+because, of course, in all repayment it is not the thing itself,
+but its equivalent which is returned. We are said to have returned
+money even though we count out gold pieces instead of silver ones,
+or even if no money passes between us, but the transaction be
+effected verbally by the assignment of a debt.
+
+I think I see you say, "You are wasting your time; of what use is
+it to me to know whether what I do not owe to another still remains
+in my hands or not? These are like the ingenious subtleties of the
+lawyers, who declare that one cannot acquire an inheritance by
+prescription, but can only acquire those things of which the
+inheritance consists, as though there were any difference between
+the heritage and the things of which it consists. Rather decide
+this point for me, which may be of use. If the same man confers a
+benefit upon me, and afterwards does me a wrong, is it my duty to
+return the benefit to him, and nevertheless to avenge myself upon
+him, having, as it were, two distinct accounts open with him, or to
+mix them both together, and do nothing, leaving the benefit to be
+wiped out by the injury, the injury by the benefit? I see that the
+former course is adopted by the law of the land; you know best what
+the law may be among you Stoic philosophers in such a case. I
+suppose that you keep the action which I bring against another
+distinct from that which he Strings against me, and the two
+processes are not merged into one? For instance, if a man entrusts
+me with money, and afterwards robs me, I shall bring an action
+against him for theft, and he will bring one against me for
+unlawfully detaining his property?"
+
+VI. The cases which you have mentioned, my Liberalis, come under
+well-established laws, which it is necessary for us to follow. One
+law cannot be merged in another: each one proceeds its own way.
+There is a particular action which deals with deposits just as
+there is one which deals with theft. A benefit is subject to no
+law; it depends upon my own arbitration. I am at liberty to
+contrast the amount of good or harm which any one may have done me,
+and then to decide which of us is indebted to the other. In legal
+processes we ourselves have no power, we must go whither they lead
+us; in the case of a benefit the supreme power is mine, I pronounce
+sentence. Consequently I do not separate or distinguish between
+benefits and wrongs, but send them before the same judge. Unless I
+did so, you would bid me love and hate, give thanks and make
+complaints at the same time, which human nature does not admit of.
+I would rather compare the benefit and the injury with one another,
+and see whether there were any balance in my favour. If anybody
+puts lines of other writing upon my manuscript he conceals, though
+he does not take away, the letters which were there before, and in
+like manner a wrong coming after a benefit does not allow it to be
+seen.
+
+VII. Your face, by which I have agreed to be guided, now becomes
+wrinkled with frowns, as though I were straying too widely from the
+subject. You seem to say to me:
+
+ "Why steer to seaward? Hither bend thy course, Hug close the
+shore..."
+
+I do hug it as close as possible. So now, if you think that we have
+dwelt sufficiently upon this point, let us proceed to the
+consideration of the next--that is, whether we are at all indebted
+to any one who does us good without wishing to do so. I might have
+expressed this more clearly, if it were not right that the question
+should be somewhat obscurely stated, in order that by the
+distinction immediately following it may be shown that we mean to
+investigate the case both of him who does us good against his will,
+and that of him who does us good without knowing it. That a man who
+does us good by acting under compulsion does not thereby lay us
+under any obligation, is so clear, that no words are needed to
+prove it. Both this question, and any other of the like character
+which may be raised, can easily be settled if in each case we bear
+in mind that, for anything to be a benefit, it must reach us in the
+first place through some thought, and secondly through the thought
+of a friend and well-wisher. Therefore we do not feel any gratitude
+towards rivers, albeit they may bear large ships, afford an ample
+and unvarying stream for the conveyance of merchandise, or flow
+beauteously and full of fish through fertile fields. No one
+conceives himself to be indebted for a benefit to the Nile, any
+more than he would owe it a grudge if its waters flooded his fields
+to excess, and retired more slowly than usual; the wind does not
+bestow benefits, gentle and favorable though it may be, nor does
+wholesome and useful food; for he who would bestow a benefit upon
+me, must not only do me good, but must wish to do so. No obligation
+can therefore be incurred towards dumb animals; yet how many men
+have been saved from peril by the swiftness of a horse!--nor yet
+towards trees--yet how many sufferers from summer heat have been
+sheltered by the thick foliage of a tree! What difference can it
+make, whether I have profited by the act of one who did not know
+that he was doing me good, or one who could not know it, when in
+each case the will to do me good was wanting? You might as well bid
+me be grateful to a ship, a carriage, or a lance for saving me from
+danger, as bid me be grateful to a man who may have done me good by
+chance, but with no more intention of doing me good than those
+things could have.
+
+VIII. Some men may receive benefits without knowing it, but no man
+can bestow them without knowing it. Many sick persons have been
+cured by chance circumstances, which do not therefore become
+specific remedies; as, for instance, one man was restored to health
+by falling into a river during very cold weather, as another was
+set free from a quartan fever by means of a flogging, because the
+sudden terror turned his attention into a new channel, so that the
+dangerous hours passed unnoticed. Yet none of these are remedies,
+even though they may have been successful; and in like manner some
+men do us good, though they are unwilling--indeed, because they are
+unwilling to do so--yet we need not feel grateful to them as though
+we had received a benefit from them, because fortune has changed
+the evil which they intended into good. Do you suppose that I am
+indebted to a man who strikes my enemy with a blow which he aimed
+at me, who would have injured me had he not missed his mark? It
+often happens that by openly perjuring himself a man makes even
+trustworthy witnesses disbelieved, and renders his intended victim
+an object of compassion, as though he were being ruined by a
+conspiracy. Some have been saved by the very power which was
+exerted to crush them, and judges who would have condemned a man by
+law, have refused to condemn him by favour. Yet they did not confer
+a benefit upon the accused, although they rendered him a service,
+because we must consider at what the dart was aimed, not what it
+hits, and a benefit is distinguished from an injury not by its
+result, but by the spirit in which it was meant. By contradicting
+himself, by irritating the judge by his arrogance, or by rashly
+allowing his whole case to depend upon the testimony of one
+witness, my opponent may have saved my cause. I do not consider
+whether his mistakes benefited me or not, for he wished me ill.
+
+IX. In order that I may be grateful, I must wish to do what my
+benefactor must have wished in order that he might bestow a
+benefit. Can anything be more unjust than to bear a grudge against
+a person who may have trodden upon one's foot in a crowd, or
+splashed one, or pushed one the way which one did not wish to go?
+Yet it was by his act that we were injured, and we only refrain
+from complaining of him, because he did not know what he was doing.
+The same reason makes it possible for men to do us good without
+conferring benefits upon us, or to harm us without doing us wrong,
+because it is intention which distinguishes our friends from our
+enemies. How many have been saved from service in the army by
+sickness! Some men have been saved from sharing the fall of their
+house, by being brought up upon their recognizances to a court of
+law by their enemies; some have been saved by ship-wreck from
+falling into the hands of pirates; yet we do not feel grateful to
+such things, because chance has no feeling of the service it
+renders, nor are we grateful to our enemy, though his lawsuit,
+while it harassed and detained us, still saved our lives. Nothing
+can be a benefit which does not proceed from good will, and which
+is not meant as such by the giver. If any one does me a service,
+without knowing it, I am under no obligation to him; should he do
+so, meaning to injure me, I shall imitate his conduct.
+
+X. Let us turn our attention to the first of these. Can you desire
+me to do anything to express my gratitude to a man who did nothing
+in order to confer a benefit upon me? Passing on to the next, do
+you wish me to show my gratitude to such a man, and of my own will
+to return to him what I received from him against his will? What am
+I to say of the third, he who, meaning to do an injury, blunders
+into bestowing a benefit? That you should have wished to confer a
+benefit upon me is not sufficient to render me grateful; but that
+you should have wished not to do so is enough to set me free from
+any obligation to you. A mere wish does not constitute a benefit;
+and just as the best and heartiest wish is not a benefit when
+fortune prevents its being carried into effect, neither is what
+fortune bestows upon us a benefit, unless good wishes preceded it.
+In order to lay me under an obligation, you must not merely do me a
+service, but you must do so intentionally.
+
+XI. Cleanthes makes use of the following example:--"I sent," says
+he, "two slaves to look for Plato and bring him to me from the
+Academy. One of them searched through the whole of the colonnade,
+and every other place in which he thought that he was likely to be
+found, and returned home alike weary and unsuccessful; the other
+sat down among the audience of a mountebank close by, and, while
+amusing himself in the society of other slaves like a careless
+vagabond as he was, found Plato, without seeking for him, as he
+happened to pass that way. We ought," says he, "to praise that
+slave who, as far as lay in his power, did what he was ordered, and
+we ought to punish the other whose laziness turned out so
+fortunate." It is goodwill alone which does one real service; let
+us then consider under what conditions it lays us under
+obligations. It is not enough to wish a man well, without doing him
+good; nor is it enough to do him good without wishing him well.
+Suppose that some one wished to give me a present, but did not give
+it; I have his good will, but I do not have his benefit, which
+consists of subject matter and goodwill together. I owe nothing to
+one who wished to lend me money but did not do so, and in like
+manner I shall be the friend of one who wished but was not able to
+bestow a benefit upon me, but I shall not be under any obligation
+to him. I also shall wish to bestow something upon him, even as he
+did upon me; but if fortune be more favorable to me than to him,
+and I succeed in bestowing something upon him, my doing so will be
+a benefit bestowed upon him, not a repayment out of gratitude for
+what he did for me. It will become his duty to be grateful to me; I
+shall have begun the interchange of benefits; the series must be
+counted from my act.
+
+XII. I already understand what you wish to ask; there is no need
+for you to say anything, your countenance speaks for you. "If any
+one does us good for his own sake, are we," you ask, "under an
+obligation to him? I often hear you complain that there are some
+things which men make use of themselves, but which they put down to
+the account of others." I will tell you, my Liberalis; but first
+let me distinguish between the two parts of your question, and
+separate what is fair from what is unfair. It makes a great
+difference whether any one bestows a benefit upon us for his own
+sake, or whether he does so partly for his own sake and partly for
+ours. He who looks only to his own interests, and who does us good
+because he cannot otherwise make a profit for himself, seems to me
+to be like the farmer who provides winter and summer fodder for his
+flocks, or like the man who feeds up the captives whom he has
+bought in order that they may fetch a better price in the slave
+market, or who crams and curry-combs fat oxen for sale; or like the
+keeper of a school of arms, who takes great pains in exercising and
+equipping his gladiators. As Cleanthes says, there is a great
+difference between benefits and trade.
+
+XIII. On the other hand, I am not so unjust as to feel no gratitude
+to a man, because, while helping me, he helped himself also; for I
+do not insist upon his consulting my interests to the exclusion of
+his own--nay, I should prefer that the benefit which I receive may
+be of even greater advantage to the giver, provided that he thought
+of us both when giving it, and meant to divide it between me and
+himself. Even should he possess the larger portion of it, still, if
+he admits me to a share, if he meant it for both of us, I am not
+only unjust but ungrateful, if I do not rejoice in what has
+benefited me benefiting him also. It is the essence of spitefulness
+to say that nothing can be a benefit which does not cause some
+inconvenience to the giver.
+
+As for him who bestows a benefit for his own sake, I should say to
+him, "You have made use of me, and how can you say that you have
+bestowed a benefit upon me, rather than I upon you?" "Suppose,"
+answers he, "that I cannot obtain a public office except by
+ransoming ten citizens out of a great number of captives, will you
+owe me nothing for setting you free from slavery and bondage? Yet I
+shall do so for my own sake." To this I should answer, "You do this
+partly for my sake, partly for your own. It is for your own sake
+that you ransom captives, but it is for my sake that you ransom me;
+for to serve your purpose it would be enough for you to ransom any
+one. I am therefore your debtor, not for ransoming me but for
+choosing me, since you might have attained the same result by
+ransoming some one else instead of me. You divide the advantages of
+the act between yourself and me, and you confer upon me a benefit
+by which both of us profit. What you do entirely for my sake is,
+that you choose me in preference to others. If therefore you were
+to be made praetor for ransoming ten captives, and there were only
+ten of us captives, none of us would be under any obligation to
+you, because there is nothing for which you can ask any one of us
+to give you credit apart from your own advantage. I do not regard a
+benefit jealously and wish it to be given to myself alone, but I
+wish to have a share in it."
+
+XIV. "Well, then," says he, "suppose that I were to order all your
+names to be put into a ballot-box, and that your name was drawn
+among those who were to be ransomed, would you owe me nothing?"
+Yes, I should owe you something, but very little: how little, I
+will explain to you. By so doing you do something for my sake, in
+that you grant me the chance of being ransomed; I owe to fortune
+that my name was drawn, all I owe to you is that my name could be
+drawn. You have given me the means of obtaining your benefit. For
+the greater part of that benefit I am indebted to fortune; that I
+could be so indebted, I owe to you.
+
+I shall take no notice whatever of those whose benefits are
+bestowed in a mercenary spirit, who do not consider to whom, but
+upon what terms they give, whose benefits are entirely selfish.
+Suppose that some one sells me corn; I cannot live unless I buy it;
+yet I do not owe my life to him because I have bought it. I do not
+consider how essential it was to me, and that I could not live
+without it; but how little thanks are due for it, since I could not
+have had it without paying for it, and since the merchant who
+imported it did not consider how much good he would do me, but how
+much he would gain for himself, I owe nothing for what I have
+bought and paid for.
+
+XV. "According to this reasoning," says my opponent, "you would say
+that you owe nothing to a physician beyond his paltry fee, nor to
+your teacher, because you have paid him some money; yet these
+persons are all held very dear, and are very much respected." In
+answer to this I should urge that some things are of greater value
+than the price which we pay for them. You buy of a physician life
+and good health, the value of which cannot be estimated in money;
+from a teacher of the liberal sciences you buy the education of a
+gentleman and mental culture; therefore you pay these persons the
+price, not of what they give us, but of their trouble in giving it;
+you pay them for devoting their attention to us, for disregarding
+their own affairs to attend to us: they receive the price, not of
+their services, but of the expenditure of their time. Yet this may
+be more truly stated in another way, which I will at once lay
+before you, having first pointed out how the above may be confuted.
+Our adversary would say, "If some things are of greater value than
+the price which we pay for them, then, though you may have bought
+them, you still owe me something more for them." I answer, in the
+first place, what does their real value matter, since the buyer and
+seller have settled the price between them? Next, I did not buy it
+at it's own price, but at yours. "It is," you say, "worth more than
+its sale price." True, but it cannot be sold for more. The price of
+everything varies according to circumstances; after you have well
+praised your wares, they are worth only the highest price at which
+you can sell them; a man who buys things cheap is not on that
+account under any obligation to the seller. In the next place, even
+if they are worth more, there is no generosity in your letting them
+go for less, since the price is settled by custom and the rate of
+the market, not by the uses and powers of the merchandise. What
+would you state to be the proper payment of a man who crosses the
+seas, holding a true course through the midst of the waves after
+the land has sunk out of sight, who foresees coming storms, and
+suddenly, when no one expects danger, orders sails to be furled,
+yards to be lowered, and the crew to stand at their posts ready to
+meet the fury of the unexpected gale? and yet the price of such
+great skill is fully paid for by the passage money. At what sum can
+you estimate the value of a lodging in a wilderness, of a shelter
+in the rain, of a bath or fire in cold weather? Yet I know on what
+terms I shall be supplied with these when I enter an inn. How much
+the man does for us who props our house when it is about to fall,
+and who, with a skill beyond belief, suspends in the air a block of
+building which has begun to crack at the, foundation; yet we can
+contract for underpinning at a fixed and cheap rate. The city wall
+keeps us safe from our enemies, and from sudden inroads of
+brigands; yet it is, well known how much a day a smith would earn
+for erecting towers and scaffoldings [Footnote: See Viollet-le-
+Duc's "Dictionnaire d'Architecture," articles "Architecture
+Militaire" and "Hourds," for the probable meaning of
+"Propugnacula."]to provide for the public safety.
+
+XVI. I might go on for ever collecting instances to prove that
+valuable things are sold at a low price. What then? why is it that
+I owe something extra both to my physician and to my teacher, and
+that I do not acquit myself of all obligation to them by paying
+them their fee? It is because they pass from physicians and
+teachers into friends, and lay us under obligations, not by the
+skill which they sell to us, but by kindly and familiar good will.
+If my physician does no more than feel my pulse and class me among
+those whom he sees in his daily rounds, pointing out what I ought
+to do or to avoid without any personal interest, then I owe him no
+more than his fee, because he views me with the eye not of a
+friend, but of a commander. [Footnote: I read "Nbn tamquam amicus
+videt sed tamquam imperator."] Neither have I any reason for loving
+my teacher, if he has regarded me merely as one of the mass of his
+scholars, and has not thought me worthy of taking especial pains
+with by myself, if he has never fixed his attention upon me, and if
+when he discharged his knowledge on the public, I might be said
+rather to have picked it up than to have learnt it from him. What
+then is our reason for owing them much? It is, not that what they
+have sold us is worth more than we paid for it, but that they have
+given something to us personally. Suppose that my physician has
+spent more consideration upon my case than was professionally
+necessary; that it was for me, not for his own credit, that he
+feared: that he was not satisfied with pointing out remedies, but
+himself applied them, that he sat by my bedside among my anxious
+friends, and came to see me at the crises of my disorder; that no
+service was too troublesome or too disgusting for him to perform;
+that he did not hear my groans unmoved; that among the numbers who
+called for him I was his favourite case; and that he gave the
+others only so much time as his care of my health permitted him: I
+should feel obliged to such a man not as to a physician, but as to
+a friend. Suppose again that my teacher endured labour and
+weariness in instructing me; that he taught me something more than
+is taught by all masters alike; that he roused my better feelings
+by his encouragement, and that at one time he would raise my
+spirits by praise, and at another warn me to shake off
+slothfulness: that he laid his hand, as it were, upon my latent and
+torpid powers of intellect and drew them out into the light of day;
+that he did not stingily dole out to me what he knew, in order that
+he might be wanted for a longer time, but was eager, if possible,
+to pour all his learning into me; then I am ungrateful, if I do not
+love him as much as I love my nearest relatives and my dearest
+friends.
+
+XVII. We give something additional even to those who teach the
+meanest trades, if their efforts appear to be extraordinary; we
+bestow a gratuity upon pilots, upon workmen who deal with the
+commonest materials and hire themselves out by the day. In the
+noblest arts, however, those which either preserve or beautify our
+lives, a man would be ungrateful who thinks he owes the artist no
+more than he bargained for. Besides this, the teaching of such
+learning as we have spoken of blends mind with mind; now when this
+takes place, both in the case of the physician and of the teacher
+the price of his work is paid, but that of his mind remains owing.
+
+XVIII. Plato once crossed a river, and as the ferryman did not ask
+him for anything, he supposed that he had let him pass free out of
+respect, and said that the ferryman had laid Plato under an
+obligation. Shortly afterwards, seeing the ferryman take one person
+after another across the river with the same pains, and without
+charging anything, Plato declared that the ferryman had not laid
+him under an obligation. If you wish me to be grateful for what you
+give, you must not merely give it to me, but show that you mean it
+specially for me; you cannot make any claim upon one for having
+given him what you fling away broad-cast among the crowd. What
+then? shall I owe you nothing for it? Nothing, as an individual; I
+will pay, when the rest of mankind do, what I owe no more than
+they.
+
+XIX. "Do you say," inquires my opponent, "that he who carries me
+gratis in a boat across the river Po, does not bestow any benefit
+upon me?" I do. He does me some good, but he does not bestow a
+benefit upon me; for he does it for his own sake, or at any rate
+not for mine; in short, he himself does not imagine that he is
+bestowing a benefit upon me, but does it for the credit of the
+State, or of the neighbourhood, or of himself, and expects some
+return for doing so, different from what he would receive from
+individual passengers. "Well," asks my opponent, "if the emperor
+were to grant the franchise to all the Gauls, or exemption, from
+taxes to all the Spaniards, would each individual of them owe him
+nothing on that account?" Of course he would: but he would be
+indebted to him, not as having personally received a benefit
+intended for himself alone, but as a partaker in one conferred upon
+his nation. He would argue, "The emperor had no thought of me at
+the time when he benefited us all; he did not care to give me the
+franchise separately, he did not fix his attention upon me; why
+then should I be grateful to one who did not have me in his mind
+when he was thinking of doing what he did? In answer to this, I say
+that when he thought of doing good to all the Gauls, he thought of
+doing good to me also, for I was a Gaul, and he included me under
+my national, if not under my personal appellation. In like manner,
+I should feel grateful to him, not as for a personal, but for a
+general benefit; being only one of the people, I should regard the
+debt of gratitude as incurred, not by myself, but by my country,
+and should not pay it myself, but only contribute my share towards
+doing so. I do not call a man my creditor because he has lent money
+to my country, nor should I include that money in a schedule of my
+debts were I either a candidate for a public office, or a defendant
+in the courts; yet I would pay my share towards extinguishing such
+a debt. Similarly, I deny that I am laid under an obligation by a
+gift bestowed upon my entire nation, because although the giver
+gave it to me, yet he did not do so for my sake, but gave it
+without knowing whether he was giving it to me or not: nevertheless
+I should feel that I owed something for the gift, because it did
+reach me, though not directly. To lay me under an obligation, a
+thing must be done for my sake alone.
+
+XX. "According to this," argues our opponent, "you are under no
+obligation to the sun or the moon; for they do not move for your
+sake alone." No, but since they move with the object of preserving
+the balance of the universe, they move for my sake also, seeing
+that I am a fraction of the universe. Besides, our position and
+theirs is not the same, for he who does me good in order that he
+may by my means do good to himself, does not bestow a benefit upon
+me, because he merely makes use of me as an instrument for his own
+advantage; whereas the sun and the moon, even if they do us good
+for their own sakes, still cannot do good to us in order that by
+our means they may do good to themselves, for what is there which
+we can bestow upon them?
+
+XXI. "I should be sure," replies he, "that the sun and the moon
+wished to do us good, if they were able to refuse to do so; but
+they cannot help moving as they do. In short, let them stop and
+discontinue their work."
+
+See now, in how many ways this argument may be refuted. One who
+cannot refuse to do a thing may nevertheless wish to do it; indeed
+there is no greater proof of a fixed desire to do anything, than
+not to be able to alter one's determination. A good man cannot
+leave undone what he does: for unless he does it he will not be a
+good man. Is a good man, then, not able to bestow a benefit,
+because he does what he ought to do, and is not able not to do what
+he ought to do? Besides this, it makes a great difference whether
+you say, "He is not able not to do this, because he is forced to do
+it," or "He is not able to wish not to do it;" for, if he could not
+help doing it, then I am not indebted for it to him, but to the
+person who forced him to do it; if he could not help wishing for it
+because he had nothing better to wish for, then it is he who forces
+himself to do it, and in this case the debt which as acting under
+compulsion he could not claim, is due to him as compelling himself.
+
+"Let the sun and moon cease to wish to benefit us," says our
+adversary. I answer, "Remember what has been said. Who can be so
+crazy as to refuse the name of free-will to that which has no
+danger of ceasing to act, and of adopting the opposite course,
+since, on the contrary, he whose will is fixed for ever, must be
+thought to wish more earnestly than any one else. Surely if he, who
+may at any moment change his mind, can be said to wish, we must not
+deny the existence of will in a being whose nature does not admit
+of change of mind.
+
+XXII. "Well," says he "let them stop, if it be possible." What you
+say is this:--Let all those heavenly bodies, placed as they are at
+vast distances from each other, and arranged to preserve the
+balance of the universe, leave their appointed posts: let sudden
+confusion arise, so that constellations may collide with
+constellations, that the established harmony of all things may be
+destroyed and the works of God be shaken into ruin; let the whole
+frame of the rapidly moving heavenly bodies abandon in mid career
+those movements which we were assured would endure for ages, and
+let those which now by their regular advance and retreat keep the
+world at a moderate temperature, be instantly consumed by fire, so
+that instead of the infinite variety of the seasons all may be
+reduced to one uniform condition; let fire rage everywhere,
+followed by dull night, and let the bottomless abyss swallow up all
+the gods." Is it worth while to destroy all this merely in order to
+refute you? Even though you do not wish it, they do you good, and
+they wheel in their courses for your sake, though their motion may
+be due to some earlier and more important cause.
+
+XXIII. Besides this, the gods act under no external constraint, but
+their own will is a law to them for all time. They have established
+an order which is not to be changed, and consequently it is
+impossible that they should appear to be likely to do anything
+against their will, since they wish to continue doing whatever they
+cannot cease from doing, and they never regret their original
+decision, No doubt it is impossible for them to stop short, or to
+desert to the other side, but it is so for no other reason than
+that their own force holds them to their purpose. It is from no
+weakness that they persevere; no, they have no mind to leave the
+best course, and by this it is fated that they should proceed.
+When, at the time of the original creation, they arranged the
+entire universe, they paid attention to us as well as to the rest,
+and took thought about the human race; and for this reason we
+cannot suppose that it is merely for their own pleasure that they
+move in their orbits and display their work since we also are a
+part of that work. We are, therefore; under an obligation to the
+sun and moon and the rest of the heavenly host, because, although
+they may rise in order to bestow more important benefits than those
+which we receive from them, yet they do bestow these upon us as
+they pass on their way to greater things. Besides this, they assist
+us of set purpose, and, therefore, lay us under an obligation,
+because we do not in their case stumble by chance upon a benefit
+bestowed by one who knew not what he was doing, but they knew that
+we should receive from them the advantages which we do; so that,
+though they may have some higher aim, though the result of their
+movements may be something of greater importance than the
+preservation of the human race, yet from the beginning thought has
+been directed to our comforts, and the scheme of the world has been
+arranged in a fashion which proves that our interests were neither
+their least nor last concern. It is our duty to show filial love
+for our parents, although many of them had no thought of children
+when they married. Not so with the gods: they cannot but have known
+what they were doing when they furnished mankind with food and
+comforts. Those for whose advantage so much was created, could not
+have been created without design. Nature conceived the idea of us
+before she formed us, and, indeed, we are no such trifling piece of
+work as could have fallen from her hands unheeded. See how great
+privileges she has bestowed upon us, how far beyond the human race
+the empire of mankind extends; consider how widely she allows us to
+roam, not having restricted us to the land alone, but permitted us
+to traverse every part of herself; consider, too, the audacity of
+our intellect, the only one which knows of the gods or seeks for
+them, and how we can raise our mind high above the earth, and
+commune with those divine influences: you will perceive that man is
+not a hurriedly put together, or an unstudied piece of work. Among
+her noblest products nature has none of which she can boast more
+than man, and assuredly no other which can comprehend her boast.
+What madness is this, to call the gods in question for their
+bounty? If a man declares that he has received nothing when he is
+receiving all the while, and from those who will always be giving
+without ever receiving anything in return, how will he be grateful
+to those whose kindness cannot be returned without expense? and how
+great a mistake is it not to be thankful to a giver, because he is
+good even to him who disowns him, or to use the fact of his bounty
+being poured upon us in an uninterrupted stream, as an argument to
+prove that he cannot help bestowing it. Suppose that such men as
+these say, "I do not want it," "Let him keep it to himself," "Who
+asks him for it?" and so forth, with all the other speeches of
+insolent minds: still, he whose bounty reaches you, although you
+say that it does not, lays you under an obligation nevertheless;
+indeed, perhaps the greatest part of the benefit which he bestows
+is that he is ready to give even when you are complaining against
+him.
+
+XXIV. Do you not see how parents force children during their
+infancy to undergo what is useful for their health? Though the
+children cry and struggle, they swathe them and bind their limbs
+straight lest premature liberty should make them grow crooked,
+afterwards instill into them a liberal education, threatening those
+who are unwilling to learn, and finally, if spirited young men do
+not conduct themselves frugally, modestly, and respectably, they
+compel them to do so. Force and harsh measures are used even to
+youths who have grown up and are their own masters, if they, either
+from fear or from insolence, refuse to take what is good for them.
+Thus the greatest benefits that we receive, we receive either
+without knowing it, or against our will, from our parents.
+
+XXV. Those persons who are ungrateful and repudiate benefits, not
+because they do not wish to receive them, but in order that they
+may not be laid under an obligation for them, are like those who
+fall into the opposite extreme, and are over grateful, who pray
+that some trouble or misfortune may befall their benefactors to
+give them an opportunity of proving how gratefully they remember
+the benefit which they have received. It is a question whether they
+are right, and show a truly dutiful feeling; their state of mind is
+morbid, like that of frantic lovers who long for their mistress to
+be exiled, that they may accompany her when she leaves her country
+forsaken by all her friends, or that she may be poor in order that
+she may the more need what they give her, or who long that she may
+be ill in order that they may sit by her bedside, and who, in
+short, out of sheer love form the same wishes as her enemies would
+wish for her. Thus the results of hatred and of frantic love are
+very nearly the same; and these lovers are very like those who hope
+that their friends may meet with difficulties which they may
+remove, and who thus do a wrong that they may bestow a benefit,
+whereas it would have been much better for them to do nothing, than
+by a crime to gain an opportunity of doing good service. What
+should we say of a pilot who prayed to the gods for dreadful storms
+and tempests, in order that danger might make his skill more highly
+esteemed? what of a general who should pray that a vast number of
+the enemy surround his camp, fill the ditches by a sudden charge,
+tear down the rampart round his panic-stricken army, and plant its
+hostile standards at the very gates, in order that he might gain
+more glory by restoring his broken ranks and shattered fortunes?
+All such men confer their benefits upon us by odious means, for
+they beg the gods to harm those whom they mean to help, and wish
+them to be struck down before they raise them up; it is a cruel
+feeling, brought about by a distorted sense of gratitude, to wish
+evil to befall one whom one is bound in honour to succour.
+
+XXVI. "My wish," argues our opponent, "does him no harm, because
+when I wish for the danger I wish for the rescue at the same time."
+What you mean by this is not that you do no wrong, but that you do
+less than if you wished that the danger might befall him, without
+wishing for the rescue. It is wicked to throw a man into the water
+in order that you may pull him out, to throw him down that you may
+raise him up, or to shut him up that you may release him. You do
+not bestow a benefit upon a man by ceasing to wrong him, nor can it
+ever be a piece of good service to anyone to remove from him a
+burden which you yourself imposed on him. True, you may cure the
+hurt which you inflict, but I had rather that you did not hurt me
+at all. You may gain my gratitude by curing me because I am
+wounded, but not by wounding me in order that you may cure me: no
+man likes scars except as compared with wounds, which he is glad to
+see thus healed, though he had rather not have received them. It
+would be cruel to wish such things to befall one from whom you had
+never received a kindness; how much more cruel is it to wish that
+they may befall one in whose debt you are.
+
+XXVII. "I pray," replies he, "at the same time, that I may be able
+to help him." In the first place, if I stop you short in the middle
+of your prayer, it shows at once that you are ungrateful: I have
+not yet heard what you wish to do for him; I have heard what you
+wish him to suffer. You pray that anxiety and fear and even worse
+evil than this may come upon him. You desire that he may need aid:
+this is to his disadvantage; you desire that he may need your aid:
+this is to your advantage. You do not wish to help him, but to be
+set free from your obligation to him: for when you are eager to
+repay your debt in such a way as this, you merely wish to be set
+free from the debt, not to repay it. So the only part of your wish
+that could be thought honourable proves to be the base and
+ungrateful feeling of unwillingness to lie under an obligation: for
+what you wish for is, not that you may have an opportunity of
+repaying his kindness, but that he may be forced to beg you to do
+him a kindness. You make yourself the superior, and you wickedly
+degrade beneath your feet the man who has done you good service.
+How much better would it be to remain in his debt in an honourable
+and friendly manner, than to seek to discharge the debt by these
+evil means! You would be less to blame if you denied that you had
+received it, for your benefactor would then lose nothing more than
+what he gave you, whereas now you wish him to be rendered inferior
+to you, and brought by the loss of his property and social position
+into a condition below his own benefits. Do you think yourself
+grateful? Just utter your wishes in the hearing of him to whom you
+wish to do good. Do you call that a prayer for his welfare, which
+can be divided between his friend and his enemy, which, if the last
+part were omitted, you would not doubt was pronounced, by one who
+opposed and hated him? Enemies in war have sometimes wished to
+capture certain towns in order to spare them, or to conquer certain
+persons in order to pardon, them, yet these were the wishes of
+enemies, and what was the kindest part of them began by cruelty.
+Finally, what sort of prayers do you think those can be which he,
+on whose behalf they are made, hopes more earnestly than any one
+else may not be granted? In hoping that the gods may injure a man,
+and that you may help him, you deal most dishonourably with him,
+and you do not treat the gods themselves fairly, for you give them
+the odious part to play, and reserve the generous one for yourself:
+the gods must do him wrong in order that you may do him a service.
+If you were to suborn an informer to accuse a man, and afterwards
+withdrew him, if you engaged a man in a law suit and afterwards
+gave it up, no one would hesitate to call you a villain: what
+difference does it make, whether you attempt to do this by
+chicanery or by prayer, unless it be that by prayer you raise up
+more powerful enemies to him than by the other means? You cannot
+say "Why, what harm do I do him?" your prayer is either futile or
+harmful, indeed it is harmful even though nothing comes of it. You
+do your friend wrong by wishing him harm: you must thank the gods
+that you do him no harm. The fact of your wishing it is enough: we
+ought to be just as angry with you as if you had effected it.
+
+XXVIII. "If," argues our adversary, "my prayers had any efficacy,
+they would also have been efficacious to save him from danger." In
+the first place, I reply, the danger into which you wish me to fall
+is certain, the help which I should receive is uncertain. Or call
+them both certain; it is that which injures me that comes first.
+Besides, YOU understand the terms of your wish; _I_ shall be tossed
+by the storm without being sure that I have a haven of rest at
+hand.
+
+Think what torture it must have been to me, even if I receive your
+help, to have stood in need of it: if I escape safely, to have
+trembled for myself; if I be acquitted, to have had to plead my
+cause. To escape from fear, however great it may be, can never be
+so pleasant as to live in sound unassailable safety. Pray that you
+may return my kindnesses when I need their return, but do not pray
+that I may need them. You would have done what you prayed for, had
+it been in your power.
+
+XXIX. How far more honourable would a prayer of this sort be: "I
+pray that he may remain in such a position as that he may always
+bestow benefits and never need them: may he be attended by the
+means of giving and helping, of which he makes such a bountiful
+use; may he never want benefits to bestow, or be sorry for any
+which he has bestowed; may his nature, fitted as it is for acts of
+pity, goodness, and clemency, be stimulated and brought out by
+numbers of grateful persons, whom I trust he will find without
+needing to make trial of their gratitude; may he refuse to be
+reconciled to no one, and may no one require to be reconciled to
+him: may fortune so uniformly continue to favour him that no one
+may be able to return his kindness in any way except by feeling
+grateful to him."
+
+How far more proper are such prayers as these, which do not put you
+off to some distant opportunity, but express your gratitude at
+once? What is there to prevent your returning your benefactor's
+kindness, even while he is in prosperity? How many ways are there
+by which we can repay what we owe even to the affluent--for
+instance, by honest advice, by constant intercourse, by courteous
+conversation, pleasing him without flattering him, by listening
+attentively to any subject which he may wish to discuss, by keeping
+safe any secret that he may impart to us, and by social
+intercourse. There is no one so highly placed by fortune as not to
+want a friend all the more because he wants nothing.
+
+XXX. The other is a melancholy opportunity, and one which we ought
+always to pray may be kept far from us: must the gods be angry with
+a man in order that you may prove your gratitude to him? Do you not
+perceive that you are doing wrong, from the very fact that those to
+whom you are ungrateful fare better? Call up before your mind
+dungeons, chains, wretchedness, slavery, war, poverty: these are
+the opportunities for which you pray; if any one has any dealings
+with you, it is by means of these that you square your account. Why
+not rather wish that he to whom you owe most may be powerful and
+happy? for, as I have just said, what is there to prevent your
+returning the kindness even of those who enjoy the greatest
+prosperity? to do which, ample and various opportunities will
+present themselves to you, What! do you not know that a debt can be
+paid even to a rich man? Nor will I trouble you with many instances
+of what you may do. Though a man's riches and prosperity may
+prevent your making him any other repayment, I will show you what
+the highest in the land stand in need of, what is wanting to those
+who possess everything. They want a man to speak the truth, to save
+them from the organized mass of falsehood by which they are beset,
+which so bewilders them with lies that the habit of hearing only
+what is pleasant instead of what is true, prevents their knowing
+what truth really is. Do you not see how such persons are driven to
+ruin by the want of candour among their friends, whose loyalty has
+degenerated into slavish obsequiousness? No one, when giving them
+his advice, tells them what he really thinks, but each vies with
+the other in flattery; and while the man's friends make it their
+only object to see who can most pleasantly deceive him, he himself
+is ignorant of his real powers, and, believing himself to be as
+great a man as he is told that he is, plunges the State in useless
+wars, which bring disasters upon it, breaks off a useful and
+necessary peace, and, through a passion of anger which no one
+checks, spills the blood of numbers of people, and at last sheds
+his own. Such persons assert what has never been investigated as
+certain facts, consider that to modify their opinion is as
+dishonourable as to be conquered, believe that institutions which
+are just flickering out of existence will last for ever, and, thus
+overturn great States, to the destruction of themselves and all who
+are connected with them. Living as they do in a fool's paradise,
+resplendent with unreal and short-lived advantages, they forget
+that, as soon as they put it out of their power to hear the truth,
+there is no limit to the misfortunes which they may expect.
+
+XXXI. When Xerxes declared war against Greece, all his courtiers
+encouraged his boastful temper, which forgot how unsubstantial his
+grounds for confidence were. One declared that the Greeks would not
+endure to hear the news of the declaration of war, and would take
+to flight at the first rumour of his approach; another, that with
+such a vast army Greece could not only be conquered, but utterly
+overwhelmed, and that it was rather to be feared that they would
+find the Greek cities empty and abandoned, and that the panic
+flight of the enemy would leave them only vast deserts, where no
+use could be made of their enormous forces. Another told him that
+the world was hardly large enough to contain him, that the seas
+were too narrow for his fleets, the camps would not take in his
+armies, the plains were not wide enough to deploy his cavalry in,
+and that the sky itself was scarcely large enough to enable all his
+troops to hurl their darts at once. While much boasting of this
+sort was going on around him, raising his already overweening self-
+confidence to a frantic pitch, Demaratus, the Lacedaemonian, alone
+told him that the disorganized and unwieldy multitude in which he
+trusted, was in itself a danger to its chief, because it possessed
+only weight without strength; for an army which is too large cannot
+be governed, and one which cannot be governed, cannot long exist.
+"The Lacedaemonians," said he, "will meet you upon the first
+mountain in Greece, and will give you a taste of their quality. All
+these thousands of nations of yours will be held in check by three
+hundred men: they will stand firm at their posts, they will defend
+the passes entrusted to them with their weapons, and block them up
+with their bodies: all Asia will not force them to give way; few as
+they are, they will stop all this terrible invasion, attempted
+though it be by nearly the whole human race. Though the laws of
+nature may give way to you, and enable you to pass from Europe to
+Asia, yet you will stop short in a bypath; consider what your
+losses will be afterwards, when you have reckoned up the price
+which you have to pay for the pass of Thermopylae; when you learn
+that your march can be stayed, you will discover that you may be
+put to flight. The Greeks will yield up many parts of their country
+to you, as if they were swept out of them by the first terrible
+rush of a mountain torrent; afterwards they will rise against you
+from all quarters and will crush you by means of your own strength.
+What people say, that your warlike preparations are too great to be
+contained in the countries which you intend to attack, is quite
+true; but this is to our disadvantage. Greece will conquer you for
+this very reason, that she cannot contain you; you cannot make use
+of the whole of your force. Besides this, you will not be able to
+do what is essential to victory--that is, to meet the manoeuvres of
+the enemy at once, to support your own men if they give way, or to
+confirm and strengthen them when their ranks are wavering; long
+before you know it, you will be defeated. Moreover, you should not
+think that because your army is so large that its own chief does
+not know its numbers, it is therefore irresistible; there is
+nothing so great that it cannot perish; nay, without any other
+cause, its own excessive size may prove its ruin." What Demaratus
+predicted came to pass. He whose power gods and men obeyed, and who
+swept away all that opposed him, was bidden to halt by three
+hundred men, and the Persians, defeated in every part of Greece,
+learned how great a difference there is between a mob and an army.
+Thus it came to pass that Xerxes, who suffered more from the shame
+of his failure than from the losses which he sustained, thanked
+Demaratus for having been the only man who told him the truth, and
+permitted him to ask what boon he pleased. He asked to be allowed
+to drive a chariot into Sardis, the largest city in Asia, wearing a
+tiara erect upon his head, a privilege which was enjoyed by kings
+alone. He deserved his reward before he asked for it, but how
+wretched must the nation have been, in which there was no one who
+would speak the truth to the king except one man. who did not speak
+it to himself.
+
+XXXII. The late Emperor Augustus banished his daughter, whose
+conduct went beyond the shame of ordinary immodesty, and made
+public the scandals of the imperial house
+
+Led away by his passion, he divulged all these crimes which, as
+emperor, he ought to have kept secret with as much care as he
+punished them, because the shame of some deeds asperses even him
+who avenges them. Afterwards, when by lapse of time shame took the
+place of anger in his mind, he lamented that he had not kept
+silence about matters which he had not learned until it was
+disgraceful to speak of them, and often used to exclaim, "None of
+these things would have happened to me, if either Agrippa or
+Maecenas had lived!" So hard was it for the master of so many
+thousands of men to repair the loss of two. When his legions were
+slaughtered, new ones were at once enrolled; when his fleet was
+wrecked, within a few days another was afloat; when the public
+buildings were consumed by fire, finer ones arose in their stead;
+but the places of Agrippa and Maecenas remained unfilled throughout
+his life. What am I to imagine? that there were not any men like
+these, who could take their place, or that it was the fault of
+Augustus himself, who preferred mourning for them to seeking for
+their likes? We have no reason for supposing that it was the habit
+of Agrippa or Maecenas to speak the truth to him; indeed, if they
+had lived they would have been as great dissemblers as the rest. It
+is one of the habits of kings to insult their present servants by
+praising those whom they have lost, and to attribute the virtue of
+truthful speaking to those from whom there is no further risk of
+hearing it.
+
+XXXIII. However, to return to my subject, you see how easy it is to
+return the kindness of the prosperous, and even of those who occupy
+the highest places of all mankind. Tell them, not what they wish to
+hear, but what they will wish that they always had heard; though
+their ears be stopped by flatteries, yet sometimes truth may
+penetrate them; give them useful advice. Do you ask what service
+you can render to a prosperous man? Teach him not to rely upon his
+prosperity, and to understand that it ought to be supported by the
+hands of many trusty friends. Will you not have done much for him,
+if you take away his foolish belief that his influence will endure
+for ever, and teach him that what we gain by chance passes away
+soon, and at a quicker rate than it came; that we cannot fall by
+the same stages by which we rose to the height of good fortune, but
+that frequently between it and ruin there is but one step? You do
+not know how great is the value of friendship, if you do not
+understand how much you give to him to whom you give a friend, a
+commodity which is scarce not only in men's houses, but in whole
+centuries, and which is nowhere scarcer than in the places where it
+is thought to be most plentiful. Pray, do you suppose that those
+books of names, which your nomenclator [Footnote: The nomenclator
+was a slave who attended his master in canvassing and on similar
+occasions, for the purpose of telling him the names of whom he met
+in the street.] can hardly carry or remember, are those of friends?
+It is not your friends who crowd to knock at your door, and who are
+admitted to your greater or lesser levees.
+
+XXXIV. To divide one's friends into classes is an old trick of
+kings and their imitators; it shows great arrogance to think that
+to touch or to pass one's threshold can be a valuable privilege, or
+to grant as an honour that you should sit nearer one's front door
+than others, or enter house before them, although within the house
+there are many more doors, which shut out even those who have been
+admitted so far. With us Gaius Gracchus, and shortly after him
+Livius Drusus, were the first to keep themselves apart from the
+mass of their adherents, and to admit some to their privacy, some
+to their more select, and others to their general receptions. These
+men consequently had friends of the first and second rank, and so
+on, but in none had they true friends. Can you apply the name of
+friend to one who is admitted in his regular order to pay his
+respects to you? or can you expect perfect loyalty from one who is
+forced to slip into your presence through a grudgingly-opened door?
+How can a man arrive at using bold freedom of speech with you, if
+he is only allowed in his proper turn to make use of the common
+phrase, "Hail to you," which is used by perfect strangers? Whenever
+you go to any of these great men, whose levees interest the whole
+city, though you find all the streets beset with throngs of people,
+and the passers-by hardly able to make their way through the crowd,
+you may be sure that you have come to a place where there are many
+men, but no friends of their patron. We must not seek our friends
+in our entrance hall, but in our own breast; it is there that he
+ought to be received, there retained, and hoarded up in our minds.
+Teach this, and you will have repaid your debt of gratitude.
+
+XXXV. If you are useful to your friend only when he is in distress,
+and are superfluous when all goes well with him, you form a mean
+estimate of your own value. As you can bear yourself wisely both in
+doubtful, in prosperous, and in adverse circumstances, by showing
+prudence in doubtful cases, courage in misfortune, and self-
+restraint in good fortune, so in all circumstances you can make
+yourself useful to your friend. Do not desert him in adversity, but
+do not wish that it may befall him: the various incidents of human
+life will afford you many opportunities of proving your loyalty to
+him without wishing him evil. He who prays that another may become
+rich, in order that he may share his riches, really has a view to
+his own advantage, although his prayers are ostensibly offered in
+behalf of his friend; and similarly he who wishes that his friend
+may get into some trouble from which his own friendly assistance
+may extricate him--a most ungrateful wish--prefers himself to his
+friend, and thinks it worthwhile that his friend should be unhappy,
+in order that he may prove his gratitude. This very wish makes him
+ungrateful, for he wishes to rid himself of his gratitude as though
+it were a heavy burden. In returning a kindness it makes a great
+difference whether you are eager to bestow a benefit, or merely to
+free yourself from a debt. He who wishes to return a benefit will
+study his friend's interests, and will hope that a suitable
+occasion will arise; he who only wishes to free himself from an
+obligation will be eager to do so by any means whatever, which
+shows very bad feeling. "Do you say," we may be asked, "that
+eagerness to repay kindness belongs to a morbid feeling of
+gratitude?" I cannot explain my meaning more clearly than by
+repeating what I have already said. You do not want to repay, but
+to escape from the benefit which you. have received. You seem to
+say, "When shall I get free from this obligation? I must strive by
+any means in my power to extinguish my debt to him." You would be
+thought to be far from grateful, if you wished to pay a debt to him
+with his own money; yet this wish of yours is even more unjust; for
+you invoke curses upon him, and call down terrible imprecations
+upon the head of one who ought to be held sacred by you. No one, I
+suppose, would have any doubt of your wickedness if you were openly
+to pray that he might suffer poverty, captivity, hunger, or fear;
+yet what is the difference between openly praying for some of these
+things, and silently wishing for them? for you do wish for some of
+these. Go, and enjoy your belief that this is gratitude, to do what
+not even an ungrateful man would do, supposing he confined himself
+to repudiating the benefit, and did not go so far as to hate his
+benefactor.
+
+XXXVI. Who would call Aeneas pious, if he wished that his native
+city might be captured, in order that he might save his father from
+captivity? Who would point to the Sicilian youths as good examples
+for his children, if they had prayed that Aetna might flame with
+unusual heat and pour forth a vast mass of fire in order to afford
+them an opportunity of displaying their filial affection by
+rescuing their parents from the midst of the conflagration? Rome
+owes Scipio nothing if he kept the Punic War alive in order that he
+might have the glory of finishing it; she owes nothing to the Decii
+if they prayed for public disasters, to give themselves an
+opportunity of displaying their brave self-devotion. It is the
+greatest scandal for a physician to make work for himself; and many
+who have aggravated the diseases of their patients that they may
+have the greater credit for curing them, have either failed to cure
+them, at all or have done so at the cost of the most terrible
+suffering to their victims.
+
+XXXVII. It is said (at any rate Hecaton tells us) that when
+Callistratus with many others was driven into exile by his factious
+and licentiously free country, some one prayed that such trouble
+might befall the Athenians that they would be forced to recall the
+exiles, on hearing which, he prayed that God might forbid his
+return upon such terms. When some one tried to console our own
+countryman, Rutilius, for his exile, pointing out that civil war
+was at hand, and that all exiles would soon be restored to Rome, he
+answered with even greater spirit, "What harm have I done you, that
+you should wish that I may return to my country more unhappily than
+I quit it? My wish is, that my country should blush at my being
+banished, rather than that she should mourn at my having returned."
+An exile, of which every one is more ashamed than the sufferer, is
+not exile at all. These two persons, who did not wish to be
+restored to their homes at the cost of a public disaster, but
+preferred that two should suffer unjustly than that all should
+suffer alike, are thought to have acted like good citizens; and in
+like manner it does not accord with the character of a grateful
+man, to wish that his benefactor may fall into troubles which he
+may dispel; because, even though he may mean well to him, yet he
+wishes him evil. To put out a fire which you yourself have lighted,
+will not even gain acquittal for you, let alone credit.
+
+XXXVIII. In some states an evil wish was regarded as a crime. It is
+certain that at Athens Demades obtained a verdict against one who
+sold furniture for funerals, by proving that he had prayed for
+great gains, which he could not obtain without the death of many
+persons. Yet it is a stock question whether he was rightly found
+guilty. Perhaps he prayed, not that he might sell his wares to many
+persons, but that he might sell them dear, or that he might procure
+what he was going to sell, cheaply. Since his business consisted of
+buying and selling, why should you consider his prayer to apply to
+one branch of it only, although he made profit from both? Besides
+this, you might find every one of his trade guilty, for they all
+wish, that is, secretly pray, as he did. You might, moreover, find
+a great part of the human race guilty, for who is there who does
+not profit by his neighbour's wants? A soldier, if he wishes for
+glory, must wish for war; the farmer profits by corn being dear; a
+large number of litigants raises the price of forensic eloquence;
+physicians make money by a sickly season; dealers in luxuries are
+made rich by the effeminacy of youth; suppose that no storms and no
+conflagrations injured our dwellings, the builder's trade would be
+at a standstill. The prayer of one man was detected, but it was
+just like the prayers of all other men. Do you imagine that
+Arruntius and Haterius, and all other professional legacy-hunters
+do not put up the same prayers as undertakers and grave-diggers?
+though the latter know not whose death it is that they wish for,
+while the former wish for the death of their dearest friends, from
+whom, on account of their intimacy, they have most hopes of
+inheriting a fortune. No one's life does the undertaker any harm,
+whereas these men starve if their friends are long about dying;
+they do not, therefore, merely wish for their deaths in order that
+they may receive what they have earned by a disgraceful servitude,
+but in order that they may be set free from a heavy tax. There can,
+therefore, be no doubt that such persons repeat with even greater
+earnestness the prayer for which the undertaker was condemned, for
+whoever is likely to profit such men by dying, does them an injury
+by living. Yet the wishes of all these are alike well known and
+unpunished. Lastly, let every man examine his own self, let him
+look into the secret thoughts of his heart and consider what it is
+that he silently hopes for; how many of his prayers he would blush
+to acknowledge, even to himself; how few there are which we could
+repeat in the presence of witnesses!
+
+XXXIX. Yet we must not condemn every thing which we find worthy of
+blame, as, for instance, this wish about our friends which we have
+been discussing, arises from a misdirected feeling of affection,
+and falls into the very error which it strives to avoid, for the
+man is ungrateful at the very time when he hurries to prove his
+gratitude. He prays aloud, "May he fall into my power, may he need
+my influence, may not be able to be safe and respectable without my
+aid, may he be so unfortunate that whatever return I make to him
+may be regarded as a benefit." To the gods alone he adds, "May
+domestic treasons encompass him, which can be quelled by me alone;
+may some powerful and virulent enemy, some excited and armed mob,
+assail him; may he be set upon by a creditor or an informer."
+
+XL. See, how just you are; you would never have wished any of these
+misfortunes to befall him, if he had not bestowed a benefit upon
+you. Not to speak of the graver guilt which you incur by returning
+evil for good, you distinctly do wrong in not waiting for the
+fitting time for each action, for it is as wrong to anticipate this
+as it is not to take it when it comes. A benefit ought not always
+to be accepted, and ought not in all cases to be returned. If you
+were to return it to me against my will, you would be ungrateful,
+how much more ungrateful are you, if you force me to wish for it?
+Wait patiently; why are you unwilling to let my bounty abide with
+you? Why do you chafe at being laid under an obligation? why, as
+though you were dealing with a harsh usurer, are you in such a
+hurry to sign and seal an equivalent bond? Why do you wish me to
+get into trouble? Why do you call upon the gods to ruin me? If this
+is your way of returning a kindness, what would you do if you were
+exacting repayment of a debt?
+
+XLI. Above all, therefore, my Liberalis, let us learn to live
+calmly under an obligation to others, and watch for opportunities
+of repaying our debt without manufacturing them. Let us remember
+that this anxiety to seize the first opportunity of setting
+ourselves free shows ingratitude; for no one repays with good will
+that which he is unwilling to owe, and his eagerness to get it out
+of his hands shows that he regards it as a burden rather than as a
+favour. How much better and more righteous is it to bear in mind
+what we owe to our friends, and to offer repayment, not to obtrude
+it, nor to think ourselves too much indebted; because a benefit is
+a common bond which connects two persons. Say "I do not delay to
+repay your kindness to me; I hope that you will accept my gratitude
+cheerfully. If irresistible fate hangs over either of us, and
+destiny rules either that you must receive your benefit back again,
+or that I must receive a second benefit, why then, of us two, let
+him give that was wont to give. I am ready to receive it.
+
+ "'Tis not the part of Turnus to delay."
+
+That is the spirit which I shall show whenever the time comes; in
+the meanwhile the gods shall be my witnesses.
+
+XLII. I have noted in you, my Liberalis, and as it were touched
+with my hand a feeling of fussy anxiety not to be behindhand in
+doing what is your duty. This anxiety is not suitable to a grateful
+mind, which, on the contrary, produces the utmost confidence in
+oneself, and which drives away all trouble by the consciousness of
+real affection towards one's benefactor. To say "Take back what you
+gave me," is no less a reproach than to say "You are in my debt."
+Let this be the first privilege of a benefit, that he who bestowed
+it may choose the time when he will have it returned. "But I fear
+that men may speak ill of me." You do wrong if you are grateful
+only for the sake of your reputation, and not to satisfy your
+conscience. You have in this matter two judges, your benefactor,
+whom you ought not, and yourself, whom you cannot deceive. "But,"
+say you, "if no occasion of repayment offers, am I always to remain
+in his debt?" Yes; but you should do so openly, and willingly, and
+should view with great pleasure what he has entrusted to you. If
+you are vexed at not having yet returned a benefit, you must be
+sorry that you ever received it; but if he deserved that you should
+receive a benefit from him, why should he not deserve that you
+should long remain in his debt?
+
+XLIII. Those persons are much mistaken who regard it as a proof of
+a great mind to make offers to give, and to fill many men's pockets
+and houses with their presents, for sometimes these are due not to
+a great mind, but to a great fortune; they do not know how far more
+great and more difficult it sometimes is to receive than to lavish
+gifts. I must disparage neither act; it is as proper to a noble
+heart to owe as to receive, for both are of equal value when done
+virtuously; indeed, to owe is the more difficult, because it
+requires more pains to keep a thing safe than to give it away. We
+ought not therefore to be in a hurry to repay, nor need we seek to
+do so out of due season, for to hasten to make repayment at the
+wrong time is as bad as to be slow to do so at the right time. My
+benefactor has entrusted his bounty to me: I ought not to have any
+fears either on his behalf or on my own. He has a sufficient
+security; he cannot lose it except he loses me--nay, not even if he
+loses me. I have returned thanks to him for it--that is, I have
+requited him. He who thinks too much about repaying a benefit must
+suppose that his friend thinks too much about receiving repayment.
+Make no difficulty about either course. If he wishes to receive his
+benefit back again, let us return it cheerfully; if he prefers to
+leave it in our hands, why should we dig up his treasure? why
+should we decline to be its guardians? he deserves to be allowed to
+do whichever he pleases. As for fame and reputation, let us regard
+them as matters which ought to accompany, but which ought not to
+direct our actions.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK VII.
+
+I.
+
+
+ Be of good cheer, my Liberalis:
+
+ "Our port is close, and I will not delay,
+ Nor by digressions wander from the way."
+
+This book collects together all that has been omitted, and in it,
+having exhausted my subject, I shall consider not what I am to say,
+but what there is which I have not yet said. If there be anything
+superfluous in it, I pray you take it in good part, since it is for
+you that it is superfluous. Had I wished to set off my work to the
+best advantage, I ought to have added to it by degrees, and to have
+kept for the last that part which would be eagerly perused even by
+a sated reader. However, instead of this, I have collected together
+all that was essential in the beginning; I am now collecting
+together whatever then escaped me; nor, by Hercules, if you ask me,
+do I think that, after the rules which govern our conduct have been
+stated, it is very much to the purpose to discuss the other
+questions which have been raised more for the exercise of our
+intellects than for the health of our minds. The cynic Demetrius,
+who in my opinion was a great man even if compared with the
+greatest philosophers, had an admirable saying about this, that one
+gained more by having a few wise precepts ready and in common use
+than by learning many without having them at hand. "The best
+wrestler," he would say, "is not he who has learned thoroughly all
+the tricks and twists of the art, which are seldom met with in
+actual wrestling, but he who has well and carefully trained himself
+in one or two of them, and watches keenly for an opportunity of
+practising them. It does not matter how many of them he knows, if
+he knows enough to give him the victory; and so in this subject of
+ours there are many points of interest, but few of importance. You
+need not know what is the system of the ocean tides, why each
+seventh year leaves its mark upon the human body, why the more
+distant parts of a long portico do not keep their true proportion,
+but seem to approach one another until at last the spaces between
+the columns disappear, how it can be that twins are conceived
+separately, though they are born together, whether both result from
+one, or each from a separate act, why those whose birth was the
+same should have such different fates in life, and dwell at the
+greatest possible distance from one another, although they were
+born touching one another; it will not do you much harm to pass
+over matters which we are not permitted to know, and which we
+should not profit by knowing. Truths so obscure may be neglected
+with impunity. [Footnote: The old saying, 'Truth lurks deep in a
+well (or abyss).'] Nor can we complain that nature deals hardly
+with us, for there is nothing which is hard to discover except
+those things by which we gain nothing beyond the credit of having
+discovered them; whatever things tend to make us better or happier
+are either obvious or easily discovered. Your mind can rise
+superior to the accidents of life, if it can raise itself above
+fears and not greedily covet boundless wealth, but has learned to
+seek for riches within itself; if it has cast out the fear of men
+and gods, and has learned that it has not much to fear from man,
+and nothing to fear from God; if by scorning all those things which
+make life miserable while they adorn it, the mind can soar to such
+a height as to see clearly that death cannot be the beginning of
+any trouble, though it is the end of many; if it can dedicate
+itself to righteousness and think any path easy which leads to it;
+if, being a gregarious creature, and born for the common good, it
+regards the world as the universal home, if it keeps its conscience
+clear towards God and lives always as though in public, fearing
+itself more than other men, then it avoids all storms, it stands on
+firm ground in fair daylight, and has brought to perfection its
+knowledge of all that is useful and essential. All that remains
+serves merely to amuse our leisure; yet, when once anchored in
+safety, the mind may consider these matters also, though it can
+derive no strength, but only culture from their discussion."
+
+II. The above are the rules which my friend Demetrius bids him who
+would make progress in philosophy to clutch with both hands, never
+to let go, but to cling to them, and make them a part of himself,
+and by daily meditation upon them to bring himself into such a
+state of mind, that these wholesome maxims occur to him of their
+own accord, that wherever he may be, they may straightway be ready
+for use when required, and that the criterion of right and wrong
+may present itself to him without delay. Let him know that nothing
+is evil except what is base, and nothing good except what is
+honourable: let him guide his life by this rule: let him both act
+and expect others to act in accordance with this law, and let him
+regard those whose minds are steeped in indolence, and who are
+given up to lust and gluttony, as the most pitiable of mankind, no
+matter how splendid their fortunes may be. Let him say to himself,
+"Pleasure is uncertain, short, apt to pall upon us, and the more
+eagerly we indulge in it, the sooner we bring on a reaction of
+feeling against it; we must necessarily afterwards blush for it, or
+be sorry for it, there is nothing grand about it, nothing worthy of
+man's nature, little lower as it is than that of the gods; pleasure
+is a low act, brought about by the agency of our inferior and baser
+members, and shameful in its result. True pleasure, worthy of a
+human being and of a man, is, not to stuff or swell his body with
+food and drink, nor to excite lusts which are least hurtful when
+they are most quiet, but to be free from all forms of mental
+disturbance, both those which arise from men's ambitious struggles
+with one another, and those which come from on high and are more
+difficult to deal with, which flow from our taking the traditional
+view of the gods, and estimating them by the analogy of our own
+vices." This equable, secure, uncloying pleasure is enjoyed by the
+man now described; a man skilled, so to say, in the laws of gods
+and men alike. Such a man enjoys the present without anxiety for
+the future: for he who depends upon what is uncertain can rely
+confidently upon nothing. Thus he is free from all those great
+troubles which unhinge the mind, he neither hopes for, nor covets
+anything, and engages in no uncertain adventures, being satisfied
+with what he has. Do not suppose that he is satisfied with a
+little; for everything is his, and that not in the sense in which
+all was Alexander's, who, though he reached the shore of the Red
+Sea, yet wanted more territory than that through which he had come.
+He did not even own those countries which he held or had conquered,
+while Onesicritus, whom he had sent on before him to discover new
+countries, was wandering about the ocean and engaging in war in
+unknown seas. Is it clear that he who pushed his armies beyond the
+bounds of the universe, who with reckless greed dashed headlong
+into a boundless and unexplored sea, must in reality have been full
+of wants? It matters not how many kingdoms he may have seized or
+given away, or how great a part of the world may pay him tribute;
+such a man must be in need of as much as he desires.
+
+III. This was not the vice of Alexander alone, who followed with a
+fortunate audacity in the footsteps of Bacchus and Hercules, but it
+is common to all those whose covetousness is whetted rather than
+appeased by good fortune. Look at Cyrus and Cambyses and all the
+royal house of Persia: can you find one among them who thought his
+empire large enough, or was not at the last gasp still aspiring
+after further conquests? We need not wonder at this, for whatever
+is obtained by covetousness is simply swallowed up and lost, nor
+does it matter how much is poured into its insatiable maw. Only the
+wise man possesses everything without having to struggle to retain
+it; he alone does not need to send ambassadors across the seas,
+measure out camps upon hostile shores, place garrisons in
+commanding forts, or manoeuvre legions and squadrons of cavalry.
+Like the immortal gods, who govern their realm without recourse to
+arms, and from their serene and lofty heights protect their own, so
+the wise man fulfils his duties, however far-reaching they may be,
+without disorder, and looks down upon the whole human race, because
+he himself is the greatest and most powerful member thereof. You
+may laugh at him, but if you in your mind survey the east and the
+west, reaching even to the regions separated from us by vast
+wildernesses, if you think of all the creatures of the earth, all
+the riches which the bounty of nature lavishes, it shows a great
+spirit to be able to say, as though you were a god, "All these are
+mine." Thus it is that he covets nothing, for there is nothing
+which is not contained in everything, and everything is his.
+
+IV. "This," say you, "is the very thing that I wanted! I have
+caught you! I shall be glad to see how you will extricate yourself
+from the toils into which you have fallen of your own accord. Tell
+me, if the wise man possesses everything, how can one give anything
+to a wise man? for even what you give him is his already. It is
+impossible, therefore, to bestow a benefit upon a wise man, if
+whatever is given him comes from his own store; yet you Stoics
+declare that it is possible to give to a wise man. I make the same
+inquiry about friends as well: for you say that friends own
+everything in common, and if so, no one can give anything to his
+friend, for he gives what his friend owned already in common with
+himself."
+
+There is nothing to prevent a thing belonging to a wise man, and
+yet being the property of its legal owner. According to law
+everything in a state belongs to the king, yet all that property
+over which the king has rights of possession is parcelled out among
+individual owners, and each separate thing belongs to somebody: and
+so one can give the king a house, a slave, or a sum of money
+without being said to give him what was his already; for the king
+has rights over all these things, while each citizen has the
+ownership of them. We speak of the country of the Athenians, or of
+the Campanians, though the inhabitants divide them amongst
+themselves into separate estates; the whole region belongs to one
+state or another, but each part of it belongs to its own individual
+proprietor; so that we are able to give our lands to the state,
+although they are reckoned as belonging to the state, because we
+and the state own them in different ways. Can there be any doubt
+that all the private savings of a slave belong to his master as
+well as he himself? yet he makes his master presents. The slave
+does not therefore possess nothing, because if his master chose he
+might possess nothing; nor does what he gives of his own free will
+cease to be a present, because it might have been wrung from him
+against his will. As for how we are to prove that the wise man
+possesses all things, we shall see afterwards; for the present we
+are both agreed to regard this as true; we must gather together
+something to answer the question before us, which is, how any means
+remain of acting generously towards one who already possesses all
+things? All things that a son has belong to his father, yet who
+does not know that in spite of this a son can make presents to his
+father? All things belong to the gods; yet we make presents and
+bestow alms even upon the gods. What I have is not necessarily not
+mine because it belongs to you; for the same thing may belong both
+to me and to you.
+
+"He to whom courtezans belong," argues our adversary, "must be a
+procurer: now courtezans are included in all things, therefore
+courtezans belong to the wise man. But he to whom courtezans belong
+is a procurer; therefore the wise man is a procurer." Yes! by the
+same reasoning, our opponents would forbid him to buy anything,
+arguing, "No man buys his own property. Now all things are the
+property of the wise man; therefore the wise man buys nothing." By
+the same reasoning they object to his borrowing, because no one
+pays interest for the use of his own money. They raise endless
+quibbles, although they perfectly well understand what we say.
+
+V. For, when I say that the wise man possesses everything, I mean
+that he does so without thereby impairing each man's individual
+rights in his own property, in the same way as in a country ruled
+by a good king, everything belongs to the king, by the right of his
+authority, and to the people by their several rights of ownership.
+This I shall prove in its proper place; in the mean time it is a
+sufficient answer to the question to declare that I am able to give
+to the wise man that which is in one way mine, and in another way
+his. Nor is it strange that I should be able to give anything to
+one who possesses everything. Suppose I have hired a house from
+you: some part of that house is mine, some is yours; the house
+itself is yours, the use of your house belongs to me. Crops may
+ripen upon your land, but you cannot touch them against the will of
+your tenant; and if corn be dear, or at famine price, you will
+
+ "In vain another's mighty store behold,"
+
+grown upon your land, lying upon your land, and to be deposited in
+your own barns. Though you be the landlord, you must not enter my
+hired house, nor may you take away your own slave from me if I have
+contracted for his services; nay, if I hire a carriage from you, I
+bestow a benefit by allowing you to take your seat in it, although
+it is your own. You see, therefore, that it is possible for a man
+to receive a present by accepting what is his own.
+
+VI. In all the cases which I have mentioned, each party is the
+owner of the same thing. How is this? It is because the one owns
+the thing, the other owns the use of the thing. We speak of the
+books of Cicero. Dorus, the bookseller, calls these same books his
+own; the one claims them because he wrote them, the other because
+he bought them; so that they may quite correctly be spoken of as
+belonging to either of the two, for they do belong to each, though
+in a different manner. Thus Titus Livius may receive as a present,
+or may buy his own books from Dorus. Although the wise man
+possesses everything, yet I can give him what I individually
+possess; for though, king-like, he in his mind possesses
+everything, yet the ownership of all things is divided among
+various individuals, so that he can both receive a present and owe
+one; can buy, or hire things. Everything belongs to Caesar; yet he
+has no private property beyond his own privy purse; as Emperor all
+things are his, but nothing is his own except what he inherits. It
+is possible, without treason, to discuss what is and what is not
+his; for even what the court may decide not to be his, from another
+point of view is his. In the same way the wise man in his mind
+possesses everything, in actual right and ownership he possesses
+only his own property.
+
+VII. Bion is able to prove by argument at one time that everyone is
+sacrilegious, at another that no one is. When he is in a mood for
+casting all men down the Tarpeian rock, he says, "Whosoever touches
+that which belongs to the gods, and consumes it or converts it to
+his own uses, is sacrilegious; but all things belong to the gods,
+so that whatever thing any one touches belongs to them to whom all
+belongs; whoever, therefore, touches anything is sacrilegious."
+Again, when he bids men break open temples and pillage the Capitol
+without fear of the wrath of heaven, he declares that no one can be
+sacrilegious; because, whatever a man takes away, he takes from one
+place which belongs to the gods into another place which belongs to
+the gods. The answer to this is that all places do indeed belong to
+the gods, but all are not consecrated to them, and that sacrilege
+can only be done in places solemnly dedicated to heaven. Thus,
+also, the whole world is a temple of the immortal gods, and,
+indeed, the only one worthy of their greatness and splendour, and
+yet there is a distinction between things sacred and profane; all
+things which it is lawful to do under the sky and the stars are not
+lawful to do within consecrated walls. The sacrilegious man cannot
+do God any harm, for He is placed beyond his reach by His divine
+nature; yet he is punished because he seems to have done Him harm:
+his punishment is demanded by our feeling on the matter, and even
+by his own. In the same way, therefore, as he who carries off any
+sacred things is regarded as sacrilegious, although that which he
+stole is nevertheless within the limits of the world, so it is
+possible to steal from a wise man: for in that case it will be
+some, not of that universe which he possesses, but some of those
+things of which he is the acknowledged owner, and which are
+severally his own property, which will be stolen from him. The
+former of these possessions he will recognize as his own, the
+latter he will be unwilling, even if he be able to possess; he will
+say, as that Roman commander said, when, to reward his courage and
+good service to the state, he was assigned as much land as he could
+inclose in one day's ploughing. "You do not," said he, "want a
+citizen who wants more than is enough for one citizen." Do you not
+think that it required a much greater man to refuse this reward
+than to earn it? for many have taken away the landmarks of other
+men's property, but no one sets up limits to his own.
+
+VIII. When, then, we consider that the mind of the truly wise man
+has power over all things and pervades all things, we cannot help
+declaring that everything is his, although, in the estimation of
+our common law, it may chance that he may be rated as possessing no
+property whatever. It makes a great difference whether we estimate
+what he owns by the greatness of his mind, or by the public
+register. He would pray to be delivered from that possession of
+everything of which you speak. I will not remind you of Socrates,
+Chrysippus, Zeno, and other great men, all the greater, however,
+because envy prevents no one from praising the ancients. But a
+short time ago I mentioned Demetrius, who seems to have been placed
+by nature in our times that he might prove that we could neither
+corrupt him nor be corrected by him; a man of consummate wisdom,
+though he himself disclaimed it, constant to the principles which
+he professed, of an eloquence worthy to deal with the mightiest
+subjects, scorning mere prettinesses and verbal niceties, but
+expressing with infinite spirit, the ideas which inspired it. I
+doubt not that he was endowed by divine providence with so pure a
+life and such power of speech in order that our age might neither
+be without a model nor a reproach. Had some god wished to give all
+our wealth to Demetrius on the fixed condition that he should not
+be permitted to give it away, I am sure that he would have refused
+to accept it, and would have said,
+
+IX. "I do not intend to fasten upon my back a burden like this, of
+which I never can rid myself, nor do I, nimble and lightly equipped
+as I am, mean to hinder my progress by plunging into the deep
+morass of business transactions. Why do you offer to me what is the
+bane of all nations? I would not accept it even if I meant to give
+it away, for I see many things which it would not become me to
+give. I should like to place before my eyes the things which
+fascinate both kings and peoples, I wish to behold the price of
+your blood and your lives. First bring before me the trophies of
+Luxury, exhibiting them as you please, either in succession, or,
+which is better, in one mass. I see the shell of the tortoise, a
+foul and slothful brute, bought for immense sums and ornamented
+with the most elaborate care, the contrast of colours which is
+admired in it being obtained by the use of dyes resembling the
+natural tints. I see tables and pieces of wood valued at the price
+of a senator's estate, which are all the more precious, the more
+knots the tree has been twisted into by disease. I see crystal
+vessels, whose price is enhanced by their fragility, for among the
+ignorant the risk of losing things increases their value instead of
+lowering it, as it ought. I see murrhine cups, for luxury would be
+too cheap if men did not drink to one another out of hollow gems
+the wine to be afterwards thrown up again. I see more than one
+large pearl placed in each ear; for now our ears are trained to
+carry burdens, pearls are hung from them in pairs, and each pair
+has other single ones fastened above it. This womanish folly is not
+exaggerated enough for the men of our time, unless they hang two or
+three estates upon each ear. I see ladies' silk dresses, if those
+deserve to be called dresses which can neither cover their body or
+their shame; when wearing which, they can scarcely with a good
+conscience, swear that they are not naked. These are imported at a
+vast expense from nations unknown even to trade, in order that our
+matrons may show as much of their persons in public as they do to
+their lovers in private."
+
+X. What are you doing, Avarice? see how many things there are whose
+price exceeds that of your beloved gold: all those which I have
+mentioned are more highly esteemed and valued. I now wish to
+review your wealth, those plates of gold and silver which dazzle
+our covetousness. By Hercules, the very earth, while she brings
+forth upon the surface every thing that is of use to us, has buried
+these, sunk them deep, and rests upon them with her whole weight,
+regarding them as pernicious substances, and likely to prove the
+ruin of mankind if brought into the light of day. I see that iron
+is brought out of the same dark pits as gold and silver, in order
+that we may lack neither the means nor the reward of murder. Thus
+far we have dealt with actual substances; but some forms of wealth
+deceive our eyes and minds alike. I see there letters of credit,
+promissory notes, and bonds, empty phantoms of property, ghosts of
+sick Avarice, with which she deceives our minds, which delight in
+unreal fancies; for what are these things, and what are interest,
+and account books, and usury, except the names of unnatural
+developments of human covetousness? I might complain of nature for
+not having hidden gold and silver deeper, for not having laid over
+it a weight too heavy to be removed: but what are your documents,
+your sale of time, your blood-sucking twelve per cent. interest?
+these are evils which we owe to our own will, which flow merely
+from our perverted habit, having nothing about them which can be
+seen or handled, mere dreams of empty avarice. Wretched is he who
+can take pleasure in the size of the audit book of his estate, in
+great tracts of land cultivated by slaves in chains, in huge flocks
+and herds which require provinces and kingdoms for their pasture
+ground, in a household of servants, more in number than some of the
+most warlike nations, or in a private house whose extent surpasses
+that of a large city! After he has carefully reviewed all his
+wealth, in what it is invested, and on what it is spent, and has
+rendered himself proud by the thoughts of it, let him compare what
+he has with what he wants: he becomes a poor man at once. Let me
+go: restore me to those riches of mine. I know the kingdom of
+wisdom, which is great and stable: I possess every thing, and in
+such a manner that it belongs to all men nevertheless."
+
+XI. When, therefore, Gaius Csesar offered him two hundred thousand
+sesterces, he laughingly refused it, thinking it unworthy of
+himself to boast of having refused so small a sum. Ye gods and
+goddesses, what a mean mind must the emperor have had, if he hoped
+either to honour or to corrupt him. I must here repeat a proof of
+his magnanimity. I have heard that when he was expressing his
+wonder at the folly of Gaius at supposing that he could be
+influenced by such a bribe, he said, "If he meant to tempt me, he
+ought to have tried to do so by offering his entire kingdom."
+
+XII. It is possible, then, to give something to the wise man,
+although all things belong to the wise man. Similarly, though we
+declare that friends have all things in common, it is nevertheless
+possible to give something to a friend: for I have not everything
+in common with a friend in the same manner as with a partner, where
+one part belongs to him, and another to me, but rather as a father
+and a mother possess their children in common when they have two,
+not each parent possessing one child, but each possessing both.
+First of all I will prove that any chance would-be partner of mine
+has nothing in common with me: and why? Because this community of
+goods can only exist between wise men, who are alone capable of
+friendship: other men can neither be friends nor partners one to
+another. In the next place, things may be owned in common in
+various ways. The knights' seats in the theatre belong to all the
+Roman knights; yet of these the seat which I occupy becomes my own,
+and if I yield it up to any one, although I only yield him a thing
+which we own in common, still I appear to have given him something.
+Some things belong to certain persons under particular conditions.
+I have a place among the knights, not to sell, or to let, or to
+dwell in, but simply to see the spectacle from, wherefore I do not
+tell an untruth when I say that I have a place among the knights'
+seats. Yet if, when I come into the theatre, the knights' seats are
+full, I both have a seat there by right, because I have the
+privilege of sitting there, and I have not a seat there, because my
+seat is occupied by those who share my right to those places.
+Suppose that the same thing takes place between friends; whatever
+our friend possesses, is common to us, but is the property of him
+who owns it; I cannot make use of it against his will. "You are
+laughing at me," say you; "if what belongs to my friend is mine, I
+am able to sell it." You are not able; for you are not able to sell
+your place among the knights' seats, and yet they are in common
+between you and the other knights. Consequently, the fact that you
+cannot sell a thing, or consume it, or exchange it for the better
+or the worse does not prove that it is not yours; for that which is
+yours under certain conditions is yours nevertheless.
+
+XIII. I have received, but certainly not less. Not to detain you
+longer than is necessary, a benefit can be no more than a benefit;
+but the means employed to convey benefits may be both greater and
+more numerous. I mean those things by which kindness expresses and
+gives vent to itself, like lovers, whose many kisses and close
+embraces do not increase their love but give it play.
+
+XIV. The next question which arises has been thoroughly threshed out
+in the former books, so here it shall only be touched on shortly;
+for the arguments which have been used for other cases can be
+transferred to it.
+
+The question is, whether one who has done everything in his power
+to return a benefit, has returned it. "You may know," says our
+adversary, "that he has not returned it, because he did everything
+in his power to return it; it is evident, therefore, that he did
+not not do that which he did not have an opportunity of doing. A
+man who searches everywhere for his creditor without finding him
+does not thereby pay him what he owes." Some are in such a position
+that it is their duty to effect something material; in the case of
+others to have done all in their power to effect it is as good as
+effecting it. If a physician has done all in his power to heal his
+patient he has performed his duty; an advocate who employs his
+whole powers of eloquence on his client's behalf, performs his duty
+even though his client be convicted; the generalship even of a
+beaten commander is praised if he has prudently, laboriously, and
+courageously exercised his functions. Your friend has done all in
+his power to return your kindness, but your good fortune stood in
+his way; no adversity befell you in which he could prove the truth
+of his friendship; he could not give you money when you were rich,
+or nurse you when you were in health, or help you when you were
+succeeding; yet he repaid your kindness, even though you did not
+receive a benefit from him. Moreover, this man, being always eager,
+and on the watch for an opportunity of doing this, as he has
+expended much anxiety and much trouble upon it, has really done
+more than he who quickly had an opportunity of repaying your
+kindness. The case of a debtor is not the same, for it is not
+enough for him to have tried to find the money unless he pays it;
+in his case a harsh creditor stands over him who will not let a
+single day pass without charging him interest; in yours there is a
+most kind friend, who seeing you busy, troubled, and anxious would
+say.
+
+ "'Dismiss this trouble from thy breast;'
+
+leave off disturbing yourself; I have received from you all that I
+wish; you wrong me, if you suppose that I want anything further;
+you have fully repaid me in intention."
+
+"Tell me," says our adversary, "if he had repaid the benefit you
+would say that he had returned your kindness: is, then, he who
+repays it in the same position as he who does not repay it?"
+
+On the other hand, consider this: if he had forgotten the benefit
+which he had received, if he had not even attempted to be grateful,
+you would say that he had not returned the kindness; but this man
+has laboured day and night to the neglect of all his other duties
+in his devoted care to let no opportunity of proving his gratitude
+escape him; is then he who took no pains to return a kindness to be
+classed with this man who never ceased to take pains? you are
+unjust, if you require a material payment from me when you see that
+I am not wanting in intention.
+
+XV. In short, suppose that when you are taken captive, I have
+borrowed money, made over my property as security to my creditor,
+that I have sailed in a stormy winter season along coasts swarming
+with pirates, that I have braved all the perils which necessarily
+attend a voyage even on a peaceful sea, that I have wandered
+through all wildernesses seeking for those men whom all others flee
+from, and that when I have at length reached the pirates, someone
+else has already ransomed you: will you say that I have not
+returned your kindness? Even if during this voyage I have lost by
+shipwreck the money that I had raised to save you, even if I myself
+have fallen into the prison from which I sought to release you,
+will you say that I have not returned your kindness? No, by
+Hercules! the Athenians call Harmodius and Aristogiton,
+tyrannicides; the hand of Mucius which he left on the enemy's altar
+was equivalent to the death of Porsena, and valour struggling
+against fortune is always illustrious, even if it falls short of
+accomplishing its design. He who watches each opportunity as it
+passes, and tries to avail himself of one after another, does more
+to show his gratitude than he whom the first opportunity enabled to
+be grateful without any trouble whatever. "But," says our
+adversary, "he gave you two things, material help and kindly
+feeling; you, therefore, owe him two." You might justly say this to
+one who returns your kindly feeling without troubling himself
+further; this man is really in your debt; but you cannot say so of
+one who wishes to repay you, who struggles and leaves no stone
+unturned to do so; for, as far as in him lies, he repays you in
+both kinds; in the next place, counting is not always a true test,
+sometimes one thing is equivalent to two; consequently so intense
+and ardent a wish to repay takes the place of a material repayment.
+Indeed, if a feeling of gratitude has no value in repaying a
+kindness without giving something material, then no one can be
+grateful to the gods, whom we can repay by gratitude alone. "We
+cannot," says our adversary, "give the gods anything else." Well,
+but if I am not able to give this man, whose kindness I am bound to
+return, anything beside my gratitude, why should that which is all
+that I can bestow on a god be insufficient to prove my gratitude
+towards a man?
+
+XVI. If, however, you ask me what I really think, and wish me to
+give a definite answer, I should say that the one party ought to
+consider his benefit to have been returned, while the other ought
+to feel that he has not returned it; the one should release his
+friend from the debt, the other should hold himself bound to pay
+it; the one should say, "I have received;" the other should answer,
+"I owe." In our whole investigation, we ought to look entirely to
+the public good; we ought to prevent the ungrateful having any
+excuses in which they can take refuge, and under cover of which
+they can disown their debts. "I have done all in my power," say
+you. Well, keep on doing so still. Do you suppose that our
+ancestors were so foolish, as not to understand that it is most
+unjust that the man who has wasted the money which he received from
+his creditor on debauchery, or gambling, should be classed with one
+who has lost his own property as well as that of others in a fire,
+by robbery, or some sadder mischance? They would take no excuse,
+that men might understand that they were always bound to keep their
+word; it was thought better that even a good excuse should not be
+accepted from a few persons, than that all men should be led to try
+to make excuses. You say that you have done all in your power to
+repay your debt; this ought to be enough for your friend, but not
+enough for you. He to whom you owe a kindness, is unworthy of
+gratitude if he lets all your anxious care and trouble to repay it
+go for nothing; and so, too, if your friend takes your good will as
+a repayment, you are ungrateful if you are not all the more eager
+to feel the obligation of the debt which he has forgiven you. Do
+not snap up his receipt, or call witnesses to prove it; rather seek
+opportunities for repaying not less than before; repay the one man
+because he asks for repayment, the other because he forgives you
+your debt; the one because he is good, the other because he is bad.
+You, need not, therefore, think that you have anything to do with
+the question whether a man be bound to repay the benefit which he
+has received from a wise man, if that man has ceased to be wise and
+has turned into a bad man. You would return a deposit which you had
+received from a wise man; you would return a loan even to a bad
+man; what grounds have you for not returning a benefit also?
+Because he has changed, ought he to change you? What? if you had
+received anything from a man when healthy, would you not return it
+to him when he was sick, though we always are more bound to treat
+our friends with more kindness when they are ailing? So, too, this
+man is sick in his mind; we ought to help him, and bear with him;
+folly is a disease of the mind.
+
+XVII. I think here we ought to make a distinction, in order to
+render this point more intelligible. Benefits are of two kinds:
+one, the perfect and true benefit, which can only be bestowed by
+one wise man upon another; the other, the common vulgar form which
+ignorant men like ourselves interchange. With regard to the latter,
+there is no doubt that it is my duty to repay it whether my friend
+turns out to be a murderer, a thief, or an adulterer. Crimes have
+laws to punish them; criminals are better reformed by judges than
+by ingratitude; a man ought not to make you bad by being so
+himself. I will fling a benefit back to a bad man, I will return it
+to a good man; I do so to the latter, because I owe it to him; to
+the former, that I may not be in his debt.
+
+XVIII. With regard to the other class of benefit, the question
+arises whether if I was not able to take it without being a wise
+man, I am able to return it, except to a wise man. For suppose I do
+return it to him, he cannot receive it, he is not any longer able
+to receive such a thing, he has lost the knowledge of how to use
+it. You would not bid me throw back [Footnote: i.e. in the game of
+ball.] a ball to a man who has lost his hand; it is folly to give
+any one what he cannot receive. If I am to begin to reply to the
+last argument, I say that I should not give him what he is unable
+to take; but I would return it, even though he is not able to
+receive it. I cannot lay him under an obligation unless he takes my
+bounty; but by returning it I can free myself from my obligations
+to him. You say, "he will not be able to use it." Let him see to
+that; the fault will lie with him, not with me.
+
+XIX. "To return a thing," says our adversary, "is to hand it over
+to one who can receive it. Why, if you owed some wine to any man,
+and he bade you pour it into a net or a sieve, would you say that
+you had returned it? or would you be willing to return it in such a
+way that in the act of returning it was lost between you?" To
+return is to give that which you owe back to its owner when he
+wishes for it. It is not my duty to perform more than this; that he
+should possess what he has received from me is a matter for further
+consideration; I do not owe him the safe-keeping of his property,
+but the honourable payment of my debt, and it is much better that
+he should not have it, than that I should not return it to him. I
+would repay my creditor, even though he would at once take what I
+paid him to the market; even if he deputed an adulteress to receive
+the money from me, I would pay it to her; even if he were to pour
+the coins which he receives into a loose fold of his cloak, I would
+pay it. It is my business to return it to him, not to keep it and
+save it for him after I have returned it; I am bound to take care
+of his bounty when I have received it, but not when I have returned
+it to him. While it remains with me, it must be kept safe; but when
+he asks for it again I must give it to him, even though it slips
+out of his hands as he takes it. I will repay a good man when it is
+convenient; I will repay a bad man when he asks me to do so.
+
+"You cannot," argues our adversary, "return him a benefit of the
+same kind as that which you received; for you received it from a
+wise man, and you are returning it to a fool." Do I not return to
+him such a benefit, as he is now able to receive? It is not my
+fault if I return it to him worse than I received it, the fault
+lies with him, and so, unless he regains his former wisdom, I shall
+return it in such a form as he in his fallen condition is able to
+receive. "But what," asks he, "if he become not only bad, but
+savage and ferocious, like Apollodorus or Phalaris, would you
+return even to such a man as this a benefit which you had received
+from him?" I answer, Nature does not admit of so great a change in
+a wise man. Men do not change from the best to the worst; even in
+becoming bad, he would necessarily retain some traces of goodness;
+virtue is never so utterly quenched as not to imprint on the mind
+marks which no degradation can efface. If wild animals bred in
+captivity escape into the woods, they still retain something of
+their original tameness, and are as remote from the gentlest in the
+one extreme as they are in the other from those which have always
+been wild, and have never endured to be touched by man's hand. No
+one who has ever applied himself to philosophy ever becomes
+completely wicked; his mind becomes so deeply coloured with it,
+that its tints can never be entirely spoiled and blackened. In the
+next place, I ask whether this man of yours be ferocious merely in
+intent, or whether he breaks out into actual outrages upon mankind?
+You have instanced the tyrants Apollodorus and Phalaris; if the bad
+man restrains their evil likeness within himself, why should I not
+return his benefit to him, in order to set myself free from any
+further dealings with him? If, however, he not only delights in
+human blood, but feeds upon it; if he exercises his insatiable
+cruelty in the torture of persons of all ages, and his fury is not
+prompted by anger, but by a sort of delight in cruelty, if he cuts
+the throats of children before the eyes of their parents; if, not
+satisfied with merely killing his victims, he tortures them, and
+not only burns but actually roasts them; if his castle is always
+wet with freshly shed blood; then it is not enough not to return
+his benefits. All connexion between me and such a man has been
+broken off by his destruction of the bonds of human society. If he
+had bestowed something upon me, but were to invade my native
+country, he would have lost all claim to my gratitude, and it would
+be counted a crime to make him any return; if he does not attack my
+country, but is the scourge of his own; if he has nothing to do
+with my nation, but torments and cuts to pieces his own, then in
+the same manner such depravity, though it does not render him my
+personal enemy, yet renders him hateful to me, and the duty which I
+owe to the human race is anterior to and more important than that
+which I owe to him as an individual.
+
+XX. However, although this be so, and although I am freed from all
+obligation towards him, from the moment when, by outraging all
+laws, he rendered it impossible for any man to do him a wrong,
+nevertheless, I think I ought to make the following distinction in
+dealing with him. If my repayment of his benefit will neither
+increase nor maintain his powers of doing mischief to mankind, and
+is of such a character that I can return it to him without
+disadvantage to the public, I would return it: for instance, I
+would save the life of his infant child; for what harm can this
+benefit do to any of those who suffer from his cruelty? But I would
+not furnish him with money to pay his bodyguard. If he wishes for
+marbles, or fine clothes, the trappings of his luxury will harm no
+one; but with soldiers and arms I would not furnish him. If he
+demands, as a great boon, actors and courtesans and such things as
+will soften his savage nature, I would willingly bestow them upon
+him. I would not furnish him with triremes and brass-beaked ships
+of war, but I would send him fast sailing and luxuriously-fitted
+vessels, and all the toys of kings who take their pleasure on the
+sea. If his health was altogether despaired of, I would by the same
+act bestow a benefit on all men and return one to him; seeing that
+for such characters death is the only remedy, and that he who never
+will return to himself, had best leave himself. However, such
+wickedness as this is uncommon, and is always regarded as a
+portent, as when the earth opens, or when fires break forth from
+caves under the sea; so let us leave it, and speak of those vices
+which we can hate without shuddering at them. As for the ordinary
+bad man, whom I can find in the marketplace of any town, who is
+feared only by individuals, I would return to him a benefit which I
+had received from him. It is not right that I should profit by his
+wickedness; let me return what is not mine to its owner. Whether he
+be good or bad makes no difference; but I would consider the matter
+most carefully, if I were not returning but bestowing it.
+
+XXI. This point requires to be illustrated by a story. A certain
+Pythagoraean bought a fine pair of shoes from a shoemaker; and as
+they were an expensive piece of work, he did not pay ready money
+for them. Some time afterwards he came to the shop to pay for them,
+and after he had long been knocking at the closed door, some one
+said to him, "Why do you waste your time? The shoemaker whom you
+seek has been carried out of his house and buried; this is a grief
+to us who lose our friends for ever, but by no means so to you, who
+know that he will be born again," jeering at the Pythagoraean. Upon
+this our philosopher not unwillingly carried his three or four
+denarii home again, shaking them every now and then; afterwards,
+blaming himself for the pleasure which he had secretly felt at not
+paying his debt, and perceiving that he enjoyed having made this
+trifling gain, he returned to the shop, and saying, "the man lives
+for you, pay him what you owe," he passed four denarii into the
+shop through the crack of the closed door, and let them fall
+inside, punishing himself for his unconscionable greediness that he
+might not form the habit of appropriating that which is not his
+own.
+
+XXII. If you owe anything, seek for some one to whom you may repay
+it, and if no one demands it, dun your own self; whether the man be
+good or bad is no concern of yours; repay him, and then blame him.
+You have forgotten, how your several duties are divided: it is
+right for him to forget it, but we have bidden you bear it in mind.
+When, however, we say that he who bestows a benefit ought to forget
+it, it is a mistake to suppose that we rob him of all recollection
+of the business, though it is most creditable to him; some of our
+precepts are stated over strictly in order to reduce them to their
+true proportions. When we say that he ought not to remember it, we
+mean he ought not to speak publicly, or boast of it offensively.
+There are some, who, when they have bestowed a benefit, tell it in
+all societies, talk of it when sober, cannot be silent about it
+when drunk, force it upon strangers, and communicate it to friends;
+it is to quell this excessive and reproachful consciousness that we
+bid him who gave it forget it, and by commanding him to do this,
+which is more than he is able, encourage him to keep silence.
+
+XXIII. When you distrust those whom you order to do anything, you
+ought to command them to do more than enough in order that they may
+do what is enough. The purpose of all exaggeration is to arrive at
+the truth by falsehood. Consequently, he who spoke of horses as
+being:
+
+ "Whiter than snows and swifter than the winds,"
+
+said what could not possibly be in order that they might be thought
+to be as much so as possible. And he who said:
+
+ "More firm than crags, more headlong than the stream,"
+
+did not suppose that he should make any one believe that a man
+could ever be as firm as a crag. Exaggeration never hopes all its
+daring flights to be believed, but affirms what is incredible, that
+thereby it may convey what is credible. When we say, "let the man
+who has bestowed a benefit, forget it," what we mean is, "let him
+be as though he had forgotten it; let not his remembrance of it
+appear or be seen." When we say that repayment of a benefit ought
+not to be demanded, we do not utterly forbid its being demanded;
+for repayment must often be extorted from bad men, and even good
+men require to be reminded of it. Am I not to point out a means of
+repayment to one who does not perceive it? Am I not to explain my
+wants to one does not know them? Why should he (if a bad man) have
+the excuse, or (if a good man) have the sorrow of not knowing them?
+Men ought sometimes to be reminded of their debts, though with
+modesty, not in the tone of one demanding a legal right.
+
+XXIV. Socrates once said in the hearing of his friends: "I would
+have bought a cloak, if I had had the money for it." He asked no
+one for money, but he reminded them all to give it. There was a
+rivalry between them, as to who should give it; and how should
+there not be? Was it not a small thing which Socrates received?
+Yes, but it was a great thing to be the man from whom Socrates
+received it. Could he blame them more gently? "I would," said he,
+"have bought a cloak if I had had the money for it." After this,
+however eager any one was to give, he gave too late; for he had
+already been wanting in his duty to Socrates. Because some men
+harshly demand repayment of debts, we forbid it, not in order that
+it may never be done, but that it may be done sparingly.
+
+XXV. Aristippus once, when enjoying a perfume, said: "Bad luck to
+those effeminate persons who have brought so nice a thing into
+disrepute." We also may say, "Bad luck to those base extortioners
+who pester us for a fourfold return of their benefits, and have
+brought into disrepute so nice a thing as reminding our friends of
+their duty." I shall nevertheless make use of this right of
+friendship, and I shall demand the return of a benefit from any man
+from whom I would not have scrupled to ask for one, such a man as
+would regard the power of returning a benefit as equivalent to
+receiving a second one. Never, not even when complaining of him,
+would I say,
+
+ "A wretch forlorn upon the shore he lay,
+ His ship, his comrades, all were swept away;
+ Fool that I was, I pitied his despair,
+ And even gave him of my realm a share."
+
+This is not to remind, but to reproach; this is to make one's
+benefits odious to enable him, or even to make him wish to be
+ungrateful. It is enough, and more than enough, to remind him of it
+gently and familiarly:
+
+ "If aught of mine hath e'er deserved thy thanks."
+
+To this his answer would be, "Of course you have deserved my
+thanks; you took me up, 'a wretch forlorn upon the shore.'"
+
+XXVI. "But," says our adversary, "suppose that we gain nothing by
+this; suppose that he pretends that he has forgotten it, what ought
+I to do?" You now ask a very necessary question, and one which
+fitly concludes this branch of the subject, how, namely, one ought
+to bear with the ungrateful. I answer, calmly, gently,
+magnanimously. Never let any one's discourtesy, forgetfulness, or
+ingratitude, enrage you so much that you do not feel any pleasure
+at having bestowed a benefit upon him; never let your wrongs drive
+you into saying, "I wish I had not done it." You ought to take
+pleasure even in the ill-success of your benefit; he will always be
+sorry for it, even though you are not even now sorry for it. You
+ought not to be indignant, as if something strange had happened;
+you ought rather to be surprised if it had not happened. Some are
+prevented by difficulties, some by expense, and some by danger from
+returning your bounty; some are hindered by a false shame, because
+by returning it, they would confess that they had received it; with
+others ignorance of their duty, indolence, or excess of business,
+stands in the way. Reflect upon the insatiability of men's desires.
+You need not be surprised if no one repays you in a world in which
+no one ever gains enough. What man is there of so firm and
+trustworthy a mind that you can safely invest your benefits in him?
+One man is crazed with lust, another is the slave of his belly,
+another gives his whole soul to gain, caring nothing for the means
+by which he amasses it; some men's minds are disturbed by envy,
+some blinded by ambition till they are ready to fling themselves on
+the sword's point. In addition to this, one must reckon
+sluggishness of mind and old age; and also the opposites of these,
+restlessness and disturbance of mind, also excessive self-esteem
+and pride in the very things for which a man ought to be despised.
+I need not mention obstinate persistence in wrong-doing, or
+frivolity which cannot remain constant to one point; besides all
+this, there is headlong rashness, there is timidity which never
+gives us trustworthy counsel, and the numberless errors with which
+we struggle, the rashness of the most cowardly, the quarrels of our
+best friends, and that most common evil of trusting in what is most
+uncertain, and of undervaluing, when we have obtained it, that
+which we once never hoped to possess. Amidst all these restless
+passions, how can you hope to find a thing so full of rest as good
+faith?
+
+XXVII. If a true picture of our life were to rise before your
+mental vision, you would, I think, behold a scene like that of a
+town just taken by storm, where decency and righteousness were no
+longer regarded, and no advice is heard but that of force, as if
+universal confusion were the word of command. Neither fire nor
+sword are spared; crime is unpunished by the laws; even religion,
+which saves the lives of suppliants in the very midst of armed
+enemies, does not check those who are rushing to secure plunder.
+Some men rob private houses, some public buildings; all places,
+sacred or profane, are alike stripped; some burst their way in,
+others climb over; some open a wider path for themselves by
+overthrowing the walls that keep them out, and make their way to
+their booty over ruins; some ravage without murdering, others
+brandish spoils dripping with their owner's blood; everyone carries
+off his neighbours' goods. In this greedy struggle of the human
+race surely you forget the common lot of all mankind, if you seek
+among these robbers for one who will return what he has got. If you
+are indignant at men being ungrateful, you ought also to be
+indignant at their being luxurious, avaricious and lustful; you
+might as well be indignant with sick men for being ugly, or with
+old men for being pale. It is, indeed, a serious vice, it is not to
+be borne, and sets men at variance with one another; nay, it rends
+and destroys that union by which alone our human weakness can be
+supported; yet it is so absolutely universal, that even those who
+complain of it most are not themselves free from it.
+
+XXVIII. Consider within yourself, whether you have always shown
+gratitude to those to whom you owe it, whether no one's kindness
+has ever been wasted upon you, whether you constantly bear in mind
+all the benefits which you have received. You will find that those
+which you received as a boy were forgotten before you became a man;
+that those bestowed upon you as a young man slipped from your
+memory when you became an old one. Some we have lost, some we have
+thrown away, some have by degrees passed out of our sight, to some
+we have wilfully shut our eyes. If I am to make excuses for your
+weakness, I must say in the first place that human memory is a
+frail vessel, and is not large enough to contain the mass of things
+placed in it; the more it receives, the more it must necessarily
+lose; the oldest things in it give way to the newest. Thus it comes
+to pass that your nurse has hardly any influence with you, because
+the lapse of time has set the kindness which you received from her
+at so great a distance; thus it is that you no longer look upon
+your teacher with respect; and that now when you are busy about
+your candidature for the consulate or the priesthood, you forget
+those who supported you in your election to the quaestorship. If
+you carefully examine yourself, perhaps you will find the vice of
+which you complain in your own bosom; you are wrong in being angry
+with a universal failing, and foolish also, for it is your own as
+well; you must pardon others, that you may yourself be acquitted.
+You will make your friend a better man by bearing with him, you
+will in all cases make him a worse one by reproaching him. You can
+have no reason for rendering him shameless; let him preserve any
+remnants of modesty which he may have. Too loud reproaches have
+often dispelled a modesty which might have borne good fruit. No man
+fears to be that which all men see that he is; when his fault is
+made public, he loses his sense of shame.
+
+XXIX. You say, "I have lost the benefit which I bestowed." Yet do
+we say that we have lost what we consecrate to heaven, and a
+benefit well bestowed, even though we get an ill return for it, is
+to be reckoned among things consecrated. Our friend is not such a
+man as we hoped he was; still, let us, unlike him, remain the same
+as we were. The loss did not take place when he proved himself so;
+his ingratitude cannot be made public without reflecting some shame
+upon us, since to complain of the loss of a benefit is a sign that
+it was not well bestowed. As far as we are able we ought to plead
+with ourselves on his behalf: "Perhaps he was not able to return
+it, perhaps he did not know of it, perhaps he will still do so." A
+wise and forbearing creditor prevents the loss of some debts by
+encouraging his debtor and giving him time. We ought to do the
+same, we ought to deal tenderly with a weakly sense of honour.
+
+XXX. "I have lost," say you, "the benefit which I bestowed." You
+are a fool, and do not understand when your loss took place; you
+have indeed lost it, but you did so when you gave it, the fact has
+only now come to light. Even in the case of those benefits which
+appear to be lost, gentleness will do much good; the wounds of the
+mind ought to be handled as tenderly as those of the body. The
+string, which might be disentangled by patience, is often broken by
+a rough pull. What is the use of abuse, or of complaints? why do
+you overwhelm him with reproaches? why do you set him free from his
+obligation? even if he be ungrateful he owes you nothing after
+this. What sense is there in exasperating a man on whom you have
+conferred great favours, so as out of a doubtful friend to make a
+certain enemy, and one, too, who will seek to support his own cause
+by defaming you, or to make men say, "I do not know what the reason
+is that he cannot endure a man to whom he owes so much; there must
+be something in the background?" Any man can asperse, even if he
+does not permanently stain the reputation of his betters by
+complaining of them; nor will any one be satisfied with imputing
+small crimes to them, when it is only by the enormity of his
+falsehood that he can hope to be believed.
+
+XXXI. What a much better way is that by which the semblance of
+friendship, and, indeed, if the other regains to his right mind,
+friendship itself is preserved! Bad men are overcome by unwearying
+goodness, nor does any one receive kindness in so harsh and hostile
+a spirit as not to love good men even while he does them wrong,
+when they lay him under the additional obligation of requiring no
+return for their kindness. Reflect, then, upon this: you say, "My
+kindness has met with no return, what am I to do? I ought to
+imitate the gods, those noblest disposers of all events, who begin
+to bestow their benefits on those who know them not, and persist in
+bestowing them on those who are ungrateful for them. Some reproach
+them with neglect of us, some with injustice towards us; others
+place them outside of their own world, in sloth and indifference,
+without light, and without any functions; others declare that the
+sun itself, to whom we owe the division of our times of labour and
+of rest, by whose means we are saved from being plunged in the
+darkness of eternal night; who, by his circuit, orders the seasons
+of the year, gives strength to our bodies, brings forth our crops
+and ripens our fruits, is merely a mass of stone, or a fortuitous
+collection of fiery particles, or anything rather than a god. Yet,
+nevertheless, like the kindest of parents, who only smile at the
+spiteful words of their children, the gods do not cease to heap
+benefits upon those who doubt from what source their benefits are
+derived, but continue impartially distributing their bounty among
+all the peoples and nations of the earth. Possessing only the power
+of doing good, they moisten the land with seasonable showers, they
+put the seas in movement by the winds, they mark time by the course
+of the constellations, they temper the extremes of heat and cold,
+of summer and winter, by breathing a milder air upon us; and they
+graciously and serenely bear with the faults of our erring spirits.
+Let us follow their example; let us give, even if much be given to
+no purpose, let us, in spite of this, give to others; nay, even to
+those upon whom our bounty has been wasted. No one is prevented by
+the fall of a house from building another; when one home has been
+destroyed by fire, we lay the foundations of another before the
+site has had time to cool; we rebuild ruined cities more than once
+upon the same spots, so untiring are our hopes of success. Men
+would undertake no works either on land or sea if they were not
+willing to try again what they have failed in once.
+
+XXXII. Suppose a man is ungrateful, he does not injure me, but
+himself; I had the enjoyment of my benefit when I bestowed it upon
+him. Because he is ungrateful, I shall not be slower to give but
+more careful; what I have lost with him, I shall receive back from
+others. But I will bestow a second benefit upon this man himself,
+and will overcome him even as a good husbandman overcomes the
+sterility of the soil by care and culture; if I do not do so my
+benefit is lost to me, and he is lost to mankind. It is no proof of
+a great mind to give and to throw away one's bounty; the true test
+of a great mind is to throw away one's bounty and still to give."
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits, by Aubrey Stewart
+