diff options
Diffstat (limited to '3794.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 3794.txt | 7383 |
1 files changed, 7383 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/3794.txt b/3794.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..58d01a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/3794.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7383 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits, by Seneca + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits + +Author: Seneca + +Editor: Aubrey Stewart + +Release Date: February, 2003 [Etext #3794] +Posting Date: December 3, 2009 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK L. ANNAEUS SENECA ON BENEFITS *** + + + + +Produced by Charles Franks, Robert Rowe and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team + + + + + + +L. ANNAEUS SENECA, ON BENEFITS + +By Seneca + +Edited by Aubrey Stewart + + + + +PREFACE + +Seneca, the favourite classic of the early fathers of the church and +of the Middle Ages, whom Jerome, Tertullian, and Augustine speak of as +"Seneca noster," who was believed to have corresponded with St. Paul, +and upon whom [Footnote: On the "De Clementia," an odd subject for the +man who burned Servetus alive for differing with him.] Calvin wrote a +commentary, seems almost forgotten in modern times. Perhaps some of his +popularity may have been due to his being supposed to be the author +of those tragedies which the world has long ceased to read, but which +delighted a period that preferred Euripides to Aeschylus: while casuists +must have found congenial matter in an author whose fantastic cases of +conscience are often worthy of Sanchez or Escobar. Yet Seneca's morality +is always pure, and from him we gain, albeit at second hand, an +insight into the doctrines of the Greek philosophers, Zeno, Epicurus, +Chrysippus, &c., whose precepts and system of religious thought had in +cultivated Roman society taken the place of the old worship of Jupiter +and Quirinus. + +Since Lodge's edition (fol. 1614), no complete translation of Seneca has +been published in England, though Sir Roger L'Estrange wrote paraphrases +of several Dialogues, which seem to have been enormously popular, +running through more than sixteen editions. I think we may conjecture +that Shakespeare had seen Lodge's translation, from several allusions to +philosophy, to that impossible conception "the wise man," and especially +from a passage in "All's Well that ends Well," which seems to breathe +the very spirit of "De Beneficiis." + + "'Tis pity-- + That wishing well had not a body in it + Which might be felt: that we, the poorer born, + Whose baser stars do shut us up in wishes, + Might with effects of them follow our friends + And show what we alone must think; which never + Returns us thanks." + + "All's Well that ends Well," Act i. sc. 1. + +Though, if this will not fit the supposed date of that play, he may +have taken the idea from "The Woorke of Lucius Annaeus Seneca concerning +Benefyting, that is too say, the dooing, receyving, and requyting of +good turnes, translated out of Latin by A. Golding. J. Day, London, +1578." And even during the Restoration, Pepys's ideal of virtuous and +lettered seclusion is a country house in whose garden he might sit on +summer afternoons with his friend, Sir W. Coventry, "it maybe, to read a +chapter of Seneca." In sharp contrast to this is Vahlen's preface to the +minor Dialogues, which he edited after the death of his friend Koch, who +had begun that work, in which he remarks that "he has read much of this +writer, in order to perfect his knowledge of Latin, for otherwise he +neither admires his artificial subtleties of thought, nor his childish +mannerisms of style" (Vahlen, preface, p. v., ed. 1879, Jena). + +Yet by the student of the history of Rome under the Caesars, Seneca is +not to be neglected, because, whatever may be thought of the intrinsic +merit of his speculations, he represents, more perhaps even than +Tacitus, the intellectual characteristics of his age, and the tone of +society in Rome--nor could we well spare the gossiping stories which we +find imbedded in his graver dissertations. The following extract from +Dean Merivale's "History of the Romans under the Empire" will show the +estimate of him which has been formed by that accomplished writer:-- + +"At Rome, we, have no reason, to suppose that Christianity was only the +refuge of the afflicted and miserable; rather, if we may lay any stress +on the documents above referred to, it was first embraced by persons in +a certain grade of comfort and respectability; by persons approaching +to what we should call the MIDDLE CLASSES in their condition, their +education, and their moral views. Of this class Seneca himself was the +idol, the oracle; he was, so to speak, the favourite preacher of the +more intelligent and humane disciples of nature and virtue. Now the +writings of Seneca show, in their way, a real anxiety among this class +to raise the moral tone of mankind around them; a spirit of reform, a +zeal for the conversion of souls, which, though it never rose, indeed, +under the teaching of the philosophers, to boiling heat, still simmered +with genial warmth on the surface of society. Far different as was their +social standing-point, far different as were the foundations and the +presumed sanctions of their teaching respectively, Seneca and St. +Paul were both moral reformers; both, be it said with reverence, were +fellow-workers in the cause of humanity, though the Christian could +look beyond the proximate aims of morality and prepare men for a final +development on which the Stoic could not venture to gaze. Hence there +is so much in their principles, so much even in their language, which +agrees together, so that the one has been thought, though it must be +allowed without adequate reason, to have borrowed directly from the +other. [Footnote: It is hardly necessary to refer to the pretended +letters between St. Paul and Seneca. Besides the evidence from style, +some of the dates they contain are quite sufficient to condemn them as +clumsy forgeries. They are mentioned, but with no expression of belief +in their genuineness, by Jerome and Augustine. See Jones, "On the +Canon," ii. 80.] + +"But the philosopher, be it remembered, discoursed to a large and not +inattentive audience, and surely the soil was not all unfruitful on +which his seed was scattered when he proclaimed that God dwells not +in temples of wood and stone, nor wants the ministrations of human +hands;[Footnote: Sen., Ep. 95, and in Lactantius, Inst. vi.] that He has +no delight in the blood of victims:[Footnote: Ep. 116: "Colitur Deus +non tauris sed pia et recta voluntate."] that He is near to all His +creatures:[Footnote: Ep. 41, 73.] that His Spirit resides in men's +hearts:[Footnote: Ep. 46: "Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet."] that +all men are truly His offspring:[Footnote: "De Prov," i.] that we are +members of one body, which is God or Nature;[Footnote: Ep. 93, 95: +"Membra sumus magni corporis."] that men must believe in God before +they can approach Him:[Footnote: Ep. 95: "Primus Deorum cultus est +Deos credere."] that the true service of God is to be like unto +Him:[Footnote: Ep. 95: "Satis coluit quisquis imitatus est."] that all +men have sinned, and none performed all the works of the law:[Footnote: +Sen. de Ira. i. 14; ii. 27: "Quis est iste qui se profitetur omnibus +legibus innocentem?"] that God is no respecter of nations, ranks, or +conditions, but all, barbarian and Roman, bond and free, are alike under +His all-seeing Providence.[Footnote: "De Benef.," iii. 18: "Virtus omnes +admittit, libertinos, servos, reges." These and many other passages +are collected by Champagny, ii. 546, after Fabricius and others, and +compared with well-known texts of Scripture. The version of the Vulgate +shows a great deal of verbal correspondence. M. Troplong remarks, after +De Maistre, that Seneca has written a fine book on Providence, for which +there was not even a name at Rome in the time of Cicero.--"L'Influence +du Christianisme," &c., i., ch. 4.] + +"St. Paul enjoined submission and obedience even to the tyranny of +Nero, and Seneca fosters no ideas subversive of political subjection. +Endurance is the paramount virtue of the Stoic. To forms of government +the wise man was wholly indifferent; they were among the +external circumstances above which his spirit soared in serene +self-contemplation. We trace in Seneca no yearning for a restoration +of political freedom, nor does he even point to the senate, after +the manner of the patriots of the day, as a legitimate check to the +autocracy of the despot. The only mode, in his view, of tempering +tyranny is to educate the tyrant himself in virtue. His was the +self-denial of the Christians, but without their anticipated +compensation. It seems impossible to doubt that in his highest flights +of rhetoric--and no man ever recommended the unattainable with a finer +grace--Seneca must have felt that he was labouring to build up a house +without foundations; that his system, as Caius said of his style, was +sand without lime. He was surely not unconscious of the inconsistency of +his own position, as a public man and a minister, with the theories to +which he had wedded himself; and of the impossibility of preserving in +it the purity of his character as a philosopher or a man. He was aware +that in the existing state of society at Rome, wealth was necessary to +men high in station; wealth alone could retain influence, and a poor +minister became at once contemptible. The distributor of the Imperial +favours must have his banquets, his receptions, his slaves and freedmen; +he must possess the means of attracting if not of bribing; he must not +seem too virtuous, too austere, among an evil generation; in order to do +good at all he must swim with the stream, however polluted it might be. +All this inconsistency Seneca must have contemplated without blenching; +and there is something touching in the serenity he preserved amidst the +conflict that must have perpetually raged between his natural sense +and his acquired principles. Both Cicero and Seneca were men of many +weaknesses, and we remark them the more because both were pretenders to +unusual strength of character; but while Cicero lapsed into political +errors, Seneca cannot be absolved of actual crime. Nevertheless, if we +may compare the greatest masters of Roman wisdom together, the Stoic +will appear, I think, the more earnest of the two, the more anxious to +do his duty for its own sake, the more sensible of the claims of mankind +upon him for such precepts of virtuous living as he had to give. In an +age of unbelief and compromise he taught that Truth was positive and +Virtue objective. He conceived, what never entered Cicero's mind, the +idea of improving his fellow-creatures; he had, what Cicero had not, a +heart for conversion to Christianity." + +To this eloquent account of Seneca's position and of the tendency of his +writings I have nothing to add. The main particulars of his life, +his Spanish extraction (like that of Lacan and Martial), his father's +treatises on Rhetoric, his mother Helvia, his brothers, his wealth, his +exile in Corsica, his outrageous flattery of Claudius and his satiric +poem on his death--"The Vision of Judgment," Merivale calls it, after +Lord Byron--his position as Nero's tutor, and his death, worthy at once +of a Roman and a Stoic, by the orders of that tyrant, may be read of in +"The History of the Romans under the Empire," or in the article "Seneca" +in the "Dictionary of Classical Biography," and need not be reproduced +here: but I cannot resist pointing out how entirely Grote's view of the +"Sophists" as a sort of established clergy, and Seneca's account of the +various sects of philosophers as representing the religious thought of +the time, is illustrated by his anecdote of Julia Augusta, the mother of +Tiberius, better known to English readers as Livia the wife of Augustus, +who in her first agony of grief at the loss of her first husband applied +to his Greek philosopher, Areus, as to a kind of domestic chaplain, for +spiritual consolation. ("Ad Marciam de Consolatione," ch. iv.) + +I take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to the Rev. J. E. +B. Mayor, Professor of Latin in the University of Cambridge, for his +kindness in finding time among his many and important literary labours +for reading and correcting the proofs of this work. + +The text which I have followed for De Beneficiis is that of Gertz, +Berlin (1876.). + +AUBREY STEWART + +London, March, 1887. + + + + + + +CONTENTS + + +BOOK I. The prevalence of ingratitude--How a benefit ought to be +bestowed--The three Graces--Benefits are the chief bond of human +society--What we owe in return for a benefit received--A benefit +consists not of a thing but of the wish to do good--Socrates and +Aeschines--What kinds of benefits should be bestowed, and in what +manner--Alexander and the franchise of Corinth. + +BOOK II. Many men give through weakness of character--We ought to give +before our friends ask--Many benefits are spoiled by the manner of +the giver--Marius Nepos and Tiberius--Some benefits should be given +secretly--We must not give what would harm the receiver--Alexander's +gift of a city--Interchange of benefits like a game of ball--From +whom ought one to receive a benefit?--Examples--How to receive +a benefit--Ingratitude caused by self-love, by greed, or by +jealousy--Gratitude and repayment not the same thing--Phidias and the +statue. + +BOOK III. Ingratitude--Is it worse to be ungrateful for kindness or +not even to remember it?--Should ingratitude be punished by law?--Can +a slave bestow a benefit?--Can a son bestow a benefit upon his +father?--Examples + +BOOK IV. Whether the bestowal of benefits and the return of gratitude +for them are desirable objects in themselves? Does God bestow +benefits?--How to choose the man to be benefited--We ought not to look +for any return--True gratitude--Of keeping one's promise--Philip and the +soldier--Zeno + +BOOK V. Of being worsted in a contest of benefits--Socrates and +Archelaus--Whether a man can be grateful to himself, or can bestow +a benefit upon himself--Examples of ingratitude--Dialogue on +ingratitude--Whether one should remind one's friends of what one has +done for them--Caesar and the soldier--Tiberius. + +BOOK VI. Whether a benefit can be taken from one by force--Benefits +depend upon thought--We are not grateful for the advantages which we +receive from inanimate Nature, or from dumb animals--In order to lay me +under an obligation you must benefit me intentionally--Cleanthes's story +of the two slaves--Of benefits given in a mercenary spirit--Physicians +and teachers bestow enormous benefits, yet are sufficiently paid by a +moderate fee--Plato and the ferryman--Are we under an obligation to the +sun and moon?--Ought we to wish that evil may befall our benefactors, in +order that we may show our gratitude by helping them? + +BOOK VII. The cynic Demetrius--his rules of conduct--Of the truly +wise man--Whether one who has done everything in his power to return +a benefit has returned it--Ought one to return a benefit to a bad +man?--The Pythagorean, and the shoemaker--How one ought to bear with the +ungrateful. + + + + + + +L. A. SENECA + +ON BENEFITS. + + +DEDICATED TO + +AEBUTIUS LIBERALIS. + + + + +BOOK I. + +I. + + +Among the numerous faults of those who pass their lives recklessly and +without due reflexion, my good friend Liberalis, I should say that there +is hardly any one so hurtful to society as this, that we neither know +how to bestow or how to receive a benefit. It follows from this that +benefits are badly invested, and become bad debts: in these cases it is +too late to complain of their not being returned, for they were thrown +away when we bestowed them. Nor need we wonder that while the greatest +vices are common, none is more common than ingratitude: for this I see +is brought about by various causes. The first of these is, that we do +not choose worthy persons upon whom to bestow our bounty, but although +when we are about to lend money we first make a careful enquiry into +the means and habits of life of our debtor, and avoid sowing seed in a +worn-out or unfruitful soil, yet without any discrimination we scatter +our benefits at random rather than bestow them. It is hard to say +whether it is more dishonourable for the receiver to disown a benefit, +or for the giver to demand a return of it: for a benefit is a loan, the +repayment of which depends merely upon the good feeling of the debtor. +To misuse a benefit like a spendthrift is most shameful, because we +do not need our wealth but only our intention to set us free from the +obligation of it; for a benefit is repaid by being acknowledged. Yet +while they are to blame who do not even show so much gratitude as to +acknowledge their debt, we ourselves are to blame no less. We find many +men ungrateful, yet we make more men so, because at one time we harshly +and reproachfully demand some return for our bounty, at another we are +fickle and regret what we have given, at another we are peevish and +apt to find fault with trifles. By acting thus we destroy all sense of +gratitude, not only after we have given anything, but while we are in +the act of giving it. Who has ever thought it enough to be asked for +anything in an off-hand manner, or to be asked only once? Who, when he +suspected that he was going to be asked for any thing, has not frowned, +turned away his face, pretended to be busy, or purposely talked without +ceasing, in order not to give his suitor a chance of preferring his +request, and avoided by various tricks having to help his friend in his +pressing need? and when driven into a corner, has not either put the +matter off, that is, given a cowardly refusal, or promised his help +ungraciously, with a wry face, and with unkind words, of which he seemed +to grudge the utterance. Yet no one is glad to owe what he has not +so much received from his benefactor, as wrung out of him. Who can be +grateful for what has been disdainfully flung to him, or angrily cast +at him, or been given him out of weariness, to avoid further trouble? No +one need expect any return from those whom he has tired out with delays, +or sickened with expectation. A benefit is received in the same temper +in which it is given, and ought not, therefore, to be given carelessly, +for a man thanks himself for that which he receives without the +knowledge of the giver. Neither ought we to give after long delay, +because in all good offices the will of the giver counts for much, and +he who gives tardily must long have been unwilling to give at all. Nor, +assuredly, ought we to give in offensive manner, because human nature is +so constituted that insults sink deeper than kindnesses; the remembrance +of the latter soon passes away, while that of the former is treasured in +the memory; so what can a man expect who insults while he obliges? All +the gratitude which he deserves is to be forgiven for helping us. On +the other hand, the number of the ungrateful ought not to deter us +from earning men's gratitude; for, in the first place, their number is +increased by our own acts. Secondly, the sacrilege and indifference +to religion of some men does not prevent even the immortal gods from +continuing to shower their benefits upon us: for they act according to +their divine nature and help all alike, among them even those who so ill +appreciate their bounty. Let us take them for our guides as far as the +weakness of our mortal nature permits; let us bestow benefits, not put +them out at interest. The man who while he gives thinks of what he will +get in return, deserves to be deceived. But what if the benefit turns +out ill? Why, our wives and our children often disappoint our hopes, +yet we marry--and bring up children, and are so obstinate in the face of +experience that we fight after we have been beaten, and put to sea after +we have been shipwrecked. How much more constancy ought we to show in +bestowing benefits! If a man does not bestow benefits because he has +not received any, he must have bestowed them in order to receive them +in return, and he justifies ingratitude, whose disgrace lies in not +returning benefits when able to do so. How many are there who are +unworthy of the light of day? and nevertheless the sun rises. How many +complain because they have been born? yet Nature is ever renewing our +race, and even suffers men to live who wish that they had never lived. +It is the property of a great and good mind to covet, not the fruit of +good deeds, but good deeds themselves, and to seek for a good man even +after having met with bad men. If there were no rogues, what glory would +there be in doing good to many? As it is, virtue consists in bestowing +benefits for which we are not certain of meeting with any return, but +whose fruit is at once enjoyed by noble minds. So little influence ought +this to have in restraining us from doing good actions, that even though +I were denied the hope of meeting with a grateful man, yet the fear of +not having my benefits returned would not prevent my bestowing them, +because he who does not give, forestalls the vice of him who is +ungrateful. I will explain what I mean. He who does not repay a benefit, +sins more, but he who does not bestow one, sins earlier. + + "If thou at random dost thy bounties waste, + Much must be lost, for one that's rightly placed." + +II. In the former verse you may blame two things, for one should not +cast them at random, and it is not right to waste anything, much less +benefits; for unless they be given with judgement, they cease to be +benefits, and, may be called by any other name you please. The meaning +of the latter verse is admirable, that one benefit rightly bestowed +makes amends for the loss of many that have been lost. See, I pray you, +whether it be not truer and more worthy of the glory of the giver, that +we should encourage him to give, even though none of his gifts should +be worthily placed. "Much must be lost." Nothing is lost because he +who loses had counted the cost before. The book-keeping of benefits +is simple: it is all expenditure; if any one returns it, that is clear +gain; if he does not return it, it is not lost, I gave it for the sake +of giving. No one writes down his gifts in a ledger, or like a grasping +creditor demands repayment to the day and hour. A good man never thinks +of such matters, unless reminded of them by some one returning his +gifts; otherwise they become like debts owing to him. It is a base usury +to regard a benefit as an investment. Whatever may have been the result +of your former benefits, persevere in bestowing others upon other men; +they will be all the better placed in the hands of the ungrateful, whom +shame, or a favourable opportunity, or imitation of others may some day +cause to be grateful. Do not grow weary, perform your duty, and act +as becomes a good man. Help one man with money, another with credit, +another with your favour; this man with good advice, that one with +sound maxims. Even wild beasts feel kindness, nor is there any animal +so savage that good treatment will not tame it and win love from it. The +mouths of lions are handled by their keepers with impunity; to obtain +their food fierce elephants become as docile as slaves: so that constant +unceasing kindness wins the hearts even of creatures who, by their +nature, cannot comprehend or weigh the value of a benefit. Is a man +ungrateful for one benefit? perhaps he will not be so after receiving +a second. Has he forgotten two kindnesses? perhaps by a third he may be +brought to remember the former ones also. + +III. He who is quick to believe that he has thrown away his benefits, +does really throw them away; but he who presses on and adds new benefits +to his former ones, forces out gratitude even from a hard and forgetful +breast. In the face of many kindnesses, your friend will not dare to +raise his eyes; let him see you whithersoever he turns himself to escape +from his remembrance of you; encircle him with your benefits. As for the +power and property of these, I will explain it to you if first you will +allow me to glance at a matter which does not belong to our subject, as +to why the Graces are three in number, why they are sisters, why hand in +hand, and why they are smiling and young, with a loose and transparent +dress. Some writers think that there is one who bestows a benefit, +one who receives it, and a third who returns it; others say that they +represent the three sorts of benefactors, those who bestow, those who +repay, and those who both receive and repay them. But take whichever +you please to be true; what will this knowledge profit us? What is the +meaning of this dance of sisters in a circle, hand in hand? It means +that the course of a benefit is from hand to hand, back to the giver; +that the beauty of the whole chain is lost if a single link fails, and +that it is fairest when it proceeds in unbroken regular order. In the +dance there is one, esteemed beyond the others, who represents the +givers of benefits. Their faces are cheerful, as those of men who give +or receive benefits are wont to be. They are young, because the memory +of benefits ought not to grow old. They are virgins, because benefits +are pure and untainted, and held holy by all; in benefits there should +be no strict or binding conditions, therefore the Graces wear loose +flowing tunics, which are transparent, because benefits love to be seen. +People who are not under the influence of Greek literature may say that +all this is a matter of course; but there can be no one who would think +that the names which Hesiod has given them bear upon our subject. He +named the eldest Aglaia, the middle one Euphrosyne, the third Thalia. +Every one, according to his own ideas, twists the meaning of these +names, trying to reconcile them with some system, though Hesiod merely +gave his maidens their names from his own fancy. So Homer altered +the name of one of them, naming her Pasithea, and betrothed her to a +husband, in order that you may know that they are not vestal virgins. +[Footnote: i.e. not vowed to chastity.] + +I could find another poet, in whose writings they are girded, and wear +thick or embroidered Phrygian robes. Mercury stands with them for the +same reason, not because argument or eloquence commends benefits, +but because the painter chose to do so. Also Chrysippus, that man of +piercing intellect who saw to the very bottom of truth, who speaks +only to the point, and makes use of no more words than are necessary to +express his meaning, fills his whole treatise with these puerilities, +insomuch that he says but very little about the duties of giving, +receiving, and returning a benefit, and has not so much inserted fables +among these subjects, as he has inserted these subjects among a mass of +fables. For, not to mention what Hecaton borrows from him, Chrysippus +tells us that the three Graces are the daughters of Jupiter and +Eurynome, that they are younger than the Hours, and rather more +beautiful, and that on that account they are assigned as companions +to Venus. He also thinks that the name of their mother bears upon the +subject, and that she is named Eurynome because to distribute benefits +requires a wide inheritance; as if the mother usually received her name +after her daughters, or as if the names given by poets were true. In +truth, just as with a 'nomenclator' audacity supplies the place of +memory, and he invents a name for every one whose name he cannot +recollect, so the poets think that it is of no importance to speak the +truth, but are either forced by the exigencies of metre, or attracted by +sweetness of sound, into calling every one by whatever name runs neatly +into verse. Nor do they suffer for it if they introduce another name +into the list, for the next poet makes them bear what name he pleases. +That you may know that this is so, for instance Thalia, our present +subject of discourse, is one of the Graces in Hesiod's poems, while in +those of Homer she is one of the Muses. + +IV. But lest I should do the very thing which I am blaming, I will pass +over all these matters, which are so far from the subject that they are +not even connected with it. Only do you protect me, if any one attacks +me for putting down Chrysippus, who, by Hercules, was a great man, but +yet a Greek, whose intellect, too sharply pointed, is often bent and +turned back upon itself; even when it seems to be in earnest it only +pricks, but does not pierce. Here, however, what occasion is there for +subtlety? We are to speak of benefits, and to define a matter which is +the chief bond of human society; we are to lay down a rule of life, such +that neither careless openhandedness may commend itself to us under the +guise of goodness of heart, and yet that our circumspection, while it +moderates, may not quench our generosity, a quality in which we ought +neither to exceed nor to fall short. Men must be taught to be willing +to give, willing to receive, willing to return; and to place before +themselves the high aim, not merely of equalling, but even of surpassing +those to whom they are indebted, both in good offices and in good +feeling; because the man whose duty it is to repay, can never do so +unless he out-does his benefactor; [Footnote: That is, he never comes up +to his benefactor unless he leaves him behind: he can only make a dead +heat of it by getting a start.] the one class must be taught to look +for no return, the other to feel deeper gratitude. In this noblest of +contests to outdo benefits by benefits, Chrysippus encourages us by +bidding us beware lest, as the Graces are the daughters of Jupiter, to +act ungratefully may not be a sin against them, and may not wrong those +beauteous maidens. Do thou teach me how I may bestow more good things, +and be more grateful to those who have earned my gratitude, and how the +minds of both parties may vie with one another, the giver in forgetting, +the receiver in remembering his debt. As for those other follies, let +them be left to the poets, whose purpose is merely to charm the ear and +to weave a pleasing story; but let those who wish to purify men's +minds, to retain honour in their dealings, and to imprint on their minds +gratitude for kindnesses, let them speak in sober earnest and act with +all their strength; unless you imagine, perchance, that by such flippant +and mythical talk, and such old wives' reasoning, it is possible for us +to prevent that most ruinous consummation, the repudiation of benefits. + +V. However, while I pass over what is futile and irrelevant I must +point out that the first thing which we have to learn is, what we owe in +return for a benefit received. One man says that he owes the money which +he has received, another that he owes a consulship, a priesthood, +a province, and so on. These, however, are but the outward signs of +kindnesses, not the kindnesses themselves. A benefit is not to be felt +and handled, it is a thing which exists only in the mind. There is +a great difference between the subject-matter of a benefit, and the +benefit itself. Wherefore neither gold, nor silver, nor any of those +things which are most highly esteemed, are benefits, but the benefit +lies in the goodwill of him who gives them. The ignorant take notice +only of that which comes before their eyes, and which can be owned and +passed from hand to hand, while they disregard that which gives these +things their value. The things which we hold in our hands, which we see +with our eyes, and which our avarice hugs, are transitory, they may +be taken from us by ill luck or by violence; but a kindness lasts even +after the loss of that by means of which it was bestowed; for it is +a good deed, which no violence can undo. For instance, suppose that I +ransomed a friend from pirates, but another pirate has caught him and +thrown him into prison. The pirate has not robbed him of my benefit, but +has only robbed him of the enjoyment of it. Or suppose that I have saved +a man's children from a shipwreck or a fire, and that afterwards disease +or accident has carried them off; even when they are no more, the +kindness which was done by means of them remains. All those things, +therefore, which improperly assume the name of benefits, are means by +which kindly feeling manifests itself. In other cases also, we find a +distinction between the visible symbol and the matter itself, as when a +general bestows collars of gold, or civic or mural crowns upon any one. +What value has the crown in itself? or the purple-bordered robe? or the +fasces? or the judgment-seat and car of triumph? None of these things +is in itself an honour, but is an emblem of honour. In like manner, +that which is seen is not a benefit--it is but the trace and mark of a +benefit. + +VI. What, then, is a benefit? It is the art of doing a kindness which +both bestows pleasure and gains it by bestowing it, and which does its +office by natural and spontaneous impulse. It is not, therefore, the +thing which is done or given, but the spirit in which it is done or +given, that must be considered, because a benefit exists, not in that +which is done or given, but in the mind of the doer or giver. How great +the distinction between them is, you may perceive from this, that +while a benefit is necessarily good, yet that which is done or given is +neither good nor bad. The spirit in which they are given can exalt small +things, can glorify mean ones, and can discredit great and precious +ones; the objects themselves which are sought after have a neutral +nature, neither good nor bad; all depends upon the direction given them +by the guiding spirit from which things receive their shape. That which +is paid or handed over is not the benefit itself, just as the honour +which we pay to the gods lies not in the victims themselves, although +they be fat and glittering with gold, [Footnote: Alluding to the +practice of gilding the horns of the victims.] but in the pure and holy +feelings of the worshippers. + +Thus good men are religious, though their offering be meal and their +vessels of earthenware; whilst bad men will not escape from their +impiety, though they pour the blood of many victims upon the altars. + +VII. If benefits consisted of things, and not of the wish to benefit, +then the more things we received the greater the benefit would be. But +this is not true, for sometimes we feel more gratitude to one who gives +us trifles nobly, who, like Virgil's poor old soldier, "holds himself as +rich as kings," if he has given us ever so little with a good will a man +who forgets his own need when he sees mine, who has not only a wish but +a longing to help, who thinks that he receives a benefit when he +bestows one, who gives as though he would receive no return, receives a +repayment as though he had originally given nothing, and who watches for +and seizes an opportunity of being useful. On the other hand, as I said +before, those gifts which are hardly wrung from the giver, or which drop +unheeded from his hands, claim no gratitude from us, however great they +may appear and may be. We prize much more what comes from a willing +hand, than what comes from a full one. This man has given me but little, +yet more he could not afford, while what that one has given is much +indeed, but he hesitated, he put it off, he grumbled when he gave it, +he gave it haughtily, or he proclaimed it aloud, and did it to please +others, not to please the person to whom he gave it; he offered it to +his own pride, not to me. + +VIII. As the pupils of Socrates, each in proportion to his means, gave +him large presents, Aeschines, a poor pupil, said, "I can find nothing +to give you which is worthy of you; I feel my poverty in this respect +alone. Therefore I present you with the only thing I possess, myself. I +pray that you may take this my present, such as it is, in good part, and +may remember that the others, although they gave you much, yet left for +themselves more than they gave." Socrates answered, "Surely you have +bestowed a great present upon me, unless perchance you set a small value +upon yourself. I will accordingly take pains to restore you to yourself +a better man than when I received you." By this present Aeschines outdid +Alcibiades, whose mind was as great as his Wealth, and all the splendour +of the most wealthy youths of Athens. + +IX. You see how the mind even in the straitest circumstances finds the +means of generosity. Aeschines seems to me to have said, "Fortune, it +is in vain that you have made me poor; in spite of this I will find a +worthy present for this man. Since I can give him nothing of yours, I +will give him something of my own." Nor need you suppose that he held +himself cheap; he made himself his own price. By a stroke of genius this +youth discovered a means of presenting Socrates to himself. We must not +consider how great presents are, but in what spirit they are given. + +A rich man is well spoken of if he is clever enough to render himself +easy of access to men of immoderate ambition, and although he intends to +do nothing to help them, yet encourages their unconscionable hopes; but +he is thought the worse of if he be sharp of tongue, sour in appearance, +and displays his wealth in an invidious fashion. For men respect and +yet loathe a fortunate man, and hate him for doing what, if they had the +chance, they would do themselves. + + * * * * * * * + +Men nowadays no longer secretly, but openly outrage the wives of others, +and allow to others access to their own wives. A match is thought +countrified, uncivilized, in bad style, and to be protested against by +all matrons, if the husband should forbid his wife to appear in +public in a litter, and to be carried about exposed to the gaze of all +observers. If a man has not made himself notorious by a LIAISON with +some mistress, if he does not pay an annuity to some one else's wife, +married women speak of him as a poor-spirited creature, a man given +to low vice, a lover of servant girls. Soon adultery becomes the most +respectable form of marriage, and widowhood and celibacy are commonly +practised. No one takes a wife unless he takes her away from some one +else. Now men vie with one another in wasting what they have stolen, and +in collecting together what they have wasted with the keenest avarice; +they become utterly reckless, scorn poverty in others, fear personal +injury more than anything else, break the peace by their riots, and by +violence and terror domineer over those who are weaker than themselves. +No wonder that they plunder provinces and offer the seat of judgment for +sale, knocking it down after an auction to the highest bidder, since it +is the law of nations that you may sell what you have bought. + +X. However, my enthusiasm has carried me further than I intended, the +subject being an inviting one. Let me, then, end by pointing out that +the disgrace of these crimes does not belong especially to our own time. +Our ancestors before us have lamented, and our children after us will +lament, as we do, the ruin, of morality, the prevalence of vice, and +the gradual deterioration of mankind; yet these things are really +stationary, only moved slightly to and fro like the waves which at +one time a rising tide washes further over the land, and at another an +ebbing one restrains within a lower water mark. At one time the chief +vice will be adultery, and licentiousness will exceed all bounds; at +another time a rage for feasting will be in vogue, and men will waste +their inheritance in the most shameful of all ways, by the kitchen; at +another, excessive care for the body, and a devotion to personal beauty +which implies ugliness of mind; at another time, injudiciously granted +liberty will show itself in wanton recklessness and defiance of +authority; sometimes there will be a reign of cruelty both in public +and private, and the madness of the civil wars will come upon us, which +destroy all that is holy and inviolable. Sometimes even drunkenness will +be held in honour, and it will be a virtue to swallow most wine. Vices +do not lie in wait for us in one place alone, but hover around us in +changeful forms, sometimes even at variance one with another, so that +in turn they win and lose the field; yet we shall always be obliged to +pronounce the same verdict upon ourselves, that we are and always were +evil, and, I unwillingly add, that we always shall be. There always will +be homicides, tyrants, thieves, adulterers, ravishers, sacrilegious, +traitors: worse than all these is the ungrateful man, except we consider +that all these crimes flow from ingratitude, without which hardly any +great wickedness has ever grown to full stature. Be sure that you guard +against this as the greatest of crimes in yourself, but pardon it as the +least of crimes in another. For all the injury which you suffer is this: +you have lost the subject-matter of a benefit, not the benefit itself, +for you possess unimpaired the best part of it, in that you have given +it. Though we ought to be careful to bestow our benefits by preference +upon those who are likely to show us gratitude for them, yet we must +sometimes do what we have little hope will turn out well, and bestow +benefits upon those who we not only think will prove ungrateful, but who +we know have been so. For instance, if I should be able to save a +man's children from a great danger with no risk to myself, I should not +hesitate to do so. If a man be worthy I would defend him even with my +blood, and would share his perils; if he be unworthy, and yet by +merely crying for help I can rescue him from robbers, I would without +reluctance raise the shout which would save a fellow-creature. + +XI. The next point to be defined is, what kind of benefits are to be +given, and in what manner. First let us give what is necessary, next +what is useful, and then what is pleasant, provided that they be +lasting. We must begin with what is necessary, for those things which +support life affect the mind very differently from, those which adorn +and improve it. A man may be nice, and hard to please, in things which +he can easily do without, of which he can say, "Take them back; I do not +want them, I am satisfied with what I have." Sometimes, we wish not +only to, return what we have received, but even to throw it away. Of +necessary things, the first class consists of things without which we +cannot live; the second, of things without which we ought not to live; +and the third, of things without which we should not care to live. The +first class are, to be saved from the hands of the enemy, from the anger +of tyrants, from proscription, and the various other perils which +beset human life. By averting any one of these, we shall earn gratitude +proportionate to the greatness of the danger, for when men think of +the greatness of the misery from which they have been saved, the terror +which they have gone through enhances the value of our services. Yet we +ought not to delay rescuing any one longer than we are obliged, solely +in order to make his fears add weight to our services. Next come those +things without which we can indeed live, but in such a manner that it +would be better to die, such as liberty, chastity, or a good conscience. +After these are what we have come to hold dear by connexion and +relationship and long use and custom, such as our wives and children, +our household gods, and so on, to which the mind so firmly attaches +itself that separation from them seems worse than death. + +After these come useful things, which form a very wide and varied +class; in which will be money, not in excess, but enough for living in +a moderate style; public office, and, for the ambitious, due advancement +to higher posts; for nothing can be more useful to a man than to be +placed in a position in which he can benefit himself. All benefits +beyond these are superfluous, and are likely to spoil those who receive +them. In giving these we must be careful to make them acceptable by +giving them at the appropriate time, or by giving things which are not +common, but such as few people possess, or at any rate few possess in +our times; or again, by giving things in such a manner, that though not +naturally valuable, they become so by the time and place at which they +are given. We must reflect what present will produce the most pleasure, +what will most frequently come under the notice of the possessor of it, +so that whenever he is with it he may be with us also; and in all cases +we must be careful not to send useless presents, such as hunting weapons +to a woman or old man, or books to a rustic, or nets to catch wild +animals to a quiet literary man. On the other hand, we ought to be +careful, while we wish to send what will please, that we do not send +what will insultingly remind our friends of their failings, as, for +example, if we send wine to a hard drinker or drugs to an invalid, for a +present which contains an allusion to the shortcomings of the receiver, +becomes an outrage. + +XII. If we have a free choice as to what to give, we should above all +choose lasting presents, in order that our gift may endure as long +as possible; for few are so grateful as to think of what they have +received, even when they do not see it. Even the ungrateful remember +us by our gifts, when they are always in their sight and do not allow +themselves to be forgotten, but constantly obtrude and stamp upon the +mind the memory of the giver. As we never ought to remind men of what we +have given them, we ought all the more to choose presents that will be +permanent; for the things themselves will prevent the remembrance of the +giver from fading away. I would more willingly give a present of plate +than of coined money, and would more willingly give statues than clothes +or other things which are soon worn out. Few remain grateful after the +present is gone: many more remember their presents only while they make +use of them. If possible, I should like my present not to be consumed; +let it remain in existence, let it stick to my friend and share his +life. No one is so foolish as to need to be told not to send gladiators +or wild beasts to one who has just given a public show, or not to send +summer clothing in winter time, or winter clothing in summer. Common +sense must guide our benefits; we must consider the time and the place, +and the character of the receiver, which are the weights in the +scale, which cause our gifts to be well or ill received. How far more +acceptable a present is, if we give a man what he has not, than if we +give him what he has plenty of! if we give him what he has long been +searching for in vain, rather than what he sees everywhere! Let us make +presents of things which are rare and scarce rather than costly, things +which even a rich man will be glad of, just as common fruits, such as +we tire of after a few days, please us if they have ripened before the +usual season. People will also esteem things which no one else has given +to them, or which we have given to no one else. + +XIII. When the conquest of the East had flattered Alexander of Macedon +into believing himself to be more than man, the people of Corinth sent +an embassy to congratulate him, and presented him with the franchise of +their city. When Alexander smiled at this form of courtesy, one of +the ambassadors said, "We have never enrolled any stranger among our +citizens except Hercules and yourself." Alexander willingly accepted the +proffered honour, invited the ambassadors to his table, and showed them +other courtesies. He did not think of who offered the citizenship, but +to whom they had granted it; and being altogether the slave of glory, +though he knew neither its true nature or its limits, had followed in +the footsteps of Hercules and Bacchus, and had not even stayed his march +where they ceased; so that he glanced aside from the givers of this +honour to him with whom he shared it, and fancied that the heaven to +which his vanity aspired was indeed opening before him when he was made +equal to Hercules. In what indeed did that frantic youth, whose only +merit was his lucky audacity, resemble Hercules? Hercules conquered +nothing for himself; he travelled throughout the world, not coveting for +himself but liberating the countries which he conquered, an enemy to bad +men, a defender of the good, a peacemaker both by sea and land; whereas +the other was from his boyhood a brigand and desolator of nations, a +pest to his friends and enemies alike, whose greatest joy was to be the +terror of all mankind, forgetting that men fear not only the fiercest +but also the most cowardly animals, because of their evil and venomous +nature. + +XIV. Let us now return to our subject. He who bestows a benefit without +discrimination, gives what pleases no one; no one considers himself to +be under any obligation to the landlord of a tavern, or to be the guest +of any one with whom he dines in such company as to be able to say, +"What civility has he shown to me? no more than he has shown to that +man, whom he scarcely knows, or to that other, who is both his personal +enemy and a man of infamous character. Do you suppose that he wished to +do me any honour? not so, he merely wished to indulge his own vice of +profusion." If you wish men to be grateful for anything, give it but +seldom; no one can bear to receive what you give to all the world. +Yet let no one gather from this that I wish to impose any bonds upon +generosity; let her go to what lengths she will, so that she go a steady +course, not at random. It is possible to bestow gifts in such a manner +that each of those who receive them, although he shares them with many +others, may yet feel himself to be distinguished from the common herd. +Let each man have some peculiarity about his gift which may make him +consider himself more highly favoured than the rest. He may say, "I +received the same present that he did, but I never asked for it." "I +received the same present, but mine was given me after a few days, +whereas he had earned it by long service." "Others have the same +present, but it was not given to them with the same courtesy and +gracious words with which it was given to me." "That man got it because +he asked for it; I did not ask." "That man received it as well as I, but +then he could easily return it; one has great expectations from a rich +man, old and childless, as he is; whereas in giving the same present to +me he really gave more, because he gave it without the hope of receiving +any return for it." Just as a courtesan divides her favours among +many men, so that no one of her friends is without some proof of her +affection, so let him who wishes his benefits to be prized consider how +he may at the same time gratify many men, and nevertheless give each one +of them some especial mark of favour to distinguish him from the rest. + +XV. I am no advocate of slackness in giving benefits: the more and the +greater they are, the more praise they will bring to the giver. Yet +let them be given with discretion; for what is given carelessly and +recklessly can please no one. Whoever, therefore, supposes that in +giving this advice I wish to restrict benevolence and to confine it to +narrower limits, entirely mistakes the object of my warning. What virtue +do we admire more than benevolence? Which do we encourage more? Who +ought to applaud it more than we Stoics, who preach the brotherhood of +the human race? What then is it? Since no impulse of the human mind can +be approved of, even though it springs from a right feeling, unless it +be made into a virtue by discretion, I forbid generosity to degenerate +into extravagance. It is, indeed, pleasant to receive a benefit with +open arms, when reason bestows it upon the worthy, not when it is flung +hither or thither thoughtlessly and at random; this alone we care to +display and claim as our own. Can you call anything a benefit, if +you feel ashamed to mention the person who gave it you? How far more +grateful is a benefit, how far more deeply does it impress itself upon +the mind, never to be forgotten, when we rejoice to think not so much of +what it is, as from whom we have received it! Crispus Passienus was wont +to say that some men's advice was to be preferred to their presents, +some men's presents to their advice; and he added as an example, "I +would rather have received advice from Augustus than a present; I would +rather receive a present from Claudius than advice." I, however, think +that one ought not to wish for a benefit from any man whose judgement +is worthless. What then? Ought we not to receive what Claudius gives? We +ought; but we ought to regard it as obtained from fortune, which may at +any moment turn against us. Why do we separate this which naturally is +connected? That is not a benefit, to which the best part of a benefit, +that it be bestowed with judgment, is wanting: a really great sum of +money, if it be given neither with discernment nor with good will, is +no more a benefit than if it remained hoarded. There are, however, +many things which we ought not to reject, yet for which we cannot feel +indebted. + + + + +BOOK II. + +I. + + +Let us consider, most excellent Liberalis, what still remains of the +earlier part of the subject; in what way a benefit should be bestowed. I +think that I can point out the shortest way to this; let us give in the +way in which we ourselves should like to receive. Above all we should +give willingly, quickly, and without any hesitation; a benefit commands +no gratitude if it has hung for a long time in the hands of the giver, +if he seems unwilling to part with it, and gives it as though he were +being robbed of it. Even though some delay should intervene, let us +by all means in our power strive not to seem to have been in two minds +about giving it at all. To hesitate is the next thing to refusing to +give, and destroys all claim to gratitude. For just as the sweetest part +of a benefit is the kindly feeling of the giver, it follows that one who +has by his very delay proved that he gives unwillingly, must be regarded +not as having given anything, but as having been unable to keep it from +an importunate suitor. Indeed, many men are made generous by want of +firmness. The most acceptable benefits are those which are waiting for +us to take them, which are easy to be received, and offer themselves to +us, so that the only delay is caused by the modesty of the receiver. +The best thing of all is to anticipate a person's wishes; the next, to +follow them; the former is the better course, to be beforehand with our +friends by giving them what they want before they ask us for it, for the +value of a gift is much enhanced by sparing an honest man the misery of +asking for it with confusion and blushes. He who gets what he asked +for does not get it for nothing, for indeed, as our austere ancestors +thought, nothing is so dear as that which is bought by prayers. Men +would be much more modest in their petitions to heaven, if these had to +be made publicly; so that even when addressing the gods, before whom +we can with all honour bend our knees, we prefer to pray silently and +within ourselves. + +II. It is unpleasant, burdensome, and covers one with shame to have to +say, "Give me." You should spare your friends, and those whom you wish +to make your friends, from having to do this; however quick he may be, +a man gives too late who gives what he has been asked for. We ought, +therefore, to divine every man's wishes, and when we have discovered +them, to set him free from the hard necessity of asking; you may be sure +that a benefit which comes unasked will be delightful and will not be +forgotten. If we do not succeed in anticipating our friends, let us at +any rate cut them short when they ask us for anything, so that we may +appear to be reminded of what we meant to do, rather than to have been +asked to do it. Let us assent at once, and by our promptness make it +appear that we meant to do so even before we were solicited. As in +dealing with sick persons much depends upon when food is given, and +plain water given at the right moment sometimes acts as a remedy, so +a benefit, however slight and commonplace it may be, if it be promptly +given without losing a moment of time, gains enormously in importance, +and wins our gratitude more than a far more valuable present given after +long waiting and deliberation. One who gives so readily must needs give +with good will; he therefore gives cheerfully and shows his disposition +in his countenance. + +III. Many who bestow immense benefits spoil them by their silence or +slowness of speech, which gives them an air of moroseness, as they say +"yes" with a face which seems to say "no." How much better is it to join +kind words to kind actions, and to enhance the value of our gifts by a +civil and gracious commendation of them! To cure your friend of being +slow to ask a favour of you, you may join to your gift the familiar +rebuke, "I am angry with you for not having long ago let me know what +you wanted, for having asked for it so formally, or for having made +interest with a third party." "I congratulate myself that you have been +pleased to make trial of me; hereafter, if you want anything, ask for it +as your right; however, for this time I pardon your want of manners." +By so doing you will cause him to value your friendship more highly +than that, whatever it may have been, which he came to ask of you. The +goodness and kindness of a benefactor never appears so great as when on +leaving him one says, "I have to-day gained much; I am more pleased at +finding him so kind than if I had obtained many times more of this, of +which I was speaking, by some other means; I never can make any adequate +return to this man for his goodness." + +IV. Many, however, there are who, by harsh words and contemptuous +manner, make their very kindnesses odious, for by speaking and acting +disdainfully they make us sorry that they have granted our requests. +Various delays also take place after we have obtained a promise; and +nothing is more heartbreaking than to be forced to beg for the very +thing which you already have been promised. Benefits ought to be +bestowed at once, but from some persons it is easier to obtain the +promise of them than to get them. One man has to be asked to remind our +benefactor of his purpose; another, to bring it into effect; and thus a +single present is worn away in passing through many hands, until hardly +any gratitude is left for the original promiser, since whoever we are +forced to solicit after the giving of the promise receives some of the +gratitude which we owe to the giver. Take care, therefore, if you +wish your gifts to be esteemed, that they reach those to whom they are +promised entire, and, as the saying is, without any deduction. Let no +one intercept them or delay them; for no one can take any share of the +gratitude due for your gifts without robbing you of it. + +V. Nothing is more bitter than long uncertainty; some can bear to have +their hopes extinguished better than to have them deferred. Yet many +men are led by an unworthy vanity into this fault of putting off the +accomplishment of their promises, merely in order to swell the crowd of +their suitors, like the ministers of royalty, who delight in prolonging +the display of their own arrogance, hardly thinking themselves possessed +of power unless they let each man see for a long time how powerful they +are. They do nothing promptly, or at one sitting; they are indeed swift +to do mischief, but slow to do good. Be sure that the comic poet speaks +the most absolute truth in the verses:-- + + "Know you not this? If you your gifts delay, + You take thereby my gratitude away." + +And the following lines, the expression of virtuous pain--a +high-spirited man's misery,-- + + "What thou doest, do quickly;" + +and:-- + + "Nothing in the world + Is worth this trouble; I had rather you + Refused it to me now." + +When the mind begins through weariness to hate the promised benefit, or +while it is wavering in expectation of it, how can it feel grateful +for it? As the most refined cruelty is that which prolongs the torture, +while to kill the victim at once is a kind of mercy, since the extremity +of torture brings its own end with it--the interval is the worst part of +the execution--so the shorter time a benefit hangs in the balance, the +more grateful it is to the receiver. It is possible to look forward with +anxious disquietude even to good things, and, seeing that most benefits +consist in a release from some form of misery, a man destroys the value +of the benefit which he confers, if he has the power to relieve us, +and yet allows us to suffer or to lack pleasure longer than we need. +Kindness always eager to do good, and one who acts by love naturally +acts at once; he who does us good, but does it tardily and with long +delays, does not do so from the heart. Thus he loses two most important +things: time, and the proof of his good will to us; for a lingering +consent is but a form of denial. + +VI. The manner in which things are said or done, my Liberalis, forms a +very important part of every transaction. We gain much by quickness, and +lose much by slowness. Just as in darts, the strength of the iron head +remains the same, but there is an immeasureable difference between the +blow of one hurled with the full swing of the arm and one which merely +drops from the hand, and the same sword either grazes or pierces +according as the blow is delivered; so, in like manner, that which +is given is the same, but the manner in which it is given makes the +difference. How sweet, how precious is a gift, when he who gives does +not permit himself to be thanked, and when while he gives he forgets +that he has given! To reproach a man at the very moment that you are +doing him a service is sheer madness; it is to mix insult with your +favours. We ought not to make our benefits burdensome, or to add any +bitterness to them. Even if there be some subject upon which you wish to +warn your friend, choose some other time for doing so. + +VII. Fabius Verrucosus used to compare a benefit bestowed by a harsh man +in an offensive manner to a gritty loaf of bread, which a hungry man is +obliged to receive, but which is painful to eat. When Marius Nepos of +the praetorian guard asked Tiberius Caesar for help to pay his debts, +Tiberius asked him for a list of his creditors; this is calling a +meeting of creditors, not paying debts. When the list was made out, +Tiberius wrote to Nepos telling him that he had ordered the money to be +paid, and adding some offensive reproaches. The result of this was +that Nepos owed no debts, yet received no kindness; Tiberius, indeed, +relieved him from his creditors, but laid him under no obligation. +Tiberius, however, had some design in doing so; I imagine he did not +wish more of his friends to come to him with the same request. His mode +of proceeding was, perhaps, successful in restraining men's extravagant +desires by shame, but he who wishes to confer benefits must follow quite +a different path. In all ways you should make your benefit as acceptable +as possible by presenting it in the most attractive form; but the method +of Tiberius is not to confer benefits, but to reproach. + +VIII. Moreover, if incidentally I should say what I think of this part +of the subject, I do not consider that it is becoming even to an emperor +to give merely in order to cover a man with shame. "And yet," we are +told, "Tiberius did not even by this means attain his object; for after +this a good many persons were found to make the same request. He ordered +all of them to explain the reasons of their indebtedness before the +senate, and when they did so, granted them certain definite sums of +money." This is not an act of generosity, but a reprimand. You may call +it a subsidy, or an imperial contribution; it is not a benefit, for +the receiver cannot think of it without shame. I was summoned before a +judge, and had to be tried at bar before I obtained what I asked for. + +IX. Accordingly, all writers on ethical philosophy tell us that some +benefits ought to be given in secret, others in public. Those things +which it is glorious to receive, such as military decorations or public +offices, and whatever else gains in value the more widely it is known, +should be conferred in public; on the other hand, when they do not +promote a man or add to his social standing, but help him when in +weakness, in want, or in disgrace, they should be given silently, and so +as to be known only to those who profit by them. + +X. Sometimes even the person who is assisted must be deceived, in order +that he may receive our bounty without knowing the source from whence +it flows. It is said that Arcesilaus had a friend who was poor, but +concealed his poverty; who was ill, yet tried to hide his disorder, and +who had not money for the necessary expenses of existence. Without his +knowledge, Arcesilaus placed a bag of money under his pillow, in order +that this victim of false shame might rather seem to find what he wanted +than to receive. "What," say you, "ought he not to know from whom he +received it?" Yes; let him not know it at first, if it be essential to +your kindness that he should not; afterwards I will do so much for him, +and give him so much that he will perceive who was the giver of the +former benefit; or, better still, let him not know that he has received +any thing, provided I know that I have given it. "This," you say, "is to +get too little return for one's goodness." True, if it be an investment +of which you are thinking; but if a gift, it should be given in the way +which will be of most service to the receiver. You should be satisfied +with the approval of your own conscience; if not, you do not really +delight in doing good, but in being seen to do good. "For all that," say +you, "I wish him to know it." Is it a debtor that you seek for? "For +all that, I wish him to know it." What! though it be more useful, more +creditable, more pleasant for him not to know his benefactor, will you +not consent to stand aside? "I wish him to know." So, then, you would +not save a man's life in the dark? I do not deny that, whenever the +matter admits of it, one ought to take into consideration the pleasure +which we receive from the joy of the receiver of our kindness; but if he +ought to have help and is ashamed to receive it--if what we bestow upon +him pains him unless it be concealed--I forbear to make my benefits +public. Why should I not refrain from hinting at my having given him +anything, when the first and most essential rule is, never to reproach +a man with what you have done for him, and not even to remind him of it. +The rule for the giver and receiver of a benefit is, that the one should +straightway forget that he has given, the other should never forget that +he has received it. + +XI. A constant reference to one's own services wounds our friend's +feelings. Like the man who was saved from the proscription under +the triumvirate by one of Caesar's friends, and afterwards found it +impossible to endure his preserver's arrogance, they wish to cry, "Give +me back to Caesar." How long will you go on saying, "I saved you, I +snatched you from the jaws of death?" This is indeed life, if I remember +it by my own will, but death if I remember it at yours; I owe you +nothing, if you saved me merely in order to have some one to point at. +How long do you mean to lead me about? how long do you mean to forbid +me to forget my adventure? If I had been a defeated enemy, I should +have been led in triumph but once. We ought not to speak of the benefits +which we have conferred; to remind men of them is to ask them to return +them. We should not obtrude them, or recall the memory of them; you +should only remind a man of what you have given him by giving him +something else. We ought not even to tell others of our good deeds. +He who confers a benefit should be silent, it should be told by the +receiver; for otherwise you may receive the retort which was made to one +who was everywhere boasting of the benefit which he had conferred: "You +will not deny," said his victim, "that you have received a return for +it?" "When?" asked he. "Often," said the other, "and in many places, +that is, wherever and whenever you have told the story." What need is +there for you to speak, and to take the place which belongs to another? +There is a man who can tell the story in a way much more to your credit, +and thus you will gain glory for not telling it your self. You would +think me ungrateful if, through your own silence, no one is to know of +your benefit. So far from doing this, even if any one tells the story in +our presence, we ought to make answer, "He does indeed deserve much more +than this, and I am aware that I have not hitherto done any great things +for him, although I wish to do so." This should not be said jokingly, +nor yet with that air by which some persons repel those whom they +especially wish to attract. In addition to this, we ought to act with +the greatest politeness towards such persons. If the farmer ceases his +labours after he has put in the seed, he will lose what he has sown; it +is only by great pains that seeds are brought to yield a crop; no plant +will bear fruit unless it be tended with equal care from first to last, +and the same rule is true of benefits. Can any benefits be greater than +those which children receive from their parents? Yet these benefits +are useless if they be deserted while young, if the pious care of the +parents does not for a long time watch over the gift which they have +bestowed. So it is with other benefits; unless you help them, you will +lose them; to give is not enough, you must foster what you have given. +If you wish those whom you lay under an obligation to be grateful to +you, you must not merely confer benefits upon them, but you must also +love them. Above all, as I said before, spare their ears; you will weary +them if you remind them of your goodness, if you reproach them with it +you will make them hate you. Pride ought above all things to be avoided +when you confer a benefit. What need have you for disdainful airs, +or swelling phrases? the act itself will exalt you. Let us shun vain +boasting: let us be silent, and let our deeds speak for us. A benefit +conferred with haughtiness not only wins no gratitude, but causes +dislike. + +XII. Gaius Caesar granted Pompeius Pennus his life, that is, if not +to take away life be to grant it; then, when Pompeius was set free and +returning thanks to him, he stretched out his left foot to be kissed. +Those who excuse this action, and say that it was not done through +arrogance, say that he wished to show him a gilded, nay a golden slipper +studded with pearls. "Well," say they, "what disgrace can there be in a +man of consular rank kissing gold and pearls, and what part of Caesar's +whole body was it less pollution to kiss?" So, then, that man, +the object of whose life was to change a free state into a Persian +despotism, was not satisfied when a senator, an aged man, a man who had +filled the highest offices in the state, prostrated himself before him +in the presence of all the nobles, just as the vanquished prostrate +themselves before their conqueror! He discovered a place below his knees +down to which he might thrust liberty. What is this but trampling upon +the commonwealth, and that, too, with the left foot, though you may say +that this point does not signify? It was not a sufficiently foul and +frantic outrage for the emperor to sit at the trial of a consular for +his life wearing slippers, he must needs push his shoes into a senator's +face. + +XIII. O pride, the silliest fault of great good fortune! how pleasant +it is to take nothing from thee! how dost thou turn all benefits into +outrages! how dost thou delight in all excess! how ill all things become +thee! The higher thou risest the lower thou art, and provest that +the good things by which thou art so puffed up profit thee not; thou +spoilest all that thou givest. It is worth while to inquire why it is +that pride thus swaggers and changes the form and appearance of her +countenance, so that she prefers a mask to her own face. It is pleasant +to receive gifts when they are conferred in a kindly and gentle manner, +when a superior in giving them does not exalt himself over me, but shows +as much good feeling as possible, placing himself on a level with me, +giving without parade, and choosing a time when I am glad of his help, +rather than waiting till I am in the bitterest need. The only way by +which you can prevail upon proud men not to spoil their gifts by their +arrogance is by proving to them that benefits do not appear greater +because they are bestowed with great pomp and circumstance; that no one +will think them greater men for so doing, and that excessive pride is a +mere delusion which leads men to hate even what they ought to love. + +XIV. There are some things which injure those who receive them, things +which it is not a benefit to give but to withhold; we should therefore +consider the usefulness of our gift rather than the wish of the +petitioner to receive it; for we often long for hurtful things, and are +unable to discern how ruinous they are, because our judgment is biassed +by our feelings; when, however, the longing is past, when that frenzied +impulse which masters our good sense has passed away, we abhor those +who have given us hurtful gifts. As we refuse cold water to the sick, +or swords to the grief-stricken or remorseful, and take from the insane +whatever they might in their delirium use to their own destruction, so +must we persist in refusing to give anything whatever that is hurtful, +although our friends earnestly and humbly, nay, sometimes even most +piteously beg for it. We ought to look at the end of our benefits as +well as the beginning, and not merely to give what men are glad to +receive, but what they will hereafter be glad to have received. There +are many who say, "I know that this will do him no good, but what am I +to do? he begs for it, I cannot withstand his entreaties. Let him see +to it; he will blame himself, not me." Not so: you he will blame, and +deservedly; when he comes to his right mind, when the frenzy which +now excites him has left him, how can he help hating the man who has +assisted him to harm and to endanger himself? It is a cruel kindness to +allow one's self to be won over into granting that which injures those +who beg for it. Just as it is the noblest of acts to save men from harm +against their will, so it is but hatred, under the mask of civility, to +grant what is harmful to those who ask for it. Let us confer benefits of +such a kind, that the more they are made use of the better they please, +and which never can turn into injuries. I never will give money to a man +if I know that he will pay it to an adulteress, nor will I be found in +connexion with any wicked act or plan; if possible, I will restrain men +from crime; if not, at least I will never assist them in it. Whether my +friend be driven into doing wrong by anger, or seduced from the path of +safety by the heat of ambition, he shall never gain the means of doing +mischief except from himself, nor will I enable him one day to say, +"He ruined me out of love for me." Our friends often give us what our +enemies wish us to receive; we are driven by the unseasonable fondness +of the former into the ruin which the latter hope will befall us. Yet, +often as it is the case, what can be more shameful than that there +should be no difference between a benefit and hatred? + +XV. Let us never bestow gifts which may recoil upon us to our shame. +As the sum total of friendship consists in making our friends equal to +ourselves, we ought to consider the interests of both parties; I must +give to him that wants, yet so that I do not want myself; I must help +him who is perishing, yet so that I do not perish myself, unless by so +doing I can save a great man or a great cause. I must give no benefit +which it would disgrace me to ask for. I ought not to make a small +benefit appear a great one, nor allow great benefits to be regarded as +small; for although it destroys all feeling of gratitude to treat what +you give like a creditor, yet you do not reproach a man, but merely +set off your gift to the best advantage by letting him know what it is +worth. Every man must consider what his resources and powers are, so +that we may not give either more or less than we are able. We must also +consider the character and position of the person to whom we give, for +some men are too great to give small gifts, while others are too small +to receive great ones. Compare, therefore, the character both of the +giver and the receiver, and weigh that which you give between the two, +taking care that what is given be neither too burdensome nor too trivial +for the one to give, nor yet such as the receiver will either treat with +disdain as too small, or think too great for him to deal with. + +XVI. Alexander, who was of unsound mind, and always full of magnificent +ideas, presented somebody with a city. When the man to whom he gave it +had reflected upon the scope of his own powers, he wished to avoid the +jealousy which so great a present would excite, saying that the gift did +not suit a man of his position. "I do not ask," replied Alexander, "what +is becoming for you to receive, but what is becoming for me to give." +This seems a spirited and kingly speech, yet really it is a most foolish +one. Nothing is by itself a becoming gift for any one: all depends upon +who gives it, to whom he gives it, when, for what reason, where, and +so forth, without which details it is impossible to argue about it. +Inflated creature! if it did not become him to receive this gift, it +could not become thee to give it. There should be a proportion between +men's characters and the offices which they fill; and as virtue in all +cases should be our measure, he who gives too much acts as wrongly as he +who gives too little. Even granting that fortune has raised you so high, +that, where other men give cups, you give cities (which it would show a +greater mind in you not to take than to take and squander), still there +must be some of your friends who are not strong enough to put a city in +their pockets. + +XVII. A certain cynic asked Antigonus for a talent. Antigonus answered +that this was too much for a cynic to ask for. After this rebuff he +asked for a penny. Antigonus answered that this was too little for a +king to give. "This kind of hair-splitting" (you say) "is contemptible: +he found the means of giving neither. In the matter of the penny he +thought of the king, in that of the talent he thought of the cynic, +whereas with respect to the cynic it would have been right to receive +the penny, with respect to the king it would have been right to give the +talent. Though there may be things which are too great for a cynic to +receive, yet nothing is so small, that it does not become a gracious +king to bestow it." If you ask me, I applaud Antigonus; for it is not to +be endured that a man who despises money should ask for it. Your cynic +has publicly proclaimed his hatred of money, and assumed the character +of one who despises it: let him act up to his professions. It is most +inconsistent for him to earn money by glorifying his poverty. I wish +to use Chrysippus's simile of the game of ball, in which the ball must +certainly fall by the fault either of the thrower or of the catcher; it +only holds its course when it passes between the hands of two persons +who each throw it and catch it suitably. It is necessary, however, for a +good player to send the ball in one way to a comrade at a long distance, +and in another to one at a short distance. So it is with a benefit: +unless it be suitable both for the giver and the receiver, it will +neither leave the one nor reach the other as it ought. If we have to +do with a practised and skilled player, we shall throw the ball more +recklessly, for however it may come, that quick and agile hand will send +it back again; if we are playing with an unskilled novice, we shall not +throw it so hard, but far more gently, guiding it straight into his very +hands, and we shall run to meet it when it returns to us. This is just +what we ought to do in conferring benefits; let us teach some men how to +do so, and be satisfied if they attempt it, if they have the courage and +the will to do so. For the most part, however, we make men ungrateful, +and encourage them, to be so, as if our benefits were only great when +we cannot receive any gratitude for them; just as some spiteful +ball-players purposely put out their companion, of course to the ruin of +the game, which cannot be carried on without entire agreement Many men +are of so depraved a nature that they had rather lose the presents which +they make than be thought to have received a return for them, because +they are proud, and like to lay people under obligations: yet how much +better and more kindly would it be if they tried to enable the others +also to perform their parts, if they encouraged them in returning +gratitude, put the best construction upon all their acts, received one +who wished to thank them just as cordially as if he came to repay what +he had received, and easily lent themselves to the belief that those +whom they have laid under an obligation wish to repay it. We blame +usurers equally when they press harshly for payment, and when they delay +and make difficulties about taking back the money which they have lent; +in the same way, it is just as right that a benefit should be returned, +as it is wrong to ask any one to return it. The best man is he who gives +readily, never asks for any return, and is delighted when the return +is made, because, having really and truly forgotten what he gave, he +receives it as though it were a present. + +XVIII. Some men not only give, but even receive benefit haughtily, a +mistake into which we ought not to fall: for now let us cross over to +the other side of the subject, and consider how men should behave when +they receive benefits. Every function which is performed by two persons +makes equal demands upon both: after you have considered what a father +ought to be, you will perceive that there remains an equal task, that +of considering what a son ought to be: a husband has certain duties, +but those of a wife are no less important. Each of these give and take +equally, and each require a similar rule of life, which, as Hecaton +observes, is hard to follow: indeed, it is difficult for us to attain +to virtue, or even to anything that comes near virtue: for we ought not +only to act virtuously but to do so upon principle. We ought to follow +this guide throughout our lives, and to do everything great and small +according to its dictates: according as virtue prompts us we ought both +to give and to receive. Now she will declare at the outset that we ought +not to receive benefits from every man. "From whom, then, ought we to +receive them?" To answer you briefly, I should say, from those to whom +we have given them. Let us consider whether we ought not to be even more +careful in choosing to whom we should owe than to whom we should give. +For even supposing that no unpleasantness should result (and very much +always does), still it is a great misery to be indebted to a man to whom +you do not wish to be under an obligation; whereas it is most delightful +to receive a benefit from one whom you can love even after he has +wronged you, and when the pleasure which you feel in his friendship is +justified by the grounds on which it is based. Nothing is more wretched +for a modest and honourable man than to feel it to be his duty to love +one whom it does not please him to love. I must constantly remind you +that I do not speak of wise men, who take pleasure in everything that is +their duty, who have their feelings under command, and are able to lay +down whatever law they please to themselves and keep it, but that I +speak of imperfect beings struggling to follow the right path, who often +have trouble in bending their passions to their will. I must therefore +choose the man from whom I will accept a benefit; indeed, I ought to be +more careful in the choice of my creditor for a benefit than for money; +for I have only to pay the latter as much as I received of him, land +when I have paid it I am free from all obligation; but to the other I +must both repay more, and even when I have repaid his kindness we remain +connected, for when I have paid my debt I ought again to renew it, +while our friendship endures unbroken. Thus, as I ought not to make an +unworthy man my friend, so I ought not to admit an unworthy man into +that most holy bond of gratitude for benefits, from which friendship +arises. You reply, "I cannot always say 'No': sometimes I must receive a +benefit even against my will. Suppose I were given something by a cruel +and easily offended tyrant, who would take it as an affront if his +bounty were slighted? am I not to accept it? Suppose it were offered by +a pirate, or a brigand, or a king of the temper of a pirate or brigand. +What ought I to do? Such a man is not a worthy object for me to owe a +benefit to." When I say that you ought to choose, I except vis major +and fear, which destroy all power of choice. If you are free, if it lies +with you to decide whether you will or not, then you will turn over in +your own mind whether you will take a gift from a man or not; but if +your position makes it impossible for you to choose, then be assured +that you do not receive a gift, you merely obey orders. No one incurs +any obligation by receiving what it was not in his power to refuse; if +you want to know whether I wish to take it, arrange matters so that I +have the power of saying 'No.' "Yet suppose he gave you your life." It +does not matter what the gift was, unless it be given and received with +good will: you are not my preserver because you have saved my life. +Poison sometimes acts as a medicine, yet it is not on that account +regarded as wholesome. Some things benefit us but put us under no +obligation: for instance a man who intended to kill a tyrant, cut with +his sword a tumour from which he suffered: yet the tyrant did not show +him gratitude because by wounding him he had healed a disease which +surgeons had feared to meddle with. + +XIX. You see that the actual thing itself is not of much importance, +because it is not regarded as a benefit at all, if you do good when you +intended to do evil; in such a case the benefit is done by chance, the +man did harm. I have seen a lion in the amphitheatre, who recognized one +of the men who fought with wild beasts, who once had been his keeper, +and protected him against the attacks of the other animals. Are we, +then, to say that this assistance of the brute was a benefit? By no +means, because it did not intend to do it, and did not do it with kindly +intentions. You may class the lion and your tyrant together: each of +them saved a man's life, yet neither conferred a benefit. Because it is +not a benefit to be forced to receive one, neither is it a benefit to be +under an obligation to a man to whom we do not wish to be indebted. You +must first give me personal freedom of decision, and then your benefit. + +XX. The question has been raised, whether Marcus Brutus ought to have +received his life from the hands of Julius Caesar, who, he had decided, +ought to be put to death. + +As to the grounds upon which he put him to death, I shall discuss them +elsewhere; for to my mind, though he was in other respects a great man, +in this he seems to have been entirely wrong, and not to have followed +the maxims of the Stoic philosophy. He must either have feared the name +of "King," although a state thrives best under a good king, or he must +have hoped that liberty could exist in a state where some had so much to +gain by reigning, and others had so much to gain by becoming slaves. Or, +again, he must have supposed that it would be possible to restore the +ancient constitution after all the ancient manners had been lost, and +that citizens could continue to possess equal rights, or laws remain +inviolate, in a state in which he had seen so many thousands of men +fighting to decide, not whether they should be slaves or free, but which +master they should serve. How forgetful he seems to have been, both of +human nature and of the history of his own country, in supposing that +when one despot was destroyed another of the same temper would not take +his place, though, after so many kings had perished by lightning and the +sword, a Tarquin was found to reign! Yet Brutus did right in receiving +his life from Caesar, though he was not bound thereby to regard Caesar +as his father, since it was by a wrong that Caesar had come to be in a +position to bestow this benefit. A man does not save your life who does +not kill you; nor does he confer a benefit, but merely gives you your +discharge. [The 'discharge' alluded to is that which was granted to +the beaten one of a pair of gladiators, when their duel was not to the +death.] + +XXI. It seems to offer more opportunity for debate to consider what a +captive ought to do, if a man of abominable vices offers him the price +of his ransom? Shall I permit myself to be saved by a wretch? When safe, +what recompense can I make to him? Am I to live with an infamous person? +Yet, am I not to live with my preserver? I will tell you my opinion. I +would accept money, even from such a person, if it were to save my life; +yet I would only accept it as a loan, not as a benefit. I would repay +him the money, and if I were ever able to preserve him from danger I +would do so. As for friendship, which can only exist between equals, I +would not condescend to be such a man's friend; nor would I regard him +as my preserver, but merely as a money-lender, to whom I am only bound +to repay what I borrowed from him. + +A man may be a worthy person for me to receive a benefit from, but it +will hurt him to give it. For this reason I will not receive it, because +he is ready to help me to his own prejudice, or even danger. Suppose +that he is willing to plead for me in court, but by so doing will make +the king his enemy. I should be his enemy, if, when he is willing to +risk himself for me, if I were not to risk myself without him, which +moreover is easier for me to do. + +As an instance of this, Hecaton calls the case of Arcesilaus silly, and +not to the purpose. Arcesilaus, he says, refused to receive a large sum +of money which was offered to him by a son, lest the son should offend +his penurious father. What did he do deserving of praise, in not +receiving stolen goods, in choosing not to receive them, instead of +returning them? What proof of self-restraint is there in refusing to +receive another man's property. If you want an instance of magnanimity, +take the case of Julius Graecinus, whom Caius Caesar put to death merely +on the ground that he was a better man than it suited a tyrant for +anyone to be. This man, when he was receiving subscriptions from many of +his friends to cover his expenses in exhibiting public games, would not +receive a large sum which was sent him by Fabius Persicus; and when he +was blamed for rejecting it by those who think more of what is given +than of who gives it, he answered, "Am I to accept a present from a man +when I would not accept his offer to drink a glass of wine with him?" + +When a consular named Rebilius, a man of equally bad character, sent +a yet larger sum to Graecinus, and pressed him to receive it. "I must +beg," answered he, "that you will excuse me. I did not take money from +Persicus either." Ought we to call this receiving presents, or rather +taking one's pick of the senate? + +XXII. When we have decided to accept, let us accept with cheerfulness, +showing pleasure, and letting the giver see it, so that he may at once +receive some return for his goodness: for as it is a good reason for +rejoicing to see our friend happy, it is a better one to have made +him so. Let us, therefore, show how acceptable a gift is by loudly +expressing our gratitude for it; and let us do so, not only in the +hearing of the giver, but everywhere. He who receives a benefit with +gratitude, repays the first instalment of it. + +XXIII. There are some, who only like to receive benefits privately: they +dislike having any witnesses and confidants. Such men, we may believe, +have no good intentions. As a giver is justified in dwelling upon those +qualities of his gift which will please the receiver, so a man, when he +receives, should do so publicly; you should not take from a man what +you are ashamed to owe him. Some return thanks to one stealthily, in a +corner, in a whisper. This is not modesty, but a kind of denying of the +debt: it is the part of an ungrateful man not to express his gratitude +before witnesses. Some object to any accounts being kept between them +and their benefactors, and wish no brokers to be employed or witnesses +to be called, but merely to give their own signature to a receipt. Those +men do the like, who take care to let as few persons as possible know +of the benefits which they have received. They fear to receive them in +public, in order that their success may be attributed rather to their +own talents than to the help of others: they are very seldom to be +found in attendance upon those to whom they owe their lives and their +fortunes, and thus, while avoiding the imputation of servility, they +incur that of ingratitude. + +XXIV. Some men speak in the most offensive terms of those to whom they +owe most. There are men whom it is safer to affront than to serve, +for their dislike leads them to assume the airs of persons who are not +indebted to us: although nothing more is expected of them than that they +should remember what they owe us, refreshing their memory from time to +time, because no one can be grateful who forgets a kindness, and he +who remembers it, by so doing proves his gratitude. We ought neither to +receive benefits with a fastidious air, nor yet with a slavish humility: +for if a man does not care for a benefit when it is freshly bestowed--a +time at which all presents please us most--what will he do when its +first charms have gone off? Others receive with an air of disdain, as +much as to say. "I do not want it; but as you wish it so very much, I +will allow you to give it to me." Others take benefits languidly, and +leave the giver in doubt as to whether they know that they have received +them; others barely open their lips in thanks, and would be less +offensive if they said nothing. One ought to proportion one's thanks +to the importance of the benefit received, and to use the phrases, "You +have laid more of us than you think under an obligation," for everyone +likes to find his good actions extend further than he expected. "You do +not know what it is that you have done for me; but you ought to know +how much more important it is than you imagine." It is in itself +an expression of gratitude to speak of one's self as overwhelmed by +kindness; or "I shall never be able to thank you sufficiently; but, at +any rate, I will never cease to express everywhere my inability to thank +you." + +XXV. By nothing did Furnius gain greater credit with Augustus, and make +it easy for him to obtain anything else for which he might ask, than +by merely saying, when at his request Augustus pardoned his father for +having taken Antonius's side, "One wrong alone I have received at your +hands, Caesar; you have forced me to live and to die owing you a greater +debt of gratitude than I can ever repay." What can prove gratitude +so well as that a man should never be satisfied, should never even +entertain the hope of making any adequate return for what he has +received? By these and similar expressions we must try not to conceal +our gratitude, but to display it as clearly as possible. No words need +be used; if we only feel as we ought, our thankfulness will be shown in +our countenances. He who intends to be grateful, let him think how he +shall repay a kindness while he is receiving it. Chrysippus says that +such a man must watch for his opportunity, and spring forward whenever +it offers, like one who has been entered for a race, and who stands at +the starting-point waiting for the barriers to be thrown open; and even +then he must use great exertions and great swiftness to catch the other, +who has a start of him. + +XXVI. We must now consider what is the main cause of ingratitude. It is +caused by excessive self-esteem, by that fault innate in all mortals, +of taking a partial view of ourselves and our own acts, by greed, or by +jealousy. + +Let us begin with the first of these. Every one is prejudiced in his own +favour, from which it follows that he believes himself to have earned +all that he receives, regards it as payment for his services, and does +not think that he has been appraised at a valuation sufficiently near +his own. "He has given me this," says he, "but how late, after how much +toil? how much more might I have earned if I had attached myself to So +and so, or to So and so? I did not expect this; I have been treated like +one of the herd; did he really think that I only deserved so little? +why, it would have been less insulting to have passed me over +altogether." + +XXVII. The augur Cnaeus Lentulus, who, before his freedmen reduced him +to poverty, was one of the richest of men, who saw himself in possession +of a fortune of four hundred millions--I say advisedly, "saw," for he +never did more than see it--was as barren and contemptible in intellect +as he was in spirit. Though very avaricious, yet he was so poor a +speaker that he found it easier to give men coins than words. This man, +who owed all his prosperity to the late Emperor Augustus, to whom he had +brought only poverty, encumbered with a noble name, when he had risen to +be the chief man in Rome, both in wealth and influence, used sometimes +to complain that Augustus had interrupted his legal studies, observing +that he had not received anything like what he had lost by giving up the +study of eloquence. Yet the truth was that Augustus, besides loading him +with other gifts, had set him free from the necessity of making himself +ridiculous by labouring at a profession in which he never could succeed. + +Greed does not permit any one to be grateful; for what is given is never +equal to its base desires, and the more we receive the more we +covet, for avarice is much more eager when it has to deal with great +accumulations of wealth, just as the power of a flame is enormously +greater in proportion to the size of the conflagration from which it +springs. Ambition in like manner suffers no man to rest satisfied with +that measure of public honours, to gain which was once the limit of his +wildest hope; no one is thankful for becoming tribune, but grumbles at +not being at once promoted to the post of praetor; nor is he grateful +for this if the consulship does not follow; and even this does not +satisfy him if he be consul but once. His greed ever stretches itself +out further, and he does not understand the greatness of his success +because he always looks forward to the point at which he aims, and never +back towards that from which he started. + +XXVIII. A more violent and distressing vice than any of these is +jealousy which disturbs us by suggesting comparisons. "He gave me this, +but he gave more to that man, and he gave it to him before me;" after +which he sympathises with no one, but pushes his own claims to the +prejudice of every one else. How much more straightforward and modest +is it to make the most of what we have received, knowing that no man is +valued so highly by any one else as by his own, self! "I ought to have +received more, but it was not easy for him to give more; he was obliged +to distribute his liberality among many persons. This is only the +beginning; let me be contented, and by my gratitude encourage him to +show me more favour; he has not done as much as he ought, but he will +do so the more frequently; he certainly preferred that man to me, but he +has preferred me before many others; that man is not my equal either in +virtue or in services, but he has some charm of his own: by complaining +I shall not make myself deserve to receive more, but shall become +unworthy of what I have received. More has been given to those most +villainous men than has been given to me; well, what is that to the +purpose? how seldom does Fortune show judgment in her choice? We +complain every day of the success of bad men; very often the hail passes +over the estates of the greatest villains and strikes down the crops of +the best of men; every man has to take his chance, in friendship as well +as in everything else." There is no benefit so great that spitefulness +can pick no holes in it, none so paltry that it cannot be made more of +by friendly interpretation. We shall never want a subject for complaint +if we look at benefits on their wrong side. + +XXIX. See how unjustly the gifts of heaven are valued even by some who +profess themselves philosophers, who complain that we are not as big +as elephants, as swift as stags, as light as birds, as strong as bulls; +that the skins of seals are stronger, of hinds prettier, of bears +thicker, of beavers softer than ours; that dogs excel us in delicacy of +scent, eagles in keenness of sight, crows in length of days, and many +beasts in ease of swimming. And although nature itself does not allow +some qualities, as for example strength and swiftness, to be combined +in the same person, yet they call it a monstrous thing that men are not +compounded of different and inconsistent good qualities, and call the +gods neglectful of us because we have not been given health which even +our vices cannot destroy, or knowledge of the future. They scarcely +refrain from rising to such a pitch of impudence as to hate nature +because we are below the gods, and not on an equality with them. +How much better is it to turn to the contemplation of so many great +blessings, and to be thankful that the gods have been pleased to give us +a place second only to themselves in this most beautiful abode, and that +they have appointed us to be the lords of the earth! Can any one compare +us with the animals over whom we rule? Nothing has been denied us except +what could not have been granted. In like manner, thou that takest an +unfair view of the lot of mankind, think what blessings our Father has +bestowed upon us, how far more powerful animals than ourselves we have +broken to harness, how we catch those which are far swifter, how +nothing that has life is placed beyond the reach of our weapons! We have +received so many excellencies, so many crafts, above all our mind, which +can pierce at once whatever it is directed against, which is swifter +than the stars in their courses, for it arrives before them at the place +which they will reach after many ages; and besides this, so many fruits +of the earth, so much treasure, such masses of various things piled one +upon another. You may go through the whole order of nature, and since +you find no entire creature which you would prefer to be, you may choose +from each, the special qualities which you would like to be given to +yourself; then, if you rightly appreciate the partiality of nature for +you, you cannot but confess yourself to be her spoiled child. So it is; +the immortal gods have unto this day always held us most dear, and +have bestowed upon us the greatest possible honour, a place nearest to +themselves. We have indeed received great things, yet not too great. + +XXX. I have thought it necessary, my friend Liberalis, to state these +facts, both because when speaking of small benefits one ought to make +some mention of the greatest, and because also this shameless and +hateful vice (of ingratitude), starting with these, transfers itself +from them to all the rest. If a man scorn these, the greatest of all +benefits, to whom will he feel gratitude, what gift will he regard as +valuable or deserving to be returned: to whom will he be grateful for +his safety or his life, if he denies that he has received from the gods +that existence which he begs from them daily? He, therefore, who teaches +men to be grateful, pleads the cause not only of men, but even of the +gods, for though they, being placed above all desires, cannot be in want +of anything, yet we can nevertheless offer them our gratitude. + +No one is justified in seeking an excuse for ingratitude in his own +weakness or poverty, or in saying, "What am I to do, and how? When can I +repay my debt to my superiors the lords of heaven and earth?" Avaricious +as you are, it is easy for you to give them thanks, without expense; +lazy though you be, you can do it without labour. At the same instant at +which you received your debt towards them, if you wish to repay it, +you have done as much as any one can do, for he returns a benefit who +receives it with good will. + +XXXI. This paradox of the Stoic philosophy, that he returns a benefit +who receives it with good will, is, in my opinion, either far from +admirable, or else it is incredible. For if we look at everything merely +from the point of view of our intentions, every man has done as much +as he chose to do; and since filial piety, good faith, justice, and in +short every virtue is complete within itself, a man may be grateful in +intention even though he may not be able to lift a hand to prove his +gratitude. Whenever a man obtains what he aimed at, he receives the +fruit of his labour. When a man bestows a benefit, at what does he aim? +clearly to be of service and afford pleasure to him upon whom he bestows +it. If he does what he wishes, if his purpose reaches me and fills us +each with joy, he has gained his object. He does not wish anything to be +given to him in return, or else it becomes an exchange of commodities, +not a bestowal of benefits. A man steers well who reaches the port for +which he started: a dart hurled by a steady hand performs its duty if it +hits the mark; one who bestows a benefit wishes it to be received with +gratitude; he gets what he wanted if it be well received. "But," you +say, "he hoped for some profit also." Then it was not a benefit, the +property of which is to think nothing of any repayment. I receive what +was given me in the same spirit in which it was given: then I have +repaid it. If this be not true, then this best of deeds has this worst +of conditions attached to it, that it depends entirely upon fortune +whether I am grateful or not, for if my fortune is adverse I can make no +repayment. The intention is enough. What then? am I not to do whatever +I may be able to repay it, and ought I not ever to be on the watch for +an opportunity of filling the bosom [Footnote: Sinus, the fold of the +toga over the breast, used as a pocket by the Romans. The great French +actor Talma, when dressed for the first time in correct classical +costume, indignantly asked where he was to put his snuff-box.] of him +from whom I have received any kindness? True; but a benefit is in +an evil plight if we cannot be grateful for it even when we are +empty-handed. + +XXXII. "A man," it is argued, "who has received a benefit, however +gratefully he may have received it, has not yet accomplished all his +duty, for there remains the part of repayment; just as in playing at +ball it is something to catch the ball cleverly and carefully, but a man +is not called a good player unless he can handily and quickly send +back the ball which he has caught." This analogy is imperfect; and why? +Because to do this creditably depends upon the movement and activity of +the body, and not upon the mind: and an act of which we judge entirely +by the eye, ought to be all clearly displayed. But if a man caught +the ball as he ought to do, I should not call him a bad player for not +returning it, if his delay in returning it was not caused by his own +fault. "Yet," say you, "although the player is not wanting in skill, +because he did one part of his duty, and was able to do the other part, +yet in such a case the game is imperfect, for its perfection lies in +sending the ball backwards and forwards." I am unwilling to expose this +fallacy further; let us think that it is the game, not the player that +is imperfect: so likewise in the subject which we are discussing, the +thing which is given lacks something, because another equal thing ought +to be returned for it, but the mind of the giver lacks nothing, because +it has found another mind equal to itself, and as far as intentions go, +has effected what it wished. + +XXXIII. A man bestows a benefit upon me: I receive it just as he wished +it to be received: then he gets at once what he wanted, and the only +thing which he wanted, and therefore I have proved myself grateful. +After this it remains for me to enjoy my own resources, with the +addition of an advantage conferred upon me by one whom I have obliged; +this advantage is not the remainder of an imperfect service, but an +addition to a perfected service. [Footnote: Nothing is wanted to make +a benefit, conferred from good motives, perfect: if it is returned, the +gratitude is to be counted as net profit.] For example, Phidias makes a +statue. Now the product of an art is one thing, and that of a trade is +another. It is the business of the art to make the thing which he wished +to make, and that of the trade to make it with a profit. Phidias has +completed his work, even though he does not sell it. The product, +therefore, of his work is threefold: there is the consciousness of +having made it, which he receives when his work is completed; there is +the fame which he receives; and thirdly, the advantage which he obtains +by it, in influence, or by selling it, or otherwise. In like manner the +first fruit of a benefit is the consciousness of it, which we feel when +we have bestowed it upon the person whom we chose; secondly and thirdly +there is the credit which we gain by doing so, and there are those +things which we may receive in exchange for it. So when a benefit has +been graciously received, the giver has already received gratitude, but +has not yet received recompense for it: that which we owe in return is +therefore something apart from the benefit itself, for we have paid for +the benefit itself when we accept it in a grateful spirit. + +XXXIV. "What," say you, "can a man repay a benefit, though he does +nothing?" He has taken the first step, he has offered you a good thing +with good feeling, and, which is the characteristic of friendship, has +placed you both on the same footing. In the next place, a benefit is not +repaid in the same manner as a loan: you have no reason for expecting +me to offer you any payment; the account between us depends upon the +feelings alone. What I say will not appear difficult, although it may +not at first accord with your ideas, if you will do me the favour to +remember that there are more things than there are words to express +them. There is an enormous mass of things without names, which we do not +speak of under distinctive names of their own, but by the names of other +things transferred to them. We speak of our own foot, of the foot of a +couch, of a sail, or of a poem; we apply the word 'dog' to a hound, a +fish, and a star. Because we have not enough words to assign a separate +name to each thing, we borrow a name whenever we want one. Bravery is +the virtue which rightly despises danger, or the science of repelling, +sustaining, or inviting dangers: yet we call a brave man a gladiator, +and we use the same word for a good-for-nothing slave, who is led by +rashness to defy death. Economy is the science of avoiding unnecessary +expenditure, or the art of using one's income with moderation: yet we +call a man of mean and narrow mind, most economical, although there is +an immeasurable distance between moderation and meanness. These things +are naturally distinct, yet the poverty of our language compels us to +call both these men economical, just as he who views slight accidents +with rational contempt, and he who without reason runs into danger are +alike called brave. Thus a benefit is both a beneficent action, and also +is that which is bestowed by that action, such as money, a house, an +office in the state: there is but one name for them both, though their +force and power are widely different. + +XXXV. Wherefore, give me your attention, and you will soon perceive that +I say nothing to which you can object. That benefit which consists of +the action is repaid when we receive it graciously; that other, which +consists of something material, we have not then repaid, but we hope to +do so. The debt of goodwill has been discharged by a return of goodwill; +the material debt demands a material return. Thus, although we may +declare that he who has received a benefit with good-will has returned +the favour, yet we counsel him to return to the giver something of the +same kind as that which he has received. Some part of what we have said +departs from the conventional line of thought, and then rejoins it by +another path. We declare that a wise man cannot receive an injury; yet, +if a man hits him with his fist, that man will be found guilty of doing +him an injury. We declare that a fool can possess nothing; yet if a man +stole anything from a fool, we should find that man guilty of theft. We +declare that all men are mad, yet we do not dose all men with hellebore; +but we put into the hands of these very persons, whom we call madmen, +both the right of voting and of pronouncing judgment. Similarly, we say +that a man who has received a benefit with good-will has returned the +favour, yet we leave him in debt nevertheless--bound to repay it even +though he has repaid it. This is not to disown benefits, but is an +encouragement to us neither to fear to receive benefits, nor to faint +under the too great burden of them. "Good things have been given to me; +I have been preserved from starving; I have been saved from the misery +of abject poverty; my life, and what is dearer than life, my liberty, +has been preserved. How shall I be able to repay these favours? When +will the day come upon which I can prove my gratitude to him?" When a +man speaks thus, the day has already come. Receive a benefit, embrace +it, rejoice, not that you have received it, but that you have to owe it +and return it; then you will never be in peril of the great sin of being +rendered ungrateful by mischance. I will not enumerate any difficulties +to you, lest you should despair, and faint at the prospect of a long and +laborious servitude. I do not refer you to the future; do it with what +means you have at hand. You never will be grateful unless you are so +straightway. What, then, will you do? You need not take up arms, yet +perhaps you may have to do so; you need not cross the seas, yet it may +be that you will pay your debt, even when the wind threatens to blow a +gale. Do you wish to return the benefit? Then receive it graciously; +you have then returned the favour--not, indeed, so that you can think +yourself to have repaid it, but so that you can owe it with a quieter +conscience. + + + + +BOOK III. + +I. + + +Not to return gratitude for benefits, my AEbutius Liberalis, is +both base in itself, and is thought base by all men; wherefore even +ungrateful men complain of ingratitude, and yet what all condemn is at +the same time rooted in all; and so far do men sometimes run into the +other extreme that some of them become our bitterest enemies, not merely +after receiving benefits from us, but because they have received them. +I cannot deny that some do this out of sheer badness of nature; but +more do so because lapse of time destroys their remembrance, for time +gradually effaces what they felt vividly at the moment. I remember +having had an argument with you about this class of persons, whom you +wished to call forgetful rather than ungrateful, as if that which caused +a man to be ungrateful was any excuse for his being so, or as if the +fact of this happening to a man prevented his being ungrateful, when we +know that it only happens to ungrateful men. There are many classes of +the ungrateful, as there are of thieves or of homicides, who all have +the same fault, though there is a great variety in its various forms. +The man is ungrateful who denies that he has received a benefit; who +pretends that he has not received it; who does not return it. The most +ungrateful man of all is he who forgets it. The others, though they do +not repay it, yet feel their debt, and possess some traces of worth, +though obstructed by their bad conscience. They may by some means and at +some time be brought to show their gratitude, if, for instance, they +be pricked by shame, if they conceive some noble ambition such as +occasionally rises even in the breasts of the wicked, if some easy +opportunity of doing so offers; but the man from whom all recollection +of the benefit has passed away can never become grateful. Which of the +two do you call the worse--he who is ungrateful for kindness, or he who +does not even remember it? The eyes which fear to look at the light are +diseased, but those which cannot see it are blind. It is filial impiety +not to love one's parents, but not to recognise them is madness. + +II. Who is so ungrateful as he who has so completely laid aside and cast +away that which ought to be in the forefront of his mind and ever +before him, that he knows it not? It is clear that if forgetfulness of +a benefit steals over a man, he cannot have often thought about repaying +it. + +In short, repayment requires gratitude, time, opportunity, and the help +of fortune; whereas, he who remembers a benefit is grateful for it, and +that too without expenditure. Since gratitude demands neither labour, +wealth, nor good fortune, he who fails to render it has no excuse behind +which to shelter himself; for he who places a benefit so far away that +it is out of his sight, never could have meant to be grateful for it. +Just as those tools which are kept in use, and are daily touched by the +hand, are never in danger of growing rusty, while those which are not +brought before our eyes, and lie as if superfluous, not being required +for common use, collect dirt by the mere lapse of time, so likewise that +which our thoughts frequently turn over and renew never passes from our +memory, which only loses those things to which it seldom directs its +eyes. + +III. Besides this, there are other causes which at times erase the +greatest services from our minds. The first and most powerful of these +is that, being always intent upon new objects of desire, we think, not +of what we have, but of what we are striving to obtain. Those whose mind +is fixed entirely upon what they hope to gain, regard with contempt all +that is their own already. It follows that since men's eagerness for +something new makes them undervalue whatever they have received, they +do not esteem those from whom they have received it. As long as we are +satisfied with the position we have gained, we love our benefactor, we +look up to him, and declare that we owe our position entirely to him; +then we begin to entertain other aspirations, and hurry forward to +attain them after the manner of human beings, who when they have gained +much always covet more; straightway all that we used to regard as +benefits slip from our memory, and we no longer consider the advantages +which we enjoy over others, but only the insolent prosperity of those +who have outstripped us. Now no one can at the same time be both jealous +and grateful, because those who are jealous are querulous and sad, while +the grateful are joyous. In the next place, since none of us think of +any time but the present, and but few turn back their thoughts to the +past, it results that we forget our teachers, and all the benefits +which we have obtained from them, because we have altogether left +our childhood behind us: thus, all that was done for us in our youth +perishes unremembered, because our youth itself is never reviewed. What +has been is regarded by every one, not only as past, but as gone; and +for the same reason, our memory is weak for what is about to happen in +the future. + +IV. Here I must do Epicurus the justice to say that he constantly +complains of our ingratitude for past benefits, because we cannot bring +back again, or count among our present pleasures, those good things +which we have received long ago, although no pleasures can be more +undeniable than those which cannot be taken from us. Present good is not +yet altogether complete, some mischance may interrupt it; the future is +in suspense, and uncertain; but what is past is laid up in safety. How +can any man feel gratitude for benefits, if he skips through his +whole life entirely engrossed with the present and the future? It is +remembrance that mates men grateful; and the more men hope, the less +they remember. + +V. In the same way, my Liberalis, as some things remain in our memory as +soon as they are learned, while to know others it is not enough to have +learned them, for our knowledge slips away from us unless it be kept +up--I allude to geometry and astronomy, and such other sciences as are +Hard to remember because of their intricacy--so the greatness of some +benefits prevents their being forgotten, while others, individually +less, though many more in number, and bestowed at different times, pass +from our minds, because, as I have stated above, we do not constantly +think about them, and do not willingly recognize how much we owe to each +of our benefactors. Listen to the words of those who ask for favours. +There is not one of them who does not declare that his remembrance will +be eternal, who does not vow himself your devoted servant and slave, or +find, if he can, some even greater expression of humility with which to +pledge himself. After a brief space of time these same men avoid +their former expressions, thinking them abject, and scarcely befitting +free-born men; afterwards they arrive at the same point to which, as +I suppose, the worst and most ungrateful of men come--that is, they +forget. So little does forgetfulness excuse ingratitude, that even the +remembrance of a benefit may leave us ungrateful. + +VI. The question has been raised, whether this most odious vice ought to +go unpunished; and whether the law commonly made use of in the schools, +by which we can proceed against a man for ingratitude, ought to be +adopted by the State also, since all men agree that it is just. "Why +not?" you may say, "seeing that even cities cast in each other's teeth +the services which they have performed to one another, and demand from +the children some return for benefits conferred upon their fathers?" On +the other hand, our ancestors, who were most admirable men, made demands +upon their enemies alone, and both gave and lost their benefits with +magnanimity. With the exception of Macedonia, no nation has ever +established an action at law for ingratitude. And this is a strong +argument against its being established, because all agree in blaming +crime; and homicide, poisoning, parricide, and sacrilege are visited +with different penalties in different countries, but everywhere with +some penalty; whereas this most common vice is nowhere punished, though +it is everywhere blamed. We do not acquit it; but as it would be most +difficult to reckon accurately the penalty for so varying a matter, we +condemn it only to be hated, and place it upon the list of those crimes +which we refer for judgment to the gods. + +VII. Many arguments occur to me which prove that this vice ought not +to come under the action of the law. First of all, the best part of a +benefit is lost if the benefit can be sued for at law, as in the case of +a loan, or of letting and hiring. Indeed, the finest part of a benefit +is that we have given it without considering whether we shall lose it or +not, that we have left all this to the free choice of him who receives +it: if I call him before a judge, it begins to be not a benefit, but a +loan. Next, though it is a most honourable thing to show gratitude, it +ceases to be honourable if it be forced, for in that case no one will +praise a grateful man any more than he praises him who restores the +money which was deposited in his keeping, or who pays what he borrowed +without the intervention of a judge. We should therefore spoil the two +finest things in human life,--a grateful man and a beneficent man; for +what is there admirable in one who does not give but merely lends a +benefit, or in one who repays it, not because he wishes, but because he +is forced to do so? There is no credit in being grateful, unless it +is safe to be ungrateful. Besides this, all the courts would hardly be +enough for the action of this one law. Who would not plead under it? Who +would not be pleaded against? for every one exalts his own merits, +every one magnifies even the smallest matters which he has bestowed upon +another. Besides this, those things which form the subject of a judicial +inquiry can be distinctly defined, and cannot afford unlimited licence +to the judge; wherefore a good cause is in a better position if it +before a judge than before an arbitrator, because the words of the law +tie down a judge and define certain limits beyond which he may not pass, +whereas the conscience of an arbitrator is free and not fettered by +any rules, so that he can either give or take away, and can arrange his +decision, not according to the precepts of law and justice, but just +as his own kindly feeling or compassion may prompt him. An action for +ingratitude would not bind a judge, but would place him in the position +of an autocrat. It cannot be known what or how great a benefit is; all +that would be really important would be, how indulgently the judge might +interpret it. No law defines an ungrateful person, often, indeed, one +who repays what he has received is ungrateful, and one who has not +returned it is grateful. Even an unpractised judge can give his vote +upon some matters; for instance, when the thing to be determined is +whether something has or has not been done, when a dispute is terminated +by the parties giving written bonds, or when the casting up of accounts +decides between the disputants. When, however, motives have to be +guessed at, when matters upon which wisdom alone can decide, are brought +into court, they cannot be tried by a judge taken at random from the +list of "select judges," [Footnote: See Smith's "Dict. of Antiq.," s. +v] whom property and the inheritance of an equestrian fortune [Footnote: +400,000 sesterces] has placed upon the roll. + +VIII. Ingratitude, therefore, is not only matter unfit to be brought +into court, but no judge could be found fit to try it; and this you +will not be surprised at, if you examine the difficulties of any one who +should attempt to prosecute a man upon such a charge. One man may +have given a large sum of money, but he is rich and would not feel it; +another may have given it at the cost of his entire inheritance. The +sum given is the same in each case, but the benefit conferred is not the +same. Add another instance: suppose that to redeem a debtor from slavery +one man paid money from his own private means, while another man paid +the same sum, but had to borrow it or beg for it, and allow himself to +be laid under a great obligation to some one; would you rank the man who +so easily bestowed his benefit on an equality with him who was obliged +to receive a benefit himself before he could bestow it? Some benefits +are great, not because of their amount, but because of the time at which +they are bestowed; it is a benefit to give an estate whose fertility +can bring down the price of corn, and it is a benefit to give a loaf of +bread in time of famine; it is a benefit to give provinces through which +flow vast navigable rivers, and it is a benefit, when men are parched +with thirst, and can scarcely draw breath through their dry throats, +to show them a spring of water. Who will compare these cases with one +another, or weigh one against the other? It is hard to give a decision +when it is not the thing given, but its meaning, which has to be +considered; though what is given is the same, yet if it be given +under different circumstances it has a different value. A man may have +bestowed a benefit upon me, but unwillingly; he may have complained of +having given it; he may have looked at me with greater haughtiness than +he was wont to do; he may have been so slow in giving it, that he would +have done me a greater service if he had promptly refused it. How could +a judge estimate the value of these things, when words, hesitation, or +looks can destroy all their claim to gratitude? + +IX. What, again, could he do, seeing that some things are called +benefits because they are unduly coveted, whilst others are not benefits +at all, according to this common valuation, yet are of even greater +value, though not so showy? You call it a benefit to cause a man to be +adopted as a member of a powerful city, to get him enrolled among the +knights, or to defend one who is being tried for his life: what do you +say of him who gives useful advice? of him who holds you back when you +would rush into crime? of him who strikes the sword from the hands of +the suicide? of him who by his power of consolation brings back to the +duties of life one who was plunged in grief, and eager to follow those +whom he had lost? of him who sits at the bedside of the sick man, and +who, when health and recovery depend upon seizing the right moment, +administers food in due season, stimulates the failing veins with wine, +or calls in the physician to the dying man? Who can estimate the value +of such services as these? who can bid us weigh dissimilar benefits one +with another? "I gave you a house," says one. Yes, but I forewarned +you that your own house would come down upon your head. "I gave you an +estate," says he. True, but I gave a plank to you when shipwrecked. "I +fought for you and received wounds for you," says another. But I saved +your life by keeping silence. Since a benefit is both given and returned +differently by different people, it is hard to make them balance. + +X. Besides this, no day is appointed for repayment of a benefit, as +there is for borrowed money; consequently he who has not yet repaid a +benefit may do so hereafter: for tell me, pray, within what time a man +is to be declared ungrateful? The greatest benefits cannot be proved by +evidence; they often lurk in the silent consciousness of two men +only; are we to introduce the rule of not bestowing benefits without +witnesses? Next, what punishment are we to appoint for the ungrateful? +is there to be one only for all, though the benefits which they have +received are different? or should the punishment be varying, greater +or less according to the benefit which each has received? Are our +valuations to be restricted to pecuniary fines? what are we to do, +seeing that in some cases the benefit conferred is life, and things +dearer than life? What punishment is to be assigned to ingratitude for +these? One less than the benefit? That would be unjust. One equal to it; +death? What could be more inhuman than to cause benefits to result in +cruelty? + +XI. It may be argued, "Parents have certain privileges: these are +regarded as exempt from the action of ordinary rules, and so also ought +to be the case with other beneficent persons." Nay; mankind has +assigned a peculiar sanctity to the position of parents, because it +was advantageous that children should be reared, and people had to be +tempted into undergoing the toil of doing so, because the issue of their +experiment was doubtful. One cannot say to them, as one does to others +who bestow benefits, "Choose the man to whom you give: you must only +blame yourself if you are deceived; help the deserving." In rearing +children nothing depends upon the judgment of those who rear them; it is +a matter of hope: in order, therefore, that people may be more willing +to embark upon this lottery, it was right that they should be given a +certain authority; and since it is useful for youth to be governed, we +have placed their parents in the position of domestic magistrates, under +whose guardianship their lives may be ruled. Moreover, the position of +parents differs from that of other benefactors, for their having given +formerly to their children does not stand in the way of their giving +now and hereafter; and also, there is no fear of their falsely asserting +that they have given: with others one has to inquire not only whether +they have received, but whether they have given; but the good deeds of +parents are placed beyond doubt. In the next place, one benefit bestowed +by parents is the same for all, and might be counted once for all; +while the others which they bestow are of various kinds, unlike one to +another, differing from one another by the widest possible intervals; +they can therefore come under no regular rule, since it would be more +just to leave them all unrewarded than to give the same reward to all. + +XII. Some benefits cost much to the givers, some are of much value +to the receivers but cost the givers nothing. Some are bestowed upon +friends, others on strangers: now although that which is given be the +same, yet it becomes more when it is given to one with whom you +are beginning to be acquainted through the benefits which you have +previously conferred upon him. One man may give us help, another +distinctions, a third consolation. You may find one who thinks nothing +pleasanter or more important than to have some one to save him from +distress; you may again find one who would rather be helped to great +place than to security; while some consider themselves more indebted to +those who save their lives than to those who save their honour. Each +of these services will be held more or less important, according as the +disposition of our judge inclines to one or the other of them. Besides +this, I choose my creditors for myself, whereas I often receive benefits +from those from whom I would not, and sometimes I am laid under an +obligation without my knowledge. What will you do in such a case? When +a man has received a benefit unknown to himself, and which, had he known +of it, he would have refused to receive, will you call him ungrateful if +he does not repay it, however he may have received it? Suppose that some +one has bestowed a benefit upon me, and that the same man has afterwards +done me some wrong; am I to be bound by his one bounty to endure with +patience any wrong that he may do me, or will it be the same as if I had +repaid it, because he himself has by the subsequent wrong cancelled his +own benefit? How, in that case, would you decide which was the greater; +the present which the man has received, or the injury which has +been done him? Time would fail me if I attempted to discuss all the +difficulties which would arise. + +XIII. It may be argued that "we render men less willing to confer +benefits by not supporting the claim of those which have been bestowed +to meet with gratitude, and by not punishing those who repudiate them." +But you would find, on the other hand, that men would be far less +willing to receive benefits, if by so doing they were likely to incur +the danger of having to plead their cause in court, and having more +difficulty in proving their integrity. This legislation would also +render us less willing to give: for no one is willing to give to those +who are unwilling to receive, but one who is urged to acts of kindness +by his own good nature and by the beauty of charity, will give all the +more freely to those who need make no return unless they choose. It +impairs the credit of doing a service, if in doing it we are carefully +protected from loss. + +XIV. "Benefits, then, will be fewer, but more genuine: well, what harm +is there in restricting people from giving recklessly?" Even those who +would have no legislation upon the subject follow this rule, that we +ought to be somewhat careful in giving, and in choosing those upon whom +we bestow favours. Reflect over and over again to whom you are giving: +you will have no remedy at law, no means of enforcing repayment. You are +mistaken if you suppose that the judge will assist you: no law will +make full restitution to you, you must look only to the honour of the +receiver. Thus only can benefits retain their influence, and thus only +are they admirable: you dishonour them if you make them the grounds of +litigation, "Pay what you owe" is a most just proverb; and one which +carries with it the sanction of all nations; but in dealing with +benefits it is most shameful. "Pay!" How is a man to pay who owes his +life, his position, his safety, or his reason to another? None of the +greatest benefits can be repaid. "Yet," it is said, "you ought to give +in return for them something of equal value." This is just what I have +been saying, that the grandeur of the act is ruined if we make our +benefits commercial transactions. We ought hot to encourage ourselves in +avarice, in discontent, or in quarrels; the human mind is prone enough +to these by nature. As far as we are able, let us check it, and cut off +the opportunities for which it seeks. + +XV. Would that we could indeed persuade men to receive back money which +they have lent from those debtors only who are willing to pay! would +that no agreement ever bound the buyer to the seller, and that their +interests were not protected by sealed covenants and agreements, but +rather by honour and a sense of justice! However, men prefer what +is needful to what is truly best, and choose rather to force their +creditors to keep faith with them than to trust that they will do so. +Witnesses are called on both sides; the one, by calling in brokers, +makes several names appear in his accounts as his debtors instead of +one; the other is not content with the legal forms of question and +answer unless he holds the other party by the hand. What a shameful +admission of the dishonesty and wickedness of mankind! men trust more to +our signet-rings than to our intentions. For what are these respectable +men summoned? for what do they impress their seals? it is in order that +the borrower may not deny that he has received what he has received. +You regard these men, I suppose, as above bribes, as maintainers of the +truth: well, these very men will not be entrusted with money except on +the same terms. Would it not, then, be more honourable to be deceived +by some than to suspect all men of dishonesty? To fill up the measure +of avarice one thing only is lacking, that we should bestow no benefit +without a surety. To help, to be of service, is the part of a generous +and noble mind; he who gives acts like a god, he who demands repayment +acts like a money-lender. Why then, by trying to protect the rights of +the former class, should we reduce them to the level of the basest of +mankind? + +XVI. "More men," our opponent argues, "will be ungrateful, if no legal +remedy exists against ingratitude." Nay, fewer, because then benefits +will be bestowed with more discrimination, In the next place, it is not +advisable that it should be publicly known how many ungrateful men there +are: for the number of sinners will do away with the disgrace of +the sin, and a reproach which applies to all men will cease to be +dishonourable. Is any woman ashamed of being divorced, now that some +noble ladies reckon the years of their lives, not by the number of the +consuls, but by that of their husbands, now that they leave their +homes in order to marry others, and marry only in order to be divorced? +Divorce was only dreaded as long as it was unusual; now that no gazette +appears without it, women learn to do what they hear so much about. Can +any one feel ashamed of adultery, now that things have come to such +a pass that no woman keeps a husband at all unless it be to pique her +lover? Chastity merely implies ugliness. Where will you find any woman +so abject, so repulsive, as to be satisfied with a single pair of +lovers, without having a different one for each hour of the day; nor is +the day long enough for all of them, unless she has taken her airing +in the grounds of one, and passes the night with another. A woman is +frumpish and old-fashioned if she does not know that "adultery with one +paramour is nick-named marriage." Just as all shame at these vices has +disappeared since the vice itself became so widely spread, so if you +made the ungrateful begin to count their own numbers, you would both +make them more numerous, and enable them to be ungrateful with greater +impunity. + +XVII. "What then? shall the ungrateful man go unpunished?" What then, +I answer, shall we punish the undutiful, the malicious, the avaricious, +the headstrong, and the cruel? Do you imagine that those things which +are loathed are not punished, or do you suppose that any punishment is +greater than the hate of all men? It is a punishment not to dare receive +a benefit from anyone, not to dare to bestow one, to be, or to fancy +that you are a mark for all men's eyes, and to lose all appreciation of +so excellent and pleasant a matter. Do you call a man unhappy who has +lost his sight, or whose hearing has been impaired by disease, and do +you not call him wretched who has lost the power of feeling benefits? He +fears the gods, the witnesses of all ingratitude; he is tortured by +the thought of the benefit which he has misapplied, and, in fine, he is +sufficiently punished by this great penalty, that, as I said before, he +cannot enjoy the fruits of this most delightful act. On the other hand, +he who takes pleasure in receiving a benefit, enjoys an unvarying and +continuous happiness, which he derives from consideration, not of +the thing given, but of the intention of the giver. A benefit gives +perpetual joy to a grateful man, but pleases an ungrateful one only for +a moment. Can the lives of such men be compared, seeing that the one +is sad and gloomy--as it is natural that a denier of his debts and a +defrauder should be, a man who does not give his parents, his nurses, or +his teachers the honour which is their due--while the other is joyous, +cheerful, on the watch for an opportunity of proving his gratitude, and +gaining much pleasure from this frame of mind itself? Such a man has no +wish to become bankrupt, but only to make the fullest and most copious +return for benefits, and that not only to parents and friends, but also +to more humble persons; for even if he receives a benefit from his +own slave, he does not consider from whom he receives it, but what he +receives. + +XVIII. It has, however, been doubted by Hecaton and some other writers, +whether a slave can bestow a benefit upon his master. Some distinguish +between benefits, duties, and services, calling those things benefits +which are bestowed by a stranger--that is, by one who could discontinue +them without blame--while duties are performed by our children, our +wives, and those whom relationship prompts and orders to afford us help; +and, thirdly, services are performed by slaves, whose position is such +that nothing which they do for their master can give them any claim upon +him.... + +Besides this, he who affirms that a slave does not sometimes confer +a benefit upon his master is ignorant of the rights of man; for the +question is, not what the station in life of the giver may be, but what +his intentions are. The path of virtue is closed to no one, it lies open +to all; it admits and invites all, whether they be free-born men, slaves +or freed-men, kings or exiles; it requires no qualifications of family +or of property, it is satisfied with a mere man. What, indeed, should we +have to trust to for defence against sudden misfortunes, what could--a +noble mind promise to itself to keep unshaken, if virtue could be lost +together with prosperity? If a slave cannot confer a benefit upon his +master, then no subject can confer a benefit upon his king, and no +soldier upon his general; for so long as the man is subject to supreme +authority, the form of authority can make no difference. If main force, +or the fear of death and torture, can prevent a slave from gaining any +title to his master's gratitude, they will also prevent the subjects of +a king, or the soldiers of a general from doing so, for the same things +may happen to either of these classes of men, though under different +names. + +Yet men do bestow benefits upon their kings and their generals; +therefore slaves can bestow benefits upon their masters. A slave can be +just, brave, magnanimous; he can therefore bestow a benefit, for this +is also the part of a virtuous man. So true is it that slaves can bestow +benefits upon their masters, that the masters have often owed their +lives to them. + +XIX. There is no doubt that a slave can bestow a benefit upon anyone; +why, then, not upon his master? "Because," it is argued, "he cannot +become his master's creditor if he gives him money. If this be not so, +he daily lays his master under an obligation to him; he attends him when +on a journey, he nurses him when sick, he works most laboriously at the +cultivation of his estate; yet all these, which would be called benefits +if done for us by anyone else, are merely called service when done by +a slave. A benefit is that which some one bestows who has the option of +withholding it:--now a slave has no power to refuse, so that he does +not afford us his help, but obeys our orders, and cannot boast of having +done what he could not leave undone." Even under these conditions I +shall win the day, and will place a slave in such positions, that for +many purposes he will be free; in the meanwhile, tell me, if I give you +an instance of a slave fighting for his master's safety without regard +to himself, pierced through with wounds, yet spending the last drops of +his blood, and gaining time for his master to escape by the sacrifice of +his life, will you say that this man did not bestow a benefit upon his +master because he was a slave? If I give an instance of one who could +not be bribed to betray his master's secrets by any of the offers of +a tyrant, who was not terrified by any threats, nor overpowered by any +tortures, but who, as far as he was able, placed his questioners upon a +wrong scent, and, paid for his loyalty with his life; will you say +that this man did not confer a benefit upon his master because he was a +slave? Consider, rather, whether an example of virtue in a slave be not +all the greater because it is rarer than in free men, and whether it be +not all the more gratifying that, although to be commanded is odious, +and all submission to authority is irksome, yet in some particular cases +love for a master has been more powerful than men's general dislike to +servitude. A benefit does not, therefore, cease to be a benefit because +it is bestowed by a slave, but is all the greater on that account, +because not even slavery could restrain him from bestowing it. + +XX. It is a mistake to imagine that slavery pervades a man's whole +being; the better part of him is exempt from it: the body indeed is +subjected and in the power of a master, but the mind is independent, and +indeed is so free and wild, that it cannot be restrained even by this +prison of the body, wherein it is confined, from following its own +impulses, dealing with gigantic designs, and soaring into the infinite, +accompanied by all the host of heaven. It is, therefore, only the body +which misfortune hands over to a master, and which he buys and sells; +this inward part cannot be transferred as a chattel. Whatever comes +from this, is free; indeed, we are not allowed to order all things to be +done, nor are slaves compelled to obey us in all things; they will not +carry out treasonable orders, or lend their hands to an act of crime. + +XXI. There are some things which the law neither enjoins nor forbids; it +is in these that a slave finds the means of bestowing benefits. As long +as we only receive what is generally demanded from a slave, that is +mere service; when more is given than a slave need afford us, it is a +benefit; as soon as what he does begins to partake of the affection of +a friend, it can no longer be called service. There are certain things +with which a master is bound to provide his slave, such as food and +clothing; no one calls this a benefit; but supposing that he indulges +his slave, educates him above his station, teaches him arts which +free-born men learn, that is a benefit. The converse is true in the case +of the slave; anything which goes beyond the rules of a slave's duty, +which is done of his own free will, and not in obedience to orders, is a +benefit, provided it be of sufficient importance to be called by such a +name if bestowed by any other person. + +XXII. It has pleased Chrysippus to define a slave as "a hireling for +life." Just as a hireling bestows a benefit when he does more than he +engaged himself to do, so when a slave's love for his master raises him +above his condition and urges him to do something noble--something which +would be a credit even to men more fortunate by birth--he surpasses the +hopes of his master, and is a benefit found in the house. Do you think +it is just that we should be angry with our slaves when they do less +than their duty, and that we should not be grateful to them when they do +more? Do you wish to know when their service is not a benefit? When the +question can be asked, "What if he had refused to do it?" When he does +that which he might have refused to do, we must praise his good will. +Benefits and wrongs are opposites; a slave can bestow a benefit upon his +master, if he can receive a wrong from his master. Now an official has +been appointed to hear complaints of the wrongs done by masters to their +slaves, whose duty it is to restrain cruelty and lust, or avarice in +providing them with the necessaries of life. What follows, then? Is it +the master who receives a benefit from his slave? nay, rather, it is +one man who receives it from another. Lastly, he did all that lay in his +power; he bestowed a benefit upon his master; it lies in your power to +receive or not to receive it from a slave. Yet who is so exalted, that +fortune may not make him need the aid even of the lowliest? + +XXIII. I shall now quote a number of instances of benefits, not all +alike, some even contradictory. Some slaves have given their master +life, some death; have saved him when perishing, or, as if that were +not enough, have saved him by their own death; others have helped +their master to die, some have saved his life by stratagem. Claudius +Quadrigarius tells us in the eighteenth book of his "Annals," that +when Grumentum was being besieged, and had been reduced to the greatest +straits, two slaves deserted to the enemy, and did valuable service. +Afterwards, when the city was taken, and the victors were rushing wildly +in every direction, they ran before every one else along the streets, +which they well knew, to the house in which they had been slaves, and +drove their mistress before them; when they were asked who she might +be, they answered that she was their mistress, and a most cruel one, and +that they were leading her away for punishment. They led her outside the +walls, and concealed her with the greatest care until the fighting +was over; then, as the soldiery, satisfied with the sack of the city, +quickly resumed the manners of Romans, they also returned to their +own countrymen, and themselves restored their mistress to them. She +manumitted each of them on the spot, and was not ashamed to receive her +life from men over whom she had held the power of life and death. She +might, indeed, especially congratulate herself upon this; for had +she been saved otherwise, she would merely have received a common and +hackneyed piece of kindness, whereas, by being saved as she was, she +became a glorious legend, and an example to two cities. In the confusion +of the captured city, when every one was thinking only of his own +safety, all deserted her except these deserters; but they, that they +might prove what had been their intentions in effecting that desertion, +deserted again from the victors to the captive, wearing the masks of +unnatural murderers. + +They thought--and this was the greatest part of the service which they +rendered--they were content to seem to have murdered their mistress, if +thereby their mistress might be saved from murder. Believe me, it is +the mark of no slavish soul to purchase a noble deed by the semblance of +crime. + +When Vettius, the praetor of the Marsi, was being led into the presence +of the Roman general, his slave snatched a sword from the soldier who +was dragging him along, and first slew his master. Then he said, "It is +now time for me to look to myself; I have already set my master free," +and with these words transfixed himself with one blow. Can you tell me +of anyone who saved his master more gloriously? + +XXIV. When Caesar was besieging Corfinium, Domitius, who was shut up in +the city, ordered a slave of his own, who was also a physician, to give +him poison. Observing the man's hesitation, he said, "Why do you delay, +as though the whole business was in your power? I ask for death with +arms in my hands." Then the slave assented, and gave him a harmless drug +to drink. When Domitius fell asleep after drinking this, the slave went +to his son, and said, "Give orders for my being kept in custody until +you learn from the result whether I have given your father poison or +no." Domitius lived, and Caesar saved his life; but his slave had saved +it before. + +XXV. During the civil war, a slave hid his master, who had been +proscribed, put on his rings and clothes, met the soldiers who were +searching for him, and, after declaring that he would not stoop to +entreat them not to carry out their orders, offered his neck to their +swords. What a noble spirit it shows in a slave to have been willing +to die for his master, at a time when few were faithful enough to +wish their master to live! to be found kind when the state was cruel, +faithful when it was treacherous! to be eager for the reward of +fidelity, though it was death, at a time when such rich rewards were +offered for treachery! + +XXVI. I will not pass over the instances which our own age affords. In +the reign of Tiberius Caesar, there was a common and almost universal +frenzy for informing, which was more ruinous to the citizens of Rome +than the whole civil war; the talk of drunkards, the frankness of +jesters, was alike reported to the government; nothing was safe; every +opportunity of ferocious punishment was seized, and men no longer waited +to hear the fate of accused persons, since it was always the same. One +Paulus, of the Praetorian guard, was at an entertainment, wearing a +portrait of Tiberius Caesar engraved in relief upon a gem. It would be +absurd for me to beat about the bush for some delicate way of explaining +that he took up a chamber-pot, an action which was at once noticed by +Maro, one of the most notorious informers of that time, and the slave of +the man who was about to fall into the trap, who drew the ring from the +finger of his drunken master. When Maro called the guests to witness +that Paulus had dishonoured the portrait of the emperor, and was already +drawing up an act of accusation, the slave showed the ring upon his +own finger. Such a man no more deserves to be called a slave, than Maro +deserved to be called a guest. + +XXVII. In the reign of Augustus men's own words were not yet able to +ruin them, yet they sometimes brought them into trouble. A senator named +Rufus, while at dinner, expressed a hope that Caesar would not return +safe from a journey for which he was preparing, and added that all bulls +and calves wished the same thing. Some of those present carefully noted +these words. At daybreak, the slave who had stood at his feet during the +dinner, told him what he had said in his cups, and urged him to be the +first to go to Caesar, and denounce himself. Rufus followed this advice, +met Caesar as he was going down to the forum, and, swearing that he was +out of his mind the day before, prayed that what he had said might fall +upon his own head and that of his children; he then begged Caesar pardon +him, and to take him back into favour. When Caesar said that he would +do so, he added, "No one will believe that you have taken me back into +favour unless you make me a present of something;" and he asked for and +obtained a sum of money so large, that it would have been a gift not to +be slighted even if bestowed by an unoffended prince. Caesar added: "In +future I will take care never to quarrel with you, for my own sake." +Caesar acted honourably in pardoning him, and in being liberal as well +as forgiving; no one can hear this anecdote without praising Caesar, +but he must praise the slave first. You need not wait for me to tell +you that the slave who did his master this service was set free; yet his +master did not do this for nothing, for Caesar had already paid him the +price of the slave's liberty. + +XXVIII. After so many instances, can we doubt that a master may +sometimes receive a benefit from a slave? Why need the person of the +giver detract from the thing which he gives? why should not the gift add +rather to the glory of the giver. All men descend from the same original +stock; no one is better born than another, except in so far as his +disposition is nobler and better suited for the performance of good +actions. Those who display portraits of their ancestors in their halls, +and set up in the entrance to their houses the pedigree of their family +drawn out at length, with many complicated collateral branches, are they +not notorious rather than noble? The universe is the one parent of all, +whether they trace their descent from this primary source through a +glorious or a mean line of ancestors. Be not deceived when men who are +reckoning up their genealogy, wherever an illustrious name is wanting, +foist in that of a god in its place. You need despise no one, even +though he bears a commonplace name, and owes little to fortune. Whether +your immediate ancestors were freedmen, or slaves, or foreigners, pluck +up your spirits boldly, and leap over any intervening disgraces of your +pedigree; at its source, a noble origin awaits you. Why should our +pride inflate us to such a degree that we think it beneath us to receive +benefits from slaves, and think only of their position, forgetting their +good deeds? You, the slave of lust, of gluttony, of a harlot, nay, who +are owned as a joint chattel by harlots, can you call anyone else +a slave? Call a man a slave? why, I pray you, whither are you being +hurried by those bearers who carry your litter? whither are these men +with their smart military-looking cloaks carrying you? is it not to the +door of some door-keeper, or to the gardens of some one who has not even +a subordinate office? and then you, who regard the salute of another +man's slave as a benefit, declare that you cannot receive a benefit from +your own slave. What inconsistency is this? At the same time you despise +and fawn upon slaves, you are haughty and violent at home, while out of +doors you are meek, and as much despised as you despise your slaves; +for none abase themselves lower than those who unconscionably give +themselves airs, nor are anymore prepared to trample upon others than +those who have learned how to offer insults by having endured them. + +XXIX. I felt it my duty to say this, in order to crush the arrogance of +men who are themselves at the mercy of fortune, and to claim the right +of bestowing a benefit for slaves, in order that I may claim it also for +sons. The question arises, whether children can ever bestow upon their +parents greater benefits than those which they have received from them. + +It is granted that many sons become greater and more powerful than their +parents, and also that they are better men. If this be true, they may +give better gifts to their fathers than they have received from them, +seeing that their fortune and their good nature are alike greater than +that of their father. "Whatever a father receives from his son," our +opponent will urge, "must in any case be lees than what the son received +from him, because the son owes to his father the very power of giving. +Therefore the father can never be surpassed in the bestowal of benefits, +because the benefit which surpasses his own is really his." I answer, +that some things derive their first origin from others, yet are greater +than those others; and a thing may be greater than that from which it +took its rise, although without that thing to start from it never could +have grown so great. All things greatly outgrow their beginnings. Seeds +are the causes of all things, and yet are the smallest part of the +things which they produce. Look at the Rhine, or the Euphrates, or any +other famous rivers; how small they are, if you only view them at the +place from whence they take their rise? they gain all that makes them +terrible and renowned as they flow along. Look at the trees which are +tallest if you consider their height, and the broadest if you look at +their thickness and the spread of their branches; compared with all +this, how small a part of them is contained in the slender fibres of +the root? Yet take away their roots, and no more groves will arise, nor +great mountains be clothed with trees. Temples and cities are supported +by their foundations; yet what is built as the foundation of the entire +building lies out of sight. So it is in other matters; the subsequent +greatness of a thing ever eclipses its origin. I could never have +obtained anything without having previously received the boon of +existence from my parents; yet it does not follow from this that +whatever I obtain is less than that without which I could not obtain it. +If my nurse had not fed me when I was a child, I should not have been +able to conduct any of those enterprises which I now carry on, both with +my head and with my hand, nor should I ever have obtained the fame which +is due to my labours both in peace and war; would you on that account +argue that the services of a nurse were more valuable than the most +important undertakings? Yet is not the nurse as important as the father, +since without the benefits which I have received from each of them +alike, I should have been alike unable to effect anything? If I owe all +that I now can do to my original beginning, I cannot regard my father or +my grandfather as being this original beginning; there always will be a +spring further back, from which the spring next below is derived. Yet no +one will argue that I owe more to unknown and forgotten ancestors +than to my father; though really I do owe them more, if I owe it to my +ancestors that my father begat me. + +XXX. "Whatever I have bestowed upon my father," says my opponent, +"however great it may be, yet is less valuable than what my father has +bestowed upon me, because if he had not begotten me, it never could +have existed at all." By this mode of reasoning, if a man has healed +my father when ill, and at the point of death, I shall not be able to +bestow anything upon him equivalent to what I have received from him; +for had my father not been healed, he could not have begotten me. Yet +think whether it be not nearer the truth to regard all that I can do, +and all that I have done, as mine, due to my own powers and my own will? +Consider what the fact of my birth is in itself; you will see that it +is a small matter, the outcome of which is dubious, and that it may lead +equally to good or to evil; no doubt it is the first step to everything, +but because it is the first, it is not on that account more important +than all the others. Suppose that I have saved my father's life, raised +him to the highest honours, and made him the chief man in his city, +that I have not merely made him illustrious by my own deeds, but have +furnished him himself with an opportunity of performing great exploits, +which is at once important, easy, and safe, as well as glorious; that I +have loaded him with appointments, wealth, and all that attracts men's +minds; still, even when I surpass all others, I am inferior to him. +Now if you say, "You owe to your father the power of doing all this," I +shall answer, "Quite true, if to do all this it is only necessary to be +born; but if life is merely an unimportant factor in the art of living +well, and if you have bestowed upon me only that which I have in common +with wild beasts and the smallest, and some of the foulest of creatures, +do not claim for yourself what did not come into being in consequence of +the benefits which you bestowed, even though it could not have come into +being without them." + +XXXI. Suppose, father, that I have saved your life, in return for the +life which I received from you: in this case also I have outdone your +benefit, because I have given life to one who understands what I have +done, and because I understood what I was doing, since I gave you your +life not for the sake of, or by the means of my own pleasure; for just +as it is less terrible to die before one has time to fear death, so it +is a much greater boon to preserve one's life than to receive it. I have +given life to one who will at once enjoy it, you gave it to one who knew +not if he should ever live; I have given life to one who was in fear of +death, your gift of life merely enables me to die; I have given you a +life complete, perfect; you begat me without intelligence, a burden upon +others. Do you wish to know how far from a benefit it was to give life +under such conditions? You should have exposed me as a child, for you +did me a wrong in begetting me. What do I gather from this? That the +cohabitation of a father and mother is the very least of benefits to +their child, unless in addition this beginning of kindnesses be followed +up by others, and confirmed by other services. It is not a good thing +to live, but to live well. "But," say you, "I do live well." True, but +I might have lived ill; so that your part in me is merely this, that I +live. If you claim merit to yourself for giving me mere life, bare and +helpless, and boast of it as a great boon, reflect that this you claim +merit for giving me is a boon which I possess in common with flies and +worms. In the next place, if I say no more than that I have applied +myself to honourable pursuits, and have guided the course of my life +along the path of rectitude, then you have received more from your +benefit than you gave; for you gave me to myself ignorant and unlearned, +and I have returned to you a son such as you would wish to have +begotten. + +XXXII. My father supported me. If I repay this kindness, I give him +more than I received, because he has the pleasure, not only of being +supported, but of being supported by a son, and receives more delight +from my filial devotion than from the food itself, whereas the food +which he used to give me merely affected my body. What? if any man +rises so high as to become famous among nations for his eloquence, his +justice, or his military skill, if much of the splendour of his renown +is shed upon his father also, and by its clear light dispels the +obscurity of his birth, does not such a man confer an inestimable +benefit upon his parents? Would anyone have heard of Aristo and Gryllus +except through Xenophon and Plato, their sons? Socrates keeps alive +the memory of Sophroniscus. It would take long to recount the other +men whose names survive for no other reason than that the admirable +qualities of their sons have handed them down to posterity. Did the +father of Marcus Agrippa, of whom nothing was known, even after Agrippa +became famous, confer the greater benefit upon his son, or was that +greater which Agrippa conferred upon his father when he gained the +glory, unique in the annals of war, of a naval crown, and when he raised +so many vast buildings in Rome, which not only surpassed all former +grandeur, but have been surpassed by none since? Did Octavius confer a +greater benefit upon his son, or the Emperor Augustus upon his father, +obscured as he was by the intervention of an adoptive father? What joy +would he have experienced, if, after the putting down of the civil war, +he had seen his son ruling the state in peace and security? He would not +have recognized the good which he had himself bestowed, and would hardly +have believed, when he looked back upon himself, that so great a man +could have been born in his house. Why should I go on to speak of others +who would now be forgotten, if the glory of their sons had not raised +them from obscurity, and kept them in the light until this day? In the +next place, as we are not considering what son may have given back to +his father greater benefits than he received from him, but whether a son +can give back greater benefits, even if the examples which I have quoted +are not sufficient, and such benefits do not outweigh the benefits +bestowed by the parents, if no age has produced. an actual example, +still it is not in the nature of things impossible. Though no solitary +act can outweigh the deserts of a parent, yet many such acts combined by +one son may do so. + +XXXIII. Scipio, while under seventeen years of age, rode among the enemy +in battle, and saved his father's life. Was it not enough, that in order +to reach his father he despised so many dangers when they were pressing +hardest upon the greatest generals, that he, a novice in his first +battle, made his way through so many obstacles, over the bodies of so +many veteran soldiers, and showed strength and courage beyond his years? +Add to this, that he also defended his father in court, and saved him +from a plot of his powerful enemies, that he heaped upon him a second +and a third consulship and other posts which were coveted even by +consulars, that when his father was poor he bestowed upon him the +plunder which he took by military licence, and that he made him rich +with the spoils of the enemy, which is the greatest honour of a soldier. +If even this did not repay his debt, add to it that he caused him to +be constantly employed in the government of provinces and in special +commands, add, that after he had destroyed the greatest cities, +and became without a rival either in the east or in the west, the +acknowledged protector and second founder of the Roman Empire, he +bestowed upon one who was already of noble birth the higher title of +"the father of Scipio;" can we doubt that the commonplace benefit of his +birth was outdone by his exemplary conduct, and by the valour which was +at once the glory and the protection of his country? Next, if this +be not enough, suppose that a son were to rescue his father from the +torture, or to undergo it in his stead. You can suppose the benefits +returned by the son as great as you please, whereas the gift he received +from his father was of one sort only, was easily performed, and was +a pleasure to the giver; that he must necessarily have given the same +thing to many others, even to some to whom he knows not that he has +given it, that he had a partner in doing so, and that he had in view the +law, patriotism, the rewards bestowed upon fathers of families by the +state, the maintenance of his house and family: everything rather than +him to whom he was giving life. What? supposing that any one were to +learn philosophy and teach it to his father, could it be any longer +disputed that the son had given him something greater than he had +received from him, having returned to his father a happy life, whereas +he had received from him merely life? + +XXXIV. "But," says our opponent, "whatever you do, whatever you are able +to give to your father, is part of his benefit bestowed upon you." So +it is the benefit of my teacher that I have become proficient in liberal +studies; yet we pass on from those who taught them to us, at any rate +from those who taught us the alphabet; and although no one can learn +anything without them, yet it does not follow that whatsoever success +one subsequently obtains, one is still inferior to those teachers. There +is a great difference between the beginning of a thing and its final +development; the beginning is not equal to the thing at its greatest, +merely upon the ground that, without the beginning, it could never have +become so great. + +XXXV. It is now time for me to bring forth something, so to speak, from +my own mint. So long as there is something better than the benefit which +a man bestows, he may be outdone. A father gives life to his son; +there is something better than life; therefore a father may be outdone, +because there is something better than the benefit which he has +bestowed. Still further, he who has given any one his life, if he be +more than once saved from peril of death by him, has received a greater +benefit than he bestowed. Now, a father has given life to his son: if, +therefore, he be more than once saved from peril by his son, he can +receive a greater benefit than he gave. A benefit becomes greater to the +receiver in proportion to his need of it. Now he who is alive needs life +more than he who has not been born, seeing that such a one can have no +need at all; consequently a father, if his life is saved by his son, +receives a greater benefit than his son received from him by being born. +It is said, "The benefits conferred by fathers cannot be outdone by +those returned by their sons." Why? "Because the son received life from +his father, and had he not received it, he could not have returned any +benefits at all." A father has this in common with all those who have +given any men their lives; it is impossible that these men could repay +the debt if they had not received their life. Then I suppose one cannot +overpay one's debt to a physician, for a physician gives life as well +as a father; or to a sailor who has saved us when shipwrecked? Yet the +benefits bestowed by these and by all the others who give us life in +whatever fashion, can be outdone: consequently those of our fathers can +be outdone. If any one bestows upon me a benefit which requires the help +of benefits from many other persons, whereas I give him what requires no +one to help it out, I have given more than I have received; now a father +gave to his son a life which, without many accessories to preserve it, +would perish; whereas a son, if he gives life to his father, gives him +a life which requires no assistance to make it lasting; therefore the +father who receives life from his son, receives a greater benefit than +he himself bestowed upon his son. + +XXXVI. These considerations do not destroy the respect due to parents, +or make their children behave worse to them, nay, better; for virtue +is naturally ambitious, and wishes to outstrip those who are before it. +Filial piety will be all the more eager, if, in returning a father's +benefits, it can hope to outdo them; nor will this be against the will +or the pleasure of the father, since in many contests it is to our +advantage to be outdone. How does this contest become so desirable? +How comes it to be such happiness to parents that they should confess +themselves outdone by the benefits bestowed by their children? Unless we +decide the matter thus, we give children an excuse, and make them less +eager to repay their debt, whereas we ought to spur them on, saying, +"Noble youths, give your attention to this! You are invited to contend +in an honourable strife between parents and children, as to which party +has received more than it has given. Your fathers have not necessarily +won the day because they are first in the field: only take courage, as +befits you, and do not give up the contest; you will conquer if you wish +to do so. In this honourable warfare you will have no lack of leaders +who will encourage you to perform deeds like their own, and bid you +follow in their footsteps upon a path by which victory has often before +now been won over parents." + +XXXVII. AEneas conquered his father in well doing, for he himself had +been but a light and a safe burden for him when he was a child, yet he +bore his father, when heavy with age, through the midst of the enemy's +lines and the crash of the city which was falling around him, albeit the +devout old man, who bore the sacred images and the household gods in +his hands, pressed him with more than his own weight; nevertheless +(what cannot filial piety accomplish!) AEneas bore him safe through the +blazing city, and placed him in safety, to be worshipped as one of the +founders of the Roman Empire. Those Sicilian youths outdid their parents +whom they bore away safe, when Aetna, roused to unusual fury, poured +fire over cities and fields throughout a great part of the island. It +is believed that the fires parted, and that the flames retired on either +side, so as to leave a passage for these youths to pass through, who +certainly deserved to perform their daring task in safety. Antigonus +outdid his father when, after having conquered the enemy in a great +battle, he transferred the fruits of it to him, and handed over to him +the empire of Cyprus. This is true kingship, to choose not to be a king +when you might. Manlius conquered his father, imperious [Footnote: +There is an allusion to the surname of both the father and the son, +"Imperiosus" given them on account of their severity.] though he was, +when, in spite of his having previously been banished for a time by his +father on, account of his dulness and stupidity as a boy, he came to an +interview which he had demanded with the tribune of the people, who +had filed an action against his father. The tribune had granted him the +interview, hoping that he would betray his hated father, and believed +that he had earned the gratitude of the youth, having, amongst other +matters, reproached old Manlius with sending him into exile, treating +it as a very serious accusation; but the youth, having caught him alone, +drew a sword which he had hidden in his robe, and said, "Unless you +swear to give up your suit against my father, I will run you through +with this sword. It is in your power to decide how my father shall be +freed from his prosecutor." The tribune swore, and kept his oath; he +related the reason of his abandonment of his action to an assembly at +the Rostra. No other man was ever permitted to put down a tribune with +impunity. + +XXXVIII. There are instances without number of men who have saved their +parents from danger, have raised them from the lowest to the highest +station, and, taking them from the nameless mass of the lower classes, +have given them a name glorious throughout all ages. By no force of +words, by no power of genius, can one rightly express how desirable, how +admirable, how never to be erased from human memory it is to be able to +say, "I obeyed my parents, I gave way to them, I was submissive to their +authority whether it was just, or unjust and harsh; the only point in +which I resisted them was, not to be conquered by them in benefits." +Continue this struggle, I beg of you, and even though weary, yet re-form +your ranks. Happy are they who conquer, happy they who are conquered. +What can be more glorious than the youth who can say to himself--it +would not be right to say it to another--"I have conquered my father +with benefits"? What is more fortunate than that old man who declares +everywhere to everyone that he has been conquered in benefits by +his son? What, again, is more blissful than to be overcome in such a +contest? + + + + +BOOK IV. + +I. + + +Of all the matters which we have discussed, Aebutius Liberalis, there is +none more essential, or which, as Sallust says, ought to be stated with +more care than that which is now before us: whether the bestowal of +benefits and the return of gratitude for them are desirable objects +in themselves. Some men are found who act honourably from commercial +motives, and who do not care for unrewarded virtue, though it can confer +no glory if it brings any profit. What can be more base than for a man +to consider what it costs him to be a good man, when virtue neither +allures by gain nor deters by loss, and is so far from bribing any one +with hopes and promises, that on the other hand she bids them spend +money upon herself, and often consists in voluntary gifts? We must go to +her, trampling what is merely useful under our feet: whithersoever she +may call us or send us we must go, without any regard for our private +fortunes, sometimes without sparing even our own blood, nor must we +ever refuse to obey any of her commands. "What shall I gain," says my +opponent, "if I do this bravely and gratefully?" You will gain the doing +of it--the deed itself is your gain. Nothing beyond this is promised. If +any advantage chances to accrue to you, count it as something extra. +The reward of honourable dealings lies in themselves. If honour is to be +sought after for itself, since a benefit is honourable, it follows that +because both of these are of the same nature, their conditions must also +be the same. Now it has frequently and satisfactorily been proved, that +honour ought to be sought after for itself alone. + +II. In this part of the subject we oppose the Epicureans, an effeminate +and dreamy sect who philosophize in their own paradise, amongst whom +virtue is the handmaid of pleasures, obeys them, is subject to them, +and regards them as superior to itself. You say, "there is no pleasure +without virtue." But wherefore is it superior to virtue? Do you imagine +that the matter in dispute between them is merely one of precedence? +Nay, it is virtue itself and its powers which are in question. It cannot +be virtue if it can follow; the place of virtue is first, she ought to +lead, to command, to stand in the highest rank; you bid her look for a +cue to follow. "What," asks our opponent, "does that matter to you? I +also declare that happiness is impossible without virtue. Without virtue +I disapprove of and condemn the very pleasures which I pursue, and to +which I have surrendered myself. The only matter in dispute is this, +whether virtue be the cause of the highest good, or whether it be itself +the highest good." Do you suppose, though this be the only point in +question, that it is a mere matter of precedence? It is a confusion and +obvious blindness to prefer the last to the first. I am not angry at +virtue being placed below pleasure, but at her being mixed up at all +with pleasure, which she despises, whose enemy she is, and from which +she separates herself as far as possible, being more at home with labour +and sorrow, which are manly troubles, than with your womanish good +things. + +III. It was necessary to insert this argument, my Liberalis, because +it is the part of virtue to bestow those benefits which we are now +discussing, and it is most disgraceful to bestow benefits for any other +purpose than that they should be free gifts. If we give with the hope of +receiving a return, we should give to the richest men, not to the most +deserving: whereas we prefer a virtuous poor man to an unmannerly rich +one. That is not a benefit, which takes into consideration the fortune +of the receiver. Moreover, if our only motive for benefiting others was +our own advantage, those who could most easily distribute benefits, such +as rich and powerful men, or kings, and persons who do not stand in need +of the help of others, ought never to do so at all; the gods would +not bestow upon us the countless blessings which they pour upon us +unceasingly by night and by day, for their own nature suffices them in +all respects, and renders them complete, safe, and beyond the reach of +harm; they will, therefore, never bestow a benefit upon any one, if self +and self interest be the only cause for the bestowal of benefits. To +take thought, not where your benefit will be best bestowed, but where +it may be most profitably placed at interest, from whence you will most +easily get it back, is not bestowal of benefits, but usury. Now the gods +have nothing to do with usury; it follows, therefore, that they cannot +be liberal; for if the only reason for giving is the advantage of the +giver, since God cannot hope to receive any advantages from us, there is +no cause why God should give anything. + +IV. I know what answer may be made to this. "True; therefore God does +not bestow benefits, but, free from care and unmindful of us, He +turns away from our world and either does something else, or else does +nothing, which Epicurus thought the greatest possible happiness, and +He is not affected either by benefits or by injuries." The man who says +this cannot surely hear the voices of worshippers, and of those who all +around him are raising their hands to heaven and praying for the success +both of their private affairs and those of the state; which certainly +would not be the case, all men would not agree in this madness of +appealing to deaf and helpless gods, unless we knew that their benefits +are sometimes bestowed upon us unasked, sometimes in answer to our +prayers, and that they give us both great and seasonable gifts, which +shield us from the most terrible dangers. Who is there so poor, so +uncared for, born to sorrow by so unkind a fate, as never to have felt +the vast generosity of the Gods? Look even at those who complain and are +discontented with their lot; you will find that they are not altogether +without a share in the bounty of heaven, that there is no one upon whom +something has not been shed from that most gracious fount. Is the gift +which is bestowed upon all alike, at their birth, not enough? However +unequally the blessings of after life may be dealt out to us, did nature +give us too little when she gave us herself? + +V. It is said, "God does not bestow benefits." Whence, then, comes all +that you possess, that you give or refuse to give, that you hoard or +steal? whence come these innumerable delights of our eyes, our ears, and +our minds? whence the plenty which provides us even with luxury--for it +is not our bare necessities alone against which provision is made; +we are loved so much as actually to be pampered--whence so many trees +bearing various fruits, so many wholesome herbs, so many different sorts +of food distributed throughout the year, so that even the slothful may +find sustenance in the chance produce of the earth? Then, too, whence +come the living creatures of all kinds, some inhabiting the dry land, +others the waters, others alighting from the sky, that every part of +nature may pay us some tribute; the rivers which encircle our meadows +with most beauteous bends, the others which afford a passage to merchant +fleets as they flow on, wide and navigable, some of which in summer +time are subject to extraordinary overflowings in order that lands lying +parched under a glowing sun may suddenly be watered by the rush of a +midsummer torrent? + +What of the fountains of medicinal waters? What of the bursting forth of +warm waters upon the seashore itself? Shall I + + "Tell of the seas round Italy that flow, + Which laves her shore above, and which below; + Or of her lakes, unrivalled Larius, thee, + Or thee, Benacus, roaring like a sea?" + +VI. If any one gave you a few acres, you would say that you had received +a benefit; can you deny that the boundless extent of the earth is a +benefit? If any one gave you money, and filled your chest, since you +think that so important, you would call that a benefit. God has buried +countless mines in the earth, has poured out from the earth countless +rivers, rolling sands of gold; He has concealed in every place huge +masses of silver, copper and iron, and has bestowed upon you the means +of discovering them, placing upon the surface of the earth signs of the +treasures hidden below; and yet do you say that you have received +no benefit? If a house were given you, bright with marble, its roof +beautifully painted with colours and gilding, you would call it no small +benefit. God has built for you a huge mansion that fears no fire or +ruin, in which you see no flimsy veneers, thinner than the very saw with +which they are cut, but vast blocks of most precious stone, all composed +of those various and different substances whose paltriest fragments you +admire so much; he has built a roof which glitters in one fashion by +day, and in another by night; and yet do you say that you have received +no benefit? When you so greatly prize what you possess, do you act the +part of an ungrateful man, and think that there is no one to whom you +are indebted for them? Whence comes the breath which you draw? the light +by which you arrange and perform all the actions of your life? the blood +by whose circulation your vital warmth is maintained? those meats +which excite your palate by their delicate flavour after your hunger is +appeased? those provocatives which rouse you when wearied with pleasure? +that repose in which you are rotting and mouldering? Will you not, if +you are grateful, say-- + + "'Tis to a god that this repose I owe, + For him I worship, as a god below. + Oft on his altar shall my firstlings bleed, + See, by his bounty here with rustic reed + I play the airs I love the livelong day, + The while my oxen round about me stray." + +The true God is he who has placed, not a few oxen, but all the herds on +their pastures throughout the world; who furnishes food to the flocks +wherever they wander; who has ordained the alternation of summer and +winter pasturage, and has taught us not merely to play upon a reed, and +to reduce to some order a rustic and artless song, but who has invented +so many arts and varieties of voice, so many notes to make music, +some with our own breath, some with instruments. You cannot call our +inventions our own any more than you call our growth our own, or the +various bodily functions which correspond to each stage of our lives; at +one time comes the loss of childhood's teeth, at another, when our age +is advancing and growing into robuster manhood, puberty and the last +wisdom-tooth marks the end of our youth. "We have implanted in us the +seeds of all ages, of all arts, and God our master brings forth our +intellects from obscurity." + +VII. "Nature," says my opponent, "gives me all this." Do you not +perceive when you say this that you merely speak of God under another +name? for what is nature but God and divine reason, which pervades the +universe and all its parts? You may address the author of our world +by as many different titles as you please; you may rightly call him +Jupiter, Best and Greatest, and the Thunderer, or the Stayer, so called, +not because, as the historians tell us, he stayed the flight of the +Roman army in answer to the prayer of Romulus, but because all things +continue in their stay through his goodness. If you were to call this +same personage Fate, you would not lie; for since fate is nothing more +than a connected chain of causes, he is the first cause of all upon +which all the rest depend. You will also be right in applying to him any +names that you please which express supernatural strength and power: he +may have as many titles as he has attributes. + +VIII. Our school regards him as Father Liber, and Hercules, and +Mercurius: he is Father Liber because he is the parent of all, who first +discovered the power of seed, and our being led by pleasure to plant it; +he is Hercules, because his might is unconquered, and when it is wearied +after completing its labours, will retire into fire; he is Mercurius, +because in him is reasoning, and numbers, and system, and knowledge. +Whither-soever you turn yourself you will see him meeting you: +nothing is void of him, he himself fills his own work. Therefore, most +ungrateful of mortals, it is in vain that you declare yourself indebted, +not to God, but to nature, because there can be no God without nature, +nor any nature without God; they are both the same thing, differing only +in their functions. If you were to say that you owe to Annaeus or +to Lucius what you received from Seneca, you would not change your +creditor, but only his name, because he remains the same man whether you +use his first, second, or third name. So whether you speak of nature, +fate, or fortune, these are all names of the same God, using his power +in different ways. So likewise justice, honesty, discretion, courage, +frugality, are all the good qualities of one and the same mind; if you +are pleased with any one of these, you are pleased with that mind. + +IX. However, not to drift aside into a distinct controversy, God bestows +upon us very many and very great benefits without hope of receiving any +return; since he does not require any offering from us, and we are +not capable of bestowing anything upon him: wherefore, a benefit is +desirable in itself. In it the advantage of the receiver is all that +is taken into consideration: we study this without regarding our own +interests. "Yet," argues our opponent, "you say that we ought to choose +with care the persons upon whom we bestow benefits, because neither do +husbandmen sow seed in the sand: now if this be true, we follow our own +interest in bestowing benefits, just as much as in ploughing and sowing: +for sowing is not desirable in itself. Besides this you inquire where +and how you ought to bestow a benefit, which would not need to be +done if the bestowal of a benefit was desirable in itself: because in +whatever place and whatever manner it might be bestowed, it still would +be a benefit." We seek to do honourable acts, solely because they are +honourable; yet even though we need think of nothing else, we consider +to whom we shall do them, and when, and how; for in these points the act +has its being. In like manner, when I choose upon whom I shall bestow +a benefit, and when I aim at making it a benefit; because if it were +bestowed upon a base person, it could neither be a benefit nor an +honourable action. + +X. To restore what has been entrusted to one is desirable in itself; yet +I shall not always restore it, nor shall I do so in any place or at any +time you please. Sometimes it makes no difference whether I deny that I +have received it, or return it openly. I shall consider the interests +of the person to whom I am to return it, and shall deny that I have +received a deposit, which would injure him if returned. I shall act in +the same manner in bestowing a benefit: I shall consider when to give +it, to whom, in what manner, and on what grounds. Nothing ought to be +done without a reason: a benefit is not truly so, if it be bestowed +without a reason, since reason accompanies all honorable action. How +often do we hear men reproaching themselves for some thoughtless gift, +and saying, "I had rather have thrown it away than have given it to +him!" What is thoughtlessly given away is lost in the most discreditable +manner, and it is much worse to have bestowed a benefit badly than to +have received no return for it; that we receive no return is the fault +of another; that we did not choose upon whom we should bestow it, is our +own. In choosing a fit person, I shall not, as you expect, pay the +least attention to whether I am likely to get any return from him, for +I choose one who will be grateful, not one who will return my goodness, +and it often happens that the man who makes no return is grateful, while +he who returns a benefit is ungrateful for it. I value men by their +hearts alone, and, therefore, I shall pass over a rich man if he be +unworthy, and give to a good man though he be poor; for he will be +grateful however destitute he may be, since whatever he may lose, his +heart will still be left him. + +XI. I do not fish for gain, for pleasure, or for credit, by bestowing +benefits: satisfied in doing so with pleasing one man alone, I shall +give in order to do my duty. Duty, however, leaves one some choice; do +you ask me, how I am to choose? I shall choose an honest, plain, man, +with a good memory, and grateful for kindness; one who keeps his hands +off other men's goods, yet does not greedily hold to his own, and who is +kind to others; when I have chosen such a man, I shall have acted to my +mind, although fortune may have bestowed upon him no means of returning +my kindness. If my own advantage and mean calculation made me liberal, +if I did no one any service except in order that he might in turn do a +service to me, I should never bestow a benefit upon one who was setting +out for distant and foreign countries, never to return; I should not +bestow a benefit upon one who was so ill as to be past hope of recovery, +nor should I do so when I myself was failing, because I should not live +long enough to receive any return. Yet, that you may know that to do +good is desirable in itself, we afford help to strangers who put into +our harbour only to leave it straightway; we give a ship and fit it out +for a shipwrecked stranger to sail back in to his own country. He leaves +us hardly knowing who it was who saved him, and, as he will never return +to our presence, he hands over his debt of gratitude to the gods, and +beseeches them to fulfil it for him: in the meanwhile we rejoice in the +barren knowledge that we have done a good action. What? when we stand +upon the extreme verge of life, and make our wills, do we not assign to +others benefits from which we ourselves shall receive no advantage? How +much time we waste, how long we consider in secret how much property we +are to leave, and to whom! What then? does it make any difference to us +to whom we leave our property, seeing that we cannot expect any return +from any one? Yet we never give anything with more care, we never take +such pains in deciding upon our verdict, as when, without any views of +personal advantage, we think only of what is honourable, for we are bad +judges of our duty as long as our view of it is distorted by hope and +fear, and that most indolent of vices, pleasure: but when death has shut +off all these, and brought us as incorrupt judges to pronounce sentence, +we seek for the most worthy men to leave our property to, and we never +take more scrupulous care than in deciding what is to be done with what +does not concern us. Yet, by Hercules, then there steals over us a +great satisfaction as we think, "I shall make this man richer, and by +bestowing wealth upon that man I shall add lustre to his high position." +Indeed, if we never give without expecting some return, we must all die +without making our wills. + +XII. It may be said, "You define a benefit as a loan which cannot be +repaid: now a loan is not a desirable thing in itself." When we speak of +a loan, we make use of a figure, or comparison, just as we speak of law +as; the standard of right and wrong, although a standard is not a thing +to be desired for its own sake. I have adopted this phrase in order to +illustrate my subject: when I speak of a loan, I must be understood to +mean something resembling a loan. Do you wish to know how it differs +from one? I add the words "which cannot be repaid," whereas every loan +both can and ought to be repaid. It is so far from being right to bestow +a benefit for one's own advantage, that often, as I have explained, it +is one's duty to bestow it when it involves one's own loss and risk: for +instance, if I assist a man when beset by robbers, so that he gets away +from them safely, or help some victim of power, and bring upon myself +the party spite of a body of influential men, very, probably incurring +myself the same disgrace from which I saved him, although I might have +taken the other side, and looked on with safety at struggles with +which I have nothing to do: if I were to give bail for one who has been +condemned, and when my friend's goods were advertised for sale I were +to give a bond to the effect that I would make restitution to the +creditors, if, in order to save a proscribed person I myself run the +risk of being proscribed. No one, when about to buy a villa at Tusculum +or Tibur, for a summer retreat, because of the health of the locality, +considers how many years' purchase he gives for it; this must be looked +to by the man who makes a profit by it. The same is true with benefits; +when you ask what return I get for them, I answer, the consciousness +of a good action. "What return does one get for benefits?" Pray tell +me what return one gets for righteousness, innocence, magnanimity, +chastity, temperance? If you wish for anything beyond these virtues, you +do not wish for the virtues themselves. For what does the order of the +universe bring round the seasons? for what does the sun make the day +now longer and now shorter? all these things are benefits, for they take +place for our good. As it is the duty of the universe to maintain the +round of the seasons, as it is the duty of the sun to vary the points of +his rising and setting, and to do all these things by which we profit, +without any reward, so is it the duty of man, amongst other things, to +bestow benefits. Wherefore then does he give? He gives for fear that +he should not give, lest he might lose an opportunity of doing a good +action. + +XIII. You Epicureans take pleasure in making a study of dull torpidity, +in seeking for a repose which differs little from sound sleep, in +lurking beneath the thickest shade, in amusing with the feeblest +possible trains of thought that sluggish condition of your languid minds +which you term tranquil contemplation, and in stuffing with food and +drink, in the recesses of your gardens, your bodies which are pallid +with want of exercise; we Stoics, on the other hand, take pleasure in +bestowing benefits, even though they cost us labour, provided that they +lighten the labours of others; though they lead us into danger, provided +that they save others, though they straiten our means, if they alleviate +the poverty and distresses of others. What difference does it make to me +whether I receive benefits or not? even if I receive them, it is still +my duty to bestow them. A benefit has in view the advantage of him +upon whom we bestow it, not our own; otherwise we merely bestow it upon +ourselves. Many things, therefore, which are of the greatest possible +use to others lose all claim to gratitude by being paid for. Merchants +are of use to cities, physicians to invalids, dealers to slaves; yet all +these have no claim to the gratitude of those whom they benefit, because +they seek their own advantage through that of others. That which is +bestowed with a view to profit is not a benefit. "I will give this in +order that I may get a return for it" is the language of a broker. + +XIV. I should not call a woman modest, if she rebuffed her lover in +order to increase his passion, or because she feared the law or her +husband; as Ovid says: + + "She that denies, because she does not dare + To yield, in spirit grants her lover's prayer." + +Indeed, the woman who owes her chastity, not to her own virtue, but to +fear, may rightly be classed as a sinner. In the same manner, he who +merely gave in order that he might receive, cannot be said to have +given. Pray, do we bestow benefits upon animals when we feed them for +our use or for our table? do we bestow benefits upon trees when we tend +them that they may not suffer from drought or from hardness of ground? +No one is moved by righteousness and goodness of heart to cultivate an +estate, or to do any act in which the reward is something apart from the +act itself; but he is moved to bestow benefits, not by low and grasping +motives, but by a kind and generous mind, which even after it has given +is willing to give again, to renew its former bounties by fresh ones, +which thinks only of how much good it can do the man to whom it gives; +whereas to do any one a service because it is our interest to do so is a +mean action, which deserves no praise, no credit. What grandeur is there +in loving oneself, sparing oneself, gaining profit for oneself? The true +love of giving calls us away from all this, forcibly leads us to put up +with loss, and foregoes its own interest, deriving its greatest pleasure +from the mere act of doing good. + +XV. Can we doubt that the converse of a benefit is an injury? As the +infliction of injuries is a thing to be avoided, so is the bestowal of +benefits to be desired for its own sake. In the former, the disgrace of +crime outweighs all the advantages which incite us to commit it; while +we are urged to the latter course by the appearance of honour, in itself +a powerful incentive to action, which attends it. + +I should not lie if I were to affirm that every one takes pleasure in +the benefits which he has bestowed, that everyone loves best to see the +man whom he has most largely benefited. Who does not thinks that to have +bestowed one benefit is a reason for bestowing a second? and would this +be so, if the act of giving did not itself give us pleasure? How often +you may hear a man say, "I cannot bear to desert one whose life I have +preserved, whom I have saved from danger. True, he asks me to plead his +cause against men of great influence. I do not wish to do so, yet what +am I to do? I have already helped him once, nay twice." Do you not +perceive how very powerful this instinct must be, if it leads us to +bestow benefits first because it is right to do so, and afterwards +because we have already bestowed somewhat? Though at the outset a man +may have had no claim upon us, we yet continue to give to him because we +have already given to him. So untrue is it that we are urged to bestow +benefits by our own interest, that even when our benefits prove failures +we continue to nurse them and encourage them out of sheer love of +benefiting, which has a natural weakness even for what has been +ill-bestowed, like that which we feel for our vicious children. + +XVI. These same adversaries of ours admit that they are grateful, yet +not because it is honourable, but because it is profitable to be so. +This can be proved to be untrue all the more easily, because it can be +established by the same arguments by which we have established that to +bestow a benefit is desirable for its own sake. All our arguments start +from this settled point, that honour is pursued for no reason except +because it is honour. Now, who will venture to raise the question +whether it be honourable to be grateful? who does not loathe the +ungrateful man, useless as he is even to himself? How do you feel when +any one is spoken of as being ungrateful for great benefits conferred +upon him by a friend? Is it as though he had done something base, or had +merely neglected to do something useful and likely to be profitable to +himself? I imagine that you think him a bad man, and one who deserves +punishment, not one who needs a guardian; and this would not be the +case, unless gratitude were desirable in itself and honourable. Other +qualities, it may be, manifest their importance less clearly, and +require an explanation to prove whether they be honourable or no; this +is openly proved to be so in the sight of all, and is too beautiful for +anything to obscure or dim its glory. What is more praiseworthy, upon +what are all men more universally agreed, than to return gratitude for +good offices? + +XVII. Pray tell me, what is it that urges us to do so? Is it profit? +Why, unless a man despises profit, he is not grateful. Is it ambition? +why, what is there to boast of in having paid what you owe? Is it +fear? The ungrateful man feels none, for against this one crime we +have provided no law, as though nature had taken sufficient precautions +against it. Just as there is no law which bids parents love and indulge +their children, seeing that it is superfluous to force us into the +path which we naturally take, just as no one needs to be urged to love +himself, since self-love begins to act upon him as soon as he is born, +so there is no law bidding us to seek that which is honourable +in itself; for such things please us by their very nature, and so +attractive is virtue that the disposition even of bad men leads them to +approve of good rather than of evil. Who is there who does not wish +to appear beneficent, who does not even when steeped in crime and +wrong-doing strive after the appearance of goodness, does not put some +show of justice upon even his most intemperate acts, and endeavour to +seem to have conferred a benefit even upon those whom he has injured? +Consequently, men allow themselves to be thanked by those whom they have +ruined, and pretend to be good and generous, because they cannot prove +themselves so; and this they never would do were it not that a love +of honour for its own sake forces them to seek a reputation quite at +variance with their real character, and to conceal their baseness, a +quality whose fruits we covet, though we regard it itself with dislike +and shame. No one has ever so far rebelled against the laws of nature +and put off human feeling as to act basely for mere amusement. Ask any +of those who live by robbery whether he would not rather obtain what +he steals and plunders by honest means; the man whose trade is highway +robbery and the murder of travellers would rather find his booty than +take it by force; you will find no one who would not prefer to enjoy the +fruits of wickedness without acting wickedly. Nature bestows upon us all +this immense advantage, that the light of virtue shines into the minds +of all alike; even those who do not follow her, behold her. + +XVIII. A proof that gratitude is desirable for itself lies in the fact +that ingratitude is to be avoided for itself, because no vice more +powerfully rends asunder and destroys the union of the human race. +To what do we trust for safety, if not in mutual good offices one to +another? It is by the interchange of benefits alone that we gain some +measure of protection for our lives, and of safety against sudden +disasters. Taken singly, what should we be? a prey and quarry for wild +beasts, a luscious and easy banquet; for while all other animals have +sufficient strength to protect themselves, and those which are born to a +wandering solitary life are armed, man is covered by a soft skin, has no +powerful teeth or claws with which to terrify other creatures, but weak +and naked by himself is made strong by union. + +God has bestowed upon him two gifts, reason and union, which raise him +from weakness to the highest power; and so he, who if taken alone would +be inferior to every other creature, possesses supreme dominion. Union +has given him sovereignty over all animals; union has enabled a being +born upon the earth to assume power over a foreign element, and bids him +be lord of the sea also; it is union which has checked the inroads of +disease, provided supports for our old age, and given us relief from +pain; it is union which makes us strong, and to which we look for +protection against the caprices of fortune. Take away union, and you +will rend asunder the association by which the human race preserves +its existence; yet you will take it away if you succeed in proving that +ingratitude is not to be avoided for itself, but because something is +to be feared for it; for how many are there who can with safety be +ungrateful? In fine, I call every man ungrateful who is merely made +grateful by fear. + +XIX. No sane man fears the gods; for it is madness to fear what is +beneficial, and no man loves those whom he fears. You, Epicurus, ended +by making God unarmed; you stripped him of all weapons, of all power, +and, lest anyone should fear him, you banished him out of the world. +There is no reason why you should fear this being, cut off as he is, and +separated from the sight and touch of mortals by a vast and impassable +wall; he has no power either of rewarding or of injuring us; he dwells +alone half-way between our heaven and that of another world, without the +society either of animals, of men, or of matter, avoiding the crash of +worlds as they fall in ruins above and around him, but neither hearing +our prayers nor interested in us. Yet you wish to seem to worship this +being just as a father, with a mind, I suppose, full of gratitude; or, +if you do not wish to seem grateful, why should you worship him, since +you have received no benefit from him, but have been put together +entirely at random and by chance by those atoms and mites of yours? +"I worship him," you answer, "because of his glorious majesty and his +unique nature." Granting that you do this, you clearly do it without +the attraction of any reward, or any hope; there is therefore something +which is desirable for itself, whose own worth attracts you, that +is, honour. Now what is more honourable than gratitude? the means of +practising this virtue are as extensive as life itself. + +XX. "Yet," argues he, "there is also a certain amount of profit inherent +in this virtue." In what virtue is there not? But that which we speak +of as desirable for itself is such, that although it may possess some +attendant advantages, yet it would be desirable even if stripped of +all these. It is profitable to be grateful; yet I will be grateful even +though it harm me. What is the aim of the grateful man? is it that his +gratitude may win for him more friends and more benefits? What then? If +a man is likely to meet with affronts by showing his gratitude, if he +knows that far from gaining anything by it, he must lose much even of +what he has already acquired, will he not cheerfully act to his own +disadvantage? That man is ungrateful who, in returning a kindness, +looks forward to a second gift--who hopes while he repays. I call him +ungrateful who sits at the bedside of a sick man because he is about +to make a will, when he is at leisure to think of inheritances and +legacies. Though he may do everything which a good and dutiful friend +ought to do, yet, if any hope of gain be floating in his mind, he is a +mere legacy-hunter, and is angling for an inheritance. Like the birds +which feed upon carcases, which come close to animals weakened by +disease, and watch till they fall, so these men are attracted by death +and hover around a corpse. + +XXI. A grateful mind is attracted only by a sense of the beauty of its +purpose. Do you wish to know this to be so, and that it is not bribed by +ideas of profit? There are two classes of grateful men: a man is called +grateful who has made some return for what he received; this man may +very possibly display himself in this character, he has something +to boast of, to refer to. We also call a man grateful who receives a +benefit with goodwill, and owes it to his benefactor with goodwill; yet +this man's gratitude lies concealed within his own mind. What profit can +accrue to him from this latent feeling? yet this man, even though he +is not able to do anything more than this, is grateful; he loves his +benefactor, he feels his debt to him, he longs to repay his kindness; +whatever else you may find wanting, there is nothing wanting in the man. +He is like a workman who has not the tools necessary for the practice of +his craft, or like a trained singer whose voice cannot be heard through +the noise of those who interrupt him. I wish to repay a kindness: after +this there still remains something for me to do, not in order that I may +become grateful, but that I may discharge my debt; for, in many cases, +he who returns a kindness is ungrateful for it, and he who does not +return it is grateful. Like all other virtues, the whole value of +gratitude lies in the spirit in which it is done; so, if this man's +purpose be loyal, any shortcomings on his part are due not to himself, +but to fortune. A man who is silent may, nevertheless, be eloquent; his +hands may be folded or even bound, and he may yet be strong; just as +a pilot is a pilot even when upon dry land, because his knowledge +is complete, and there is nothing wanting to it, though there may be +obstacles which prevent his making use of it. In the same way, a man is +grateful who only wishes to be so, and who has no one but himself who +can bear witness to his frame of mind. I will go even further than +this: a man sometimes is grateful when he appears to be ungrateful, when +ill-judging report has declared him to be so. Such a man can look +to nothing but his own conscience, which can please him even when +overwhelmed by calumny, which contradicts the mob and common rumour, +relies only upon itself, and though it beholds a vast crowd of the other +way of thinking opposed to it, does not count heads, but wins by its own +vote alone. Should it see its own good faith meet with the punishment +due to treachery, it will not descend from its pedestal, and will remain +superior to its punishment. "I have," it says, "what I wished, what I +strove for. I do not regret it, nor shall I do so; nor shall fortune, +however unjust she may be, ever hear me say, 'What did I want? What now +is the use of having meant well?'" A good conscience is of value on +the rack, or in the fire; though fire be applied to each of our limbs, +gradually encircle our living bodies, and burst our heart, yet if our +heart be filled with a good conscience, it will rejoice in the fire +which will make its good faith shine before the world. + +XXII. Now let that question also which has been already stated be again +brought forward; Why is it that we should wish to be grateful when we +are dying, that we should carefully weigh the various services rendered +us by different individuals, and carefully review our whole life, that +we may not seem to have forgotten any kindness? Nothing then remains for +us to hope for; yet when on the very threshold, we wish to depart +from human life as full of gratitude as possible. There is in truth an +immense reward for this thing merely in doing it, and what is honourable +has great power to attract men's minds, which are overwhelmed by its +beauty and carried off their balance, enchanted by its brilliancy and +splendour. "Yet," argues our adversary, "from it many advantages take +their rise, and good men obtain a safer life and love, and the good +opinion of the better class, while their days are spent in greater +security when accompanied by innocence and gratitude." + +Indeed, nature would have been most unjust had she rendered this great +blessing miserable, uncertain, and fruitless. But consider this point, +whether you would make your way to that virtue, to which it is generally +safe and easy to attain, even though the path lay over rocks and +precipices, and were beset with fierce beasts and venomous serpents. A +virtue is none the less to be desired for its own sake, because it has +some adventitious profit connected with it: indeed, in most cases the +noblest virtues are accompanied by many extraneous advantages, but it is +the virtues that lead the way, and these merely follow in their train. + +XXIII. Can we doubt that the climate of this abode of the human race is +regulated by the motion of the sun and moon in their orbits? that +our bodies are sustained, the hard earth loosened, excessive moisture +reduced, and the surly bonds of winter broken by the heat of the one, +and that crops are brought to ripeness by the effectual all-pervading +warmth of the other? that the fertility of the human race corresponds +to the courses of the moon? that the sun by its revolution marks out +the year, and that the moon, moving in a smaller orbit, marks out the +months? Yet, setting aside all this, would not the sun be a sight worthy +to be contemplated and worshipped, if he did no more than rise and set? +would not the moon be worth looking at, even if it passed uselessly +through the heavens? Whose attention is not arrested by the universe +itself, when by night it pours forth its fires and glitters with +innumerable stars? Who, while he admires them, thinks of their being of +use to him? Look at that great company gliding over our heads, how they +conceal their swift motion under the semblance of a fixed and immovable +work. How much takes place in that night which you make use of merely +to mark and count your days! What a mass of events is being prepared in +that silence! What a chain of destiny their unerring path is forming! +Those which you imagine to be merely strewn about for ornament are +really one and all at work. Nor is there any ground for your belief that +only seven stars revolve, and that the rest remain still: we understand +the orbits of a few, but countless divinities, further removed from +our sight, come and go; while the greater part of those whom our sight +reaches move in a mysterious manner and by an unknown path. + +XXIV. What then? would you not be captivated by the sight of such a +stupendous work, even though it did not cover you, protect you, cherish +you, bring you into existence and penetrate you with its spirit? Though +these heavenly bodies are of the very first importance to us, and are, +indeed, essential to our life, yet we can think of nothing but +their glorious majesty, and similarly all virtue, especially that of +gratitude, though it confers great advantages upon us, does not wish to +be loved for that reason; it has something more in it than this, and he +who merely reckons it among useful things does not perfectly comprehend +it. A man, you say, is grateful because it is to his advantage to be +so. If this be the case, then his advantage will be the measure of his +gratitude. Virtue will not admit a covetous lover; men must approach her +with open purse. The ungrateful man thinks, "I did wish to be grateful, +but I fear the expense and danger and insults to which I should expose +myself: I will rather consult my own interest." Men cannot be rendered +grateful and ungrateful by the same line of reasoning: their actions +are as distinct as their purposes. The one is ungrateful, although it is +wrong, because it is his interest; the other is grateful, although it is +not his interest, because it is right. + +XXV. It is our aim to live in harmony with the scheme of the universe, +and to follow the example of the gods. Yet in all their acts the gods +have no object in view other than the act itself, unless you suppose +that they obtain a reward for their work in the smoke of burnt +sacrifices and the scent of incense. See what great things they do every +day, how much they divide amongst us, with how great crops they fill the +earth, how they move the seas with convenient winds to carry us to all +shores, how by the fall of sudden showers they soften the ground, renew +the dried-up springs of fountains, and call them into new life by +unseen supplies of water. All this they do without reward, without any +advantage accruing to themselves. Let our line of conduct, if it would +not depart from its model, preserve this direction, and let us not act +honourably because we are hired to do so. We ought to feel ashamed that +any benefit should have a price: we pay nothing for the gods. + +XXVI. "If," our adversary may say, "you wish to imitate the gods, then +bestow benefits upon the ungrateful as well as the grateful; for the +sun rises upon the wicked as well as the good, the seas are open even +to pirates." By this question he really asks whether a good man +would bestow a benefit upon an ungrateful person, knowing him to be +ungrateful. Allow me here to introduce a short explanation, that we may +not be taken in by a deceitful question. Understand that according to +the system of the Stoics there are two classes of ungrateful persons. +One man is ungrateful because he is a fool; a fool is a bad man; a man +who is bad possesses every vice: therefore he is ungrateful. In the same +way we speak of all bad men as dissolute, avaricious, luxurious, and +spiteful, not because each man has all these vices in any great or +remarkable degree, but because he might have them; they are in him, even +though they be not seen. The second form of ungrateful person is he who +is commonly meant by the term, one who is inclined by nature to this +vice. In the case of him who has the vice of ingratitude just as he has +every other, a wise man will bestow a benefit, because if he sets aside +all such men there will be no one left for him to bestow it on. As for +the ungrateful man who habitually misapplies benefits and acts so by +choice, he will no more bestow a benefit upon him than he would lend +money to a spendthrift, or place a deposit in the hands of one who had +already often refused to many persons to give up the property with which +they had entrusted him. + +XXVII. We call some men timid because they are fools: in this they +are like the bad men who are steeped in all vices without distinction. +Strictly speaking, we call those persons timid who are alarmed even +at unmeaning noises. A fool possesses all vices, but he is not equally +inclined by nature to all; one is prone to avarice, another to luxury, +and another to insolence. Those persons, therefore, are mistaken, who +ask the Stoics, "What do you say, then? is Achilles timid? Aristides, +who received a name for justice, is he unjust? Fabius, who 'by delays +retrieved the day,' is he rash? Does Decius fear death? Is Mucius +a traitor? Camillus a betrayer?" We do not mean that all vices are +inherent in all men in the same way in which some especial ones are +noticeable in certain men, but we declare that the bad man and the fool +possess all vices; we do not even acquit them of fear when they are +rash, or of avarice when they are extravagant. Just as a man has all his +senses, yet all men have not on that account as keen a sight as Lynceus, +so a man that is a fool has not all vices in so active and vigorous a +form as some persons have spine of them, yet he has them all. All vices +exist in all of them, yet all are not prominent in each individual. One +man is naturally prone to avarice, another is the slave of wine, a third +of lust; or, if not yet enslaved by these passions, he is so fashioned +by nature that this is the direction in which his character would +probably lead him. Therefore, to return to my original proposition, +every bad man is ungrateful, because he has the seeds of every villainy +in him; but he alone is rightly so called who is naturally inclined to +this vice. Upon such a person as this, therefore, I shall not bestow a +benefit. One who betrothed his daughter to an ill-tempered man from whom +many women had sought a divorce, would be held to have neglected her +interests; a man would be thought a bad father if he entrusted the care +of his patrimony to one who had lost his own family estate, and it would +be the act of a madman to make a will naming as the guardian of one's +son a man who had already defrauded other wards. So will that man be +said to bestow benefits as badly as possible, who chooses ungrateful +persons, in whose hands they will perish. + +XXVIII. "The gods," it may be said, "bestow much, even upon the +ungrateful." But what they bestow they had prepared for the good, and +the bad have their share as well, because they cannot be separated. It +is better to benefit the bad as well, for the sake of benefiting the +good, than to stint the good for fear of benefiting the bad. Therefore +the gods have created all that you speak of, the day, the sun, the +alternations of winter and summer, the transitions through spring and +autumn from one extreme to the other, showers, drinking fountains, and +regularly blowing winds for the use of all alike; they could not except +individuals from the enjoyment of them. A king bestows honours upon +those who deserve them, but he gives largesse to the undeserving as +well. The thief, the bearer of false witness, and the adulterer, alike +receive the public grant of corn, and all are placed on the register +without any examination as to character; good and bad men share alike in +all the other privileges which a man receives, because he is a citizen, +not because he is a good man. God likewise has bestowed certain gifts +upon the entire human race, from which no one is shut out. Indeed, it +could not be arranged that the wind which was fair for good men should +be foul for bad ones, while it is for the good of all men that the seas +should be open for traffic and the kingdom of mankind be enlarged; nor +could any law be appointed for the showers, so that they should not fall +upon the fields of wicked and evil men. Some things are given to all +alike: cities are founded for good and bad men alike; works of genius +reach, by publication, even unworthy men; medicine points out the +means of health even to the wicked; no one has checked the making up of +wholesome remedies for fear that the undeserving should be healed. You +must seek for examination and preference of individuals in such things +as are bestowed separately upon those who are thought to deserve them; +not in these, which admit the mob to share them without distinction. +There is a great difference between not shutting a man out and choosing +him. Even a thief receives justice; even murderers enjoy the blessings +of peace; even those who have plundered others can recover their own +property; assassins and private bravoes are defended against the common +enemy by the city wall; the laws protect even those who have sinned most +deeply against them. There are some things which no man could obtain +unless they were given to all; you need not, therefore, cavil about +those matters in which all mankind is invited to share. As for things +which men receive or not at my discretion, I shall not bestow them upon +one whom I know to be ungrateful. + +XXIX. "Shall we, then," argues he, "not give our advice to an ungrateful +man when he is at a loss, or refuse him a drink of water when he is +thirsty, or not show him the path when he has lost his way? or would you +do him these services and yet not give him anything?" Here I will draw +a distinction, or at any rate endeavour to do so. A benefit is a useful +service, yet all useful service is not a benefit; for some are so +trifling as not to claim the title of benefits. To produce a benefit two +conditions must concur. First, the importance of the thing given; for +some things fall short of the dignity of a benefit. Who ever called a +hunch of bread a benefit, or a farthing dole tossed to a beggar, or the +means of lighting a fire? yet sometimes these are of more value than the +most costly benefits; still their cheapness detracts from their value +even when, by the exigency of time, they are rendered essential. The +next condition, which is the most important of all, must necessarily be +present, namely, that I should confer the benefit for the sake of him +whom I wish to receive it, that I should judge him worthy of it, bestow +it of my own free will, and receive pleasure from my own gift, none +of which conditions are present in the cases of which we have just now +spoken; for we do not bestow such things as those upon these who are +worthy of them, but we give them carelessly, as trifles, and do not give +them so much to a man as to humanity. + +XXX. I shall not deny that sometimes I would give even to the unworthy, +out of respect for others; as, for instance, in competition for public +offices, some of the basest of men are preferred on account of their +noble birth, to industrious men of no family, and that for good reasons; +for the memory of great virtues is sacred, and more men will take +pleasure in being good, if the respect felt for good men does not cease +with their lives. What made Cicero's son a consul, except his father? +What lately brought Cinna [Footnote: See Seneca on "Clemency," book i., +ch. ix.] out of the camp of the enemy and raised him to the consulate? +What made Sextus Pompeius and the other Pompeii consuls, unless it was +the greatness of one man, who once was raised so high that, by his very +fall, he sufficiently exalted all his relatives. What lately made Fabius +Persicus a member of more than one college of priests, though even +profligates avoided his kiss? Was it not Verrucosus, and Allobrogicus, +and the three hundred who to serve their country blocked the invader's +path with the force of a single family? It is our duty to respect the +virtuous, not only when present with us, but also when removed from our +sight: as they have made it their study not to bestow their benefits +upon one age alone, but to leave them existing after they themselves +have passed away, so let us not confine our gratitude to a single +age. If a man has begotten great men, he deserves to receive benefits, +whatever he himself may be: he has given us worthy men. If a man +descends from glorious ancestors, whatever he himself may be, let him +find refuge under the shadow of his ancestry. As mean places are lighted +up by the rays of the sun, so let the degenerate shine in the light of +their forefathers. + +XXXI. In this place, my Liberalis, I wish to speak in defence of the +gods. We sometimes say, "What could Providence mean by placing an +Arrhidaeus upon the throne?" Do you suppose that the crown was given +to Arrhidaeus? nay, it was given to his father and his brother. Why +did Heaven bestow the empire of the world upon Caius Caesar, the most +bloodthirsty of mankind, who was wont to order blood to be shed in his +presence as freely as if he wished to drink of it? Why, do you suppose +that it was given to him? It was given to his father, Germanicus, to his +grandfather, his great grandfather, and to others before them, no less +illustrious men, though they lived as private citizens on a footing +of equality with others. Why, when you yourself were making Mamercus +Scaurus consul, were you ignorant of his vices? did he himself conceal +them? did he wish to appear decent? + +Did you admit a man who was so openly filthy to the fasces and the +tribunal? Yes, it was because you were thinking of the great old +Scaurus, the chief of the Senate, and were unwilling that his descendant +should be despised. + +XXXII. It is probable that the gods act in the same manner, that they +show greater indulgence to some for the sake of their parents and +their ancestry, and to others for the sake of their children and +grandchildren, and a long line of descendants beyond them; for they +know the whole course of their works, and have constant access to the +knowledge of all that shall hereafter pass through their hands. These +things come upon us from the unknown future, and the gods have foreseen +and are familiar with the events by which we are startled. "Let these +men," says Providence, "be kings, because their ancestors were good +kings, because they regarded righteousness and temperance as the highest +rule of life, because they did not devote the state to themselves, but +devoted themselves to the state. Let these others reign, because some +one of their ancestors before them was a good man, who bore a soul +superior to fortune, who preferred to be conquered rather than to +conquer in civil strife, because it was more to the advantage of +the state. [Footnote: Gertz, "Stud. Crit," p. 159, note.] It was not +possible to make a sufficient return to him for this during so long a +time; let this other, therefore, out of regard for him, be chief of the +people, not because he knows how, or is capable, but because the other +has earned it for him. This man is misshapen, loathsome to look upon, +and will disgrace the insignia of his office. Men will presently blame +me, calling me blind and reckless, not knowing upon whom I am conferring +what ought to be given to the greatest and noblest of men; but I know +that, in giving this dignity to one man, I am paying an old debt to +another. How should the men of to-day know that ancient hero, who so +resolutely avoided the glory which pressed upon him, who went into +danger with the same look which other men wear when they have escaped +from danger, who never regarded his own interest as apart from that +of the commonwealth?" "Where," you ask, "or who is he? whence does +he come?" "You know him not; it lies with me to balance the debit and +credit account in such cases as these; I know how much I owe to each +man; I repay some after a long interval, others beforehand, according +as my opportunities and the exigencies of my social system permit." +I shall, therefore, sometimes bestow somewhat upon an ungrateful man, +though not for his own sake. + +XXXIII. "What," argues he, "if you do not know whether your man be +ungrateful or grateful--will you wait until you know, or will you +not lose the opportunity of bestowing a benefit? To wait is a long +business--for, as Plato says, it is hard to form an opinion about the +human mind,--not to wait, is rash." To this objector we shall answer, +that we never should wait for absolute knowledge of the whole case, +since the discovery of truth is an arduous task, but should proceed +in the direction in which truth appeared to direct us. All our actions +proceed in this direction: it is thus that we sow seed, that we sail +upon the sea, that we serve in the army, marry, and bring up children. +The result of all these actions is uncertain, so we take that course +from which we believe that good results may be hoped for. Who can +guarantee a harvest to the sower, a harbour to the sailor, victory +to the soldier, a modest wife to the husband, dutiful children to the +father? We proceed in the way in which reason, not absolute truth, +directs us. Wait, do nothing that will not turn out well, form no +opinion until you have searched but the truth, and your life will pass +in absolute in action. Since it is only the appearance of truth, not +truth itself, which leads me hither or thither, I shall confer benefits +upon the man who apparently will be grateful. + +XXXIV. "Many circumstances," argues he, "may arise which may enable a +bad man to steal into the place of a good one, or may cause a good man +to be disliked as though he were a bad one; for appearances, to which +we trust, are deceptive." Who denies it? Yet I can find nothing else by +which to guide my opinion. I must follow these tracks in my search after +truth, for I have none more trustworthy than these; I will take pains +to weigh the value of these with all possible care, and will not hastily +give my assent to them. For instance, in a battle, it may happen that my +hand may be deceived by some mistake into turning my weapon against my +comrade, and sparing my enemy as though he were on my side; but this +will not often take place, and will not take place through any fault of +mine, for my object is to strike the enemy, and defend my countryman. +If I know a man to be ungrateful, I shall not bestow a benefit upon him. +But the man has passed himself off as a good man by some trick, and has +imposed upon me. Well, this is not at all the fault of the giver, who +gave under the impression that his friend was grateful. "Suppose," asks +he, "that you were to promise to bestow a benefit, and afterwards were +to learn that your man was ungrateful, would you bestow it or not? If +you do, you do wrong knowingly, for you give to one to whom you ought +not; if you refuse, you do wrong likewise, for you do not give to him to +whom you promised to give. This case upsets your consistency, and that +proud assurance of yours that the wise man never regrets his actions, +or amends what he has done, or alters his plans." The wise man never +changes his plans while the conditions under which he formed them remain +the same; therefore, he never feels regret, because at the time nothing +better than what he did could have been done, nor could any better +decision have been arrived at than that which was made; yet he begins +everything with the saving clause, "If nothing shall occur to the +contrary." This is the reason why we say that all goes well with him, +and that nothing happens contrary to his expectation, because he +bears in mind the possibility of something happening to prevent the +realization of his projects. It is an imprudent confidence to trust that +fortune will be on our side. The wise man considers both sides: he knows +how great is the power of errors, how uncertain human affairs are, how +many obstacles there are to the success of plans. Without committing +himself, he awaits the doubtful and capricious issue of events, and +weighs certainty of purpose against uncertainty of result. Here also, +however, he is protected by that saving clause, without which he decides +upon nothing, and begins nothing. + +XXXV. When I promise to bestow a benefit, I promise it, unless something +occurs which makes it my duty not to do so. What if, for example, my +country orders me to give to her what I had promised to my friend? or if +a law be passed forbidding any one to do what I had promised to do for +him? Suppose that I have promised you my daughter in marriage, that +then you turn out to be a foreigner, and that I have no right of +intermarriage with foreigners; in this case, the law, by which I +am forbidden to fulfil my promise, forms my defence. I shall be +treacherous, and hear myself blamed for inconsistency, only if I do not +fulfil, my promise when all conditions remain the same as when I made +it; otherwise, any change makes me free to reconsider the entire case, +and absolves me from my promise. I may have promised to plead a cause; +afterwards it appears that this cause is designed to form a precedent +for an attack upon my father. I may have promised to leave my country, +and travel abroad; then news comes that the road is beset with robbers. +I was going to an appointment at some particular place; but my son's +illness, or my wife's confinement, prevented me. All conditions must be +the same as they were when I made the promise, if you mean to hold me +bound in honour to fulfil it. Now what greater change can take place +than that I should discover you to be a bad and ungrateful man? I +shall refuse to an unworthy man that which I had intended to give him +supposing him to be worthy, and I shall also have reason to be angry +with him for the trick which he has put upon me. + +XXXVI. I shall nevertheless look into the matter, and consider what the +value of the thing promised may be. If it be trifling, I shall give it, +not because you are worthy of it, but because I promised it, and I shall +not give it as a present, but merely in order to make good my words +and give myself a twitch of the ear. I will punish my own rashness in +promising by the loss of what I gave. "See how grieved you are; mind you +take more care what you say in future." As the saying is, I will take +tongue money from you. If the matter be important, I will not, as +Maecenas said, let ten million sesterces reproach me. I will weigh the +two sides of the question one against the other: there is something in +abiding by what you have promised; on the other hand, there is a great +deal in not bestowing a benefit upon one who is unworthy of it. Now, how +great is this benefit? If it is a trifling one, let us wink and let it +pass; but if it will cause me much loss or much shame to give it, I had +rather excuse myself once for refusing it than have to do so ever after +for giving it. The whole point, I repeat, depends upon how much the +thing given is worth: let the terms of my promise be appraised. Not only +shall I refuse to give what I may have promised rashly, but I shall also +demand back again what I may have wrongly bestowed: a man must be mad +who keeps a promise made under a mistake. + +XXXVII. Philip, king of the Macedonians, had a hardy soldier whose +services he had found useful in many campaigns. From time to time he +made this man presents of part of the plunder as the reward of his +valour, and used to excite his greedy spirit by his frequent gifts. This +man was cast by shipwreck upon the estate of a certain Macedonian, +who as soon as he heard the news hastened to him, restored his breath, +removed him to his own farmhouse, gave up his own bed to him, nursed him +out of his weakened and half-dead condition, took care of him at his own +expense for thirty days, restored him to health and gave him a sum of +money for his journey, as the man kept constantly saying, "If only I +can see my chief, I will repay your kindness." He told Philip of his +shipwreck, said nothing about the help which he had received, and at +once demanded that a certain man's estate should be given to him. +The man was a friend of his: it was that very man by whom he had been +rescued and restored to health. Sometimes, especially in time of war, +kings bestow many gifts with their eyes shut. One just man cannot deal +with such a mass of armed selfishness. It is not possible for any one +to be at the same time a good man and a good general. How are so many +thousands of insatiable men to be satiated? What would they have, +if every man had his own? Thus Philip reasoned with himself while he +ordered the man to be put in possession of the property which he asked +for. However, the other, when driven out of his estate, did not, like a +peasant, endure his wrongs in silence, thankful that he himself was not +given away also, but sent a sharp and outspoken letter to Philip, who, +on reading it, was so much enraged that he straightway ordered Pausanias +to restore the property to its former owner, and to brand that +wickedest of soldiers, that most ungrateful of guests, that greediest +of shipwrecked men, with letters bearing witness to his ingratitude. He, +indeed, deserved to have the letters not merely branded but carved in +his flesh, for having reduced his host to the condition in which he +himself had been when he lay naked and shipwrecked upon the beach; +still, let us see within what limits one ought to keep in punishing him. +Of course what he had so villainously seized ought to be taken from him. +But who would be affected by the spectacle of his punishment? The crime +which he had committed would prevent his being pitied even by any humane +person. + +XXXVIII. Will Philip then give you a thing because he has promised to +give it, even though he ought not to do so, even though he will commit +a wrong by doing so, nay, a crime, even though by this one act he will +make it impossible for shipwrecked men to reach the shore? There is no +inconsistency in giving up an intention which we have discovered to +be wrong and have condemned as wrong; we ought candidly to admit, "I +thought that it was something different; I have been deceived." It is +mere pride and folly to persist, "what I once have said, be it what +it may, shall remain unaltered and settled." There is no disgrace in +altering one's plans according to circumstances. Now, if Philip had +left this man in possession of that seashore which he obtained by +his shipwreck, would he not have practically pronounced sentence of +banishment against all unfortunates for the future? "Rather," says +Philip, "do thou carry upon thy forehead of brass those letters, that +they may be impressed upon the eyes of all throughout my kingdom. Go, +let men see how sacred a thing is the table of hospitality; show them +your face, that upon it they may read the decree which prevents its +being a capital crime to give refuge to the unfortunate under one's +roof. The order will be more certainly respected by this means than if I +had inscribed it upon tablets of brass." + +XXXIX. "Why then," argues our adversary, "did your Stoic philosopher +Zeno, when he had promised a loan of five hundred denarii to some +person, whom he afterwards discovered to be of doubtful character, +persist in lending it, because of his promise, though his friends +dissuaded him from doing so?" In the first place a loan is on a +different footing to a benefit. Even when we have lent money to an +undesirable person we can recall it; I can demand payment upon a certain +day, and if he becomes bankrupt, I can obtain my share of his property; +but a benefit is lost utterly and instantly. Besides, the one is the act +of a bad man, the other that of a bad father of a family. In the next +place, if the sum had been a larger one, not even Zeno would have +persisted in lending it. It was five hundred denarii; the sort of sum of +which one says, "May he spend it in sickness," and it was worth paying +so much to avoid breaking his promise. I shall go out to supper, even +though the weather be cold, because I have promised to go; but I shall +not if snow be falling. I shall leave my bed to go to a betrothal feast, +although I may be suffering from indigestion; but I shall not do so if I +am feverish. I will become bail for you, because I promised; but not if +you wish me to become bail in some transaction of uncertain issue, if +you expose me to forfeiting my money to the state. There runs through +all these cases, I argue, an implied exception; if I am able, provided +it is right for me to do so, if these things be so and so. Make the +position the same when you ask me to fulfil my promise, as it was when +I gave it, and it will be mere fickleness to disappoint you; but if +something new has taken place in the meanwhile, why should you wonder at +my intentions being changed when the conditions under which I gave the +promise are changed? Put everything back as it was, and I shall be the +same as I was. We enter into recognizances to appear, yet if we fail to +do so an action will not in all cases lie against us, for we are excused +for making default if forced to do so by a power which we cannot resist. + +XL. You may take the same answer to the question as to whether we ought +in all cases to show gratitude for kindness, and whether a benefit ought +in all cases to be repaid. It is my duty to show a grateful mind, but +in some cases my own poverty, in others the prosperity of the friend +to whom I owe some return, will not permit me to give it. What, for +instance, am I, a poor man, to give to a king or a rich man in return +for his kindness, especially as some men regard it as a wrong to have +their benefits repaid, and are wont to pile one benefit upon another? In +dealing with such persons, what more can I do than wish to repay them? +Yet I ought not to refuse to receive a new benefit, because I have not +repaid the former one. I shall take it as freely as it is given, and +will offer myself to my friend as a wide field for the exercise of +his good nature: he who is unwilling to receive new benefits must be +dissatisfied with what he has already received. Do you say, "I shall +not be able to return them?" What is that to the purpose? I am willing +enough to do so if opportunity or means were given me. He gave it to me, +of course, having both opportunity and means: is he a good man or a bad +one? if he is a good man, I have a good case against him, and I will +not plead if he be a bad one. Neither do I think it right to insist on +making repayment, even though it be against the will of those whom we +repay, and to press it upon them however reluctant they may be; it is +not repayment to force an unwilling man to resume what you were once +willing to take. Some people, if any trifling present be sent to them, +afterwards send back something else for no particular reason, and then +declare that they are under no obligation; to send something back at +once, and balance one present by another, is the next thing to refusing +to receive it. On some occasions I shall not return a benefit, even +though I be able to do so. When? When by so doing I shall myself lose +more than he will gain, or if he would not notice any advantage to +himself in receiving that which it would be a great loss to me to +return. The man who is always eager to repay under all circumstances, +has not the feeling of a grateful man, but of a debtor; and, to put +it shortly, he who is too eager to repay, is unwilling to be in his +friend's debt; he who is unwilling, and yet is in his friend's debt, is +ungrateful. + + + + +BOOK V. + +I. + + +In the preceding books I seem to have accomplished the object which I +proposed to myself, since in them I have discussed how a benefit ought +to be bestowed, and how it ought to be received. These are the limits of +this action; when I dwell upon it further I am not obeying the orders, +but the caprices of my subject which ought to be followed whither it +leads, not whither it allures us to wander; for now and then something +will arise, which, although it is all but unconnected with the subject, +instead of being a necessary part of it, still thrills the mind with a +certain charm. However, since you wish it to be so, let us go on, after +having completed our discussion of the heads of the subject itself, +to investigate those matters which, if you wish for truth, I must +call adjacent to it, not actually connected with it; to examine which +carefully is not one worth one's while, and yet is not labour in vain. +No praise, however, which I can give to benefits does justice to +you, Aebutius Liberalis, a man of excellent disposition and naturally +inclined to bestow them. Never have I seen any one esteem even the most +trifling services more kindly; indeed, your good-nature goes so far +as to regard whatever benefit is bestowed upon anyone as bestowed upon +yourself; you are prepared to pay even what is owed by the ungrateful, +that no one may regret having bestowed benefits. You yourself are so far +from any boastfulness, you are so eager at once to free those whom you +serve from any feeling of obligation to you, that you like, when giving +anything to any one, to seem not so much to be giving a present as +returning one; and therefore what you give in this manner will all the +more fully he repaid to you: for, as a rule, benefits come to one who +does not demand repayment of them; and just as glory follows those who +avoid it, so men receive a more plentiful harvest in return for benefits +bestowed upon those who had it in their power to be ungrateful. With you +there is no reason why those who have received benefits from you should +not ask for fresh ones; nor would you refuse to bestow others, to +overlook and conceal what you have given, and to add to it more and +greater gifts, since it is the aim of all the best men and the noblest +dispositions to bear with an ungrateful man until you make him grateful. +Be not deceived in pursuing this plan; vice, if you do not too soon +begin to hate it, will yield to virtue. + +II. Thus it is that you are especially pleased with what you think the +grandly-sounding phrase, "It is disgraceful to be worsted in a contest +of benefits." Whether this be true or not deserves to be investigated, +and it means something quite different from what you imagine; for it is +never disgraceful to be worsted in any honourable contest, provided that +you do not throw down your arms, and that even when conquered you +wish to conquer. All men do not strive for a good object with the same +strength, resources, and good fortune, upon which depend at all events +the issues of the most admirable projects, though we ought to praise the +will itself which makes an effort in the right direction. Even though +another passes it by with swifter pace, yet the palm of victory does +not, as in publicly-exhibited races, declare which is the better man; +though even in the games chance frequently brings an inferior man to the +front. As far as loyalty of feeling goes, which each man wishes to be +possessed in the fullest measure on his own side, if one of the two be +the more powerful, if he have at his disposal all the resources which he +wishes to use, and be favoured by fortune in his most ambitious efforts, +while the other, although equally willing, can only return less than he +receives, or perhaps can make no return at all, but still wishes to do +so and is entirely devoted to this object; then the latter is no more +conquered than he who dies in arms, whom the enemy found it easier to +slay than to turn back. To be conquered, which you consider disgraceful, +cannot happen to a good man; for he will never surrender, never give up +the contest, to the last day of his life he will stand prepared and in +that posture he will die, testifying that though he has received much, +yet that he had the will to repay as much as he had received. + +III. The Lacedaemonians forbid their young men to contend in the +pancratium, or with the caestus, in which games the defeated party has +to acknowledge himself beaten. The winner of a race is he who first +reaches the goal; he outstrips the others in swiftness, but not in +courage. The wrestler who has been thrown three times loses the palm of +victory, but does not yield it up. Since the Lacedaemonians thought it +of great importance that their countrymen should be invincible, they +kept them away from those contests in which victory is assigned, not by +the judge, or by the issue of the contest itself, but by the voice +of the vanquished begging the victor to spare him as he falls. This +attribute of never being conquered, which they so jealously guard among +their citizens, can be attained by all men through virtue and goodwill, +because even when all else is vanquished, the mind remains unconquered. +For this cause no one speaks of the three hundred Fabii as conquered, +but slaughtered. Regulus was taken captive by the Carthaginians, not +conquered; and so were all other men who have not yielded in spirit when +overwhelmed by the strength and weight of angry fortune. + +So is it with benefits. A man may have received more than he gave, more +valuable ones, more frequently bestowed; yet is he not vanquished. It +may be that, if you compare the benefits with one another, those which +he has received will outweigh those which he has bestowed; but if you +compare the giver and the receiver, whose intentions also ought to be +considered apart, neither will prove the victor. It often happens that +even when one combatant is pierced with many wounds, while the other is +only slightly injured, yet they are said to have fought a drawn battle, +although the former may appear to be the worse man. + +IV. No one, therefore, can be conquered in a contest of benefits, if he +knows how to owe a debt, if he wishes to make a return for what he +has received, and raises himself to the same level with his friend in +spirit, though he cannot do so in material gifts. As long as he remains +in this temper of mind, as long as he has the wish to declare by proofs +that he has a grateful mind, what difference does it make upon which +side we can count the greater number of presents? You are able to give +much; I can do nothing but receive. Fortune abides with you, goodwill +alone with me; yet I am as much on an equality with you as naked or +lightly armed men are with a large body armed to the teeth. No one, +therefore, is worsted by benefits, because each man's gratitude is to be +measured by his will. If it be disgraceful to be worsted in a contest +of benefits, you ought not to receive a benefit from very powerful men +whose kindness you cannot return, I mean such as princes and kings, whom +fortune has placed in such a station that they can give away much, and +can only receive very little and quite inadequate returns for what they +give. I have spoken of kings and princes, who alone can cause works to +be accomplished, and whose superlative power depends upon the obedience +and services of inferiors; but some there are, free from all earthly +lusts, who are scarcely affected by any human objects of desire, upon +whom fortune herself could bestow nothing. I must be worsted in a +contest of benefits with Socrates, or with Diogenes, who walked naked +through the treasures of Macedonia, treading the king's wealth under his +feet. In good sooth, he must then rightly have seemed, both to himself +and to all others whose eyes were keen enough to perceive the real +truth, to be superior even to him at whose feet all the world lay. +He was far more powerful, far richer even than Alexander, who then +possessed everything; for there was more that Diogenes could refuse to +receive than that Alexander was able to give. + +V. It is not disgraceful to be worsted by these men, for I am not the +less brave because you pit me against an invulnerable enemy, nor does +fire not burn because you throw into it something over which flames have +no power, nor does iron lose its power of cutting, though you may wish +to cut up a stone which is hard, impervious to blows, and of such a +nature that hard tools are blunted upon it. I give you the same answer +about gratitude. A man is not disgracefully worsted in a contest of +benefits if he lays himself under an obligation to such persons +as these, whose enormous wealth or admirable virtue shut out all +possibility of their benefits being returned. As a rule we are worsted +by our parents; for while we have them with us, we regard them as +severe, and do not understand what they do for us. When our age begins +to bring us a little sense, and we gradually perceive that they deserve +our love for those very things which used to prevent our loving them, +their advice, their punishments, and the careful watch which they used +to keep over our youthful recklessness, they are taken from us. Few live +to reap any real fruit from children; most men feel their sons only as +a burden. Yet there is no disgrace in being worsted by one's parent +in bestowing benefits; how should there be, seeing that there is no +disgrace in being worsted by anyone. We are equal to some men, and yet +not equal; equal in intention, which is all that they care for, which +is all that we promise to be, but unequal in fortune. And if fortune +prevents any one from repaying a kindness, he need not, therefore, +blush, as though he were vanquished; there is no disgrace in failing +to reach your object, provided you attempt to reach it. It often is +necessary, that before making any return for the benefits which we have +received, we should ask for new ones; yet, if so, we shall not refrain +from asking for them, nor shall we do so as though disgraced by so +doing, because, even if we do not repay the debt, we shall owe it; +because, even if something from without befalls us to prevent our +repaying it, it will not be our fault if we are not grateful. We can +neither be conquered in intention, nor can we be disgraced by yielding +to what is beyond our strength to contend with. + +VI. Alexander, the king of the Macedonians, used to boast that he had +never been worsted by anybody in a contest of benefits. If so, it was +no reason why, in the fulness of his pride, he should despise the +Macedonians, Greeks, Carians, Persians, and other tribes of whom his +army was composed, nor need he imagine that it was this that gave him an +empire reaching from a corner of Thrace to the shore of the unknown +sea. Socrates could make the same boast, and so could Diogenes, by whom +Alexander was certainly surpassed; for was he not surpassed on the day +when, swelling as he was beyond the limits of merely human pride, +he beheld one to whom he could give nothing, from whom he could take +nothing? King Archelaus invited Socrates to come to him. Socrates is +reported to have answered that he should be sorry to go to one who would +bestow benefits upon him, since he should not be able to make him an +adequate return for them. In the first place, Socrates was at liberty +not to receive them; next, Socrates himself would have been the first +to bestow a benefit, for he would have come when invited, and would have +given to Archelaus that for which Archelaus could have made no return to +Socrates. Even if Archelaus were to give Socrates gold and silver, if +he learned in return for them to despise gold and silver, would not +Socrates be able to repay Archelaus? Could Socrates receive from him +as much value as he gave, in displaying to him a man skilled in the +knowledge of life and of death, comprehending the true purpose of each? +Suppose that he had found this king, as it were, groping his way in the +clear sunlight, and had taught him the secrets of nature, of which he +was so ignorant, that when there was an eclipse of the sun, he up his +palace, and shaved his son's head, [Footnote: Gertz very reasonably +conjectures that he shaved his own head which reading would require a +very trifling alteration of the text.] which men are wont to do in times +of mourning and distress. What a benefit it would have been if he had +dragged the terror-stricken king out of his hiding-place, and bidden him +be of good cheer, saying, "This is not a disappearance of the sun, but a +conjunction of two heavenly bodies; for the moon, which proceeds along +a lower path, has placed her disk beneath the sun, and hidden it by the +interposition of her own mass. Sometimes she only hides a small portion +of the sun's disk, because she only grazes it in passing; sometimes +she hides more, by placing more of herself before it; and sometimes she +shuts it out from our sight altogether, if she passes in an exactly even +course between the sun and the earth. Soon, however, their own swift +motion will draw these two bodies apart; soon the earth will receive +back again the light of day. And this system will continue throughout +centuries, having certain days, known beforehand, upon which the sun +cannot display all rays, because of the intervention of the moon. Wait +only for a short time; he will soon emerge, he will soon leave that +seeming cloud, and freely shed abroad his light without any hindrances." +Could Socrates not have made an adequate return to Archelaus, if he +had taught him to reign? as though Socrates would not benefit him +sufficiently, merely by enabling him to bestow a benefit upon Socrates. +Why, then, did Socrates say this? Being a joker and a speaker in +parables--a man who turned all, especially the great, into ridicule--he +preferred giving him a satirical refusal, rather than an obstinate or +haughty one, and therefore said that he did not wish to receive benefits +from one to whom he could not return as much as he received. He feared, +perhaps, that he might be forced to receive something which he did +not wish, he feared that it might be something unfit for Socrates to +receive. Some one may say, "He ought to have said that he did not wish +to go." But by so doing he would have excited against himself the anger +of an arrogant king, who wished everything connected with himself to be +highly valued. It makes no difference to a king whether you be unwilling +to give anything to him or to accept anything from him; he is equally +incensed at either rebuff, and to be treated with disdain is more +bitter to a proud spirit than not to be feared. Do you wish to know what +Socrates really meant? He, whose freedom of speech could not be borne +even by a free state, was not willing of his own choice to become a +slave. + +VII. I think that we have sufficiently discussed this part of the +subject, whether it be disgraceful to be worsted in a contest of +benefits. Whoever asks this question must know that men are not wont +to bestow benefits upon themselves, for evidently it could not be +disgraceful to be worsted by oneself. Yet some of the Stoics debate this +question, whether any one can confer a benefit upon himself, and whether +one ought to return one's own kindness to oneself. This discussion has +been raised in consequence of our habit of saying, "I am thankful +to myself," "I can complain of no one but myself," "I am angry with +myself," "I will punish myself," "I hate myself," and many other phrases +of the same sort, in which one speaks of oneself as one would of some +other person. "If," they argue, "I can injure myself, why should I not +be able also to bestow a benefit upon myself? Besides this, why are +those things not called benefits when I bestow them upon myself which +would be called benefits if I bestowed them upon another? If to receive +a certain thing from another would lay me under an obligation to him, +how is it that if I give it to myself, I do not contract an obligation +to myself? why should I be ungrateful to my own self, which is no less +disgraceful than it is to be mean to oneself, or hard and cruel to +oneself, or neglectful of oneself?" The procurer is equally odious +whether he prostitutes others or himself. We blame a flatterer, and one +who imitates another man's mode of speech, or is prepared to give praise +whether it be deserved or not; we ought equally to blame one who humours +himself and looks up to himself, and so to speak is his own flatterer. +Vices are not only hateful when outwardly practised, but also when they +are repressed within the mind. Whom would you admire more than he who +governs himself and has himself under command? It is easier to rule +savage nations, impatient of foreign control, than to restrain one's +own mind and keep it under one's own control. Plato, it is argued, +was grateful to Socrates for having been taught by him; why should not +Socrates be grateful to himself for having taught himself? Marcus Cato +said, "Borrow from yourself whatever you lack;" why, then, if I can +lend myself anything, should I be unable to give myself anything? The +instances in which usage divides us into two persons are innumerable; we +are wont to say, "Let me converse with myself," and, "I will give myself +a twitch of the ear;" [Footnote: See book iv. ch. xxxvi.] and if it be +true that one can do so, then a man ought to be grateful to himself, +just as he is angry with himself; as he blames himself, SO he ought +to praise himself; since he can impoverish himself, he can also enrich +himself. Injuries and benefits are the converse of one another: if we +say of a man, 'he has done himself an injury,' we can also say 'he has +bestowed upon himself a benefit?' + +VIII. It is natural that a man should first incur an obligation, and +then that he should return gratitude for it; a debtor cannot exist +without a creditor, any more than a husband without a wife, or a son +without a father; someone must give in order that some one may +receive. Just as no one carries himself, although he moves his body and +transports it from place to place; as no one, though he may have made a +speech in his own defence, is said to have stood by himself, or erects +a statue to himself as his own patron; as no sick man, when by his +own care he has regained his health, asks himself for a fee; so in no +transaction, even when a man does what is useful to himself, need he +return thanks to himself, because there is no one to whom he can return +them. Though I grant that a man can bestow a benefit upon himself, yet +at the same time that he gives it, he also receives it; though I grant +that a man may receive a benefit from himself, yet he receives it at the +same time that he gives it. The exchange takes place within doors, as +they say, and the transfer is made at once, as though the debt were a +fictitious one; for he who gives is not a different person to he who +receives, but one and the same. The word "to owe" has no meaning except +as between two persons; how then can it apply to one man who incurs an +obligation, and by the same act frees himself from it? In a disk or +a ball there is no top or bottom, no beginning or end, because the +relation of the parts is changed when it moves, what was behind coming +before, and what went down on one side coming up on the other, so that +all the parts, in whatever direction they may move, come back to the +same position. Imagine that the same thing takes place in a man; into +however many pieces you may divide him, he remains one. If he strikes +himself, he has no one to call to account for the insult; if he binds +himself and locks himself up, he cannot demand damages; if he bestows a +benefit upon himself, he straightway returns it to the giver. It is said +that there is no waste in nature, because everything which is taken from +nature returns to her again, and nothing can perish, because it cannot +fall out of nature, but goes round again to the point from whence +it started. You ask, "What connection has this illustration with the +subject?" I will tell you. Imagine yourself to be ungrateful, the +benefit bestowed upon you is not lost, he who gave it has it; suppose +that you are unwilling to receive it, it still belongs to you before it +is returned. You cannot lose anything, because what you take away from +yourself, you nevertheless gain yourself. The matter revolves in a +circle within yourself; by receiving you give, by giving you receive. + +IX. "It is our duty," argues our adversary, "to bestow benefits upon +ourselves, therefore we ought also to be grateful to ourselves." The +original axiom, upon which the inference depends, is untrue, for no one +bestows benefits upon himself, but obeys the dictates of his nature, +which disposes him to affection for himself, and which makes him take +the greatest pains to avoid hurtful things, and to follow after those +things which are profitable to him. Consequently, the man who gives to +himself is not generous, nor is he who pardons himself forgiving, nor is +he who is touched by his own misfortunes tender-hearted; it is +natural to do those things to oneself which when done to others become +generosity, clemency, and tenderness of heart. A benefit is a voluntary +act, but to do good to oneself is an instinctive one. The more benefits +a man bestows, the more beneficent he is, yet who ever was praised for +having been of service to himself? or for having rescued himself from +brigands? No one bestows a benefit upon himself any more than he bestows +hospitality upon himself; no one gives himself anything, any more than +he lends himself anything. If each man bestows benefits upon himself, is +always bestowing them, and bestows them without any cessation, then +it is impossible for him to make any calculation of the number of his +benefits; when then can he show his gratitude, seeing that by the very +act of doing so he would bestow a benefit? for what distinction can +you draw between giving himself a benefit or receiving a benefit for +himself, when the whole transaction takes place in the mind of the same +man? Suppose that I have freed myself from danger, then I have bestowed +a benefit upon myself; suppose I free myself a second time, by so doing +do I bestow or repay a benefit? In the next place, even if I grant the +primary axiom, that we can bestow benefits upon ourselves, I do not +admit that which follows; for even if we can do so, we ought not to do +so. Wherefore? Because we receive a return for them at once. It is right +for me to receive a benefit, then to lie under an obligation, then to +repay it; now here there is no time for remaining under an obligation, +because we receive the return without any delay. No one really gives +except to another, no one owes except to another, no one repays except +to another. An act which always requires two persons cannot take place +within the mind of one. + +X. A benefit means the affording of something useful, and the word +AFFORDING implies other persons. Would not a man be thought mad if +he said that he had sold something to himself, because selling means +alienation, and the transferring of a thing and of one's rights in that +thing to another person? Yet giving, like selling anything, consists in +making it pass away from you, handing over what you yourself once owned +into the keeping of some one else. + +If this be so, no one ever gave himself a benefit, because no one gives +to himself; if not, two opposites coalesce, so that it becomes the same +thing to give and to receive. Yet there is a great difference between +giving and receiving; how should there not be, seeing that these words +are the converse of one another? Still, if any one can give himself a +benefit, there can be no difference between giving and receiving. I said +a little before that some words apply only to other persons, and are +so constituted that their whole meaning lies apart from ourselves; for +instance, I am a brother, but a brother of some other man, for no one is +his own brother; I am an equal, but equal to somebody else, for who +is equal to himself? A thing which is compared to another thing is +unintelligible without that other thing; a thing which is joined to +something else does not exist apart from it; so that which is given does +not exist without the other person, nor can a benefit have any existence +without another person. This is clear from the very phrase which +describes it, 'to do good,' yet no one does good to himself, any more +than he favours himself or is on his own side. I might enlarge further +upon this subject and give many examples. Why should benefits not be +included among those acts which require two persons to perform them? +Many honourable, most admirable and highly virtuous acts cannot take +place without a second person. Fidelity is praised and held to be one +of the chief blessings known among men, yet was any one ever on that +account said to have kept faith with himself? + +XI. I come now to the last part of this subject. The man who returns a +kindness ought to expend something, just as he who repays expends money; +but the man who returns a kindness to himself expends nothing, just +as he who receives a benefit from himself gains nothing. A benefit +and gratitude for it must pass to and fro between two persons; their +interchange cannot take place within one man. He who returns a kindness +does good in his turn to him from whom he has received something; +but the man who returns his own kindness, to whom does he do good? +To himself? Is there any one who does not regard the returning of a +kindness, and the bestowal of a benefit, as distinct acts? 'He who +returns a kindness to himself does good to himself.' Was any man ever +unwilling to do this, even though he were ungrateful? nay, who ever was +ungrateful from any other motive than this? "If," it is argued, "we are +right in thanking ourselves, we ought to return our own kindness;" +yet we say, "I am thankful to myself for having refused to marry that +woman," or "for having refused to join a partnership with that man." +When we speak thus, we are really praising ourselves, and make use +of the language of those who return thanks to approve our own acts. A +benefit is something which, when given, may or may not be returned. +Now, he who gives a benefit to himself must needs receive what he gives; +therefore, this is not a benefit. A benefit is received at one time, and +is returned at another; (but when a man bestows a benefit upon himself, +he both receives it and returns it at the same time). In a benefit, +too, what we commend and admire is, that a man has for the time being +forgotten his own interests, in order that he may do good to another; +that he has deprived himself of something, in order to bestow it upon +another. Now, he who bestows a benefit upon himself does not do this. +The bestowal of a benefit is an act of companionship--it wins some man's +friendship, and lays some man under an obligation; but to bestow it upon +oneself is no act of companionship--it wins no man's friendship, lays +no man under an obligation, raises no man's hopes, or leads him to +say, "This man must be courted; he bestowed a benefit upon that person, +perhaps he will bestow one upon me also." A benefit is a thing which +one gives not for one's own sake, but for the sake of him to whom it is +given; but he who bestows a benefit upon himself, does so for his own +sake; therefore, it is not a benefit. + +XII. Now I seem to you not to have made good what I said at the +beginning of this book. You say that I am far from doing what is worth +any one's while; nay, that in real fact I have thrown away all my +trouble. Wait, and soon you will be able to say this more truly, for +I shall lead you into covert lurking-places, from which when you have +escaped, you will have gained nothing except that you will have freed +yourself from difficulties with which you need never have hampered +yourself. What is the use of laboriously untying knots which you +yourself have tied, in order that you might untie them? Yet, just as +some knots are tied in fun and for amusement, so that a tyro may find +difficulty in untying them, which knots he who tied them can loose +without any trouble, because he knows the joinings and the difficulties +of them, and these nevertheless afford us some pleasure, because they +test the sharpness of our wits, and engross, our attention; so also +these questions, which seem subtle and tricky, prevent our intellects +becoming careless and lazy, for they ought at one time to have a field +given them to level, in order that they may wander about it, and at +another to have some dark and rough passage thrown in their way for them +to creep through, and make their way with caution. It is said by +our opponent that no one is ungrateful; and this is supported by the +following arguments: "A benefit is that which does good; but, as you +Stoics say, no one can do good to a bad man; therefore, a bad man does +not receive a benefit. (If he does not receive it, he need not return +it; therefore, no bad man is ungrateful.) Furthermore, a benefit is an +honourable and commendable thing. No honourable or commendable thing can +find any place with a bad man; therefore, neither can a benefit. If he +cannot receive one, he need not repay one; therefore, he does not become +ungrateful. Moreover, as you say, a good man does everything rightly; if +he does everything rightly, he cannot be ungrateful. A good man returns +a benefit, a bad man does not receive one. If this be so, no man, good +or bad, can be ungrateful. Therefore, there is no such thing in nature +as an ungrateful man: the word is meaningless." We Stoics have only one +kind of good, that which is honourable. This cannot come to a bad man, +for he would cease to be bad if virtue entered into him; but as long as +he is bad, no one can bestow a benefit upon him, because good and bad +are contraries, and cannot exist together. Therefore, no one can do good +to such a man, because whatever he receives is corrupted by his vicious +way of using it. Just as the stomach, when disordered by disease and +secreting bile, changes all the food which it receives, and turns every +kind of sustenance into a source of pain, so whatever you entrust to an +ill-regulated mind becomes to it a burden, an annoyance, and a source +of misery. Thus the most prosperous and the richest men have the most +trouble; and the more property they have to perplex them, the less +likely they are to find out what they really are. Nothing, therefore, +can reach bad men which would do them good; nay, nothing which would +not do them harm. They change whatever falls to their lot into their own +evil nature; and things which elsewhere would, if given to better men, +be both beautiful and profitable, are ruinous to them. They cannot, +therefore, bestow benefits, because no one can give what he does not +possess, and, therefore, they lack the pleasure of doing good to others. + +XIII. But, though this be so, yet even a bad man can receive some things +which resemble benefits, and he will be ungrateful if he does not return +them. There are good things belonging to the mind, to the body, and to +fortune. A fool or a bad man is debarred from the first--those, that is, +of the mind; but he is admitted to a share in the two latter, and, if +he does not return them, he is ungrateful. Nor does this follow from +our (Stoic) system alone the Peripatetics, also, who widely extend the +boundaries of human happiness, declare that trifling benefits reach bad +men, and that he who does not return them is ungrateful. We therefore +do not agree that things which do not tend to improve the mind should +be called benefits, yet do not deny that these things are convenient and +desirable. Such things as these a bad man may bestow upon a good man, +or may receive from him--such, for example, as money, clothes, public +office, or life; and, if he makes no return for these, he will come +under the denomination of ungrateful. "But how can you call a man +ungrateful for not returning that which you say is not a benefit?" Some +things, on account of their similarity, are included under the same +designation, although they do not really deserve it. Thus we speak of +a silver or golden box; ["The original word is 'pyx,' which means a box +made of box-wood."] thus we call a man illiterate, although he may not +be utterly ignorant, but only not acquainted with the higher branches of +literature; thus, seeing a badly-dressed ragged man we say that we have +seen a naked man. These things of which we spoke are not benefits, +but they possess the appearance of benefits. "Then, just as they are +quasi-benefits, so your man is quasi-ungrateful, not really ungrateful." +This is untrue, because both he who gives and he who receives them +speaks of them as benefits; so he who fails to return the semblance of +a real benefit is as much an ungrateful man as he who mixes a sleeping +draught, believing it to be poison, is a poisoner. + +XIV. Cleanthes speaks more impetuously than this. "Granted," says he, +"that what he received was not a benefit, yet he is ungrateful, because +he would not have returned a benefit if he had received one." So he who +carries deadly weapons and has intentions of robbing and murdering, is +a brigand even before he has dipped his hands in blood; his wickedness +consists and is shown in action, but does not begin thereby. Men are +punished for sacrilege, although no one's hands can reach to the gods. +"How," asks our opponent, "can any one be ungrateful to a bad man, since +a bad man cannot bestow a benefit?" In the same way, I answer, because +that which he received was not a benefit, but was called one; if any +one receives from a bad man any of those things which are valued by the +ignorant, and of which bad men often possess great store, it becomes his +duty to make a return in the same kind, and to give back as though they +were truly good those things which he received as though they were +truly good. A man is said to be in debt, whether he owes gold pieces +or leather marked with a state stamp, such as the Lacedaemonians used, +which passes for coined money. Pay your debts in that kind in which you +incurred them. You have nothing to do with the definition of benefits, +or with the question whether so great and noble a name ought to be +degraded by applying it to such vulgar and mean matters as these, nor do +we seek for truth that we may use it to the disadvantage of others; +do you adjust your minds to the semblance of truth, and while you are +learning what is really honourable, respect everything to which the name +of honour is applied. + +XV. "In the same way," argues our adversary, "that your school proves +that no one is ungrateful, you afterwards prove that all men are +ungrateful. For, as you say, all fools are bad men; he who has one vice +has all vices; all men are both fools and bad men; therefore all men are +ungrateful." Well, what then? Are they not? Is not this the universal +reproach of the human race? is there not a general complaint that +benefits are thrown away, and that there are very few men who do not +requite their benefactors with the basest ingratitude? Nor need you +suppose that what we say is merely the grumbling of men who think +every act wicked and depraved which falls short of an ideal standard of +righteousness. Listen! I know not who it is who speaks, yet the voice +with which he condemns mankind proceeds, not from the schools of +philosophers, but from the midst of the crowd: + + "Host is not safe from guest; + Father-in-law from son; but seldom love + Exists 'twixt brothers; wives long to destroy + Their husbands; husbands long to slay their wives." + +This goes even further: according to this, crimes take the place of +benefits, and men do not shrink from shedding the blood of those for +whom they ought to shed their own; we requite benefits by steel and +poison. We call laying violent hands upon our own country, and putting +down its resistance by the fasces of its own lictors, gaining power +and great place; every man thinks himself to be in a mean and degraded +position if he has not raised himself above the constitution; the armies +which are received from the state are turned against her, and a general +now says to his men, "Fight against your wives, fight against your +children, march in arms against your altars, your hearths and homes!" +Yes, [Footnote: I believe, in spite of Gertz, that this is part of +the speech of the Roman general, and that the conjecture of Muretus, +"without the command of the senate," gives better sense.] you, who even +when about to triumph ought not to enter the city at the command of the +senate, and who have often, when bringing home a victorious army, been +given an audience outside the walls, you now, after slaughtering your +countrymen, stained with the blood of your kindred, march into the city +with standards erect. "Let liberty," say you, "be silent amidst the +ensigns of war, and now that wars are driven far away and no ground +for terror remains, let that people which conquered and civilized all +nations be beleaguered within its own walls, and shudder at the sight of +its own eagles." + +XVI. Coriolanus was ungrateful, and became dutiful late, and after +repenting of his crime; he did indeed lay down his arms, but only in +the midst of his unnatural warfare. Catilina was ungrateful; he was +not satisfied with taking his country captive without overturning it, +without despatching the hosts of the Allobroges against it, without +bringing an enemy from beyond the Alps to glut his old inborn hatred, +and to offer Roman generals as sacrifices which had been long owing to +the tombs of the Gaulish dead. Caius Marius was ungrateful, when, after +being raised from the ranks to the consulship, he felt that he would not +have wreaked his vengeance upon fortune, and would sink to his original +obscurity, unless he slaughtered Romans as freely as he had slaughtered +the Cimbri, and not merely gave the signal, but was himself the signal +for civil disasters and butcheries. Lucius Sulla was ungrateful, for he +saved his country by using remedies worse than the perils with which it +was threatened, when he marched through human blood all the way from the +citadel of Praeneste to the Colline Gate, fought more battles and caused +more slaughter afterwards within the city, and most cruelly after the +victory was won, most wickedly after quarter had been promised them, +drove two legions into a corner and put them to the sword, and, great +gods! invented a proscription by which he who slew a Roman citizen +received indemnity, a sum of money, everything but a civic crown! Cnaeus +Pompeius was ungrateful, for the return which he made to his country for +three consulships, three triumphs, and the innumerable public offices +into most of which he thrust himself when under age, was to lead others +also to lay hands upon her under the pretext of thus rendering his own +power less odious; as though what no one ought to do became right +if more than one person did it. Whilst he was coveting extraordinary +commands, arranging the provinces so as to have his own choice of them, +and dividing the whole state with a third person, [Footnote: Crassus.] +in such a manner as to leave two-thirds of it in the possession of his +own family, [Footnote: Pompey was married to Caesar's daughter. Cf. +Virg., "Aen.," vi., 831, sq., and Lucan's beautiful verses, "Phars.," +i., 114.] he reduced the Roman people to such a condition that they +could only save themselves by submitting to slavery. The foe and +conqueror [Footnote: Seneca is careful to avoid the mention of Caesar's +name, which might have given offence to the emperors under whom +he lived, who used the name as a title.] of Pompeius was himself +ungrateful; he brought war from Gaul and Germany to Rome, and he, the +friend of the populace, the champion of the commons, pitched his camp in +the Circus Flaminus, nearer to the city than Porsena's camp had been. He +did, indeed, use the cruel privileges of victory with moderation; as was +said at the time, he protected his countrymen, and put to death no man +who was not in arms. Yet what credit is there in this? Others used their +arms more cruelly, but flung them away when glutted with blood, while +he, though he soon sheathed the sword, never laid it aside. Antonius was +ungrateful to his dictator, who he declared was rightly slain, and whose +murderers he allowed to depart to their commands in the provinces; +as for his country, after it had been torn to pieces by so many +proscriptions, invasions, and civil wars, he intended to subject it +to kings, not even of Roman birth, and to force that very state to pay +tribute to eunuchs, [Footnote: The allusion is to Antonius's connection +with Cleopatra. Cf. Virg. "Aen.," viii., 688.] which had itself restored +sovereign rights, autonomy, and immunities, to the Achaeans, the +Rhodians, and the people of many other famous cities. + +XVII. The day would not be long enough for me to enumerate those who +have pushed their ingratitude so far as to ruin their native land. +It would be as vast a task to mention how often the state has been +ungrateful to its best and most devoted lovers, although it has done no +less wrong than it has suffered. It sent Camillus and Scipio into exile; +even after the death of Catiline it exiled Cicero, destroyed his house, +plundered his property, and did everything which Catiline would +have done if victorious; Rutilius found his virtue rewarded with a +hiding-place in Asia; to Cato the Roman people refused the praetorship, +and persisted in refusing the consulship. We are ungrateful in public +matters; and if every man asks himself, you will find that there is +no one who has not some private ingratitude to complain of. Yet it is +impossible that all men should complain, unless all were deserving of +complaint, therefore all men are ungrateful. Are they ungrateful +alone? nay, they are also all covetous, all spiteful, and all cowardly, +especially those who appear daring; and, besides this, all men fawn upon +the great, and all are impious. Yet you need not be angry with them; +pardon them, for they are all mad. I do not wish to recall you to what +is not proved, or to say, "See how ungrateful is youth! what young man, +even if of innocent life, does not long for his father's death? even if +moderate in his desires, does not look forward to it? even if dutiful, +does not think about it? How few there are who fear the death even of +the best of wives, who do not even calculate the probabilities of it. +Pray, what litigant, after having been successfully defended, retains +any remembrance of so great a benefit for more than a few days?" All +agree that no one dies without complaining. Who on his last day dares to +say, + + "I've lived, I've done the task which Fortune set me." + +Who does not leave the world with reluctance, and with lamentations? Yet +it is the part of an ungrateful man not to be satisfied with the past. +Your days will always be few if you count them. Reflect that length +of time is not the greatest of blessings; make the best of your time, +however short it may be; even if the day of your death be postponed, +your happiness will not be increased, for life is merely made longer, +not pleasanter, by delay. How much better is it to be thankful for the +pleasures which one has received, not to reckon up the years of others, +but to set a high value upon one's own, and score them to one's credit, +saying, "God thought me worthy of this; I am satisfied with it; he might +have given me more, but this, too, is a benefit." Let us be grateful +towards both gods and men, grateful to those who have given us anything, +and grateful even to those who have given anything to our relatives. + +XVIII. "You render me liable to an infinite debt of gratitude," says our +opponent, "when you say 'even to those who have given any thing to our +relations,' so fix some limit. He who bestows a benefit upon the son, +according to you, bestows it likewise upon the father: this is the first +question I wish to raise. In the next place I should like to have a +clear definition of whether a benefit, if it be bestowed upon your +friend's father as well as upon himself, is bestowed also upon his +brother? or upon his uncle? or his grandfather? or his wife and his +father-in-law? tell me where I am to stop, how far I am to follow out +the pedigree of the family?" + +SENECA. If I cultivate your land, I bestow a benefit upon you; if I +extinguish your house when burning, or prop it so as to save it from +falling, I shall bestow a benefit upon you; if I heal your slave, I +shall charge it to you; if I save your son's life, will you not thereby +receive a benefit from me? + +XIX. THE ADVERSARY. Your instances are not to the purpose, for he who +cultivates my land, does not benefit the land, but me; he who props my +house so that it does not fall, does this service to me, for the house +itself is without feeling, and as it has none, it is I who am indebted +to him; and he who cultivates my land does so because he wishes to +oblige me, not to oblige the land. I should say the same of a slave; he +is a chattel owned by me; he is saved for my advantage, therefore I am +indebted for him. My son is himself capable of receiving a benefit; so +it is he who receives it; I am gratified at a benefit which comes so +near to myself, but am not laid under any obligation. + +SE. Still I should like you, who say that you are under no obligation, +to answer me this. The good health, the happiness, and the inheritance +of a son are connected with his father; his father will be more happy if +he keeps his son safe, and more unhappy if he loses him. What follows, +then? when a man is made happier by me and is freed from the greatest +danger of unhappiness, does he not receive a benefit? + +AD. No, because there are some things which are bestowed upon others, +and yet flow from them so as to reach ourselves; yet we must ask the +person upon whom it was bestowed for repayment; as for example, money +must be sought from the man to whom it was lent, although it may, +by some means, have come into my hands. There is no benefit whose +advantages do not extend to the receiver's nearest friends, and +sometimes even to those less intimately connected with him; yet we do +not enquire whither the benefit has proceeded from him to whom it was +first given, but where it was first placed. You must demand repayment +from the defendant himself personally. + +SE. Well, but I pray you, do you not say, "you have preserved my son for +me; had he perished, I could not have survived him?" Do you not owe +a benefit for the life of one whose safety you value above your own? +Moreover, should I save your son's life, you would fall down before +my knees, and would pay vows to heaven as though you yourself had been +saved; you would say, "It makes no difference whether you have saved +mine or me; you have saved us both, yet me more than him." Why do you +say this, if you do not receive a benefit? + +A.D. Because, if my son were to contract a loan, I should pay his +creditor, yet I should not, therefore, be indebted to him; or if my son +were taken in adultery, I should blush, yet I should not, therefore, be +an adulterer. I say that I am under an obligation to you for saving my +son, not because I really am, but because I am willing to constitute +myself your debtor of my own free will. On the other hand I have derived +from his safety the greatest possible pleasure and advantage, and I have +escaped that most dreadful blow, the loss of my child. True, but we are +not now discussing whether you have done me any good or not, but whether +you have bestowed a benefit upon me; for animals, stones, and herbs can +do one good, but do not bestow benefits, which can only be given by one +who wishes well to the receiver. Now you do not wish well to the father, +but only to the son; and sometimes you do not even know the father. So +when you have said, "Have I not bestowed a benefit upon the father by +saving the son?" you ought to meet this with, "Have I, then, bestowed a +benefit upon a father whom I do not know, whom I never thought of?" And +what will you say when, as is sometimes the case, you hate the father, +and yet save his son? Can you be thought to have bestowed a benefit upon +one whom you hated most bitterly while you were bestowing it? + +However, if I were to lay aside the bickering of dialogue, and answer +you as a lawyer, I should say that you ought to consider the intention +of the giver, you must regard his benefit as bestowed upon the person +upon whom he meant to bestow it. If he did it in honour of the father, +then the father received the benefit; if he thought only of the son, +then the father is not laid under any obligation: by the benefit which +was conferred upon the son, even though the father derives pleasure from +it. Should he, however, have an opportunity, he will himself wish to +give you something, yet not as though he were forced to repay a debt, +but rather as if he had grounds for beginning an exchange of favours. +No return for a benefit ought to be demanded from the father of the +receiver; if he does you any kindness in return for it, he should be +regarded as, a righteous man, but not as a grateful one. For there is no +end to it; if I bestow a benefit on the receiver's father, do I likewise +bestow it upon his mother, his grandfather, his maternal uncle, his +children, relations, friends, slaves, and country? Where, then, does +a benefit begin to stop? for there follows it this endless chain of +people, to whom it is hard to assign bounds, because they join it by +degrees, and are always creeping on towards it. + +XX. A common question is, "Two brothers are at variance. If I save the +life of one, do I confer a benefit upon the other, who will be sorry +that his hated brother did not perish?" There can be no doubt that it is +a benefit to do good to a man, even against that man's will, just as he, +who against his own will does a man good, does not bestow a benefit upon +him. "Do you," asks our adversary, "call that by which he is displeased +and hurt a benefit?" Yes; many benefits have a harsh and forbidding +appearance, such as cutting or burning to cure disease, or confining +with chains. We must not consider whether a man is grieved at receiving +a benefit, but whether he ought to rejoice: a coin is not bad because it +is refused by a savage who is unacquainted with its proper stamp. A man +receives a benefit even though he hates what is done, provided that it +does him good, and that the giver bestowed it in order to do him good. +It makes no difference if he receives a good thing in a bad spirit. +Consider the converse of this. Suppose that a man hates his brother, +though it is to his advantage to have a brother, and I kill this +brother, this is not a benefit, though he may say that it is, and be +glad of it. Our most artful enemies are those whom we thank for the +wrongs which they do us. + +"I understand; a thing which does good is a benefit, a thing which does +harm is not a benefit. Now I will suggest to you an act which neither +does good nor harm, and yet is a benefit. Suppose that I find the corpse +of some one's father in a wilderness, and bury it, then I certainly +have done him no good, for what difference could it make to him in what +manner his body decayed? Nor have I done any good to his son, for what +advantage does he gain by my act?" I will tell you what he gains. He has +by my means performed a solemn and necessary rite; I have performed a +service for his father which he would have wished, nay, which it would +have been his duty to have performed himself. Yet this act is not a +benefit, if I merely yielded to those feelings of pity and kindliness +which would make me bury any corpse whatever, but only if I recognized +this body, and buried it, with the thought in my mind that I was doing +this service to the son; but, by merely throwing earth over a dead +stranger, I lay no one under an obligation for an act performed on +general principles of humanity. + +It may be asked, "Why are you so careful in inquiring upon whom you +bestow benefits, as though some day you meant to demand repayment of +them? Some say that repayment should never be demanded; and they give +the following reasons. An unworthy man will not repay the benefit which +he has received, even if it be demanded of him, while a worthy man will +do so of his own accord. Consequently, if you have bestowed it upon a +good man, wait; do not outrage him by asking him for it, as though of +his own accord he never would repay it. If you have bestowed it upon a +bad man, suffer for it, but do not spoil your benefit by turning it +into a loan. Moreover the law, by not authorizing you, forbids you, +by implication, to demand the repayment of a benefit." All this is +nonsense. As long as I am in no pressing need, as long as I am +not forced by poverty, I will lose my benefits rather than ask for +repayment; but if the lives of my children were at stake, if my wife +were in danger, if my regard for the welfare of my country and for +my own liberty were to force me to adopt a course which I disliked, I +should overcome my delicacy, and openly declare that I had done all that +I could to avoid the necessity of receiving help from an ungrateful man; +the necessity of obtaining repayment of one's benefit will in the end +overcome one's delicacy about asking for it. In the next place, when I +bestow a benefit upon a good man, I do so with the intention of never +demanding repayment, except in case of absolute necessity. + +XXI. "But," argues he, "by not authorizing you, the law forbids you to +exact repayment." There are many things which are not enforced by any +law or process, but which the conventions of society, which are stronger +than any law, compel us to observe. There is no law forbidding us to +divulge our friend's secrets; there is no law which bids us keep faith +even with an enemy; pray what law is there which binds us to stand by +what we have promised? There is none. Nevertheless I should remonstrate +with one who did not keep a secret, and I should be indignant with one +who pledged his word and broke it. "But," he argues, "you are turning a +benefit into a loan." By no means, for I do not insist upon repayment, +but only demand it; nay, I do not even demand it, but remind my friend +of it. Even the direst need will not bring me to apply for help to one +with whom I should have to undergo a long struggle. + +If there be any one so ungrateful that it is not sufficient to remind +him of his debt, I should pass him over, and think that he did not +deserve to be made grateful by force. A money-lender does not demand +repayment from his debtors if he knows they have become bankrupt, and, +to their shame, have nothing but shame left to lose; and I, like him, +should pass over those who are openly and obstinately ungrateful, and +would demand repayment only from those who were likely to give it me, +not from those from whom I should have to extort it by force. + +XXII. There are many who cannot deny that they have received a benefit, +yet cannot return it--men who are not good enough to be termed grateful, +nor yet bad enough to be termed ungrateful; but who are dull and +sluggish, backward debtors, though not defaulters. Such men as these I +should not ask for repayment, but forcibly remind them of it, and, from +a state of indifference, bring them back to their duty. They would at +once reply, "Forgive me; I did not know, by Hercules, that you missed +this, or I would have offered it of my own accord, I beg that you will +not think me ungrateful; I remember your goodness to me." Why need I +hesitate to make such men as these better to themselves and to me? I +would prevent any one from doing wrong, if I were able; much more would +I prevent a friend, both lest he should do wrong, and lest he should +do wrong to me in particular. I bestow a second benefit upon him by not +permitting him to be ungrateful; and I should not reproach him harshly +with what I had done for him, but should speak as gently as I could. In +order to afford him an opportunity of returning my kindness, I +should refresh his remembrance of it, and ask for a benefit; he would +understand that I was asking for repayment. Sometimes I would make use +of somewhat severe language, if I had any hope that by it he might be +amended; though I would not irritate a hopelessly ungrateful man, for +fear that I might turn him into an enemy. If we spare the ungrateful +even the affront of reminding them of their conduct, we shall render +them' more backward in returning benefits; and although some might +be cured of their evil ways, and be made into good men, if their +consciences were stung by remorse, yet we shall allow them to perish for +want of a word of warning, with which a father sometimes corrects +his son, a wife brings back to herself an erring husband, or a man +stimulates the wavering fidelity of his friend. + +XXIII. To awaken some men, it is only necessary to stir them, not to +strike them; in like manner, with some men, the feeling of honour about +returning a benefit is not extinct, but slumbering. Let us rouse it. "Do +not," they will say, "make the kindness you have done me into a wrong: +for it is a wrong, if you do not demand some return from me, and so make +me ungrateful. What if I do not know what sort of repayment you wish +for? if I am so occupied by business, and my attention is so much +diverted to other subjects that I have not been able to watch for an +opportunity of serving you? Point out to me what I can do for you, what +you wish me to do. Why do you despair, before making a trial of me? Why +are you in such haste to lose both your benefit and your friend? How can +you tell whether I do not wish, or whether I do not know how to repay +you: whether it be in intention or in opportunity that I am wanting? +Make a trial of me." I would therefore remind him of what I had done, +without bitterness, not in public, or in a reproachful manner, but so +that he may think that he himself has remembered it rather than that it +has been recalled to him. + +XXIV. One of Julius Caesar's veterans was once pleading before him +against his neighbours, and the cause was going against him. "Do you +remember, general," said he, "that in Spain you dislocated your ankle +near the river Sucro [Footnote: Xucar]?" When Caesar said that he +remembered it, he continued, "Do you remember that when, during the +excessive heat, you wished to rest under a tree which afforded very +little shade, as the ground in which that solitary tree grew was rough +and rocky, one of your comrades spread his cloak under you?" Caesar +answered, "Of course, I remember; indeed, I was perishing with thirst; +and since was unable to walk to the nearest spring, I would have crawled +thither on my hands and knees, had not my comrade, a brave and active +man, brought me water in his helmet." "Could you, then, my general, +recognize that man or that helmet?" Caesar replied that he could not +remember the helmet, but that he could remember the man well; and he +added, I fancy in anger at being led away to this old story in the midst +of a judicial enquiry, "At any rate, you are not he." "I do not blame +you, Caesar," answered the man, "for not recognizing me; for when this +took place, I was unwounded; but afterwards, at the battle of Munda, +my eye was struck out, and the bones of my skull crushed. Nor would +you recognize that helmet if you saw it, for it was split by a Spanish +sword." Caesar would not permit this man to be troubled with lawsuits, +and presented his old soldier with the fields through which a village +right of way had given rise to the dispute. + +XXV. In this case, what ought he to have done? Because his commander's +memory was confused by a multitude of incidents, and because his +position as the leader of vast armies did not permit him to notice +individual soldiers, ought the man not to have asked for a return for +the benefit which he had conferred? To act as he did is not so much to +ask for a return as to take it when it lies in a convenient position +ready for us, although we have to stretch out our hands in order to +receive it. I shall therefore ask for the return of a benefit, whenever +I am either reduced to great straits, or where by doing so I shall act +to the advantage of him from whom I ask it. Tiberius Caesar, when some +one addressed him with the words, "Do you remember....?" answered, +before the man could mention any further proofs of former acquaintance, +"I do not remember what I was." Why should it not be forbidden to demand +of this man repayment of former favours? He had a motive for forgetting +them: he denied all knowledge of his friends and comrades, and wished +men only to see, to think, and to speak of him as emperor. He regarded +his old friend as an impertinent meddler. + +We ought to be even more careful to choose a favorable opportunity when +we ask for a benefit to be repaid to us than when we ask for one to +be bestowed upon us. We must be temperate in our language, so that the +grateful may not take offence, or the ungrateful pretend to do so. If we +lived among wise men, it would be our duty to wait in silence until our +benefits were returned. Yet even to wise men it would be better to give +some hint of what our position required. We ask for help even from +the gods themselves, from whose knowledge nothing is hid, although our +prayers cannot alter their intentions towards us, but can only recall +them to their minds. Homer's priest, [Il. i. 39 sqq.] I say, recounts +even to the gods his duteous conduct and his pious care of their +altars. The second best form of virtue is to be willing and able to take +advice.[Hes. Op. 291.] A horse who is docile and prompt to obey can be +guided hither and thither by the slightest movement of the reins. Very +few men are led by their own reason: those who come next to the best are +those who return to the right path in consequence of advice; and these +we must not deprive of their guide. When our eyes are covered they still +possess sight; but it is the light of day which, when admitted to them, +summons them to perform their duty: tools lie idle, unless the workman +uses them to take part in his work. Similarly men's minds contain a good +feeling, which, however, lies torpid, either through luxury and disuse, +or through ignorance of its duties. This we ought to render useful, and +not to get into a passion with it, and leave it in its wrong doing, but +bear with it patiently, just as schoolmasters bear patiently with the +blunders of forgetful scholars; for as by the prompting of a word or two +their memory is often recalled to the text of the speech which they +have to repeat, so men's goodwill can be brought to return kindness by +reminding them of it. + + + + +BOOK VI. + +I. + + +There are some things, my most excellent Liberalis, which lie completely +outside of our actual life, and which we only inquire into in order to +exercise our intellects, while others both give us pleasure while we are +discovering them, and are of use when discovered. I will place all these +in your hands; you, at your own discretion, may order them either to +be investigated thoroughly, or to be reserved, and be used as agreeable +interludes. Something will be gained even by those which you dismiss at +once, for it is advantageous even to know what subjects are not worth +learning. I shall be guided, therefore, by your face: according to its +expression, I shall deal with some questions at greater length, and +drive others out of court, and put an end to them at once. + +II. It is a question whether a benefit can be taken away from one by +force. Some say that it cannot, because it is not a thing, but an act. A +gift is not the same as the act of giving, any more than a sailor is the +same as the act of sailing. A sick man and a disease are not the same +thing, although no one can be ill without disease; and, similarly, +a benefit itself is one thing, and what any of us receive through a +benefit is another. The benefit itself is incorporeal, and never becomes +invalid; but its subject-matter changes owners, and passes from hand to +hand. So, when you take away from anyone what you have given him, +you take away the subject-matter only of the benefit, not the benefit +itself. Nature herself cannot recall what she has given. She may cease +to bestow benefits, but cannot take them away: a man who dies, yet has +lived; a man who becomes blind, nevertheless has seen. She can cut off +her blessings from us in the future, but she cannot prevent our having +enjoyed them in the past. We are frequently not able to enjoy a benefit +for long, but the benefit is not thereby destroyed. Let Nature struggle +as hard as she please, she cannot give herself retrospective action. A +man may lose his house, his money, his property--everything to which the +name of benefit can be given--yet the benefit itself will remain firm +and unmoved; no power can prevent his benefactor's having bestowed them, +or his having received them. + +III. I think that a fine passage in Rabirius's poem, where M. Antonius, +seeing his fortune deserting him, nothing left him except the privilege +of dying, and even that only on condition that he used it promptly, +exclaims, + + "What I have given, that I now possess!" + +How much he might have possessed, had he chosen! These are riches to be +depended upon, which through all the turmoil of human life will remain +steadfast; and the greater they are, the less envy they will attract. +Why are you sparing of your property, as though it were your own? You +are but the manager of it. All those treasures, which make you swell +with pride, and soar above mere mortals, till you forget the weakness of +your nature; all that which you lock up in iron-grated treasuries, and +guard in arms, which you win from other men with their lives, and defend +at the risk of your own; for which you launch fleets to dye the sea with +blood, and shake the walls of cities, not knowing what arrows fortune +may be preparing for you behind your back; to gain which you have so +often violated all the ties of relationship, of friendship, and of +colleagueship, till the whole world lies crushed between the two +combatants: all these are not yours; they are a kind of deposit, which +is on the point of passing into other hands: your enemies, or your +heirs, who are little better, will seize upon them. "How," do you ask, +"can you make them your own?" "By giving them away." Do, then, what is +best for your own interests, and gain a sure enjoyment of them, which +cannot be taken from you, making them at once more certainly yours, and +more honorable to you. That which you esteem so highly, that by which +you think that you are made rich and powerful, owns but the shabby title +of "house," "slave," or "money;" but when you have given it away, it +becomes a benefit. + +IV. "You admit," says our adversary, "that we sometimes are under no +obligation to him from whom we have received a benefit. In that case it +has been taken by force." Nay, there are many things which would cause +us to cease to feel gratitude for a benefit, not because the benefit has +been taken from me, but because it has been spoiled. Suppose that a man +has defended me in a lawsuit, but has forcibly outraged my wife; he has +not taken away the benefit which he conferred upon me, but by balancing +it with an equivalent wrong, he has set me free from my debt; indeed, if +he has injured me more than he had previously benefited me, he not only +puts an end to my gratitude, but makes me free to revenge myself upon +him, and to complain of him, when the wrong outweighs the benefit; in +such a case the benefit is not taken away, but is overcome. Why, are +not some fathers so cruel and so wicked that it is right and proper for +their sons to turn away from them, and disown them? Yet, pray, have they +taken away the life which they gave? No, but their unnatural conduct in +later years has destroyed all the gratitude which was due to them for +their original benefit. In these cases it is not a benefit itself, but +the gratitude owing for a benefit which is taken away, and the result +is, not that one does not possess the benefit, but that one is not laid +under any obligation by it. It is as though a man were to lend me money, +and then burn my house down; the advantage of the loan is balanced by +the damage which he has caused: I do not repay him, and yet I am not +in his debt. In like manner any one who may have acted kindly and +generously to me, and who afterwards has shown himself haughty, +insulting, and cruel, places me in just the same position as though I +never had received anything from him: he has murdered his own benefits. +Though the lease may remain in force, still a man does not continue to +be a tenant if his landlord tramples down his crops, or cuts down his +orchard; their contract is at an end, not because the landlord has +received the rent which was agreed upon, but because he has made it +impossible that he should receive it. So, too, a creditor often has to +pay money to his debtor, should he have taken more property from him in +other transactions than he claims as having lent him. The judge does not +sit merely to decide between debtor and creditor, when he says, "You did +lend the man money; but then, what followed? You have driven away his +cattle, you have murdered his slave, you have in your possession plate +which you have not paid for. After valuing what each has received, +I order you, who came to this court as a creditor, to leave it as +a debtor." In like manner a balance is struck between benefits and +injuries. In many cases, I repeat, a benefit is not taken away from him +who receives it, and yet it lays him under no obligation, if the giver +has repented of giving it, called himself unhappy because he gave it, +sighed or made a wry face while he gave it; if he thought that he was +throwing it away rather than giving it, if he gave it to please himself, +or to please any one except me, the receiver; if he persistently makes +himself offensive by boasting of what he has done, if he brags of his +gift everywhere, and makes it a misery to me, then indeed the benefit +remains in my hands, but I owe him nothing for it, just as sums of money +to which a creditor has no legal right are owed to him, but cannot be +claimed by him. + +V. Though you have bestowed a benefit upon me, yet you have since +done me a wrong; the benefit demanded gratitude, the wrong required +vengeance: the result is that I do not owe you gratitude, nor do you +owe me compensation--each is cancelled by the other. When we say, "I +returned him his benefit," we do not mean that we restored to him the +very thing which we had received, but something else in its place. To +return is to give back one thing instead of another, because, of course, +in all repayment it is not the thing itself, but its equivalent which +is returned. We are said to have returned money even though we count out +gold pieces instead of silver ones, or even if no money passes between +us, but the transaction be effected verbally by the assignment of a +debt. + +I think I see you say, "You are wasting your time; of what use is it +to me to know whether what I do not owe to another still remains in my +hands or not? These are like the ingenious subtleties of the lawyers, +who declare that one cannot acquire an inheritance by prescription, +but can only acquire those things of which the inheritance consists, as +though there were any difference between the heritage and the things of +which it consists. Rather decide this point for me, which may be of +use. If the same man confers a benefit upon me, and afterwards does me +a wrong, is it my duty to return the benefit to him, and nevertheless to +avenge myself upon him, having, as it were, two distinct accounts open +with him, or to mix them both together, and do nothing, leaving the +benefit to be wiped out by the injury, the injury by the benefit? I see +that the former course is adopted by the law of the land; you know +best what the law may be among you Stoic philosophers in such a case. I +suppose that you keep the action which I bring against another distinct +from that which he Strings against me, and the two processes are not +merged into one? For instance, if a man entrusts me with money, and +afterwards robs me, I shall bring an action against him for theft, and +he will bring one against me for unlawfully detaining his property?" + +VI. The cases which you have mentioned, my Liberalis, come under +well-established laws, which it is necessary for us to follow. One law +cannot be merged in another: each one proceeds its own way. There is a +particular action which deals with deposits just as there is one which +deals with theft. A benefit is subject to no law; it depends upon my +own arbitration. I am at liberty to contrast the amount of good or +harm which any one may have done me, and then to decide which of us is +indebted to the other. In legal processes we ourselves have no power, we +must go whither they lead us; in the case of a benefit the supreme +power is mine, I pronounce sentence. Consequently I do not separate or +distinguish between benefits and wrongs, but send them before the same +judge. Unless I did so, you would bid me love and hate, give thanks and +make complaints at the same time, which human nature does not admit of. +I would rather compare the benefit and the injury with one another, and +see whether there were any balance in my favour. If anybody puts lines +of other writing upon my manuscript he conceals, though he does not take +away, the letters which were there before, and in like manner a wrong +coming after a benefit does not allow it to be seen. + +VII. Your face, by which I have agreed to be guided, now becomes +wrinkled with frowns, as though I were straying too widely from the +subject. You seem to say to me: + + "Why steer to seaward? + Hither bend thy course, + Hug close the shore..." + +I do hug it as close as possible. So now, if you think that we have +dwelt sufficiently upon this point, let us proceed to the consideration +of the next--that is, whether we are at all indebted to any one who +does us good without wishing to do so. I might have expressed this +more clearly, if it were not right that the question should be somewhat +obscurely stated, in order that by the distinction immediately following +it may be shown that we mean to investigate the case both of him who +does us good against his will, and that of him who does us good without +knowing it. That a man who does us good by acting under compulsion does +not thereby lay us under any obligation, is so clear, that no words +are needed to prove it. Both this question, and any other of the like +character which may be raised, can easily be settled if in each case we +bear in mind that, for anything to be a benefit, it must reach us in the +first place through some thought, and secondly through the thought of a +friend and well-wisher. Therefore we do not feel any gratitude towards +rivers, albeit they may bear large ships, afford an ample and unvarying +stream for the conveyance of merchandise, or flow beauteously and full +of fish through fertile fields. No one conceives himself to be indebted +for a benefit to the Nile, any more than he would owe it a grudge if its +waters flooded his fields to excess, and retired more slowly than usual; +the wind does not bestow benefits, gentle and favorable though it +may be, nor does wholesome and useful food; for he who would bestow a +benefit upon me, must not only do me good, but must wish to do so. No +obligation can therefore be incurred towards dumb animals; yet how many +men have been saved from peril by the swiftness of a horse!--nor +yet towards trees--yet how many sufferers from summer heat have been +sheltered by the thick foliage of a tree! What difference can it make, +whether I have profited by the act of one who did not know that he was +doing me good, or one who could not know it, when in each case the will +to do me good was wanting? You might as well bid me be grateful to a +ship, a carriage, or a lance for saving me from danger, as bid me be +grateful to a man who may have done me good by chance, but with no more +intention of doing me good than those things could have. + +VIII. Some men may receive benefits without knowing it, but no man can +bestow them without knowing it. Many sick persons have been cured by +chance circumstances, which do not therefore become specific remedies; +as, for instance, one man was restored to health by falling into a river +during very cold weather, as another was set free from a quartan fever +by means of a flogging, because the sudden terror turned his attention +into a new channel, so that the dangerous hours passed unnoticed. Yet +none of these are remedies, even though they may have been +successful; and in like manner some men do us good, though they are +unwilling--indeed, because they are unwilling to do so--yet we need not +feel grateful to them as though we had received a benefit from them, +because fortune has changed the evil which they intended into good. Do +you suppose that I am indebted to a man who strikes my enemy with a blow +which he aimed at me, who would have injured me had he not missed his +mark? It often happens that by openly perjuring himself a man makes even +trustworthy witnesses disbelieved, and renders his intended victim an +object of compassion, as though he were being ruined by a conspiracy. +Some have been saved by the very power which was exerted to crush +them, and judges who would have condemned a man by law, have refused +to condemn him by favour. Yet they did not confer a benefit upon the +accused, although they rendered him a service, because we must +consider at what the dart was aimed, not what it hits, and a benefit +is distinguished from an injury not by its result, but by the spirit in +which it was meant. By contradicting himself, by irritating the judge by +his arrogance, or by rashly allowing his whole case to depend upon the +testimony of one witness, my opponent may have saved my cause. I do not +consider whether his mistakes benefited me or not, for he wished me ill. + +IX. In order that I may be grateful, I must wish to do what my +benefactor must have wished in order that he might bestow a benefit. Can +anything be more unjust than to bear a grudge against a person who may +have trodden upon one's foot in a crowd, or splashed one, or pushed one +the way which one did not wish to go? Yet it was by his act that we were +injured, and we only refrain from complaining of him, because he did not +know what he was doing. The same reason makes it possible for men to do +us good without conferring benefits upon us, or to harm us without doing +us wrong, because it is intention which distinguishes our friends +from our enemies. How many have been saved from service in the army by +sickness! Some men have been saved from sharing the fall of their house, +by being brought up upon their recognizances to a court of law by their +enemies; some have been saved by ship-wreck from falling into the hands +of pirates; yet we do not feel grateful to such things, because chance +has no feeling of the service it renders, nor are we grateful to our +enemy, though his lawsuit, while it harassed and detained us, still +saved our lives. Nothing can be a benefit which does not proceed from +good will, and which is not meant as such by the giver. If any one +does me a service, without knowing it, I am under no obligation to him; +should he do so, meaning to injure me, I shall imitate his conduct. + +X. Let us turn our attention to the first of these. Can you desire me to +do anything to express my gratitude to a man who did nothing in order to +confer a benefit upon me? Passing on to the next, do you wish me to show +my gratitude to such a man, and of my own will to return to him what I +received from him against his will? What am I to say of the third, he +who, meaning to do an injury, blunders into bestowing a benefit? That +you should have wished to confer a benefit upon me is not sufficient +to render me grateful; but that you should have wished not to do so is +enough to set me free from any obligation to you. A mere wish does not +constitute a benefit; and just as the best and heartiest wish is not a +benefit when fortune prevents its being carried into effect, neither is +what fortune bestows upon us a benefit, unless good wishes preceded +it. In order to lay me under an obligation, you must not merely do me a +service, but you must do so intentionally. + +XI. Cleanthes makes use of the following example:--"I sent," says he, +"two slaves to look for Plato and bring him to me from the Academy. One +of them searched through the whole of the colonnade, and every other +place in which he thought that he was likely to be found, and returned +home alike weary and unsuccessful; the other sat down among the audience +of a mountebank close by, and, while amusing himself in the society of +other slaves like a careless vagabond as he was, found Plato, without +seeking for him, as he happened to pass that way. We ought," says he, +"to praise that slave who, as far as lay in his power, did what he was +ordered, and we ought to punish the other whose laziness turned out so +fortunate." It is goodwill alone which does one real service; let us +then consider under what conditions it lays us under obligations. It is +not enough to wish a man well, without doing him good; nor is it enough +to do him good without wishing him well. Suppose that some one wished to +give me a present, but did not give it; I have his good will, but I +do not have his benefit, which consists of subject matter and goodwill +together. I owe nothing to one who wished to lend me money but did not +do so, and in like manner I shall be the friend of one who wished but +was not able to bestow a benefit upon me, but I shall not be under any +obligation to him. I also shall wish to bestow something upon him, even +as he did upon me; but if fortune be more favorable to me than to him, +and I succeed in bestowing something upon him, my doing so will be a +benefit bestowed upon him, not a repayment out of gratitude for what he +did for me. It will become his duty to be grateful to me; I shall have +begun the interchange of benefits; the series must be counted from my +act. + +XII. I already understand what you wish to ask; there is no need for you +to say anything, your countenance speaks for you. "If any one does us +good for his own sake, are we," you ask, "under an obligation to him? I +often hear you complain that there are some things which men make use +of themselves, but which they put down to the account of others." I will +tell you, my Liberalis; but first let me distinguish between the two +parts of your question, and separate what is fair from what is unfair. +It makes a great difference whether any one bestows a benefit upon us +for his own sake, or whether he does so partly for his own sake and +partly for ours. He who looks only to his own interests, and who does us +good because he cannot otherwise make a profit for himself, seems to +me to be like the farmer who provides winter and summer fodder for his +flocks, or like the man who feeds up the captives whom he has bought +in order that they may fetch a better price in the slave market, or who +crams and curry-combs fat oxen for sale; or like the keeper of a +school of arms, who takes great pains in exercising and equipping his +gladiators. As Cleanthes says, there is a great difference between +benefits and trade. + +XIII. On the other hand, I am not so unjust as to feel no gratitude to +a man, because, while helping me, he helped himself also; for I do +not insist upon his consulting my interests to the exclusion of his +own--nay, I should prefer that the benefit which I receive may be of +even greater advantage to the giver, provided that he thought of us +both when giving it, and meant to divide it between me and himself. Even +should he possess the larger portion of it, still, if he admits me to +a share, if he meant it for both of us, I am not only unjust but +ungrateful, if I do not rejoice in what has benefited me benefiting him +also. It is the essence of spitefulness to say that nothing can be a +benefit which does not cause some inconvenience to the giver. + +As for him who bestows a benefit for his own sake, I should say to him, +"You have made use of me, and how can you say that you have bestowed a +benefit upon me, rather than I upon you?" "Suppose," answers he, "that I +cannot obtain a public office except by ransoming ten citizens out of a +great number of captives, will you owe me nothing for setting you free +from slavery and bondage? Yet I shall do so for my own sake." To this I +should answer, "You do this partly for my sake, partly for your own. +It is for your own sake that you ransom captives, but it is for my sake +that you ransom me; for to serve your purpose it would be enough for you +to ransom any one. I am therefore your debtor, not for ransoming me +but for choosing me, since you might have attained the same result by +ransoming some one else instead of me. You divide the advantages of the +act between yourself and me, and you confer upon me a benefit by which +both of us profit. What you do entirely for my sake is, that you choose +me in preference to others. If therefore you were to be made praetor for +ransoming ten captives, and there were only ten of us captives, none of +us would be under any obligation to you, because there is nothing for +which you can ask any one of us to give you credit apart from your own +advantage. I do not regard a benefit jealously and wish it to be given +to myself alone, but I wish to have a share in it." + +XIV. "Well, then," says he, "suppose that I were to order all your names +to be put into a ballot-box, and that your name was drawn among those +who were to be ransomed, would you owe me nothing?" Yes, I should owe +you something, but very little: how little, I will explain to you. By so +doing you do something for my sake, in that you grant me the chance of +being ransomed; I owe to fortune that my name was drawn, all I owe +to you is that my name could be drawn. You have given me the means +of obtaining your benefit. For the greater part of that benefit I am +indebted to fortune; that I could be so indebted, I owe to you. + +I shall take no notice whatever of those whose benefits are bestowed +in a mercenary spirit, who do not consider to whom, but upon what terms +they give, whose benefits are entirely selfish. Suppose that some one +sells me corn; I cannot live unless I buy it; yet I do not owe my life +to him because I have bought it. I do not consider how essential it was +to me, and that I could not live without it; but how little thanks are +due for it, since I could not have had it without paying for it, and +since the merchant who imported it did not consider how much good he +would do me, but how much he would gain for himself, I owe nothing for +what I have bought and paid for. + +XV. "According to this reasoning," says my opponent, "you would say +that you owe nothing to a physician beyond his paltry fee, nor to your +teacher, because you have paid him some money; yet these persons are all +held very dear, and are very much respected." In answer to this I should +urge that some things are of greater value than the price which we pay +for them. You buy of a physician life and good health, the value of +which cannot be estimated in money; from a teacher of the liberal +sciences you buy the education of a gentleman and mental culture; +therefore you pay these persons the price, not of what they give us, but +of their trouble in giving it; you pay them for devoting their attention +to us, for disregarding their own affairs to attend to us: they receive +the price, not of their services, but of the expenditure of their time. +Yet this may be more truly stated in another way, which I will at once +lay before you, having first pointed out how the above may be confuted. +Our adversary would say, "If some things are of greater value than the +price which we pay for them, then, though you may have bought them, you +still owe me something more for them." I answer, in the first place, +what does their real value matter, since the buyer and seller have +settled the price between them? Next, I did not buy it at it's own +price, but at yours. "It is," you say, "worth more than its sale price." +True, but it cannot be sold for more. The price of everything varies +according to circumstances; after you have well praised your wares, they +are worth only the highest price at which you can sell them; a man who +buys things cheap is not on that account under any obligation to the +seller. In the next place, even if they are worth more, there is no +generosity in your letting them go for less, since the price is settled +by custom and the rate of the market, not by the uses and powers of the +merchandise. What would you state to be the proper payment of a man who +crosses the seas, holding a true course through the midst of the waves +after the land has sunk out of sight, who foresees coming storms, and +suddenly, when no one expects danger, orders sails to be furled, yards +to be lowered, and the crew to stand at their posts ready to meet the +fury of the unexpected gale? and yet the price of such great skill is +fully paid for by the passage money. At what sum can you estimate the +value of a lodging in a wilderness, of a shelter in the rain, of a bath +or fire in cold weather? Yet I know on what terms I shall be supplied +with these when I enter an inn. How much the man does for us who props +our house when it is about to fall, and who, with a skill beyond belief, +suspends in the air a block of building which has begun to crack at the +foundation; yet we can contract for underpinning at a fixed and cheap +rate. The city wall keeps us safe from our enemies, and from sudden +inroads of brigands; yet it is, well known how much a day a smith +would earn for erecting towers and scaffoldings [Footnote: See +Viollet-le-Duc's "Dictionnaire d'Architecture," articles "Architecture +Militaire" and "Hourds," for the probable meaning of "Propugnacula."]to +provide for the public safety. + +XVI. I might go on for ever collecting instances to prove that valuable +things are sold at a low price. What then? why is it that I owe +something extra both to my physician and to my teacher, and that I do +not acquit myself of all obligation to them by paying them their fee? It +is because they pass from physicians and teachers into friends, and lay +us under obligations, not by the skill which they sell to us, but by +kindly and familiar good will. If my physician does no more than feel +my pulse and class me among those whom he sees in his daily rounds, +pointing out what I ought to do or to avoid without any personal +interest, then I owe him no more than his fee, because he views me with +the eye not of a friend, but of a commander. [Footnote: I read "Nbn +tamquam amicus videt sed tamquam imperator."] Neither have I any reason +for loving my teacher, if he has regarded me merely as one of the mass +of his scholars, and has not thought me worthy of taking especial pains +with by myself, if he has never fixed his attention upon me, and if when +he discharged his knowledge on the public, I might be said rather to +have picked it up than to have learnt it from him. What then is our +reason for owing them much? It is, not that what they have sold us is +worth more than we paid for it, but that they have given something to us +personally. Suppose that my physician has spent more consideration upon +my case than was professionally necessary; that it was for me, not for +his own credit, that he feared: that he was not satisfied with pointing +out remedies, but himself applied them, that he sat by my bedside among +my anxious friends, and came to see me at the crises of my disorder; +that no service was too troublesome or too disgusting for him to +perform; that he did not hear my groans unmoved; that among the numbers +who called for him I was his favourite case; and that he gave the others +only so much time as his care of my health permitted him: I should feel +obliged to such a man not as to a physician, but as to a friend. Suppose +again that my teacher endured labour and weariness in instructing me; +that he taught me something more than is taught by all masters alike; +that he roused my better feelings by his encouragement, and that at +one time he would raise my spirits by praise, and at another warn me +to shake off slothfulness: that he laid his hand, as it were, upon my +latent and torpid powers of intellect and drew them out into the light +of day; that he did not stingily dole out to me what he knew, in order +that he might be wanted for a longer time, but was eager, if possible, +to pour all his learning into me; then I am ungrateful, if I do not love +him as much as I love my nearest relatives and my dearest friends. + +XVII. We give something additional even to those who teach the meanest +trades, if their efforts appear to be extraordinary; we bestow a +gratuity upon pilots, upon workmen who deal with the commonest materials +and hire themselves out by the day. In the noblest arts, however, those +which either preserve or beautify our lives, a man would be ungrateful +who thinks he owes the artist no more than he bargained for. Besides +this, the teaching of such learning as we have spoken of blends mind +with mind; now when this takes place, both in the case of the physician +and of the teacher the price of his work is paid, but that of his mind +remains owing. + +XVIII. Plato once crossed a river, and as the ferryman did not ask him +for anything, he supposed that he had let him pass free out of respect, +and said that the ferryman had laid Plato under an obligation. Shortly +afterwards, seeing the ferryman take one person after another across the +river with the same pains, and without charging anything, Plato declared +that the ferryman had not laid him under an obligation. If you wish me +to be grateful for what you give, you must not merely give it to me, but +show that you mean it specially for me; you cannot make any claim upon +one for having given him what you fling away broad-cast among the crowd. +What then? shall I owe you nothing for it? Nothing, as an individual; I +will pay, when the rest of mankind do, what I owe no more than they. + +XIX. "Do you say," inquires my opponent, "that he who carries me gratis +in a boat across the river Po, does not bestow any benefit upon me?" I +do. He does me some good, but he does not bestow a benefit upon me; for +he does it for his own sake, or at any rate not for mine; in short, he +himself does not imagine that he is bestowing a benefit upon me, but +does it for the credit of the State, or of the neighbourhood, or of +himself, and expects some return for doing so, different from what he +would receive from individual passengers. "Well," asks my opponent, "if +the emperor were to grant the franchise to all the Gauls, or exemption, +from taxes to all the Spaniards, would each individual of them owe him +nothing on that account?" Of course he would: but he would be indebted +to him, not as having personally received a benefit intended for himself +alone, but as a partaker in one conferred upon his nation. He would +argue, "The emperor had no thought of me at the time when he benefited +us all; he did not care to give me the franchise separately, he did not +fix his attention upon me; why then should I be grateful to one who did +not have me in his mind when he was thinking of doing what he did? In +answer to this, I say that when he thought of doing good to all the +Gauls, he thought of doing good to me also, for I was a Gaul, and he +included me under my national, if not under my personal appellation. In +like manner, I should feel grateful to him, not as for a personal, but +for a general benefit; being only one of the people, I should regard +the debt of gratitude as incurred, not by myself, but by my country, and +should not pay it myself, but only contribute my share towards doing so. +I do not call a man my creditor because he has lent money to my country, +nor should I include that money in a schedule of my debts were I either +a candidate for a public office, or a defendant in the courts; yet I +would pay my share towards extinguishing such a debt. Similarly, I deny +that I am laid under an obligation by a gift bestowed upon my entire +nation, because although the giver gave it to me, yet he did not do so +for my sake, but gave it without knowing whether he was giving it to me +or not: nevertheless I should feel that I owed something for the +gift, because it did reach me, though not directly. To lay me under an +obligation, a thing must be done for my sake alone." + +XX. "According to this," argues our opponent, "you are under no +obligation to the sun or the moon; for they do not move for your sake +alone." No, but since they move with the object of preserving the +balance of the universe, they move for my sake also, seeing that I am +a fraction of the universe. Besides, our position and theirs is not the +same, for he who does me good in order that he may by my means do good +to himself, does not bestow a benefit upon me, because he merely makes +use of me as an instrument for his own advantage; whereas the sun and +the moon, even if they do us good for their own sakes, still cannot do +good to us in order that by our means they may do good to themselves, +for what is there which we can bestow upon them? + +XXI. "I should be sure," replies he, "that the sun and the moon wished +to do us good, if they were able to refuse to do so; but they cannot +help moving as they do. In short, let them stop and discontinue their +work." + +See now, in how many ways this argument may be refuted. One who cannot +refuse to do a thing may nevertheless wish to do it; indeed there is no +greater proof of a fixed desire to do anything, than not to be able to +alter one's determination. A good man cannot leave undone what he does: +for unless he does it he will not be a good man. Is a good man, then, +not able to bestow a benefit, because he does what he ought to do, and +is not able not to do what he ought to do? Besides this, it makes +a great difference whether you say, "He is not able not to do this, +because he is forced to do it," or "He is not able to wish not to do +it;" for, if he could not help doing it, then I am not indebted for it +to him, but to the person who forced him to do it; if he could not help +wishing for it because he had nothing better to wish for, then it is he +who forces himself to do it, and in this case the debt which as acting +under compulsion he could not claim, is due to him as compelling +himself. + +"Let the sun and moon cease to wish to benefit us," says our adversary. +I answer, "Remember what has been said. Who can be so crazy as to refuse +the name of free-will to that which has no danger of ceasing to act, and +of adopting the opposite course, since, on the contrary, he whose will +is fixed for ever, must be thought to wish more earnestly than any one +else. Surely if he, who may at any moment change his mind, can be said +to wish, we must not deny the existence of will in a being whose nature +does not admit of change of mind." + +XXII. "Well," says he "let them stop, if it be possible." What you say +is this:--"Let all those heavenly bodies, placed as they are at vast +distances from each other, and arranged to preserve the balance of the +universe, leave their appointed posts: let sudden confusion arise, +so that constellations may collide with constellations, that the +established harmony of all things may be destroyed and the works of God +be shaken into ruin; let the whole frame of the rapidly moving heavenly +bodies abandon in mid career those movements which we were assured would +endure for ages, and let those which now by their regular advance and +retreat keep the world at a moderate temperature, be instantly consumed +by fire, so that instead of the infinite variety of the seasons all may +be reduced to one uniform condition; let fire rage everywhere, followed +by dull night, and let the bottomless abyss swallow up all the gods." Is +it worth while to destroy all this merely in order to refute you? Even +though you do not wish it, they do you good, and they wheel in their +courses for your sake, though their motion may be due to some earlier +and more important cause. + +XXIII. Besides this, the gods act under no external constraint, but +their own will is a law to them for all time. They have established an +order which is not to be changed, and consequently it is impossible that +they should appear to be likely to do anything against their will, since +they wish to continue doing whatever they cannot cease from doing, and +they never regret their original decision, No doubt it is impossible for +them to stop short, or to desert to the other side, but it is so for no +other reason than that their own force holds them to their purpose. It +is from no weakness that they persevere; no, they have no mind to leave +the best course, and by this it is fated that they should proceed. When, +at the time of the original creation, they arranged the entire universe, +they paid attention to us as well as to the rest, and took thought about +the human race; and for this reason we cannot suppose that it is merely +for their own pleasure that they move in their orbits and display their +work since we also are a part of that work. We are, therefore; under +an obligation to the sun and moon and the rest of the heavenly host, +because, although they may rise in order to bestow more important +benefits than those which we receive from them, yet they do bestow these +upon us as they pass on their way to greater things. Besides this, they +assist us of set purpose, and, therefore, lay us under an obligation, +because we do not in their case stumble by chance upon a benefit +bestowed by one who knew not what he was doing, but they knew that we +should receive from them the advantages which we do; so that, though +they may have some higher aim, though the result of their movements may +be something of greater importance than the preservation of the human +race, yet from the beginning thought has been directed to our comforts, +and the scheme of the world has been arranged in a fashion which proves +that our interests were neither their least nor last concern. It is our +duty to show filial love for our parents, although many of them had no +thought of children when they married. Not so with the gods: they cannot +but have known what they were doing when they furnished mankind with +food and comforts. Those for whose advantage so much was created, could +not have been created without design. Nature conceived the idea of us +before she formed us, and, indeed, we are no such trifling piece of work +as could have fallen from her hands unheeded. See how great privileges +she has bestowed upon us, how far beyond the human race the empire of +mankind extends; consider how widely she allows us to roam, not having +restricted us to the land alone, but permitted us to traverse every part +of herself; consider, too, the audacity of our intellect, the only one +which knows of the gods or seeks for them, and how we can raise our mind +high above the earth, and commune with those divine influences: you will +perceive that man is not a hurriedly put together, or an unstudied piece +of work. Among her noblest products nature has none of which she can +boast more than man, and assuredly no other which can comprehend her +boast. What madness is this, to call the gods in question for their +bounty? If a man declares that he has received nothing when he is +receiving all the while, and from those who will always be giving +without ever receiving anything in return, how will he be grateful to +those whose kindness cannot be returned without expense? and how great a +mistake is it not to be thankful to a giver, because he is good even to +him who disowns him, or to use the fact of his bounty being poured upon +us in an uninterrupted stream, as an argument to prove that he cannot +help bestowing it. Suppose that such men as these say, "I do not want +it," "Let him keep it to himself," "Who asks him for it?" and so forth, +with all the other speeches of insolent minds: still, he whose bounty +reaches you, although you say that it does not, lays you under an +obligation nevertheless; indeed, perhaps the greatest part of the +benefit which he bestows is that he is ready to give even when you are +complaining against him. + +XXIV. Do you not see how parents force children during their infancy +to undergo what is useful for their health? Though the children cry and +struggle, they swathe them and bind their limbs straight lest premature +liberty should make them grow crooked, afterwards instill into them a +liberal education, threatening those who are unwilling to learn, and +finally, if spirited young men do not conduct themselves frugally, +modestly, and respectably, they compel them to do so. Force and harsh +measures are used even to youths who have grown up and are their own +masters, if they, either from fear or from insolence, refuse to take +what is good for them. Thus the greatest benefits that we receive, +we receive either without knowing it, or against our will, from our +parents. + +XXV. Those persons who are ungrateful and repudiate benefits, not +because they do not wish to receive them, but in order that they may not +be laid under an obligation for them, are like those who fall into the +opposite extreme, and are over grateful, who pray that some trouble or +misfortune may befall their benefactors to give them an opportunity +of proving how gratefully they remember the benefit which they have +received. It is a question whether they are right, and show a truly +dutiful feeling; their state of mind is morbid, like that of frantic +lovers who long for their mistress to be exiled, that they may accompany +her when she leaves her country forsaken by all her friends, or that she +may be poor in order that she may the more need what they give her, or +who long that she may be ill in order that they may sit by her bedside, +and who, in short, out of sheer love form the same wishes as her enemies +would wish for her. Thus the results of hatred and of frantic love are +very nearly the same; and these lovers are very like those who hope that +their friends may meet with difficulties which they may remove, and who +thus do a wrong that they may bestow a benefit, whereas it would have +been much better for them to do nothing, than by a crime to gain an +opportunity of doing good service. What should we say of a pilot who +prayed to the gods for dreadful storms and tempests, in order that +danger might make his skill more highly esteemed? what of a general who +should pray that a vast number of the enemy surround his camp, fill +the ditches by a sudden charge, tear down the rampart round his +panic-stricken army, and plant its hostile standards at the very gates, +in order that he might gain more glory by restoring his broken ranks and +shattered fortunes? All such men confer their benefits upon us by odious +means, for they beg the gods to harm those whom they mean to help, and +wish them to be struck down before they raise them up; it is a cruel +feeling, brought about by a distorted sense of gratitude, to wish evil +to befall one whom one is bound in honour to succour. + +XXVI. "My wish," argues our opponent, "does him no harm, because when +I wish for the danger I wish for the rescue at the same time." What you +mean by this is not that you do no wrong, but that you do less than if +you wished that the danger might befall him, without wishing for the +rescue. It is wicked to throw a man into the water in order that you may +pull him out, to throw him down that you may raise him up, or to shut +him up that you may release him. You do not bestow a benefit upon a man +by ceasing to wrong him, nor can it ever be a piece of good service to +anyone to remove from him a burden which you yourself imposed on him. +True, you may cure the hurt which you inflict, but I had rather that you +did not hurt me at all. You may gain my gratitude by curing me because I +am wounded, but not by wounding me in order that you may cure me: no man +likes scars except as compared with wounds, which he is glad to see thus +healed, though he had rather not have received them. It would be cruel +to wish such things to befall one from whom you had never received a +kindness; how much more cruel is it to wish that they may befall one in +whose debt you are. + +XXVII. "I pray," replies he, "at the same time, that I may be able to +help him." In the first place, if I stop you short in the middle of your +prayer, it shows at once that you are ungrateful: I have not yet heard +what you wish to do for him; I have heard what you wish him to suffer. +You pray that anxiety and fear and even worse evil than this may come +upon him. You desire that he may need aid: this is to his disadvantage; +you desire that he may need your aid: this is to your advantage. You do +not wish to help him, but to be set free from your obligation to him: +for when you are eager to repay your debt in such a way as this, you +merely wish to be set free from the debt, not to repay it. So the only +part of your wish that could be thought honourable proves to be the base +and ungrateful feeling of unwillingness to lie under an obligation: for +what you wish for is, not that you may have an opportunity of repaying +his kindness, but that he may be forced to beg you to do him a kindness. +You make yourself the superior, and you wickedly degrade beneath your +feet the man who has done you good service. How much better would it be +to remain in his debt in an honourable and friendly manner, than to seek +to discharge the debt by these evil means! You would be less to blame if +you denied that you had received it, for your benefactor would then +lose nothing more than what he gave you, whereas now you wish him to be +rendered inferior to you, and brought by the loss of his property and +social position into a condition below his own benefits. Do you think +yourself grateful? Just utter your wishes in the hearing of him to whom +you wish to do good. Do you call that a prayer for his welfare, which +can be divided between his friend and his enemy, which, if the last part +were omitted, you would not doubt was pronounced, by one who opposed and +hated him? Enemies in war have sometimes wished to capture certain +towns in order to spare them, or to conquer certain persons in order +to pardon, them, yet these were the wishes of enemies, and what was the +kindest part of them began by cruelty. Finally, what sort of prayers do +you think those can be which he, on whose behalf they are made, hopes +more earnestly than any one else may not be granted? In hoping that +the gods may injure a man, and that you may help him, you deal most +dishonourably with him, and you do not treat the gods themselves fairly, +for you give them the odious part to play, and reserve the generous one +for yourself: the gods must do him wrong in order that you may do him +a service. If you were to suborn an informer to accuse a man, and +afterwards withdrew him, if you engaged a man in a law suit and +afterwards gave it up, no one would hesitate to call you a villain: what +difference does it make, whether you attempt to do this by chicanery +or by prayer, unless it be that by prayer you raise up more powerful +enemies to him than by the other means? You cannot say "Why, what harm +do I do him?" your prayer is either futile or harmful, indeed it is +harmful even though nothing comes of it. You do your friend wrong by +wishing him harm: you must thank the gods that you do him no harm. The +fact of your wishing it is enough: we ought to be just as angry with you +as if you had effected it. + +XXVIII. "If," argues our adversary, "my prayers had any efficacy, they +would also have been efficacious to save him from danger." In the first +place, I reply, the danger into which you wish me to fall is certain, +the help which I should receive is uncertain. Or call them both certain; +it is that which injures me that comes first. Besides, YOU understand +the terms of your wish; _I_ shall be tossed by the storm without being +sure that I have a haven of rest at hand. + +Think what torture it must have been to me, even if I receive your help, +to have stood in need of it: if I escape safely, to have trembled for +myself; if I be acquitted, to have had to plead my cause. To escape from +fear, however great it may be, can never be so pleasant as to live in +sound unassailable safety. Pray that you may return my kindnesses when I +need their return, but do not pray that I may need them. You would have +done what you prayed for, had it been in your power. + +XXIX. How far more honourable would a prayer of this sort be: "I pray +that he may remain in such a position as that he may always bestow +benefits and never need them: may he be attended by the means of giving +and helping, of which he makes such a bountiful use; may he never want +benefits to bestow, or be sorry for any which he has bestowed; may his +nature, fitted as it is for acts of pity, goodness, and clemency, be +stimulated and brought out by numbers of grateful persons, whom I trust +he will find without needing to make trial of their gratitude; may +he refuse to be reconciled to no one, and may no one require to be +reconciled to him: may fortune so uniformly continue to favour him that +no one may be able to return his kindness in any way except by feeling +grateful to him." + +How far more proper are such prayers as these, which do not put you off +to some distant opportunity, but express your gratitude at once? What is +there to prevent your returning your benefactor's kindness, even while +he is in prosperity? How many ways are there by which we can repay what +we owe even to the affluent--for instance, by honest advice, by constant +intercourse, by courteous conversation, pleasing him without flattering +him, by listening attentively to any subject which he may wish to +discuss, by keeping safe any secret that he may impart to us, and by +social intercourse. There is no one so highly placed by fortune as not +to want a friend all the more because he wants nothing. + +XXX. The other is a melancholy opportunity, and one which we ought +always to pray may be kept far from us: must the gods be angry with +a man in order that you may prove your gratitude to him? Do you not +perceive that you are doing wrong, from the very fact that those to +whom you are ungrateful fare better? Call up before your mind dungeons, +chains, wretchedness, slavery, war, poverty: these are the opportunities +for which you pray; if any one has any dealings with you, it is by means +of these that you square your account. Why not rather wish that he to +whom you owe most may be powerful and happy? for, as I have just said, +what is there to prevent your returning the kindness even of those +who enjoy the greatest prosperity? to do which, ample and various +opportunities will present themselves to you, What! do you not know that +a debt can be paid even to a rich man? Nor will I trouble you with many +instances of what you may do. Though a man's riches and prosperity may +prevent your making him any other repayment, I will show you what the +highest in the land stand in need of, what is wanting to those who +possess everything. They want a man to speak the truth, to save them +from the organized mass of falsehood by which they are beset, which so +bewilders them with lies that the habit of hearing only what is pleasant +instead of what is true, prevents their knowing what truth really is. Do +you not see how such persons are driven to ruin by the want of candour +among their friends, whose loyalty has degenerated into slavish +obsequiousness? No one, when giving them his advice, tells them what he +really thinks, but each vies with the other in flattery; and while the +man's friends make it their only object to see who can most pleasantly +deceive him, he himself is ignorant of his real powers, and, believing +himself to be as great a man as he is told that he is, plunges the State +in useless wars, which bring disasters upon it, breaks off a useful and +necessary peace, and, through a passion of anger which no one checks, +spills the blood of numbers of people, and at last sheds his own. +Such persons assert what has never been investigated as certain facts, +consider that to modify their opinion is as dishonourable as to be +conquered, believe that institutions which are just flickering out of +existence will last for ever, and, thus overturn great States, to the +destruction of themselves and all who are connected with them. Living +as they do in a fool's paradise, resplendent with unreal and short-lived +advantages, they forget that, as soon as they put it out of their power +to hear the truth, there is no limit to the misfortunes which they may +expect. + +XXXI. When Xerxes declared war against Greece, all his courtiers +encouraged his boastful temper, which forgot how unsubstantial his +grounds for confidence were. One declared that the Greeks would not +endure to hear the news of the declaration of war, and would take to +flight at the first rumour of his approach; another, that with such a +vast army Greece could not only be conquered, but utterly overwhelmed, +and that it was rather to be feared that they would find the Greek +cities empty and abandoned, and that the panic flight of the enemy +would leave them only vast deserts, where no use could be made of their +enormous forces. Another told him that the world was hardly large enough +to contain him, that the seas were too narrow for his fleets, the camps +would not take in his armies, the plains were not wide enough to deploy +his cavalry in, and that the sky itself was scarcely large enough to +enable all his troops to hurl their darts at once. While much boasting +of this sort was going on around him, raising his already overweening +self-confidence to a frantic pitch, Demaratus, the Lacedaemonian, +alone told him that the disorganized and unwieldy multitude in which he +trusted, was in itself a danger to its chief, because it possessed +only weight without strength; for an army which is too large cannot +be governed, and one which cannot be governed, cannot long exist. "The +Lacedaemonians," said he, "will meet you upon the first mountain in +Greece, and will give you a taste of their quality. All these thousands +of nations of yours will be held in check by three hundred men: they +will stand firm at their posts, they will defend the passes entrusted to +them with their weapons, and block them up with their bodies: all Asia +will not force them to give way; few as they are, they will stop all +this terrible invasion, attempted though it be by nearly the whole human +race. Though the laws of nature may give way to you, and enable you to +pass from Europe to Asia, yet you will stop short in a bypath; consider +what your losses will be afterwards, when you have reckoned up the price +which you have to pay for the pass of Thermopylae; when you learn that +your march can be stayed, you will discover that you may be put to +flight. The Greeks will yield up many parts of their country to you, as +if they were swept out of them by the first terrible rush of a mountain +torrent; afterwards they will rise against you from all quarters and +will crush you by means of your own strength. What people say, that +your warlike preparations are too great to be contained in the +countries which you intend to attack, is quite true; but this is to our +disadvantage. Greece will conquer you for this very reason, that she +cannot contain you; you cannot make use of the whole of your force. +Besides this, you will not be able to do what is essential to +victory--that is, to meet the manoeuvres of the enemy at once, to +support your own men if they give way, or to confirm and strengthen +them when their ranks are wavering; long before you know it, you will +be defeated. Moreover, you should not think that because your army is +so large that its own chief does not know its numbers, it is therefore +irresistible; there is nothing so great that it cannot perish; nay, +without any other cause, its own excessive size may prove its ruin." +What Demaratus predicted came to pass. He whose power gods and men +obeyed, and who swept away all that opposed him, was bidden to halt by +three hundred men, and the Persians, defeated in every part of Greece, +learned how great a difference there is between a mob and an army. Thus +it came to pass that Xerxes, who suffered more from the shame of his +failure than from the losses which he sustained, thanked Demaratus for +having been the only man who told him the truth, and permitted him to +ask what boon he pleased. He asked to be allowed to drive a chariot into +Sardis, the largest city in Asia, wearing a tiara erect upon his head, +a privilege which was enjoyed by kings alone. He deserved his reward +before he asked for it, but how wretched must the nation have been, in +which there was no one who would speak the truth to the king except one +man who did not speak it to himself. + +XXXII. The late Emperor Augustus banished his daughter, whose conduct +went beyond the shame of ordinary immodesty, and made public the +scandals of the imperial house. + +Led away by his passion, he divulged all these crimes which, as emperor, +he ought to have kept secret with as much care as he punished them, +because the shame of some deeds asperses even him who avenges them. +Afterwards, when by lapse of time shame took the place of anger in his +mind, he lamented that he had not kept silence about matters which he +had not learned until it was disgraceful to speak of them, and often +used to exclaim, "None of these things would have happened to me, if +either Agrippa or Maecenas had lived!" So hard was it for the master +of so many thousands of men to repair the loss of two. When his legions +were slaughtered, new ones were at once enrolled; when his fleet was +wrecked, within a few days another was afloat; when the public buildings +were consumed by fire, finer ones arose in their stead; but the places +of Agrippa and Maecenas remained unfilled throughout his life. What am I +to imagine? that there were not any men like these, who could take +their place, or that it was the fault of Augustus himself, who preferred +mourning for them to seeking for their likes? We have no reason for +supposing that it was the habit of Agrippa or Maecenas to speak the +truth to him; indeed, if they had lived they would have been as great +dissemblers as the rest. It is one of the habits of kings to insult +their present servants by praising those whom they have lost, and to +attribute the virtue of truthful speaking to those from whom there is no +further risk of hearing it. + +XXXIII. However, to return to my subject, you see how easy it is to +return the kindness of the prosperous, and even of those who occupy the +highest places of all mankind. Tell them, not what they wish to hear, +but what they will wish that they always had heard; though their ears be +stopped by flatteries, yet sometimes truth may penetrate them; give them +useful advice. Do you ask what service you can render to a prosperous +man? Teach him not to rely upon his prosperity, and to understand that +it ought to be supported by the hands of many trusty friends. Will you +not have done much for him, if you take away his foolish belief that +his influence will endure for ever, and teach him that what we gain by +chance passes away soon, and at a quicker rate than it came; that we +cannot fall by the same stages by which we rose to the height of good +fortune, but that frequently between it and ruin there is but one step? +You do not know how great is the value of friendship, if you do not +understand how much you give to him to whom you give a friend, a +commodity which is scarce not only in men's houses, but in whole +centuries, and which is nowhere scarcer than in the places where it is +thought to be most plentiful. Pray, do you suppose that those books of +names, which your nomenclator [Footnote: The nomenclator was a slave +who attended his master in canvassing and on similar occasions, for +the purpose of telling him the names of whom he met in the street.] can +hardly carry or remember, are those of friends? It is not your friends +who crowd to knock at your door, and who are admitted to your greater or +lesser levees. + +XXXIV. To divide one's friends into classes is an old trick of kings and +their imitators; it shows great arrogance to think that to touch or +to pass one's threshold can be a valuable privilege, or to grant as an +honour that you should sit nearer one's front door than others, or enter +house before them, although within the house there are many more doors, +which shut out even those who have been admitted so far. With us Gaius +Gracchus, and shortly after him Livius Drusus, were the first to keep +themselves apart from the mass of their adherents, and to admit some to +their privacy, some to their more select, and others to their general +receptions. These men consequently had friends of the first and second +rank, and so on, but in none had they true friends. Can you apply the +name of friend to one who is admitted in his regular order to pay his +respects to you? or can you expect perfect loyalty from one who is +forced to slip into your presence through a grudgingly-opened door? How +can a man arrive at using bold freedom of speech with you, if he is only +allowed in his proper turn to make use of the common phrase, "Hail to +you," which is used by perfect strangers? Whenever you go to any of +these great men, whose levees interest the whole city, though you find +all the streets beset with throngs of people, and the passers-by hardly +able to make their way through the crowd, you may be sure that you +have come to a place where there are many men, but no friends of their +patron. We must not seek our friends in our entrance hall, but in our +own breast; it is there that he ought to be received, there retained, +and hoarded up in our minds. Teach this, and you will have repaid your +debt of gratitude. + +XXXV. If you are useful to your friend only when he is in distress, and +are superfluous when all goes well with him, you form a mean estimate +of your own value. As you can bear yourself wisely both in doubtful, +in prosperous, and in adverse circumstances, by showing prudence in +doubtful cases, courage in misfortune, and self-restraint in good +fortune, so in all circumstances you can make yourself useful to your +friend. Do not desert him in adversity, but do not wish that it may +befall him: the various incidents of human life will afford you many +opportunities of proving your loyalty to him without wishing him evil. +He who prays that another may become rich, in order that he may share +his riches, really has a view to his own advantage, although his prayers +are ostensibly offered in behalf of his friend; and similarly he who +wishes that his friend may get into some trouble from which his own +friendly assistance may extricate him--a most ungrateful wish--prefers +himself to his friend, and thinks it worthwhile that his friend should +be unhappy, in order that he may prove his gratitude. This very wish +makes him ungrateful, for he wishes to rid himself of his gratitude as +though it were a heavy burden. In returning a kindness it makes a great +difference whether you are eager to bestow a benefit, or merely to free +yourself from a debt. He who wishes to return a benefit will study his +friend's interests, and will hope that a suitable occasion will arise; +he who only wishes to free himself from an obligation will be eager to +do so by any means whatever, which shows very bad feeling. "Do you say," +we may be asked, "that eagerness to repay kindness belongs to a morbid +feeling of gratitude?" I cannot explain my meaning more clearly than +by repeating what I have already said. You do not want to repay, but to +escape from the benefit which you have received. You seem to say, "When +shall I get free from this obligation? I must strive by any means in my +power to extinguish my debt to him." You would be thought to be far from +grateful, if you wished to pay a debt to him with his own money; yet +this wish of yours is even more unjust; for you invoke curses upon him, +and call down terrible imprecations upon the head of one who ought to +be held sacred by you. No one, I suppose, would have any doubt of your +wickedness if you were openly to pray that he might suffer poverty, +captivity, hunger, or fear; yet what is the difference between openly +praying for some of these things, and silently wishing for them? for +you do wish for some of these. Go, and enjoy your belief that this is +gratitude, to do what not even an ungrateful man would do, supposing he +confined himself to repudiating the benefit, and did not go so far as to +hate his benefactor. + +XXXVI. Who would call Aeneas pious, if he wished that his native +city might be captured, in order that he might save his father from +captivity? Who would point to the Sicilian youths as good examples for +his children, if they had prayed that Aetna might flame with unusual +heat and pour forth a vast mass of fire in order to afford them an +opportunity of displaying their filial affection by rescuing their +parents from the midst of the conflagration? Rome owes Scipio nothing +if he kept the Punic War alive in order that he might have the glory of +finishing it; she owes nothing to the Decii if they prayed for public +disasters, to give themselves an opportunity of displaying their brave +self-devotion. It is the greatest scandal for a physician to make work +for himself; and many who have aggravated the diseases of their patients +that they may have the greater credit for curing them, have either +failed to cure them, at all or have done so at the cost of the most +terrible suffering to their victims. + +XXXVII. It is said (at any rate Hecaton tells us) that when Callistratus +with many others was driven into exile by his factious and licentiously +free country, some one prayed that such trouble might befall the +Athenians that they would be forced to recall the exiles, on hearing +which, he prayed that God might forbid his return upon such terms. When +some one tried to console our own countryman, Rutilius, for his exile, +pointing out that civil war was at hand, and that all exiles would soon +be restored to Rome, he answered with even greater spirit, "What harm +have I done you, that you should wish that I may return to my country +more unhappily than I quit it? My wish is, that my country should blush +at my being banished, rather than that she should mourn at my having +returned." An exile, of which every one is more ashamed than the +sufferer, is not exile at all. These two persons, who did not wish to be +restored to their homes at the cost of a public disaster, but preferred +that two should suffer unjustly than that all should suffer alike, are +thought to have acted like good citizens; and in like manner it does not +accord with the character of a grateful man, to wish that his benefactor +may fall into troubles which he may dispel; because, even though he may +mean well to him, yet he wishes him evil. To put out a fire which you +yourself have lighted, will not even gain acquittal for you, let alone +credit. + +XXXVIII. In some states an evil wish was regarded as a crime. It is +certain that at Athens Demades obtained a verdict against one who sold +furniture for funerals, by proving that he had prayed for great gains, +which he could not obtain without the death of many persons. Yet it is +a stock question whether he was rightly found guilty. Perhaps he prayed, +not that he might sell his wares to many persons, but that he might sell +them dear, or that he might procure what he was going to sell, cheaply. +Since his business consisted of buying and selling, why should you +consider his prayer to apply to one branch of it only, although he made +profit from both? Besides this, you might find every one of his trade +guilty, for they all wish, that is, secretly pray, as he did. You might, +moreover, find a great part of the human race guilty, for who is there +who does not profit by his neighbour's wants? A soldier, if he wishes +for glory, must wish for war; the farmer profits by corn being dear; +a large number of litigants raises the price of forensic eloquence; +physicians make money by a sickly season; dealers in luxuries are +made rich by the effeminacy of youth; suppose that no storms and no +conflagrations injured our dwellings, the builder's trade would be at a +standstill. The prayer of one man was detected, but it was just like the +prayers of all other men. Do you imagine that Arruntius and Haterius, +and all other professional legacy-hunters do not put up the same prayers +as undertakers and grave-diggers? though the latter know not whose death +it is that they wish for, while the former wish for the death of their +dearest friends, from whom, on account of their intimacy, they have most +hopes of inheriting a fortune. No one's life does the undertaker any +harm, whereas these men starve if their friends are long about dying; +they do not, therefore, merely wish for their deaths in order that they +may receive what they have earned by a disgraceful servitude, but in +order that they may be set free from a heavy tax. There can, therefore, +be no doubt that such persons repeat with even greater earnestness the +prayer for which the undertaker was condemned, for whoever is likely to +profit such men by dying, does them an injury by living. Yet the wishes +of all these are alike well known and unpunished. Lastly, let every man +examine his own self, let him look into the secret thoughts of his heart +and consider what it is that he silently hopes for; how many of his +prayers he would blush to acknowledge, even to himself; how few there +are which we could repeat in the presence of witnesses! + +XXXIX. Yet we must not condemn every thing which we find worthy of +blame, as, for instance, this wish about our friends which we have been +discussing, arises from a misdirected feeling of affection, and falls +into the very error which it strives to avoid, for the man is ungrateful +at the very time when he hurries to prove his gratitude. He prays aloud, +"May he fall into my power, may he need my influence, may not be able +to be safe and respectable without my aid, may he be so unfortunate that +whatever return I make to him may be regarded as a benefit." To the +gods alone he adds, "May domestic treasons encompass him, which can be +quelled by me alone; may some powerful and virulent enemy, some excited +and armed mob, assail him; may he be set upon by a creditor or an +informer." + +XL. See, how just you are; you would never have wished any of these +misfortunes to befall him, if he had not bestowed a benefit upon you. +Not to speak of the graver guilt which you incur by returning evil for +good, you distinctly do wrong in not waiting for the fitting time for +each action, for it is as wrong to anticipate this as it is not to take +it when it comes. A benefit ought not always to be accepted, and ought +not in all cases to be returned. If you were to return it to me against +my will, you would be ungrateful, how much more ungrateful are you, if +you force me to wish for it? Wait patiently; why are you unwilling to +let my bounty abide with you? Why do you chafe at being laid under an +obligation? why, as though you were dealing with a harsh usurer, are you +in such a hurry to sign and seal an equivalent bond? Why do you wish me +to get into trouble? Why do you call upon the gods to ruin me? If this +is your way of returning a kindness, what would you do if you were +exacting repayment of a debt? + +XLI. Above all, therefore, my Liberalis, let us learn to live calmly +under an obligation to others, and watch for opportunities of repaying +our debt without manufacturing them. Let us remember that this +anxiety to seize the first opportunity of setting ourselves free shows +ingratitude; for no one repays with good will that which he is unwilling +to owe, and his eagerness to get it out of his hands shows that he +regards it as a burden rather than as a favour. How much better and more +righteous is it to bear in mind what we owe to our friends, and to offer +repayment, not to obtrude it, nor to think ourselves too much indebted; +because a benefit is a common bond which connects two persons. Say "I do +not delay to repay your kindness to me; I hope that you will accept my +gratitude cheerfully. If irresistible fate hangs over either of us, and +destiny rules either that you must receive your benefit back again, or +that I must receive a second benefit, why then, of us two, let him give +that was wont to give. I am ready to receive it. + + "'Tis not the part of Turnus to delay." + +That is the spirit which I shall show whenever the time comes; in the +meanwhile the gods shall be my witnesses. + +XLII. I have noted in you, my Liberalis, and as it were touched with my +hand a feeling of fussy anxiety not to be behindhand in doing what is +your duty. This anxiety is not suitable to a grateful mind, which, +on the contrary, produces the utmost confidence in oneself, and which +drives away all trouble by the consciousness of real affection towards +one's benefactor. To say "Take back what you gave me," is no less +a reproach than to say "You are in my debt." Let this be the first +privilege of a benefit, that he who bestowed it may choose the time when +he will have it returned. "But I fear that men may speak ill of me." You +do wrong if you are grateful only for the sake of your reputation, and +not to satisfy your conscience. You have in this matter two judges, your +benefactor, whom you ought not, and yourself, whom you cannot deceive. +"But," say you, "if no occasion of repayment offers, am I always to +remain in his debt?" Yes; but you should do so openly, and willingly, +and should view with great pleasure what he has entrusted to you. If you +are vexed at not having yet returned a benefit, you must be sorry that +you ever received it; but if he deserved that you should receive a +benefit from him, why should he not deserve that you should long remain +in his debt? + +XLIII. Those persons are much mistaken who regard it as a proof of a +great mind to make offers to give, and to fill many men's pockets and +houses with their presents, for sometimes these are due not to a great +mind, but to a great fortune; they do not know how far more great and +more difficult it sometimes is to receive than to lavish gifts. I must +disparage neither act; it is as proper to a noble heart to owe as to +receive, for both are of equal value when done virtuously; indeed, to +owe is the more difficult, because it requires more pains to keep a +thing safe than to give it away. We ought not therefore to be in a hurry +to repay, nor need we seek to do so out of due season, for to hasten to +make repayment at the wrong time is as bad as to be slow to do so at the +right time. My benefactor has entrusted his bounty to me: I ought not +to have any fears either on his behalf or on my own. He has a sufficient +security; he cannot lose it except he loses me--nay, not even if he +loses me. I have returned thanks to him for it--that is, I have requited +him. He who thinks too much about repaying a benefit must suppose that +his friend thinks too much about receiving repayment. Make no difficulty +about either course. If he wishes to receive his benefit back again, +let us return it cheerfully; if he prefers to leave it in our hands, +why should we dig up his treasure? why should we decline to be its +guardians? he deserves to be allowed to do whichever he pleases. As +for fame and reputation, let us regard them as matters which ought to +accompany, but which ought not to direct our actions. + + + + +BOOK VII. + +I. + + + Be of good cheer, my Liberalis: + + "Our port is close, and I will not delay, + Nor by digressions wander from the way." + +This book collects together all that has been omitted, and in it, having +exhausted my subject, I shall consider not what I am to say, but what +there is which I have not yet said. If there be anything superfluous +in it, I pray you take it in good part, since it is for you that it is +superfluous. Had I wished to set off my work to the best advantage, I +ought to have added to it by degrees, and to have kept for the last that +part which would be eagerly perused even by a sated reader. However, +instead of this, I have collected together all that was essential in the +beginning; I am now collecting together whatever then escaped me; nor, +by Hercules, if you ask me, do I think that, after the rules which +govern our conduct have been stated, it is very much to the purpose to +discuss the other questions which have been raised more for the exercise +of our intellects than for the health of our minds. The cynic Demetrius, +who in my opinion was a great man even if compared with the greatest +philosophers, had an admirable saying about this, that one gained more +by having a few wise precepts ready and in common use than by learning +many without having them at hand. "The best wrestler," he would say, "is +not he who has learned thoroughly all the tricks and twists of the art, +which are seldom met with in actual wrestling, but he who has well and +carefully trained himself in one or two of them, and watches keenly for +an opportunity of practising them. It does not matter how many of them +he knows, if he knows enough to give him the victory; and so in +this subject of ours there are many points of interest, but few of +importance. You need not know what is the system of the ocean tides, +why each seventh year leaves its mark upon the human body, why the more +distant parts of a long portico do not keep their true proportion, +but seem to approach one another until at last the spaces between the +columns disappear, how it can be that twins are conceived separately, +though they are born together, whether both result from one, or each +from a separate act, why those whose birth was the same should have such +different fates in life, and dwell at the greatest possible distance +from one another, although they were born touching one another; it will +not do you much harm to pass over matters which we are not permitted to +know, and which we should not profit by knowing. Truths so obscure may +be neglected with impunity. [Footnote: The old saying, 'Truth lurks deep +in a well (or abyss).'] Nor can we complain that nature deals hardly +with us, for there is nothing which is hard to discover except those +things by which we gain nothing beyond the credit of having discovered +them; whatever things tend to make us better or happier are either +obvious or easily discovered. Your mind can rise superior to the +accidents of life, if it can raise itself above fears and not greedily +covet boundless wealth, but has learned to seek for riches within +itself; if it has cast out the fear of men and gods, and has learned +that it has not much to fear from man, and nothing to fear from God; if +by scorning all those things which make life miserable while they adorn +it, the mind can soar to such a height as to see clearly that death +cannot be the beginning of any trouble, though it is the end of many; +if it can dedicate itself to righteousness and think any path easy which +leads to it; if, being a gregarious creature, and born for the common +good, it regards the world as the universal home, if it keeps its +conscience clear towards God and lives always as though in public, +fearing itself more than other men, then it avoids all storms, it stands +on firm ground in fair daylight, and has brought to perfection its +knowledge of all that is useful and essential. All that remains serves +merely to amuse our leisure; yet, when once anchored in safety, the mind +may consider these matters also, though it can derive no strength, but +only culture from their discussion." + +II. The above are the rules which my friend Demetrius bids him who would +make progress in philosophy to clutch with both hands, never to let +go, but to cling to them, and make them a part of himself, and by daily +meditation upon them to bring himself into such a state of mind, that +these wholesome maxims occur to him of their own accord, that wherever +he may be, they may straightway be ready for use when required, and +that the criterion of right and wrong may present itself to him without +delay. Let him know that nothing is evil except what is base, and +nothing good except what is honourable: let him guide his life by this +rule: let him both act and expect others to act in accordance with this +law, and let him regard those whose minds are steeped in indolence, and +who are given up to lust and gluttony, as the most pitiable of mankind, +no matter how splendid their fortunes may be. Let him say to himself, +"Pleasure is uncertain, short, apt to pall upon us, and the more eagerly +we indulge in it, the sooner we bring on a reaction of feeling against +it; we must necessarily afterwards blush for it, or be sorry for it, +there is nothing grand about it, nothing worthy of man's nature, little +lower as it is than that of the gods; pleasure is a low act, brought +about by the agency of our inferior and baser members, and shameful in +its result. True pleasure, worthy of a human being and of a man, is, +not to stuff or swell his body with food and drink, nor to excite lusts +which are least hurtful when they are most quiet, but to be free from +all forms of mental disturbance, both those which arise from men's +ambitious struggles with one another, and those which come from on high +and are more difficult to deal with, which flow from our taking the +traditional view of the gods, and estimating them by the analogy of our +own vices." This equable, secure, uncloying pleasure is enjoyed by the +man now described; a man skilled, so to say, in the laws of gods and men +alike. Such a man enjoys the present without anxiety for the future: for +he who depends upon what is uncertain can rely confidently upon nothing. +Thus he is free from all those great troubles which unhinge the mind, +he neither hopes for, nor covets anything, and engages in no uncertain +adventures, being satisfied with what he has. Do not suppose that he +is satisfied with a little; for everything is his, and that not in the +sense in which all was Alexander's, who, though he reached the shore of +the Red Sea, yet wanted more territory than that through which he +had come. He did not even own those countries which he held or had +conquered, while Onesicritus, whom he had sent on before him to discover +new countries, was wandering about the ocean and engaging in war in +unknown seas. Is it clear that he who pushed his armies beyond the +bounds of the universe, who with reckless greed dashed headlong into a +boundless and unexplored sea, must in reality have been full of wants? +It matters not how many kingdoms he may have seized or given away, or +how great a part of the world may pay him tribute; such a man must be in +need of as much as he desires. + +III. This was not the vice of Alexander alone, who followed with a +fortunate audacity in the footsteps of Bacchus and Hercules, but it is +common to all those whose covetousness is whetted rather than appeased +by good fortune. Look at Cyrus and Cambyses and all the royal house of +Persia: can you find one among them who thought his empire large enough, +or was not at the last gasp still aspiring after further conquests? We +need not wonder at this, for whatever is obtained by covetousness is +simply swallowed up and lost, nor does it matter how much is poured +into its insatiable maw. Only the wise man possesses everything +without having to struggle to retain it; he alone does not need to send +ambassadors across the seas, measure out camps upon hostile shores, +place garrisons in commanding forts, or manoeuvre legions and squadrons +of cavalry. Like the immortal gods, who govern their realm without +recourse to arms, and from their serene and lofty heights protect their +own, so the wise man fulfils his duties, however far-reaching they may +be, without disorder, and looks down upon the whole human race, because +he himself is the greatest and most powerful member thereof. You may +laugh at him, but if you in your mind survey the east and the west, +reaching even to the regions separated from us by vast wildernesses, if +you think of all the creatures of the earth, all the riches which the +bounty of nature lavishes, it shows a great spirit to be able to say, as +though you were a god, "All these are mine." Thus it is that he covets +nothing, for there is nothing which is not contained in everything, and +everything is his. + +IV. "This," say you, "is the very thing that I wanted! I have caught +you! I shall be glad to see how you will extricate yourself from the +toils into which you have fallen of your own accord. Tell me, if the +wise man possesses everything, how can one give anything to a wise man? +for even what you give him is his already. It is impossible, therefore, +to bestow a benefit upon a wise man, if whatever is given him comes from +his own store; yet you Stoics declare that it is possible to give to +a wise man. I make the same inquiry about friends as well: for you +say that friends own everything in common, and if so, no one can give +anything to his friend, for he gives what his friend owned already in +common with himself." + +There is nothing to prevent a thing belonging to a wise man, and yet +being the property of its legal owner. According to law everything in a +state belongs to the king, yet all that property over which the king has +rights of possession is parcelled out among individual owners, and +each separate thing belongs to somebody: and so one can give the king +a house, a slave, or a sum of money without being said to give him what +was his already; for the king has rights over all these things, while +each citizen has the ownership of them. We speak of the country of the +Athenians, or of the Campanians, though the inhabitants divide them +amongst themselves into separate estates; the whole region belongs to +one state or another, but each part of it belongs to its own individual +proprietor; so that we are able to give our lands to the state, although +they are reckoned as belonging to the state, because we and the state +own them in different ways. Can there be any doubt that all the private +savings of a slave belong to his master as well as he himself? yet he +makes his master presents. The slave does not therefore possess nothing, +because if his master chose he might possess nothing; nor does what he +gives of his own free will cease to be a present, because it might have +been wrung from him against his will. As for how we are to prove that +the wise man possesses all things, we shall see afterwards; for the +present we are both agreed to regard this as true; we must gather +together something to answer the question before us, which is, how any +means remain of acting generously towards one who already possesses all +things? All things that a son has belong to his father, yet who does not +know that in spite of this a son can make presents to his father? All +things belong to the gods; yet we make presents and bestow alms even +upon the gods. What I have is not necessarily not mine because it +belongs to you; for the same thing may belong both to me and to you. + +"He to whom courtezans belong," argues our adversary, "must be +a procurer: now courtezans are included in all things, therefore +courtezans belong to the wise man. But he to whom courtezans belong is +a procurer; therefore the wise man is a procurer." Yes! by the same +reasoning, our opponents would forbid him to buy anything, arguing, "No +man buys his own property. Now all things are the property of the wise +man; therefore the wise man buys nothing." By the same reasoning they +object to his borrowing, because no one pays interest for the use of +his own money. They raise endless quibbles, although they perfectly well +understand what we say. + +V. For, when I say that the wise man possesses everything, I mean that +he does so without thereby impairing each man's individual rights in +his own property, in the same way as in a country ruled by a good king, +everything belongs to the king, by the right of his authority, and to +the people by their several rights of ownership. This I shall prove +in its proper place; in the mean time it is a sufficient answer to the +question to declare that I am able to give to the wise man that which is +in one way mine, and in another way his. Nor is it strange that I should +be able to give anything to one who possesses everything. Suppose I have +hired a house from you: some part of that house is mine, some is yours; +the house itself is yours, the use of your house belongs to me. Crops +may ripen upon your land, but you cannot touch them against the will of +your tenant; and if corn be dear, or at famine price, you will + + "In vain another's mighty store behold," + +grown upon your land, lying upon your land, and to be deposited in +your own barns. Though you be the landlord, you must not enter my hired +house, nor may you take away your own slave from me if I have contracted +for his services; nay, if I hire a carriage from you, I bestow a benefit +by allowing you to take your seat in it, although it is your own. You +see, therefore, that it is possible for a man to receive a present by +accepting what is his own. + +VI. In all the cases which I have mentioned, each party is the owner of +the same thing. How is this? It is because the one owns the thing, the +other owns the use of the thing. We speak of the books of Cicero. Dorus, +the bookseller, calls these same books his own; the one claims them +because he wrote them, the other because he bought them; so that they +may quite correctly be spoken of as belonging to either of the two, for +they do belong to each, though in a different manner. Thus Titus Livius +may receive as a present, or may buy his own books from Dorus. +Although the wise man possesses everything, yet I can give him what I +individually possess; for though, king-like, he in his mind possesses +everything, yet the ownership of all things is divided among various +individuals, so that he can both receive a present and owe one; can +buy, or hire things. Everything belongs to Caesar; yet he has no private +property beyond his own privy purse; as Emperor all things are his, +but nothing is his own except what he inherits. It is possible, without +treason, to discuss what is and what is not his; for even what the court +may decide not to be his, from another point of view is his. In the same +way the wise man in his mind possesses everything, in actual right and +ownership he possesses only his own property. + +VII. Bion is able to prove by argument at one time that everyone is +sacrilegious, at another that no one is. When he is in a mood for +casting all men down the Tarpeian rock, he says, "Whosoever touches that +which belongs to the gods, and consumes it or converts it to his own +uses, is sacrilegious; but all things belong to the gods, so that +whatever thing any one touches belongs to them to whom all belongs; +whoever, therefore, touches anything is sacrilegious." Again, when he +bids men break open temples and pillage the Capitol without fear of the +wrath of heaven, he declares that no one can be sacrilegious; because, +whatever a man takes away, he takes from one place which belongs to the +gods into another place which belongs to the gods. The answer to this +is that all places do indeed belong to the gods, but all are not +consecrated to them, and that sacrilege can only be done in places +solemnly dedicated to heaven. Thus, also, the whole world is a temple of +the immortal gods, and, indeed, the only one worthy of their greatness +and splendour, and yet there is a distinction between things sacred and +profane; all things which it is lawful to do under the sky and the stars +are not lawful to do within consecrated walls. The sacrilegious man +cannot do God any harm, for He is placed beyond his reach by His divine +nature; yet he is punished because he seems to have done Him harm: his +punishment is demanded by our feeling on the matter, and even by his +own. In the same way, therefore, as he who carries off any sacred +things is regarded as sacrilegious, although that which he stole is +nevertheless within the limits of the world, so it is possible to steal +from a wise man: for in that case it will be some, not of that universe +which he possesses, but some of those things of which he is the +acknowledged owner, and which are severally his own property, which will +be stolen from him. The former of these possessions he will recognize as +his own, the latter he will be unwilling, even if he be able to possess; +he will say, as that Roman commander said, when, to reward his courage +and good service to the state, he was assigned as much land as he could +inclose in one day's ploughing. "You do not," said he, "want a citizen +who wants more than is enough for one citizen." Do you not think that it +required a much greater man to refuse this reward than to earn it? for +many have taken away the landmarks of other men's property, but no one +sets up limits to his own. + +VIII. When, then, we consider that the mind of the truly wise man has +power over all things and pervades all things, we cannot help declaring +that everything is his, although, in the estimation of our common law, +it may chance that he may be rated as possessing no property whatever. +It makes a great difference whether we estimate what he owns by the +greatness of his mind, or by the public register. He would pray to be +delivered from that possession of everything of which you speak. I will +not remind you of Socrates, Chrysippus, Zeno, and other great men, all +the greater, however, because envy prevents no one from praising the +ancients. But a short time ago I mentioned Demetrius, who seems to have +been placed by nature in our times that he might prove that we could +neither corrupt him nor be corrected by him; a man of consummate wisdom, +though he himself disclaimed it, constant to the principles which he +professed, of an eloquence worthy to deal with the mightiest subjects, +scorning mere prettinesses and verbal niceties, but expressing with +infinite spirit, the ideas which inspired it. I doubt not that he was +endowed by divine providence with so pure a life and such power of +speech in order that our age might neither be without a model nor a +reproach. Had some god wished to give all our wealth to Demetrius on the +fixed condition that he should not be permitted to give it away, I am +sure that he would have refused to accept it, and would have said, + +IX. "I do not intend to fasten upon my back a burden like this, of which +I never can rid myself, nor do I, nimble and lightly equipped as I am, +mean to hinder my progress by plunging into the deep morass of business +transactions. Why do you offer to me what is the bane of all nations? +I would not accept it even if I meant to give it away, for I see many +things which it would not become me to give. I should like to place +before my eyes the things which fascinate both kings and peoples, I wish +to behold the price of your blood and your lives. First bring before +me the trophies of Luxury, exhibiting them as you please, either in +succession, or, which is better, in one mass. I see the shell of +the tortoise, a foul and slothful brute, bought for immense sums and +ornamented with the most elaborate care, the contrast of colours which +is admired in it being obtained by the use of dyes resembling the +natural tints. I see tables and pieces of wood valued at the price of +a senator's estate, which are all the more precious, the more knots +the tree has been twisted into by disease. I see crystal vessels, whose +price is enhanced by their fragility, for among the ignorant the risk of +losing things increases their value instead of lowering it, as it ought. +I see murrhine cups, for luxury would be too cheap if men did not drink +to one another out of hollow gems the wine to be afterwards thrown up +again. I see more than one large pearl placed in each ear; for now our +ears are trained to carry burdens, pearls are hung from them in pairs, +and each pair has other single ones fastened above it. This womanish +folly is not exaggerated enough for the men of our time, unless they +hang two or three estates upon each ear. I see ladies' silk dresses, if +those deserve to be called dresses which can neither cover their body +or their shame; when wearing which, they can scarcely with a good +conscience, swear that they are not naked. These are imported at a vast +expense from nations unknown even to trade, in order that our matrons +may show as much of their persons in public as they do to their lovers +in private." + +X. What are you doing, Avarice? see how many things there are whose +price exceeds that of your beloved gold: all those which I have +mentioned are more highly esteemed and valued. I now wish to review your +wealth, those plates of gold and silver which dazzle our covetousness. +By Hercules, the very earth, while she brings forth upon the surface +every thing that is of use to us, has buried these, sunk them deep, +and rests upon them with her whole weight, regarding them as pernicious +substances, and likely to prove the ruin of mankind if brought into the +light of day. I see that iron is brought out of the same dark pits as +gold and silver, in order that we may lack neither the means nor the +reward of murder. Thus far we have dealt with actual substances; but +some forms of wealth deceive our eyes and minds alike. I see there +letters of credit, promissory notes, and bonds, empty phantoms of +property, ghosts of sick Avarice, with which she deceives our minds, +which delight in unreal fancies; for what are these things, and what are +interest, and account books, and usury, except the names of unnatural +developments of human covetousness? I might complain of nature for not +having hidden gold and silver deeper, for not having laid over it a +weight too heavy to be removed: but what are your documents, your sale +of time, your blood-sucking twelve per cent. interest? these are evils +which we owe to our own will, which flow merely from our perverted +habit, having nothing about them which can be seen or handled, mere +dreams of empty avarice. Wretched is he who can take pleasure in the +size of the audit book of his estate, in great tracts of land cultivated +by slaves in chains, in huge flocks and herds which require provinces +and kingdoms for their pasture ground, in a household of servants, more +in number than some of the most warlike nations, or in a private house +whose extent surpasses that of a large city! After he has carefully +reviewed all his wealth, in what it is invested, and on what it is +spent, and has rendered himself proud by the thoughts of it, let him +compare what he has with what he wants: he becomes a poor man at once. +"Let me go: restore me to those riches of mine. I know the kingdom of +wisdom, which is great and stable: I possess every thing, and in such a +manner that it belongs to all men nevertheless." + +XI. When, therefore, Gaius Caesar offered him two hundred thousand +sesterces, he laughingly refused it, thinking it unworthy of himself to +boast of having refused so small a sum. Ye gods and goddesses, what a +mean mind must the emperor have had, if he hoped either to honour or to +corrupt him. I must here repeat a proof of his magnanimity. I have +heard that when he was expressing his wonder at the folly of Gaius at +supposing that he could be influenced by such a bribe, he said, "If +he meant to tempt me, he ought to have tried to do so by offering his +entire kingdom." + +XII. It is possible, then, to give something to the wise man, although +all things belong to the wise man. Similarly, though we declare that +friends have all things in common, it is nevertheless possible to give +something to a friend: for I have not everything in common with a friend +in the same manner as with a partner, where one part belongs to him, +and another to me, but rather as a father and a mother possess their +children in common when they have two, not each parent possessing one +child, but each possessing both. First of all I will prove that any +chance would-be partner of mine has nothing in common with me: and why? +Because this community of goods can only exist between wise men, who +are alone capable of friendship: other men can neither be friends nor +partners one to another. In the next place, things may be owned in +common in various ways. The knights' seats in the theatre belong to all +the Roman knights; yet of these the seat which I occupy becomes my own, +and if I yield it up to any one, although I only yield him a thing +which we own in common, still I appear to have given him something. Some +things belong to certain persons under particular conditions. I have +a place among the knights, not to sell, or to let, or to dwell in, but +simply to see the spectacle from, wherefore I do not tell an untruth +when I say that I have a place among the knights' seats. Yet if, when I +come into the theatre, the knights' seats are full, I both have a seat +there by right, because I have the privilege of sitting there, and I +have not a seat there, because my seat is occupied by those who share my +right to those places. Suppose that the same thing takes place between +friends; whatever our friend possesses, is common to us, but is the +property of him who owns it; I cannot make use of it against his will. +"You are laughing at me," say you; "if what belongs to my friend is +mine, I am able to sell it." You are not able; for you are not able to +sell your place among the knights' seats, and yet they are in common +between you and the other knights. Consequently, the fact that you +cannot sell a thing, or consume it, or exchange it for the better or the +worse does not prove that it is not yours; for that which is yours under +certain conditions is yours nevertheless. + +XIII. I have received, but certainly not less. Not to detain you longer +than is necessary, a benefit can be no more than a benefit; but the +means employed to convey benefits may be both greater and more numerous. +I mean those things by which kindness expresses and gives vent to +itself, like lovers, whose many kisses and close embraces do not +increase their love but give it play. + +XIV. The next question which arises has been thoroughly threshed out in +the former books, so here it shall only be touched on shortly; for the +arguments which have been used for other cases can be transferred to it. + +The question is, whether one who has done everything in his power to +return a benefit, has returned it. "You may know," says our adversary, +"that he has not returned it, because he did everything in his power to +return it; it is evident, therefore, that he did not not do that which +he did not have an opportunity of doing. A man who searches everywhere +for his creditor without finding him does not thereby pay him what +he owes." Some are in such a position that it is their duty to effect +something material; in the case of others to have done all in their +power to effect it is as good as effecting it. If a physician has done +all in his power to heal his patient he has performed his duty; an +advocate who employs his whole powers of eloquence on his client's +behalf, performs his duty even though his client be convicted; the +generalship even of a beaten commander is praised if he has prudently, +laboriously, and courageously exercised his functions. Your friend has +done all in his power to return your kindness, but your good fortune +stood in his way; no adversity befell you in which he could prove the +truth of his friendship; he could not give you money when you were +rich, or nurse you when you were in health, or help you when you were +succeeding; yet he repaid your kindness, even though you did not receive +a benefit from him. Moreover, this man, being always eager, and on the +watch for an opportunity of doing this, as he has expended much anxiety +and much trouble upon it, has really done more than he who quickly had +an opportunity of repaying your kindness. The case of a debtor is not +the same, for it is not enough for him to have tried to find the money +unless he pays it; in his case a harsh creditor stands over him who will +not let a single day pass without charging him interest; in yours there +is a most kind friend, who seeing you busy, troubled, and anxious would +say. + + "'Dismiss this trouble from thy breast;' + +leave off disturbing yourself; I have received from you all that I wish; +you wrong me, if you suppose that I want anything further; you have +fully repaid me in intention." + +"Tell me," says our adversary, "if he had repaid the benefit you would +say that he had returned your kindness: is, then, he who repays it in +the same position as he who does not repay it?" + +On the other hand, consider this: if he had forgotten the benefit which +he had received, if he had not even attempted to be grateful, you would +say that he had not returned the kindness; but this man has laboured day +and night to the neglect of all his other duties in his devoted care to +let no opportunity of proving his gratitude escape him; is then he who +took no pains to return a kindness to be classed with this man who never +ceased to take pains? you are unjust, if you require a material payment +from me when you see that I am not wanting in intention. + +XV. In short, suppose that when you are taken captive, I have borrowed +money, made over my property as security to my creditor, that I have +sailed in a stormy winter season along coasts swarming with pirates, +that I have braved all the perils which necessarily attend a voyage even +on a peaceful sea, that I have wandered through all wildernesses seeking +for those men whom all others flee from, and that when I have at length +reached the pirates, someone else has already ransomed you: will you +say that I have not returned your kindness? Even if during this voyage I +have lost by shipwreck the money that I had raised to save you, even if +I myself have fallen into the prison from which I sought to release you, +will you say that I have not returned your kindness? No, by Hercules! +the Athenians call Harmodius and Aristogiton, tyrannicides; the hand of +Mucius which he left on the enemy's altar was equivalent to the death +of Porsena, and valour struggling against fortune is always illustrious, +even if it falls short of accomplishing its design. He who watches +each opportunity as it passes, and tries to avail himself of one +after another, does more to show his gratitude than he whom the first +opportunity enabled to be grateful without any trouble whatever. "But," +says our adversary, "he gave you two things, material help and kindly +feeling; you, therefore, owe him two." You might justly say this to one +who returns your kindly feeling without troubling himself further; this +man is really in your debt; but you cannot say so of one who wishes to +repay you, who struggles and leaves no stone unturned to do so; for, +as far as in him lies, he repays you in both kinds; in the next place, +counting is not always a true test, sometimes one thing is equivalent to +two; consequently so intense and ardent a wish to repay takes the place +of a material repayment. Indeed, if a feeling of gratitude has no value +in repaying a kindness without giving something material, then no one +can be grateful to the gods, whom we can repay by gratitude alone. "We +cannot," says our adversary, "give the gods anything else." Well, but +if I am not able to give this man, whose kindness I am bound to return, +anything beside my gratitude, why should that which is all that I can +bestow on a god be insufficient to prove my gratitude towards a man? + +XVI. If, however, you ask me what I really think, and wish me to give a +definite answer, I should say that the one party ought to consider his +benefit to have been returned, while the other ought to feel that he has +not returned it; the one should release his friend from the debt, the +other should hold himself bound to pay it; the one should say, "I have +received;" the other should answer, "I owe." In our whole investigation, +we ought to look entirely to the public good; we ought to prevent the +ungrateful having any excuses in which they can take refuge, and under +cover of which they can disown their debts. "I have done all in my +power," say you. Well, keep on doing so still. Do you suppose that our +ancestors were so foolish, as not to understand that it is most unjust +that the man who has wasted the money which he received from his +creditor on debauchery, or gambling, should be classed with one who has +lost his own property as well as that of others in a fire, by robbery, +or some sadder mischance? They would take no excuse, that men might +understand that they were always bound to keep their word; it was +thought better that even a good excuse should not be accepted from a few +persons, than that all men should be led to try to make excuses. You say +that you have done all in your power to repay your debt; this ought to +be enough for your friend, but not enough for you. He to whom you owe a +kindness, is unworthy of gratitude if he lets all your anxious care and +trouble to repay it go for nothing; and so, too, if your friend takes +your good will as a repayment, you are ungrateful if you are not all the +more eager to feel the obligation of the debt which he has forgiven you. +Do not snap up his receipt, or call witnesses to prove it; rather seek +opportunities for repaying not less than before; repay the one man +because he asks for repayment, the other because he forgives you your +debt; the one because he is good, the other because he is bad. You, need +not, therefore, think that you have anything to do with the question +whether a man be bound to repay the benefit which he has received from +a wise man, if that man has ceased to be wise and has turned into a bad +man. You would return a deposit which you had received from a wise man; +you would return a loan even to a bad man; what grounds have you for +not returning a benefit also? Because he has changed, ought he to change +you? What? if you had received anything from a man when healthy, would +you not return it to him when he was sick, though we always are more +bound to treat our friends with more kindness when they are ailing? So, +too, this man is sick in his mind; we ought to help him, and bear with +him; folly is a disease of the mind. + +XVII. I think here we ought to make a distinction, in order to render +this point more intelligible. Benefits are of two kinds: one, the +perfect and true benefit, which can only be bestowed by one wise man +upon another; the other, the common vulgar form which ignorant men like +ourselves interchange. With regard to the latter, there is no doubt that +it is my duty to repay it whether my friend turns out to be a murderer, +a thief, or an adulterer. Crimes have laws to punish them; criminals are +better reformed by judges than by ingratitude; a man ought not to make +you bad by being so himself. I will fling a benefit back to a bad man, I +will return it to a good man; I do so to the latter, because I owe it to +him; to the former, that I may not be in his debt. + +XVIII. With regard to the other class of benefit, the question arises +whether if I was not able to take it without being a wise man, I am able +to return it, except to a wise man. For suppose I do return it to him, +he cannot receive it, he is not any longer able to receive such a thing, +he has lost the knowledge of how to use it. You would not bid me throw +back [Footnote: i.e. in the game of ball.] a ball to a man who has lost +his hand; it is folly to give any one what he cannot receive. If I am +to begin to reply to the last argument, I say that I should not give him +what he is unable to take; but I would return it, even though he is not +able to receive it. I cannot lay him under an obligation unless he takes +my bounty; but by returning it I can free myself from my obligations to +him. You say, "he will not be able to use it." Let him see to that; the +fault will lie with him, not with me. + +XIX. "To return a thing," says our adversary, "is to hand it over to one +who can receive it. Why, if you owed some wine to any man, and he bade +you pour it into a net or a sieve, would you say that you had returned +it? or would you be willing to return it in such a way that in the act +of returning it was lost between you?" To return is to give that which +you owe back to its owner when he wishes for it. It is not my duty to +perform more than this; that he should possess what he has received +from me is a matter for further consideration; I do not owe him the +safe-keeping of his property, but the honourable payment of my debt, +and it is much better that he should not have it, than that I should +not return it to him. I would repay my creditor, even though he would +at once take what I paid him to the market; even if he deputed an +adulteress to receive the money from me, I would pay it to her; even +if he were to pour the coins which he receives into a loose fold of his +cloak, I would pay it. It is my business to return it to him, not to +keep it and save it for him after I have returned it; I am bound to take +care of his bounty when I have received it, but not when I have returned +it to him. While it remains with me, it must be kept safe; but when he +asks for it again I must give it to him, even though it slips out of his +hands as he takes it. I will repay a good man when it is convenient; I +will repay a bad man when he asks me to do so. + +"You cannot," argues our adversary, "return him a benefit of the same +kind as that which you received; for you received it from a wise man, +and you are returning it to a fool." Do I not return to him such a +benefit, as he is now able to receive? It is not my fault if I return it +to him worse than I received it, the fault lies with him, and so, unless +he regains his former wisdom, I shall return it in such a form as he +in his fallen condition is able to receive. "But what," asks he, "if +he become not only bad, but savage and ferocious, like Apollodorus or +Phalaris, would you return even to such a man as this a benefit which +you had received from him?" I answer, Nature does not admit of so great +a change in a wise man. Men do not change from the best to the worst; +even in becoming bad, he would necessarily retain some traces of +goodness; virtue is never so utterly quenched as not to imprint on the +mind marks which no degradation can efface. If wild animals bred in +captivity escape into the woods, they still retain something of their +original tameness, and are as remote from the gentlest in the one +extreme as they are in the other from those which have always been wild, +and have never endured to be touched by man's hand. No one who has ever +applied himself to philosophy ever becomes completely wicked; his mind +becomes so deeply coloured with it, that its tints can never be entirely +spoiled and blackened. In the next place, I ask whether this man of +yours be ferocious merely in intent, or whether he breaks out into +actual outrages upon mankind? You have instanced the tyrants Apollodorus +and Phalaris; if the bad man restrains their evil likeness within +himself, why should I not return his benefit to him, in order to set +myself free from any further dealings with him? If, however, he not +only delights in human blood, but feeds upon it; if he exercises his +insatiable cruelty in the torture of persons of all ages, and his fury +is not prompted by anger, but by a sort of delight in cruelty, if he +cuts the throats of children before the eyes of their parents; if, not +satisfied with merely killing his victims, he tortures them, and not +only burns but actually roasts them; if his castle is always wet with +freshly shed blood; then it is not enough not to return his benefits. +All connexion between me and such a man has been broken off by his +destruction of the bonds of human society. If he had bestowed something +upon me, but were to invade my native country, he would have lost all +claim to my gratitude, and it would be counted a crime to make him any +return; if he does not attack my country, but is the scourge of his own; +if he has nothing to do with my nation, but torments and cuts to pieces +his own, then in the same manner such depravity, though it does not +render him my personal enemy, yet renders him hateful to me, and the +duty which I owe to the human race is anterior to and more important +than that which I owe to him as an individual. + +XX. However, although this be so, and although I am freed from all +obligation towards him, from the moment when, by outraging all laws, he +rendered it impossible for any man to do him a wrong, nevertheless, I +think I ought to make the following distinction in dealing with him. +If my repayment of his benefit will neither increase nor maintain his +powers of doing mischief to mankind, and is of such a character that I +can return it to him without disadvantage to the public, I would return +it: for instance, I would save the life of his infant child; for what +harm can this benefit do to any of those who suffer from his cruelty? +But I would not furnish him with money to pay his bodyguard. If he +wishes for marbles, or fine clothes, the trappings of his luxury will +harm no one; but with soldiers and arms I would not furnish him. If he +demands, as a great boon, actors and courtesans and such things as will +soften his savage nature, I would willingly bestow them upon him. I +would not furnish him with triremes and brass-beaked ships of war, but I +would send him fast sailing and luxuriously-fitted vessels, and all +the toys of kings who take their pleasure on the sea. If his health was +altogether despaired of, I would by the same act bestow a benefit on all +men and return one to him; seeing that for such characters death is +the only remedy, and that he who never will return to himself, had best +leave himself. However, such wickedness as this is uncommon, and is +always regarded as a portent, as when the earth opens, or when fires +break forth from caves under the sea; so let us leave it, and speak of +those vices which we can hate without shuddering at them. As for the +ordinary bad man, whom I can find in the marketplace of any town, who is +feared only by individuals, I would return to him a benefit which I +had received from him. It is not right that I should profit by his +wickedness; let me return what is not mine to its owner. Whether he be +good or bad makes no difference; but I would consider the matter most +carefully, if I were not returning but bestowing it. + +XXI. This point requires to be illustrated by a story. A certain +Pythagoraean bought a fine pair of shoes from a shoemaker; and as they +were an expensive piece of work, he did not pay ready money for them. +Some time afterwards he came to the shop to pay for them, and after he +had long been knocking at the closed door, some one said to him, "Why do +you waste your time? The shoemaker whom you seek has been carried out +of his house and buried; this is a grief to us who lose our friends for +ever, but by no means so to you, who know that he will be born again," +jeering at the Pythagoraean. Upon this our philosopher not unwillingly +carried his three or four denarii home again, shaking them every now and +then; afterwards, blaming himself for the pleasure which he had secretly +felt at not paying his debt, and perceiving that he enjoyed having made +this trifling gain, he returned to the shop, and saying, "the man lives +for you, pay him what you owe," he passed four denarii into the +shop through the crack of the closed door, and let them fall inside, +punishing himself for his unconscionable greediness that he might not +form the habit of appropriating that which is not his own. + +XXII. If you owe anything, seek for some one to whom you may repay it, +and if no one demands it, dun your own self; whether the man be good +or bad is no concern of yours; repay him, and then blame him. You have +forgotten, how your several duties are divided: it is right for him to +forget it, but we have bidden you bear it in mind. When, however, we +say that he who bestows a benefit ought to forget it, it is a mistake to +suppose that we rob him of all recollection of the business, though it +is most creditable to him; some of our precepts are stated over strictly +in order to reduce them to their true proportions. When we say that he +ought not to remember it, we mean he ought not to speak publicly, or +boast of it offensively. There are some, who, when they have bestowed +a benefit, tell it in all societies, talk of it when sober, cannot be +silent about it when drunk, force it upon strangers, and communicate it +to friends; it is to quell this excessive and reproachful consciousness +that we bid him who gave it forget it, and by commanding him to do this, +which is more than he is able, encourage him to keep silence. + +XXIII. When you distrust those whom you order to do anything, you ought +to command them to do more than enough in order that they may do what +is enough. The purpose of all exaggeration is to arrive at the truth by +falsehood. Consequently, he who spoke of horses as being: + + "Whiter than snows and swifter than the winds," + +said what could not possibly be in order that they might be thought to +be as much so as possible. And he who said: + + "More firm than crags, more headlong than the stream," + +did not suppose that he should make any one believe that a man could +ever be as firm as a crag. Exaggeration never hopes all its daring +flights to be believed, but affirms what is incredible, that thereby it +may convey what is credible. When we say, "let the man who has bestowed +a benefit, forget it," what we mean is, "let him be as though he had +forgotten it; let not his remembrance of it appear or be seen." When +we say that repayment of a benefit ought not to be demanded, we do not +utterly forbid its being demanded; for repayment must often be extorted +from bad men, and even good men require to be reminded of it. Am I not +to point out a means of repayment to one who does not perceive it? Am I +not to explain my wants to one does not know them? Why should he (if +a bad man) have the excuse, or (if a good man) have the sorrow of not +knowing them? Men ought sometimes to be reminded of their debts, though +with modesty, not in the tone of one demanding a legal right. + +XXIV. Socrates once said in the hearing of his friends: "I would have +bought a cloak, if I had had the money for it." He asked no one for +money, but he reminded them all to give it. There was a rivalry between +them, as to who should give it; and how should there not be? Was it not +a small thing which Socrates received? Yes, but it was a great thing +to be the man from whom Socrates received it. Could he blame them more +gently? "I would," said he, "have bought a cloak if I had had the money +for it." After this, however eager any one was to give, he gave too +late; for he had already been wanting in his duty to Socrates. Because +some men harshly demand repayment of debts, we forbid it, not in order +that it may never be done, but that it may be done sparingly. + +XXV. Aristippus once, when enjoying a perfume, said: "Bad luck to those +effeminate persons who have brought so nice a thing into disrepute." We +also may say, "Bad luck to those base extortioners who pester us for a +fourfold return of their benefits, and have brought into disrepute +so nice a thing as reminding our friends of their duty." I shall +nevertheless make use of this right of friendship, and I shall demand +the return of a benefit from any man from whom I would not have scrupled +to ask for one, such a man as would regard the power of returning a +benefit as equivalent to receiving a second one. Never, not even when +complaining of him, would I say, + + "A wretch forlorn upon the shore he lay, + His ship, his comrades, all were swept away; + Fool that I was, I pitied his despair, + And even gave him of my realm a share." + +This is not to remind, but to reproach; this is to make one's benefits +odious to enable him, or even to make him wish to be ungrateful. It is +enough, and more than enough, to remind him of it gently and familiarly: + + "If aught of mine hath e'er deserved thy thanks." + +To this his answer would be, "Of course you have deserved my thanks; you +took me up, 'a wretch forlorn upon the shore.'" + +XXVI. "But," says our adversary, "suppose that we gain nothing by this; +suppose that he pretends that he has forgotten it, what ought I to do?" +You now ask a very necessary question, and one which fitly concludes +this branch of the subject, how, namely, one ought to bear with the +ungrateful. I answer, calmly, gently, magnanimously. Never let any one's +discourtesy, forgetfulness, or ingratitude, enrage you so much that you +do not feel any pleasure at having bestowed a benefit upon him; never +let your wrongs drive you into saying, "I wish I had not done it." You +ought to take pleasure even in the ill-success of your benefit; he will +always be sorry for it, even though you are not even now sorry for it. +You ought not to be indignant, as if something strange had happened; you +ought rather to be surprised if it had not happened. Some are prevented +by difficulties, some by expense, and some by danger from returning your +bounty; some are hindered by a false shame, because by returning it, +they would confess that they had received it; with others ignorance of +their duty, indolence, or excess of business, stands in the way. Reflect +upon the insatiability of men's desires. You need not be surprised if no +one repays you in a world in which no one ever gains enough. What man is +there of so firm and trustworthy a mind that you can safely invest your +benefits in him? One man is crazed with lust, another is the slave of +his belly, another gives his whole soul to gain, caring nothing for the +means by which he amasses it; some men's minds are disturbed by envy, +some blinded by ambition till they are ready to fling themselves on the +sword's point. In addition to this, one must reckon sluggishness of +mind and old age; and also the opposites of these, restlessness and +disturbance of mind, also excessive self-esteem and pride in the +very things for which a man ought to be despised. I need not mention +obstinate persistence in wrong-doing, or frivolity which cannot remain +constant to one point; besides all this, there is headlong rashness, +there is timidity which never gives us trustworthy counsel, and the +numberless errors with which we struggle, the rashness of the most +cowardly, the quarrels of our best friends, and that most common evil +of trusting in what is most uncertain, and of undervaluing, when we have +obtained it, that which we once never hoped to possess. Amidst all these +restless passions, how can you hope to find a thing so full of rest as +good faith? + +XXVII. If a true picture of our life were to rise before your mental +vision, you would, I think, behold a scene like that of a town just +taken by storm, where decency and righteousness were no longer regarded, +and no advice is heard but that of force, as if universal confusion +were the word of command. Neither fire nor sword are spared; crime +is unpunished by the laws; even religion, which saves the lives of +suppliants in the very midst of armed enemies, does not check those who +are rushing to secure plunder. Some men rob private houses, some public +buildings; all places, sacred or profane, are alike stripped; some burst +their way in, others climb over; some open a wider path for themselves +by overthrowing the walls that keep them out, and make their way to +their booty over ruins; some ravage without murdering, others brandish +spoils dripping with their owner's blood; everyone carries off his +neighbours' goods. In this greedy struggle of the human race surely you +forget the common lot of all mankind, if you seek among these robbers +for one who will return what he has got. If you are indignant at +men being ungrateful, you ought also to be indignant at their being +luxurious, avaricious and lustful; you might as well be indignant with +sick men for being ugly, or with old men for being pale. It is, indeed, +a serious vice, it is not to be borne, and sets men at variance with one +another; nay, it rends and destroys that union by which alone our human +weakness can be supported; yet it is so absolutely universal, that even +those who complain of it most are not themselves free from it. + +XXVIII. Consider within yourself, whether you have always shown +gratitude to those to whom you owe it, whether no one's kindness has +ever been wasted upon you, whether you constantly bear in mind all the +benefits which you have received. You will find that those which you +received as a boy were forgotten before you became a man; that those +bestowed upon you as a young man slipped from your memory when you +became an old one. Some we have lost, some we have thrown away, some +have by degrees passed out of our sight, to some we have wilfully shut +our eyes. If I am to make excuses for your weakness, I must say in the +first place that human memory is a frail vessel, and is not large enough +to contain the mass of things placed in it; the more it receives, the +more it must necessarily lose; the oldest things in it give way to the +newest. Thus it comes to pass that your nurse has hardly any influence +with you, because the lapse of time has set the kindness which you +received from her at so great a distance; thus it is that you no longer +look upon your teacher with respect; and that now when you are busy +about your candidature for the consulate or the priesthood, you forget +those who supported you in your election to the quaestorship. If you +carefully examine yourself, perhaps you will find the vice of which +you complain in your own bosom; you are wrong in being angry with a +universal failing, and foolish also, for it is your own as well; you +must pardon others, that you may yourself be acquitted. You will make +your friend a better man by bearing with him, you will in all cases make +him a worse one by reproaching him. You can have no reason for rendering +him shameless; let him preserve any remnants of modesty which he may +have. Too loud reproaches have often dispelled a modesty which might +have borne good fruit. No man fears to be that which all men see that he +is; when his fault is made public, he loses his sense of shame. + +XXIX. You say, "I have lost the benefit which I bestowed." Yet do we +say that we have lost what we consecrate to heaven, and a benefit well +bestowed, even though we get an ill return for it, is to be reckoned +among things consecrated. Our friend is not such a man as we hoped he +was; still, let us, unlike him, remain the same as we were. The loss did +not take place when he proved himself so; his ingratitude cannot be made +public without reflecting some shame upon us, since to complain of the +loss of a benefit is a sign that it was not well bestowed. As far as we +are able we ought to plead with ourselves on his behalf: "Perhaps he was +not able to return it, perhaps he did not know of it, perhaps he will +still do so." A wise and forbearing creditor prevents the loss of some +debts by encouraging his debtor and giving him time. We ought to do the +same, we ought to deal tenderly with a weakly sense of honour. + +XXX. "I have lost," say you, "the benefit which I bestowed." You are a +fool, and do not understand when your loss took place; you have indeed +lost it, but you did so when you gave it, the fact has only now come +to light. Even in the case of those benefits which appear to be lost, +gentleness will do much good; the wounds of the mind ought to be +handled as tenderly as those of the body. The string, which might be +disentangled by patience, is often broken by a rough pull. What is +the use of abuse, or of complaints? why do you overwhelm him with +reproaches? why do you set him free from his obligation? even if he +be ungrateful he owes you nothing after this. What sense is there in +exasperating a man on whom you have conferred great favours, so as out +of a doubtful friend to make a certain enemy, and one, too, who will +seek to support his own cause by defaming you, or to make men say, "I do +not know what the reason is that he cannot endure a man to whom he +owes so much; there must be something in the background?" Any man can +asperse, even if he does not permanently stain the reputation of his +betters by complaining of them; nor will any one be satisfied with +imputing small crimes to them, when it is only by the enormity of his +falsehood that he can hope to be believed. + +XXXI. What a much better way is that by which the semblance of +friendship, and, indeed, if the other regains to his right mind, +friendship itself is preserved! Bad men are overcome by unwearying +goodness, nor does any one receive kindness in so harsh and hostile a +spirit as not to love good men even while he does them wrong, when they +lay him under the additional obligation of requiring no return for their +kindness. Reflect, then, upon this: you say, "My kindness has met with +no return, what am I to do? I ought to imitate the gods, those noblest +disposers of all events, who begin to bestow their benefits on those who +know them not, and persist in bestowing them on those who are ungrateful +for them. Some reproach them with neglect of us, some with injustice +towards us; others place them outside of their own world, in sloth and +indifference, without light, and without any functions; others declare +that the sun itself, to whom we owe the division of our times of labour +and of rest, by whose means we are saved from being plunged in the +darkness of eternal night; who, by his circuit, orders the seasons +of the year, gives strength to our bodies, brings forth our crops and +ripens our fruits, is merely a mass of stone, or a fortuitous collection +of fiery particles, or anything rather than a god. Yet, nevertheless, +like the kindest of parents, who only smile at the spiteful words of +their children, the gods do not cease to heap benefits upon those +who doubt from what source their benefits are derived, but continue +impartially distributing their bounty among all the peoples and nations +of the earth. Possessing only the power of doing good, they moisten +the land with seasonable showers, they put the seas in movement by the +winds, they mark time by the course of the constellations, they temper +the extremes of heat and cold, of summer and winter, by breathing a +milder air upon us; and they graciously and serenely bear with the +faults of our erring spirits. Let us follow their example; let us give, +even if much be given to no purpose, let us, in spite of this, give to +others; nay, even to those upon whom our bounty has been wasted. No one +is prevented by the fall of a house from building another; when one home +has been destroyed by fire, we lay the foundations of another before the +site has had time to cool; we rebuild ruined cities more than once +upon the same spots, so untiring are our hopes of success. Men would +undertake no works either on land or sea if they were not willing to try +again what they have failed in once." + +XXXII. Suppose a man is ungrateful, he does not injure me, but himself; +I had the enjoyment of my benefit when I bestowed it upon him. Because +he is ungrateful, I shall not be slower to give but more careful; what I +have lost with him, I shall receive back from others. But I will bestow +a second benefit upon this man himself, and will overcome him even as a +good husbandman overcomes the sterility of the soil by care and culture; +if I do not do so my benefit is lost to me, and he is lost to mankind. +It is no proof of a great mind to give and to throw away one's bounty; +the true test of a great mind is to throw away one's bounty and still to +give. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits, by Seneca + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK L. ANNAEUS SENECA ON BENEFITS *** + +***** This file should be named 3794.txt or 3794.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/7/9/3794/ + +Produced by Charles Franks, Robert Rowe and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |