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diff --git a/37864-h/37864-h.htm b/37864-h/37864-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..100d88d --- /dev/null +++ b/37864-h/37864-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,9238 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml11/DTD/xhtml11.dtd"> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + +<head> + + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> + + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of Know The Truth;, by Jesse H. 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Jones + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Know the Truth; A critique of the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation + +Author: Jesse H. Jones + +Release Date: October 27, 2011 [EBook #37864] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KNOW THE TRUTH; A CRITIQUE *** + + + + +Produced by Charlene Taylor, Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, +Matthew Wheaton and the Online Distributed Proofreading +Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from +images generously made available by the Digital & Multimedia +Center, Michigan State University Libraries.) + + + + + + +</pre> + +<div> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<h1 class="booktitle">KNOW THE TRUTH;</h1> + +<p class="h3">A CRITIQUE ON THE HAMILTONIAN THEORY +OF LIMITATION,</p> + +<p class="h6">INCLUDING</p> + +<p class="h4">SOME STRICTURES UPON THE THEORIES OF<br /> +REV. HENRY L. MANSEL AND MR.<br /> +HERBERT SPENCER</p> + +<p class="h6">BY</p> +<p class="h4">JESSE H. JONES</p> + +<p class="h5">"Give me to see, that I may know where to strike."</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h5">NEW YORK:<br /> +PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY HURD AND HOUGHTON.<br /> +BOSTON: NICHOLS AND NOYES<br /> +1865.</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h6">Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, by<br /> +<span class="smcap">Jesse H. Jones</span>, +in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h6">RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE:<br /> +STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY<br /> +H. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY.</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h5">Dedication.<br /> +<br /> +TO MY FELLOW-STUDENTS AND FRIENDS OF ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL<br /> +SEMINARY WHO HAVE READ MANSEL AND REJECTED<br /> +HIS TEACHINGS,<br /> +<br /> +This Little Treatise<br /> + +IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY + +<i>THE AUTHOR</i>.</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h3">Contents</p> +<p> +<a href="#PREFACE"><b>PREFACE.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#KNOW_THE_TRUTH"><b>KNOW THE TRUTH.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#PART_I"><b>PART I.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#PART_II"><b>PART II.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#PART_III"><b>PART III.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#REVIEW_OF_LIMITS_OF_RELIGIOUS_THOUGHT"><b>REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#REVIEW_OF_MR_HERBERT_SPENCERS_FIRST_PRINCIPLES"><b>REVIEW OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "FIRST PRINCIPLES."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#ULTIMATE_RELIGIOUS_IDEAS"><b>"ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#ULTIMATE_SCIENTIFIC_IDEAS"><b>"ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#THE_RELATIVITY_OF_ALL_KNOWLEDGE"><b>"THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#THE_RECONCILIATION"><b>"THE RECONCILIATION."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#CONCLUSION"><b>CONCLUSION.</b></a><br /> +</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[v]</span></p> + +<h2 id="PREFACE">PREFACE.</h2> + +<p>This book has been written simply in the interest of +Truth. It was because the doctrines of the Hamiltonian +School were believed to be dangerous errors, which this process +of thought exposes, that it was undertaken.</p> + +<p>Logically, and in the final analysis, there can be but two +systems of philosophical theology in the world. The one +will be Pantheism, or Atheism,—both of which contain +the same essential principle, but viewed from different standpoints,—the +other will be a pure Theism. In the schools +of Brahma and Buddh, or in the schools of Christ, the truth +is to be found. And this is so because every teacher is to be +held responsible for all which can be logically deduced from +his system; and every erroneous result which can be so +deduced is decisive of the presence of an error in principle +in the foundation; and all schemes of philosophy, by such a +trial, are seen to be based on one of these two classes of +schools. Just here a quotation from Dr. Laurens Hickok's +"Rational Psychology" will be in point:</p> + +<p>"Except as we determine the absolute to be personality +wholly out of and beyond all the conditions and modes of +space and time, we can by no possibility leave nature for the +supernatural. The clear-sighted and honest intellect, resting +in this conclusion that the conditions of space and time<span class="pagenum">[vi]</span> +cannot be transcended, will be Atheistic; while the deluded +intellect, which has put the false play of the discursive understanding +in its abstract speculations for the decisions of an +all-embracing reason, and deems itself so fortunate as to have +found a deity within the modes of space and time, will be +Pantheistic. The Pantheism will be ideal and transcendent, +when it reaches its conclusions by a logical process in the +abstract law of thought; and it will be material and empiric, +when it concludes from the fixed connections of cause and +effect in the generalized law of nature; but in neither case +is the Pantheism any other than Atheism, for the Deity, +circumscribed in the conditions of space and time with nature, +is but nature still, and, whether in abstract thought or generalized +reality, is no God."</p> + +<p>The Hamiltonian system is logically Atheism. Perceiving +that the Deity cannot be found in Nature, it denies that he +can be known at all. What the mind cannot know at all, +<i>it is irrational to believe</i>. If man cannot <i>know that</i> God is, +and have a clear sight of his attributes as a rational ground +of confidence in what he says, it is the height of blind credulity +to believe in him. And more; if man cannot have such +knowledge, he has <i>no standard</i> by which to measure teachings, +and be <i>sure</i> he has the truth. Under such circumstances, +faith is <i>impossible</i>. Faith can only be based on +<i>Reason</i>. If there is no Reason, there can be no faith. +Hence he who talks about faith, and denies Reason, does not +know what faith is. The logician rightfully held that God +could not be found in Nature; but he was just as wrong in +asserting that man is wholly in Nature and cannot know God, +as he was right in the former instance. The acceptance of +his one truth, and one error, compels man to be an Atheist; +because then he has no faculty by which to know aught of<span class="pagenum">[vii]</span> +God; and few thorough men will accept blind credulity as +the basis of Religion.</p> + +<p>The author's sense of obligation to President Hickok cannot +be too strongly stated. But for his works, it is believed that +this little treatise could never have been written. Indeed, +the author looks for but scanty credit on the score of originality, +since most of what he has written he has learned, +directly or indirectly, from that profound thinker. He has +deemed it his chief work, to apply the principles developed +by others to the exposure of a great error. And if he shall +be judged to have accomplished this, his ambition will have +been satisfied.</p> + +<p>After the substance of this treatise had been thought out, +and while the author was committing it to paper, the essays on +"Space and Time," and on "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," +in the numbers of the "North American Review" +for July and October, 1864, happened to fall under his notice. +Some persons will appreciate the delight and avidity with +which he read them; and how grateful it was to an obscure +student, almost wholly isolated in the world, to find the views +which he had wrought out in his secluded chamber, so ably +advocated in the leading review of his country. Not that he +had gone as far, or examined the subjects in hand as thoroughly +as has been there done. By no means. Rather what +results he had attained accord with some of those therein +laid down. Of those essays it is not too much to say, that, if +they have not exhausted the topics of which they treat, they +have settled forever the conclusions to be reached, and leave +for other writers only illustration and comment. If the author +shall seem to differ from them on a minor question,—that of +quantitative infinity,—the difference will, it is believed, be +found to be one of the form of expression only. And the difference<span class="pagenum">[viii]</span> +is maintained from the conviction that no term in science +should have more than one signification. It is better to adopt +illimitable and indivisible, as the technical epithets of Space, +in place of the commonly used terms infinite and absolute.</p> + +<p>A metaphysical distinction has been incidentally touched +upon in the following discussion, which deserves a more +extensive consideration than the scope and plan of this work +would permit to it here; and which, so far as the author's +limited reading goes, has received very little attention from +modern writers on metaphysics. He refers to the distinction +between the animal nature and spiritual person, so repeatedly +enounced by that profound metaphysical theologian, the +apostle Paul, and by that pure spiritual pastor, the apostle +John, in the terms "flesh" and "spirit." The thinkers of +the world, even the best Christian philosophers, seem to have +esteemed this a moral and religious distinction, and no more, +when in fact it cleaves down through the whole human being, +and forms the first great radical division in any proper analysis +of man's soul, and classification of his constituent elements. +<i>This is a purely natural division.</i> It is organic in man. It +belonged as much to Adam in his purity, as it does to the +most degraded wretch on the globe now. It is of such a +character that, had it been properly understood and developed, +the Hamiltonian system of philosophy could never have been +constructed.</p> + +<p>An adequate statement of the truth would be conducted as +follows. First, the animal nature should be carefully analyzed, +its province accurately defined, and both the laws and forms +of its activity exactly stated. Second, a like examination of +the spiritual person should follow; and third, the relations, +interactions, and influences of the two parts upon each other +should be, as extensively as possible, presented. But it is to<span class="pagenum">[ix]</span> +be remarked, that, while the analysis, by the human intellect, +of these two great departments of man's soul, may be exhaustive, +it is doubtful if any but the All-seeing Eye can +read all their relations and inter-communications. The development +of the third point, by any one mind, must needs, +therefore, be partial. Whether any portion of the above +designated labor shall be hereafter entered upon, will depend +upon circumstances beyond control of the writer.</p> + +<p>As will appear, it is believed, in the development of the +subject, the great, the <i>vital</i> point upon which the whole controversy +with the Hamiltonian school must turn, is a question +of <i>fact</i>; viz., whether man has a Reason, as the faculty +giving <i>a priori</i> principles, or not. If he has such a Reason, +then by it the questions now at issue can be settled, and that +finally. If he has no Reason, then he can have no knowledge, +except of appearances and events, as perceived by the Sense +and judged by the Understanding. Until, then, the question +of fact is decided, it would be a gain if public attention was +confined wholly to it. Establish first a well ascertained and +sure foundation before erecting a superstructure.</p> + +<p>The method adopted in constructing this treatise does not +admit the presentation of the matter in a symmetrical form. +On the contrary, it involves some, perhaps many, repetitions. +What has been said at one point respecting one author must +be said again in reply to another. Yet the main object for +which the work was undertaken could, it seemed, be thoroughly +accomplished in no other way.</p> + +<p>The author has in each case used American editions of the +works named.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2 id="KNOW_THE_TRUTH">KNOW THE TRUTH.</h2> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[1]</span></p> + +<h2 id="PART_I">PART I.</h2> + +<p class="h3">THE SEEKING AND THE FINDING.</p> + +<p>In April, 1859, there was republished in Boston, from an +English print, a volume entitled "The Limits of Religious +Thought Examined," &c., "by Henry Longueville Mansel, +B. D."</p> + +<p>The high position occupied by the publishers,—a firm of +Christian gentlemen, who, through a long career in the publication +of books either devoutly religious, or, at least, having +a high moral tone, and being marked by deep, earnest +thought, have obtained the confidence of the religious community; +the recommendations with which its advent was heralded, +but most of all the intrinsic importance of the theme +announced, and its consonance with many of the currents of +mental activity in our midst,—gave the book an immediate +and extensive circulation. Its subject lay at the foundation +of all religious, and especially of all theological thinking. +The author, basing his teaching on certain metaphysical +tenets, claimed to have circumscribed the boundary to all +positive, and so valid effort of the human intellect in its upward +surging towards the Deity, and to have been able to +say, "Thus far canst thou come, and no farther, and here +must thy proud waves be stayed." And this effort was declaredly +made in the interest of religion. It was asserted<span class="pagenum">[2]</span> +that from such a ground only, as was therein sought to be +established, could infidelity be successfully assailed and destroyed. +Moreover, the writer was a learned and able divine +in the Anglican Church, orthodox in his views; and his volume +was composed of lectures delivered upon what is known +as "The Bampton Foundation;"—a bequest of a clergyman, +the income of which, under certain rules, he directed +should be employed forever, in furthering the cause of Christ, +by Divinity Lecture Sermons in Oxford. Such a book, on +such a theme, by such a man, and composed under such auspices, +would necessarily receive the almost universal attention +of religious thinkers, and would mark an era in human +thought. Such was the fact in this country. New England, +the birthplace and home of American Theology, gave it her +most careful and studious examination. And the West alike +with the East pored over its pages, and wrought upon its +knotty questions. Clergymen especially, and theological students, +perused it with the earnestness of those who search +for hid treasures. And what was the result? We do not +hesitate to say that it was unqualified rejection. The book +now takes its place among religious productions, not as a +contribution to our positive knowledge, not as a practicable +new road, surveyed out through the Unknown Regions of +Thought, but rather as possessing only a negative value, as a +monument of warning, erected at that point on the roadside +where the writer branched off in his explorations, and on +which is inscribed, "In this direction the truth cannot be +found."</p> + +<p>The stir which this book produced, naturally brought prominently +to public attention a writer heretofore not extensively +read in this country, Sir William Hamilton, upon +whose metaphysical teachings the lecturer avowedly based +his whole scheme. The doctrines of the metaphysician were +subjected to the same scrutinizing analysis, which dissolved +the enunciations of the divine; and they, like these, were +pronounced "wanting." This decision was not reached or<span class="pagenum">[3]</span> +expressed in any extensive and exhaustive criticism of these +writers; in which the errors of their principles and the revolting +nature of the results they attained, were presented; +but it rather was a shoot from the spontaneous and deep-seated +conviction, that the whole scheme, of both teacher and +pupil, was utterly insufficient to satisfy the craving of man's +highest nature. It was rejected because it <i>could</i> not be received.</p> + +<p>Something more than a year ago, and while the American +theological mind, resting in the above-stated conviction, was +absorbed in the tremendous interests connected with the Great +Rebellion, a new aspirant for honors appeared upon the stage. +A book was published entitled "The Philosophy of Herbert +Spencer: First Principles." This was announced as the foundation +of a new system of Philosophy, which would command +the confidence of the present, and extort the wonder of all +succeeding ages. Avowing the same general principles with +Mansel and Hamilton, this writer professed to have found a +radical defect in their system, which being corrected, rendered +that system complete and final; so that, from it as a base, he +sets out to construct a new scheme of Universal Science. This +man, too, has been read, not so extensively as his predecessors; +because when one has seen a geometrical absurdity demonstrated, +he does not care, unless from professional motives, +to examine and disprove further attempts to bolster up the +folly; but still so widely read, as to be generally associated +with the other writers above mentioned, and, like them, rejected. +Upon being examined, he is found to be a man of +less scope and mental muscle than either of his teachers; +yet going over the same ground and expressing the same +ideas, scarcely in new language even; and it further appears +that his discovery is made at the expense of his logic +and consistency, and involves an unpardonable contradiction. +Previous to the publication of the books just mentioned, +an American writer had submitted to the world a system +of thought upon the questions of which they treat, which<span class="pagenum">[4]</span> +certainly seems worthy of some notice from their authors. +Yet it has received none. To introduce him we must retrace +our steps for a little.</p> + +<p>In 1848, Laurens P. Hickok, then a Professor in Auburn +Theological Seminary, published a work entitled "Rational +Psychology," in which he professed to establish, by <i>a priori</i> +processes, positions which, if true, afford a ground for the +answer, at once and forever, of all the difficulties raised by +Sir William Hamilton and his school. Being comparatively +a new writer, his work attracted only a moiety of the attention +it should have done. It was too much like Analytical +Geometry and Calculus for the popular mind, or even for +any but a few patient thinkers. For them it was marrow +and fatness.</p> + +<p>Since the followers of Sir William Hamilton, whom we +will hereafter term Limitists, have neglected to take the +great truths enunciated by the American metaphysician, and +apply them to their own system, and so be convinced by their +own study of the worthlessness of that system, it becomes +their opponents, in the interest of truth, to perform this work +in their stead; viz., upon the basis of immutable truth, to +unravel each of their well-knit sophistries, to show to the +world that it may "<i>know the truth</i>;" and thus to destroy +a system which, if allowed undisputed sway, would sap the +very foundations of Christian faith.</p> + +<p>The philosophical system of the Limitists is built upon a +single fundamental proposition, which carries all their deductions +with it. He who would strike these effectually, must +aim his blow, and give it with all his might, straight at that +one object; sure that if he destroys that, the destruction of +the whole fabric is involved therein. But, as the Limitists +are determined not to confess the dissolution of their scheme, +by the simple establishment of principles, which they cannot +prove false, and which, if true, involve the absurdity of +their own tenets, it is further necessary to go through their +writings, and examine them passage by passage, and show<span class="pagenum">[5]</span> +the fallacy of each. In the former direction we can but re-utter +some of the principles of the great American teacher. +In the latter there is room for new effort; and this shall be +our especial province.</p> + +<p>The proposition upon which the whole scheme of the Limitists +is founded, was originally enunciated by Sir William +Hamilton, in the following terms. "The Unconditioned is +incognizable and inconceivable; its notion being only negative +of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively +known or conceived." "In our opinion, the mind can conceive, +and consequently can know, only the <i>limited and the +conditionally limited</i>. The unconditionally unlimited, or the +Infinite, the unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot +positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived +only by a thinking away from, or abstraction of, those very +conditions under which thought itself is realized; consequently, +the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative—negative +of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one +hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, +that is, a whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a +relative part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, +that is, a part so small, that we cannot also conceive it as a +relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. On the other +hand, we cannot positively represent, or realize, or construe +to the mind, (as here understanding and imagination coincide,) +an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the +infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would +itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, +for the same reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite +divisibility of parts.... As the conditionally limited +(which we may briefly call the conditioned) is thus the only +possible object of knowledge, and of positive thought—thought +necessarily supposes conditions. <i>To think</i> is <i>to condition</i>; +and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of +the possibility of thought." ... "The conditioned is the +mean between two extremes—two inconditionates, exclusive<span class="pagenum">[6]</span> +of each other, neither of which <i>can be conceived as possible</i>, +but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded +middle, one <i>must be admitted as necessary</i>."</p> + +<p>This theory may be epitomized as follows:—"The Unconditioned +denotes the genus of which the Infinite and +Absolute are the species." This genus is inconceivable, is +"negative of the conceivable itself." Hence both the species +must be so also. Although they are thus incognizable, they +may be defined; the one, the Infinite, as "that which is beyond +all limits;" the other, the Absolute, as "a whole beyond +all conditions:" or, concisely, the one is illimitable immensity, +the other, unconditional totality. As defined, these are seen +to be "mutually repugnant:" that is, if there is illimitable +immensity, there cannot be absolute totality; and the reverse. +Within these two all possible being is included; and, because +either excludes the other, it can be in only one. Since both +are inconceivable we can never know in which the conditioned +or conceivable being is. Either would give us a being—God—capable +of accounting for the Universe. This fact +is assumed to be a sufficient ground for faith; and man may +therefore rationally satisfy himself with the study of those +matters which are cognizable—the conditioned.</p> + +<p>It is not our purpose at this point to enter upon a criticism +of the philosophical theory thus enounced. This will fall, +in the natural course, upon a subsequent page. We have +stated it here, for the purpose of placing in that strong light +which it deserves, another topic, which has received altogether +too little attention from the opponents of the Limitists. +Underlying and involved in the above theory, there +is a question of <i>fact</i>, of the utmost importance. Sir William +Hamilton's metaphysic rests upon his psychology; and if +his psychology is true, his system is impregnable. It is his +diagnosis of the human mind, then, which demands our attention. +He has presented this in the following passage:—</p> + +<p>"While we regard as conclusive Kant's analysis of Time +and Space into conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing<span class="pagenum">[7]</span> +his deduction of the 'Categories of Understanding' and +the 'Ideas of Speculative Reason' as the work of a great +but perverse ingenuity. The categories of understanding +are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not, +therefore, generalize the <i>Conditioned—Existence Conditioned</i>, +as the supreme category, or categories, of thought?—and +if it were necessary to analyze this form into its subaltern +applications, why not develop these immediately out of +the generic principle, instead of preposterously, and by a +forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws of the understanding +from a questionable division of logical proposition? +Why distinguish Reason (Vernunft) from Understanding +(Verstand), simply on the ground that the former is conversant +about, or rather tends toward, the unconditioned; when +it is sufficiently apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived +as the negation of the conditioned, and also that the conception +of contradictories is one? In the Kantian philosophy, +both faculties perform the same function, both seek the one +in the many;—the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff) +sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the +Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.'"</p> + +<p>Not stopping now to correct the entirely erroneous statement +that "both faculties," <i>i. e.</i>, Understanding and Reason, +"perform the same function," we are to notice the two leading +points which are made, viz.:—1. That there is no distinction +between the Understanding and the Reason; or, in +other words, there is no such faculty as the Reason is +claimed to be, there is none but the Understanding; and, +2. A generalization is the highest form of human knowledge; +both of which may be comprised in one affirmation; the Understanding +is the highest faculty of knowledge belonging to +the human soul. Upon this, a class of thinkers, following +Plato and Kant, take issue with the logician, and assert that +the distinction between the two faculties named above, has +a substantial basis; that, in fact, they are different in <i>kind</i>, +and that the mode of activity in the one is wholly unlike<span class="pagenum">[8]</span> +the mode of activity in the other. Thus, then, is the great +issue between the Hamiltonian and Platonic schools made +upon a question of <i>fact</i>. He who would attack the former +school successfully, must aim his blow straight at their fundamental +assumption; and he who shall establish the fact of +the Pure Reason as an unquestionable faculty in the human +soul, will, in such establishment, accomplish the destruction +of the Hamiltonian system of philosophy. Believing this +system to be thoroughly vicious in its tendencies; being such +indeed, as would, if carried out, undermine the whole Christian +religion; and what is of equal importance, being false +to the facts in man's soul as God's creature, the writer will +attempt to achieve the just named and so desirable result; +and by the mode heretofore indicated.</p> + +<p>It is required, then, to <i>prove</i> that there is a faculty belonging +to the human soul, essentially diverse from the Sense or +the Understanding; a faculty peculiar and unique, which +possesses such qualities as have commonly been ascribed by +its advocates to the Pure Reason; and thereby to establish +such faculty as a fact, and under that name.</p> + +<p>Previous to bringing forward any proofs, it is important to +make an exact statement of what is to be proved. To this +end, let the following points be noted:—</p> + +<p><i>a.</i> Its modes of activity are essentially diverse from those +of the Sense or Understanding. The Sense is only capacity. +According to the laws of its construction, it receives impressions +from objects, either material, and so in a different place +from that which it occupies, or imaginary, and so proceeding +from the imaging faculty in itself. But it is only capacity +to receive and transmit impressions. The Understanding, +though more than this, even faculty, is faculty shut within +the limits of the Sense. According to its laws, it takes up +the presentations of the Sense, analyzes and classifies them, +and deduces conclusions: but it can attain to nothing more +than was already in the objects presented. It can construct +a system; it cannot develop a science. It can observe a<span class="pagenum">[9]</span> +relation it cannot intuit a law. What we seek is capacity, +but of another and higher kind from that of the Sense. +Sense can have no object except such, at least, as is constructed +out of impressions received from without. What +we seek does not observe outside phenomena; and can have +no object except as inherent within itself. It is faculty moreover, +but not faculty walled in by the Sense. It is faculty +and capacity in one, which, possessing inherent within itself, +as objects, the <i>a priori</i> conditional laws of the Universe, and +the <i>a priori</i> conditional ideal forms which these laws, standing +together according to their necessary relations, compose, +transcends, in its activity and acquisitions, all limitations +of a <i>Nature</i>; and attends to objects which belong to the +Supernatural, and hence which absoluteness qualifies. We +observe, therefore,</p> + +<p><i>b.</i> The objects of its activity are also essentially diverse +in kind from those of the Sense and the Understanding. All +the objects of the Sense must come primarily or secondarily, +from a material Universe; and the discussions and conclusions +of the Understanding must refer to such a Universe. +The faculty which we seek must have for its objects, <i>laws</i>, +or, if the term suit better, first principles, which are reasons +why conduct must be one way, and not another; which, in +their combinations, compose the forms conditional for all +activity; and which, therefore, constitute within us an <i>a priori</i> +standard by which to determine the validity of all judgments. +To illustrate. Linnæus constructed a system of botanical +classification, upon the basis of the number of stamens in a +flower. This was satisfactory to the Sense and the Understanding. +Later students have, however, discovered that +certain <i>organic laws</i> extend as a framework through the +whole vegetable kingdom; which, once seen, throw back the +Linnæan system into company with the Ptolemaic Astronomy; +and upon which laws a <i>science</i> of Botany becomes possible. +That faculty which intuits these laws, is called the +Pure Reason.<span class="pagenum">[10]</span></p> + +<p>To recapitulate. What we seek is, in its modes and objects +of activity, diverse from the Sense and Understanding. +It is at once capacity and faculty, having as object first principles, +possessing these as an <i>inherent heritage</i>, and able to +compare with them as standard all objects of the Sense and +judgments of the Understanding; and to decide thereby +their validity. These principles, and combinations of principles, +are known as <i>Ideas</i>, and, being innate, are denominated +<i>innate Ideas</i>. It is their reality which Sir William +Hamilton denies, declaring them to be only higher generalizations +of the Understanding, and it is the faculty called the +Pure Reason, in which they are supposed to inhere, whose +actuality is now to be proved.</p> + +<p>The effort to do this will be successful if it can be shown +that the logician's statement of the facts is partial, and essentially +defective; what are the phenomena which cannot be +comprehended in his scheme; and, finally, that they can be +accounted for on no other ground than that stated.</p> + +<p>1. The statement of facts by the Limitists is partial and +essentially defective. They start with the assumption that a +generalization is the highest form of human knowledge. To +appreciate this fully, let us examine the process they thus +exalt. A generalization is a process of thought through +which one advances from a discursus among facts, to a conclusion, +embodying a seemingly general truth, common to all +the facts of the class. For instance. The inhabitants of +the north temperate zone have long observed it to be a fact, +that north winds are cold; and so have arrived at the general +conclusion that such winds will lower the temperature. +A more extensive experience teaches them, however, that in +the south temperate zone, north winds are warm, and their +judgment has to be modified accordingly. A yet larger investigation +shows that, at one period in geologic history, +north winds, even in northern climes, were warm, and that +tropical animals flourished in arctic regions; and the judgment +is again modified. Now observe this most important<span class="pagenum">[11]</span> +fact here brought out. <i>Every judgment may be modified by +a larger experience.</i> Apply this to another class of facts. +An apple is seen to fall when detached from the parent stem. +An arrow, projected into the air, returns again. An invisible +force keeps the moon in its orbit. Other like phenomena are +observed; and, after patient investigation, it is found to be +a fact, that there is a force in the system to which our planet +belongs, which acts in a ratio inverse to the square of the +distance, and which thus binds it together. But if a +generalization is the highest form of knowledge, we can never be +sure we are right, for a subsequent experience may teach us +the reverse. We know we have not <i>all the facts</i>. We may +again find that the north wind is elsewhere, or was once here, +warm. Should a being come flying to us from another sphere +so distant, that the largest telescope could catch no faintest +ray, even, of its shining, and testify to us that there, the force +we called gravitation, was inversely as the <i>cube</i> of the distance, +we could only accept the testimony, and modify our +judgment accordingly. Conclusions of to-day may be errors +to-morrow; and we can never know we are right. The Limitists +permit us only interminable examinations of interminable +changes in phenomena; which afford no higher result +than a new basis for new studies.</p> + +<p>From this wearisome, Io-like wandering, the soul returns +to itself, crying its wailing cry, "Is this true? Is this all?" +when suddenly, as if frenzied by the presence of a god, it +shouts exultingly "The truth! the truth! I see the eternal +truth."</p> + +<p>The assumption of the Limitists is not all the truth. Their +diagnosis is both defective and false. It is defective, in that +they have failed to perceive those qualities of <i>universality</i> +and <i>necessity</i>, which most men instinctively accord to certain +perceptions of the mind; and false, in that they deny the +reality of those qualities, and of the certain perceptions as +modified by them, and the actuality of that mental faculty +which gives the perceptions, and thus qualified. They state a<span class="pagenum">[12]</span> +part of the truth, and deny a part. The whole truth is, the +mind both generalizes and intuits.</p> + +<p>It is the <i>essential</i> tenet of their whole scheme, that the +human mind nowhere, and under no circumstance, makes an +affirmation which it unreservedly qualifies as necessary and +universal. Their doctrine is, that these affirmations <i>seem</i> to +be such, but that a searching examination shows this seeming +to be only a bank of fog. For instance. The mind seems +to affirm that two and two <i>must</i> make four. "Not so," says +the Limitist. "As a fact, we see that two and two do make +four, but it may make five, or any other sum. For don't you +see? if two and two must make four, then the Infinite must +see it so; and if he must see it so, he is thereby conditioned; +and what is worse, we know just as much about it as he does." +In reply to all such quibbles, it is to be said,—there is no +seeming about it! If the mind is not utterly mendacious, it +affirms, positively and unreservedly, "Two and two are four, +<i>must</i> be four; and to see it so, <i>is conditional for</i> <span class="smcap">all</span> <i>intellect</i>." +Take another illustration. The mind instinctively, often unconsciously, +always compulsorily, affirms that the sentiment, +In society the rights of the individual can never trench upon +the rights of the body politic,—is a necessary, and universally +applicable principle; which, however much it may be violated, +can never be changed. The whole fabric of society is +based upon this. Could a mind think this away, it could not +construct a practical system of society upon what would be +left,—its negation. But the Limitists step in here, and say, +"All this seems so, perhaps, but then the mind is so weak, +that it can never be sure. You must modify (correct?) this +seeming, by the consideration that, if it is so, then the Infinite +must know it so, and the finite and Infinite must know +it alike, and the Infinite will be limited and conditioned +thereby, which would be impious." Again, the intellect unreservedly +asserts, "There is no seeming in the matter. The +utterance is true, absolutely and universally true, and every +intellect <i>must</i> see it so."<span class="pagenum">[13]</span></p> + +<p>Illustrations like the above might be drawn from every +science of which the human mind is cognizant. But more are +not needed. Enough has been adduced to establish the <i>fact</i> +of those qualities, universality and necessity, as inherent +in certain mental affirmations. Having thus pointed out the +essential defect of the logician's scheme, it is required to state:</p> + +<p>2. What the phenomena are which cannot be comprehended +therein.</p> + +<p>In general, it may be said that all those perceptions and +assertions of the mind, which are instinctive, and which it +involuntarily qualifies as universal and necessary, are not, +and cannot be comprehended in Sir William Hamilton's +scheme. To give an exhaustive presentation of all the +<i>a priori</i> laws of the mind, would be beyond the scope of +the present undertaking, and would be unnecessary to its +success. This will be secured by presenting a classification +of them, and sufficient examples under each class. Moreover, +to avoid a labor which would not be in place here, we +shall attempt no new classification; but shall accept without +question, as ample for our purpose, that set forth by one of +our purest and every way best thinkers,—Rev. Mark Hopkins, +D. D., President of Williams College, Mass.</p> + +<p>"The ideas and beliefs which come to us thus, may be +divided into, first, mathematical ideas and axioms. These +are at the foundation of the abstract sciences, having for +their subject, quantity. In the second division are those +which pertain to mere being and its relations. Upon these +rest all sciences pertaining to actual being and its relations. +The third division comprises those which pertain to beauty. +These are at the foundation of æsthetical science. In the +fourth division are those which pertain to morals and religion. +Of these the pervading element is the sense of obligation +or duty. Of this the idea necessarily arises in connection +with the choice by a rational being of a supreme end, +and with the performance of actions supposed to bear upon +that."—<i>Moral Science</i>, p. 161.<span class="pagenum">[14]</span></p> + +<p>First.—Mathematical ideas and axioms.</p> + +<p>Take, for instance, the multiplication table. Can any one, +except a Limitist, be induced to believe that it was originally +<i>constructed</i>; that a will put it together, and might take it +apart? Seven times seven now make forty-nine. Will +any one say that it might have been made to make forty-seven; +or that at some future time such may be the case? +Or again, take the axiom "Things which are equal to the +same thing are equal to one another." Will some one say, +that the intellectual beings in the universe might, with equal +propriety, have been so constructed as to affirm that, in some +instances, things which are equal to the same thing are <i>unequal</i> +to one another? Or consider the properties of a triangle. +Will our limitist teachers instruct us that these properties are +a matter of indifference; that for aught we know, the triangle +might have been made to have three right angles? Yet +again. Examine the syllogism. Was its law constructed?</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">All M is X;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All Z is M;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All Z is X.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>Will any one say that <i>perhaps</i>, we don't know but it might +have been so made, as to appear to us that the conclusion +was Some Z is not X? Or will the Limitists run into that +miserable petty subterfuge of an assertion, "All this <i>seems</i> +to us as it is, and we cannot see how it could be different; +but then, our minds are so feeble, they are confined in such +narrow limits, that it would be the height of presumption to +assert positively with regard to stronger minds, and those of +wider scope? Perhaps they see things differently." <i>Perhaps</i> +they do; but if they do, their minds or ours falsify! The +question is one of <i>veracity</i>, nothing more. Throughout all the +range of mathematics, the positive and <i>unqualified</i> affirmation +of the mind is that its intuitions are absolute and universal; +that they are <i>a priori</i> laws conditional of <i>all</i> intellect; that +of the Deity just as much as that of man. Feebleness and +want of scope have nothing to do with mind in its affirmation,<span class="pagenum">[15]</span> +"Seven times seven <i>must</i> make forty-nine; <i>and cannot by +any possibility of effort make any other product</i>;" and every +intellect, <i>if it sees at all, must see it so</i>. And so on through +the catalogue. From this, it follows in this instance, that +human knowledge is <i>exhaustive</i>, and so is exactly similar, +and equal to the Deity's knowledge.</p> + +<p>Second. Those ideas and beliefs which pertain to mere +being and its relations.</p> + +<p>Take, for instance, the axiom, A material body cannot exist +in the Universe without standing in some relation to all +the other material bodies in that Universe. Either this is +absolutely true, or it is not. If it is so true, then every intellectual +being to whom it presents itself as object at all, +must see it as every other does. One may see more relations +than another; but the axiom in its intrinsic nature must +be seen alike by all. If it is not absolutely true, then the +converse, or any partially contradictory proposition, may be +true. For example. A material body may exist in the Universe, +and stand in no relation to some of the other material +bodies in that Universe. But, few men will hesitate to say, +that this is not only utterly unthinkable, but that it could only +become thinkable by a denial and destruction of the laws of +thought; or, in other words, by the stultification of the mind.</p> + +<p>Take another instance, arising from the fact of parentage +and offspring, in the sentient beings of the world. A pair, +no matter to what class they belong, by the fact of becoming +parents, establish a new relation for themselves; and, "after +their kind," they are under bonds to their young. And, to a +greater or less extent, their young have a claim upon them. +As we ascend in the scale of being, the duty imposed is +greater, and the claim of the offspring stronger. Whether +it be the fierce eagle, or the timid dove, or the chirping sparrow; +whether it be the prowling lion, or the distrustful deer, +or the cowering hare; or whether it be the races of man who +are examined, the relations established by parentage are +everywhere recognized. Now, will one say that all this<span class="pagenum">[16]</span> +might be changed for aught we know; that, what we call +law, is only a judgment of mankind; and so that this relation +did not exist at first, but was the product of growth? +And will one further say that there is no necessity or universality +in this relation; but that the races might, for aught +we know, have just as well been established with a parentage +which involved no relation at all; that the fabled indifference +of the ostrich, intensified a hundredfold, might have been the +law of sentient being? Yet such results logically flow from +the principles of the Limitists. Precisely the same line of +argument might be pursued respecting the laws of human +society. But it is not needed here. It is evident now, that +what gives validity to judgments <i>is the fact that they accord +with an a priori principle in the mind</i>.</p> + +<p>Third. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to beauty. +A science of beauty has not yet been sufficiently developed +to permit of so extensive an illustration of this class as the +others. Yet enough is established for our purpose. Let us +consider beauty as in proportioned form. It is said that certain +Greek mathematicians, subsequently to the Christian +era, studied out a mathematical formula for the human body, +and constructed a statue according to it; and that both were +pronounced at the time <i>perfect</i>. Both statue and formula +are now lost. Be the story true, or a legend, there is valid +ground for the assertion, that the mind instinctively assumes, +in all its criticisms, the axiom, There is a perfect ideal by +which as standard, all art must be judged. The very fact +that the mind, though acknowledging the imperfection of its +own ideal, unconsciously asserts, that somewhere, in some +mind, there is an ideal, in which a perfect hand joins a perfect +arm, and a perfect foot a perfect leg, and these a perfect +trunk; and a perfect neck supports a perfect head, adorned +by perfect features, and thus there is a perfect ideal, is <i>decisive</i> +that such an ideal exists. And this conclusion is true, +because God who made us, and constructed the ground from +whence this instinctive affirmation springs, is true.<span class="pagenum">[17]</span></p> + +<p>Take another instance. Few men, who have studied +Gothic spires, have failed to observe that the height of some, +in proportion to their base, is too great, and that of others, +too small. The mind irresistibly affirms, that between these +opposite imperfections, there is a golden mean, at which the +proportion shall be <i>perfect</i>. When the formula of this proportion +shall be studied out, any workman, who is skilled +with tools, can construct a perfect spire. The law once discovered +and promulgated, becomes common knowledge. Mechanical +skill will be all that can differentiate one workman +from another. The fact that the law has not been discovered +yet, throws no discredit upon the positive affirmation of the +mind, that there must be such a law; any more than the fact +of Newton's ignorance of the law of gravitation, when he +saw the apple fall, discredited his instinctive affirmation, upon +seeing that phenomenon, there is a law in accordance with +which it fell.</p> + +<p>Now how comes the mind instinctively and positively to +make these assertions. If they were judgments, the mind +would only speak of probabilities; but here, it qualifies the +assertion with necessity. Men, however positive in their +temperament, do not say, "I know it will rain to-morrow," +but only, "In all probability it will." Not so here. Here +the mind refuses to express itself doubtfully. Its utterance +is the extreme of positiveness. It says <i>must</i>. And if its +affirmation is not true, then there is no <i>reason</i> why those +works of art which are held in highest esteem, should be +adjudged better than the efforts of the tyro, except the whim +of the individual, or the arbitrary determination of their +admirers.</p> + +<p>Fourth. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to morals +and religion.</p> + +<p>We now enter a sphere of which no understanding could +by any possibility ever guess, much less investigate. Here +no sense could ever penetrate; there is no object for it to +perceive. Here all judgments are impertinent; for in this<span class="pagenum">[18]</span> +sphere are only laws, and duties, and obligations. An understanding +cannot "conceive" of a moral law, because such +a law is inconceivable; and it cannot perceive one, because +it has no eye. If it were competent to explain every phenomenon +in the other classes, it would be utterly impotent +to explain a single phenomenon in this. What is moral obligation? +Whence does it arise, or how is it imposed? and +who will enforce it, and how will it be enforced? All these, +and numerous such other questions, cannot be raised even +by the Understanding, much less answered by it. The moral +law of the Universe is one which can be learned from no +judgment, or combination of judgments. It can be learned +only by being <i>seen</i>. The moral law is no conclusion, which +may be modified by a subsequent experience. It is an affirmation +which is <i>imperative</i>. To illustrate. It is an axiom, +that the fact of free moral agency involves the fact of obligation. +Man is a free moral agent; and so, under the obligation +imposed. At the first, it was optional with the Deity +whether he would create man or not. But will any one +assert that, having determined to create man such as he is, it +was optional with him, whether man should be under the +obligation, or not? Can man be a free moral agent, and be +free from the duties inherent therein? Does not the mind +instinctively and necessarily affirm, that the fact of free moral +agency assures the fact of such a relation to God's moral +government, that obligation <i>must</i> follow? One cannot hesitate +to say, that the formula, A free agent may be released +from his obligation to moral law, is absolutely unthinkable.</p> + +<p>Again, no judgment can attain to the moral law of the +Universe; and yet man knows it. Jesus Christ, when he +proclaimed that law in the words "Thou shalt love the Lord +thy God with all thy mind and strength, and thy neighbor +as thyself," only uttered what no man can, in thought, deny. +A man can no more think selfishness as the moral law of +the Universe, than he can think two and two to be five. Man +not only sees the law, but he feels and acknowledges the<span class="pagenum">[19]</span> +obligation, even in his rebellion. In fact there would be +no rebellion, no sense of sin, if there were no obligation. +Whence comes the authority of the law? No power can +give it authority, or enforce obedience. Power can crush a +Universe, it cannot change a heart. The law has, and can +have authority; it imposes, and can impose obligation; only +because <i>it is an a priori law of the Universe</i>, alike binding +upon <i>all</i> moral beings, upon God as well as man; and is +so seen immediately, and necessarily, by a direct intuition. +Man finds this law fundamental to his self; and as well, a +necessarily fundamental law of <i>all</i> moral beings. <i>Therefore</i> +he acknowledges it. And the very efforts he makes to set +up a throne for Passion, over against the throne of Benevolence, +is an involuntary acknowledgment of the authority of +that law he seeks to rival.</p> + +<p>It was said above, that neither Sense nor Understanding +can take any cognizance of the objects of investigation which +fall in this class. This is because the Sense can gather no +material over which the Understanding can run. Is the +moral law matter? No. How then can the Sense observe +it? One answer may possibly be made, viz.: It is deduced +from the conduct of men; and sense observes that. To this +it is replied</p> + +<p><i>a.</i> The allegation is not true. Most men violate the moral +law of the Universe. Their conduct accords with the law +of selfishness. Such conclusions as that of Hobbes, that war +is the natural condition of Society, are those which would +follow from a consideration of man, as he appears to the +Sense.</p> + +<p><i>b.</i> If it were true, the question obtrudes itself,—How came +it there? <i>How came this fundamental law to be?</i> and to this +the Sense and Understanding return no shadow of answer.</p> + +<p>But from the stand-point of a Pure Reason, all is clear. +All the ideas and beliefs, every process of thought which +belongs to this sphere, are absolute and universal. They +must be what they are; and so are conditional of all moral<span class="pagenum">[20]</span> +beings. Here what the human mind sees, is just what the +Deity sees; and it sees just as the Divine mind sees, so that +the truth, as far as so seen, is <i>common</i> to both.</p> + +<p>Although the facts which have been adduced above, are +inexplicable by the Limitists, and are decisive of the actuality +of the Reason, as it has been heretofore described, yet +another line of argument of great wight must not be omitted. +There are in language certain <i>positive</i> terms, which +the Limitists, and the advocates of the Reason agree in +asserting cannot convey any meaning to, or be explained by +the Sense and Understanding. Such are the words infinite +and absolute. The mere presence of such words in language, +as positive terms, is a decisive evidence of the fact, that there +is also a faculty which entertains positive ideas corresponding +to them. Sir William Hamilton's position in this matter, is +not only erroneous, but astonishing. He asserts that these +words express only "negative notions." "They," the infinite +and absolute, "can be conceived only by a thinking away +from, or abstraction of, those very conditions under which +thought itself is realized; consequently, the notion of the +Unconditioned is only negative—negative of the conceivable +itself." But, if this is true, how came these words in the +language at all? Negative ideas produce negative expressions. +Indeed, the Limitists are confidently challenged to +designate another case in language, in which a positive term +can be alleged to have a <i>purely</i> negative signification. Take +an illustration to which we shall recur further on. The +question has been raised, whether a sixth sense can be. Can +the Limitists find in language, or can they construct, a positive +term which will represent the negation of a sixth sense? +We find in language the positive terms, ear and hearing; but +can such positive terms be found, which will correspond to +the phrase, no sixth sense? In this instance, in physics, the +absurdity is seen at once. Why is not as readily seen the +equal absurdity of affirming that, in metaphysics, positive +terms have grown up in the language which are simple<span class="pagenum">[21]</span> +negations? Here, for the present, the presentation of facts +may rest. Let us recapitulate those which have been adduced. +The axioms in mathematics, the principles of the +relations of being, the laws of æsthetics, and most of all the +whole system of principles pertaining to morals and religion, +standing, as they do, a series of mental affirmations, which +all mankind, except the Limitists, qualify as necessary and +universal, compel assent to the proposition, that there must +be a faculty different in kind from the Sense and Understanding,—for +these have already been found impotent—which +can be ground to account of all these facts satisfactorily. +And the presence in language of such positive terms +as absolute and infinite, is a most valuable auxiliary argument. +The faculty which is required,—the faculty which +qualifies all the products of its activity with the characteristics +above named, is the Pure Reason. And its actuality +may therefore be deemed established.</p> + +<p>The Pure Reason having thus been proved to be, it is next +required to show the mode of its activity. This can best be +done, by first noticing the <i>kind</i> of results which it produces. +The Reason gives us, not thoughts, but ideas. These are +simple, pure, primary, necessary. It is evident that any such +object of mental examination can be known only in, and by, +itself. It cannot be analyzed, for it is simple. It cannot +be compared, for it is pure; and so possesses no element +which can be ground for a comparison. It cannot be deduced, +for it is primary and necessary. <i>It can only be seen.</i> +Such an object must be known under the following circumstances. +It must be inherent in the seeing faculty, and must +be <i>immediately and directly seen</i> by that faculty; all this in +such a manner, that the abstraction of the object seen, would +annihilate the faculty itself. Now, how is it with the Reason? +Above we found it to be both capacity and faculty: +capacity in that it possessed as integral elements, <i>a priori</i> +first principles, as objects of sight; faculty in that it saw, +brought forward, and made available, those principles. The<span class="pagenum">[22]</span> +mode of activity of the Pure Reason is then a <i>seeing</i>, direct, +immediate, <i>sure</i>; which holds pure truth <i>fast</i>, right in the +very centre of the field of vision. This act of the Reason in +thus seeing pure truth is best denominated an intuition of +the Reason. And here it may be said,—If perception and +perceive could be strictly confined to the Sense; concept and +conceive to the Understanding; and intuition and intuit to +the Reason, a great gain would be made in accuracy of expression +regarding these departments of the mind.</p> + +<p>Having thus, as it is believed, established the fact of the +existence of a Pure Reason, and shown the mode of its +activity, it devolves to declare the function of that faculty.</p> + +<p>The function of the Pure Reason is, first:—to intuit, by +an immediate perception, the <i>a priori</i> elemental principles +which condition all being; second,—to intuit, by a like immediate +perception, those principles, combined in <i>a priori</i> +systematic processes, which are the conditional ideal forms +for all being; and third,—again to intuit, by another immediate +perception, precisely similar in kind to the others, the +fact, at least, of the perfectly harmonious combination of all +<i>a priori</i> elemental principles, in all possible systematic processes, +into a perfect unity,—an absolute, infinite Person,—God.</p> + +<p>To illustrate.</p> + +<p>1. The Reason asserts that "Malice is criminal;" and +that it is <i>necessarily</i> criminal; or, in other words, that no act, +of any will, can make it otherwise than it is. The assertion, +then, that "Malice is criminal," is an axiom, and conditions +all being, God as well as man.</p> + +<p>2. The Reason asserts that every mathematical form must +be seen in Space and Time, and it affirms the same necessity +in this as in the former case.</p> + +<p>3. The full illustration of this point would be Anselm's +<i>a priori</i> argument for the existence of God. His statement +of it should, however, be so modified as to appear, not as an +<i>a priori</i> argument for the existence of God, but as an ampli<span class="pagenum">[23]</span>fied +declaration of the fact, that the existence of God is a +first principle of Reason; and as such, can no more be denied +than the multiplication table. Objection.—This doctrine +degrades God to the level of the finite; both being +alike conditioned. Answer.—By no means; as will be +seen from the two following points.</p> + +<p>1. It is universally acknowledged that God must be self-existent, +which means, if it means anything, that the existence +of God is <i>beyond his own control</i>; or, in other words, +that self-existence is an <i>a priori</i> elemental principle, which +conditions God's existing at all.</p> + +<p>2. In the two instances under consideration, the word condition +has entirely different significations. God is conditioned +only by <i>Himself</i>. Not only is this conditioning not a limitation, +properly speaking, but the very absence of limitation. +The fact that He is absolute and infinite, is a condition of +His existence. Man's conditions are the very opposite of +these. He is relative, instead of absolute; finite, instead +of infinite; dependent, instead of self-existent. Hence he +differs in <i>kind</i> from God as do his conditions.</p> + +<p>Such being the function of the Pure Reason, it is fully +competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sir William +Hamilton and his followers; and the statement of such +solution is the work immediately in hand.</p> + +<p>Much of the difficulty and obscurity which have, thus far, +attended every discussion of this subject, will be removed by +examining the definitions given to certain terms;—either +by statement, or by implication in the use made of them;—by +exposing the errors involved; and by clearly expressing +the true signification of each term.</p> + +<p>By way of criticism the general statement may be made,—that +the Limitists—as was natural from their rejection of +the faculty of the Pure Reason—use only such terms, and +in such senses, as are pertinent to those subjects which come +under the purvey of the Understanding and the Sense; but +which are entirely impertinent, in reference to the sphere of<span class="pagenum">[24]</span> +spiritual subjects. The two following phases of this error +are sufficient to illustrate the criticism.</p> + +<p>1. The terms Infinite and Absolute are used to express +abstractions. For instance, "<i>the infinite</i>, from a human point +of view, is merely a name for the absence of those conditions +under which thought is possible." "It is thus manifest that +a consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory +with that of the Infinite."—<i>Limits of Religious Thought</i>, +pp. 94 and 96. If asked "Absolute" what? "Infinite" +what? Will you allow person, or other definite term to be +supplied? Mansel would reply—No! no possible answer +can be given by man.</p> + +<p>Now, without passing at all upon the question whether +these terms can represent concrete objects of thought or not, +it is to be said, that the use of them to express abstract notions, +is utterly unsound. The mere fact of abstraction is +an undoubted limitation. There may be an Infinite and Absolute +Person. By no possibility can there be an abstract +Infinite.</p> + +<p>2. But a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by +the Limitists in their use of the words infinite and absolute, +as expressing quantity. Take a few examples from many.</p> + +<p>"For example, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute +whole, that is, a whole so great that we cannot also +conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole; nor an +absolute part, that is, a part so small, that we cannot also +conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. +On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or realize, +or construe to the mind (as here understanding and imagination +coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done +by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which +would itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment; +nor, for the same reason, can we follow out in thought an +infinite divisibility of parts."—<i>Hamilton's Essays</i>, p. 20.</p> + +<p>"The metaphysical representation of the Deity as absolute +and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest meta<span class="pagenum">[25]</span>physicians +have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than +the sum of all reality."—<i>Limits of Religious Thought</i>, p. 76.</p> + +<p>"Is the First Cause finite or infinite?... To think +of the First Cause as finite, is to think of it as limited. To +think of it as limited, necessarily implies a conception of +something beyond its limits; it is absolutely impossible to +conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving a region surrounding +its boundaries."—<i>Spencer's First Principles</i>, p. 37.</p> + +<p>The last extract tempts one to ask Mr. Spencer if he ever +stood on the north side of the affections. Besides the extracts +selected, any person reading the authors above named, +will find numerous phrases like these: "infinite whole," "infinite +sum," "infinite number," "infinite series," by which +they express sometimes a mathematical, and sometimes a +material amount.</p> + +<p>Upon this whole topic it is to be said, that the terms infinite +and absolute have, and can have, no relevancy to any +object of the Sense or of the Understanding, judging according +to the Sense, or to any number. There is no +whole, no sum, no number, no amount, but is definite and +limited; and to use those words with the word infinite, is as +absurd as to say an infinite finite. And to use words thus, +is to "multiply words without knowledge."</p> + +<p>Again, the lines of thought which these writers pursue, do +not tend in any degree to clear up the fogs in which they +have lost themselves, but only make the muddle thicker. +Take, for instance, the following extract:—</p> + +<p>"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The +Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be +conceived as unconscious; it cannot be conceived as complex, +neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived +by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of +difference; it cannot be identified with the Universe, neither +can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, +regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible."—<i>Limits +of Religious Thought</i>, p. 79.<span class="pagenum">[26]</span></p> + +<p>The soul, while oaring her way with weary wing, over the +watery waste of such a philosophy, can find no rest for the +sole of her foot, except on that floating carcase of a doctrine, +Chaos is God. The simple fact that such confusion logically +results from the premises of the Limitists, is a sufficient warrant +for rejecting their whole system of thought,—principle +and process; and for striking for a new base of operations. +But where shall such a base be sought for? On what immutable +Ararat can the soul find her ark, and a sure resting-place? +Man seeks a Rock upon which he can climb and cry, +I <span class="smcap">know</span> that this is truth. Where is the Everlasting Rock? +In our search for the answer to these queries, we may be +aided by setting forth the goal to be reached,—the object to +be obtained.</p> + +<p>By observation and reflection man comes to know that he +is living in, and forms part of, a system of things, which he +comprehensively terms the Universe. The problem is,—<i>To +find an Ultimate Ground, a Final Cause, which shall be +adequate to account for the existence and sustentation of this +Universe</i>. There are but two possible directions from which +the solution of this problem can come. It must be found +either within the Universe, or without the Universe.</p> + +<p>Can it be found within the Universe? If it can, one of +two positions must be true. Either a part of the Universe +is cause for the existence of the whole of the Universe; or +the Universe is self-existent. Upon the first position nothing +need be said. Its absurdity is manifested in the very statement +of it. A full discussion, or, in fact, anything more than +a notice of the doctrine of Pantheism, set forth in the second +point, would be beyond the intention of the author. The +questions at issue lie not between theists and pantheists, but +between those who alike reject Pantheism as erroneous. The +writer confesses himself astonished that a class of rational +men could ever have been found, who should have attempted +to find the Ultimate Ground of the Universe <i>in itself</i>. All +that man can know of the facts of the Universe, he learns<span class="pagenum">[27]</span> +by observation; and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains +is, that a vast system of physical objects exists. From the +facts observed, he draws conclusions: but the stream cannot +rise higher than its fountain. With reference to any lesser +object, as a watch, the same process goes on. A watch is. +It has parts; and these parts move in definite relations to +each other; and to secure a given object. If now, any person, +upon being asked to account for the existence of the +watch, should confine himself wholly to an examination of +the nature of the springs, the wheels, the hands, face, &c., +endeavoring to find the reason of its being within itself, the +world would laugh at him. How much more justly may the +world laugh, yea, shout its ridicule, at the mole-eyed man +who rummages among the springs and wheels of the vast +machine of the Universe, to find the reason of <i>its</i> being. In +the former instance, the bystander would exclaim,—"The +watch is an evidence of intelligence. Man is the only intelligent +being on the earth; and is superior to the watch. +Man made the watch." And his assertion would be true. +<i>A fortiori</i> would a bystander of the Universe exclaim, "The +Universe is an evidence of intelligence. An intelligent Being, +superior to the Universe, made the Universe." And his +assertion is true. We are driven then to our last position; +but it is the Gibraltar of Philosophy.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Ultimate Ground of the Universe must Be +sought for, and can only be found, without +the Universe.</span></p> + +<p>From this starting-point alone can we proceed, with any +hope of reaching the goal. Setting out on our new course +we will gain a step by noticing a fact involved in the illustration +just given. The bystander exclaims, "The watch is +an evidence of intelligence." In this very utterance is necessarily +expressed the fact of two diverse spheres of existence: +the one the sphere of matter, the other the sphere of +mind. One cannot think of matter except as inferior, nor<span class="pagenum">[28]</span> +of mind except as superior. These two, matter and mind, +comprise all possible existence. The Reason not only cannot +see <i>how</i> any other existence can be, but affirms <i>that</i> no +other can be. Mind, then, is the Ultimate Ground of the +Universe. What mind?</p> + +<p>By examination, man perceives what appears to be an +order in the Universe, concludes that there is such an order, +assumes the conclusion to be valid, and names the order Nature. +Turning his eye upon himself, he finds himself not +only associated with, but, through a portion of his faculties, +forming a part of that Nature. But a longer, sharper scrutiny, +a profounder examination, reveals to him his soul's most +secret depth; and the fact of his spiritual personality glows +refulgent in the calm light of consciousness. He sees himself, +indeed, in Nature; but he thrills with joy at the quickly +acquired knowledge that Nature is only a nest, in which he, +a purely supernatural being, must flutter for a time, until he +shall be grown, and ready to plume his flight for the Spirit +Land. If then, man, though bound in Nature, finds his central +self utterly diverse from, and superior to Nature, so that +he instinctively cries, "My soul is worth more than a Universe +of gold and diamonds;" <i>a fortiori</i> must that Being, +who is the Ultimate Ground, not only of Nature, but of those +supernatural intelligences who live in Nature, be supernatural, +spiritual, and supreme?</p> + +<p>Just above, it was seen that matter and mind comprise all +possible existence. It has now been found that mind, in its +highest form, even in man, is pure spirit; and as such, wholly +supernatural. It has further been determined, that the object +of our search must be the Supreme Spirit.</p> + +<p>Just at this point it is suitable to notice, what is, perhaps, +the most egregious and unpardonable blunder the Limitists +have made. In order to do this satisfactorily, the following +analysis of the human mind is presented. The soul is a +spiritual person, and an animal nature. To this animal nature +belong the Sense and the Understanding. It is universally<span class="pagenum">[29]</span> +acknowledged,—at least the Limitists will not deny,—that +the Sense and the Understanding are wholly within, and +conditioned by Nature. Observe then their folly. They +deny that a part can account for a whole; they reject Pantheism; +<i>and yet they employ only those faculties which they +confess are wholly within and conditioned by Nature</i>—for +they deny the existence of the Pure Reason, the perceptive +faculty of the spiritual person—<i>to search, only in Nature, +for the cause of Nature</i>. A fly would buzz among the wheels +of a clock to as little purpose.</p> + +<p>The result arrived at just above, now claims our careful +attention.</p> + +<p><i>The Ultimate Ground of the Universe is</i> <span class="smcap">the Supreme +Spirit</span>.</p> + +<p>To appreciate this result, we must return to our analysis +of man. In his spiritual personality we have found him +wholly supernatural. We have further found that, only as a +spiritual person is he capable of pursuing this investigation to +a final and valid termination. If, then, we would complete our +undertaking, we must ascend into a sphere whose light no +eagle's eye can ever bear; and whose atmosphere his daring +wing can never beat. There no sense can ever enter; no +judgments are needed. Through Reason—the soul's far-darting +eye,—and through Reason alone, can we gaze on the +Immutable.</p> + +<p>Turning this searching eye upon ourselves, we find that +man, as spiritual person, is a Pure Reason,—the faculty +which gives him <i>a priori</i> first principles, as the standard for +conduct and the forms for activity,—a Spiritual Sensibility, +which answers with emotive music to the call of the Reason; +and lastly, a Will, in which the Person dwells central, solitary, +and supreme, the final arbiter of its own destiny. +Every such being is therefore a miniature final cause.</p> + +<p>The goal of our search must be near at hand. In man +appears the very likeness of the Being we seek. His highest +powers unmistakably shadow forth the form of that Being,<span class="pagenum">[30]</span> +who is The Final. Man originates; but he is dependent +for his power, and the sphere of that power is confined to +his own soul. We seek a being who can originate, who is +utterly independent; and the sphere of whose activity extends +wherever, without himself, he chooses. Man, after a +process of culture, comes to intuit some first principles, in +some combinations. We seek a being who necessarily sees, +at once and forever, all possible first principles, in all possible +relations, as the ideal forms for all possible effort. Man +stumbles along on the road of life, frequently ignorant of +the way, but more frequently perversely violating the eternal +law which he finds written on his heart. We seek a being +who never stumbles, but who is perfectly wise; and whose +conduct is in immutable accord with the <i>a priori</i> standards +of his Reason. Man is a spiritual person, dependent for existence, +and limited to himself in his exertions. He whom +we seek will be found to be also a spiritual person who is +self-existent, and who sets his own bounds to his activity.</p> + +<p>That the line of thought we are now pursuing is the true +one, and that the result which we approach, and are about +to utter, is well founded, receives decisive confirmation from +the following facts. Man perceives that malice must be +criminal. Just so the Eternal Eye must see it. A similar +remark is true of mathematical, and all other <i>a priori</i> laws. +Sometimes, at least, there awakens in man's bosom the unutterable +thrill of benevolence; and thus he tastes of the crystal +river which flows, calmly and forever, through the bosom +of the "Everlasting Father." For his own conduct, man is +the final cause. In this is he, must he be, the likeness of +the Ultimate. Spiritual personality is the highest possible +form of being. It is then a form common to God and man. +Here, therefore, Philosophy and Revelation are at one. +With startling, and yet grateful unanimity, they affirm the +solemn truth, "<span class="smcap">God made man in his own image</span>."</p> + +<p>We reach the goal at last. The Final Truth stands full +in the field of our vision. "I am Alpha and Omega, the<span class="pagenum">[31]</span> +beginning and the ending, saith Jehovah, who is, and who +was, and who is to come, the Almighty." <span class="smcap">That spiritual +Person who is self-existent, absolute, and infinite, +is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause of the +Universe.</span></p> + +<p>The problem of the Universe is solved. We stand within +the portico of the sublime temple of truth. Mortal has lifted, +at last, the veil of Isis, and looked upon the eternal mysteries.</p> + +<p>It is manifest now, how irrelevant and irreverent those +expressions must be, in which the terms infinite and absolute +are employed as signifying abstractions or amounts. They +can have no meaning with reference to the Universe. But +what their true significance is, stands out with unmistakable +clearness and precision.</p> + +<p>1. <i>Absoluteness is that distinctive spiritual</i> <span class="smcap">quality</span> <i>of the +necessary Being which establishes Him as unqualified except +by Himself, and as complete</i>.</p> + +<p>2. Absoluteness and Unconditionedness are,—the one the +positive, and the other the negative term expressive of the +same idea.</p> + +<p>3. <i>Infinity is that distinctive spiritual</i> <span class="smcap">quality</span> <i>of the +necessary Being which gives to Him universality</i>.</p> + +<p>Absoluteness and Infinity are, then, spiritual qualities of +the self-existent Person, which, distinguishing Him from all +other persons, constitute Him unique and supreme.</p> + +<p>It is a law of Logic, which even the child must acknowledge, +that whenever, by a process of thought, a result has +been attained and set forth, he who propounds the result is +directly responsible for all that is logically involved in it. +The authority of that law is here both acknowledged and +invoked. The most rigid and exhaustive logical development +of the premises heretofore obtained, which the human +mind is capable of, is challenged, in the confidence that +there can be found therein no jot of discrepancy, no tittle +of contradiction. As germain, and important to the matter +in hand, some steps in this development will be noted.<span class="pagenum">[32]</span></p> + +<p>In solving the problem placed before us, viz: To account +for the being and continuance of the Universe, we have +found that the Universe and its Cause are two distinct and +yet intimately and necessarily connected beings, the one dependent +upon the other, and that other utterly independent; +and so that the one is limited and finite, and the other absolute +and infinite; that the one is partly thing and partly person, +and that to both thing and person limitation and finiteness +belong; while the other is wholly person, and consequently +the pure, absolute, and infinite Person. We have +further found that absoluteness and infinity are spiritual +qualities of that one Person, which are incommunicable, and +differentiate Him from all other possible beings; and which +establish Him as the uncaused, self-active ground for all +possible beings besides. It is then a Person with all the +limitations and conditions of personality,—a Person at once +limited and unlimited, conditioned and unconditioned, related +and unrelated, whose limitations, conditions, and relations +are entirely consistent with his absoluteness and infinity, who +is the final Cause, the Ultimate Ground of the Universe.</p> + +<p>The finite person is self-conscious, and in a measure self-comprehending; +but he only partially perceives the workings +of his own being. <i>A fortiori</i>, must the infinite Person be +self-conscious, and exhaustively self-comprehending. The +finite person is an intellect, sensibility, and will; but these +are circumscribed by innumerable limitations. So must the +infinite Person be intellect, sensibility, and will; but His +intellect must be Universal Genius; His sensibility Pure Delight, +and His will, as choice, Universal Benevolence, and as +act, Omnipotence.</p> + +<p>1. As intellect, the infinite Person is Universal Genius.</p> + +<p>Then, he "must possess the primary copies or patterns of +what it is possible may be, in his own subjective apprehension;" +or, in other words, "The pure ideals of all possible +entities, lie as pure reason conceptions in the light of the +divine intelligence, and in these must be found the rules<span class="pagenum">[33]</span> +after which the creative agency must go forth." These <i>a +priori</i> "pure ideals" are <i>conditional</i> of his knowledge. +They are the sum and limit of all possible knowledge. He +must know them as they are. He cannot intuit, or think +otherwise than in accordance with them. However many +there may be of these ideals, the number is fixed and definite, +and must be so; and so the infinite Person must see it. +In fine, in the fact of exhaustive self-comprehension is involved +the fact, that the number of his qualities, attributes, +faculties, forms of activity, and acts, are, and must be limited, +definite, and so known to him; and yet he is infinite +and absolute, and thoroughly knows himself to be so.</p> + +<p>2. As sensibility, the infinite Person is Pure Delight.</p> + +<p>Then he exists in a state of unalloyed and complete bliss, +produced by the ceaseless consciousness of his perfect worth +and worthiness, and his entire complacency therein. Yet he +is pleased with the good conduct, and displeased with the +evil conduct, of the moral beings he has made. And if two +are good, and one better than another, he loves the one more +than the other. Yet all this in no way modifies, or limits, or +lessens his own absolute self-satisfaction and happiness.</p> + +<p>3. As will, the infinite Person is, in choice, Universal Benevolence; +in act, Omnipotence.</p> + +<p><i>a.</i> In choice, the whole personality,—both the spontaneous +and self activity, are entirely and concordantly active in the +one direction. Some of the objects towards which this state +manifests itself may be very small. The fact that each receives +the attention appropriate to his place in the system of +beings in no way modifies the Great Heart, which spontaneously +prompts to all good acts. But</p> + +<p><i>b.</i> In act, the infinite Person, though omnipotent, is, always +must be, limited. His ability to act is limited and +determined by the "pure ideals," in which "must be found +the rules after which the creative agency must go forth." In +act he is also limited by his choice. The fact that he is +Universal Benevolence estops him from performing any act<span class="pagenum">[34]</span> +which is not in exact accordance therewith. He cannot construct +a rational being, to whom two and two will appear +five; and if he should attempt to, he would cease to be perfect +Goodness. Again, the infinite Person performs an act—of +Creation. The act is, must be, limited and definite; and +so must the product—the Universe be. He cannot create +an unlimited Universe, nor perform an infinite act. The very +words unlimited Universe, and as well the notions they express, +are contradictory, and annihilate each other. Further, +an infinite act, even if possible, would not, could not create, +or have any relation to the construction of a Universe. An +infinite act must be the realization of an infinite ideal. The +infinite Person has a thorough comprehension of himself; +and consequently a complete idea of himself. That idea, +being the idea of the infinite Person, is infinite; and it is the +only possible infinite idea. He finds this idea realized in +himself. But, should it be in his power to realize it <i>again</i>, +that exertion of power would be an infinite act, and its +product another infinite Person. No other infinite act, and +no other result, are rationally supposable.</p> + +<p>The Universe, then, however large it be, is, must be, limited +and definite. Its magnitude may be inconceivable to us; +but in the mind of its Creator every atom is numbered. No +spirit may ever have skirted its boundary; but that boundary +is as clear and distinct to his eye as the outline of the Alps +against a clear sky is to the traveller's. The questions Where? +How far? How long? How much? and the like, are pertinent +only in the Universe; and their answers are always +limited and definite.</p> + +<p>The line of thought we have been pursuing is deemed by +a large class of thinkers not only paradoxical, but utterly +contradictory and self-destructive. We speak of a Person, +a term which necessarily involves limitation and condition, +as infinite and absolute. We speak of this infinity and absoluteness +as spiritual qualities, which are conditional and limiting +to him. We speak of him as conditioned by an inability<span class="pagenum">[35]</span> +to be finite. In fine, to those good people, the Limitists, +our sense seems utter nonsense. It is required, therefore, +for the completion of this portion of our task, to present a +rational ground upon which these apparent contradictions +shall become manifestly consistent.</p> + +<p>In those sentences where the infinite Person is spoken of +as limited and unlimited, &c., it is evident that there is a +play upon words, and that they apply to different qualities in +the personality. It is not said, of course, that the number of +his faculties is limited and unlimited; or that his self-complacency +is boundless and constrained; or that his act is conditioned +and unconditioned. Nor are these seeming paradoxes +stated to puzzle and disturb. They are written to +express a great, fundamental, and all-important truth, which +seems never once to have shadowed the minds of the Limitists,—a +truth which, when once seen, dispels forever all +the ghostly battalions of difficulties which they have raised. +The truth is this.</p> + +<p>That Being whose limitations, conditions, and relations +are wholly subjective, <i>i. e.</i> find their whole base and spring +in his self; and who is therefore entirely free from on all possible +limitations, conditions, and relations, from without himself; +and who possesses, therefore, all possible fulness of all +possible excellences, and finds the perennial acme of happiness +in self-contemplation, and the consciousness of his perfect +worth; and being such is ground for all other possible +being; is, in the true philosophical sense, unrelated, unconditioned, +unlimited. Or, in other words, the conditions imposed +by Universal Genius upon the absolute and infinite +Person are <i>different in kind</i> from the conditions imposed +upon finite persons and physical things. The former in no +way diminish aught from the fulness of their possessor's endowments; +the latter not only do so diminish, but render +it impossible for their possessor to supply the deficiency.</p> + +<p>The following dictum will, then, concisely and exactly +express the truth we have attained.<span class="pagenum">[36]</span></p> + +<p><i>Those only are conditions, in the philosophical sense, which +diminish the fulness of the possessor's endowments.</i></p> + +<p>An admirable illustration of this truth can be drawn from +some reflections of Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., which we +quote. "What we need is not merely a rule by which to +direct <i>the process</i> in the attainment of any artistic end, but +we must find the legislator who may determine the end itself"...</p> + +<p>Whence is the ultimate behest that is to determine +the archetype, and control the pure spontaneity in its action.</p> + +<hr class="tb" /> + +<p>"Must the artist work merely because there is an inner +want to gratify, with no higher end than the gratification of +the highest constitutional craving? Can we find nothing +beyond a want, which shall from its own behest demand that +this, and not its opposite, shall be? Grant that the round +worlds and all their furniture are <i>good</i>—but why good? +Certainly as means to an end. Grant that this end, the happiness +of sentient beings, is <i>good</i>—but why good? Because +it supplies the want of the Supreme Architect. And is this +the <i>supreme good</i>? Surely if it is, we are altogether within +nature's conditions, call our ultimate attainment by what +name we may. We have no origin for our legislation, only +as the highest architect finds such wants within himself, and +the archetypal rule for gratifying his wants in the most effectual +manner; and precisely as the ox goes to his fodder in +the shortest way, so he goes to his work in making and peopling +worlds in the most direct manner. Here is no will; +no personality; no pure autonomy. The artist finds himself +so constituted that he must work in this manner, or the craving +of his own nature becomes intolerable to himself, and +the gratifying of this craving is <i>the highest good</i>."</p> + +<p>We attain hereby a mark by which to distinguish the +diminishing from the undiminishing condition. A sense of +want, <i>a craving</i>, is the necessary result of a diminishing condition. +Hence the presence of any craving is the distinguishing +mark of the finite; and that plenitude of endowments<span class="pagenum">[37]</span> +which excludes all possible craving or lack, is the +distinguishing mark of the infinite and absolute Person. In +this plenitude his infinity and absoluteness consist; and it is, +therefore, conditional of them. Upon this plenitude, as conditional +of this Person's perfection, Dr. Hickok speaks further, +as follows:—</p> + +<p>"We must find that which shall itself be the reason and +law for benevolence, and for the sake of which the artist +shall be put to his beneficent agency above all considerations +that he finds his nature craving it. It must be that for whose +sake, happiness, even that which, as kind and benevolent, +craves on all sides the boon to bless others, itself should be. +Not sensient nor artistic autonomy, but a pure ethic autonomy, +which knows that within itself there is an excellency +which obliges for the sake of itself. This is never to be +found, nor anything very analogous to it, in sensient nature +and a dictate from some generalized experience. It lies +within the rational spirit, and is law in the heart, as an inward +imperative in its own right, and must there be found.... +This inward witnessing capacitates for self-legislating +and self-rewarding. It is inward consciousness of a worth +imperative above want; an end in itself, and not means to +another end; a user of things, but not itself to be used by anything; +and, on account of its intrinsic excellency, an authoritative +determiner for its own behoof of the entire artistic agency +with all its products, and thus a conscience excusing or accusing.</p> + +<p>"This inward witnessing of the absolute to his own worthiness, +gives the ultimate estimate to nature, which needs and +can attain to nothing higher, than that it should satisfy this +worthiness as end; and thereby in all his works, he fixes, in +his own light, upon the subjective archetype, and attains to +the objective result of that which is befitting his own dignity. +It is, therefore, in no craving want which must be gratified, +but from the interest of an inner behest, which should be +executed for his own worthiness' sake, that 'God has created +all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created.'"<span class="pagenum">[38]</span></p> + +<p>In the light of the foregoing discussion and illustrations, +the division of conditions into two classes—the one class, +conditions proper, comprising those which diminish the endowments +of the being upon whom they lie, and are ground +for a craving or lack; and the other class, comprising those +conditions which do not diminish the endowments of the +being upon whom they lie, and which are, therefore, ground +for perfect plenitude of endowments, and of self-satisfaction +on account thereof—is seen to be thoroughly philosophical. +And let it be here noted, that the very construction, or, if +the term suit better, perception of this distinction, is a decisive +evidence of the fact, and a direct product of the operation +of the Pure Reason. If our intellect comprised only +what the Limitists acknowledge it to be, a Sense and an Understanding, +not only could no other but diminishing conditions +be thought of, but by no possibility could a hint that +there were any others flit through the mind. Such a mind, +being wholly in nature, and conditioned by nature, <i>cannot</i> +climb up out of nature, and perceive aught there. But those +conditions which lie upon the infinite Person are supernatural +and spiritual; and could not be even vaguely guessed +at, much more examined critically and classified, but by a +being possessed of a faculty the same in kind with the intellect +in which such spiritual conditions inhere.</p> + +<p>The actual processes which go on in the mind are as +follows. The Sense, possessing a purely mechanical structure, +a structure not differing in <i>kind</i> from that of the vegetable,—both +being alike entirely conditioned by the law of +cause and effect,—perceives phenomena. The relation of the +object to the sensorium, or of the image to the sensory, and +the forms under which the Sense shall receive the impression, +are fixed. Because the Sense acts compulsorily, in +fixed mechanical forms, it is, by this very construction, incapable, +not only of receiving impressions and examining +phenomena outside of those forms, but it can never be startled +with the guess that there <i>is</i> anything else than what is received<span class="pagenum">[39]</span> +therein. For instance: A man born blind, though +he can have no possible notion of what light is, knows that +light is, from the testimony of those who can see. But if a +race of men born blind should be found, who had never had +any communication with men who could see, it is notorious +that they could have no possible notion even that light was. +A suspicion of its existence could never cross their minds. +This position is strengthened and established beyond controversy, +by the failure of the mind in its efforts to construct +an entirely new sense. Every attempt only intensifies our +appreciation of the futility of the effort. From fragments +of the five senses we might, perhaps, construct a patchwork +sixth; but the mind makes no presentation to itself of a new +sense. The reason is, that, to do so, the Sense, as mental +faculty, must transcend the very conditions of its existence. +It is precisely with the Understanding as with the lower faculty. +It cannot transcend its limits. It can add no item to +the sum of human knowledge, except as it deduces it from a +presentation by the Sense. Hence its conditions correspond +to those in its associate faculty.</p> + +<p>It is manifest, then, that a being with only these faculties +may construct a <i>system</i>, but can never develop a <i>science</i>. +It can arrange, classify, by such standards as its fancy may +select, the phenomena in nature; but this must be in accordance +with some sensuous form. <i>No law can be seen</i>, by which +it ought to be so, and not otherwise. Such classification must +always be determined by the number of stamens in the flower, +for instance; and that standard, though arbitrary, will be as +good as any other, <i>unless there comes a higher faculty</i> which, +overlooking all nature, perceives the <i>a priori</i> law working in +nature, which gives the ultimate ground for an exhaustive +development of a science which in its <i>idea</i> cannot be improved. +It is manifest, further, that those conditions, to which +we have applied the epithet proper, lie upon the two faculties +we have been considering. In this we agree with the +Limitists.<span class="pagenum">[40]</span></p> + +<p>It now behooves to present the fact that the faculty whose +existence was proved in the earlier part of our work, is competent +to overlook, and so comprehend nature, and all the +conditions of nature, and thereby assign to said conditions +their true and inferior place, while it soars out of nature, and +intuits those <i>a priori</i> laws which, though the conditions of, +are wholly unconditioned <i>by nature</i>; but which are both the +conditions of and conditioned by the supernatural; and this +in an entirely different sense from the other. This is the +province of the Pure Reason. Standing on some lofty peak, +above all clouds of sense, under the full blaze of eternal +truth, the soul sees all nature spread like a vast map before +her searching eye, sharply observes, and appreciates all the +conditions of nature; and then, while holding it full in the +field of her vision, with equal fulness perceives that other +land, the spiritual plains of the supernatural, sees them too +in all their conditionings; and sees, with a clearness of vision +never approximated by the earthly eye, the fact that these +supernatural conditions are no deprivation which awaken a +want, but that they inhere and cohere, as final ground for +absolute plenitude of endowments and fulness of bliss, in +the Self-existent Person.</p> + +<p>It will be objected to the position now attained, that it involves +the doctrine that the Pure Reason in the finite spiritual +person is on a par with the Universal Genius in the infinite +spiritual Person. The objection is fallacious, because +based upon the assumption that likeness in mode of action +involves entire similarity. The mode of action in the finite +Pure Reason is precisely similar to that of the Universal +Genius; the objects perceived by both are the same, they +are seen in the same light, and so are in accord; but the +<i>range</i> of the finite is one, and the <i>range</i> of the infinite is +another; and so diverse also are the circumstances attending +the act of seeing. The range of the finite Reason is, <i>always +must be, partial</i>: the range of the infinite Reason is, <i>always +must be, exhaustive</i> (not infinite). In circumstances, the finite<span class="pagenum">[41]</span> +Reason is created dependent for existence, must begin in a +germ in which it is inactive, and <i>must</i> be developed by association +with nature, and under forms of nature; and can +never, by any possibility of growth, attain to that perfectness +in which it shall be satisfied, or to a point in development +from which it can continue its advance as <i>pure spirit</i>. It +always must be spirit in a body; even though that be a spiritual +body. The infinite Reason is self-existent, and therefore +independent; and is, and always must be, in the absolute +possession of all possible knowledge, and so cannot grow. +Hence, while the infinite and finite reasons see the same object +in the same light, and therefore <i>alike</i>, the difference in +range, and the difference in circumstance, must forever constitute +them dissimilar. The exact likeness of sight just +noticed is the <i>necessary a priori</i> ground upon which a moral +government is <i>possible</i>.</p> + +<p>In thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction +between the two classes of conditions rests, we have been +led to distinguish more clearly between the faculties of the +mind, and especially to observe how the Pure Reason enables +us thereby to solve the problems she has raised. In this +radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication +of all the problems which the Limitists raise. It also appears +that the terms must, possible, and the like, being used +to express no idea of restraint, as coming from without upon +the infinite Person, or of lack or craving, as subsisting within +him, are properly employed in expressing the fact that his +<i>Self, as a priori ground for his activity</i>, is, though the only, +yet a real, positive, and irremovable limit, condition, and law +of his action. Of two possible ends he may freely choose +either. Of all possible modes of action he may choose one; +but the constituting laws of the Self he <i>cannot</i>, and the moral +laws of his Self he <i>will not</i>, violate.</p> + +<p>That point has now been reached at which this branch of +the discussion in hand may be closed. The final base from +which to conduct an examination of the questions respecting<span class="pagenum">[42]</span> +absoluteness and infinity has been attained. In the progress +to this consummation it was found that a radical psychological +error lay at the root of the philosophy taught by the Limitists. +Their theory was seen to be partial, and essentially +defective. Qualities which they do not recognise were found +to belong to certain mental affirmations. Four classes of +these affirmations or ideas were named and illustrated; and +by them the fact of the Reason was established. Then its +mode of activity and its functions were stated; and finally +the great truth which solves the problem of the ages was, by +this faculty, attained and stated. It became evident that the +final cause of the Universe must be found without the Universe; +and it was then seen that</p> + +<blockquote><p>That spiritual Person who is self-existent, absolute, and +infinite, is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause, of the +Universe.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Definitions of the terms absolute and infinite suitable to +such a position were then given, with a few concluding reflections. +From the result thus secured the way is prepared +for an examination of the general principles and their special +applications which the Limitists maintain, and this will +occupy our future pages.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[43]</span></p> + +<h2 id="PART_II">PART II.</h2> + +<p class="h3">AN EXAMINATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITION +OF THE LIMITISTS, AND OF CERTAIN GENERAL COROLLARIES +UNDER IT.</p> + +<p>It has been attempted in the former pages to find a valid +and final basis of truth, one which would satisfy the cravings +of the human soul, and afford it a sure rest. In the +fact that God made man in his own image, and that thus +there is, <i>to a certain extent</i>, a community of faculties, a community +of knowledge, a community of obligations, and a +community of interests, have we found such a basis. We +have hereby learned that a part of man's knowledge is necessary +and final; in other words, that he can know the truth, +and be sure that his knowledge is correct. If the proofs +which have been offered of the fact of the Pure Reason, and +the statements which have been made of the mode of its activity +and of its functions, and, further, of the problem of +the Universe, and the true method for solving it, shall have +been satisfactory to the reader, he will now be ready to consider +the analysis of Sir William Hamilton's fundamental +proposition, which was promised on an early page. We +there gave, it was thought, sufficiently full extracts for a fair +presentation of his theory, and followed them with a candid +epitome. In recurring to the subject now, and for the purpose +named, we are constrained at the outset to make an +acknowledgment.</p> + +<p>It would be simple folly, a childish egotism, to pass by in +silence the masterly article on this subject in the "North +American Review" for October, 1864, and after it to pretend<span class="pagenum">[44]</span> +to offer anything new. Whatever the author might +have wrought out in his own mental workshop,—and his +work was far less able than what is there given,—that article +has left nothing to be said. He has therefore been +tempted to one of two courses: either to transfer it to these +pages, or pass by the subject entirely. Either course may, +perhaps, be better than the one finally chosen; which is, +while pursuing the order of his own thought, to add a few +short extracts therefrom. One possibility encourages him in +this, which is, that some persons may see this volume, who +have no access to the Review, and to whom, therefore, these +pages will be valuable. To save needless repetition, this +discussion will presuppose that the reader has turned back +and perused the extracts and epitome above alluded to.</p> + +<p>Upon the very threshold of Sir William Hamilton's statement, +one is met by a logical <i>faux pas</i> which is truly amazing. +Immediately after the assertion that "the mind can +know only the <i>limited and the conditionally limited</i>," and in +the very sentence in which he denies the possibility of a +knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, <i>he proceeds to define +those words in definite and known terms</i>! The Infinite he +defines as "the unconditionally unlimited," and the Absolute +as "the unconditionally limited." Or, to save him, will one say +that the defining terms are unknown? So much the worse, +then! "The Infinite," an unknown term, may be represented +by <i>x</i>; and the unconditionally unlimited, a compound +unknown term, by <i>ab</i>. Now, who has the right to say, either +in mathematics or metaphysics, in any philosophy, that +<i>x</i>=<i>ab</i>? Yet such dicta are the basis of "The Philosophy +of the Unconditioned." But, one of two suppositions is possible. +Either the terms infinite and absolute are known terms +and definable, or they are unknown terms and undefinable. +Yet, Hamilton says, they are unknown and definable. Which +does he mean? If he is held to the former, they are unknown; +then all else that he has written about them are +batches of meaningless words. If he is held to the latter,<span class="pagenum">[45]</span> +they are definable; then are they known, and his system is +denied in the assertion of it. Since his words are so contradictory, +he must be judged by his deeds; and in these he always +assumes that we have a positive knowledge of the infinite +and absolute, else he would not have argued the matter; +for there can be no argument about nothing. Our analysis +of his theory, then, must be conducted upon this hypothesis.</p> + +<p>Turn back for a moment to the page upon which his theory +is quoted, and read the last sentence. Is his utterance a +"principle," or is it a judgment? Is it an axiom, or is it a +guess. The logician asserts that we know only the conditioned, +and yet bases his assertion upon "the principles," &c. +What is a principle, and how is it known? If it is axiom, +then he has denied his own philosophy in the very sentence +in which he uttered it. And this, we have no hesitation in +saying, is just what he did. He blindly assumed certain +"fundamental laws of thought,"—to quote another of his +phrases—to establish the impotence of the mind to know +those laws <i>as fundamental</i>. Again, if his philosophy is valid, +the words "must," "necessary," and the like are entirely +out of place; for they are unconditional. In the conditioned +there is, can be, no must, no necessity.</p> + +<p>From these excursions about the principle let us now return +to the principle itself. It may be stated concisely thus: +There are two extremes,—"the Absolute" and the "Infinite." +These include all being. They are contradictories, +that is, one must be, to the exclusion of the other. But the +mind can "conceive" of neither. What, then, is the logical +conclusion? <i>That the mind cannot conceive of anything.</i> +What is his conclusion? That the mind can conceive of +something between the infinite and the absolute, which is +neither the one nor the other, but a <i>tertium quid</i>—the conditioned. +Where did this <i>tertium quid</i> come from, when he +had already comprehended everything in the two extremes? +If there is a mean, the conditioned, and the two extremes, +then "excluded middle" has nothing to do with the matter +at all.<span class="pagenum">[46]</span></p> + +<p>To avoid the inevitable conclusion of his logic as just +stated, Hamilton erected the subterfuge of <i>mental imbecility</i>. +To deny any knowledge to man, was to expose himself to +ridicule. He, therefore, and his followers after him, drew a +line in the domain of knowledge, and assigned to the hither +side of it all knowledge that can come through generalizations +in the Understanding; and then asserted that the contradictions +which appeared in the mind, when one examined +those questions which lie on the further side of that line, resulted +from the impotency of the mind to comprehend the +questions themselves. This was, is, their psychology. How +satisfactory it may be to Man, a hundred years, perhaps, will +show. But strike out the last assertion, and write, Both are +cognizable; and then let us proceed with our reasoning. +The essayist in the North American presents the theory +under four heads, as follows:—</p> + +<p>"1. The Infinite and Absolute as defined, are contradictory +and exclusive of each other; yet, one must be true.</p> + +<p>"2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.</p> + +<p>"3. Each is inconceivable; and the inconceivability of +each is referable to the same cause, namely, mental imbecility.</p> + +<p>"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable +between them."</p> + +<p>The first and fourth points require our especial attention.</p> + +<p>1. Let us particularly mark, then, that it is <i>as defined</i>, +that the terms are "contradictory." The question, therefore, +turns upon the definitions. Undoubtedly the definitions are +erroneous; but in order to see wherein, the following general +reflections may be made:—</p> + +<p>The terms infinite and absolute, as used by philosophers, +have two distinct applications: one to Space and Time, and +one to God. Such definitions as are suitable to the latter +application, and self-consistent, have already been given. +Though reluctant to admit into a philosophical treatise a term +bearing two distinct meanings, we shall waive for a little our<span class="pagenum">[47]</span> +scruples,—though choosing, for ourselves, to use the equivalent +rather than the term.</p> + +<p>Such definitions are needed, then, as that absolute Space +and Time shall not be contradictory to infinite Space and +Time. Let us first observe Hamilton's theory. According +to it, Space, for instance, is either unconditional illimitation, +or it is unconditional limitation; in other words, it is illimitable, +or it is a limited whole. The first part of the assertion +is true. That Space is illimitable, is unquestionably a self-evident +truth. Any one who candidly considers the subject +will see not only that the mind cannot assign limits to Space, +but that the attempt is an absurdity just alike in kind with +the attempt to think two and two five. The last part is a +psychological blunder, has no pertinence to the question, and +is not what Hamilton was groping for. He was searching +for the truth, that <i>there is no absolute unit in Space</i>. A limited +whole has nothing to do with the matter in hand—absoluteness—at +all. The illimitability of Space, which has +just been established as an axiom, precludes this. What, +then, is the opposite pole of thought? We have just declared +it. There is no absolute unit of Space; or, in other words, +all division is in Space, but Space is indivisible. This, also, +is an axiom, is self-evident. We attain, then, two poles of +thought, and definitions of the two terms given, which are +exhaustive and consistent.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"Space is illimitable.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Space is indivisible."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>The one is the infinity of Space, the other is the absoluteness +of Space. The fact, then, is, all limitation is <i>in</i> Space, +and all division is <i>in</i> Space; but Space is neither limited or +divided. One of the logician's extremes is seen, then, to +have no foundation in fact; and that which is found to be +true is also found to be consistent with, nay, essential to, +what should have been the other.</p> + +<p>Having hitherto expressed a decided protest against any +attempt to find out God through the forms of Space and<span class="pagenum">[48]</span> +Time, a repetition will not be needed here. God is only to +be sought for, found, and studied, by such methods as are +suitable to the supreme spiritual Person. Hence all the attempts +of the Limitists to reason from spatial and temporal +difficulties over to those questions which belong to God, are +simply absurd. The questions respecting Space and Time +are to be discussed by themselves. And the questions respecting +God are to be discussed by themselves. He who +tries to reason from the one to the other is not less absurd +than he who should try to reason from a farm to the multiplication +table.</p> + +<p>In Sir William Hamilton's behalf it should be stated, that +there is just a modicum of truth underlying his theory,—just +enough to give it a degree of plausibility. The Sense, +as faculty for the perception of physical objects, or their images, +and the Understanding as discursive faculty for passing +over and forming judgments upon the materials gathered by +the Sense, lie under the shadow of a law very like the one he +stated. The Sense was made <i>incapable</i> of perceiving an ultimate +atom or of comprehending the universe. From the +fact that the Sense never has perceived these objects, the +Understanding concludes that it never will. Only by the insight +and oversight of that higher faculty, the Pure Reason, +do we come to know that it never <i>can</i>. It was because those +lower faculties are thus walled in by the conditions of Space +and Time, and are unable to perceive or conceive anything +out of those conditions, and because, in considering them, he +failed to see the other mental powers, that Sir William Hamilton +constructed his Philosophy of the Unconditioned.</p> + +<p>2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.</p> + +<p>Literally, this is true. The word "conceive" applies +strictly to the work of the Understanding; and that faculty +can never have any notion of the Infinite or Absolute. But, +assuming that "conceive" is a general term for cognize, the +conclusion developed just above is inevitable. If all being +is in one or the other, and neither can be known, nothing can +be known.<span class="pagenum">[49]</span></p> + +<p>3. They cannot be known, because of mental imbecility. +If man can know nothing because of mental imbecility, why +suppose that he has a mental faculty at all? Why not +enounce, as the fundamental principle of one's theory, the +assertion, All men are idiots? This would be logically consistent. +The truth is, the logician was in a dilemma. He +must confess that men know something. By a false psychology +he had ruled the Reason out of the mind, and so +had left himself no faculty by which to form any notion of +absoluteness and infinity; and yet they would thrust themselves +before him, and demand an explanation. Hence, he +constructed a subterfuge. He would have been more consistent +if he had said, There is no absolute and infinite. +The conditioned is the whole of existence; and this the mind +knows.</p> + +<p>"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable +between them."</p> + +<p>What the essayist in the North American says upon this +point is so apt, and so accords with our own previous reflections, +that we will not forbear making an extract. "The +last of the four theses will best be re-stated in Hamilton's +own words; the italics are his. 'The conditioned is the +mean between two extremes—two inconditionates, exclusive +of each other, neither of which <i>can be conceived as possible</i>, +but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded +middle, one <i>must be admitted as necessary</i>.' This sentence +excites unmixed wonder. To mention in the same breath the +law of excluded middle, and two contradictions with a mean +between them, requires a hardihood unparalleled in the history +of philosophy, except by Hegel. If the two contradictory +extremes are themselves incogitable, yet include a cogitable +mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either +extreme? This necessity of accepting one of two contradictories +is wholly based upon the supposed impossibility of +a mean; if the mean exists, that may be true, and both the +contradictories false. But if a mean between the two contradictories<span class="pagenum">[50]</span> +be both impossible and absurd, (and we have +hitherto so interpreted the law of excluded middle,) Hamilton's +conditioned entirely vanishes."</p> + +<p>Upon a system which, in whatever aspect one looks at it, +is found to be but a bundle of contradictions and absurdities, +further criticism would appear to be unnecessary.</p> + +<p>Having, impliedly at least, accepted as true Sir William +Hamilton's psychological error,—the rejection of the Reason +as the intellectual faculty of the spiritual person,—and having, +with him, used the terms limit, condition, and the like, +in such significations as are pertinent to the Sense and Understanding +only, the Limitists proceed to present in a paradoxical +light many questions which arise concerning "the Infinite." +They take the ground that, to our view, he can be +neither person, nor intellect, nor consciousness; for each of +these implies limitation; and yet that it is impossible for us +to know aught of him, except as such. Then having, as +they think, completely confused the mind, they draw hence +new support for their conclusion, that we can attain to no +satisfactory knowledge on the subject. The following extracts +selected from many will show this.</p> + +<p>"Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, +in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies +distinction between one object and another. To be +conscious, we must be conscious of something; and that +something can only be known as that which it is, by being +distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is +necessarily a limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished +from another, it must possess some form of existence +which the other has not, or it must not possess some form +which the other has. But it is obvious that the Infinite cannot +be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by the absence +of any quality which the Finite possesses; for such absence +would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by +the presence of an attribute which the Finite has not; for +as no finite part can be a constituent of an infinite whole,<span class="pagenum">[51]</span> +this differential characteristic must itself be infinite; and +must at the same time have nothing in common with the +finite....</p> + +<p>"That a man can be conscious of the Infinite, is thus a supposition +which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, +annihilates itself. Consciousness is essentially a limitation; +for it is the determination of the mind to one actual out of +many possible modifications. But the Infinite, if it is conceived +at all, must be conceived as potentially everything, +and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general +which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is +anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded +from being any other thing. But again, it must also +be conceived as actually everything, and potentially nothing; +for an unrealized potentiality is likewise a limitation. If +the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very +possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher +perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no +characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from +anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness....</p> + +<p>"Rationalism is thus only consistent with itself when it +refuses to attribute consciousness to God. Consciousness, in +the only form in which we can conceive it, implies limitation +and change,—the perception of one object out of many, and +a comparison of that object with others. To he always conscious +of the same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be +conscious at all; and, beyond its human manifestation, we +can have no conception of what consciousness is."—<i>Limits +of Religious Thought</i>, pp. 93-95.</p> + +<p>"As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call +the conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge +and of positive thought—thought necessarily supposes conditions. +To <i>think</i> is to <i>condition</i>; and conditional limitation +is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought....</p> + +<p>"Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness +is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object<span class="pagenum">[52]</span> +of thought; known only in correlation, and mutually limiting +each other; while, independently of this, all that we know +either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only +a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the +different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit +that the consequence of this doctrine is—that philosophy, if +viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. +Departing from the particular, we admit that we can +never, in out highest generalizations, rise above the finite; +that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be nothing +more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of +an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize +as beyond the reach of philosophy."</p> + +<p>"In all this, so far as human intelligence is concerned, we +cordially agree; for a more complete admission could not be +imagined, not only that a knowledge, and even a notion, of +the absolute is impossible for man, but that we are unable +to conceive the possibility of such a knowledge even in the +Deity himself, without contradicting our human conceptions +of the possibility of intelligence itself."—<i>Sir William Hamilton's +Essays</i>, pp. 21, 22, 38.</p> + +<p>"The various mental attributes which we ascribe to God—Benevolence, +Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example—can +be conceived by us only as existing in a benevolent and holy +and just and wise Being, who is not identical with any one +of his attributes, but the common subject of them all; in one +word, a <i>Person</i>. But Personality, as we conceive it, is +essentially a limitation and relation. Our own personality +is presented to us as relative and limited; and it is from that +presentation that all our representative notions of personality +are derived. Personality is presented to us as a relation +between the conscious self and the various modes of his +consciousness. There is no personality in abstract thought without +a thinker: there is no thinker unless he exercises some +mode of thought. Personality is also a limitation; for the +thought and the thinker are distinguished from and limit each<span class="pagenum">[53]</span> +other; and the various modes of thought are distinguished +each from each by limitation likewise...."—<i>Limits of +Religious Thought</i>, p. 102.</p> + +<p>"Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting +the absolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, +more elevating, more religious, than those barren, vague, +meaningless abstractions in which men babble about nothing +under the name of the Infinite and Personal conscious existence, +limited though it be, is yet the noblest of all existence +of which man can dream.... It is by consciousness +alone that we know that God exists, or that we are able to +offer Him any service. It is only by conceiving Him as a +Conscious Being, that we can stand in any religious relation +to Him at all; that we can form such a representation of +Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants, insufficient though +it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity."—<i>Limits of Religious +Thought</i>, p. 104.</p> + +<p>The conclusions of these writers upon this whole topic are +as follows:—</p> + +<p>"The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions +subversive of each other as equally possible; <i>but only +as unable to understand</i> as possible two extremes; one of +which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, +it is compelled to recognize as true.... And by a wonderful +revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of +our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, +inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned +beyond the sphere of all comprehensive reality."—<i>Sir +William Hamilton's Essays</i>, p. 22.</p> + +<p>"To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The +conception of the Absolute and Infinity, from whatever side +we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. There +is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether +alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction +in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction +in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving<span class="pagenum">[54]</span> +it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving +it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it +as impersonal. It cannot, without contradiction, be represented +as active; nor, without equal contradiction, be represented +as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of +all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of +that sum."—<i>Limits of Religious Thought</i>, pp. 84, 85.</p> + +<p>We have quoted thus largely, preferring that the Limitists +should speak for themselves. Their doctrine, as taught, not +simply in these passages, but throughout their writings, may +be briefly summed up as follows.</p> + +<p>The human mind, whenever it attempts to investigate the +profoundest subjects which come before it, and which it is +goaded to examine, finds itself in an inextricable maze of +contradictions; and, after vainly struggling for a while to get +out, becomes nonplussed, confused, confounded, dazed; and, +falling down helpless and effortless in the maze, and with +devout humility acknowledging its impotence, it finds that +the "highest reason" is to pass beyond the sphere and out +of the light of reason, into the sphere of a superrational and +therefore dark, and therefore <i>blind</i> faith.</p> + +<p>But it is to be stated, and here we strike to the centre of +the errors of the Limitists, that a perception and confession +of mental impotence is <i>not</i> the logical deduction from their +premises. Lustrous as may be their names in logic,—and +Sir William Hamilton is esteemed a sun in the logical firmament,—no +one of them ever saw, or else dared to acknowledge, +the logical sequence from their principles. They have +climbed upon the dizzy heights of thought, and out on their +verge; and there they stand, hesitating and shivering, like +naked men on Alpine precipices, with no eagle wings to +spread and soar away towards the Eternal Truth; and not +daring to take the awful plunge before them. Behold the +gulf from which they shrink. Mr. Mansel says:—</p> + +<p>"It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it +is our duty to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we<span class="pagenum">[55]</span> +cannot reconcile these two representations with each other, +as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently +contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does +not follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our +own minds: it does not follow that it implies any impossibility +in the absolute nature of God. The apparent contradiction, +in this case, as in those previously noticed, is the +necessary consequence of an attempt on the part of the +human thinker to transcend the boundaries of his own consciousness. +It proves that there are limits to man's power of +thought; and it proves no more."—<i>Limits of Religious +Thought</i>, p. 106.</p> + +<p>Or, to put it in sharp and accurate, plain and unmistakable +English. "It is our duty to think of God as personal," +when to think of Him as personal is to think a lie; "to believe +that He is infinite," when so to believe is to believe +the lie already thought; and when to believe a lie is to incur +the penalty decreed by the Bible—God's book—upon +all who believe lies. And this is the religious teaching of +a professed Christian minister in one of the first Universities +in the world. Not that Mr. Mansel meant to teach this. +By no means. But it logically follows from his premises. +In his philosophy the mind instinctively, necessarily, and +with equal authority in each case, asserts</p> + +<p>That there must be an infinite Being;</p> + +<p>That that Being must be Self-conscious,</p> + +<p>Must be unlimited; and that</p> + +<p>Consciousness is a limitation.</p> + +<p>These assertions are contradictory and self-destructive. What +follows then? That the mind is impotent? No! It follows +that the mind is a deceiver! We learn again the lesson we +have learned before. It is not weakness, it is falsehood: +it is not want of capacity, it is want of integrity that is proved +by this contradiction. Man is worse than a hopeless, mental +imbecile, he is a hopeless, mental cheat.</p> + +<p>But is the result true? How can it be, when with all its<span class="pagenum">[56]</span> +might the mind revolts from it, as nature does from a +vacuum? True that the human mind is an incorrigible falsifier? +With the indignation of outraged honesty, man's soul +rejects the insulting aspersion, and reasserts its own integrity +and authority. Ages of controversy have failed to obliterate +or cry down the spontaneous utterance of the soul, "I have +within myself the ultimate standard of truth."</p> + +<p>It now devolves to account for the aberrations of the Limitists. +The ground of all their difficulties is simple and +plain. While denying to the human mind the faculty of +the Pure Reason, they have, <i>by the (to them) undistinguished +use of that faculty</i>, raised questions which the Understanding +by no possibility could raise, which the Reason +alone is capable of presenting, and which that Reason alone +can solve; and have attempted to solve them solely by the +assistance, and in the forms of, the Sense and the Understanding. +Their problems belong to a spiritual person; and +they attempt to solve them by the inferior modes of an animal +nature. Better, by far, could they see with their ears. +All their processes are developed on the vicious assumption, +that the highest form of knowledge possible to the human +mind is a generalization in the Understanding, upon facts +given in the Sense: a form of knowledge which is always +one, whether the substance be distinguished in the form, be +a peach, as diverse from an apple; or a star, as one among +a million. The meagreness and utter insufficiency of this +doctrine, to account for all the phenomena of the human +mind, we have heretofore shown; and shall therefore need +only now to distinguish certain special phases of their fundamental +error.</p> + +<p>As heretofore, there will be continual occasion to note +how the doctrine of the Limitists, that the Understanding +is man's highest faculty of knowledge, and the logical sequences +therefrom respecting the laws of thought and consciousness +vitiate their whole system. One of their most +important errors is thus expressed:—"To be conscious, we<span class="pagenum">[57]</span> +must be conscious of something; and that something can +only be known as that which it is, by being distinguished +from that which it is not." "Thought cannot transcend +consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the antithesis +of subject and object of thought known only in correlation, +and mutually limiting each other; while, independently +of this, all that we know either of subject or object, +either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in each of the +particular, of the plural, of the different, of the modified, of +the phenomenal." In other words, our highest possible form +of knowledge is that by which we examine the peach, distinguish +its qualities among themselves, and discriminate +between them and the qualities of the apple. And Sir William +Hamilton fairly and truly acknowledges that, as a +consequence, science, except as a system of objects of sense, +is impossible.</p> + +<p>The fact is, as has been made already sufficiently apparent, +that the diagnosis by the Limitists of the constitution of +the mind is erroneous. Their dictum, that all knowledge +must be attained through "relation, plurality, and difference," +is not true. There is a kind of knowledge which +we obtain by a direct and immediate <i>sight</i>; and that, too, +under such conditions as are no limitation upon the object +thought. For instance, the mind, by a direct intuition, affirms, +"Malice is criminal." It also affirms that this is an +eternal, immutable, universal law, conditional for all possibility +of moral beings. This direct and immediate sight, and +the consciousness attending it, are <i>full</i> of that one object, +and so are occupied only with it; and it does <span class="smcap">not</span> come +under any forms of relation, plurality, and difference. So is +it with all <i>a priori</i> laws. The mode of the pure reason is +thus seen to be the direct opposite of that of the Understanding +and the Sense.</p> + +<p>Intimately connected with the foregoing is a question whose +importance cannot be overstated. It is one which involves +the very possibility of God's existence as a self-conscious<span class="pagenum">[58]</span> +person. To present it, we recur again to the extracts made +just above from Sir William Hamilton. "Consciousness is +only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of +thought known only in correlation, and mutually limiting +each other." Subsequently, he makes the acknowledgment +as logically following from this: "that we are unable to +conceive the possibility of such knowledge," <i>i. e.</i> of the absolute, +"even in the Deity himself." That is, God can be +believed to be self-conscious only on the ground that the +human intellect is a cheat. The theory which underlies this +assertion of the logician—a theory not peculiar to the Limitists, +but which has, perhaps, been hitherto universally maintained +by philosophers—may be concisely stated thus. In +every correlation of subject and object,—in every instance +where they are to be contrasted,—the subject must be one, +and the object must be <i>another and different</i>. Hamilton, in +another place, utters it thus: "Look back for a moment into +yourselves, and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence +in our feeble consciousness, is, that there are there +several terms, of which the one perceives the other, of which +the other is perceived by the first; in this consists self-knowledge," +&c. Mark the "several terms," and that the +one can only see the other, never itself.</p> + +<p>This position is both a logical and psychological error. +It is a logical error because it <i>assumes</i>, without argument, +that there is involved in the terms subject and object such a +logical contradiction and contradistinction that the subject +cannot be object to itself. This assumption is groundless. +As a matter of fact, it is <i>generally</i> true that, so far as man is +concerned, the subject is one, and the object another and different. +But this by no means proves that it is <i>always</i> so; it +only raises the presumption that such may be the case. And +when one comes to examine the question in itself, there is +absolutely no logical ground for the assumption. It is found +to be a question upon which no decision from logical considerations +can have any validity, because <i>it is purely psycho<span class="pagenum">[59]</span>logical</i>, +and can only be decided by evidence upon a matter +of fact. Furthermore, it is a psychological error, because +a careful examination shows that, in some instances, the opposite +is the fact; that, in certain experiences, the subject +and object are identical.</p> + +<p>This fact that the subject and object are often identical in +the searching eye of human reason, and <i>always</i> so under the +eye of Universal Genius, is of too vast scope and too vital +importance to be passed with a mere allusion. It seems +amazing that a truth which, the instant it is stated, solves a +thousand difficulties which philosophy has raised, should +never yet have been affirmed by any of the great spiritual-eyed +thinkers, and that it should have found utterance, only +to be denied, by the pen of the Limitists. A word of personal +reminiscence may be allowed here. The writer came +to see this truth during a process of thought, having for its +object the solution of the problem, How can the infinite Person +be self-comprehending, and still infinite? While considering +this, and without ever having received a hint from any +source that the possibility of such a problem had dawned on +a human mind before, there blazed upon him suddenly, like a +heaven full of light, this, which appeared the incomparably +profounder question: How can any soul, not God only, but +any soul, be a self-examiner? Why don't the Limitists entertain +and explain this? It was only years after that he +met the negative statement in Herbert Spencer's book. The +difficulty is, that the Limitists have represented to their +minds the mode of the seeing of the Reason, by a sensuous +image, as the eye; and because the eye cannot see itself, +have concluded that the Reason cannot see itself. It is always +dangerous to argue from an illustration; and, in this +instance, it has been fatal. If man was only an animal +nature, and so only a <i>receiver</i> of impressions, with a capacity +to generalize from the impressions received, the doctrine of +the Limitists would be true. But once establish that man is +also a spiritual <i>person</i>, with a reason, which sees truth by immediate<span class="pagenum">[60]</span> +intuition, and their whole teaching becomes worthless. +The Reason is not receptivity merely, or mainly; it is +originator. In its own light it gives to itself <i>a priori</i> truth, +and itself as seeing that truth; and so the subject and object +are identical. This is one of the differentiating qualities +of the spiritual person.</p> + +<p>Our position may be more accurately stated and more +amply illustrated and sustained as follows:</p> + +<p><i>Sometimes, in the created spiritual person, and always in +the self-existent, the absolute and infinite spiritual Person, the +subject and object are</i> <span class="smcap">identical</span>.</p> + +<p>1. Sometimes in the created spiritual person, the subject +and object are identical. The question is a question of fact. +In illustrating the fact, it will be proved. When a man +looks at his hands, he sees they are instruments for <i>his</i> use. +When he considers his physical sense, he still perceives it to +be instrument for <i>his</i> use. In all his conclusions, judgments, +he still finds, not himself, but <i>his</i> instrument. Even in the +Pure Reason he finds only <i>his</i> faculty; though it be the +highest possible to intellect. Yet still he searches, searches +for the <i>I am</i>; which claims, and holds, and uses, the faculties +and capacities. There is a phrase universally familiar +to American Christians, a fruit of New England Theology, +which leads us directly to the goal we seek. It is the phrase, +"self-examination." In all thorough, religious self-examination +the subject and object are identical. In the ordinary +labors and experiences of life, man says, "I can do this or +that;" and he therein considers only his aptitudes and capabilities. +But in this last, this profoundest act, the assertion +is not, "I can do this or that." It is, "I am this or that." +The person stands unveiled before itself, in the awful sanctuary +of God's presence. The decision to be made is not +upon the use of one faculty or another. It is upon the end +for which all labor shall be performed. The character of +the person is under consideration, and is to be determined. +The selfhood, with all its wondrous mysteries, is at once<span class="pagenum">[61]</span> +subject and object. The I am in man, alike in kind to that +most impenetrable mystery, the eternal I AM of "the everlasting +Father," is now stirred to consider its most solemn +duty. How shall the finite I am accord <i>itself</i> to the pure +purpose of the infinite I AM? It may be, possibly is, that +some persons have never been conscious of this experience. +To some, from a natural inaptitude, and to others, from a +perverse disinclination, it may never come. Some have so +little gift of introspection, that their inner experiences are +never observed and analyzed. Their conduct may be beautiful, +but they never know it. Their impressions ever come +from without. Another class of persons shun such an experience +as Balshazzar would have shunned, if he could, the +handwriting on the wall. Their whole souls are absorbed in +the pursuit of earthly things. They are intoxicated with +sensuous gratification. The fore-thrown shadow of the coming +thought of self-examination awakens within them a vague +instinctive dread; and they shudder, turn away, and by +every effort avoid it. Sometimes they succeed; and through +the gates of death rush headlong into the spirit-land, only to +be tortured forever there with the experience they so successfully +eluded here. For the many thousands, who know +by experience what a calm, candid, searching, self-examination +is, now that their attention has been drawn to its full +psychological import, no further word is necessary. They +know that in that supreme insight there was seen and +known, at one and the same instant, in a spontaneous and +simultaneous action of the soul, the seer and the seen as +one, as identical. And this experience is so wide-spread, +that the wonder is that it has not heretofore been assigned its +suitable place in philosophy.</p> + +<p>2. Always in the self-existent, the absolute and infinite, +spiritual Person, the subject and object are identical. This +question, though one of fact, cannot be determined <i>by us</i>, by +our experience; it must be shown to follow logically from +certain <i>a priori</i> first principles. This may be done as follows.<span class="pagenum">[62]</span> +Eternity, independence, universality, are qualities of +God. Being eternal, he is ever the same. Being independent, +he excludes the possibility of another Being to whom +he is necessarily related. Being universal, he possesses all +possible endowment, and is ground for all possible existence; +so that no being can exist but by his will. As Universal +Genius, all possible objects of knowledge or intellectual +effort are immanent before the eye of his Reason; and this +is a <i>permanent state</i>. He is an object of knowledge, comprehending +all others; and therefore he <i>exhaustively</i> knows himself. +He distinguishes his Self as object, from no what else, +because there is no else to distinguish his Self from; but +having an exhaustive self-comprehension, he distinguishes +within that Self all possible forms of being each from each.</p> + +<p>He is absolute, and never learns or changes. There is +nothing to learn and nothing to change to, except to a wicked +state; and for this there <i>can be to him no temptation</i>. He is +ever the same, and hence there can be no instant in time +when he does not <i>exhaustively</i> know himself. Thus always +in him are the subject and object identical.</p> + +<p>These two great principles, viz: That the Pure Reason +sees <i>a priori</i> truth <i>immediately</i>, and out of all relation, plurality +and difference, and that in the Pure Reason, in self-examination, +the subject and object are identical, by their simple +statement explode, as a Pythagorean system, the mental +astronomy of the Limitists. Reason is the sun, and the +Sense and the Understanding, with their satellite faculties, the +circumvolving planets.</p> + +<p>The use of terms by the Limitists has been as vicious as +their processes of thought, and has naturally sprung from +their fundamental error. We will note one in the following +sentence. "Consciousness, in the only form in which we +can conceive it, implies limitation and change,—the perception +of one object out of many, and a comparison of that object +with others." Conceive is the vicious word. Strictly, +it is usable only with regard to things in Nature, and can<span class="pagenum">[63]</span> +have no relevancy to such subjects as are now under consideration. +It is a word which expresses <i>only</i> such operations +as lie in the Sense and Understanding. The following definition +explains this: "The concept refers to all the things +whose common or similar attributes or traits it conceives +(con-cepis), or <i>grasps together</i> into one class and one act of +mind."—<i>Bowen's Logic</i>, p. 7. This is not the mode of the +Reason's action at all. It does not run over a variety of +objects and select out from them the points of similarity, and +grasp these together into one act of mind. It sees one object +in its unity as pure law, or first truth; and examines that in +its own light. Hence, the proper word is, <i>intuits</i>. Seen +from this standpoint, consciousness does <i>not</i> imply limitation +and change. A first truth we always see as <i>absolute</i>,—we +are conscious of this sight; and yet we know that neither +consciousness nor sight is any limitation upon the truth. +We would paraphrase the sentence thus: Consciousness, in +the highest form in which we know it, implies and possesses +<i>permanence</i>; and is the light in which pure truth is +seen as pure object by itself, and forever the same.</p> + +<p>It is curious to observe how the Understanding and the +Pure Reason run along side by side in the same sentence; +the inferior faculty encumbering and defeating the efforts of +the other. Take the following for example.</p> + +<p>"If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that +very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a +higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses +no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished +from anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness." +The presence in language of the word infinite and +its cognates is decisive evidence of the presence of a faculty +capable of entertaining it as a subject for investigation. +This faculty, the Reason having presented the subject for +consideration, the Understanding seizes upon it and drags it +down into her den, and says, "can be that which it is not." +This she says, because she cannot act, except to conceive,<span class="pagenum">[64]</span> +and cannot conceive, except to distinguish this from something +else; and so cannot perceive that the very utterance +of the word "infinite" excludes the word "else." The +Understanding conceives the finite as one and independent, +and the infinite as one and independent. Then the Reason +steps in, and says the infinite is all-comprehending. This +conflicts with the Understanding's <i>conception</i>, and so the puzzle +comes. In laboring for a solution, the Reason's affirmation +is expressed hypothetically: "If it (the infinite) is actually +everything;" and thereupon the Understanding puts in +its blind, impertinent assertion, "it possesses no characteristic +feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else." +<i>There is nothing else from which to distinguish it.</i> The perception +of the Reason is as follows. The infinite Person +comprehends intellectually, and is ground for potentially and +actually, all that is possible and real; and so there can be +no else with which to compare him. Because, possessing all +fulness, he is actually everything, by this characteristic feature +of completeness he distinguishes himself from nothing, +which is all there is, (if no-thing—void—can be said to <i>be</i>,) +beside him; and from any part, which there is within him. +Thus is he object to himself in his own consciousness.</p> + +<p>This vicious working of the Understanding against the +Reason, in the same sentences, can be more fully illustrated +from the following extracts. "God, as necessarily determined +to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation, +is determined to pass either <i>from the better to the worse, or +from the worse to the better</i>. A third possibility that both +states are equal, as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted +by our author, it is not necessary to consider."—<i>Sir William +Hamilton's Essays</i>, p. 42. "Again, how can the Relative be +conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality +from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing from non-existence +into existence. But to conceive an object as non-existent +is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived +exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception.<span class="pagenum">[65]</span> +We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; +but if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. +It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and +at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of +it in the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into +being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates +itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems forced +upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the +condition of that which already exists; and thus the creature +is conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being +of the Creator."—<i>Limits of Religious Thought</i>, p. 81.</p> + +<p>"God," a word which has <i>no significance</i> except to the +Reason: "as necessarily determined,"—a phrase which belongs +only to the Understanding. The opposite is the truth: +"to pass from absolute essence." This can have no meaning +except to the Pure Reason: "to relative manifestation." +This belongs to the Understanding. It contradicts the other; +and the process is absurd. The mind balks in the attempt +to think it. In creation there is no such process as "passing +from absolute essence to relative manifestation." The +words imply that God, in passing from the state of absolute +essence, ceased to be absolute essence, and became "relative +manifestation." All this is absurd; and is in the Understanding +and Sense. God never <i>became</i>. The Creator is +still absolute essence, as before creation; and the logician's +this or that are both false; and his third possibility is not a +contradiction, but the truth. The fact of creation may be +thus stated. The infinite Person, freely according his will +to the behest of his worth, and yet equally free to not so +accord his will, put forth from himself the creative energy; +and this under such modes, that he neither lost nor gained +by the act; but that, though the latter state was diverse from +the first, still neither was better than the other, but both +were equally good. Before creation, he possessed absolute +plenitude of endowments. All possible ideals were present +before his eye. All possible joy continued a changeless<span class="pagenum">[66]</span> +state in his sensibility. His will, as choice, was absolute benevolence; +and, as act, was competent to all possible effort. +To push the ideal out, and make it real, added nothing to, +and subtracted nothing from, his fulness.</p> + +<p>The fact must be learned that muscular action and the +working of pure spirit are so diverse, that the inferior mode +cannot be an illustration of the superior. A change in a +pure spirit, which neither adds nor subtracts, leaves the good +unchanged. Hence, when the infinite Person created, he +passed neither from better to worse, nor from worse to better; +but the two states, though diverse, were equally good.</p> + +<p>We proceed now to the other extract. "Again, how can +the relative," etc. "If the Relative is a distinct reality from +the absolute," then each is <i>self-existent</i>, and independent. +The sentence annihilates itself. "It must be conceived as +passing from non-existence into existence." The image here +is from the Sense, as usual, and vicious accordingly. It is, +that the soul is to look into void, and see, out of that void, +existence come, without there being any cause for that existence +coming. This would be the phenomenon to the Sense. +And the Sense is utterly unable to account for the phenomenon. +The object in the Sense must appear as <i>form</i>; but in +the Reason it is idea. Mr. Mansel's presentation may well +be illustrated by a trick of jugglery. The performer stands +before his audience, dressed in tights, and presents the palms +of his hands to the spectators, apparently empty. He then +closes his right hand, and then opening it again, appears holding +a bouquet of delicious flowers, which he hands about to +the astonished gazers. The bouquet seems to come from +nothing, <i>i. e.</i> to have no cause. It appears "to pass from +non-existence to existence." But common sense corrects the +cheating seeming, and asserts, "There is an adequate cause +for the coming of the bunch of flowers, though we cannot +see it." Precisely similar is creation. Could there have +been a Sense present at that instant, creation would have +seemed to it a juggler's trick. Out of nothing something<span class="pagenum">[67]</span> +would have seemed to come. But under the correcting +guide of the Pure Reason, an adequate cause is found. Before +creation, the infinite Person did not manifest himself; +and so was actually alone. At creation his power, which before +was immanent, he now made emanent; and put it forth +in the forms chosen from his Reason, and according to the +requirement of his own worth. Nothing was added to God. +That which was ideal he now made actual. The form as +Idea was one, the power as Potentiality was another, and +each was in him by itself. He put forth the power into the +form, the Potentiality into the Idea, and the Universe was. +Thus it was that "the Relative came into being." In the +same manner it might be shown how, all along through the +writings of the Limitists, the Understanding runs along by +the Reason, and vitiates her efforts to solve her problems. +We shall have occasion to do something of this farther on.</p> + +<p>The topic now under discussion could not be esteemed finished +without an examination of the celebrated dictum, "To +think is to condition." Those who have held this to be universally +true, have also received its logical sequence, that to +the finite intellect God cannot appear self-comprehending. +In our present light, the dictum is known to be, not a universal, +but only a partial, truth. It is incumbent, therefore, +to circumscribe its true sphere, and fix it there. We shall +best enter upon this labor by answering the question, What +is thinking?</p> + +<p>First. In general, and loosely, any mental operation is +called thinking. Second. Specifically, all acts of reflection +are thinkings. Under this head we notice two points. +<i>a.</i> That act of the Understanding in which an object presented +by the Sense is analyzed, and its special and generic +elements noted, and is thus classified, and its relations determined, +is properly a thinking. Thus, in the object cat I distinguish +specifically that it is domestic, and generically that +it is carnivorous. <i>b.</i> That act of the finite spiritual person +by which he compares the judgments of the Understanding<span class="pagenum">[68]</span> +with the <i>a priori</i> laws of the Pure Reason, and by this final +standard decides their truth or error. Thus, the judgment +of the young Indian warrior is, that he ought to hunt down +and slay the man who killed his father in battle. The standard +of Reason is, that Malice is criminal. This judgment is +found to involve malice, and so is found to be wrong. Third, +the intuitions of the reason. These, in the finite person, +come <i>after</i> a process of reflection, and are partly consequent +upon it; yet they take place in another faculty, which is +developed by this process; but they are such, that by no +process of reflection <i>alone</i> could they be. Thinking, in the +Universal Genius, is the <i>sight</i>, at once and forever, of all +possible object of mental effort. It is necessary and <i>spontaneous</i>, +and so is an endowment, not an attainment; and is +possessed without effort. We are prepared now to entertain +the following statements:—</p> + +<p>A. So far as it represents thinking as the active, <i>i. e.</i> +causative ground, or agent of the condition, the dictum is not +true. The fact of the thinking is not, cannot be, the ground +of the condition. The condition of the object thought, whatever +the form of thinking may be, must lie as far back at +least as the ground of the thinker. Thus, God's self, as +ground for his Genius, must also be ground for <i>all</i> conditions. +Yet men think of an object <i>in its conditions</i>. This is because +the same Being who constructed the objects in their +conditions, constructed also man as thinker, <i>correlated to +those conditions</i>, so that he should think upon things <i>as they +are</i>. In this view, to think is not condition, but is mental +activity in the conditions already imposed. Thus it is with +the Understanding; and the process of thinking, as above +designated, goes on in accordance with the law stated in <i>a</i>, +of the second general definition. It follows, therefore,</p> + +<p>B. That so far as the dictum expresses the fact, that within +the sphere of conditions proper,—observing the distinction +of conditions into two classes heretofore made,—the +finite intellect must act under them, and see those objects<span class="pagenum">[69]</span> +upon which they lie, accordingly,—as, for instance, a geometrical +figure must be seen in Time and Space,—so far it is +true, and no farther. For instance: To see an eagle flying, +is to see it under all the conditions imposed upon the bird as +flying, and the observer as seeing. But when men intuit the +<i>a priori</i> truth, Malice is criminal, they perceive that it lies +under no conditions proper, but is absolute and universal. +We perceive, then,</p> + +<p>C. That for all mental operations which have as object +pure laws and ideal forms, and that Being in whom all these +inhere, this dictum is not true. The thinker may be conditioned +in the proper sense of that term; yet he entertains +objects of thought which are unconditioned; and they are +not affected by it. Thus, it does not affect the universality +of the principle in morals above noted that I perceive it to +be such, and that necessarily.</p> + +<p>Assuming, then, that by the dictum, To think is to condition, +is meant, not that the thinker, by the act of thinking, +constructs the conditions, but that he recognizes in himself, +as thinking subject, and in the object thought, the several +conditions (proper) thereof,—the following statements will +define the province of this dictum.</p> + +<p>1. The Universe as physical object, the observing Sense, +and the discursive Understanding, lie wholly within it.</p> + +<p>2. Created spiritual persons, <i>as constituted beings,</i> also lie +wholly within it. <i>But it extends no farther.</i> On the other +hand,</p> + +<p>3. Created spiritual persons, in their capacities to intuit +pure laws, and pure ideal forms; and those laws and forms +themselves lie wholly without it.</p> + +<p>4. So also does God the absolute Being in whom those +laws and forms inhere. Or, in general terms,</p> + +<p>When conditions (proper) already lie upon the object +thought, since the thinker must needs see the object under +its conditions, it is true that, To think is to condition. But +so far as it is meant that thinking is such a kind of operation<span class="pagenum">[70]</span> +that it cannot proceed except the object be conditioned, it is +not true; for there are processes of thought whose objects +are unconditioned.</p> + +<p>The question, "What are Space and Time?" with which +Mr. Spencer opens his chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," +introduces a subject common to all the Limitists, and which, +therefore, should be considered in this part of our work. A +remark made a few pages back, respecting an essay in the +"North American Review" for October 1864, applies with +equal force here in reference to another essay by the same +writer, in the preceding July number of that periodical. At +most, his view can only be unfolded. He has left nothing to +be added. In discussing a subject so abstruse and difficult as +this, it would seem, in the present stage of human thought at +least, most satisfactory to set out from the Reason rather than +the Sense, from the idea rather than the phenomenon; and +so will we do.</p> + +<p>In general, then, it may be said that Space and Time are +<i>a priori</i> conditions of created being. The following extracts +are in point. "Pure Space, therefore, as given in the primitive +intuition, is pure form for any possible phenomenon. +As unconjoined in the unity of any form, it is given in the +primitive intuition, and is a cognition necessary and universal. +Though now obtained from experience, and in chronological +order subsequent to experience, yet is it no deduction +from experience, nor at all given by experience; but it is +wholly independent of all experience, prior to it, and without +which it were impossible that any experience of outer object +should be." "Pure Time, as given in the intuition, is immediately +beheld to be conditional for all possible period, +prior to any period being actually limited, and necessarily +continuing, though all bounded period be taken away."—<i>Rational +Psychology</i>, pp. 125, 128.</p> + +<p>Again, a clearly defined distinction may be made between +them as conditions. Space is the <i>a priori</i> condition of <i>material</i> +being. Should a spiritual person, as the soul of a man,<span class="pagenum">[71]</span> +be stripped of all its material appurtenances, and left to exist +as pure spirit, it could hold no communication with any other +being but God; and no other being but he could hold any +communication with it. It would exist out of all relation to +Space. Not so, however, with Time. Time is the <i>a priori</i> +condition of all created being, of the spiritual as well as +material. In the case just alluded to, the isolated spiritual +person would have a consciousness of succession and duration, +although he would have no standard by which to measure +that duration, he could think in processes, and only in +processes, and thus would be necessarily related to Time. +Dr. Hickok has expressed this thus: "Space in reference to +time has no significancy. Time is the pure form for phenomena +as given in the internal sense only, and in these there +can be only succession. The inner phenomenon may endure +in time, but can have neither length, breadth, nor thickness +in space. A thought, or other mental phenomenon, may fill +a period, but cannot have superficial or solid content; it may +be before or after another, but not above or below it, nor with +any outer or inner side."—<i>Rational Psychology</i>, p. 135.</p> + +<p>Space and Time may also be distinguished thus: "Space +has three dimensions," or, rather, there can be three dimensions +in space,—length, breadth, and thickness. In other +words, it is solid room. "Time has but one dimension," or, +rather, but one dimension can enter into Time,—length. In +Time there can only be procession. Space and Time may +then be called, the one "statical," the other "dynamical," +illimitation. Following the essayist already referred to, they +may be defined as follows:</p> + +<p>"Space is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter.</p> + +<p>"Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existence."</p> + +<p>Both, then, are marked by receptivity, indivisibility, and +illimitability. The one is receptivity, that material object +may come into it; the other, that event may occur in it. +There is for neither a final unit nor any limit. All objects<span class="pagenum">[72]</span> +are divisible in Space, and all periods in Time; and thus +also are all limits comprehended, but they are without limit. +Turning now from these more general aspects of the subject, +a detailed examination may be conducted as follows.</p> + +<p>The fundamental law given by the Reason is, as was seen +above, that Space and Time are <i>a priori</i> conditions of created +being. We can best consider this law in its application to +the facts, by observing two general divisions, with two sub-divisions +under each. Space and Time have, then, two general +phases, one within, and one without, the mind. Each +of these has two special phases. The former, one in the +Sense, and one in the Understanding. The latter, one within, +and one without, the Universe.</p> + +<p>First general phase within the mind. First special phase, +in the Sense. "As pure form in the primitive intuition, they +are wholly limitless, and void of any conjunction in unity, +having themselves no figure nor period, and having within +themselves no figure nor period, but only pure diversity, in +which any possible conjunction of definite figures and periods +may, in some way, be effected." In other words, they are +pure, <i>a priori</i>, formal laws, which are conditional to the being +of any sense as the perceiver of a phenomenon; and yet this +sense could present no figure or period, till some figure or +period was produced into it by an external agency. As such +necessary formal laws, Space and Time "have a necessity +of being independently of all phenomena." Or, in other +words, the fact that all phenomena <i>must</i> appear in them, lies +beyond the province of power. This, however, is no more a +limit to the Deity than it is a limit to him that he cannot +hate his creatures and be good. In our experience the Sense +gives two kinds of phenomena: the one the actual phenomena +of actual objects, the other, ideal phenomena with ideal +objects. The one is awakened by the presentation, in the +physical sense, of a material object, as a house; the other, +by the activity of the imaging faculty, engaged in constructing +some form in the inner or mental sense, from forms<span class="pagenum">[73]</span> +actually observed. Upon both alike the formal law of Space +and Time must lie.</p> + +<p>Second special phase, in the Understanding. Although +there is pure form, if there was no more than this, no notion +of a system of things could be. Each object would have its +own space, and each event its own time. But one object +and event could not be seen in any relation to another object +and event. In order that this shall be, there must be some +ground by which all the spaces and times of phenomena shall +be joined into a unity of Space and Time; so that all objects +shall be seen in one Space, and all events in one Time. "A +notional connective for the phenomena may determine these +phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of all +space and of all time, and so may give both the phenomena +and their space and time in an objective experience." The +operation of the Understanding is, then, the connection, by a +notional, of all particular spaces and times; <i>i. e.</i> the space +and time of each phenomenon in the Sense, into a comprehensive +unity of Space and Time, in which all phenomena +can be seen to occur; and thus a system can be. In a word, +not only must each phenomenon be seen in its own space +and time, but all phenomena must be seen in <i>one</i> Space and +Time. This connection of the manifold into unity is the +peculiar work of the Understanding. An examination of +the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a general +formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental +law given by the Reason. That law, that all objects must +be seen in Space, and all events in Time, involves the subordinate +law:</p> + +<p><i>That no mind can observe material objects or any events +except under the conditions of Space and Time</i>; or, to change +the phraseology, <i>Space and Time are</i> a priori <i>conditional to +the being of any mind or faculty in a mind capable of observing +a material object or any event</i>. This will, perhaps, +be deemed to be, in substance, Kant's theory. However +that may be, this is true, but is only <i>a part of the truth</i>.<span class="pagenum">[74]</span> +The rest will appear just below. The reader will notice +that no exception is made to the law here laid down, and will +start at the thought that this law lies upon the Deity equally +as upon created beings. No exception is made, because +none can be truthfully made. The intellect is just as unqualified +in its assertion on this point as in those noticed on +an earlier page of this work. Equally with the laws of +numbers does the law of Space and Time condition all intellect. +The Deity can no more see a house out of all relation +to Space and Time than he can see how to make two and +two five.</p> + +<p>Second general phase, without the mind. First special +phase, within the Universe. All that we are now to examine +is objective to us; and all the questions which can arise +are questions of fact. Let us search for the fact carefully +and hold it fearlessly. To recur to the general law. It was +found at the outset that Reason gave the idea of Space and +Time as pure conditions for matter and event. We are now +to observe the pure become the actual condition; or, in other +words, we are to see the condition <i>realized</i>. Since, then, we +are to observe material objects and events in a material system, +it is fitting to use the Sense and the Understanding; +and our statements and conclusions will conform to those +faculties.</p> + +<p>We have a concept of the Universe as a vast system in +the form of a sphere in which all things are included. This +spherical system is complete, definite, limited, and so has +boundaries. A portion of "immeasurable void"—Space—has +been occupied. Where there was nothing, something +has become. Now it is evident that the possibility of our +having a concept of the Universe, or of a space and a time +in the Universe, is based upon the presence of an actual, underlying, +all-pervading substance, which fills and forms the +boundaries of the Universe, and thus enables spaces and +times to be. We have no concept except as in limits, and +those limits are conceived to be substance. In other words,<span class="pagenum">[75]</span> +space is distance, and time is duration, in our concept. Take +away the boundaries which mark the distance, and the procession +of events which forms the duration, and in the concept +pure negation is left. To illustrate. Suppose there be +in our presence a cubic yard of vacuum. Is this vacuum an +entity? Not at all. It can neither be perceived by the +Sense nor conceived by the Understanding. Yet it is a +space. Speaking carelessly, we should say that this cube +was object to us. Why? Because it is enclosed by substantial +boundaries. All, then, that is object, all that is entity, +is substance. In our concept, therefore, a space is solid +distance within the substance, and the totality of all distances +in the Universe is conceived to be Space. Again; suppose +there pass before our mind a procession of events. One +event has a fixed recurrence. In our concept the procession +of events is a time, and the recurring event marks a period +in time. The events proceeding are all that there is in the +concept; and apart from the procession a conception of time +is impossible. The procession of all the events of the Universe, +that is <i>duration</i>, is our concept of Time. Thus, within +the Universe, space is solid distance and time is duration; +and neither has any actuality except as the Universe is. +Let us assume for a moment that our concept is the final +truth, and observe the result. In that concept space is limited +by matter, and matter is conceived of as unlimited. +This result is natural and necessary, because matter, substance, +"a space-filling force," is the underlying notional +upon which as ground any concept is possible. If matter is +truly illimitable, then materialistic pantheism, which is really +atheism, logically follows. Again; in our concept time is +duration, and duration is conceived of as unlimited. If so, +the during event is unlimited. From this hypothesis idealistic +pantheism logically follows. But bring our concept into +the clear light, and under the searching eye of Reason, and +all ground for those systems vanishes instantly. Instead of +finding matter illimitable and the limit for a space, Space is<span class="pagenum">[76]</span> +seen to be illimitable and pure condition, that matter may +establish a limit within it. And Time, instead of being duration, +and so limited by the during event, is found to be +illimitable and pure condition, that event may have duration +in it. This brings us to the</p> + +<p>Second special phase, without or independent of the Universe. +We have been considering facts in an objective experience, +and have used therefore the Sense and Understanding, +as was proper. What we are now to consider is a subject +of which all experience is impossible. It can therefore +be examined only by that faculty which presents it, the Pure +Reason. Remove now from our presence all material object +in Space, and all during event in Time; in a word, remove +the Universe, and what will be left? As the Universe had +a beginning, and both it and all things in it are conditioned +by Space and Time, so also let it have an end. Will its conditions +cease in its ceasing? Could another Universe arise, +upon which would be imposed no conditions of Space and +Time? These questions are answered in the statement of +them. Those conditions must remain. When we have abstracted +from our <i>concept</i> all substance and duration, there is +left only <i>void</i>. Hence, in our concept it would be proper to +say that without the Universe is void, and before the Universe +there was void. Also, that in void there is no thing, +no where, and no when; or, void is the negation of actual +substance, space and time. But pure Space and Time, as <i>a +priori</i> conditions that material object and during event may +be, have not ceased. There is still <i>room</i>, that an object may +become. There is still <i>opportunity</i>, that an event may occur. +By the Reason it is seen that these conditions have the same +necessary being for material object and occurring event, as +the conditions of mental activity have for mind; and they +have their peculiar characteristics exactly according with +what they do condition, just as the laws of thought have +their peculiar characteristics, which exactly suit them to +what they condition. If there be a spiritual person, the<span class="pagenum">[77]</span> +moral law must be given in the intuition as necessarily binding +upon him; and this is an <i>a priori</i> condition of the being +of such person. Precisely similar is the relation between +Space and Time as <i>a priori</i> conditions, and object and event +upon which they lie. The moral law has its characteristics, +which fit it to condition spiritual person. Space and Time +have their characteristics, which fit them to condition object +and event. Space, then, as room, and Time as opportunity, +and both as <i>a priori</i> conditions of a Universe, must have the +same necessity of being that God has. They <i>must</i> be, as he +<i>must</i> be. But observe, they are pure conditions, and no +more. They are neither things nor persons. The idea of +them in the Reason is simple and unanalyzable. They can +be assigned their logical position, but further than this the +mind cannot go.</p> + +<p>The devout religious soul will start, perhaps, at some of +the positions stated above. We have not wrought to pain +such soul, but only for truth, and the clue of escape from all +dilemmas. The only question to be raised is, are they true? +If a more patient investigation than we have given to this +subject shall show our positions false, then we shall only +have failed as others before us have; but we shall love the +truth which shall be found none the less. But if they shall +be found true, then is it certain that God always knew them +so and was always pleased with them, and no derogation to +his dignity can come from the proclamation of them, however +much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions. +Most blessed next after the Saviour's tender words of forgiveness +are those pure words of the apostle John, "No lie +is of the truth."</p> + +<p>The conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to +state how it is that primarily God was out of all relation to +Space and Time. He was out of all relation to Space, because +he is not material object, thereby having limits, form, +and position in Space. He was out of all relation to Time, +because he holds immediately, and at once, all possible objects<span class="pagenum">[78]</span> +of knowledge before the Eye of his mind. Hence he can +learn nothing, and can experience no process of thought. +Within his mind no event occurs, no substance endures. Yet, +while this is true, it is equally true that, as the Creator, he +is conditioned by Space and Time, just as he is conditioned +by himself; and it may be found by future examination that +they are essential to that Self. But, whatever conclusion +may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a subject, +this much is certain: God, as the infinite and absolute +spiritual Person, self-existent and supreme, is the great Fact; +and Space and Time, whatever they are, will, <i>can</i> in no wise +interfere with and compromise his perfectness and supremacy. +It is a pleasure to be able to close this discussion with reflections +profound and wise as those contained in the following +extract from the essay heretofore alluded to.</p> + +<p>"The reciprocal relations of Space, Time, and God, are +veiled in impenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to +attribute real infinity to Space and Time, lest it should conflict +with the infinity of God. Such timidity has but a slender +title to respect. If the Laws of Thought necessitate +any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion that +Space and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile +this result with the infinity of God, there is no alternative +but to accept of scepticism with as good a grace as possible. +No man is worthy to join in the search for truth, who +trembles at the sight of it when found. But a profound +faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by anticipation, +and prophesies the solutions of reason. Space is +infinite, Time is infinite, God is infinite; three infinites coexist. +Limitation is possible only between existences of the +same kind. There could not be two infinite Spaces, two infinite +Times, or two infinite Gods; but while infinites of the same +kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds may. When an +hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite Space; +when a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, +infinite Space and Time will limit the infinite God. <i>But not</i><span class="pagenum">[79]</span> +<i>before.</i> Time exists ubiquitously, Space exists eternally, +God exists ubiquitously and eternally. The nature of the +relations between the three infinites, so long as Space and +Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and absolutely +incomprehensible; but to assume contradiction, exclusion, or +mutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous +as it is irreverent."</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[80]</span></p> + +<h2 id="PART_III">PART III.</h2> + +<p class="h3">AN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT PASSAGES +IN THE WRITINGS OF THE LIMITISTS.<br /> +<br /> +ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM +HAMILTON.</p> + +<p>It never formed any part of the plan of this work to give +an extended examination of the logician's system of metaphysics, +or even to notice it particularly. From the first, it +was only proposed to attempt the refutation of that peculiar +theory which he enounced in his celebrated essay, "The +Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a monograph that has +generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation +thereof; and which he supplemented, but never superseded. +If the arguments adduced, and illustrations presented, in the +first part, in behalf of the fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, +and the analysis and attempted refutation of the +celebrated dictum based upon two extremes, an excluded +middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as sufficient, +as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, +and the explanation of certain general questions, then, so far +at least as Sir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if +any, further remark will be expected. A few subordinate +passages in the essay above referred to may, however, it is +believed, be touched with profit by the hand of criticism and +explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention is +now called.</p> + +<p>In remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: +"Now, it is manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin +is involved in the proposition, <i>that the Unconditioned, the</i><span class="pagenum">[81]</span> +<i>Absolute, the Infinite, is immediately known in consciousness, +and this by difference, plurality, and relation</i>." It is hardly +necessary to repeat here the criticism, that the terms infinite, +absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when used to express +abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite—what? The fact +of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates +every such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may +be thus stated:—The infinite Person, or the necessary principle +as inhering in that Person, is <i>immediately</i> known in +consciousness, and this, not by difference, plurality, and relation, +but by a direct intuition of the Pure Reason. In this +act the object seen—the idea—is held right in the Reason's +eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not +known by difference, because there is no other object but the +one before that eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it +known by plurality, because it is seen by itself, and there is +no other object contemplated, with which to join it. Nor is +it known by relation, because it is seen to be what it is <i>in +itself</i>, and as out of all relation. A little below, in the same +paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin, thus:—"The +recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle +of intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition +and the end of philosophy." The true idea, accurately +stated, is as follows. The fact that, by a constituting law of +intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately intuits absoluteness +as the distinctive quality of <i>a priori</i> first principles, and +of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the condition, +and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy.</p> + +<p>These two erroneous positions the logician follows with +his celebrated "statement of the opinions which may be entertained +regarding the Unconditioned, as an immediate object +of knowledge and of thought." The four "opinions," to +which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are too well +known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only +to afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, +as it is believed, the true opinion, which is as follows.<span class="pagenum">[82]</span></p> + +<p>The infinite Person is "inconceivable," but is cognizable +as a fact, is known to be, and is, to a certain extent, known +to be such and such; all this, by an immediate intuition of +the Pure Reason, of which the spiritual person is definitely +conscious; and that Person is so seen to be primarily unconditioned, +<i>i. e.</i> out of all relation, difference, and plurality.</p> + +<p>"Inconceivable." As we have repeatedly said, this word +has no force except with regard to things in nature.</p> + +<p>Is cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain +than that an <i>exhaustive</i> knowledge of the Deity is impossible +to any creature. But equally certain is it, that, except as we +have some true, positive, <i>reliable</i> knowledge of him <i>as he is</i>, +we cannot be moral beings under his moral government. +Take, for instance, the moral law as the expression of God's +nature. 1. Either "God is love," or he is not love—hate; +or he is indifferent, <i>i. e.</i> love has no relation to him. If +the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy +to the subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it +is unquestionably true that he is utterly inscrutable. Then +are we in just the condition which the Limitists assert. But +observe the results respecting ourselves. Our whole moral +nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is +possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We +feel that we ought to love the perfect Being. At times we +go starving for love to him and beg that bread. He has no +love to give. He never felt a pulsation of affection. He +sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow; and, +covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable +mystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. +He gives us a stone. Does such a picture instantly shock, +yea, horrify, all our finer sensibilities? Does the soul cry out +in agony, her rejection of such a conclusion? In that cry +we hear the truth in God's voice; for he made the soul. +Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It +is impossible, then, to think of God except as <i>love</i>. We know +what love is. We know what God is. There is a somewhat<span class="pagenum">[83]</span> +common to the Deity and his spiritual creatures. This +enables us to attain a final law, as follows.</p> + +<p><i>In so far as God's creatures have faculties and capacities +in common with him, in so far do they know him positively; +but in all matters to which their peculiarities as creatures pertain, +they only know him negatively;</i> i. e. <i>they know that he +is the opposite of themselves.</i></p> + +<p>That passage which was quoted in a former page, simply +to prove that Sir William Hamilton denied the reality of the +Reason as distinct from the Understanding, requires and will +now receive a particular examination. He says: "In the +Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function; +both seek the one in the many;—the Idea (Idee) is +only the Concept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; +Reason only the Understanding which has 'overleaped +itself.'" In this sentence, and the remarks which follow it, +the logician shows that he neither comprehends the assigned +function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any accurate +knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he +passes judgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly +erroneous than his. For "both faculties" do <i>not</i> +"perform the same function." Only the Understanding +seeks "the one in the many." The Reason seeks <i>the many +in the one</i>. The functions and modes of activity of the two +faculties are exactly opposite. The Understanding runs +about through the universe, and gathers up what facts it may, +and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason sees the truth +<i>first</i>, as necessary <i>a priori</i> law, and holding it up as standard, +measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts +in which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this assertion, is +guilty of a most glaring <i>petitio principii</i>. For, the very +question at issue is, whether "both faculties" do "perform +the same function"; whether "both" do "seek the one in +the many." In order not to leave the hither side of the +question built upon a bare assertion, it will be proper to +revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The<span class="pagenum">[84]</span> +Reason sees the truth first. Take now the assertion, Malice +is criminal. Is this primarily learned by experience; or is +it an intuitive conviction, which conditions experience. Or, +in more general terms, does a child need to be taught what +guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its letters +before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within +it spontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter +be the true experience, then it can only be accounted for +upon the ground that an idea of right and wrong, as an <i>a +priori</i> law, is organic in man; and, by our definition, the +presentation of this law to the attention in consciousness is +the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one principle +was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but +the many acts are compared with, and judged by, that one +standard, which was seen <i>first</i>, and as necessarily true. +Take another illustration. All religions, in accounting for +the universe, have one common point of agreement, which is, +that some being or beings, superior to it and men, produced +it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more +subtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a +crude form, is associated with the other. These notions +must be accounted for. How shall it be done? Are they +the result of experience? Then, the first human beings had +no such notions. But another and more palpable objection +arises. Are they the result of individual experience? +Then there would be as many religions as individuals. But, +very ignorant people have the experience,—persons who +never learned anything but the rudest forms of work, from +the accumulated experience of others; nor by their own experience, +to make the smallest improvement in a simple agricultural +instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience +one of the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last +resort, it may be said they were taught it by philosophers. +But this is negatived by the fact, that philosophers do not, to +any considerable extent, teach the people, either immediately +or mediately; but that generally those who have the least philosophy<span class="pagenum">[85]</span> +have the largest influence. And what is most in point, +none of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the +gist of the idea, however crude its form, is everywhere the +same. Be it a Fetish, or Brahm, or God, in the kernel final +cause will be found. It would seem that any candid mind +must acknowledge that no combined effort of men, were this +possible, could secure such universal exactitude. But turn +now and examine any individual in the same direction, as +we did just above, respecting the question of right and wrong, +and a plain answer will come directly. The notion of first +cause, however crude and rudimentary its form, is organic. +It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual takes it—"the +one,"—and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of +nature—"the many,"—and is satisfied. And this is an +experience not peculiar to the philosopher; but is shared +equally by the illiterate,—those entirely unacquainted with +scientific abstractions. These illustrations might be carried +to an almost indefinite length, showing that commonly, in +the every-day experiences of life, men are accustomed not +only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as "It is +cloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow," but also to measure +phenomena by an original and fixed standard, as, "This +man is malicious, and therefore wicked." Between the two +modes of procedure, the following distinction may always be +observed. Conclusions are always doubtful, only probable. +Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what +may be, decisions what must be. The former result from +concepts and experience, the latter from intuitions and logical +processes. Thus is made plain the fact that, to give it +the most favorable aspect, Sir William Hamilton, in his +eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely mistaken one +class of human experiences, and so was led to deny the actuality +of the most profound and important faculty of the +human mind. In view of the foregoing results, one need +not hesitate to say that, whether he ever attempted it or not, +Kant never "has clearly shown that the idea of the unconditioned<span class="pagenum">[86]</span> +can have no objective reality," for it is impossible +to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective reality +is God; it therefore "conveys" to us the most important +"knowledge," and "involves" no "contradictions." Moreover, +unconditionedness is a "simple," "positive," "notion," +and not "a fasciculus of negations"; but is an attribute of +God, who comprehends all positives. A little after, Hamilton +says: "And while he [Kant] appropriated Reason as a +specific faculty to take cognizance of these negations, hypostatized +as positive, under the Platonic name of <i>Ideas</i>," &c. +Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the Reason +such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are +they hypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish +an affirmative answer to the first question, a negative to the +others follows directly, and the logician's system is a failure. +Again, the discrimination of thought into <i>positive</i> and <i>negative</i> +is simply absurd. All thought is <i>positive</i>. The phrase, +negative thought, is only a convenient expression for the +refusal of the mind to think. But "Ideas" are not thoughts +at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the +operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. +Ideas are a part of such objects. All objects in the +mind are positive. The phrase, negative object, is a contradiction. +But, without any deduction, we see immediately +that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of the +human race affirms this.</p> + +<p>The following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. +"For those who, with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the +unconditioned as a positive and real knowledge of existence +in its all-comprehensive unity, and who consequently employ +the terms <i>Absolute</i>, <i>Infinite</i>, <i>Unconditioned</i>, as only various +expressions for the same identity, are imperatively bound to +prove that their idea of <i>the One corresponds, either with that +Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with +that Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or +that it includes both, or that it excludes both</i>. This they have<span class="pagenum">[87]</span> +not done, and, we suspect, have never attempted to do." The +italics are Hamilton's. The above statement is invalid, for +the following reasons. The Absolute, therein named, has +been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand, and an +absurdity. It is self-evident that the term "limited whole," +as applied to Space and Time, is a violation of the laws of +thought. Since we seek the truth, that Absolute must be +rejected. Again, the definitions of the terms absolute and +infinite, which have been found consistent, and pertinent to +Space and Time, have been further found irrelevant and +meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is the +Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation +to Space and Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and +known as he is. The terms infinite and absolute will, of +necessity, then, when applied to him, have entirely different +significations from what they will when applied to Space and +Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in this latter +sphere will have other than a negative value in the former. +The questions in that sphere must be decided on their +own merits, as must those in this. What is really required, +then, is, that the One, the Person, be shown to be both absolute +and infinite, and that these, as qualities, consistently inhere +in that <i>unity</i>. As this has already been done in the +first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here.</p> + +<p>Some pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. +Cousin, Hamilton quotes from him as follows: "The condition +of intelligence <i>is difference</i>; and an act of knowledge +is only possible where there exists a plurality of terms." +In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues from this, +thus: "But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the condition +of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference; +consequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and +under which it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, +as capable of knowing, are incompatible. For, if we +suppose the absolute cognizable, it must be identified either, +first, with the subject knowing; or, second, with the object<span class="pagenum">[88]</span> +known; or, third, with the indifference of both." Rejecting +the first two, Hamilton says: "The <i>third</i> hypothesis, on the +other hand, is <i>contradictory of the plurality of intelligence</i>; +for, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality +of terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. +The alternative is therefore necessary: Either the absolute +cannot be known or conceived at all, or our author is wrong +in subjecting thought to the conditions of plurality and difference."</p> + +<p>In these extracts may be detected an error which, so far +as the author is informed, has been hitherto overlooked by +philosophers. The logician presents an alternative which is +unquestionably valid. Yet with almost, if not entire unanimity, +writers have been accustomed to assign plurality, relation, +difference, and—to adopt a valuable suggestion of +Mr. Spencer—likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and +among them those who have claimed for man a positive +knowledge of the absolute. The error by which they have +been drawn into this contradiction is purely psychological; +and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed out, +from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, +the Sense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and +concludes about, things in nature, to the Pure Reason, by +which he sees and knows, with an <i>absolutely certain</i> knowledge, +principles and laws; and to subject this faculty to those +conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if the logician's +premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If +"an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a +plurality of terms," then is it impossible that we should +know God, <i>or that he should know himself</i>. The logic is impregnable. +But the conclusion is revolting. What must be +done, then? Erect some makeshift subterfuge of mental +impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It +will not satisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she +casts it out utterly, as a most gross insult. Unquestionably, +but one course is left; and that is so plain, that one cannot<span class="pagenum">[89]</span> +see how even a Limitist could have overlooked it. Correct +the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will +give us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the +principle that <i>every truth is in complete harmony with every +other truth</i>; and hold with no less tenacity to the principle +that the human intellect is true. And what is the true premiss +which through an irrefutable logic will give us a satisfactory, +a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A plurality +of terms is <i>not</i> the necessary condition of intelligence; but +objects which are pure, simple, unanalyzable, may be directly +known by an intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, +relation, difference, and likeness, are necessary conditions of +intelligence through the Sense and Understanding; but they +do not in the least degree lie upon the Reason, which sees its +objects as pure, simple ideas which are <i>self-evident</i>, and, consequently, +are not subject to those conditions. Whatever +knowledge we may have of "mammals," we undoubtedly +gain under the conditions of plurality, relation, difference, +and likeness; for "mammals" are things in nature. But +absoluteness is a pure, simple, unanalyzable idea in the Reason, +and as such is seen and known by a direct insight as +out of all plurality, relation, difference, and likeness: for +this is a <i>quality</i> of the self-existent Person, and so belongs +wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined +only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural.</p> + +<p>Let us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The +knowledge given by the Sense and Understanding. This is +of material objects. Take, for example, an apple. The +Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that many +characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color, +skin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, +also, that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it +grows, and, as well, that its several qualities have relations +among themselves. One color belongs to the skin, another +to the pulp. The skin, as cover, relates to the pulp as covered, +and the like. The apple, moreover, is distinguished<span class="pagenum">[90]</span> +from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of likeness. +It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different +flavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, +and possesses those marks just named, which, though differing +among themselves, according to the fruit in which they +inhere, have a commonality of kind, as compared with other +objects. This distinguishing, analyzing, and classifying of +characteristics, and connecting them into a unity, as an +apple, is the work of the Sense and Understanding.</p> + +<p>2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is +of <i>a priori</i> laws, of these laws combined in pure archetypal +forms, and of God as the Supreme Being who comprehends +all laws and forms. A fundamental difference in the two +modes of activity immediately strikes one's attention. In +the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and <i>analysis</i>. +In the latter it is by comprehension and <i>synthesis</i>. +Take the idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic. +No one but a Limitist will, it is believed, contend against the +position of Dr Hopkins, "that this idea of obligation or +<i>oughtness</i> is a simple idea." This being once acceded, carries +with it the whole theory which the author seeks to +maintain. How may "a simple idea" be known? It cannot +be distinguished or analyzed. Being simple, it is <i>sui generis</i>. +Hence, it cannot be known by plurality or relation, difference +or likeness. If known at all, it must be known <i>as it is in +itself</i>, by a spontaneous insight. Such, in fact, is the mode of +the activity of the Pure Reason, and such are the objects of +that activity. In maintaining, then, the doctrine of "intellectual +intuition," M. Cousin was right, but wrong in subjecting +all knowledge "to the conditions of plurality and difference."</p> + +<p>Near the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. +Hamilton states certain problems, which he is "confident" +Cousin cannot solve. There is nothing very difficult about +them; and it is a wonder that he should have so presented +them. Following the passage—which is here quoted—will +be found what appear simple and easy solutions.<span class="pagenum">[91]</span></p> + +<p>"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)—(1) how +liberty can be conceived, supposing always a plurality of +modes of activity, without a knowledge of that plurality;—(2) +how a faculty can resolve to act by preference in a particular +manner, and not determine itself by final causes;—(3) +how intelligence can influence a blind power, without +operating as an efficient cause;—(4) or how, in fine, morality +can be founded on a liberty which at best only escapes +necessity by taking refuge with chance;—these are problems +which M. Cousin, in none of his works, has stated, and +which we are confident he is unable to solve."</p> + +<p>1. Liberty cannot be <i>conceived</i>. It must be intuited. +There is "a plurality of modes," and there is "a knowledge +of that plurality." 2. "A faculty" cannot resolve +to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot determine +itself <i>at all</i>. Only a <i>spiritual person</i> can <i>resolve</i>, can have +a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence. +Blind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual +person can be influenced, and he by object through +the intelligence as medium, and only he can be an efficient +cause. 4. Morality cannot "be founded on a liberty, which +only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;" and, +what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it +as possible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought +of the Limitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: +viz., the employment both in thinking and expressions of faculties, +capacities, and qualities, as if they possessed all the +powers of persons. This habit is thoroughly erroneous, and +destructive of truth. The truth desired to answer this whole +passage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The infinite and +absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible, and +indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality +of personality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion +or restraint in the choice of one of two possible ends. +This Person intuits a multitude of modes of activity. He +possesses also perfect wisdom, which enables him, having<span class="pagenum">[92]</span> +chosen the right end, to determine with unerring accuracy +which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure +the end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination +to put in force the best means for securing that end. +Hence this Person decides that the best mode shall <i>be</i>. He +also possesses all-power. This is <i>his</i> endowment, not that +of his intelligence. The intelligence is not person, but <i>faculty</i> +in the person. So is it with the <i>power</i>. So then this +Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting +his dignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; +and is efficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity +nor chance. He is not under necessity, because there +is no constraint which compels him to choose the right +end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under chance, +because he is <i>certain</i> which is the best mode of action to +gain the end chosen. In this distinction between ends and +modes of activity, which has been so clearly set forth by +Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in the motions of spiritual +persons in each sphere, lie the ground for answering +<i>all</i> difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or chance. +With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's +philosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of +his followers.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[93]</span></p> + +<h2 id="REVIEW_OF_LIMITS_OF_RELIGIOUS_THOUGHT">REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT."</h2> + +<p>This volume is one which will always awaken in the mind +of the candid and reflective reader a feeling of profound +respect. The writer is manifestly a deeply religious man. +The book bears the marks of piety, and an earnest search +after the truth respecting that august Being whom its author +reverentially worships. However far wrong we may believe +him to have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit +must ever inspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and +condemn the intellectual principles upon which his work is +based, we cannot but desire to be like him, in rendering +solemn homage to the Being he deems inscrutable.</p> + +<p>In proceeding with our examination, all the defects which +were formerly noticed as belonging to the system of the +Limitists will here be found plainly observable. Following +his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the Understanding to be the +highest faculty of the human intellect, and the consequent +corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge. +The word "conceive" he therefore uses as expressive of the +act of the mind in grasping together various marks into a +concept, when that word and act of mind are utterly irrelevant +to the object to which he applies them; and hence they +can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak +of "starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the +human"; or of "starting from the human, and reasoning up +to the divine"; where, upon the hypothesis that the two are +entirely diverse, no reasoning process, based upon either one, +can reach the other. On the other hand, if any knowledge +of God is possible to the created mind, it is only on the +ground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain<span class="pagenum">[94]</span> +respects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator +plainly declared a simple fact, in literal language, when he +said, "God made man in his own image." If man's mind is +wholly unlike God's mind, he cannot know truth as God +knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty, man +cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every +subject of a moral government is amenable to law. In +order to be so amenable, he must know the law <i>as it is</i>. +No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will do. It must +be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth +is <i>one</i>. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be +binding, sees it as God sees it, and feels the same obligation +that God feels. And such an one must man be if he is +a moral agent. Whether he is such an agent or not, we will +not argue here; since all governments and laws of society +are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be +assumed as granted.</p> + +<p>Of the "three terms, familiar as household words," which +Mr. Mansel, in his second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is +to be said, that "First Cause," if properly mentioned at all, +should have been put last; and that "Infinite" and "Absolute" +are not pertinent to Cause, but to Person. So then +when we consider "the Deity as He is," we consider him, not +as Cause, for this is <i>incidental</i>, but as the infinite and absolute +Person, for these three marks are <i>essential</i>. Further, +these last-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; +while the term Cause expresses "an <i>a priori</i> Element of +connection, and thus a primitive understanding-conception." +Hardly more satisfactory than his use of the term Cause +is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite. He +defines "the Absolute" to be "that which exists in and by +itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being," +when it is rather the exclusion of the possibility of any other +Being. Again, he defines "the Infinite" to be "that which +is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater +is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can receive no<span class="pagenum">[95]</span> +additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not +from all eternity." "That which" means the thing which, +for which is neuter. Mr. Mansel's infinite is, then, the <i>Thing</i>. +This <i>Thing</i> "is free from all possible limitation." How can +that be when the Being he thus defines is, must be, necessarily +existent, and so is bound by one of the greatest of limitations, +the inability to cease to be. But some light may +be thrown upon his use of the term "limitation" by the +subsequent portions of his definition. The Thing "which is +free from all possible limitation" is "that than which a +greater is inconceivable." Moreover, this greatest of all +possible things possesses all possible "attributes," and is in +every possible "mode of existence" "from all eternity." +Respecting the phrase "than which a greater is inconceivable," +two suppositions may be made. Either there may be +a thing "greater" than, and diverse from, all other things; +or there may be a thing greater than, and including all, other +things. Probably the latter is Mr. Mansel's thought; but +it is Materialistic Pantheism. This Being must be in every +"mode of existence" "from all eternity." Personality is a +"mode of existence"; therefore this Being must forever +have been in that mode. But impersonality is also a mode +of existence, therefore this Being must forever have been in +that mode. Yet again these two modes are contradictory +and mutually exclusive; then this Being must have been +from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually exclusive +modes of existence! Is further remark necessary to show +that Mr. Mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the +understanding-conception that infinity is amount, and is, +therefore, utterly worthless? Can there be a thing so great +as to be without limits? Has greatness anything to do with +infinity? Manifestly not. It becomes necessary, then, to +recur to and amplify those definitions which we have already +given to the terms he uses.</p> + +<p>Absoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary +Being.<span class="pagenum">[96]</span></p> + +<p>Absoluteness is that quality of the necessary Being by +which he is endowed with self-existence, self-dependence, and +totality. Or in other words, having this quality, he is wholly +independent of any other being; and also the possibility of +the existence of any other independent Being is excluded; +and so he is the Complete, the Final, upon whom all possible +beings must depend.</p> + +<p>Infinity is that quality of the necessary Being which gives +him universality in the totality. It expresses the fact, that +he possesses all possible endowments in perfection.</p> + +<p>Possessing these qualities, that Being is free from any external +restraint or limitation; but those restraints and limitations, +which his very constituting elements themselves impose, +are not removed by these qualities. For instance, the +possession of Love, Mercy, Justice, Wisdom, Power, and the +like, are essential to God's entirety; and the possession of +them in <i>perfect harmony</i> is essential to his perfectness in the +entirety. This fact of perfect harmony, exact balance, bars +him from the <i>undue</i> exercise of any one of his attributes; or, +concisely, his perfection restrains him from being imperfect. +We revert, then, to the fundamental distinction, attained heretofore, +between improper limitations, or those which are involved +in perfection; and proper limitations, or those which +are involved in deficiency and dependence; and applying it +here, we see that those limitations, which we speak of as belonging +to God, are not indicative of a lack, but rather are +necessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection +which constitutes him the Ultimate.</p> + +<p>In this view infinity can have no relevancy to "number." +It is not that God has one, or one million endowments. It +asks no question about the number; and cares not for it. It +is satisfied in the assertion that he possesses <i>all that are possible</i>, +and in perfect harmony. It is, further, an idea, not a +concept. It must be intuited, for it cannot be "conceived." +No analogy of "line" or "surface" has any pertinence; because +these are concepts, belonging wholly in the Understanding<span class="pagenum">[97]</span> +and Sense, where no idea can come. Yet it may be, <i>is</i>, +the quality of an intelligence endowed with a limited number +of attributes;—for there can be no number without limitation, +since the phrase unlimited number is a contradiction +of terms;—but this limitation involves no lack, because +there are no "others," which can be "thereby related to it, +as cognate or opposite modes of consciousness." Without +doubt it is, in a certain sense, true, that "the metaphysical +representation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must +necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, +amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality." +This sense is that all reality is by him, and for him, and from +him; and is utterly dependent upon him. But Hegel's conclusion +by no means follows, in which he says: "What kind +of an Absolute Being is that which does not contain in itself +all that is actual, even evil included." This is founded upon +the suppressed premiss, that such a Being <i>must</i> do what he +does, and his creatures <i>must</i> do what they do; and so evil +must come. This much only can be admitted, and this may +be admitted, without derogating aught from God's perfectness: +viz., that he sees in the ideals of his Reason <i>how</i> his +laws may be violated, and so, how sin may and will be in +this moral system; but it is a perversion of words to say that +this knowledge on the part of God is evil.</p> + +<p>The knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect +law, is involved in the knowing how such agent may keep +that law. But the fact of the knowledge does not involve +any whit of consent to the act of violation. On the other +hand, it may, does, become the ground for the putting forth +of every wise effort to prevent that act. Again; evil is produced +by those persons whom God has made, who violate +his moral laws. He being perfectly wise and perfectly good, +for perfectly wise and good reasons sustains them in the +ability to sin. There can be, in the nature of things, no +persons at all, without this ability to sin. But God does not +direct them to sin; neither when they do sin does any stain<span class="pagenum">[98]</span> +fall upon him for sustaining their existence during their sinning. +That definition of the term absolute, upon which +Hegel bases his assertion, is one fit only for the Sense and +Understanding; as if God was the physical sum of all existence. +It is Materialistic Pantheism. But by observing the +definitions and distinctions, which have been heretofore laid +down, it may be readily seen how an actual mode of existence, +as that of finite person, may be denied to God, and no +lack be indicated thereby. Hegel's blasphemy may, then, +be answered as follows: God is the infinite and absolute +spiritual Person. Personality is the form of his being. The +form cannot be empty. Organized essence fills the form. +Infinity and absoluteness are <i>qualities</i> of the Person as thus +organized. The quality of absoluteness, for instance, as +transfusing the essence, is the endowment of pure independence, +and involves the exclusion of the possibility of any +other independent Being, and the possession of the ability to +create every possible dependent being. In so far, then, as +Hegel's assertion means that no being can exist, and do evil, +except he is created and sustained by the Deity, it is true. +But in so far as it means—and this is undoubtedly what +Hegel did mean—that God must be the efficient author of +sin, that, forced by the iron rod of Fate, he must produce +evil, the assertion is utterly false, and could only have been +uttered by one who, having dwelt all his life in the gloomy +cave of the Understanding, possessed not even a tolerably +correct notion of the true nature of the subject he had in +hand,—the character of God. From the above considerations +it is apparent that all the requirements of the Reason +are fulfilled when it is asserted that all things—the Universe—are +dependent upon God; and he is utterly independent.</p> + +<p>The paragraphs next succeeding, which have been quoted +with entire approbation by Mr. Herbert Spencer, are thoroughly +vitiated by their author's indefensible assumption, +that cause is "indispensable" to our idea of the Deity. +As was remarked above, the notion of cause is incidental.<span class="pagenum">[99]</span> +The Deity may or may not become a cause, as he shall +decide. But he has no choice as to whether he shall be +a person or not. Hence we may freely admit that "the +cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause +is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the +cause." It is also true that "the conception"—idea—"of +the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation." +The position we have taken is in advance of this, +for we say, involves an actual existence out of all relation. +Introducing, then, not "the idea of succession in time," but +the idea of the logical order, we rightly say, "the Absolute +exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause." Nor +are we here "checked by the third conception, that of the +Infinite." "Causation is a possible mode of existence," and +yet "that which exists without causing" is infinite. How is +this? It is thus. Infinity is the universality of perfect endowment. +Now, taking as the point of departure the first +creative nisus or effort of the Deity, this is true. Before +that act he was perfect in every possible endowment, and +accorded his choice thereto. He was able to create, but did +not, for a good and sufficient reason. In and after that act, +he was still perfect as before. That act then involved no +<i>essential</i> change in God. But he was in one mode of being +before, and in another mode of being in and after that act. +Yet he was equally perfect, and equally blessed, before as +after. What then follows? This: that there was some good +and sufficient reason why before that act he should be a +potential creator, and in that act he should become an actual +creator: and this reason preserves the perfection, <i>i. e.</i> the +infinity of God, equally in both modes. When, then, Mr. +Mansel says, "if Causation is a possible mode of existence, +that which exists without causing is not infinite, that which +becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits," his +utterance is prompted by that pantheistic understanding-conception +of God, which thinks him the sum of all that +was, and is, and ever shall be, or can be; and that in all this,<span class="pagenum">[100]</span> +he is <i>actual</i>. On the other hand, as we have seen, all that +is required to fulfil the idea of infinity is, that the Being, +whom it qualifies, possesses all fulness, has all the forms and +springs of being in himself. It is optional with him whether +he will create or not; and his remaining out of all relation, +or his creating a Universe, and thus establishing relations to +and for himself, in no way affect his essential nature, <i>i. e.</i> +his infinity. He is a person, possessing all possible endowments, +and in this does his infinity consist. In this view, +"creation at any particular moment of time" is seen to be the +only possible hypothesis by which to account for the Universe. +Such a <i>Person</i>, the necessary Being, must have been +in existence before the Universe; and his first act in producing +that Universe would mark the first moment of time. +No "alternative of Pantheism" is, can be, presented to the +advocates of this theory. On the other hand, that scheme +is seen to be both impossible and absurd.</p> + +<p>One cannot disagree with Mr. Mansel, when in the next +paragraph he says, that, "supposing the Absolute to become +a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will +and consciousness." But the difficulties which he then +raises lie only in the Understanding, and may be explained +thus. Always in God's consciousness <i>the subject and object +are identical</i>. All that God is, is always present to his Eye. +Hence all relations always appear subordinate to, and dependent +upon him; and it is a misapprehension of the true +idea to suppose, that any relation which falls <i>in idea</i> within +him, and only becomes actual at his will, is any proper limitation. +Both subject and object are thus absolute, being +identical; and yet there is no contradiction.</p> + +<p>The difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the +absolute Being any interrelations, as of attributes among +themselves, or of attributes to the Being. This arises from +an erroneous definition of the term absolute. The definition +heretofore given in this treatise presents no such difficulty. +The possession of these attributes and interrelations is essential<span class="pagenum">[101]</span> +to the exclusion by then possessor of another independent +Being; and it is a perversion to so use a quality +which is essential to a being, that it shall militate against the +consistency of his being what he must be. If then "the +almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that +the absolute is both one and simple," uses the term "simple" +in the same sense that it would have when applied to the idea +of moral obligation, viz., that it is unanalyzable, then that +voice is wrong, just as thoroughly as the voice of antiquity +in favor of the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was wrong; +and is to be treated as that was. On such questions <i>opinions</i> +have no weight. The search is after a knowledge which is +sure, and which every man may have within himself. We +land, then, in no "inextricable dilemma." The absolute +Person we see to be conscious; and to possess complexity +in unity, universality in totality. By an immediate intuition +we know him as primarily out of all relation, plurality, +difference, and likeness; and yet as having, of his own self, +established the Universe, which is still entirely dependent +upon him; from which he differs, and with which he is not +identified.</p> + +<p>Again Mr. Mansel says: "A mental attribute to be conceived +as infinite, must be in actual exercise on every possible +object: otherwise it is potential only, with regard to +those on which it is not exercised; and an unrealized potentiality +is a limitation." With our interpretation the assertion +is true and contains no puzzle. Every mental attribute +of the Deity is most assuredly "in actual exercise," upon +every one of its "possible objects" <i>as ideas</i>. But the objects +are not therefore actual. Neither is there any need +that they should ever become so. He sees them just as +clearly, and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals, as he +does as actual objects. All ideal objects are "unrealized +potentialities"; and yet they are the opposite of limitations +proper. But this sentence, as an expression of the thought +which Mr. Mansel seemingly wished to convey, is vitiated<span class="pagenum">[102]</span> +by the presence of that understanding-conception that infinity +is amount, which must be actual. Once regard infinity +as <i>quality</i> of the necessarily existent Person, and it +directly follows that this or that act, of that Person, in no +way disturbs that infinity. The quality conditions the +acting being; but the act of that being cannot limit the +quality. The quality is, that the act may be; not the reverse. +Hence the questions arising from the interrelations +of Power and Goodness, Justice and Mercy, are solved at +once. Infinity as quality, not amount, pervades them all, +and holds them all in perfect harmony, adjusting each to +each, in a melody more beautiful than that of the spheres. +Even "the existence of Evil" is "compatible with that of" +this "perfectly good Being." He does not will that it shall +be; neither does he will that it shall not be. If he willed +that it should not be, and it was, then he would be "thwarted"; +but only on such a hypothesis can the conclusion follow. +But he does will that certain creatures shall be, who, +though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance, +are, like him, final causes,—the final arbiters of their own +destinies, who in the choice of ends are unrestrained, and +may choose good or ill. He made these creatures, knowing +that some of them would choose wrong, and so evil would +be: but <i>he</i> did not will the evil. He only willed the conditions +upon which evil was possible, and placed all proper +bars to prevent the evil; and the <i>a priori</i> facts of his immutable +perfection in endowments, and of his untarnished holiness, +are decisive of the consequent fact, that, in willing those +conditions, God did the very best possible deed. If it be +further asserted that the fact, that the Being who possesses +all possible endowments in perfection could not wisely prevent +sin, is a limitation; and, further, that it were better to +have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted +it by a wise act; it can only be replied: This is the same +as to say, that it is essential to God's perfection that he be +imperfect; or, that it was better for the perfect Being to<span class="pagenum">[103]</span> +violate his Self than to permit sin. If any one in his thinking +chooses to accept of such alternatives, there remains no +ground of argument with him; but only "a certain fearful +looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall +devour the adversary."</p> + +<p>Carrying on his presentation of difficulties, Mr. Mansel +further remarks: "Let us however suppose for an instant, +that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of +the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. +Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with +that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining +how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to +the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher +state than that of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting +voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of +comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; +and therefore was not originally perfect. If the state of +activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, +in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection." +On this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore +adduced. Let the supposition be entertained that perfection +does not belong to a state, but to God's nature, to what God +<i>is</i>, as ground for what God does, and standing in the logical +order before his act; and it will directly appear that a state +of quiescence or a state of activity in no way modifies his +perfection. What God is, remains permanent and perfect, +and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and +perfect. It follows, then, taking the first moment of time as +the point of departure, that, before that point, God was in a +state of complete blessedness, and that after that point he +was also in such a state; and, further, that while these two +states are equal, there is not "complete indifference," because +there was a reason, clearly seen by the Divine mind, +why the passage from quiescence to activity should be when +it was, and as it was, and that this reason having been acknowledged +in his conduct, gives to the two states equality, +and yet differentiates the one from the other.<span class="pagenum">[104]</span></p> + +<p>"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming +into being?" It cannot be <i>conceived</i> at all. The faculty +of the mind by which it forms a concept—the discursive +Understanding—is impotent to conceive what cannot be +conceived—the act of creation. The changes of matter +can be concluded into a system, but not the power by which +the matter came to be, and the changes were produced. If +the how is known at all, it must be seen. The laws of the +process must be intuited, as also the process as logically +according with those laws. The following is believed to be +an intelligible account of the process, and an answer to the +above question. The absolute and infinite Person possesses +as <i>a priori</i> organic elements of his being, all possible endowments +in perfect harmony. Hence all laws, and all possible +combinations of laws, are at once and always present before +the Eye of his Reason, which is thus constituted Universal +Genius. These combinations may be conveniently named +ideal forms. They arise spontaneously, being in no way +dependent upon his will, but are rather <i>a priori</i> conditional +of any creative activity. So, too, they harmoniously arrange +themselves into systems,—archetypes of what may be, +some of which may appear nobler, and others inferior. This +Person, being such as we have stated, possesses also as endowment +all power, and thereby excludes the possibility of +there being any "<i>other</i>" power. This power is adequate to +do all that <i>power</i> can do,—to accomplish all that lies within +the province of power. So long as the Person sees fit not +to exert his power, his ideal forms will be only ideals, and +the power will be simply power. But whenever he shall see +fit to send forth his power, and organize it according to the +ideal forms, the Universe will become. In all this the Person, +"of his own will," freely establishes whatever his unerring +wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity; and so the +actualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper +limit or restraint, for they in no way lessen his fulness, but +are only a manifestation of that fulness,—a declaration of<span class="pagenum">[105]</span> +his glory. In a word, Creation is that executive act of God +by which he combines with his power that ideal system which +he had chosen because best, or <i>it is the organization of ample +power according to perfect law</i>. If one shall now ask, "How +could he send forth the power?" it is to be replied that the +question is prompted by the curiosity of the "flesh," man's +animal nature; and since no representation—picture—can +be made, no answer can be furnished. It is not needed to +know <i>how</i> God is, or does anything, but only that he does it. +All the essential requirements of the problem are met when +it is ascertained in the light of the Reason, that all fulness is +in God, that from this fulness he established all other beings +and their natural relations, and that no relation is <i>imposed</i> +upon him by another. The view thus advanced avoids the +evil of the understanding-conception, that creation is the +bringing of something out of nothing. There is an actual +self-existent ground, from which the Universe is produced. +Neither is the view pantheistic, for it starts with the <i>a priori</i> +idea of an absolute and infinite Person who is "before all +things, and by whom all things consist,"—who organizes his +own power in accordance with his own ideals, and thus produces +the Universe, and all this by free will in self-consciousness.</p> + +<p>On page eighty-four, in speaking "of the atheistic alternative," +Mr. Mansel makes use of the following language: +"A limit is itself a relation; and to conceive a limit as such, +is virtually to acknowledge the existence of a correlative on +the other side of it." Upon reading this sentence, some +sensuous form spontaneously appears in the Sense. Some +object is conceived, and something outside it, that bounds it. +But let the idea be once formed of a Being who possesses +all limitation within himself, and for whom there is no +"other side," nor any "correlative," and the difficulty vanishes. +We do not seek to account for sensuous objects. It is pure +Spirit whom we consider. We do not need to form a concept +of "a first moment in time," or "a first unit of space,"<span class="pagenum">[106]</span> +nor could we if we would. To do so would be for the faculty +which forms concepts to transcend the very laws of its organization. +What we need is, to see the fact that a Spirit +is, who, possessing personality as form, and absoluteness and +infinity as qualities, thereby contains all limits and the +ground of all being in himself, and antithetical to whom is +only negation.</p> + +<p>From the ground thus attained there is seen to result, not +the dreary Sahara of interminable contradictions, but the fair +land of harmonious consistency. A Spirit, sole, personal, +self-conscious, the absolute and infinite Person, is the Being +we seek and have found; and upon such a Being the soul +of man may rest with the unquestioning trust of an infant +in its mother's arms. One cannot pass by unnoticed the +beautiful spirit of religious reverence which shines through +the closing paragraphs of this lecture. It is evident with +what dissatisfaction the writer views the sterile puzzles of +which he has been treating, and what a relief it is to turn +from them to "the God who is 'gracious and merciful, slow +to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth Him of the +evil.'" The wonder is, that he did not receive that presentation +which his devout spirit has made, as the truth—which +it is—and say, "I will accept this as final. My definitions +and deductions shall accord with this highest revelation. +This shall be my standard of interpretation." Had he done +so, far other, and, as it is believed, more satisfactory and +truthful would have been the conclusions he would have +given us.</p> + +<p>In his third Lecture Mr. Mansel is occupied with an examination +of the human nature, for the purpose, if possible, +of finding "some explanation of the singular phenomenon +of human thought," which he has just developed. At the +threshold of the investigation the fact of consciousness appears, +and he begins the statement of its conditions in the +following language: "Now, in the first place, the very conception +of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested,<span class="pagenum">[107]</span> +necessarily implies <i>distinction between one object and +another</i>. To be conscious we must be conscious of something; +and that something can only be known as that which +it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." In +this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, +the very question at issue; for, the position maintained by +one class of writers is, that in certain of our mental operations, +viz., in intuitions, the mind sees a simple truth, idea, +first principle, as it is, in itself, and that there is no distinction +in the act of knowledge. It is unquestionably true that, +in the examination of objects on the Sense, and the conclusion +of judgments in the Understanding, no object can come +into consciousness without implying a "distinction between +one object and another." But it is also evident that a first +truth, to be known as such, must be intuited—seen as it is in +itself; and so directly known to have the qualities of necessity +and universality which constitute it a first truth. Of +this fact Sir William Hamilton seems to have been aware, +when he denied the actuality of the Reason,—perceiving, +doubtless, that only on the ground of such a denial was his +own theory tenable. But if it shall be admitted, as it would +seem it must be, that men have necessary and universal convictions, +then it must also be admitted that these convictions +are not entertained by distinguishing them from other mental +operations, but that they are seen of themselves to be true; +and thus it appears that there are some modes of consciousness +which do not imply the "distinction" claimed. The +subsequent sentences seem capable of more than one interpretation. +If the author means that "the Infinite" cannot +be infinite without he is also finite, so that all distinction +ceases, then his meaning is both pantheistic and contradictory; +for the word infinite has no meaning, if it is not the +opposite of finite, and to identify them is undoubtedly Pantheism. +Or if he means "that the Infinite cannot be distinguished" +as independent, from the Finite <i>as independent</i>, and +thus, as possessing some quality with which it was not endowed<span class="pagenum">[108]</span> +by the infinite Person, then there can be no doubt of +his correctness. But if, as would seem, his idea of infinity is +that of amount, is such that it appears inconsistent, contradictory, +for the infinite Person to retain his infinity, and still +create beings who are really other than himself, and possessing, +as quality, finiteness, which he cannot possess as quality, +then is his idea of what infinity is wrong. Infinity is quality, +and the capacity to thus create is essential to it. All that +the Reason requires is, that the finite be created by and +wholly dependent upon the infinite Person; then all the relations +and conditions are only <i>improper</i>,—such as that Person +has established, and which, therefore, in no way diminish +his glory or detract from his fulness. When, then, Mr. Mansel +says, "A consciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus +necessarily involves a self-contradiction, for it implies the +recognition, by limitation and difference, of that which can +only be given as unlimited and indifferent," it is evident that +he uses the term infinite to express the understanding-conception +of unlimited amount, which is not relevant here, +rather than the reason-idea of universality which is not contradictory +to a real distinction between the Infinite and finite. +There is also involved the unexpressed assumption that we +have no knowledge except of the limited and different, or, +in other words, that the Understanding is the highest faculty +of the mind. It has already been abundantly shown that +this is erroneous,—that the Reason knows its objects in +themselves, as out of all relation, plurality, difference, or +likeness. Dropping now the abstract term "the infinite," +and using the concrete and proper form, we may say:</p> + +<p>We are conscious of infinity, <i>i. e.</i> we are conscious that we +see with the eye of Reason infinity as a simple, <i>a priori</i> idea; +and that it is quality of the Deity.</p> + +<p>2. We are conscious of the infinite Person; in that we are +conscious, that we see with the eye of Reason the complex <i>a +priori</i> idea of a perfect Person possessing independence and +universality as qualities of his Self. But we are not conscious<span class="pagenum">[109]</span> +of him in that we exhaustively comprehend him. As +is said elsewhere, we know that he is, and to a certain extent, +but not wholly what he is.</p> + +<p>In further discussing this question Mansel is guilty of +another grave psychological error. He says, "Consciousness +is essentially a limitation, for it is the determination to one +actual out of many possible modifications." There is no truth +in this sentence. Consciousness is not a limitation; it is not +a determination; it is not a modification. It may be well to +state here certain conclusions on this assertion, which will be +brought out in the fuller discussion of it, when we come to +speak of Mr. Spencer's book. Consciousness is <i>one</i>, and +retains that oneness throughout all modifications. These occur +in the unity as items of experience affect it. Doubtless +Dr. Hickok's illustration is the best possible. Consciousness +is the <i>light</i> in which a spiritual person sees the modifications +of himself, <i>i. e.</i> the activity of his faculties and capacities. +Like Space, only in a different sphere, it is an illimitable +indivisible unity, which is, that all limits may be in it—that +all objects may come into it. If, then, only one modification—object—comes +into it at a time, this is because the faculties +which see in its light are thus organized;—the being to +whom it belongs is partial; but there is nothing pertaining +to consciousness <i>as such</i>, which constitutes a limit,—which +could bar the infinite Person from seeing all things at once +in its light. This Person, then, so far as known, must be +known as an actual absolute, infinite Spirit, and hence no +"thing"; and further as the originator and sustainer of all +"<i>things</i>,"—which, though dependent on him, in no way take +aught from him. He may be known also, as potentially +everything, in the sense that all possible combinations, or +forms of objects, must ever stand as ideals in his Reason; and +he can, at his will, organize his power in accordance therewith. +But he must also be known as free to create or not to +create; and that the fact that many potential forms remain +such, in no way detracts from his infinity.<span class="pagenum">[110]</span></p> + +<p>Another of Mr. Mansel's positions involve conclusions +which, we feel assured, he will utterly reject. He says, "If +all thought is limitation,—if whatever we conceive is, by the +very act of conception, regarded as finite,—the infinite, from +a human point of view, is merely a name for the absence of +those conditions under which thought is possible." "From +a human point of view," and <i>we</i>, at least, can take no other, +what follows? That the Deity <i>can have no thoughts</i>; cannot +know what our thoughts are, or that we think. But three +suppositions can be made. Either he has no thoughts, is +destitute of an intellect; or his intellect is Universal Genius, +and he sees all possible objects at once; or there is a faculty +different in kind from and higher than the Reason, of which +we have, can have, no knowledge. The first, though acknowledged +by Hamilton in a passage elsewhere quoted, and logically +following from the position taken by Mr. Mansel, is so +abhorrent to the soul that it must be unhesitatingly rejected. +The second is the position advocated in this treatise. The +third is hinted at by Mr. Herbert Spencer. We reject this +third, because the Reason affirms it to be impossible; and +because, being unnecessary, by the law of parsimony it +should not be allowed. To advocate a position of which, in +the very terms of it, the intellect can have no possible +shadow of knowledge, is, to say the least, no part of the +work of a philosopher. "The condition of consciousness is" +not "distinction" in the understanding-conception of that +term. So consciousness is not a limitation, though all limits +when cognized are seen in the light of consciousness. According +to the philosophy we advocate, God is a particular +being, and is so known; yet he is not known as "one thing +out of many," but is known in himself, as being such and +such, and yet being <i>unique</i>. When Mr. Mansel says, "In +assuming the possibility of an infinite object of consciousness, +I assume, therefore, that it is at the same time limited and +unlimited," he evidently uses those terms with a signification +pertinent only to the Understanding. He is thinking of<span class="pagenum">[111]</span> +<i>amount</i> under the forms of Space and Time; and so his remark +has no validity. He who thinks of God rightly, will +think of him as the infinite and absolute spiritual Person; +and will define infinity and absoluteness in accordance therewith.</p> + +<p>If the views now advanced are presentations of truth, a +consistent rationalism <i>must</i> attribute "consciousness to God." +<i>We</i> are always conscious of "limitation and change," because +partiality and growth are organic with us. But we can perceive +no peculiarity in consciousness, which should produce +such an effect. On the contrary we see, that if a person has +little knowledge, he will be conscious of so much and no +more. And if a person has great capabilities, and corresponding +information, he is conscious of just so much. +Whence, it appears, that the "limitation and change" spring +from the nature of the constitution, and not from the consciousness. +If, then, there should be one Person who possessed +the sum of all excellencies, there could arise no reason +from consciousness why he should be conscious thereof.</p> + +<p>Mr. Mansel names as the "second characteristic of Consciousness, +that it is only possible in the form of a <i>relation</i>. +There must be a Subject, or person conscious, and an Object +or thing of which he is conscious." This utterance, taken in +the sense which Mr. Mansel wishes to convey, involves the +denial of consciousness to God. But upon the ground that +the subject and object in the Deity are always identical the +difficulty vanishes. But how can man be "conscious of the +Absolute?" If by this is meant, have an exhaustive comprehension +of the absolute Person, the experience is manifestly +impossible. But man may have a certain knowledge, +<i>that</i> such Person is without knowing in all respects <i>what</i> he is, +just as a child may know that an apple is, without knowing +what it is. Again Mr. Mansel uses the terms absolute and +infinite to represent a simple unanalyzable Being. In this he +is guilty of personifying an abstract term, and then reasoning +with regard to the Being as he would with regard to the<span class="pagenum">[112]</span> +term. Absoluteness is a simple unanalyzable idea, but it is +not God; it is only one quality of God. So with infinity. +God is universal complexity; and to reason of him as unanalyzable +simplicity is as absurd as to select the color of the +apple's skin, and call that the apple, and then reason from it +about the apple. So, then, though man cannot comprehend +the absolute Person <i>as such</i>, he has a positive idea of absoluteness, +and a positive knowledge that the Being is who +is thus qualified. Upon the subsequent question respecting +the partiality of our knowledge of the infinite and absolute +Person, a remark made above may be repeated and amplified. +We may have a true, clear, thorough knowledge <i>that</i> +he exists without having an exhaustive knowledge of <i>what</i> +he is. The former is necessary to us; the latter impossible. +So, too, the knowledge by us, of any <i>a priori</i> law, will be exhaustive. +Yet while we know that it <i>must</i> be such, and not +otherwise, it neither follows that we know all other <i>a priori</i> +laws, nor that we know all the exemplifications of this one. +And since, as we have heretofore seen, neither absoluteness +nor infinity relate to number, and God is not material substance +that can be broken into "parts," but an organized +Spirit, we see that we may consider the elements of his +organization in their logical order; and, remembering that +absoluteness and infinity as qualities pervade all, we may +examine his nature and attributes without impiety.</p> + +<p>Mr. Mansel says further: "But in truth it is obvious, on +a moment's reflection, that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite +can be represented in the form of a whole composed of +parts." This is tantamount to saying, the spiritual cannot be +represented under the form of the material—a truth so evident +as hardly to need so formal a statement. But what the +Divine means is, that that Being cannot be known as having +qualities and attributes which may be distinguished in and +from himself; which is an error. God is infinite. So is his +Knowledge, his Wisdom, his Holiness, his Love, &c. Yet +these are distinguished from each other, and from him. All<span class="pagenum">[113]</span> +this is consistent, because infinity is <i>quality</i>, and permeates +them all; and not amount, which jumbles them all into a +confused, <i>indistinguishable</i> mass.</p> + +<p>In speaking of "human consciousness" as "necessarily +subject to the law of Time," Mr. Mansel says, "Every object +of whose existence we can be in any way conscious is +necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time to some +former object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a certain +portion of time." In so far as there is here expressed +the law of created beings, under which they must see objects, +the remark is true. But when Mr. Mansel proceeds further, +and concludes that, because we are under limitation in seeing +the object, it is under the same limitation, so far as we apprehend +it in being seen, he asserts what is a psychological +error. To show this, take the mathematical axiom, "Things +which are equal to the same things, are equal to one another." +Except under the conditions of Time, we cannot see +this, that is, we do, must, occupy a time in observing it. +But do we see that the axiom is under any condition of +Time? By no means. We see, directly, that it is, <i>must be</i>, +true, and that in itself it has no relation to Time. It is thus +<i>absolutely</i> true; and as one of the ideas of the infinite and +absolute Person, it possesses these his qualities. We have, +then, a faculty, the Reason, which, while it sees its objects in +succession, and so under the law of Time, also sees that +those objects, whether ideas, or that Being to whom all ideas +belong, are, <i>in themselves</i>, out of all relation to Time. Thus +is the created spiritual person endowed; thus is he like God; +thus does he know "the Infinite." Hence, "the command, +so often urged upon man by philosophers and theologians, +'In contemplating God, transcend time,'" means, "In all +your reflections upon God, behold him in his true aspect, in +the reason-idea, as out of all relation." It is true that "to +know the infinite" <i>exhaustively</i>, "the human mind must itself +be infinite." But this knowledge is not required of that +mind. Only that knowledge is required which is possible,<span class="pagenum">[114]</span> +viz., that the Deity is, and what he is, <i>in so far as we are in +his image</i>.</p> + +<p>Again; personality is not "essentially a limitation and a +relation," in the sense that it necessarily detracts aught from +any being who possesses it. It rather adds,—is, indeed, a +pure addition. We appear to ourselves as limited and related, +not because of our personality, but because of our +finiteness as <i>quality</i> in the personality.</p> + +<p>Hence we not only see no reason why the complete and +universal Spirit should not have personality, but we see that +if he was destitute of it, he must possess a lower form of +being,—since this is the highest possible form,—which +would be an undoubted limitation; or, in other words, we +see that he must be a Person. In what Mr. Mansel subsequently +says upon this subject, he presents arguments for the +personality of God so strong, that one is bewildered with the +question, "How could he escape the conviction which they +awaken? How could he reject the cry of his spiritual nature, +and accept the barren contradictions of his lower +mind?" Let us note a few sentences. "It is by consciousness +alone that we know that God exists, or that we are able +to offer him any service. It is only by conceiving Him as a +Conscious Being, that we can stand in any religious relation +to Him at all,—that we can form such a representation of +Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants, insufficient +though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity." "Personality +comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation +to personality comprises all that we know of that which +seems to exist. And when, from the little world of man's +consciousness and its objects, we would lift up our eyes to the +inexhaustible universe beyond, and ask to whom all this is +related, the highest existence is still the highest personality, +and the Source of all Being reveals Himself by His name, +'I AM.'" "It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; +and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite." We +may at this point quote with profit the words of that Book<span class="pagenum">[115]</span> +whose authority Mr. Mansel, without doubt, most heartily +acknowledges. "And for this cause God shall send them +strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all +might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure +in unrighteousness." "I have not written unto you because +ye know not the truth, but because ye know it, and +that no lie is of the truth." Either God is personal or he is +not. If he is, then all that we claim is conceded. If he is +not personal, and "it is our duty to think" of him as personal, +then it is our duty to think and believe a <i>falsehood</i>. +This no man, at least neither Mr. Mansel nor any other enlightened +man, <i>can</i> bring his mind to accept as a moral law. +The soul instinctively asserts that obligation lies parallel +with <i>truth</i>, and "that no lie is of the truth." So, then, there +can be no duty except where truth is. And the converse +may also be accepted, viz.: Where an enlightened sense of +duty is, there is truth. When, therefore, so learned and +truly spiritual a man as Mr. Mansel asserts "that it is our +duty to think God personal, and believe him infinite," we unhesitatingly +accept it as the utterance of a great fundamental +truth in that spiritual realm which is the highest realm of +being, and so, as one of the highest truths, and with it we +accept all its logical consequences. It is a safe rule anywhere, +that if two mental operations seem to clash, and one +must be rejected, man should cling to, and trust in the +higher—the teaching of the nobler nature. Thus will we +do, and from the Divine's own ground will we see the destruction +of his philosophy. "It is our duty to think of God +as personal," because he is personal; and we know that he +is personal because it is our duty to think him so. We need +pay no regard to the perplexities of the Understanding. We +soar with the eagle above the clouds, and float ever in the +light of the Sun. The teachings of the Moral Sense are far +more sure, safe, and satisfactory than any discursions of the +lower faculty. Therefore it is man's wisdom, in all perplexity +to heed the cry of his highest nature, and determine to<span class="pagenum">[116]</span> +stand on its teachings, as his highest knowledge, interpret all +utterances by this, and reject all which contradict it. At the +least, the declaration of this faculty is <i>as</i> valid as that of the +lower, and is to be more trusted in every disagreement, because +higher. Still further, no man would believe that God, +in the most solemn, yea, awful moment of his Self-revelation, +would declare a lie. The bare thought, fully formed, horrifies +the soul as a blasphemy of the damned. Yet, in that +supreme act, in the solitude of the Sinaitic wilderness, to one +of the greatest, one of the profoundest, most devout of men, +He revealed Himself by the pregnant words, "I AM": the +most positive, the most unquestionable form in which He +could utter the fact of His personality. This, then, and all +that is involved in it, we accept as truth; and all perplexities +must be interpreted by this surety.</p> + +<p>In summing up the results to which an examination of the +facts of consciousness conducted him, Mr. Mansel utters the +following psychological error: "But a limit is necessarily +conceived as a relation between something within and something +without itself; and the consciousness of a limit of +thought implies, though it does not directly present to us, the +existence of something of which we do not and cannot +think." Not so; for a limit may be seen to be wholly +within the being to whom it belongs, and so <i>not</i> to be "a +relation between something within and something without +itself." This is precisely the case with the Deity. All relations +and limits spring from within him, and there is nothing +"without" to establish the relation claimed. This absence +of all limit from without is rudely expressed in such +common phrases as this: "It must be so in the <i>nature of +things</i>." This "nature of things" is, in philosophical language, +the system of <i>a priori</i> laws of the Universe, and +these are necessary ideas in the Divine Reason. It appears, +then, that what must be in the nature of things, finds its limits +wholly within, and its relations established by the Deity.</p> + +<p>With these remarks the author would close his criticism<span class="pagenum">[117]</span> +upon Mr. Mansel's book. We start from entirely different +bases, and these two systems logically follow from their foundations. +If Sir William Hamilton is right in his psychology, +his follower is unquestionably right in his deductions. But +if that psychology is partial, if besides the Understanding +there is the Reason, if above the judgment stands the intuition, +giving the final standard by which to measure that +judgment, then is the philosophical system of the Divine utterly +fallacious. The establishment of the validity of the +Pure Reason is the annihilation of "the Philosophy of the +Unconditioned." On the ground which the author has +adopted, it is seen that "God is a spirit," infinite, absolute, +self-conscious, personal; and a consistent interpretation of +these terms has been given. We have found that certain +objects may be seen as out of all relation, plurality, difference, +or likeness. Consciousness and personality have also +been found to involve no limit, in the proper sense of that +term. On the contrary, the one was ascertained to be the +light in which any or all objects might be seen under conditions +of Time, or at once; and that this seeing was according +to the capacity with which the being was endowed, and +was not determined by any peculiarity of the consciousness; +while the other appeared to be the highest possible form of +existence, and that also in which God had revealed himself. +From such a ground it is possible to go forward and construct +a Rational Theology which shall verify by Reason the +teachings of the Bible.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[118]</span></p> + +<h2 id="REVIEW_OF_MR_HERBERT_SPENCERS_FIRST_PRINCIPLES">REVIEW OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "FIRST PRINCIPLES."</h2> + +<p>In the criticisms heretofore made, some points, held in common +by the three writers named early in this work, have +been, it may be, passed over unnoticed. This was done, +because, being held in common, it was believed that an examination +of them, as presented by the latest writer, would +be most satisfactory. Therefore, what was peculiar in thought +or expression to Sir Wm. Hamilton or Mr. Mansel, we have +intended to notice when speaking of those writers. But where +Mr. Spencer seems to present their very thought as his own, +it has appeared better to remark upon it in his latest form of +expression. Mr. Spencer also holds views peculiar to himself. +These we shall examine in their place. And for convenience' +sake, what we have to say will take the form of a +running commentary upon those chapters entitled, "Ultimate +Religious Ideas," "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," "The Relativity +of all Knowledge," and "The Reconciliation." Before +entering upon this, however, some general remarks will be +pertinent.</p> + +<p>1. Like his teachers, Mr. Spencer believes that the Understanding +is the highest faculty of the human intellect. This +is implied in the following sentence: "Those imbecilities of +the understanding that disclose themselves when we try to +answer the highest questions of objective science, subjective +science proves to be necessitated by the laws of that understanding."—<i>First +Principles</i>, p. 98.</p> + +<p>His illustrations, also, are all, or nearly all, taken from +sensuous objects. In speaking of the Universe, evidently the +<i>material</i> Universe is present to his mind. His questions refer +to objects of sense, and he shows plainly enough that any<span class="pagenum">[119]</span> +attempt to answer them by the Sense or Understanding is +futile. Hence he concludes that they cannot be answered. +But those who "know of a surety," that man is more than +an animal nature, containing a Sense and an Understanding; +that he is also a spiritual person, having an <i>Eye</i>, the pure +Reason, which can <i>see</i> straight to the central Truth, with a +clearness and in a light which dims and pales the noonday +sun, know also that, and how, these difficulties, insoluble to +the lower faculties, are, in this noble alembic, finally dissolved.</p> + +<p>2. As Mr. Spencer follows his teachers in the psychology +of man's faculties, so does he also in the use of terms. Like +them, he employs only such terms as are pertinent to the +Sense and Understanding. So also with them he is at fault, +in that he raises questions which no Sense or Understanding +could suggest even, questions whose very presence are decisive +that a Pure Reason is organic in man; and then is guilty of +applying to them terms entirely impertinent,—terms belonging +only to those lower tribunals before which these questions +can never come. For instance, he always employs the word +"conceive" to express the effort of the mind in presenting to +itself the subjects now under discussion. In some form of +noun, verb, or adjective, this word seems to have rained upon +his pages; while such terms as "infinite period," "infinitely +divisible," "absolutely incompressible," "infinitesimal," and +the like, dot them repeatedly. Let us revert, then, a moment +to the positions attained in an earlier portion of this work. It +was there found that the word conceive was <i>utterly irrelevant</i> +to any subject except to objects of Sense and the Understanding +in its work of classifying them, or generalizing from +them, so, also, with regard to the other terms quoted, it was +found that they not only presented no object of thought to +the mind, but that the words had no relation to each other, +and could not properly be used together. For instance, infinite +has no more relation to, and can no more qualify period, +than the points of the compass are pertinent to, and can<span class="pagenum">[120]</span> +qualify the affections. The phrase, infinite period, is simply +absurd, and so also are the others. The words infinite and +absolute have nothing to do with amount of any sort. They +can be pertinent only to God and his <i>a priori</i> ideas. Many, +perhaps most of the criticisms in detail we shall have to make, +will be based on this single misuse of words; which yet grows +naturally out of that denial and perversion of faculties which +Mr. Spencer, in common with the other Limitist writers, has +attempted. On the other hand, it is to be remembered, that, +if we arrive at the truth at all, we must <i>intuit</i> it; we must +either see it as a simple <i>a priori</i> idea, or as a logical deduction +from such ideas.</p> + +<p>3. A third, and graver error on Mr. Spencer's part is, that +he goes on propounding his questions, and asserting that they +are insoluble, apparently as unconscious as a sleeper in an +enchanted castle that they have all been solved, or at least +that the principles on which it would seem that they could +be solved have been stated by a man of no mean ability,—Dr. +Hickok,—and that until the proposed solutions are +thoroughly analyzed and shown to be unsound, his own pages +are idle. He implies that there is no cognition higher than +a conception, when some very respectable writers have named +intuitions as incomparably superior. He speaks of the Understanding +as if it were without question the highest faculty +of man's intellect, when no less a person than Coleridge said +it would satisfy his life's labor to have introduced into +English thinking the distinction between the Understanding, +as "the faculty judging according to sense," and the Reason, +as "the power of universal and necessary convictions," which, +being such, must necessarily rank far above the other. And +finally he uses the words and phrases above disallowed, and +the faculties to which they belong, in an attempt to prove, by +the citation of a few items in an experience, what had already +been demonstrated by another in a process of as pure reasoning +as Calculus. No one, it is believed, can master the volume +heretofore alluded to, entitled "Rational Psychology," and so<span class="pagenum">[121]</span> +appreciate the <i>demonstration</i> therein contained, of the utter +incompetency of the Sense or Understanding to solve such +questions as Mr. Spencer has raised by his incident of the +partridge, (p. 69,) and the utter irrelevancy to them of the +efforts of those faculties, without feeling how tame and unsatisfactory +in comparison is the evidence drawn from a few +facts in a sensuous experience. One cares not to see a half +dozen proofs, more or less that a theory is fallacious who has +learned that, and why, the theory <i>cannot</i> be true. Let us +now take up in order the chapters heretofore mentioned.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2 id="ULTIMATE_RELIGIOUS_IDEAS">"ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS."</h2> + +<p>The summing up of certain reflections with which this +chapter opens, concludes thus: "But that when our symbolic +conceptions are such that no cumulative or indirect +processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that there +are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made +whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether +vicious and illusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure +fictions,"—p. 29. So far very good; but his use of it is utterly +unsound. "And now to consider the bearings of this general +truth on our immediate topic—Ultimate Religious Ideas." +But this "general truth" has <i>no</i> bearings upon "ultimate +religious ideas"; how then can you consider them? <i>No</i> ideas, +and most of all religious ideas, are conceptions, or the results +of conceptions—or are the products of "cumulative or indirect +processes of thought." They are not results or products +<i>at all</i>. They are organic, are the spontaneous presentation +of what is inborn, and so must be directly seen to be known +at all. Man might pile up "cumulative processes of thought" +for unnumbered ages, and might form most exact conceptions +of objects of Sense,—conceptions are not possible of others,—and +he could never creep up to the least and faintest religious +idea.<span class="pagenum">[122]</span></p> + +<p>On the next page, speaking of "suppositions respecting +the origin of the Universe," Mr. Spencer says, "The deeper +question is, whether any one of them is even conceivable in +the true sense of that word. Let us successively test them." +This is not necessary. It has already been <i>demonstrated</i> +that a conception, or any effort of the Understanding, cannot +touch, or have relation to such topics. But it does not follow, +therefore, that no one of them is cognizable at all; which he +implies. Take the abstract notion of self-existence, for example. +No "vague symbolic conceptions," or any conception +at all, of it <i>can be formed</i>. A conception is possible only +"under relation, difference, and plurality." <i>This</i> is a pure, +simple idea, and so can only be known in itself by a seeing—an +immediate intuition. It is seen by itself, as out of all +relation. It is seen as simple, and so is learned by no difference. +It is seen as a unit, and so out of all plurality. +The discursive faculty cannot pass over it, because there are +in it no various points upon which that faculty may fasten. +It may, perhaps, better be expressed by the words pure independence. +Again, it is <i>not</i> properly "existence without a +beginning," but rather, existence out of all relation to beginning; +and so it is an idea, out of all relation to those faculties +which are confined to objects that did begin. Because we +can "by no mental effort" "form a conception of existence +without a beginning," it does not follow that we cannot <i>see</i> +that a Being existing out of all relation to beginning <i>is</i>. "To +this let us add" that the intuition of such a Being is a complete +"explanation of the Universe," and does make it "easier +to understand" "that it existed an hour ago, a day ago, a +year ago"; for we see that this Being primarily is <i>out of all +relation to time</i>, that there is no such thing as an "infinite +period," the phrase being absurd; but that through all the +procession of events which we call time he <i>is</i>; and that before +that procession began—when there was no time, he was. +Thus we see that all events are based upon Him who is +independent; and that time, in our general use of it, is but<span class="pagenum">[123]</span> +the measure of what He produces. We arrive, then, at the +conclusion that the Universe is not self-existent, not because +self-existence cannot be object to the human mind, and be +clearly seen to be an attribute of one Being, but because the +Universe is primarily object to faculties in that mind, which +cannot entertain such a notion at all; and because this notion +is <i>seen</i> to be a necessary idea in the province of that higher +faculty which entertains as objects both the idea and the +Being to whom it primarily belongs.</p> + +<p>The theory that the Universe is self-existent is Pantheism, +and not the theory that it is self-created, though this latter, +in Mr. Spencer's definition of it, seems only a phase of the +other. To say that "self-creation is potential existence +passing into actual existence by some inherent necessity," is +only to remove self-existence one step farther back, as he +himself shows. Potential existence is either no existence at +all, or it is positive existence. If it is no existence, then we +have true self-creation; which is, that out of nothing, and +with no cause, actual existence starts itself. This is not +only unthinkable, but absurd. But if potential existence is +positive, it needs to be accounted for as much as actual. +While, then, there can be no doubt as to the validity of +the conclusions to which Mr. Spencer arrives, respecting the +entire incompetency of the hypotheses of self-existence and +self-creation, to account for the Universe, the distinction +made above between self-existence as a true and self-creation +as a pseudo idea, and the fact that the true idea is a <i>reality</i>, +should never be lost sight of. By failing to discriminate—as +in the Understanding he could not do—between them, +and by concluding both as objects alike impossible to the +human intellect, and for the same reasons, he has also decided +that the "commonly received or theistic hypothesis"—creation +by external agency—is equally untenable. In his examination +of this, he starts as usual with his ever-present, fallacious +assumption, that this is a "conception"; that it can +be, <i>is</i> founded upon a "cumulative process of thought, or the<span class="pagenum">[124]</span> +fulfilment of predictions based on it." These words, phrases, +and notions, are all irrelevant. It is not a conception, process, +or prediction that we want; it is a <i>sight</i>. Hence, no +assumptions have to be made or granted. No "proceedings +of a human artificer" <i>can in the least degree</i> "vaguely symbolize +to us" the "method after which the Universe" was +"shaped." This differed in <i>kind</i> from all possible human +methods, and had not one element in common with them.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer's remarks at this point upon Space do not +appear to be well grounded. "An immeasurable void"—Space—is +not an entity, is <i>no</i> thing, and therefore cannot +"exist," neither is any explanation for it needed. His question, +"how came it so?" takes, then, this form: How came +immeasurable nothing to be nothing? Nothing needs no +"explanation." It is only <i>some</i> thing which must be accounted +for. The theory of creation by external agency being, then, +an adequate one to account for the Universe, supplies the +following statement. That Being who is primarily out of +all relation, produced, from himself, and by his immanent +power, into nothing—Space, room, the condition of material +existence,—something, matter and the Universe became. +"The genesis of the universe" having thus been explained +and seen to be "the result of external agency," we are +ready to furnish for the question, "how came there to be an +external agency?" that true answer, which we have already +shadowed forth. That pure spiritual Person who is necessarily +existent, or self-existent, <i>i. e.</i> who possess pure independence +as an essential attribute, whose being is thus +fixed, and is therefore without the province of power, is the +external agency which is needed. This Person, differing in +kind from the Universe, cannot be found in it, nor concluded +from it, but can only be known by being seen, and can only +be seen because man possesses the endowment of a spiritual +<i>Eye</i>, like in kind to His own All-seeing eye, by which spiritual +things may be discerned. This Person, being thus seen +immediately, is known in a far more satisfactory mode than<span class="pagenum">[125]</span> +he could be by any generalizations of the Understanding, +could he be represented in these at all. The knowledge of +Him is, like His self, <i>immutable</i>. We <span class="smcap">know</span> that we stand +on the eternal Rock. Our eye is illuminated with the +unwavering Light which radiates from the throne of God. +Nor is this any hallucination of the rhapsodist. It is the +simple experience which every one enjoys who looks at pure +truth in itself. It is the Pure Reason seeing, by an immediate +intuition, God as pure spirit, revealed directly to itself. +It is, then, because self-existence is a pure, simple idea, organic +in man, and seen by him to be an attribute of God, +that God is known to be the Creator of the Universe. Having +attained to this truth, we readily see that the conclusions +which Mr. Spencer states on pages 35, 36, as that "self-existence +is rigorously inconceivable"; that the theistic hypothesis +equally with the others is "literally unthinkable"; +that "our conception of self-existence can be formed only +by joining with it the notion of unlimited duration through +past time"; so far as they imply our destitution of knowledge +on these topics, are the opposite of the facts. We <i>see</i>, +though we cannot "conceive," self-existence. The theistic +hypothesis becomes, therefore, literally thinkable. We see, +also, that unlimited duration is an absurdity; that duration +must be limited; and that self-existence involves existence +out of all relation to duration.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer then turns to the nature of the Universe, and +says: "We find ourselves on the one hand obliged to make +certain assumptions, and yet, on the other hand, we find these +assumptions cannot be represented in thought." Upon this +it may be remarked:</p> + +<p>1. What are here called assumptions are properly assertions, +which man makes, and cannot help making, except he +deny himself;—necessary convictions, first truths, first principles, +<i>a priori</i> ideas. They are organic, and so are the +foundation of all knowledge. They are not results learned +from lessons, but are <i>primary</i>, and conditional to an ability<span class="pagenum">[126]</span> +to learn. But supposing them to be assumptions, having, at +most, no more groundwork than a vague guess, there devolves +a labor which Mr. Spencer and his coadjutors have +never attempted, and which, we are persuaded, they would +find the most difficult of all, viz., to account for the fact of +these assumptions. For the question is pertinent and urgent;</p> + +<p>2. How came these assumptions to suggest themselves? +Where, for instance, did the notion of self come from? Analyze +the rocks, study plants and their growth, become familiar +with animals and their habits, or exhaust the Sense in an +examination of man, and one can find no notion of self. +Yet the notion is, and is peculiar to man. How does it +arise? Is it "created by the slow action of natural causes?" +How comes it to belong, then, to the rudest aboriginal equally +with the most civilized and cultivated? Was it "created" +from nothing or from something? If from something, how +came that something to be? We might ask, Does not the +presentation of any phenomenon involve the actuality of a +somewhat, in which that phenomenon inheres, and of a receptivity +by which it is appreciated? Does not the fact of +this assumption, as a mental phenomenon, involve the higher +fact of some mental ground, some form, some capacity, which +is both organic to the mind, and organized in the mind, in +accordance with which the assumption is, and which determines +what it must be? Or are we to believe that these +assumptions are mere happenings, without law, and for which +no reason can be assigned? Again we press the question, +How came these assumptions to suggest themselves?</p> + +<p>3. "These assumptions cannot be represented in thought." +If "thought" is restricted to that mental operation of the +Understanding by which it generalizes in accordance with +the Sense, the statement is true. But if it is meant, as +seems to be implied, that the notions expressed in these assumptions +are not, cannot be, clearly and definitely known at +all by the mind, then it is directly contrary to the truth. +The ideas presented by the phrases are, as was seen above, +clear and definite.<span class="pagenum">[127]</span></p> + +<p>Since Mr. Spencer has quoted <i>in extenso</i>, and with entire +approbation, what Mr. Mansel says respecting "the Cause, +the Absolute, and the Infinite," we have placed the full examination +of these topics in our remarks upon Mr. Mansel's +writings, and shall set down only a few brief notes here.</p> + +<p>Upon this topic Mr. Spencer admits that "we are obliged +to suppose <i>some</i> cause"; or, in other words, that the notion +of cause is organic. Then we must "inevitably commit ourselves +to the hypothesis of a First Cause." Then, this First +Cause "must be infinite." Then, "it must be independent;" +"or, to use the established word, it must be absolute." One +would almost suppose that a <i>rational</i> man penned these +decisions, instead of one who denies that he has a <i>reason</i>. +The illusion is quickly dispelled, however, by the objections +he lifts out of the dingy ground-room of the Understanding. +It is curious to observe in these pages a fact which we have +noticed before, in speaking of Sir William Hamilton's works, +viz.: how, on the same page, and in the same sentence, the +workings of the Understanding and Reason will run along +side by side, the former all the while befogging and hindering +the latter. Mr. Spencer's conclusions which we have +quoted, and his objections which we are to answer, are a +striking exemplification of this. Frequently in his remarks +he uses the words limited and unlimited, as synonymous with +finite and infinite, when they are not so, and cannot be used +interchangeably with propriety. The former belong wholly +in the Sense and Understanding. The latter belong wholly +in the Pure Reason. The former pertain to material objects, +to mental images of them, or to number. The latter qualify +only spiritual persons, and have no pertinence elsewhere. +Limitation is the conception of an object <i>as bounded</i>. Illimitation +is the conception of an object as without boundaries. +Rigidly, it is a simple negation of boundaries, and gives +nothing positive in the Concept. Finity or finiteness corresponds +in the Reason to limitation in the Sense and Understanding. +It does not refer to boundaries at all. It belongs<span class="pagenum">[128]</span> +only to created spiritual persons, and expresses the fact that +they are partial, and must grow and learn. Only by its +place in the antithesis does infinity correspond in the Reason +to illimitation in the lower faculties. It is <i>positive</i>, and is +that quality of the pure spirit which is otherwise known as +<i>universality</i>. It expresses the idea of <i>all possible endowments +in perfect harmony</i>. From his misuse of these terms Mr. +Spencer is led to speak in an irrelevant manner upon the +question, "Is the First Cause finite or infinite?" He uses +words and treats the whole matter as if it were a question of +material substance, which might be "bounded," with a "region +surrounding its boundaries," and the like, which are as +out of place as to say white love or yellow kindness. His +methods of thought on these topics are also gravely erroneous. +He attempts an analysis by the logical Understanding, +where a synthesis by the Reason is required,—a synthesis +which has already been given by our Creator to man +as an original idea. It is not necessary to examine some +limited thing, or all limited things, and wander around their +boundaries to learn that the First Cause is infinite. We +need to make no discursus, but only to look the idea of first +cause through and through, and thoroughly analyze it, to find +all the truth. By such a process we would find all that Mr. +Spencer concedes that "we are obliged to suppose," and further, +that such a being <i>must be</i> self-existent. And this conviction +would be so strong that the mind would rest itself in +this decision: "A thousand phantasmagoria of the imagination +may be wrong," says the soul, "but this I know must be +true, or there is no truth in the Universe."</p> + +<p>One sentence in the paragraph now under consideration +deserves special notice. It is this. "But if we admit that +there can be some thing uncaused, there is no reason to assume +a cause for anything." This "assumes" the truth of +a major premise all <i>things</i> are substantially alike. If the +word "thing" is restricted to its exact limits,—objects of +sense,—then the sentence pertains wholly to the Sense and<span class="pagenum">[129]</span> +Understanding, and is true. But if, as it would seem, the +implication is meant that there are no other entities which +can be object to the mind except such "things," then it is a +clear <i>petitio principii</i>. For the very question at issue is, +whether, in fact, there is not one entity—"thing"—which +so differs in kind from all others, that it is uncaused, <i>i. e.</i> +self-existent; and whether the admission that that entity +is uncaused does not, because of this seen difference, satisfy +the mind, and furnish a reasonable ground on which to +account for the subordinate causes which we observe by the +Sense.</p> + +<p>In speaking of the First Cause as "independent," he says, +"but it can have no necessary relation within itself. There +can be nothing in it which determines change, and yet nothing +which prevents change. For if it contains something +which imposes such necessities or restraints, this something +must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd. +Thus, the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, +complete, total, including within itself all power, and transcending +all law." We cannot criticize this better, and mark +how curiously truth and error are mixed in it, than by so +parodying it that only truth shall be stated. The First +Cause possesses within himself all possible relations as belonging +to his necessary ideals. Hence, change, in the exact +sense of that term, is impossible to him, for there is nothing +for him to <i>change to</i>. This is not invalidated by his passing +from inaction to action; for creation involves no change in +God's nature or attributes, and so no real or essential change, +which is here meant. But he is the permanent, through +whom all changes become. He is not, then, a <i>simple</i> unit, +but is an organized Being, who is ground for, and comprehends +in a unity, all possible laws, forms, and relations, as +necessary elements of his necessary existence,—as endowments +which necessarily belong to him, and are conditional +of his pure independence. Hence, these restraints are not +"imposed" upon him, except as his existence is imposed<span class="pagenum">[130]</span> +upon him. They belong to his Self, and are conditional of +his being. So, then, instead of "transcending all law," he is +the embodiment of all law; and his perfection is, that possessing +this endowment, he accords his conduct thereto. A +being who should "transcend all law" would have no reason +why he should act, and no form how he should act, neither +would he be an organism, but would be pure lawlessness or +pure chaos. Pure chaos cannot organize order; pure lawlessness +cannot establish law; and so could not be the First +Cause. As Mr. Spencer truly says, "we have no alternative +but to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Absolute."</p> + +<p>And now having learned, by a true diagnosis of the mental +activities, that the positions we have gained are fixed, +final, irrevocable; and further, that they are not the "results" +of "reasonings," but that first there was a seeing, and then +an analysis of what was seen, and that the seeing is <i>true</i>, +though every other experience be false; we <i>know</i> that our +position is not "illusive," but that we stand on the rock; and +that what we have seen is no "symbolic conception of the +illegitimate order," but is pure truth.</p> + +<p>For the further consideration of this subject, the reader is +referred back to our remarks on that passage in Mr. Mansel's +work, which Mr. Spencer has quoted.</p> + +<p>A few remarks upon his summing up, p. 43 <i>et seq.</i>, will +complete the review of this chapter. "Passing over the +consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to that +of" consistency, we would find in any rigorous analysis, that +Atheism and Pantheism are self-contradictory; but we <i>have +found</i> that Theism, "when rigorously analyzed," presents an +absolutely consistent system, in which all the difficulties of +the Understanding are explained to the person by the Reason, +and is entirely thinkable. Such a system, based upon the +necessary convictions of man, and justly commanding that +these shall be the fixed standard, in accordance with which +all doubts and queries shall be dissolved and decided, gives +a rational satisfaction to man, and discloses to him his eternal +<span class="smcap">Rest</span>.<span class="pagenum">[131]</span></p> + +<p>In proceeding to his final fact, which he derives as the +permanent in all religions, Mr. Spencer overlooks another +equally permanent, equally common, and incomparably more +important fact, viz: that Fetishism, Polytheism, Pantheism, +and Monotheism,—all religions alike assert <i>that a god created +the Universe</i>. In other words, the great common element, +in all the popular modes of accounting for the vast +system of things in which we live is, <i>that it is the product of +an agency external to itself, and that the external agency is +personal</i>. Take the case of the rude aboriginal, who "assumes +a separate personality behind every phenomenon." +He does not attempt to account for all objects. His mind is +too infantile, and he is too degraded to suspect that those +material objects which appear permanent need to be accounted +for. It is only the changes which seem to him to need a +reason. Behind each change he imagines a sort of personal +power, superior to it and man, which produces it, and this +satisfies him. He inquires no further; yet he looks in the +same direction as the Monotheist. In this crude form of +belief, which is named Fetishism, we see that essential idea +which can be readily traced through all forms of religion, +that some <i>personal</i> being, external, and superior to the things +that be, produced them. Nor is Atheism a proper exception +to this law. For Atheism is not a religion, but the denial of +all religion. It is not a doctrine of God, but is a denial that +there is any God; and what is most in point, it never was a +<i>popular</i> belief, but is only a philosophical Sahara over which +a few caravans of speculative doubters and negatists wander. +Neither can Hindu pantheism be quoted against the position +taken: for Brahm is not the Universe; neither are Brahma, +Vishnu, and Siva. Brahm does not lose his individuality +because the Universe is evolved from him. <i>Now</i> he is +thought of as one, and the Universe as another, although the +Universe is thought to be a part of his essence, and hereafter +to be reabsorbed by him. <i>Now</i>, this part of his essence +which was <i>produced</i> through Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, is<span class="pagenum">[132]</span> +<i>individualized</i>; and so is one, while he is another. Thus, +here also, the idea of a proper external agency is preserved. +The facts, then, are decisively in favor of the proposition +above laid down. "<i>Our</i> investigation" discloses "a fundamental +verity in each religion." And the facts and the +verity find no consistent ground except in a pure Theism, +and there they do find perfect consistency and harmony.</p> + +<p>It is required, finally, in closing the discussion of this +chapter, to account for the fact that, upon a single idea so +many theories of God have fastened themselves; or better, +perhaps, that a single idea has developed itself in so many +forms. This cannot better be done than in the language of +that metaphysician, not second to Plato, the apostle Paul. +In his Epistle to the Romans, beginning at the 19th verse +of the 1st chapter, he says: "Because that which may be +known of God is manifest to them; for God hath shewed it +unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation +of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things +which are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, so +that they are without excuse. Because that, when they +knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were +thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their +foolish heart was darkened: professing themselves to be wise +they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible +God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to +birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." This +passage, which would be worthy the admiring study of ages, +did it possess no claim to be the teaching of that Being whom +Mr. Spencer asserts it is <i>impossible for us to know</i>, gives us +in a popular form the truth. Man, having organic in his +mind the idea of God, and having in the Universe an ample +manifestation to the Sense, of the eternal power and Godhead +of the Creator of that Universe, corresponding to that +idea, perverted the manifestation to the Sense, and degraded +the idea in the Reason, to the service of base passion. By +this degradation and perversion the organic idea became so<span class="pagenum">[133]</span> +bedizened with the finery of fancy formed in the Understanding, +under the direction of the animal nature, as to be +lost to the popular mind,—the trappings only being seen. +When once the truth was thus lost sight of, and with it all +that restraint which a knowledge of the true God would impose, +men became vain in their imaginations; their fancy +ran riot in all directions. Cutting loose from all law, they +plunged into every excess which could be invented; and out +of such a stimulated and teeming brain all manner of vagaries +were devised. This was the first stage; and of it we +find some historic hints in the biblical account of the times, +during and previous to the life of Abraham. Where secular +history begins the human race had passed into the second +stage. Crystallization had begun. Students were commencing +the search for truth. Religion was taking upon itself +more distinct forms. The organic idea, which could not +be wholly obliterated, formed itself distinctly in the consciousness +of some gifted individuals, and philosophy began. +Philosophy in its purest form, as taught by Socrates and +Plato, presented again the lost idea of pure Theism. But +the spirituality which enabled them to see the truth, lifted +them so far above the common people, that they could affect +only a few. And what was most disheartening, that same +degradation which originally lost to man the truth, now prevented +him from receiving it. Thus it was that by a binding +of the Reason to the wheels of Passion, and discursing +through the world with the Understanding at the beck of +the Sense, the many forms of religion became.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2 id="ULTIMATE_SCIENTIFIC_IDEAS">"ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS."</h2> + +<p>On a former page we have already attempted a positive +answer to the question, "What are Space and Time," with +which Mr. Spencer opens this chapter. It was there found<span class="pagenum">[134]</span> +that, in general terms, they are <i>a priori</i> conditions of created +being; and, moreover, that they possess characteristics suitable +to what they condition, just as the <i>a priori</i> conditions of +the spiritual person possess characteristics suitable to what +they condition. It was further found that this general law is, +from the necessity of the case, realized both within the mind +and without it; that it is, must be, the form of thought for +the perceiving subject, corresponding to the condition of existence +for the perceived object. It also appeared that the +Universe as object, and the Sense and Understanding as +faculties in the subject, thus corresponded; and further, that +these faculties could never transcend and comprehend Space +and Time, because these were the very conditions of their +being; moreover, that by them all spaces and times must be +considered with reference to the Universe, and apart from it +could not be examined by them at all. Yet it was further +found that the Universe might in the presence of the Reason +be abstracted; and that, then, pure Space and Time still +remained as pure <i>a priori</i> conditions, the one as <i>room</i>, the +other as <i>opportunity</i>, for the coming of created being. Space +and Time being such conditions, <i>and nothing more</i>, are entities +only in the same sense that the multiplication table and the +moral law are entities. They are <i>conditions</i> suited to what +they condition. In the light of this result let us examine +Mr. Spencer's teachings respecting them.</p> + +<p>Strictly speaking, Space and Time do not "exist." If they +exist (ex sto), they must stand out somewhere and when. +This of course involves the being of a where and a when in +which they can stand out; and that where and when must +needs be accounted for, and so on <i>ad infinitum</i>. Again, Mr. +Spencer would seem to speak, in his usual style, as if they, +in existing "objectively," had a <i>formal</i> objective existence. +Yet this, in the very statement of it, appears absurd. The +mind apprehends many objects, which do not "exist." They +only are. Thus, as has just been said, Space and Time, as +conditions of created being, <i>are</i>. They are entities but not<span class="pagenum">[135]</span> +existences. They are <i>a priori</i> entities, and so are <i>necessarily</i>. +By this they stand in the same category with all +pure laws, all first principles.</p> + +<p>"Moreover, to deny that Space and Time are things, and +so by implication to call them nothings, involves the absurdity +that there are two kinds of nothings." This sentence "involves +the absurdity" of assuming that "nothing" is an entity. +If I say that Space is nothing, I say that it presents no content +for a concept, and cannot, because there is no content +to be presented. It is then <i>blank</i>. Just so of Time. As +nothings they are, then, both equally blank, and destitute of +meaning. Now if Mr. Spencer wishes to hold that nothing +represented by one word, differs from nothing represented by +another, we would not lay a straw in his way, but yet would +be much surprised if he led a large company.</p> + +<p>Again, having decided that they are neither "nonentities +nor the attributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider +them as entities." But he then goes on to speak of +them as "things," evidently using the word in the same sense +as if applying it to a material object, as an apple or stone; +thereby implying that entity and thing in that sense are +synonymous terms. Upon this leap in the dark, this blunder +in the use of language, he proceeds to build up a mountain of +difficulties. But once take away this foundation, once cease +attempting "to represent them in thought as things," and +his difficulties vanish. Space is a condition. Perhaps receptivity, +indivisibility, and illimitability are attributes. If +so, it has attributes, for these certainly belong to it. But +whether these shall be called attributes or not, it is certain +that Space is, is a pure condition, is thus a positive object to +the Reason, is qualified by the characteristics named above; +and all this without any contradiction or other insuperable +difficulty arising thereby. On the ground now established, +we learn that extension and Space are <i>not</i> "convertible +terms." Extension is an attribute of matter. Space is a condition +of phenomena. It is only all <i>physical</i> "entities which<span class="pagenum">[136]</span> +we actually know as such" that "are limited." From our +standpoint, that Space is <i>no</i> thing, such remarks as "We +find ourselves totally unable to form any mental image of +unbounded Space," appear painfully absurd. "We find ourselves" +just as "totally unable to form any mental image of +unbounded" love. Such phrases as "mental image" have +<i>no relevancy</i> to either Space or Time. In criticizing Kant's +doctrine, which we have found <i>true</i> as far as it goes, Mr. +Spencer evinces a surprising lack of knowledge of the facts +in question. "In the first place," he says, "to assert that +Space and Time, as we are conscious of them, are subjective +conditions, is by implication to assert that they are not objective +realities." But the conclusion does not follow. If +the reader will take the trouble to construct the syllogism on +which this is based, he will at once perceive the absurdity of +the logic. It may be said in general that all conditions of a +thinking being are both subjective and objective: they are +conditions of his being—subjective; and they are objects +of his examination and cognizance—objective. Is not the +multiplication table an objective reality, <i>i. e.</i>, would it not +remain if he be destroyed? And yet is it not also a subjective +law; and so was it not originally discovered by introspection +and reflection? Again he says, "for that consciousness +of Space and Time which we cannot rid ourselves +of, is the consciousness of them as existing objectively." Now +the fact is, that primarily we do not have <i>any</i> consciousness +of Space and Time. <i>Consciousness has to do with phenomena.</i> +When examining the material Universe, the <i>objects</i>, and the +objects as at a distance from each other and as during, are +what we are conscious of. For instance, I view the planets +Jupiter and Saturn. They appear as objects in my consciousness. +There is a distance between them; but this distance +<i>is</i> not, except as they <i>are</i>. If they are not, the word distance +has no meaning with reference to them. Take them away, +and I have no consciousness of distance as remaining. These +planets continue in existence. They endure. This endurance<span class="pagenum">[137]</span> +we call time, but if they should cease, one could not think of +endurance in connection with them as remaining. Here we +most freely and willingly agree with Mr. Spencer that "the +question is, What does consciousness directly testify?" but +he will find that consciousness on this side of the water testifies +very differently from his consciousness: as for instance in the +two articles in the "North American Review," heretofore +alluded to. Here, "the direct testimony of consciousness is," +that spaces and times within the Universe are without the +mind; that Space and Time, as <i>a priori</i> conditions for the +possibility of formal object and during event, are also without +the mind; but the "testimony" is none the less clear and +"direct" that Space and Time are laws of thought in the +mind corresponding to the actualities without the mind. And +the question may be asked, it is believed with great force, +If this last were not so, how could the mind take any cognizance +of the actuality? Again, most truly, Space and Time +"cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the +mind to become non-existent." Much more strongly than +this should the truth be uttered. They could not become +non-existent if the Universe with every sentient being, yea, +even—to make an impossible supposition—if the Deity +himself, should cease to be. In this they differ no whit from +the laws of Mathematics, of Logic, and of Morals. These +too would remain as well. Thus is again enforced the truth, +which has been stated heretofore, that Space and Time, as +<i>a priori</i> conditions of the Universe, stand in precisely the +same relation to material object and during event that the +multiplication table does to intellect, or the moral law to a +spiritual person. It will now be doubtless plain that Mr. +Spencer's remarks sprang directly from the lower faculties. +The Sense in its very organization possesses Space and Time +as void forms into which objects may come. So also the +Understanding possesses the notional as connecting into a +totality. These faculties cannot be in a living man without +acting. Activity is their law. Hence images are ever<span class="pagenum">[138]</span> +arising and <i>must</i> arise in the Sense, and be connected in the +Understanding, and all this in the forms and conditions of +Space and Time. He who thinks continually in these conditions +will always <i>imagine</i> that Space and Time are only +without him—because he will be thinking only in the iron +prison-house of the imagining faculty—and so cannot transcend +the conditions it imposes. Now how shall one see these +conditions? They do "exist objectively"; or, to phrase it +better, they have a true being independent of our minds. In +this sense, as we have seen, every <i>a priori</i> condition must be +objective to the mind. What is objective to the Sense is not +Space but a space, <i>i. e.</i> a part of Space limited by matter; +and, after all, it is the boundaries which are the true object +rather than the space, which cannot be "conceived" of if +the boundaries be removed. Without further argument, is it +not evident that there Space, like all other <i>a priori</i> conditions, +is object only to the Reason, and that as a condition of +material existence?</p> + +<p>At the bottom of page 49 we have another of Mr. Spencer's +psychological errors:—"For if Space and Time are +forms of thought, they can never be thought of; since it is +impossible for anything to be at once the <i>form</i> of thought +and the matter of thought." Although this topic has been +amply discussed elsewhere, it may not be uninstructive to +recur to it again. Exactly the opposite of Mr. Spencer's +remark is the truth. The question at issue here is one of +those profound and subtile ones which cannot be approached +by argument, but can be decided only by a <i>seeing</i>. It is a +psychological question pertaining to the profoundest depths +of our being. If one says, "I see the forms of thought," and +another, "I cannot see them," neither impeaches the other. +All that is left is to stimulate the dull faculty of the one +until he can see. The following reflections may help us +to see. Mr. Spencer's remark implies that we have no +higher faculty than the Sense and the Understanding. It +implies, also, that we can never have any <i>self</i>-knowledge, in<span class="pagenum">[139]</span> +the fundamental signification of that phrase. We can observe +the conduct of the mind, and study and classify the +results; but the laws, the constitution of the activity itself +must forever remain closed to us. As was said, when speaking +of this subject under a different phase, the eye cannot +see and study itself. It is a mechanical organism, capable +only of reaction as acted upon, capable only of seeing results, +but never able to penetrate to the hidden springs which underlie +the event. Just so is it with the Sense and Understanding. +They are mere mechanical faculties capable of +acting as they are acted upon, but never able to go behind +the appearance to its final source. On such a hypothesis as +this all science is impossible, but most of all a science of the +human mind. If man is enclosed by such walls, no knowledge +of his central self can be gained. He may know what +he <i>does</i>; but what he <i>is</i>, is as inscrutable to him as what +God is. As such a being, he is only a higher order of +brute. He has some dim perceptions, some vague feelings, +but he has no <i>knowledge</i>; he is <i>sure</i> of nothing. He can +reach no ground which is ultimate, no <i>Rock</i> which he knows +is <i>immutable</i>. Is man such a being? The longings and +aspirations of the ages roll back an unceasing <span class="smcap">No</span>! He is +capable of placing himself before himself, of analyzing that +self to the very groundwork of his being. All the laws of +his constitution, all the forms of his activity, he can clearly +and amply place before himself and know them. And how +is this? It is because God has endowed him with an EYE +like unto His own, which enables man to be self-comprehending, +as He is self-comprehending,—the Reason, with +which man may read himself as a child reads a book; that +man can make "the <i>form</i> of thought the <i>matter</i> of thought." +True, the Understanding is shut out from any consideration +of the forms of thought; but man is not simply or mainly +an Understanding. He is, in his highest being, a spiritual +person, whom God has endowed with the faculty of <span class="smcap">Vision</span>; +and the great organic evil, which the fall wrought into the<span class="pagenum">[140]</span> +world, was this very denial of the spiritual light, and this +crowding down and out of sight, of the spiritual person beneath +the animal nature, this denial of the essential faculties +of such person, and this elevation of the lower faculties of +the animal nature, the Sense and Understanding, into the +highest place, which is involved in all such teachings as we +are criticizing.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer's remarks upon "Matter" are no nearer the +truth. In almost his first sentence there is a grievous logical +<i>faux pas</i>. He says: "Matter is either infinitely divisible +or it is not; no third possibility can be named." Yet we +will name one, as follows: <i>The divisibility of matter has no +relation to infinity</i>. And this <i>third</i> supposition happens to +be the truth. But it will be said that the question should be +stated thus: Either there is a limit to the divisibility of matter, +or there is no limit. This statement is exhaustive, because +limitation belongs to matter. Of these alternatives +there can be no hesitation which one to choose. There is a +limit to the divisibility of matter. This answer cannot be +given by the physical sense; for no one questions but what +it is incapable of finding a limit. The mental sense could +not give it, because it is a question of actual substance and +not of ideal forms. The Reason gives the answer. Matter +is limited at both extremes. Its amount is definite, as are its +final elements. These "ultimate parts" have "an under and +an upper surface, a right and a left side." When, then, one +of these parts shall be broken, what results? Not <i>pieces</i>, as +the materialist, thinking only in the Sense, would have us +believe. When a final "part" shall be broken, there will +remain <i>no matter</i>,—to the sense nothing. To it, the result +would be annihilation. But the Reason declares that there +would be left <i>God's power</i> in its simplicity,—that final Unit +out of which all diversity becomes.</p> + +<p>The subsequent difficulties raised respecting the solidity +of Matter may be explained thus. And for convenience +sake, we will limit the term Matter to such substances as are<span class="pagenum">[141]</span> +object to the physical sense, like granite, while Force shall +be used to comprise those finer substances, like the Ether, +which are impalpable to the physical sense. Matter is composed +of very minute ultimate particles which do not touch, +but which are held together by Force. The space between +the atoms, which would otherwise be <i>in vacuo</i>, is <i>full</i> of +Force. We might be more exhaustive in our analysis, and +say—which would be true—that a space-filling force composes +the Universe; and that Matter is only Force in one +of its modifications. But without this the other statement is +sufficient. When, then, a portion of matter is compressed, +the force which holds the ultimate particles in their places is +overcome by an external force, and these particles are brought +nearer together. Now, how is it with the moving body and +the collision? Bisect a line and see the truth.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i2">C<br /></span> +<span class="i0">A————B<br /></span> +<span class="i2">1<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>A body with a mass of 4 is moving with a velocity of 4 along +the line from A to B. At C it meets another body with a +mass of 4 at rest. From thence the two move on towards B +with a velocity of 2. What has happened? In the body +there was a certain amount of force, which set it in motion +and kept it in motion. And just here let us make a point. +<i>No force is ever lost or destroyed. It is only transferred.</i> +When a bullet is fired from a gun, it possesses at one <i>point</i> a +maximum of force. From that point this force is steadily +<i>transferred</i> to the air and other substances, until all that it +received from the powder is spent. But at any one point in +its flight, the sum of the force which has been transferred +since the maximum, and of the force yet to be transferred, +will always equal the maximum. Now, how is it respecting +the question raised by Mr. Spencer? The instant of contact +is a point in time, <i>not a period</i>, and the transfer of force is +instantaneous. C, then, is a <i>point</i>, not a period, and the +velocity on the one side is 4 and the other side 2, while the<span class="pagenum">[142]</span> +momentum or force is exactly equal throughout the line. If +it is said that this proves that a body can pass from one +velocity to another without passing through the intermediate +velocities, we cannot help it. The above are the facts, and +they give the truth. The following sentence of Mr. Spencer +is, at least, careless. "For when, of two such units, +one moving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the striking +unit must have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to velocity +2; must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any +lapse of time, and without passing through intermediate velocities; +must be moving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same +instant, which is impossible." If there is any sense in the +remark, "instantaneously" must mean a <i>point</i> of time <i>without +period</i>. For, if any period is allowed, the sentence has +no meaning, since during that period "the striking unit" +passes through all "intermediate velocities." But if by instantaneously +he means <i>without period</i>, then the last clause +of the sentence is illogical, since instant there evidently +means a period. For if it means point, then it contradicts +the first clause. There, it is asserted that 4 was "<i>reduced</i>" +to 2, <i>i. e.</i> that at one point the velocity was 4, and at the +next point it was 2, and that there was <i>no time</i> between. If +4 was instantaneously reduced to 2, then the velocity 2 was +next after the velocity 4, and not coeval with it. Thus it +appears that these two clauses which were meant to be synonymous +are contradictory.</p> + +<p>Bearing in mind what we have heretofore learned respecting +atoms, we shall not be troubled by the objections to the +Newtonian theory which follow. In reply to the question, +"What is the constitution of these units?" the answer, "We +have no alternative but to regard each of them as a small +piece of matter," would be true if the Sense was the only +faculty which could examine them. But even upon this +theory Mr. Spencer's remarks "respecting the parts of which +each atom consists," are entirely out of place; for the hypothesis +that it is an ultimate atom excludes the supposition<span class="pagenum">[143]</span> +of "parts," since that phrase has no meaning except it refers +to a final, indivisible, material unit. All that the Sense +could say, would be, "What this atom is I know not, but +that it is, and <i>is not divisible</i>, I believe." But when we see +by the Reason that the ultimate atom, when dissolved, becomes +God's power, all difficulty in the question vanishes. +Having thus answered the above objections, it is unnecessary +to notice the similar ones raised against Boscovich's theory, +which is a modification of that of Newton.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer next examines certain phenomena of motion. +The fact that he seeks for absolute motion by the <i>physical +sense</i>, a faculty which was only given us to perceive relative—phenomenal—motion, +and is, <i>in its kind</i>, incapable of finding +the absolute motion, (for if it should see it, it could not +<i>know</i> it,) is sufficient to condemn all that he has said on this +subject. For the presentations which he has made of the +phenomena given us by the Sense does not exhaust the subject. +The perplexities therein developed are all resolvable, +as will appear further on. The phenomena adduced on page +55 are, then, merely <i>appearances</i> in the physical sense; and +the motion is merely relative. In the first instance, the captain +walks East with reference to the ship and globe. In the +second, he walks East with reference to the ship; the ship +sails West with reference to the globe; while the resultant +motion is, that he is <i>stationary</i> with reference to this larger +object. What, then, can the Sense give us? Only resultant +motion, at the most. So we see that "our ideas of +Motion" are not "illusive," but <i>deficient</i>. The motion is +just what it appears, measured from a given object. It is +<i>relative</i>, and this is all the Sense <i>can</i> give. Our author acknowledges +that "we tacitly assume that there are real +motions"; that "we take for granted that there are fixed +points in space, with respect to which all motions are absolute; +and we find it impossible to rid ourselves of this idea." +A question instantly arises, and it seems to be one which he +is bound to entertain, viz: How comes this idea to be? We<span class="pagenum">[144]</span> +press this question upon Mr. Spencer, being persuaded that +he will find it much more perplexing than those he has entertained. +Undoubtedly, "absolute motion cannot even be +imagined." <i>No</i> motion can be imagined, though the moving +body may be. But by no means does it follow, "much less +known." This involves that the knowing faculty is inferior +to, and more circumscribed than, the imagining faculty, when +the very opposite is the fact. Neither does it follow from +what is said in the paragraph beginning with, "For motion +is change of place," that "while we are obliged to think that +there is absolute motion, we find absolute motion incomprehensible." +The Universe is limited and bounded, and is a +sphere. We <i>may</i> assume that the centre of the sphere is at +rest. Instantly absolute motion becomes comprehensible, for +it is motion measured from that point. Surely there can be +no harm in the <i>supposition</i>. The Reason shows us that the +supposition is the truth; and that that centre is the throne +of the eternal God. In this view not only is motion, apart +from the "limitations of space," totally unthinkable, but it is +absolutely impossible. Motion <i>cannot</i> be, except as a formal +body is. Hence, to speak of motion in "unlimited space" is +simply absurd. Formal object <i>cannot</i> be, except as <i>thereby</i> a +limit is established in Space. Hence it is evident that "absolute +motion" is not motion with reference to "unlimited +Space," which would be the same as motion without a moving; +but is motion with reference to that point fixed in +Space, around which all things revolve, but which is itself at +perfect rest.</p> + +<p>"Another insuperable difficulty presents itself, when we +contemplate the transfer of Motion." Motion is simply the +moving of a body, and <i>cannot be transferred</i>. The <i>force</i> +which causes the motion is what is transferred. All that can +be said of motion is, that it is, that it increases, that it diminishes, +that it ceases. If the moving body impinges upon +another moving body, and causes it to move, it is not motion +that is transferred, but the force which causes the motion.<span class="pagenum">[145]</span> +The motion in the impinging body is diminished, and a new +motion is begun in the body which was at rest. Again it +is asked: "In what respect does a body after impact differ +from itself before impact?" And further on: "The motion +you say has been communicated. But how? What has been +communicated? The striking body has not transferred a +<i>thing</i> to the body struck; and it is equally out of the question +to say that it has transferred an <i>attribute</i>." Observe now +that a somewhat is unquestionably communicated; and the +question is:—What is it? Query. Does Mr Spencer mean +to comprehend the Universe in "thing" and "attribute"? +He would seem to. If he does, he gives a decision by assertion +without explanation or proof, which involves the very +question at issue, which is, Is the somewhat transferred a +"thing" or an "attribute"; and a decision directly contrary +to the acknowledgment that a somewhat has been communicated? +On the above-named hypothesis his statement +should be as follows: A somewhat has been communicated. +"Thing" and "attribute" comprise all the Universe. Neither +a thing, nor an attribute has been communicated, <i>i. e.</i> no +somewhat has been communicated; which contradicts the +evidence and the acknowledgment. If on the other hand Mr. +Spencer means that "thing" and "attribute" comprise only +a part of the Universe, then the question is not fairly met. +It may be more convenient for the moment to conclude the +Universe in the two terms thing and attribute; and then, as +attribute is essential to the object it qualifies, and so cannot +be communicated, it will follow that a thing has been communicated. +This thing we call force. It is not in hand now +to inquire what force is. It is manifest to the Sense that the +body is in a different state after impact, than it was before. +Something has been put into the body, which, though not +directly appreciable to the Sense, is indirectly appreciable by +the results, and which is as real an addition as water is to a +bowl, when poured in. Before the impact the body was +destitute of that kind of force—motor force would be a convenient<span class="pagenum">[146]</span> +term—which tended to move it. After the impact +a sufficiency of that force was present to produce the motion. +It may be asked, where does this force go to when the motion +diminishes till the body stops. It passes into the substances +which cause the diminution until there is no surplus in the +moving body, and at the point of equilibrium motion ceases. +If it be now asked, where does this force ultimately go to, it +is to be said that it comes from God, and goes to God, who +is the Final. The Sense gives only subordinate answers, but +the Reason leads us to the Supreme.</p> + +<p>If the view adopted be true, Mr. Spencer's halving and +halving again "the rate of movement forever," is irrelevant. +It is not a <i>mental operation</i> but an <i>actual fact</i> which is to be +accounted for. Take a striking illustration. A ball lying on +smooth ice is struck with a hockey. Away it goes skimming +over the glassy surface with a steadily diminishing velocity +till it ceases. It starts, it proceeds, it stops. These are +the facts; and the mental operation must accord with them. +There is put into the ball, at the instant of contact, a certain +amount of motor force. From that instant onward, that force +flows out of the ball into the resisting substances by which +it is surrounded, until none is left. And it is just as pertinent +to ask how all the water can flow out of a pail, as how all the +motor force can flow out of a moving substance. "The +smallest movement is separated" by no more of "an impassable +gap from no movement," <i>than it is from a larger movement +above it</i>. That which will account for a movement four +becoming two, will account for a movement two becoming +zero. The "puzzle," then, may be explained thus. Time is +the procession of events. Let it be represented by a line. +Take a point in that line, which will then mark its division +but represent <i>no period</i>. On one side of that point is rest; +on the other motion. That point is the point of contact, and +occupies no period. At this point the motion is maximum. +The force instantly begins to flow off, and continues in a +steady stream until none is left, and the body is again at rest.<span class="pagenum">[147]</span> +Here, also, we take a point. This is the point of zero. It +again divides the line. Before the bisection is motion; after +the bisection is rest. All this cannot be perceived by the +Sense, nor conceived by the Understanding. It is seen by +the Reason. Now observe the actual phenomenon. The +ball starts, proceeds, stops. From maximum to zero there is +a steady diminution, or nearly enough so for the experiment; +at least the diminution can be averaged for the illustration. +Then comparing motion with time, the same difficulty falls +upon the one as the other. If the motion is halved, the time +must be; and so, "mentally," it is impossible to imagine how +a moment of time can pass. To the halving faculty—the +Sense—this is true, and so we are compelled to correct our +course of procedure. This it is. The Sense and Understanding +being impotent to discover an absolute unit of any +kind, the Sense <i>assumes</i> for itself what meets all practical +want—a standard unit, by which it measures parts in Space +and Time. So motion must be measured by some assumed +standard; and as, like time,—duration,—it can be represented +by a line, let them have a common standard. Suppose, +then, that the ball's flight occupies ten minutes of time. +The line from m to z will be divided into ten exactly equal +spaces; and it will be no more difficult to account for the +flow of force from 10 to 9, than from 1 to 0. Also let it be +observed that the force, like time, is a unit, which the Sense, +for its convenience, divides into parts; but that neither those +parts, nor any parts, have any real existence. As Time is +an indivisible whole, measured off for convenience, so any +given force is such a whole, and is so measured off. All this +appearing and measuring are phenomenal in the Sense. It +is the Reason which sees that they can be <i>only</i> phenomenal, +and that behind the appearance is pure Spirit—God, who +is primarily out of all relation.</p> + +<p>On page 58, near the close of his illustration of the chair, +Mr. Spencer says: "It suffices to remark that since the force +as known to us is an affection of consciousness, we cannot<span class="pagenum">[148]</span> +conceive the force as existing in the chair under the same +form without endowing the chair with consciousness." This +very strange assertion can only be true, provided a major +premiss, No force can be conceived to exist without involving +an affection of consciousness in the object in which +it <i>apparently</i> inheres, is true. Such a premiss seems worse +than absurd; it seems silly. We cannot learn that force +exists, without our consciousness is affected thereby; but this +is a very different thing from our being unable to conceive +of a force as <i>existing</i>, without there is a consciousness in the +object through which it <i>appears</i>. If Mr. Spencer had said +that no force can be, without being exerted, and no force +can be exerted, without an affection of the consciousness of +the exertor, he would have uttered the truth. We would +then have the following result. Primarily all force is exerted +by the Deity; and he is conscious thereof. He draws the +chair down just as really as though the hand were visible. +Secondarily spiritual persons are endowed by their Creator +with the ability to exert his force for their uses, and so I lift +the chair. The great error, which appears on every page of +Mr. Spencer's book and invalidates all his conclusions, shows +itself fully here. He presents images from the Sense, and +then tries to satisfy the Reason—the faculty which calls for +an absolute account—by the analyses of that Sense. His +attempt to "halve the rate," his remark that "the smallest +movement is separated by an impassable gap from no movement," +and many such, are only pertinent to the Sense, can +never be explained by the Sense, and are found by the +Reason to need, and be capable of, no such kind of explanation +as the Sense attempts; but that the phenomena +are appearances in <i>wholes</i>, whose partitions cannot be absolute, +and that these wholes are accounted for by the being +of an absolute and infinite Person—God, who is utterly +impalpable to the Sense, and can be known only by the +Reason.</p> + +<p>The improper use of the Sense mentioned above, is, if possible,<span class="pagenum">[149]</span> +more emphatically exemplified in the remarks upon +"the connection between Force and Matter." "Our ultimate +test of Matter is the ability to resist." This is true to the +Sense, but no farther. "Resist" what? Other matter, of +course. Thus is the sensuousness made manifest. In the +Sense, then, we have a material object. But Force is not +object to the Sense directly, but only indirectly by its effects +through Matter. The Sense, in its percept, deems the force +other than the matter. Hence it is really no more difficult +for the Sense to answer the question, How could the Sun +send a force through 95,000,000 of miles of void to the Earth +and hold it, than through solid rock that distance? All that +the Sense <i>can do</i> is to present the phenomena. It is utterly +impotent to account for the least of them.</p> + +<p>In the following passage, on page 61, Mr. Spencer seems +to have been unaccountably led astray. He says: "Let the +atoms be twice as far apart, and their attractions and repulsions +will both be reduced to one fourth of their present +amounts. Let them be brought within half the distance, and +then attractions and repulsions will both be quadrupled. +Whence it follows that this matter will as readily as not +assume any other density; and can offer no resistance to any +external agents." Now if this be true, there can be no "external +agents" to which to offer any "resistance." It is +simply to assert that all force neutralizes itself; and that +matter is impossible. But the conclusion does not "follow." +It is evidently based on the supposition that the "attractions +and repulsions" are <i>contra</i>-acting forces which exactly balance +each other, and so the molecules are held in their position by +<i>no</i> force. Instead of this, they are <i>co</i>-acting forces, which +are wholly expended in holding the molecules in their places. +The repulsions, then, are expended in resisting pressure from +without which seeks to crowd the particles in upon themselves +and thus disturb their equilibrium; while the attractions +are expended in holding the particles down to their +natural distance from each other when any disturbing force<span class="pagenum">[150]</span> +attempts to separate them. Hence, referring to the two +cases mentioned, in the first instance the power of resistance +is reduced to one fourth, and this corresponds with the fact; +and in the second instance the power of resistance is increased +fourfold, and this corresponds with the fact.</p> + +<p>We thus arrive at the end of Mr. Spencer's remarks concerning +the material Universe and of our strictures thereon. +Perhaps the reader's mind cannot better be satisfied as to the +validity of these strictures than by presenting an outline of +the system furnished by the Reason, and upon which they are +based.</p> + +<p>The Reason gives, by a direct and immediate intuition, +and as a necessary <i>a priori</i> idea, God. This is a <i>spontaneous</i>, +synthetical act, precisely the same in kind with that which +gives a simple <i>a priori</i> principle, as idea. In it the Reason +intuits, not a single principle seen to be necessary simply, but +the fact that all possible principles <i>must</i> be combined in a +perfectly harmonious unity, in a single Being, who thereby +possesses all possible endowments; and so is utterly independent, +and is seen to be the absolute and infinite Person, +the perfect Spirit. This act is no conclusion of the One from +the many in a synthetical judgment, but is entirely different. +It is the necessary seeing of the many in the One; and so is +not a judgment but an intuition, not a guess but a certainty. +God, then, is known, when known at all, not "by plurality, +difference, and relation," but by an <i>immediate</i> insight into his +unity, and so is directly known as he is. And the whole +Universe is, that creatures might be, to whom this revelation +was possible. Among the other necessary endowments which +this intuition reveals, is that of immanent power commensurate +with his dignity, and adequate to realize in actual creatures +the necessary <i>a priori</i> ideas, which he also possesses as endowments. +Power is, then, a simple idea, incapable of +analysis; and which cannot therefore be defined, except by +synonymous terms; and to which President Hopkins's remark +upon moral obligation is equally pertinent; viz: "that we<span class="pagenum">[151]</span> +can only state the occasion on which it arises." From these +data the <i>a priori</i> idea of the Universe may be developed as +follows:—</p> + +<p>God, the absolute and infinite Person, possesses, as inherent +endowment forever immanent in himself, Universal Genius; +which is at once capacity and faculty, in which he sees, and +by which he sees, all possible ideas, and these in all possible +combinations or ideals. Thus has he all possible knowledge. +From the various ideal systems which thus are, he, having +perfect wisdom, and according his choice to the behest of his +own worth, selects that one which is thus seen to be best; +and thereby determines the forms and laws under which the +Universe shall become. He also possesses, as inherent endowment, +all power; <i>i. e.</i> the ability to realize every one of +his ideals; but <i>not</i> the ability to violate the natural laws of +his being, as to make two and two five. The ideal system +is only ideal: the power is simply power; and so long as +the two remain isolated, no-thing will be. Therefore, in +order to the realization of his ideal, it must be combined with +the power; <i>i. e.</i>, the power must be organized according to +the ideal. How, then, can the power, having been sent forth +from God, be organized? Thus. If the power goes forth in +its simplicity, it will be expended uselessly, because there is +no substance upon which it may be exercised. It follows, +then, that, if exercised at all, it must be exercised upon <i>itself</i>. +When, therefore, God would create the Universe, he sent +forth two "pencils," or columns of power, of equal and sufficient +volume, which, acting upon each other from opposite +directions, just held each other in balance, and thus force was. +These two "pencils," thus balancing each other, would result +in a sphere of "space-filling force." The point of contact +would determine the first place in Space, and the first point +in Time; from which, if attainable, an absolute measure of +each could be made. All we have now attained is the single +duality "space-filling force," which is wholly homogeneous, +is of sufficient volume to constitute the Universe, and yet by<span class="pagenum">[152]</span> +no means <i>is</i> the Universe. There is only Chaos, "without +form and void, and darkness" is "upon the face of the deep." +Now must "the Spirit of God move upon the face of the +waters"; then through vast and to us immeasurable periods +of time, through cycle and epicycle, the work of organization +will go on. Ever moving under forms laid down in the +<i>a priori</i> ideal, God's power turns upon itself, as out of the +crush of elemental chaos the Universe is being evolved. +During this process, whatever of the force is to act under the +law of heat in the <i>a priori</i> ideal, assumes that form and the +heat force becomes; whatever is to act under the law of +magnetism, assumes that form, and magnetic force becomes; +so of light, and the various forms of matter. At length, in +the revolution of the cycles, the Universe attains that degree +of preparation which fits it for living things to be, and the +life force is organized; and by degrees all its various forms +are brought forth. After another vast period that point is +reached when an animal may be organized, which shall be +the dwelling-place for a time of a being whose life is utterly +different in kind from any animal life, and man appears. +Now in all these vast processes, be it observed that God is +personally present, that the first energy was his, and that +every subsequent energizing act is his special and personal +act. He organized the duality, force. He then organized +this force into heat-force, light-force, magnetic-force, +matter-force, life-force, and soul-force. And so it is that his +personal supervision and energy is actually present in every +atom of the Universe. When we turn from this process of +thought to the sensible facts, and speak of granite, sandstone, +schist, clay, herbage, animals, yes, of the thousand kinds of +substance which appear to the eye, it is to be remembered +that all these are but <i>forms to the Sense</i> of that "reason-conception," +force,—that primal duality, which power acting +upon itself becomes. Now as the machine can never carve +any other image than those for which it is specially constructed, +and must work just as it is made to work, so the<span class="pagenum">[153]</span> +Sense, which is purely mechanical, can never do any other +than the work for which it was made, can never transcend the +laws of its organization. It can only give forms—results, +but is impotent to go behind them. It can only say <i>that +things are</i>, but never say <i>what</i> or <i>why</i> they are.</p> + +<p>Seen in the light of the theory which has thus been presented, +Mr. Spencer's difficulties vanish. Matter is force. +Motion is matter affected by another form of force. The +"puzzle" of motion and rest is only phenomenal to the Sense; +it is an appearance of force acting through another force. It +may also be said that the Universe is solid force. There is +no void in it. There is no nook, no crevice or cranny, that +is not full of force. To seek, then, for some medium through +which force may traverse vast distances, is the perfection of +superfluity. From centre to circumference it is present, and +controls all things, and is all things. So it is no more difficult +to see how force reaches forth and holds worlds in their +place, than how it draws down the pebble which a boy has +thrown into the air. It is no substance which must travel +over the distance, it is rather an inflexible rod which swings +the worlds round in their orbits. Whether, then, we look at +calcined crags or lilies of the valley, whether astronomy, or +geology, or chemistry be our study, the objects grouped under +those sciences will be found to be equally the results of this +one force, acting under different laws, and taking upon itself +different forms, and becoming different objects.</p> + +<p>That faculty and that line of thought, which have given so +readily the solution of the difficulties brought to view by Mr. +Spencer's examination of the outer world, will afford us an +easier solution, if possible, of the difficulties which he has +raised respecting the inner world. That which is not of us, +but is far from us, may perchance be imperfectly known; but +ourselves, what we are, and the laws of our being, may be +certainly and accurately known. And this is the highest +knowledge. It may be important, as an element of culture, +that we become acquainted with many facts respecting the<span class="pagenum">[154]</span> +outer world. It cannot but be of the utmost importance, that +we know ourselves; for thus only can we fulfil the behest of +that likeness to God, in which we were originally created. +We seek for, we may obtain, we <i>have obtained</i> knowledge in +the inner world,—a knowledge sure, steadfast, immutable.</p> + +<p>It seems to be more than a mere verbal criticism, rather a +fundamental one, that it is not "our states of consciousness" +which "occur in succession"; but that the modifications in +our consciousness so occur. Consciousness is <i>one</i>, and retains +that oneness throughout all modifications. These occur in +the unity, as items of experience affect it. Is this series of +modifications "of consciousness infinite or finite"? To this +question experience <i>can</i> give no answer. All experiments +are irrelevant; because these can only be after the faculty +of consciousness is. They can go no further back than the +<i>forms</i> of the activity. These they may find, but they cannot +account for. A law lies on all those powers by which an +experiment may be made, which forever estops them from +attaining to the substance of the power which lies back of the +form. The eye cannot examine itself. The Sense, as mental +capacity for the reception of impressions, cannot analyze its +constituents. The Understanding, as connective faculty concluding +in judgments, is impotent to discover why it must +judge one way and not another. It is only when we ascend +to the Reason that we reach the region of true knowledge. +Here, overlooking, analyzing all the conduct of the lower +powers, and holding the self right in the full blaze of the Eye +of self, Man attains a true and fundamental <i>self-knowledge</i>. +From this Mount of Vision we know that infinity and finiteness +have no pertinence to modifications of consciousness, or +in fact to any series. We attain to the further knowledge +that this series is, <i>must be</i>, limited; because the constituted +beings, in whom it in each case inheres, are limited, and had +a beginning. It matters not now to inquire how a self-conscious +person could be created. It is sufficient to know that +one has been created. This fact involves the further fact<span class="pagenum">[155]</span> +that consciousness, as an actuality, began in the order of +nature, after the being to whom it belongs as endowment, or, +in other words, an organization must be, before the modifications +which inhere in that organization can become. The +attainment of this as necessary law is far more satisfactory +than any experience could be, were it possible; for we can +never know but that an experience may be modified; but a +law given in the intuition is immutable. The fact, ascertained +many pages back, that the subject and the object are identical +under the final examination of the Reason, enables us to +attain the present end of the chain. The question is one of +fact, and is purely psychological. It cannot be passed upon, +or in any way interfered with, by logical processes. It is +only by examination, by seeing, that the truth can be known. +Faraday ridiculed as preposterous the pretension that a vessel +propelled by steam could cross the ocean, and demonstrated, +to his entire satisfaction, the impossibility of the event. Yet +the Savannah crossed, and laughed at him. Just so here, all +arguing is folly. The question is one of fact in experience. +And upon it the soul gives undoubted answer, as we have +stated. Nor is it so difficult, as some would have us believe, +to see how this may be. Consciousness is an indivisible unity, +and, as we have before seen, may best be defined as the light +in which the person intuits his own acts and activities. This +unity is abiding, and is ground for the modifications. It is, +then, <i>now</i>, and the person now knows what the present +modification <i>is</i>. The person does not need to look to memory +and learn what the former modification was. It immediately +knows what the modification <i>is</i> now. Thus a simple attainment +of the psychological truth through a careful examination +dispels as a morning mist the whole cloud of Mr. Spencer's +difficulties. Well might President Hopkins say, "The only +question is, what is it that consciousness gives? If we say +that it does thus give both the subject and the object, that +simple affirmation sweeps away in a moment the whole basis +of the ideal and skeptical philosophy. It becomes as the spear<span class="pagenum">[156]</span> +of Ithuriel, and its simple touch will change what seemed +whole continents of solid speculation into mere banks of +German fog." We have learned, then, that it is not possible, +or necessary, either to "perceive" or "conceive" the terminations +of consciousness, because this involves the discovery, +by <i>mechanical</i> faculties, of their own being and state +before they became activities on the one hand, which is a +contradiction, and on the other an utter transcending of the +sphere of their capability, the attempt to do which would be +a greater folly than would be that of the hand to see Jupiter. +But we have intuited the law, which declares the necessity of +a beginning for us and all creatures; and we ever live in the +light of the present end. When, then, Mr. Spencer says that +"Consciousness implies perpetual change and the perpetual +establishment of relations between its successive phases," we +know that he has uttered a fundamental psychological error, +in fact, that almost the opposite is the truth. Consciousness +is the permanent, the abiding, the changeless. It is the light +of the personal Eye. Into it all changes come; but they are +only <i>incidental</i>. In the finite and partial person, they come, +because such person <i>must grow</i>; and so, because of his partiality +and incompleteness, they become necessary incidents; +but let there be a Person having all knowledge, who therefore +cannot learn, having all perfection, who therefore cannot +change, and it is plain that these facts in no way interfere +with his consciousness. All variety is immanent in its light, +and no change can come into it because <i>there is no change to +come</i>; but this Person sees <i>all</i> his endowments <i>at once</i>, in the +unity of this his light, just as we see <i>some</i> of our endowments +in the unity of this our light. The change is not in the +consciousness, but in the objects which come into it. This +view also disposes of the theory that "any mental affection +must be known as like these foregoing ones or unlike those"; +that, "if it is not thought of in connection with others—not +distinguished or identified by comparison with others, it is not +recognized—is not a state of consciousness at all." Such<span class="pagenum">[157]</span> +comparison we have found only incidental in consciousness, +pertaining to things in the Sense and Understanding and not +essential. Thus does a true psychology dissipate all these +difficulties as a true cosmology explained the perplexities +"of Motion and Rest."</p> + +<p>Take another step and we can answer the question "What +is this that thinks?" It is a spiritual person. What, then, +is a spiritual person? A substance—a kind of force—the +nature of which we need inquire about no further than to +know that it is suitable to the use which is made of it, which +is organized, according to a set of constituting laws, into such +spiritual person. The substance without the laws would be +simple substance, and nothing more. The laws without the +substance would be only laws, and could give no being having +no ground in which to inhere. But the substance as ground +and the complete set of laws as inhering in the ground, and +being its organization when combined, become a spiritual +person who thinks. The <i>ego</i>, that is the sense of personality, +is only one of the forms of activity of this being, and therefore +cannot be said to think. The pages now before us are all +vitiated by the theory that "successive impressions and +ideas constitute consciousness." Once attain to the true +psychology of the person, and learn that consciousness is as +stated above,—an abiding light into which modifications come,—and +there arises no difficulty in believing in the reality of +self, and in entirely justifying that belief by Reason. Yea, +more, from such a standpoint it is utter unreason, the height +of folly, to doubt for an instant, for immanent and central +in the light of Reason lies the solemn fact of man's selfhood. +We arrive, then, directly at Mr. Spencer's conclusion, that +"Clearly, a true cognition of self implies a state in which +the knowing and the known are one—in which subject and +object are identified," and we <i>know</i> that such a state is an +actuality. Mr. Mansel may hold that such an assertion is +the annihilation of both, but he is wholly wrong. The Savannah +has crossed the Atlantic.<span class="pagenum">[158]</span></p> + +<p>We attain, then, exactly the opposite result from Mr. +Spencer. We have seen that "Ultimate Scientific Ideas +are all" presentative "of realities" which can "be comprehended." +We have, indeed, found it to be true, that, "after +no matter how great a progress in the colligation of facts and +the establishment of generalizations ever wider and wider,—after +the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths +that are larger and deeper, has been carried no matter how +far,—the fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach +as ever." But having learned this, we do not arrive at the +conclusion that "the explanation of that which is explicable +does but bring out into greater clearness the inexplicableness +of that which remains behind." On the other hand we know +that such a conclusion is erroneous, and <i>that the method by +which it is reached is a false method, and utterly irrelevant to +the object sought</i>. Could this lesson but be thoroughly learned, +Mr. Spencer's work, and our work, would not have been in +vain. Only by a method differing from this <span class="smcap">in kind</span>—a +method in which there is no "colligation of facts," and no +"generalizations" concluded therefrom, but a simple, direct +insight into Pure Truth—can "the fundamental truth" be +known; and thus it may be known by every human soul. +"<i>God made man in his own image.</i>" In our scheme there +is ample room for the man of Science, with the eye of Sense, +to run through the Universe, and gather facts. With telescope +and microscope, he may pursue them, and capture +innumerable multitudes of them. But having done this, we +count it folly to attempt to generalize truth therefrom. But +holding up the facts in the clear light of Reason, and searching +them through and through, we <i>see</i> in them the immutable +principle, known by a spontaneous, immediate, intuitive knowledge +to be immutable, and thus we "<i>know the truth</i>."</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[159]</span></p> + +<h2 id="THE_RELATIVITY_OF_ALL_KNOWLEDGE">"THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE."</h2> + +<p>In the opening of this chapter, Mr. Spencer states the +result, which, in his opinion, philosophy has attained as +follows: "All possible conceptions have been one by one +tried and found wanting; and so the entire field of speculation +has been gradually exhausted without positive result; +the only result arrived at being the negative one above stated—that +the reality existing behind all appearances is, and +must ever be, unknown." He then sets down a considerable +list of names of philosophers, who are claimed by Sir William +Hamilton as supporters of that position. Such a parade of +names may be grateful to the feelings of the Limitists, but +it is no support to their cause. The questions at issue are of +such a nature that no array of dignities, of learning, of profound +<i>opinions</i>, can have a feather's weight in the decision. +For instance, take Problem XLVII, of the first book of +Euclid. What weight have human opinion with reference +to its validity? Though a thousand mathematicians should +deny its truth, it would be just as convincing as now; and when +a thousand mathematicians assert its truth, they add no item to +the vividness of the conviction. The school-boy, who never +heard of one of them, when he first reads it, knows it must be +so, and that this is an inevitable necessity, beyond the possibility +of any power or will to change. On principles simple, +fixed, and final, just like those of mathematics, seen by the +same Eye and known with the same intellectual certainty, +and by logical processes just as pure, conclusive, <i>demonstrative</i> +as those of geometry, <i>and by such alone</i>, can the questions +now before us be settled. But though names and opinions +have no weight in the final decision, though a demonstration is +demanded and must be given, still it is interesting to note the +absence of two names, representatives of a class, which +must ever awaken, among the devout and pure-hearted, attention<span class="pagenum">[160]</span> +and love, and whose teachings, however unnoticed +by Mr. Spencer, are a leaven working in the minds and hearts +of men, which develop with continually increasing distinctness +the solemn and sublime truth, that the human mind is +capable of absolute knowledge. Plato, with serious, yea, sad +countenance, the butt of jeer and scoff from the wits and +comedians of his day, went about teaching those who hung +upon his lips, that in every human soul were Ideas which +God had implanted, and which were final truth. And Jesus +Christ, with a countenance more beautifully serious, more +sweetly sad, said to those Jews which believed on him, "If +ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed; +<i>and ye shall know the truth</i>, and the truth shall make you +free." It may seem to men who grope about in the dismal +cavern of the animal nature—the Sense and Understanding—wise +to refuse the light, and reject the truths of the +Pure Reason and the God-man, and to call the motley +conglomeration of facts which they gather, but cannot explain, +philosophy; but no soul which craves "the Higher Life" +will, can be satisfied with such attainments. It yearns for, it +cries after, yea, with ceaseless iteration it urges its supplication +for the highest truth; and it shall attain to it, because +God, in giving the tongue to cry, gave also the Eye to see. +The Spiritual person in man, made in the very image of God, +can never be satisfied till, stripped of the weight of the +animal nature, it sees with its own Eye the Pure Reason, +God as the Highest Truth. And to bring it by culture, by +every possible manifestation of his wondrous nature, up to +this high Mount of Vision, is one object of God in his system +of the Universe.</p> + +<p>The teaching of the Word—that august personage, "who +came forth from God, and went to God," has been alluded to +above. It deserves more than an allusion, more than any +notice which can be given it here. It is astonishing, though +perhaps not wholly unaccountable, that the writings of the<span class="pagenum">[161]</span> +apostles John and Paul have received so little attention from +the metaphysicians of the world, as declarations of metaphysical +truths. Even the most devout students of them do +not seem to have appreciated their inestimable value in this +regard. The reason for this undoubtedly is, that their transcendent +importance as declarations of religious truth has +shone with such dazzling effulgence upon the eyes of those +who have loved them, that the lesser, but harmoniously combining +beams of a true spiritual philosophy have been unnoticed +in the glory of the nobler light. It will not, therefore, +we trust, be deemed irreverent to say that, laying aside +all questions of the Divinity of Christ, or of the inspiration +of the Bible, and considering the writings of John and Paul +merely as human productions, written at some time nobody +knows when, and by some men nobody knows who, they are +the most wonderful revelations, the profoundest metaphysical +treatises the world has ever seen. In them the highest +truths, those most difficult of attainment by processes of reflection, +are stated in simple, clear language, and <i>they answer +exactly to the teachings of the Reason</i>. Upon this, President +Hopkins says: "The identity which we found in the last +lecture between the teaching of the constitution of man and +the law of God, was not sought. The result was reached +because the analysis would go there. I was myself surprised +at the exactness of the coincidence." Nor is this coincidence +to be observed simply in the statement of the moral law. In +all questions pertaining to man's nature and state, the two +will be found in exact accord. No law is affirmed by either, +but is accorded to by the other. In fine, whoever wrote the +Book must have had an accurate and exhaustive knowledge +of Man, about whom he wrote. Without any reference then +to their religious bearings, but simply as expositions of metaphysical +truths, the writings of the two authors named deserve +our most careful attention. What we seek for are laws, +final, fixed laws, which are seen by a direct intuition to be<span class="pagenum">[162]</span> +such; and these writings are of great value, because they +cultivate and assist the Reason in its search for these highest +Truths.</p> + +<p>One need have no hesitation, then, in rejecting the authority +of Mr. Spencer's names, aye, even if they were a thousand +more. We seek for, and can obtain, that which he cannot +give us—a demonstration; which he cannot give us because +he denies the very existence of that faculty by which alone +a demonstration is possible. As his empiricism is worthless, +so is his rationality. No "deduction" from any "<i>product</i> of +thought, or process of thought," is in any way applicable to +the question in hand. Intuitions are the mental actions +needed. Light is neither product nor process. We pass +over, then, his whole illustration of the partridge. It proves +nothing. He leads us through an interminable series of +questions to no goal; and says there is none. He gives the +soul a stone, when it cries for bread. One sentence of his is +doubtless true. "Manifestly, as the <i>most</i> general cognition +at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one, +it cannot be understood." Of course not. When the Understanding +has attained to the last generalization <i>by these very +terms</i>, it cannot go any farther. But by no means does his +conclusion follow, that "Of necessity, therefore, explanation +must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable. The +deepest truth which we can get at must be unaccountable. +Comprehension must become something other than comprehension, +before the ultimate fact can be comprehended." +How shall we account for the last generalization, and show +this conclusion to be false? Thus. Hitherto there have +been, properly speaking, no comprehensions, only perceptions +in the Sense and connections in the Understanding. "The +sense <i>distinguishes</i> quality and <i>conjoins</i> quantity; the understanding +<i>connects</i> phenomena; the reason <i>comprehends</i> the +whole operation of both." The Reason, then, overseeing the +operations of the lower faculties, and possessing within itself<span class="pagenum">[163]</span> +the <i>a priori</i> laws in accordance with which they are, <i>sees</i> directly +and immediately why they are, and thus comprehends +and accounts for them. It sees that there is an end to every +process of generalization; and it then sees, what the Understanding +could never guess, that <i>after</i>—in the order of our +procedure—the last generalization there is an eternal truth, +in accordance with which process and conclusion were and +must be. There remains, then, no inexplicable, for the final +truth is seen and known in its very self.</p> + +<p>The passages quoted at this point from Hamilton and +Mansel have been heretofore examined, and need no further +notice. We will pass on then to his subsequent reflections +upon them. It is worthy of remark, as a general criticism +upon these comments, that there is scarcely one, if there is a +single expression in the remainder of this chapter, which does +not refer to the animal nature and its functions. The illustrations +are from the material world, and the terms and expressions +are suited thereto. With reference to objects in +the Sense, and connections in the Understanding, the "fundamental +condition of thought," which Mr. Spencer supplies, +is unquestionably valuable. There is "likeness" as well as +"relation, plurality, and difference." But observe that both +these laws alike are pertinent only to the Sense and Understanding, +that they belong to <i>things in nature</i>, and consequently +have no pertinence to the questions now before us. +We are discussing <i>ideas</i>, not <i>things</i>; and those are simple, +and can only be seen, while these are complex, and may be +perceived, distinguished, and conceived. If any one shall +doubt that Mr. Spencer is wholly occupied with things in +nature, it would seem that after having read p. 80, he could +doubt no longer. "Animals," "species or genus," "mammals, +birds, reptiles, or fishes," are objects by which he illustrates +his subject. And one is forced to exclaim, "How can +he speak of such things when they have nothing to do with +the matter in hand? What have God and infinity and absoluteness +to do with 'mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes'?<span class="pagenum">[164]</span> +If we can know only these, why speak of those?" It would +seem that the instant they are thus set together and contrasted, +the soul must cry out with an irrepressible cry, "It +is by an utterly different faculty, and in entirely other modes, +that I dwell upon God and the questions concerning him. +These modes of the animal nature, by which I know 'mammals,' +are different in kind from those of the spiritual person, +by which I know God and the eternal truth." And when +this distinction becomes clearly appreciated and fixed in one's +mind, and the query arises, how could a man so confound +the two, and make utter confusion of the subject, as the +Limitists have done, he can hardly refrain from quoting +Romans I. 20 <i>et seq.</i> against them.</p> + +<p>Let us observe now Mr. Spencer's corollary. "A cognition +of the Real as distinguished from the Phenomenal must, +if it exists, conform to this law of cognition in general. The +First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, to be known at all, +must be classed. To be positively thought of, it must be +thought of as such or such—as of this or that kind." To +begin with the law which is here asserted, is <i>not</i> a "general" +law, and so does not lie upon all cognition. It is only a special +law, and lies only upon a particular kind of cognition. This +has been already abundantly shown; yet we reproduce one +line of proof. No mathematical law comes under his law of +cognition; neither can he, nor any other Limitist, make it +appear that it does so come. His law is law only for things +in nature, and not for principles. Since then all ideas are +known in themselves—are <i>self-evident</i>, and since God, infinity, +and absoluteness are ideas, they are known in themselves, +and need not be classed. So his corollary falls to the +ground. Can we have any "sensible experience" of God? +Most certainly not. Yet we can have just as much a sensible +experience of him as of any other person—of parent, wife, +or child. Did you ever see a person—a soul? No. Can +you see—"have sensible experience of"—a soul? No. +What is it, then, that we have such experience of? Plainly<span class="pagenum">[165]</span> +the body—that material frame through which the soul +manifests itself. The Universe is that material system +through which God manifests himself to those spiritual persons +whom he has made; and that manifestation is the same +in kind as that of a created soul through the body which is +given it. It follows then,—and not only from this, but it +may be shown by further illustration,—that every other +person is just as really inscrutable to us as God is; and +further, that, if we can study and comprehend the soul of our +wife or child, we can with equal certainty study, and to some +extent comprehend, the soul of God. Or, in other words, if +man is only an animal nature, having a Sense and Understanding, +all personality is an insoluble mystery; all spiritual +persons are alike utterly inscrutable. And this is so, because, +upon the hypothesis taken, man is destitute of any +faculty which can catch a glimpse of such object. A +Sense and Understanding can no more see, or in any possible +manner take cognizance of, a spiritual person than a man +born blind can see the sun. Again, we say he is destitute of +the faculty. Will Mr. Spencer deny the fact of the idea of +personality? Will he assert that man has no such notion? +Let him once admit that he has, and in that admission is involved +the admission of the reality of that faculty by which +we know God, for the faculty which cognizes personality, +and cognizes God, is one and the same.</p> + +<p>Although we do not like certain of Mr. Spencer's terms, +yet, to please him, we will use them. Some conclusions, +then, may be expressed thus: God as the Deity cannot be +"classed"; he is unique. This is involved in the very terms +by which we designate him. Yet we cognize him, but this +is by an immediate intuition, in which we know him as he is +in himself. "We shall see him as he is," says the apostle; +and some foretastes of that transcendent revelation are vouchsafed +us here on earth. But the infinite Person, <i>as person</i>, +must be "assimilated" with other persons. Yet his infinity +and absoluteness, <i>as such</i>, cannot be "grouped." And yet<span class="pagenum">[166]</span> +again, <i>as qualities</i>, they can be "grouped" with other qualities. +Unquestionably between the Creator, <i>as such</i>, and the created, +<i>as such</i>, "there must be a distinction transcending any of +the distinctions existing between different divisions of the +created." God as self-existent differs in kind from man +as dependent, and this difference continues irrevocable; +while that same God and that same man are <i>alike</i> in kind +<i>as persons</i>. This is true, because all spiritual persons are +composite beings; and while the essential elements of a +spiritual person are common to created persons and the uncreated +Person, there are <i>other</i> characteristics, <i>not essential</i> +to personality, which belong some to the created, and some +to the uncreated, and differentiate them. Or, in other words, +God as person, and man as person, are alike. Yet they are +diverse in kind, and so diverse in kind that it is out of the +range of possibility for that diversity to be removed. How +can this be explained? Evidently thus. There are <i>qualities</i> +transfusing the personality which cannot be interchangeable, +and which constitute the diversity. Personality is <i>form</i> of +being. Qualities transfuse the form. Absoluteness and infinity +are qualities which belong to one Person, and are such +that they thereby exclude the possibility of their belonging +to any other person; and so they constitute that one to whom +they belong, unique and supreme. Dependence and partiality +are also qualities of a spiritual person, but are qualities of +the created spiritual person, and are such as must always +subordinate that person to the other. In each instance it is, +"<i>in the nature of things</i>," impossible for either to pass over +and become the other. Each is what he is by the terms of +his being, and must stay so.</p> + +<p>But from all this it by no means follows that the dependent +spiritual person can have no knowledge of the independent +spiritual Person. On the other hand, it is the high glory of +the independent spiritual Person, that he can create another +being "in his own image," to whom he can communicate a +knowledge of himself. "Like as a father pitieth his children,<span class="pagenum">[167]</span> +so Jehovah pitieth them that fear him." Out of the +fact of his Father-hood and our childhood, comes that solemn, +and, to the loving soul, joyful fact, that he teaches us the +highest knowledge just as really as our earthly parents teach +us earthly knowledge. This he could not do if we had not +the capacity to receive the knowledge; and we could not +have had the capacity, except he had been able, in "the +nature of things," and willing to bestow it upon us. While, +then, God as "the Unconditioned cannot be classed," and so +as unconditioned we do not know him "as of such or such +kind," after the manner of the Understanding, yet we may, +do, "see him as he is," do know that he is, and is unconditioned, +through the insight of the Reason, the eye of the +spiritual person, and what it is to be unconditioned.</p> + +<p>We now reach a passage which has filled us with unqualified +amazement. As much as we had familiarized ourselves +with the materialistic teachings of the Limitists, we +confess that we were utterly unprepared to meet, even in +Mr. Spencer's writings, a theory of man so ineffably degrading, +and uttered with so calm and naïve an unconsciousness +of the degradation it involved, as the following. Although +for want of room his illustrations are omitted, it is believed +that the following extracts give a fair and ample presentation +of his doctrine.</p> + +<p>"All vital actions, considered not separately but in their +ensemble, have for their final purpose the balancing of certain +outer processes by certain inner processes.</p> + +<p>"There are unceasing external forces, tending to bring the +matter of which organic bodies consist, into that state of +stable equilibrium displayed by inorganic bodies; there are +internal forces by which this tendency is constantly antagonized; +and the perpetual changes which constitute Life +may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the +antagonism....</p> + +<p>"When we contemplate the lower kinds of life, we see that +the correspondences thus maintained are direct and simple;<span class="pagenum">[168]</span> +as in a plant, the vitality of which mainly consists in osmotic +and chemical actions responding to the coexistence of light, +heat, water, and carbonic acid around it. But in animals, +and especially in the higher orders of them, the correspondences +become extremely complex. Materials for growth +and repair not being, like those which plants require, everywhere +present, but being widely dispersed and under special +forms, have to be formed, to be secured, and to be reduced to +a fit state for assimilation....</p> + +<p>"What is that process by which food when swallowed is +reduced to a fit form for assimilation, but a set of mechanical +and chemical actions responding to the mechanical and +chemical actions which distinguish the food? Whence it +becomes manifest, that, while Life in its simplest form is the +correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with +certain outer physico-chemical actions, each advance to a +higher form of Life consists in a better preservation of this +primary correspondence by the establishment of other correspondences. +Divesting this conception of all superfluities, +and reducing it to its most abstract shape, we see that Life +is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal relations +to external relations. And when we so define it, we +discover that the physical and the psychial life are equally +comprehended by the definition. We perceive that this, +which we call intelligence, shows itself when the external +relations to which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be +numerous, complex, and remote in time and space; that every +advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the establishment +of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments; +and that even the highest achievements of science +are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and +sequence, so coördinated as exactly to tally with certain relations +of coexistence and sequence that occur externally....</p> + +<p>"And lastly let it be noted that what we call <i>truth</i>, guiding +us to successful action and the consequent maintenance +of life, is simply the accurate correspondence of subjective<span class="pagenum">[169]</span> +to objective relations; while <i>error</i>, leading to failure and +therefore towards death, is the absence of such accurate correspondence.</p> + +<p>"If, then, Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence +in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment +of internal relations to external relations, the necessarily +relative character of our knowledge becomes obvious. +The simplest cognition being the establishment of some connection +between subjective states, answering to some connection +between objective agencies; and each successively more +complex cognition being the establishment of some more +involved connection of such states, answering to some more +involved connection of such agencies; it is clear that the +process, no matter how far it be carried, can never bring +within the reach of Intelligence either the states themselves +or the agencies themselves."</p> + +<p>Or, to condense Mr. Spencer's whole teaching into a few +plain every-day words, Man is an animal, and only an +animal, differing nowhat from the dog and chimpanzee, +except in the fact that his life "consists in the establishment +of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments," +than the life of said dog and chimpanzee. Mark +particularly the sententious diction of this newly arisen sage. +Forget not one syllable of the profound and most important +knowledge he would impart. "Life in all its manifestations, +inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the +continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." +See, there is not a limit, not a qualification to the +assertion! Now turn back a page or two, reader, if thou +hast this wonderful philosophy by thee, and gazing, as into +a cage in a menagerie, see the being its author would teach +thee that thou art. From the highest to the lowest forms, +life is one. In its lower forms, life is a set of "direct and +simple" "correspondences." "But in animals, <i>and especially +in the higher orders of them</i>," and, of course, most especially +in the human animal as the highest order, "the correspondences<span class="pagenum">[170]</span> +become extremely complex." As much as to +say, reader, you are not exactly a plant, nor are you yet of +quite so low a type as the chimpanzee aforesaid; but the +difference is no serious matter. You do not differ half as +much from the chimpanzee as the chimpanzee does from the +forest he roves in. All the difference there is between you +and him is, that the machinery by which "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations" is carried +on, is more "complex" in you than in the chimpanzee. +He roams the forest, inhabits some cave or hollow tree, and +lives on the food which nature spontaneously offers to his +hairy hand. You cut down the forest, construct a house, +and live on the food which some degree of skill has prepared. +He constructs no clothing, nor any covering to shield him from +the inclemency of the weather, but is satisfied with tawny, +shaggy covering, which nature has provided. You on the +contrary are destitute of such a covering, and rob the sheep, +and kill the silk-worm, to supply the lack. But in all this +there is no <i>difference in kind</i>. The mechanism by which +life is sustained in you is more "complex," it is true, than +that by which life is sustained in him; there arise, therefore, +larger needs, and the corresponding "intelligence" to supply +those needs. But sweet thought, cheering thought, oh how +it supports the soul! Your life in its highest form is only +this animal life,—is only the constructive force by which +that "extremely complex" machinery carries on "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations." +All other notions of life are "superfluities."</p> + +<p>Reader, in view of the teaching of this new and widely +heralded sage, how many "superfluities" must you and I +strip off from our "conception" of life! And with what +bitter disappointment and deep sadness should we take up +our lamentation for man, and say: How art thou fallen, oh +man! thou noblest denizen of earth; yea, how art thou cast +down to the ground. But a little ago we believed thee a +spiritual being; that thou hadst a nature too noble to rot<span class="pagenum">[171]</span> +with the beasts among the clods; that thou wast made fit to +live with angels and thy Creator, God. But a little ago we +believed thee possessed of a psychical life—a soul; that thou +wouldst live forever beyond the stars; and that this soul's +life was wholly occupied in the consideration of "heavenly +and divine things." A little ago we believed in holiness, and +that thou, consecrating thyself to pure and loving employments, +shouldst become purer and more beautiful, nobler and +more lovely, until perfect love should cast out all fear, and +thou shouldst then see God face to face, and rejoice in the +sunlight of his smiling countenance. But all this is changed +now. Our belief has been found to be a cheat, a bitter +mockery to the soul. We have sat at the feet of the English +sage, and learned how dismally different is our destiny. +Painful is it, oh reader, to listen; and the words of our +teacher sweep like a sirocco over the heart; yet we cannot +choose but hear.</p> + +<p>"The pyschical life"—the life of the soul, "the immortal +spark of fire,"—and the physical life "are <i>equally</i> definable +as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations." We had supposed that intelligence in its highest +forms was wholly occupied with the contemplation of God +and his laws, and the great end of being, and all those tremendous +questions which we had thought fitted to occupy the +activities of a spiritual person. We are undeceived now. +We find we have shot towards the pole opposite to the truth. +Now "we perceive that this which we call Intelligence shows +itself when the external relations to which the internal ones +are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in +time or space; that <i>every advance in Intelligence essentially +consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, +and more involved adjustments; and that even the highest +achievements of science</i> are resolvable into mental relations +of coexistence and sequence, so coördinated as <i>exactly to tally</i> +with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur +externally." In such relations consists the life of the "caterpillar."<span class="pagenum">[172]</span> +In such relations, <i>only a little "more complex,"</i> consists +the life of "the sparrow." Such relations only does +"the fowler" observe; such only does "the chemist" know. +This is the path by which we are led to the last, the highest +"truth" which man can attain. Thus do we learn "that what +we call <i>truth</i>, guiding us to successful action, and the consequent +maintenance of life, is <i>simply</i> the accurate correspondence +of subjective to objective relations; while error, leading +to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence +of such accurate correspondence." What a noble life, oh, +reader, what an exalted destiny thine is here declared to +be! The largest effort of thine intelligence, "the highest +achievement of science," yea, the total object of the life of +thy soul,—thy "psychial" life,—is to attain such exceeding +skill in the construction of a shelter, in the fitting of apparel, +in the preparation of food, in a word, in securing "the accurate +correspondence of subjective to objective relations," +and thus in attaining the "<i>truth</i>" which shall guide "us to +successful action and the consequent maintenance of life," +that we shall secure forever our animal existence on earth. +Study patiently thy lesson, oh human animal! Con it o'er +and o'er. Who knows but thou mayest yet attain to this +acme of the perfection of thy nature, though it be far below +what thou hadst once fondly expected,—mayest attain a +perfect knowledge of the "<i>truth</i>," and a perfect skill in the +application of that truth, <i>i. e.</i> in "the continuous adjustment +of internal relations to external relations"; and so be guided +"to successful action, and the consequent maintenance of +life," whereby thou shalt elude forever that merciless hunter +who pursues thee,—the grim man-stalker, the skeleton Death. +But when bending all thy energies, yea, all the powers of +thy soul, to this task, thou mayest recur at some unfortunate +moment to the dreams and aspirations which have hitherto +lain like golden sunlight on thy pathway. Let no vain regret +for what seemed thy nobler destiny ever sadden thy day, +or deepen the darkness of thy night. True, thou didst deem<span class="pagenum">[173]</span> +thyself capable of something higher than "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; didst +often occupy thyself with contemplating those "things which +eye hath not seen, nor ear heard"; didst deem thyself a son +of God, and "a joint-heir with Jesus Christ," "of things incorruptible +and undefiled, and which fade not away, eternal +in the heavens"; didst sometimes seem to see, with faith's +triumphant gaze, those glorious scenes which thou wouldst +traverse when in the spirit-land thou shouldst lead a pure +spiritual life with other spirits, where all earthliness had been +stripped off, all tears had been wiped away, and perfect holiness +was thine through all eternity. But all these visions +were only dreams; they wholly deluded thee. We have +learned from the lips of this latest English sage that thy god +is thy belly, and that thou must mind earthly things, so as +to keep up "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to +external relations." Such being thy lot, and to fulfil such a +lot being "the highest achievement of science," permit not +thyself to be disturbed by those old-fashioned and sometimes +troublesome notions that "<i>truth</i>" and those "achievements" +pertained to a spiritual person in spiritual relations to God as +the moral Governor of the Universe; that man was bound to +know the truth and obey it; that his "errors" were violations +of perfect law,—the truth he knew,—were <i>crimes</i> against +Him who is "of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, and cannot +look upon sin with the least degree of allowance"; that for +these crimes there impended a just penalty—an appalling +punishment; and that the only real "failure" was the failure +to repent of and forsake the crimes, and thus escape the +penalty. Far other is the fact, as thou wilt learn from this +wise man's book. As he teaches us, the only "error" we +can make, is, to miss in maintaining perfectly "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations,"—is +to eat too much roast beef and plum-pudding at dinner, or to +wear too scanty or too thick clothing, or to expose one's self +imprudently in a storm, or by some other carelessness which<span class="pagenum">[174]</span> +may produce "the absence of such accurate correspondence" +as shall secure unending life, and so lead to his only "failure"—the +advance "towards death." When, then, oh reader! by +some unfortunate mischance, some "error" into which thine +ignorance hath led thee, thou hast rendered thy "failure" inevitable, +and art surely descending "towards death," hesitate +not to sing with heedless hilarity the old Epicurean +song, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">Sing and be gay<br /></span> +<span class="i0">The livelong day,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Thinking no whit of to-morrow.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Enjoy while you may<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All pleasure and play,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">For after death is no sorrow.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>Thou hast committed thine only "error" in not maintaining +"the accurate correspondence"; thou hast fallen upon +thine only "failure," the inevitable advance "towards death." +Than death no greater evil can befall thee, and that is already +sure. Then let "dance and song," and "women and wine," +bestow some snatches of pleasure upon thy fleeting days.</p> + +<p>Delightful philosophy, is it not, reader? Poor unfortunate +man, and especially poor, befooled, cheated, hopeless Christian +man, who has these many years cherished those vain, deceitful +dreams of which we spoke a little ago! To be brought +down from such lofty aspirations; to be made to know that +he is only an animal; that "Life in all its manifestations, +inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the +continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." +Do you not join with me in pitying him?</p> + +<p>And such is the philosophy which is heralded to us from +over the sea as the newly found and wonderful truth, which +is to satisfy the hungering soul of man and still its persistent +cry for bread. And this is the teacher, mocking that painful +cry with such chaff, whom newspaper after newspaper, and +periodical after periodical on this side the water, even to those +we love best and cherish most, have pronounced one of the<span class="pagenum">[175]</span> +profoundest essayists of the day. Perhaps he can give us +some sage remarks upon "laughter," as it is observed in the +human animal, and on that point compare therewith other +animals. But, speaking in all sincerity after the manner of +the Book of Common Prayer, we can but say, "From all +such philosophers and philosophies, good Lord deliver us."</p> + +<p>Few, perhaps none of our readers, will desire to see a +denial in terms of such a theory. When a man, aspiring to +be a philosopher, advances the doctrine that not only is "Life +in its simplest form"—the animal life—"the correspondence +of certain inner physico-chemical actions with certain outer +physico-chemical actions," but that "<i>each advance to a higher +form of Life</i> consists in a better preservation of this primary +correspondence"; and when, proceeding further, and to be +explicit, he asserts that not only "the physical," <i>but also "the +psychical life</i> are <i>equally</i>" but "the continuous adjustment +of internal relations to external relations"; and when, still +further to insult man, and to utter his insult in the most +positive, extreme, and unmistakable terms, he asserts "that +even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into +mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so coördinated +as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and +sequence that occur externally,"—that is, that the highest +science is the attainment of a perfect cuisine; in a word, +when a human being in this nineteenth century offers to his +fellows as the loftiest attainment of philosophy the tenet that +the highest form of life cognizable by man is an animal life, +and that man can have no other knowledge of himself than as +an animal, of a little higher grade, it is true, than other animals, +but not different in kind, then the healthy soul, when such a +doctrine is presented to it, will reject it as instantaneously as +a healthy stomach rejects a roll of tobacco.</p> + +<p>With what a sense of relief does one turn from a system +of philosophy which, when stripped of its garb of well-chosen +words and large sounding, plausible phrases, appears in such +vile shape and hideous proportions, to the teachings of that<span class="pagenum">[176]</span> +pure and noble instructor of our youth, that man who, by his +gentle, benignant mien, so beautifully illustrates the spirit +and life of the Apostle John,—Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., +President of Williams College. No one who has read his +"Lectures on Moral Science," and no lover of truth should +fail to do so, will desire an apology for inserting the following +extract, wherein is presented a theory upon which the soul +of man can rest, as at home the soldier rests, who has just +been released from the Libby or Salisbury charnel-house.</p> + +<p>"And here, again, we have three great forces with their +products. These are the vegetable, the animal, and the +rational life.</p> + +<p>"Of these, vegetable life is the lowest. Its products are as +strictly conditional for animal life as chemical affinity is for +vegetable, for the animal is nourished by nothing that has +not been previously elaborated by the vegetable. 'The profit +of the earth is for all; the king himself is served by the +field.'</p> + +<p>"Again, we have the animal and sensitive life, capable of +enjoyment and suffering, and having the instincts necessary +to its preservation. <i>This</i>, as man is now constituted, <i>is conditional +for his rational life</i>. The rational has its roots in +that, and manifests itself only through the organization which +that builds up.</p> + +<p>"<i>We have, then, finally and highest of all, this rational and +moral life, by which man is made in the image of God.</i> In +man, as thus constituted, we first find a being who is capable +of choosing his own end, or, rather, of choosing or rejecting +the end indicated by his whole nature. This is moral freedom, +<i>and in this is the precise point of transition from all +that is below to that which is highest</i>. For everything below +man the end is necessitated. Whatever choice there may be +in the agency of animals of means for the attainment of their +end,—and they have one somewhat wide,—they have none +in respect to the end itself. This, for our purpose, and for +all purposes, is the characteristic distinction, so long sought,<span class="pagenum">[177]</span> +between man and the brute. Man determines his own end; +the end of the brute is necessitated. Up to man everything +is driven to its end by a force working from without or from +behind; but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts itself +in front, and he follows it or not, as he chooses.</p> + +<p>"In the above cases it will be seen that the process is one +of the addition of new forces, with a constant limitation of +the field within which the forces act.... It is to +be noticed, however, that while the field of each added and +superior force is narrowed, yet nothing is dropped. Each +lower force shoots through, and combines itself with all that +is higher. Because he is rational, man is not the less subject +to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. He has +also the organic life that belongs to the animal. In him none +of these are dropped; <i>but the rational life is united with and +superinduced upon all these</i>, so that man is not only a +microcosm, but is the natural head and ruler of the world. +He partakes of all that is below him, <i>and becomes man by +the addition of something higher</i>.... Here, then, is our +model and law. Have we a lower sensitive and animal +nature? Let that nature be cherished and expanded by all +its innocent and legitimate enjoyments, for it is an end. +But—and here we find the limit—let it be cherished <i>only +as subservient to the higher intellectual life</i>, for it is also a +means." The italics are ours.</p> + +<p>Satisfactory, true, and self-sustained as is this theory,—and +it is one which like a granite Gothic spire lifts itself high and +calm into the atmosphere, standing firm and immovable in +its own clear and self-evident truth, unshaken by a thousand +assaulting materialistic storms,—we would buttress it with +the utterances of other of the earth's noble ones; and this +we do not because it is in any degree needful, but because +our mind loves to linger round the theme, and to gather the +concurrent thought of various rarely endowed minds upon +this subject. Exactly in point is the following—one of +many passages which might be selected from the works of<span class="pagenum">[178]</span> +that profoundest of English metaphysicians and theologians, +S. T. Coleridge:—</p> + +<p>"And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy +of this investigation are greatly increased by our not considering +the understanding (even our own) in itself, and as +it would be were it not accompanied with and modified by +the coöperation of the will, the moral feeling, and that faculty, +perhaps best distinguished by the name of Reason, of determining +that which is universal and necessary, of fixing laws +and principles whether speculative or practical, and of contemplating +a final purpose or end. This intelligent will—having +a self-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light +of the reason, by which its acts are made to bear as a whole +upon some end in and for itself, and to which the understanding +is subservient as an organ or the faculty of selecting and +appropriating the means—seems best to account for that +progressiveness of the human race, <i>which so evidently marks +an insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between +man and the inferior animals, but which would be inexplicable, +were there no other difference than in the degree of their intellectual +faculties</i>."—<i>Works</i>, Vol. I. p. 371. The italics are ours.</p> + +<p>The attention of the reader may with profit be also directed +to the words of another metaphysician, who has been much +longer known, and has enjoyed a wider fame than either of +those just mentioned; and whose teachings, however little +weight they may seem to have with Mr. Spencer, have been +these many years, and still are received and studied with +profound respect and loving carefulness by multitudes of +persons. We refer to the apostle Paul, "There is, therefore, +now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus, +who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit." That is, +who do not walk after the law of the animal nature, but who +do walk after the law of the spiritual person, for it is of this +great psychological distinction that the apostle so fully and +continually speaks. "For they that are after the flesh do +mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the<span class="pagenum">[179]</span> +spirit, the things of the spirit. For the minding of the flesh +is death, but the minding of the spirit is life and peace; because +the minding of the flesh as enmity against God, for it +is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." +<i>Romans</i> VIII. 1, 5, 6, 7. This I say, then, "Walk in the +spirit and fulfil not the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth +against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these +are contrary the one to the other."—<i>Galatians</i> V. 16, 17.</p> + +<p>Upon these passages it should be remarked, by way of explanation, +that our translators in writing the word spirit with +a capital, and thus intimating that it is the Holy Spirit of +God which is meant, have led their readers astray. The +apostle's repeated use of that term, in contrasting the flesh +with the spirit, appears decisive of the fact that he is contrasting, +in all such passages, the animal nature with the +spiritual person. But if any one is startled by this position +and thinks to reject it, let him bear in mind that the law of +the spiritual person in man and of the Holy Spirit of God is +<i>identical</i>.</p> + +<p>The reader will hardly desire from us what his own mind +will have already accomplished—the construction in our own +terms, and the contrasting of the system above embodied +with that presented by Mr. Spencer. The human being, +Man, is a twofold being, "flesh" and "spirit," an animal +nature and a spiritual person. In the animal nature are the +Sense and the Understanding. In the spiritual person are +the Reason, the spiritual Sensibilities, and the Will. The animal +nature is common to man and the brutes. The spiritual +person is common to man and God. It is manifest, then, that +there is "an insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier" +not only "between man and the inferior animals," but +between man as spiritual person, and man as animal nature, +and that this is a greater distinction than any other in the +Universe, except that which exists between the Creator and +the created. What relation, then, do these so widely diverse +natures bear to each other? Evidently that which President<span class="pagenum">[180]</span> +Hopkins has assigned. "Because he is rational, man is not +the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. +He has also the organic life that belongs to the plant, and +the sensitive and instinctive life that belongs to the animal." +Thus far his life "is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical +actions with certain outer physico-chemical actions,"—undoubtedly +"consists in the continuous adjustment of +internal relations to external relations"; and being the highest +order of animal, his life "consists in the establishment of more +varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments" than +that of any other animal. What, then, is this life for? "This, +as man is now constituted, is <i>conditional for his rational life</i>." +"The rational life is united with and <i>superinduced upon all +these</i>." As God made man, and in the natural order, the +"flesh," the animal life, is wholly subordinate to the "spirit," +the spiritual life. And the spirit, or spiritual person of which +Paul writes so much,—does this also, this "Intelligence in its +highest form," consist "in the continuous adjustment of internal +relations to external relations"? Are the words of +the apostle a cheat, a lie, when he says, "For if ye live +after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the spirit"—<i>i. e.</i> +by living with the help of the Holy Spirit, in accordance +with the law of the spiritual person—"do mortify the deeds +of the body, ye shall live?" And are Mr. Spencer's words, in +which he teaches exactly the opposite doctrine, true? wherein +he says: "And lastly let it be noted that what we call truth," +&c., (see <i>ante</i>, p. 168,) wherein he teaches that "if ye live after +the flesh," if you are guided by "<i>truth</i>," if you are able perfectly +to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective +to objective relations," "ye shall not surely die," you will +attain to what is <i>successful action</i>, the preservation of "life," +of "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations," of the animal life, and thus your bodies will live +forever—the highest good for man; but if you "mortify the +deeds of the body," if you pay little heed to "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations," you<span class="pagenum">[181]</span> +will meet with "<i>error</i>, leading to failure and therefore towards +death,"—the death of the body, the highest evil which can +befall man,—and so "ye shall" not "live." Proceeding in +the direction already taken, we find that in his normal condition +the spiritual person would not be chiefly, much less +exclusively, occupied with attending to "the continuous adjustment +of internal relations to external relations," but would +only regard these in so far as is necessary to preserve the +body as the ground through which, in accordance with the +present dispensation of God's providence, that person may +exert himself and employ his energies upon those objects +which belong to his peculiar sphere, even the laws and duties +of spiritual beings. The person would indeed employ his +superior faculties to assist the lower nature in the preservation +of its animal life, but this only as a means. God has ordained +that through this means that person shall develop +and manifest himself; yet the life, continuance in being, of +the soul, is in no way dependent on this means. Strip away +the whole animal nature, take from man his body, his Sense +and Understanding, leave him—as he would then be—with +no possible medium of communication with the Universe, and +he, the I am, the spiritual person, would remain intact, as +active as ever. He would have lost none of his capacity to +see laws and appreciate their force; he would feel the <i>bindingness</i> +of obligation just as before; and finally, he would be just +as able as in the earlier state to make a choice of an ultimate +end, though he would be unable to make a single motion +towards putting that choice into effect. The spiritual person, +then, being such that he has in himself no element of decomposition, +has no need, for the preservation of his own existence, +to be continually occupied with efforts to maintain "the accurate +correspondence of subjective to objective relations." +Yet activity is his law, and, moreover, an activity having +objects which accord with this his indestructible nature. With +what then will such a being naturally occupy himself? There +is for him no danger of decay. He possesses within himself<span class="pagenum">[182]</span> +the laws and ideals of his action. As such, and created, he +is near of kin to that august Being in whoso image he was +created. His laws are the created person's laws. The end +of the Creator should be that also of the created. But God +is infinite, while the soul starts a babe, an undeveloped germ, +and must begin to learn at the alphabet of knowledge. What +nobler, what more sublime and satisfactory occupation could +this being, endowed with the faculties of a God, find, than to +employ all his power in the contemplation of the eternal laws +of the Universe, <i>i. e.</i> to the acquisition of an intimate acquaintance +with himself and God; and to bend all his energies +to the realization by his own efforts of that part in the +Universe which God had assigned him, <i>i. e.</i>, to accord his +will entirely with God's will. This course of life, a spiritual +person standing in his normal relation to an animal nature, +would pursue as spontaneously as if it were the law of his +being. But this which we have portrayed is not the course +which human beings do pursue. By no means. One great +evil, at least, that "the Fall" brought upon the race of man, +is, that human beings are born into the world with the +spiritual person all submerged by the animal nature; or, to +use Paul's figure, the spirit is enslaved by the flesh; and such +is the extent of this that many, perhaps most, men are born +and grow up and die, and never know that they have any +souls; and finally there arise, as there have arisen through all +the ages, just such philosophers as Sir William Hamilton and +Mr. Spencer, who in substance deny that men are spiritual +persons at all, who say that the highest knowledge is a +generalization in the Understanding, a form of a knowledge +common to man and the brutes, and that "the highest achievements +of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence +and sequence, so coördinated as exactly to tally +with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur +externally." It is this evil, organic in man, that Paul portrays +so vividly; and it is against men who teach such doctrines +that he thunders his maledictions.<span class="pagenum">[183]</span></p> + +<p>We have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse +from, superior to, and superinduced upon, the animal nature. +This is his <i>position</i> in the logical order. We have also spoken +of him as submerged under the animal nature, as enslaved +to the flesh. By such figures do we strive to express the +awfully degraded <i>condition</i> in which every human being is +born into the world. And mark, this is simply a natural +degradation. Let us then, as philosophers, carry our examination +one step farther and ask: In this state of things +what would be the fitting occupation of the spiritual person. +Is it that "continuous adjustment"? He turns from it with +loathing. Already he has served the "flesh" a long and +grievous bondage. Manifestly, then, he should struggle with +all his might to regain his normal condition to become naturally +good as well as morally good,—he should fill his soul +with thoughts of God, and then he should make every rational +exertion to induce others to follow in his footsteps.</p> + +<p>We attain, then, a far different result from Mr. Spencer. +"The highest achievements of science" for us, our "truth," +guiding us "to successful action," is that pure <i>a priori</i> truth, +the eternal law of God which is written in us, and given to +us for our guidance to what is truly "successful action,"—the +accordance of our wills with the will of God.</p> + +<p>What we now reach, and what yet remains to be considered +of this chapter, is that passage in which Mr. Spencer enounces, +as he believes, a new principle of philosophy, a principle +which will symmetrize and complete the Hamiltonian system, +and thus establish it as the true and final science for mankind. +Since we do not view this principle in the same light +with Mr. Spencer, and especially since it is our intention to +turn it upon what he has heretofore written, and demolish +that with it, there might arise a feeling in many minds that +the whole passage should be quoted, that there might be no +doubt as to his meaning. This we should willingly do, did +our space permit. Yet it seems not in the least necessary. +That part of the passage which contains the gist of the subject,<span class="pagenum">[184]</span> +followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and illustrations, +would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently +full presentation of his theory, and for a basis upon which +we might safely build our criticism. These then will be +given.</p> + +<p>"There still remains the final question—What must we say +concerning that which transcends knowledge? Are we to +rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena? Is the result +of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds everything +but the relative; or must we also believe in something beyond +the relative?</p> + +<p>"The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits +of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the +relative; and that anything transcending the relative can be +thought of only as a pure negation, or as a non-existence. +'The <i>absolute</i> is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability,' +writes Sir William Hamilton. 'The <i>Absolute</i> +and the <i>Infinite</i>,' says Mr. Mansel, 'are thus, like the <i>Inconceivable</i> +and the <i>Imperceptible</i>, names indicating, not an +object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere +absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible.' +From each of which extracts may be deduced the conclusion, +that, since reason cannot warrant us in affirming the +positive existence of what is cognizable only as a negation, +we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of anything +beyond phenomena.</p> + +<p>"Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, +a grave error. If the premiss be granted, the inference must +doubtless be admitted; but the premiss, in the form presented +by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, is not strictly +true. Though, in the foregoing pages, the arguments used +by these writers to show that the Absolute is unknowable, +have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments +have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing, yet +there remains to be stated a qualification, which saves us +from that scepticism otherwise necessitated. It is not to be<span class="pagenum">[185]</span> +denied that so long as we confine ourselves to the purely +logical aspect of the question, the propositions quoted above +must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate +its more general, or psychological aspect, we find that these +propositions are imperfect statements of the truth; omitting, +or rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To +speak specifically:—Besides that <i>definite</i> consciousness of +which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an <i>indefinite</i> +consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete +thoughts, and besides the thoughts which, though incomplete, +admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible +to complete, and yet which are still real, in the sense that +they are normal affections of the intellect.</p> + +<p>"Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments +by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, +distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond +the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, +is, by implication, to affirm that there <i>is</i> an Absolute. In +the very denial of our power to learn <i>what</i> the Absolute is, +there lies hidden the assumption <i>that</i> it is; and the making +of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present +to the mind, not as a nothing but as a something. Similarly +with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is +upheld. The Noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis +of the Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as +an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive that +our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without +at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are +appearances; for appearance without reality is unthinkable." +After carrying on this train of argument a little further, he +reaches this just and decisive result. "Clearly, then, the +very demonstration that a <i>definite</i> consciousness of the Absolute +is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite +consciousness of it." Carrying the argument further, +he says: "Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the +necessary conditions of thought, we are obliged to form a<span class="pagenum">[186]</span> +positive though vague consciousness of this which transcends +distinct consciousness, is to analyze our conception of the +antithesis between Relative and Absolute." He follows the +presentation of certain "antinomies of thought" with an extract +from Sir William Hamilton's words, in which the logician +enounces his doctrine that in "correlatives" "the positive +alone is real, the negative is only an abstraction of the other"; +or, in other words, the one gives a substance of some kind in +the mind, the other gives simply nothingness, void, absolute +negation. Criticizing this, Mr. Spencer is unquestionably +right in saying: "Now the assertion that of such contradictories +'the negative is <i>only</i> an abstraction of the other'—'is +<i>nothing else</i> than its negation'—is not true. In such +correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that +the negative concept contains something besides the negation +of the positive one; for the things of which equality is denied +are not abolished from consciousness by the denial. And the +fact overlooked by Sir William Hamilton is, that the like +holds, even with those correlatives of which the negative is inconceivable, +in the strict sense of the word." Proceeding with +his argument, he establishes, by ample illustration, the fact +that a "something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative +or Absolute." He afterwards shows plainly by quotations, +"that both Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel +do," in certain places, "distinctly imply that our consciousness +of the Absolute, indefinite though it is, is positive not +negative." Further on he argues thus: "Though Philosophy +condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute; +though it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, +nor that, nor that; though in obedience to it we negative, +one after another, each idea as it arises; yet as we cannot +expel the entire contents of consciousness, there ever remains +behind an element which passes into new shapes. The continual +negation of each particular form and limit simply results +in the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and +limits, and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed<span class="pagenum">[187]</span> +and unlimited." Thus he brings us to "the ultimate +difficulty—How can there possibly be constituted a consciousness +of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its very nature, +consciousness is possible only under forms and limits?" This +he accounts for by by hypostatizing a "raw material" in consciousness +which is, must be, present. He presents his conclusion +as follows: "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate +mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and +necessarily indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned +being literally the unconditioned consciousness, or +raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give definite +forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence +is the very basis of our intelligence." ...</p> + +<p>"To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:—We +have seen how, in the very assertion that all our knowledge, +properly so called, is Relative, there is involved the assertion +that there exists a Non-relative. We have seen how, in each +step of the argument by which this doctrine is established, +the same assumption is made. We have seen how, from the +very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that the +Relative itself is inconceivable, except as related to a real +Non-relative. We have seen that, unless a real Non-relative +or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, +and so brings the argument to a contradiction. And +on contemplating the process of thought, we have equally +seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an +actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from this impossibility, +results our indestructible belief in that actuality."</p> + +<p>The approval which has been accorded to certain of the +arguments adduced by Mr. Spencer in favor of his especial +point, that the Absolute is a positive somewhat in consciousness, +and to that point as established, must not be supposed +to apply also to that hypothesis of "indefinite consciousness" +by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his former +teachings. On the contrary, it will be our purpose hereafter +to show that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy.<span class="pagenum">[188]</span></p> + +<p>As against the positions taken by Sir William Hamilton +and Mr. Mansel, Mr. Spencer's argument may unquestionably +be deemed decisive. Admitting the logical accuracy of their +reasoning, he very justly turns from the logical to the psychological +aspect of the subject, takes exception to their +premiss, shows conclusively that it is fallacious, and gives +an approximate, though unfortunately a very partial and +defective presentation of the truth. Indeed, the main issue +which must now be made with him is whether the position +he has here taken, and which he puts forth as that peculiar +element in his philosophical system, that new truth, which +shall harmonize Hamiltonian Limitism with the facts of +human nature, is not, when carried to its logical results, in +diametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system, +and all that he has before written, and so does not +annihilate them. It will be our present endeavor to show +that such is the result.</p> + +<p>Perhaps we cannot better examine Mr. Spencer's theory +than, first, to take up what we believe to be the element of +truth in it, and carry out this to its logical results; and afterwards +to present what seem to be the elements of error, and +show them to be such.</p> + +<p>1. "We are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness +of" "the Absolute." Without criticizing his use +here of consciousness as if it were a faculty of knowledge, +and remembering that we cannot have a consciousness of +anything without having a knowledge commensurate with +that consciousness, we will see that Mr. Spencer's assertion +is tantamount to saying, We have a positive knowledge that +the Absolute is. It does not seem that he himself can disallow +this. Grant this, and our whole system follows, as does +also the fallacy of his own. Our argument will proceed +thus. Logic is the science of the pure laws of thought, and +is mathematically accurate, and is absolute. Being such, it +is law for all intellect, for God as well as man. But three +positions can be taken. Either it is true for the Deity, or<span class="pagenum">[189]</span> +else it is false for him, or else it has no reference to him. In +the last instance God is Chaos; in the second he and man +are in organic contradiction, and he created man so; the first +is the one now advocated. The second and third hypotheses +refute themselves in the statement of them. Nothing remains +but the position taken that the laws of Logic lie equally on +God and man. One of those laws is, that, if any assertion is +true, all that is logically involved in it is true; in other words, +all truth is in absolute and perfect harmony. This is fundamental +to the possibility of Logic. Now apply this law to +the psychological premiss of Mr. Spencer, that we have a +positive knowledge that the Absolute is. A better form of +expression would be, The absolute Being is. It follows then +that he is in a <i>mode</i>, has a <i>formal</i> being. But three hypotheses +are possible. He is in no mode, he is in one mode; +he is in all modes. If he is in no mode, there is no form, no +order, no law for his being; which is to say, he is Chaos. +Chaos is not God, for Chaos cannot organize an orderly being, +and men are orderly beings, and were created. If he is in +all modes, he is in a state of utter contradiction. God "is all +in every part." He is then all infinite, and all finite. Infinity +and finiteness are contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities. +God is wholly possessed of contradictory and mutually +exclusive qualities, which is more than unthinkable—it is +absurd. He is, must be, then, in one mode. Let us pause +here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established, +from Mr. Spencer's own premiss, the fact that God <i>is +limited</i>. He must be in one mode to the exclusion of all +other modes. He is limited then by the necessity to be what +he is; and if he could become what he is not, he would not +have been absolute. Since he is absolute, he is, to the exclusion +of the possibility of any other independent Being. +Other beings are, and must therefore be, dependent on and +subordinate to him. Since he is superior to all other beings +he must be in the highest possible mode of being. Personality +is the highest possible mode of being. This will appear<span class="pagenum">[190]</span> +from the following considerations. A person, possesses the +reason and law of his action, and the capacity to act, within +himself, and is thus a <i>final cause</i>. No higher form of being +than this can be needed, and so by the law of parsimony +a hypothesis of any other must be excluded. God is then a +person.</p> + +<p>We have now brought the argument to that point where +its connection with the system advocated in this treatise is +manifest. If the links are well wrought, and the chain complete, +not only is this system firmly grounded upon Mr. +Spencer's premiss, but, as was intimated on an early page, +he has in this his special point given partial utterance to +what, once established, involves the fallacy not only of all +he has written before, but as well of the whole Limitist +Philosophy. It remains now to remark upon the errors in +his form of expressing the truth.</p> + +<p>2. Mr. Spencer's error is twofold. He treats of consciousness +as a faculty of knowledge. He speaks of a "vague," +an "indefinite consciousness." Let us examine these in their +order.</p> + +<p><i>a.</i> He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. +In this he uses the term in the inexact, careless, +popular manner, rather than with due precision. As has +been observed on a former page, consciousness is the light in +which the person sees his faculties act. Thus some feeling +is affected. This feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty, +and of this the person is conscious. Hence it is an elliptical +expression to say "I am conscious of the feeling." The full +form being "I am conscious that I know the feeling." Thus +is it with all man's activities. Applying this to the case in +hand, it appears, not that we are conscious of the Absolute, +but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual faculty, +the Pure Reason, presents what absoluteness is, and that the +absolute Person is, and through this presentation—intuition—the +spiritual person knows these facts. We repeat, then, +our position: consciousness is the indivisible unity, the light<span class="pagenum">[191]</span> +in which the person sees all his faculties and capacities act; +and so is to be considered as different in kind from them all +as the peculiar and unique endowment of a spiritual person.</p> + +<p><i>b.</i> Mr. Spencer speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite consciousness." +The expression "vague consciousness" being a +popular and very common one, deserves a careful examination, +and this we hope to give it, keeping in mind meantime the +position already attained.</p> + +<p>The phrase is used in some such connection as this, "I +have a vague or undefined consciousness of impending evil." +Let us analyze this experience. In doing so it will be +observed that the consciousness, or rather the seeing by the +person in the light of consciousness, is positive, clear, and +definite, and is the apprehension of a feeling. Again, the feeling +is positive and distinct; it is a feeling of dread, of threatening +danger. What, then, is vague—is undefined? This. +That cause which produces the feeling lies without the reach +of the cognitive faculties, and of course cannot be known; +because what produces the feeling is unknown, the intellectual +apprehension experiences a sense of vagueness; and this +it instinctively carries over and applies to the feeling. Yet +really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of the +cause of the feeling. Strictly speaking, then, it is not consciousness +that is vague; and so Mr. Spencer's "<i>indefinite</i> +consciousness, which cannot be formulated," has no foundation +in fact. But this may be shown by another line of thought. +Consciousness is commensurate with knowledge, <i>i. e.</i>, man +can have no knowledge except he is conscious of that knowledge; +neither can he have any consciousness except he knows +that the consciousness is, and what the consciousness is, <i>i. e.</i>, +what he is conscious of. Now all knowledge is definite; it +is only ignorance that is indefinite. When we say that our +knowledge of an object is indefinite, we mean that we partly +know its characteristics, and are partly ignorant of them. +Thus then also the result above stated follows; and what +Mr. Spencer calls "<i>indefinite</i> consciousness" is a "<i>definite</i><span class="pagenum">[192]</span> +consciousness" that we partly know, and are partly ignorant +of the object under consideration.</p> + +<p>In the last paragraph but one, of the chapter now under +consideration, Mr. Spencer makes a most extraordinary assertion +respecting consciousness, which, when examined in the +light of the positions we have advocated, affords another +decisive evidence of the fallacy of his theory. We quote it +again, that the reader may not miss of giving it full attention. +"By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element +is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. +Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally <i>the +unconditioned consciousness</i>, or <i>raw material of thought</i>, to +which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an +ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our +intelligence." Upon reading this passage, the question spontaneously +arises, What does the writer mean? and it is a +question which is not so easily answered. More than one +interpretation may be assigned, as will appear upon examination. +A problem is given. To find what the "raw material +of thought" is. Since man has thoughts, there must be in +him the "raw material of thought"—the crude thought-ore +which he smelts down in the blast-furnace of the Understanding, +giving forth in its stead the refined metal—exact +thought. We must then proceed to attain our answer by +analyzing man's natural organization.</p> + +<p>Since man is a complex, constituted being, there is necessarily +a logical order to the parts which are combined in the +complexity. He may be considered as a substance in which +a constitution inheres, <i>i. e.</i>, which is organized according to +a <i>set</i> of fixed laws, and that set of laws may be stated in their +logical order. It is sufficient, however, for our purpose to +consider him as an organized substance, the organization +being such that he is a person—a selfhood, <i>self-active</i> and +capable of self-examination. The raw material of <i>all</i> the +activities of such a person is this organized substance. Take +away the substance, and there remains only the set of laws<span class="pagenum">[193]</span> +as <i>abstract</i> ideas. Again, take away the set of laws, and the +substance is simple, unorganized substance. In the combining +of the two the person becomes. These, then, are all +there is of the person, and therefore in these must the raw +material be. From this position it follows directly that any +capacity or faculty, or, in general, every activity of the person, +is the substance acting in accordance with the law which +determines that form of the activity. To explain the term, +form of activity. There is a <i>set</i> of laws. Each law, by itself, +is a simple law, and is incapable of organizing a substance +into a being. But when these laws are considered, as they +naturally stand in the Divine Reason, in relation to each +other, it is seen that this, their standing together, constitutes +ideals, or forms of being and activity. To illustrate from +an earthly object. The law of gravitation alone could not +organize a Universe; neither could the law of cohesion, nor of +centripetal, nor centrifugal force, nor any other one law. All +these laws must be acting together,—or rather all these +laws must stand together in perfect harmony, according to +their own nature, thus constituting an ideal form, in accordance +with which God may create this Universe. For an +illustration of our topic in its highest form, the reader is +referred to those pages of Dr. Hickok's "Rational Psychology," +where he analyzes personality into its elements of Spontaneity, +Autonomy, and Liberty. From that examination it is sufficiently +evident that either of these alone cannot organize a +person, but that all three must be present in order to constitute +such a being. There are, then, various forms of activity +in the person, as Reason, Sensibility, and Will, in each +of which the organized substance acts in a mode or form, and +this form is determined by the set of organizing laws. Consciousness +also is such a form. The "raw material of +thought," then, must be this substance considered under the +peculiar form of activity which we call consciousness, but +<i>before the substance thus formulated has been awakened into +activity by those circumstances which are naturally suited to</i><span class="pagenum">[194]</span> +<i>it, for bringing it into action</i>. Now, by the very terms of +the statement it is evident that the substance thus organized +in this form, or, to use the common term, consciousness considered +apart from and prior to its activity, can never be +known <i>by experience</i>, i. e., <i>we can never be conscious of an +unconscious state</i>. "Unconditioned consciousness" is consciousness +considered as quiescent because in it have been +awakened no "definite forms"—no "thinking." "In the +nature of things," then, it is impossible to be conscious of an +"unconditioned consciousness." Yet Mr. Spencer says that +"our consciousness of the unconditioned," which he has already +asserted and proved, is a "positive," and therefore an +active state; is identical with, is "literally the unconditioned +consciousness," or consciousness in its quiescent state, considered +before it had been awakened into activity, which is +far more absurd than what was just above shown to be a +contradiction.</p> + +<p>To escape such a result, a less objectionable interpretation +may be given to the dictum in hand. It may be said that +it looks upon consciousness only as an activity, and in the +logical order after its action has begun. We are, then, conscious, +and in this is positive action, but no definite object is +present which gives a form in consciousness, and so consciousness +<i>returns upon itself</i>. We are conscious that we are conscious, +which is an awkward way of saying that we are self-conscious, +or, more concisely yet, that we are conscious; for +accurately this is all, and this is the same as to say that the +subject and object are identical in this act. The conclusion +from this hypothesis is one which we judge Mr. Spencer will +be very loath to accept, and yet it seems logically to follow. +Indeed, in a sentence we are about to quote, he seems to +make a most marked distinction between self-consciousness +and this "consciousness of the unconditioned," which he calls +its "obverse."</p> + +<p>But whatever Mr. Spencer's notion of the "raw material +of thought" is, what more especially claims our attention and<span class="pagenum">[195]</span> +is most strange, is his application of that notion. To present +this more clearly, we will quote further from the passage +already under examination. "As we can in successive mental +acts get rid of all particular conditions, and replace them by +others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance +of consciousness, which is conditioned anew in every thought, +there ever remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently +and independently of conditions. At the same time +that by the laws of thought we are rigorously prevented from +forming a conception of absolute existence, we are by the +laws of thought equally prevented from ridding ourselves +of the consciousness of absolute existence: this consciousness +being, as we here see, the obverse of our self-consciousness." +Now, by comparing this extract with the other, which it immediately +follows, it seems plain that Mr. Spencer uses as +synonymous the phrases "consciousness of the unconditioned," +"unconditioned consciousness," "raw material of +thought," "undifferentiated substance of consciousness," and +"consciousness of absolute existence." Let us note, now, +certain conclusions, which seem to follow from this use of +language. We are conscious "of absolute existence." No +person can be conscious except he is conscious of some state +or condition of his being. Absolute existence is, therefore, +a state or condition of our being. Also this "consciousness +of absolute existence"—as it seems <i>our</i> absolute existence—is +the "raw material of thought." But, again, as was +shown above, this "raw material," this "undifferentiated +substance of consciousness," if it is anything, is consciousness +considered as capacity, and in the logical order before it +becomes, or is, active; and it further appeared that of this +quiescent state we could have no knowledge by experience. +But since the above phrases are synonymous, it follows that +"consciousness of absolute existence" is the "undifferentiated +substance of consciousness," is a consciousness of which we +can have no knowledge by experience, is a consciousness of +which we can have no consciousness. Is this philosophy?<span class="pagenum">[196]</span></p> + +<p>It would be but fair to suppose that there is some fact +which Mr. Spencer has endeavored to express in the language +we are criticizing. There is such a fact, a statement of which +will complete this criticism. Unquestionably, in self-examination, +a man may abstract all "successive mental acts," may +consider himself as he is, in the logical order before he <i>has +experiences</i>. In this he will find "that an ever-present sense +of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence"; or, in +other words, that it is an organic law of our being that there +cannot be an experience without a being to entertain the +experience; and hence that it is impossible for a man to +think or act, except on the assumption that he is. But all +this has nothing to do with a "consciousness of the unconditioned," +or of "absolute existence"; for our existence is +not absolute, and it is <i>our</i> existence of which we are conscious. +The reality and abidingness of <i>our</i> existence is +ground for <i>our</i> experience, nothing more. Even if it were +possible for us to have a consciousness of our state before +any experience, or to actually now abstract all experience, +and be conscious of our consciousness unmodified by any +object, <i>i. e.</i> to be conscious of unconsciousness, this would +not be a "consciousness of absolute existence." We could +find no more in it, and deduce no more from it, than that our +existence was involved in our experience. Such a consciousness +would indeed appear "unconditioned" by the coming +into it of any activity, which would give a form in it; but +this would give us no notion of true unconditionedness—true +"absolute existence." This consciousness, though undisturbed +by any experience, would yet be conditioned, would +have been created, and be dependent upon God for continuance +in existence, and for a chance to come into circumstances, +where it could be modified by experiences, and so +could grow. While, then, Mr. Spencer's theory gives us the +fact of the notion of the necessity of our existence to our +experience, it in no way accounts for the fact of our consciousness +of the unconditioned, be that what it may.<span class="pagenum">[197]</span></p> + +<p>But to return from this considerable digression to the result +which was attained a few pages back, viz: that what Mr. +Spencer calls "<i>indefinite</i> consciousness" is a "<i>definite</i> consciousness" +that we partly know, and are partly ignorant +of the object under consideration. Let this conclusion be +applied to the topic which immediately concerns us,—the +character of God.</p> + +<p>But three suppositions are possible. Either we know +nothing of God, not even that he is; or we have a partial +knowledge of him, we know that he is, and all which we can +logically deduce from this; or we know him exhaustively. +The latter, no one pretends, and therefore it needs no notice. +The first, even if our own arguments are not deemed satisfactory, +has been thoroughly refuted by Mr. Spencer, and so is +to be set aside. Only the second remains. Respecting this, +his position is that we know that God is and no more. Admit +this for a moment. We are conscious then of a positive, certain, +inalienable knowledge that God is; but that with reference +to any and all questions which may arise concerning +him we are in total ignorance. Here, again, it is apparent +that it is not our consciousness or knowledge that is vague; +it is our ignorance.</p> + +<p>We might suggest the question—of what use can it be to +man to know that God is, and be utterly and necessarily, yea, +organically ignorant of what he is? Let the reader answer +the question to his own mind. It is required to show how +the theory advocated in this book will appear in the light of +the second hypothesis above stated.</p> + +<p>Man knows that God is, and what God is so far as he can +logically deduce it from this premiss; but, in so far as God +is such, that he cannot be thus known, except wherein he +makes a direct revelation to us, he must be forever inscrutable. +To illustrate. If the fact that God is, be admitted, it +logically follows that he must be self-existent. Self-existence +is a positive idea in the Reason, and so here is a second +element of knowledge respecting the Deity. Thus we may<span class="pagenum">[198]</span> +go on through all that it is possible to deduce, and the system +thus wrought will be The Science of Natural Theology, a +science as pure and sure as pure equations. Its results will +be what God must be. Looking into the Universe we will +find what must be corresponding with what is, and our knowledge +will be complete. Again, in many regards God may be +utterly inscrutable to us, since he may possess characteristics +which we cannot attain by logical deductions. For instance, +let it be granted that the doctrine of the Trinity is true—that +there are three persons in one Godhead. This would be a +fact which man could never attain, could never make the +faintest guess at. He might, unaided, attain to the belief that +God would forgive; he might, with the profound and sad-eyed +man of Greece, become convinced that some god must +come from heaven to lead men to the truth; but the notion +of the Trinity could never come to him, except God himself +with carefulness revealed it. Respecting those matters of +which we cannot know except by revelation, this only can +be demanded; and this by inherent endowment man has a +right to demand; viz: that what is revealed shall not contradict +the law already "written in the heart." Yet, once +more, there are certain characteristics of God that must forever +be utterly inscrutable to every created being, and this, +because such is their nature and relation to the Deity, that +one cannot be endowed with a faculty capable of attaining +the knowledge in question. Such for instance are the questions, +How is God self-existent, how could he be eternal, +how exercise his power, and the like? These are questions +respecting which no possible reason can arise why we should +know them, except the gratification of curiosity, which in +reality is no reason at all, and therefore the inability in +question is no detriment to man.</p> + +<p>By the discussion which may now be brought to a close, +two positions seem to be established. 1. That we have, as +Mr. Spencer affirms, a positive consciousness that the absolute +Being is, and that this and all which we can logically deduce<span class="pagenum">[199]</span> +from this are objects of knowledge to us; in other words, +that the system advocated in this volume directly follows +from that premiss. 2. That any doctrine of "indefinite +consciousness" is erroneous, that the vagueness is not in +consciousness, but in our knowledge; and further, that +the hypothesis of a consciousness of the "raw material of +thought" is absurd.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2 id="THE_RECONCILIATION">"THE RECONCILIATION."</h2> + +<p>It would naturally seem, that, after what is believed to be +the thorough refutation of the limitist scheme, which has been +given in the preceding comments on Mr. Spencer's three +philosophical chapters, the one named in our heading would +need scarce more than a notice. But so far is this from being +the case, that some of the worst features in the results of his +system stand out in clearest relief here. Before proceeding +to consider these, let us note a most important admission. +He speaks of his conclusion as bringing "the results of +speculation into harmony with those of common sense," and +then makes the, for him, extraordinary statement, "Common +Sense asserts the existence of reality." In these two remarks +it would appear to be implied that Common Sense is a final +standard with which any position most be reconciled. The +question instantly arises, What is Common Sense? The +writer has never seen a definition, and would submit for the +reader's consideration the following.</p> + +<p>Common Sense <i>is the practical Pure Reason</i>; it is that +faculty by which the spiritual person sees in the light of consciousness +the <i>a priori</i> law as inherent in the fact presented +by the Sense.</p> + +<p>For the sake of completeness its complement may be +defined thus:</p> + +<p>Judgment is the practical Understanding; it is that faculty<span class="pagenum">[200]</span> +by which the spiritual person selects such means as he thinks +so conformed to that law thus intuited, as to be best suited to +accomplish the object in view.</p> + +<p>A man has good Common Sense, who quickly sees the +informing law in the fact; and good judgment, who skilfully +selects and adapts his means to the circumstances of the case, +and the end sought. Of course it will not be understood +that it is herein implied that every person who exercises +this faculty has a defined and systematic knowledge of it.</p> + +<p>The reader will readily see the results which directly follow +from Mr. Spencer's premiss. It is true that "Common Sense +asserts the existence of a reality," and this assertion is true; +but with equal truth does it assert the law of logic; that, if +a premiss is true, <i>all that is logically involved in it is true</i>. +It appears, then, that Mr. Spencer has unwittingly acknowledged +the fundamental principle of what may be called the +Coleridgian system, the psychological fact of the Pure Reason, +and thus again has furnished a basis for the demolition of his +own.</p> + +<p>It was said above that some of the evil results of Mr. +Spencer's system assumed in this chapter their worst phases. +This remark is illustrated in the following extract: "We are +obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of +some Power by which we are acted upon; phenomena being, +so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are +obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent; and criticism +teaches us that this Power is wholly incomprehensible. In this +consciousness of an Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power +we have just that consciousness on which Religion dwells. +And so we arrive at the point where Religion and Science +coalesce." The evils referred to may be developed as follows: +"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a +manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon." +This may be expressed in another form thus: Every phenomenon +is a manifestation of some Power by which we are +acted upon. Some doubt may arise respecting the precise<span class="pagenum">[201]</span> +meaning of this sentence, unless the exact signification of the +term phenomenon be ascertained. It might be confined to +material appearances, appreciable by one of the five senses. +But the context seems to leave no doubt but that Mr. Spencer +uses it in the wider sense of every somewhat in the Universe, +since he speaks of "phenomena" as "unlimited." Putting +the definition for the term, the sentence stands: Every somewhat +in the Universe is "a manifestation of some Power +by which we are acted upon." It follows, then, that there is +no somewhat in the Universe, except we are acted upon by +it. Our being arises to be accounted for. Either we began +to be, and were created, or the ground of our being is in +ourselves, our being is pure independence, and nothing further +is to be asked. This latter will be rejected. Then we were +created. But we were not created by Mr. Spencer's "some +Power," because it only <i>acts upon us</i>. In his creation, man +was not acted upon, because there was no man to be acted +upon; but in that act a being was originated <i>who might be +acted upon</i>. Then, however, we came into being, another +than "some Power" was the cause of us. But the act of +creating man was a somewhat. Every somewhat <i>in</i> the +Universe is "a manifestation of some Power." This is not +such a manifestation. Therefore the creation of man took +place outside the Universe. Or does Mr. Spencer prefer to +say that the creation of man is "a manifestation of some +Power acting upon" him!</p> + +<p>The position above taken seems the more favorable one +for Mr. Spencer. If, to avoid the difficulties which spring +from it, he limits the term phenomenon, as for instance to +material appearances, then his assertion that phenomena are +unlimited is a contradiction, and he has no ground on which +to establish the omnipresence of his Power.</p> + +<p>But another line of criticism may be pursued. Strictly +speaking, all events are phenomena. Let there be named an +event which is universally known and acknowledged, and +which, in the nature of the case, cannot be "a manifestation<span class="pagenum">[202]</span> +of some Power by which we are acted upon," and in that +statement also will the errors of the passage under consideration +be established. The experience by the human +soul of a sense of guilt, of a consciousness of ill-desert, is +such an event. No "Power" can make a sinless soul feel +guilty; no "Power" <i>can relieve a sinful soul from feeling +guilty</i>. The feeling of guilt does not arise from the defiance +of Power, <i>it arises from the violation of Law</i>. And not only +may this experience be named, but every other experience +of the moral nature of man. In this connection let it be +observed that Mr. Spencer always elsewhere uses the term +phenomenon to represent material phenomena in the material +universe. Throughout all his pages the reader is challenged +to find a single instance in which he attempts to account for +any other phenomena than these and their concomitants, the +affections of the intellect in the animal nature. Indeed, so +thoroughly is his philosophy vitiated by this omission, that +one could never learn from anything he has said in these +pages, that man had a moral nature at all, that there were +any phenomena of sin and repentance which needed to be +accounted for. In this, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel +are just as bad as he. Yet in this the Limitists have done +well; it is impossible, on the basis of their system, to render +such an account. To test the matter, the following problem +is presented.</p> + +<p>To account, on the basis of the Limitist Philosophy, for the +fact that the nations of men have universally made public +acknowledgment of their guilt, in having violated the law of +a superior being; and that they have offered propitiatory +sacrifices therefor, except in the case of those persons and +nations who have received the Bible, or have learned through +the Koran one of its leading features, that there is but one +God, and who in either case believe that the needful sacrifice +has already been made.</p> + +<p>Another pernicious result of the system under examination +is, that it affords no better ground for the doctrine of Deity's<span class="pagenum">[203]</span> +omnipresence than <i>experience</i>. Mr. Spencer's words are: +"phenomena being, <i>so far as we can ascertain</i>, unlimited in +their diffusion, we are obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent." +Now, if he, or one of his friends, should happen to +get wings some day, and should just take a turn through space, +and should happen also to find a limit to phenomena, and, +skirting in astonishment along that boundary, should happen +to light upon an open place and a bridge, which invited them +to pass across to another sphere or system of phenomena, made +by another "Power,"—said bridge being constructed "'alf +and 'alf" by the two aforesaid Powers,—then there would +be nothing to do but for the said explorer to fly back again +to England, as fast as ever he could, and relate to all the +other Limitists his new experience; and they, having no +ground on which to argue against or above experience, must +needs receive the declaration of their colaborator, with its +inevitable conclusion, that the Power by which we are here +acted upon is limited, and so is not omnipresent. But when, +instead of such a fallacious philosophy, men shall receive the +doctrine, based not upon human experience, but upon God's +inborn ideas that phenomena are limited and God is omnipresent, +and that upon these facts experience can afford no +decision, we shall begin to eliminate the real difficulties of +philosophy, and to approach the attainment of the unison +between human philosophy and the Divine Philosophy.</p> + +<p>Attached to the above is the conclusion reached by Mr. +Spencer in an earlier part of his work, that "criticism teaches +us that this Power is wholly incomprehensible." We might, +it is believed, ask with pertinence, What better, then, is man +than the brute? But the subject is recurred to at this time, +only to quote against this position a sentence from a somewhat +older book than "First Principles," a book which, did +it deserve no other regard than as a human production, would +seem, from its perfect agreement with the facts of human +nature, to be the true basis for all philosophy. The sentence +is this: "Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of<span class="pagenum">[204]</span> +God; and every one that loveth, is born of God, <i>and</i> +<span class="smcap">knoweth God</span>."</p> + +<p>But the gross materialism of Mr. Spencer's philosophy presents +its worst phase in his completed doctrine of God. Mark. +A "phenomenon" is "a manifestation of some Power." "In +this consciousness of an Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power +we have just that consciousness on which Religion dwells. +And so we arrive at the point where Religion and Science +coalesce." An "Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power" is +all the Deity Mr. Spencer allows to mankind. This Power +is omnipresent, so that we can never escape it; and incomprehensible, +so that we can never know the law of its +action, or even if it have a law. At any moment it may +fall on us and crush us. At any moment this globe may +become one vast Vesuvius, and all its cities Herculaneums +and Pompeiis. Of such a Deity the children of men may +either live in continual dread, or in continual disregard; they +may either spend their lives clad in sackcloth, or purple and +fine linen; bread and water may be their fare, or their table +may be spread like that of Dives; by merciless mortification +of the flesh, by scourges and iron chains, they may seek to +propitiate, if possible, this incomprehensible, omnipresent +Power; or, reckless of consequences, they may laugh and +dance and be gay, saying, we know nothing of this Power, +he may crush us any moment, let us take the good of life +while we can. The symbols of such a Deity are the "rough +and ragged rocks," the hills, the snow-crowned mountains +Titan-piled; the avalanche starting with ominous thunder, to +rush with crash and roar and terrible destruction upon the +hapless village beneath it; the flood gathering its waters +from vast ranges of hills into a single valley, spreading into +great lakes, drowning cattle, carrying off houses and their +agonized inhabitants, sweeping away dams, rending bridges +from their foundations, in fine, ruthlessly destroying the little +gatherings of man, and leaving the country, over which its +devastating waters flowed, a mournful desolation; and finally,<span class="pagenum">[205]</span> +perhaps the completest symbol of all may be found in that +collection of the united streams and lakes of tens upon tens +of thousands of miles of the earth's surface, into the aorta of +the world, over the rough, rocky bed of which the crowded +waters rush and roar, with rage and foam, until they come +suddenly to the swift tremendous plunge of Niagara.</p> + +<p>It should be further noticed, that this philosophy is in direct +antagonism with that of the Bible,—that, if Spencerianism +is true, the Bible is a falsehood and cheat. Instead of Mr. +Spencer's "Power," the Bible presents us a doctrine of God +as follows: "And God said unto Moses, <span class="smcap">I am that I am</span>. +And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, +<span class="smcap">I am</span> hath sent me unto you."—<i>Exodus</i> IV. 14. This +declaration, the most highly metaphysical of any but one +man ever heard, all the Limitists, even devout Mr. Mansel, +either in distinct terms, or by implication, deny. That other +declaration is this: "Beloved, let us love one another: for +love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, +and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; +<i>for God is love</i>."—1 <i>John</i> IV. 7, 8. Direct as is the antagonism +between the two philosophies now presented, the +later one appears in an especially bad light from the fact, +that, being very recent and supported by a mere handful of +men, its advocates have utterly neglected to take any notice +of the other and elder one, although the adherents of this +may be numbered by millions, and among them have been and +are many of the ablest of earth's thinkers. True, the great +majority of Bible readers do not study it as a philosophical +treatise, but rather as a book of religious and spiritual instruction; +yet, since it is the most profoundly philosophical +book which has ever been in the hands of man, and professedly +teaches us not only the philosophy of man, but also +the philosophy of God, it certainly would seem that the advocates +of the new and innovating system should have taken +up that one which it sought to supplant, and have made an +attempt, commensurate with the magnitude of the work before<span class="pagenum">[206]</span> +them, to show its position to be fallacious and unworthy +of regard. Instead of this they have nowhere recognized the +existence even of this philosophy except in the single instance +of a quotation by Mr. Mansel, in which he seems tacitly to acknowledge +the antagonism we have noted. In Mr. Spencer's +volume this neglect is especially noteworthy. Judging from +internal evidence, one would much sooner conclude that it +was written by a Hindu pundit, in a temple of Buddha, than +by an Englishman, in a land of Bibles and Christian churches. +Now, although the Bible may stand in his estimation no +higher than the Bahgavat-Gita, yet the mere fact that it is, +and that it presents a most profound philosophy, which is so +largely received in his own and neighboring nations, made it +imperative upon him not only to take some notice of it, but +to meet and answer it, as we have indicated above.</p> + +<p>Another fault in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, one which he +will be less willing to admit, perhaps, than the above, and, +at the same time, one which will be more likely forcibly to +move a certain class of mind, is, that it is in direct antagonism +to human nature. Not only is the Bible a falsehood and a +cheat, if Mr. Spencer's philosophical system is true, but human +nature is equally a falsehood and a cheat. To specify. +Human nature universally considers God, or its gods, as +persons; or, in other words, all human beings, or at least +with very rare exceptions, spontaneously ascribe personality +to Deity. This position is in no wise negatived by the fact of +the Buddhist priesthood of India, or of a class of philosophical +atheists in any other country. Man is endowed with the +power of self-education; and if an individual sees, in the +religion in which he is brought up, some inconsistency, which +he, thinking it, as it may be, integral, for philosophical reasons +rejects, and all religion with it, he may educate himself into +speculative atheism. But no child is an atheist. Not even +Shelley became such, until he had dashed against some of the +distorted and monstrous <i>human</i> theologies of his day. But +counting all the Buddhists, and all the German atheists, and<span class="pagenum">[207]</span> +all the English atheists, and all the American atheists, and +all other atheists wherever they may be found, they will not +number one tenth of the human race. On what ground can +the unanimity of the other nine tenths be accounted for? +There appears none possible, but that the notion that God is +a person, <i>is organic in human nature</i>. Another equally +universal and spontaneous utterance of mankind is, that there +is a likeness, in some way, between God and man. There +are the grossest, and in many instances most degrading modes +of representing this; but under them all, and through them +all, the indelible notion appears. The unanimity and pertinacity +of this notion, appearing in every part of the globe, +and under every variety of circumstance, and reappearing +after every revolution, which, tearing down old customs and +worships, established new ones, can without doubt only be +accounted for on the precise ground of the other,—that the +notion <i>is organic in man</i>. A third utterance of the human +race, standing in the same category with these two, is, that +the Deity can be propitiated by sacrifice. This also has had +revolting, yea most hideous and unrighteous forms of expression, +even to human sacrifices. But the notion has remained +indestructible through all ages, and must therefore +be accounted for, as have been the others. Over against the +<span class="smcap">I am</span>, which human nature presents and the Bible supports; +over against Him in whose image man and the Bible say +man was created; and over against Him who, those two +still agreeing witnesses also affirm, is moved by his great +heart of Love to have mercy on those creatures who come +to him with repentance, Mr. Spencer gives us, as the result +of <i>Science</i>, an incomprehensible omnipresent <i>Power</i>; only a +Power, nothing more; and that "utterly inscrutable." For +our part, whatever others may do, we will believe in human +nature and the Bible. On the truthfulness of these two +witnesses, as on the Central Rock in the Universe, we plant +ourselves. Here do we find our Gibraltar.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer further says that on the consciousness of this<span class="pagenum">[208]</span> +Power "Religion dwells." Now, so far is this assertion from +according with the fact, that on his hypothesis it is impossible +to account for the presence of religion as a constitutive element +of the human race. Religion was primarily worship, +the reverential acknowledgment, by the sinless creature, of +the authority of the Creator, combined with the adoration of +His absolute Holiness; but since sin has marred the race, it +has been coupled with the offering in some forms of a propitiatory +sacrifice. But if the Deity is only Power; or +equally, if this is all the notion we can form of him, we are +utterly at a loss to find aught in him to worship, much less +can we account for the fact of the religious nature in us, and +most of all are we confounded by the persistent assertion, by +this religions nature, of the personality and mercy of God, +for Power can be neither personal nor merciful.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer proceeds to strengthen as well as he can his +position by stating that "from age to age Science has continually +defeated it (Religion) wherever they have come into +collision, and has obliged it to relinquish one or more of its +positions." In this assertion, also, he manifests either a want +of acquaintance with the facts or a failure to comprehend +their significance. Religion may properly be divided into +two classes.</p> + +<p>1. Those religions which have appeared to grow up spontaneously +among men, having all the errors and deformities +which a fleshly imagination would produce.</p> + +<p>2. The religion of Jesus Christ.</p> + +<p>1. From the three great ideas mentioned above, no Science +has ever driven even the religions of this class. It has, +indeed, corrected many <i>forms of expression</i>, and has sometimes +driven <i>individuals</i>, who failed to distinguish between +the form, and the idea which the form overlies, into a +rejection of the truth itself.</p> + +<p>2. Respecting the religion of Jesus Christ, Mr. Spencer's +remark has no shadow of foundation. Since the beginning +of its promulgation by Jehovah, and especially since the completion<span class="pagenum">[209]</span> +of that promulgation by our Saviour and his apostles, +not one whit of its practical law or its philosophy has been +abated; nay, more, to-day, in these American States, there +may be found a more widespread, thoroughly believed, firmly +held, and intelligent conviction of God's personality, and +personal supervision of the affairs of men, of his Fatherhood, +and of that fatherhood exercised in bringing "order out of +confusion," in so conducting the most terrible of conflicts, that +it shall manifestly redound, not only to the glory of himself, +but to the very best good of man, so manifestly to so great a +good, that all the loss of life, and all the suffering, is felt to +be not worthy to be compared to the good achieved, and that +too <i>most strongly by the sufferers</i>, than was ever before +manifested by any nation under heaven. The truth is, that, +in spite of all its efforts to the contrary, criticism has ever +been utterly impotent to eliminate from human thinking the +elements we have presented. Its utmost triumph has been +to force a change in the form of expression; and in the Bible +it meets with forms of expression which it ever has been, is +now, and ever shall be, as helpless to change as a paralytic +would be to overturn the Himalaya.</p> + +<p>The discussion of the topic immediately in hand may +perhaps be now properly closed with the simple allusion to +a single fact. Just as far as a race of human beings descends +in the gradations of degradation, just so far does it come to +look upon Deity simply as power. African Fetishism is the +doctrine that Deity is an incomprehensible power, rendered +into the form of a popular religion; only the religion stands +one step higher than the philosophy, in that it assumes a sort +of personality for the Power.</p> + +<p>On page 102 the following extract will be found: "And +now observe that all along, the agent which has effected the +purification has been Science. We habitually overlook the +fact that this has been one of its functions. Religion ignores +its immense debt to Science; and Science is scarcely at all +conscious how much Religion owes it. Yet it is demonstrable<span class="pagenum">[210]</span> +that every step by which Religion has progressed from its +first low conception to the comparatively high one it has now +reached, Science has helped it, or rather forced it to take; +and that even now, Science is urging further steps in the +same direction." In this passage half truths are so sweepingly +asserted as universal that it becomes simply untrue. +The evil may be stand under two heads.</p> + +<p>1. It is too philosophical. Mr. Spencer undertakes to be +altogether too profound. Since he has observed that certain +changes for the better have been made in some human +religions, by the study of the natural sciences, he jumps to +the conclusion that religion has been under a state of steady +growth; and of course readily assumes—for there is not a +shadow of other basis for his assertion—that the "first" +"conception" of religion was very "low." This assumption +we utterly deny, and demand of Mr. Spencer his proof. For +ourselves we are willing to come down from the impregnable +fortresses of the Bible upon the common ground of the +Grecian Mythology, and on this do battle against him. In +this we are taught that the Golden Age came <i>first</i>, in which +was a life of spotless purity; after which were the silver and +brazen ages, and the Iron Age in which was crime, and the +"low conception" of religion came <i>last</i>. How marked is the +general agreement of this with the Bible account!</p> + +<p>2. But more and worse may be charged on this passage +than that it is too philosophical. Mr. Spencer constructs his +philosophy first and cuts his facts to match it. This is a +common mistake among men, and which they are unconscious +of. Now the fact is, Science was <i>not</i> "the agent which effected +the purification." Religion owes a very small debt to Science. +Science can never be more than a supplement, "a handmaid" +to Religion. Religion's first position was not a low +one, but nearly the highest. Afterwards it sunk very low; +but men sunk it there. Science never "helped it" or "forced +it" one atom upwards. Science alone only degrades Religion +and gives new wings and hands to crime. This will be<span class="pagenum">[211]</span> +especially manifest to those who remember what Mr. Spencer's +doctrine of Science is. He says: "That even the <i>highest</i> +achievements of Science are resolvable into mental relations +of coexistence and sequence, so coördinated as exactly to +tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that +occur externally." Of course the highest <i>object</i> of Science +will be "<i>truth</i>"; and this, our teacher tells us, "is simply the +accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations." +To interpret. A science of medicine, a science of ablutions, a +science of clothing, a science of ventilation, a science of temperature, +and to some largely, to many chiefly, a science of +<i>cookery</i> do, combined, constitute Science, and the preservation +of the body is its highest attainment. Is this Science "the +agent which has effected the purification of Religion?" What +then is the truth?</p> + +<p>"Lo this have I found, that God hath made man upright; +but they have sought out many inventions."—<i>Eccl.</i> VII. 29. +The first religion was a communion with God. The Creator +taught man, as a father would his children. But when man +sinned, he began to seek out many inventions, and sank to +that awful state of degradation hinted at in the fragmentary +sketches of the popular manners and customs of the times of +Abraham,—<i>Gen.</i> XII. XXV.; which Paul epitomizes with +such fiery vigor in the first chapter of Romans, and which +may be found fully paralleled in our own day. At the proper +time, God took mankind in hand, and began to develop his +great plan for giving purity to religion. So he raised up +Moses, and gave to Israel the Levitical law. Or if Mr. +Spencer shall deny the biblical account of the origin of the +five books of Moses, he at least cannot deny that they have +a being; and, placing them on the same ground of examination +and criticism as Herodotus, that they were written more +than a thousand years before the Christian era. Now mark. +Whoever wrote them, they remained as they were first framed, +and no one of the prophets, who came after, added one new +idea. They only emphasized and amplified "The Law."<span class="pagenum">[212]</span> +So far then as this part of Religion was concerned, Science +never helped a particle. Yea, more, the words to Moses in +the wilderness were never paralleled in the utterances of man +before the Christian era.</p> + +<p>"In the fulness of time God sent his own Son." However +defective was the former dispensation, he, who appeared to +most of the men of his day as only a carpenter's son, declared +to mankind the final and perfect truth. As the system taught +by Moses was not the result of any philosophical developments, +but was incomparably superior to the religion of the +most civilized people of the world, at whose court Moses was +brought up, and was manifestly constructed <i>de novo</i>, and from +some kind of revelation, so this, which the carpenter's son +taught, was incomparably superior to any utterance which +the human soul had up to that time, or has since, made. +It comes forth at once complete and pure. It utters the +highest principles in the simplest language. Indeed, nothing +new was left to say when John finished his writing; and the +canon might well be closed. And since that day, has Religion +advanced? Not a syllable. The purest water is drank at the +old fountain. But it will be said that the cause of Religion +among men has advanced. Very true, but Science did not +advance it. You can yet count the years on your fingers +since men of Science generally ceased to be strenuously hostile +to Religion. Religion, in every instance, has advanced just +where it has gone back, and drank at the old fountains. Who, +then, has purified Religion? God is "the agent which has +effected the purification." God is he to whom Religion owes +"its immense debt," not Science. He it is who has brought +her up to her present high position.</p> + +<p>When, now, we see how completely Mr. Spencer—to use +a commonplace but very forcible phrase—has "ruled God +out of the ring," how impertinent seems his rebuke, administered +a few pages further on, in the passage beginning, +"Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious," +to those who believe that God means what he says, and that<span class="pagenum">[213]</span> +men may know him. These men at least stand on a far +higher plane than he who teaches that an "incomprehensible +omnipresent Power" is all there is for us to worship, and his +words will sound to them like the crackling of thorns under +a pot.</p> + +<p>There does not appear in this chapter any further topic +that has not already been touched upon. With these remarks, +then, the examination of this chapter, and of Mr. Spencer's +First Principles, may be closed.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[214]</span></p> + +<h2 id="CONCLUSION">CONCLUSION.</h2> + +<p>If it has ever been the reader's lot to examine Paley's +"Evidences of Christianity," or the "Sermons of President +Dwight on the Existence of God"; and if he has risen from +their perusal with a feeling of utter unsatisfaction, enduring +the same craving for a sure truth harassing as before, he will +have partly shared the experience which drove the author +forward, until he arrived at the foundation principles of this +treatise. Those works, and all of that class are, for the object +they have in view, worthless; not because the various statements +they make are untrue, not because elegant language and +beauty of style are wanting; but because they are radically +defective in that, their <i>method</i> is irrelevant to the subject in +hand; because in all the arguments that have been or can be +brought forward there is nothing decisive and final; because +the skeptic can thrust the sharp sword of his criticism through +every one of them; because, in fine, the very root of the matter, +their method itself is false, and men have attempted to +establish by a series of arguments what must be ground for +the possibility of an argument, and can only be established by +the opposite, the <i>a priori</i> method. Though the Limitist Philosophy +has no positive value, it has this negative one, that it +has established, by the most thorough-going criticism, the +worthlessness of the <i>a posteriori</i> processes of thought on the +matter in hand. Yea, more, the existence of <i>any</i> spiritual +person cannot be proved in that way. You can prove that +the boy's body climbs the tree; but never that he has a soul. +This is always taken for granted. Lest the author should +appear singular in this view, he would call the attention of +the reader to a passage in Coleridge's writings in which he +at once sets forth the beauty of the style and incompetency<span class="pagenum">[215]</span> +of the logic of Dr. Paley's book. "I have, I am aware, in +this present work, furnished occasion for a charge of having +expressed myself with slight and irreverence of celebrated +names, especially of the late Dr. Paley. O, if I were fond +and ambitious of literary honor, of public applause, how well +content should I be to excite but one third of the admiration +which, in my inmost being, I feel for the head and heart of +Paley! And how gladly would I surrender all hope of contemporary +praise, could I even approach to the incomparable +grace, propriety, and persuasive facility of his writings! But +on this very account, I feel myself bound in conscience <i>to throw +the whole force of my intellect in the way of this triumphal car</i>, +on which the tutelary genius of modern idolatry is borne, +even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels."</p> + +<p>Instead of the method now condemned, there is one taught +us in the Book, and the only one taught us there, which is +open to every human being, for which every human being +has the faculty, and respecting which all that is needed is, +that the person exercise what he already has. The boy could +not learn his arithmetic, except he set himself resolutely to +his task; and no man can learn of God, except he also fulfils +the conditions, except he consecrate himself wholly to the +acquisition of this knowledge, except his soul is poured out +in love to God; "for every one that <i>loveth, is born of God, +and knoweth God</i>." We come then to the knowledge of God +by a direct and immediate act of the soul. The Reason, the +Sensibility, and the Will, give forth their combined and +highest action in the attainment of this knowledge. As an +intellectual achievement, this is the highest possible to the +Reason. She attains then, to the Ultima Thule of all effort, +and of this she is fully conscious. Nor is there awakened +any feverish complaining that there are no more worlds to +conquer. In the contemplation of the ineffable Goodness +she finds her everlasting occupation, and her eternal rest. +Plainly, then, both Reason and Revelation teach but a single, +and that the <i>a priori</i> method, by which to establish for man<span class="pagenum">[216]</span> +the fact of the being of God. Let us buttress this conclusion +with other lines of thought.</p> + +<p>Reader, now that it is suggested to you, does it not seem in +the highest degree improbable, that the most important truths +which can pertain to man, truths which do not concern +primarily the affairs of this life, but of his most exalted life, +the life of the spiritual person as the companion of its Creator, +should be based upon an inferior, less satisfactory, and less +adequate foundation of knowledge, than those of our childhood's +studies, of the arithmetic and the algebra? The boy +who cons the first pages of his arithmetical text-book, soon +learns what he knows to be <i>self-evident</i> truths. He who +should offer to <i>prove</i> the truth of the multiplication-table, +would only expose himself to ridicule. When the boy has +attained to youth, and advanced in his studies, the pages of +the algebra and geometry are laid before him, and he finds +new and higher orders of self-evident truths. Would any +evidence, any argument, strengthen his conviction of the +validity of the axioms? Yea, rather, if one should begin to +offer arguments, would he not instinctively and rightfully +feel that the confession was thereby tacitly made, that self-evidence +was not satisfactory; and would he not, finding his +spontaneous impulse, and his education, so contradictory, be +<i>liable</i> to fall into complete skepticism? If now there be this +spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea, unalterable, yea, universal +conviction respecting matters of subordinate importance, can +it be possible,—I repeat the question, for it seems to carry +with it irresistibly its own and the decisive answer,—can it be +possible that the decisions of questions of the highest moment, +that the knowledge of the principles of our moral being and +of the moral government to which we are amenable, and +most of all of the Governor who is at once Creator, Lawgiver, +and Judge, is not based on at least equally spontaneous, +yea, abiding, yea, unalterable, yea, universal convictions? +And when the teacher seemingly, and may it not with truth +be said <i>actually</i>, distrusting the reliability of such a conviction,<span class="pagenum">[217]</span> +goes about to bolster up his belief, and the belief of his pupil, +in the existence of God, and thereto rakes together, with +painstaking labor, many sticks and straws of evidence, instead +of looking up to the truth which shines directly down upon +him with steady ineffable effulgence, is it at all strange that +the sharper-eyed pupil, keenly appreciating the contradiction +between his spontaneous conviction and his teaching, should +become uncertain which to follow, a doubter, and finally a +confirmed skeptic? If, then, it is incredible that the fundamental +principles of man's moral nature—that to which all +the other elements of his being are subordinate, and for which +they were created—are established on inferior grounds, and +those less satisfactory than the grounds of other principles; +and if, on the other hand, the conviction is irresistible, that +they are established on the highest grounds, and since the +truths of mathematics are also based on the highest ground, +self-evidence, and since there can be none higher than the +highest, it follows that the moral principles of the Universe, +so far as they can be known by man, have <i>precisely the same +foundation of truthfulness as the principles of mathematics—they +are</i> <span class="smcap">self-evident</span>.</p> + +<p>But some good Reader will check at the result now attained +because it involves the position that the human Reason is the +final standard of truth for man. Good reader, this position +is involved, and is true; and for the sake of Christ's religion +it must be taken. The only possible ground for a thoroughly +satisfactory and thoroughly unanswerable Christian Philosophy, +is the principle that <i>The human Reason is the final +standard of truth for man</i>.</p> + +<p>It has been customary for the devout Bible-reader to esteem +that book as his final standard; and to such an extent in +many instances has his reverential regard for it been carried, +that the expression will hardly be too strong for truth, that +it has become an object of worship; and upon the mind of +such a one the above assertion will produce a shock. While +the author would treat with respect every religious feeling,<span class="pagenum">[218]</span> +he would still remind such a person that the Bible is the +moral school-book of the spiritual person in man, which God +himself prepared for man's use, and must in every case be +inferior and subordinate to the being whom it was meant to +educate; and furthermore, that, by the very fact of making +man, God established in him the standard, and the right to +require that this fact be recognized. Mark, God made the +standard and thus established the right. This principle may +be supported by the following considerations:</p> + +<p>1. The church universally has acted upon it; and none +have employed it more vigorously than those who have in +terms most bitterly opposed it. One of the class just referred +to affirms that the Bible is the standard of truth. "Admit," +says a friend standing by, "that it would be if it were what +it purports to be; but what evidence is there that this is the +case." Thereupon the champion presents evidence from the +fathers, and evidence from the book itself; and finally closes +by saying, that such an array of evidence is ample to satisfy +any <i>reasonable</i> man of its truth and validity. His argument +is undoubtedly satisfactory; but if he has not appealed to +a reasonable man, <i>i. e.</i> to the Reason, <i>i. e.</i>, if he has not +acknowledged a standard for <i>the</i> standard, and thus has not +tacitly, unconsciously and yet decisively employed the Reason +as the highest standard of truth, then his conduct has for us +no adequate expression.</p> + +<p>2. Nicodemus and Christ, in express terms, recognized the +validity of this standard. Said the ruler to Christ, "We +know that thou art a teacher come from God: for no man +can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with +him."—<i>John</i> III. 2. In these words, he both recognized +the validity of the standard, and the fact that its requirements +had been met. But decisively emphatic are the words of +our Saviour: "If I had not done among them the works +which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now +have they both seen and hated both me and my Father."—<i>John</i> +XV. 24. As if he had said, "While I appeared among<span class="pagenum">[219]</span> +them simply as a man, I had no right to claim from them a +belief in my mission; but when I had given them adequate +and ample evidence of my heavenly character, when, in a +word, I had by my works satisfied all the rational demands +for evidence which they could make, then no excuse remained +for their rejection of me."</p> + +<p>The doctrine of this treatise, that man may know the truth, +and know God, is one which will never be too largely reflected +upon by the human mind, or too fully illustrated in human +thought. In no better strain can we bring our work to a close +than by offering some reflections on those words of Jesus +Christ which have formed the title of our book.</p> + +<p>"Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, +'If ye continue in my word, <i>then</i> are ye my disciples indeed; +and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you +free.'"—<i>John</i> VIII. 31, 32. Throughout all the acts of +Christ, as recorded in John and especially during the last +days of his life, there may be traced the marks of a super-human +effort to express to the Jews, in the most skilful manner, +the nature and purport of his mission. He appeared to +them a man; and yet it would seem as if the Godhead in +him struggled with language to overcome its infirmities, and +express with perfectest skill his extraordinary character and +work. But "he came unto his own, and his own received +him not." Being then such, even the Divine Man, Jesus +Christ possessed in his own right <i>an absolute and exhaustive +metaphysic</i>. We study out some laws in some of their applications; +he knew all laws in all their applications. In these +his last days he was engaged in making the most profound +and highly philosophical revelations to his followers that one +being ever made to another. Or does the reader prefer to call +them religious? Very well: for here Religion and Philosophy +are identical. Being engaged in such a labor, it is certain +that no merely human teacher ever used words with the careful +balancing, the skilful selection, the certain exactitude, +that Jesus did. Hence in the most emphatic sense may it be<span class="pagenum">[220]</span> +said, that, whether he used figurative or literal language, he +meant just what he said. The terms used in the text quoted +are literal terms, and undoubtedly the passage is to be taken +in its most literal signification. In these words then, in this +passage of the highest philosophical import, is to be found the +basis of the whole <i>a priori</i> philosophy. They were spoken +of the most important truths, those which pertain to the soul's +everlasting welfare; but as the greater includes the less, so +do they include all lesser science. In positive and unmistakable +terms has Christ declared the fact of knowledge. +God knows all truth. In so far as we also know the truth, +in so far are we like him. And mark, this is knowledge, a +purely intellectual act. Love is indeed a <i>condition</i> of the act, +but it is not the very act itself.</p> + +<p>On this subject it is believed that the Christian church has +failed to assert the most accurate doctrine. Too generally +has this knowledge been termed a spiritual knowledge, meaning +thereby, a sort of an impression of happiness made upon +the spiritual sensibility; and this state of bliss has been +represented as in the highest degree desirable. Beyond all +question it is true, that, when the spiritual person, with the +eye of Reason, sees, and thus knows the truth, seeing it and +knowing it because his whole being, will, and intellect is consecrated +to, wrapt in the effort, and he is searching for it as +for hid treasures, there will roll over his soul some ripples of +that ineffable Delight which is a boundless ocean in Deity. +But this state of the Sensibility follows after, and is dependent +upon, the act of love, and the act of knowledge. There should +be, there was made in Christ's mind, a distinction in the +various psychical modifications of him who had sold all that +he had to buy the one pearl. The words of Christ are to be +taken, then, as the words of the perfect philosopher, and the +perfect religionist. Bearing, as he did, the destiny of a world +on his heart, and burdened beyond all utterance by the mighty +load, his soul was full of the theme for which he was suffering, +he could speak to man only of his highest needs and his<span class="pagenum">[221]</span> +highest capabilities. The truth which man may know, then, +is not only eternal,—all truth is eternal,—but it is that +eternal truth most important to him, the <i>a priori</i> laws of the +spiritual person and of all his relations. The what he is, the +why he is, and the what he ought to become, are the objects +of his examination. When, then, a spiritual person has performed +his highest act, the act of unconditional and entire +consecration to the search after the truth, <i>i. e.</i> to God; and +when, having done this he ever after puts away all lusts of +the flesh, he shall in this condition become absorbed, wrapt +away in the contemplation of the truth; then his spiritual eye +will be open, and will dart with its far-glancing, searching +gaze throughout the mysteries of the Universe, and he will +know the truth. Before, when he was absorbed in the pursuit +of the things of Sense, he could see almost no <i>a priori</i> principles +at all, and what he did see, only in their practical +bearing upon those material and transitory things which +perish with their using; but now balancing himself on tireless +pinion in the upper ether, anon he stoops to notice the +largest and highest and most important of those objects which +formerly with so much painful and painstaking labor he +climbed the rugged heights of sense to examine, and having +touched upon them cursorily, to supply the need of the hour, +he again spreads his powerful God-given wings of faith and +love, and soars upward, upward, upward, towards the eternal +Sun, the infinite Person, the final Truth, God. Then does +he come to comprehend, "to <span class="smcap">know</span>, with all saints, what is +the height and depth and length and breadth of the love of +God." Then do the pure <i>a priori</i> laws, especially those of +the relations of spiritual persons, <i>i. e.</i> of the moral government +of God, come full into the field of his vision. Then in +the clear blaze, in the noonday effulgence of the ineffable, +eternal Sun, does he see the Law which binds God as it +binds man,—that Law so terrible in its demands upon him +who had violated it, that the infinite Person himself could +find no other way of escape for sinning man but in sending<span class="pagenum">[222]</span> +"his only-begotten Son into the world." And he who is +lifted up to this knowledge needs no other revelation. All +other knowledge is a child's lesson-book to him. All lower +study is tasteless; all lower life is neglected, forgotten. He +studies forever the pure equations of truth; he lives in the +bosom of God. Such an one may all his life-long have been +utterly ignorant of books. A poor negro on some rice plantation, +he may have learned of God only by the hearing of +the ear, but by one act, in a moment, in the twinkling of an +eye, he has passed all the gradations of earthly knowledge, +and taken his seat on the topmost form in heaven. He +received little instruction from men; but forevermore God +is his teacher.</p> + +<p>This of which we have been speaking is, be it remembered, +no rhapsody of the imagination. It is a simple literal fact +respecting man's intellect. It is the same in kind, though +of far nobler import, as if upon this act of consecration +there should be revealed to every consecrated one, in a sudden +overwhelming burst of light, the whole <i>a priori</i> system of the +physical Universe. This is not so revealed because it is not +essential, and so would only gratify curiosity. The other and +the higher is revealed, because it is essential to man's spiritual +life.</p> + +<p>In the culminating act, then, of a spiritual person, in the +unreserved, the absolute consecration of the whole being to +the search after truth, do we find that common goal to which +an <i>a priori</i> philosophy inevitably leads us, and which the +purest, Christ's, religion teaches us. Thus does it appear that +in their highest idea Philosophy and Religion are identical. +The Rock upon which both alike are grounded is eternal. +The principles of both have the highest possible evidence, +for they are self-evident; and, having them given by the +intuition of the Reason, a man can cipher out the whole +natural scheme of the Universe as he would cipher out a +problem in equations. He has not done it, because he is +wicked; and God has given him the Bible, as the mathematical<span class="pagenum">[223]</span> +astronomy of the moral heavens, as a school-book to +lead him back to the goal of his lost purity.</p> + +<p>How beautiful, then, art thou, O Religion, supernal daughter +of the Deity! how noble in thy magnificent preëminence! +how dazzling in thy transcendent loveliness! Thou sittest +afar on a throne of pearl; thy diadem the Morning Stars, thy +robe the glory of God. Founded is thy throne on Eternity; +and from eternity to eternity all thy laws are enduring truth. +Sitting thus, O Queen, more firmly throned than the snow-capped +mountains, calmer than the ocean's depths, in the +surety of thy self-conscious integrity and truth, thou mayest, +with mien of noblest dignity, in unwavering confidence, throw +down the gauntlet of thy challenge to the assembled doubters +of the Universe.</p> + +<p>It may be that to some minds, unaccustomed to venturing +out fearlessly on the ocean of thought, with an unwavering +trust in the pole-star truth in the human soul, certain of the +positions attained and maintained in this volume will seem to +involve the destruction of all essential distinction between the +Creator and the created. If the universe is a definite and +limited object, some created being may, at some period, come +to know every atom of it. Moreover, if there is a definite +number of the qualities and attributes—the endowments of +Deity, some one may learn the number, and what they are, +and come at length to have a knowledge equal to God's knowledge. +Even if this possibility should be admitted,—which +it is not, for a reason to appear further on,—yet it would in +no way involve that the creature had, in any the least degree, +reduced the difference in <i>kind</i> which subsists between him +and the Creator. A consideration of the following distinctive +marks will, it would seem, be decisive upon this point.</p> + +<p>God is self-existent. His creatures are dependent upon +him. Self-existence is an essential, inherent, untransferable +attribute of Deity; and so is not a possible attainment for +any creature. Every creature is necessarily dependent upon +the Creator every moment, for his continuance in being.<span class="pagenum">[224]</span> +Let him attain ever so high a state of knowledge; let him, if +the supposition were rational, acquire a knowledge equal to +that of Deity; let him be endowed with all the power he could +use, and he would not have made, nor could he make an effort +even, in the direction of removing his dependence upon his +Creator. In the very height of his glory, in the acme of his +attainment, it would need only that God rest an instant, cease +to sustain him, and he would not be, he would have gone out, +as the light goes out on a burner when one turns the faucet.</p> + +<p>Again, the mode by which their knowledge is attained is +different in kind; and the creature never can acquire the +Creator's mode. The Deity possesses his knowledge as a +necessary endowment, given to him at once, by a spontaneous +intuition. Hence he could never learn, for there was no +knowledge which he did not already possess. Thus he is out +of all relation to Time. The creature, on the other hand, +can never acquire any knowledge except through processes; +and, what is more, can never review the knowledge already +acquired, except by a process which occupies a time. This +relation of the creature to Time is organic; and this distinction +between the creature and Creator is thus also irremovable.</p> + +<p>Another organic distinction is that observed in the mode +of seeing ideals. The Divine Reason not only gives ideas, +<i>a priori</i> laws, but it gives all possible images, which those +laws, standing in their natural relations to each other, can +become. Thus all ideals are realized to him, whether the +creative energy goes forth, and power is organized in accordance +therewith, or not. Here again the creature is of the +opposite kind. The creature can never have an idea until he +has been educated by contact with a material universe; and +then can never construct an ideal, except he have first seen +the elements of that ideal realized in material forms. To +illustrate: The infant has no ideas; and there is no radical +difference between the beginning of a human being and any +other created spiritual person. He has a rudimentary Reason,<span class="pagenum">[225]</span> +but it must grow before it can make its presentations, +and the means of its education must be a material system. +Let a spiritual person be created, and set in the Universe, +utterly isolated, with no medium of communication, and it +would stay forever just what it was at the beginning, a dry +seed. The necessity of alliance with a material Universe is +equally apparent in the mature spiritual person. Such a +one cannot construct a single ideal, except he have seen all +the elements already in material forms. He who will attempt +to construct an ideal of any <i>thing</i>, which never has been, as a +griffin, and not put into it any form of animals which have +been on earth, will immediately appreciate the unquestionableness +of this position. Therefore it is that no one can, +"by searching, find out God." The creature can only learn +what the Creator declares to him.</p> + +<p>Still another element of distinction, equally marked and +decisive as those just named, may be mentioned. The Deity +possesses as inherent and immanent endowment Power, or +the ability of himself to realize his ideals in objects. Thus +is he the Creator. If this were not so, there could have +been no Universe, for there was no substance and no one to +furnish a substance but he. The creature, on the other hand, +cannot receive as a gift, neither attain by culture the power +to create. Hence he can only realize his ideals in materials +furnished to his hand. Pigments and brushes and chisels and +marble must be before painters and sculptors can become.</p> + +<p>Each and every one of the distinctions above made is +<i>organic</i>. They cannot be eliminated. In fact their removal +is not a possible object of effort. The creature may <i>wish</i> +them removed; but no line of thought can be studied out by +which a movement can be made towards the attainment of +that wish. It would seem, then, that, such being the facts, the +fullest scope might fearlessly be allowed to the legitimate use +of every power of the creature. Such, it is believed, is God's +design.</p> + +<p class="h3">THE END.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2>Transcriber's Note:</h2> + +<p>Archaic/multiple spellings and punctuation of the original have been maintained.</p> + +</div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Know the Truth; A critique of the +Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation, by Jesse H. 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