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diff --git a/37552.txt b/37552.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..727a123 --- /dev/null +++ b/37552.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3517 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The pragmatic theory of truth as developed +by Peirce, James, and Dewey, by Delton Loring Geyer + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey + +Author: Delton Loring Geyer + +Release Date: September 28, 2011 [EBook #37552] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH *** + + + + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Barbara Tozier and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) + + + + + +THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH AS DEVELOPED BY PEIRCE, JAMES, AND DEWEY + + +BY + + +DENTON LORING GEYER + +B.A. University of Wisconsin, 1910 + +M.A. University of Wisconsin, 1911 + + +THESIS + +Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of + +DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY + +IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS + +1914 + + + + +CONTENTS + + + INTRODUCTION + CHAPTER I. + THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE AS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY PEIRCE + CHAPTER II. + THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO PRAGMATISM BY JAMES + JAMES' EXPOSITION OF PEIRCE + THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE THROUGH THE + EARLIER WRITINGS OF JAMES + THE THEORY OF TRUTH IN 'PRAGMATISM' AND 'THE MEANING OF TRUTH' + _The Ambiguity of 'Satisfaction'_ + _The Relation of Truth to Utility_ + _The Relation of Satisfaction to Agreement and Consistency_ + CHAPTER III. + THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH BY DEWEY + "THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE" + CONTRAST BETWEEN JAMES AND DEWEY + CHAPTER IV. + SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION + BIBLIOGRAPHY + + + + +THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH AS DEVELOPED BY PEIRCE, JAMES, AND +DEWEY. + + + + +INTRODUCTORY. + + +This thesis attempts to trace the growth of the pragmatic doctrine of +truth through the works of its three most famous advocates in America. + +An examination of Peirce's initial statement of pragmatism is followed +by a discussion of his objections to the meaning put upon his doctrine +by his would-be disciples, and his resort, in order to save himself +from these 'perversions', to a renaming of his theory. Some evident +contradictions in his different principles are pointed out. + +The changing position of William James is then followed through +magazine articles and books appearing successively during a period of +about thirty years. One finds here a gradually but continually +widening divergence from the rationalistic theories, which culminates +finally in the much-quoted extreme statements of the book +'Pragmatism'. The few subsequently published references to truth seem +to consist largely of defenses or retractions of the tenets there set +forth. As has been so often said, William James was too sympathetic +toward the doctrines of other men to maintain a consistent doctrine of +his own. His best work, like that of the higher literary type to which +he approached, was to transcribe and interpret the feelings of other +men. His genius lay in the clearness with which he could translate +these ideas and the lucid fashion in which he could cut to the heart +of ambiguities in them. With the highest and most sincere admiration +for the spirit of James' labors in philosophy and psychology, the +writer is unable to find there permanent contributions to the solution +of the particular problem which we have before us here, the problem of +truth. In his splendid protest against all static theories, he seems +to have accepted pragmatism for what it was not rather than for what +it was. It was not a cut-and-dried system leaving no room for +individuality, and that this was one of his strongest reasons for +accepting it is shown by his asking again and again: "If this +(pragmatism) is not truth, what is?" He was attempting to find a +theory--almost any theory, one thinks sometimes--which would serve as +an alternative to the older doctrines so incompatible with his +temperament. + +It is interesting to note that the frequent protests made by Peirce +against the turn given his ideas by his followers are always directed +against the work of James and Schiller, and never, so far as I have +been able to ascertain, against that of Dewey. It therefore seems +worth while to undertake a direct comparison between the views of +Peirce and Dewey. This comparison, then, occupies the latter part of +the thesis, with the result, it may be said at once, that Dewey's work +is found to be very closely related to the original formulation of +pragmatism as made by Peirce. + +The excellent historical sketches of pragmatism which have appeared +during the last five years[1] have been somewhat broader in scope than +the present treatise, for they have usually described the development +of all the pragmatic doctrines in the mass while the emphasis here is +placed on the intensive treatment of a single doctrine, and this +doctrine is followed, moreover, through a limited number of its +expounders. Further, almost all such sketches are taken up for the +most part in showing how pragmatism grew out of the older doctrines or +in contrasting it with various alternative theories while the thing +attempted here is, again, a careful comparison of the views of three +thinkers within the School itself--with of course the writer's own +reaction to these views. It has thus seemed best to undertake no +(necessarily fragmentary) treatment of truth as 'intuition' or +'coherence' or 'correspondence' or the rest. + + [1] See for example an article by Alfred Lloyd on + "Conformity, Consistency, and Truth" in the Journal of + Philosophy for May 22, 1913; also Boodin's Truth and + Reality, Caldwell's Pragmatism and Idealism, De Laguna's + Dogmatism and Evolution, Murray's Pragmatism, Moore's + Pragmatism and Its Critics, and others. + +General criticism of the pragmatic theory of truth, as is evident to +anyone who has followed the controversy, has been principally directed +against the more 'radical' statements of James and Schiller. Whether +this is merely because these champions of the theory are more extreme, +or whether they are really more prone to errors in their reasoning, we +need not determine here. But it is worth pointing out that, on the +other hand, if Peirce and Dewey were to be taken as the truer +representatives of pragmatism a large part of the flood of recent +criticism would be irrelevant. This is by no means to say that the +work of Peirce and Dewey is above criticism; it is merely to call +attention to the fact that most of the criticism of pragmatism is +directed against principles which these two men do not happen to hold. +An understanding of the doctrine in its more conservative terms, +however, is certainly on the increase, and we are seldom nowadays +burdened with refutations of such alleged pragmatism as that anything +is true which it is pleasant to believe or that any theory of +procedure is true which happens to turn out well. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE AS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY PEIRCE. + + +Pragmatism has been described as an attitude of mind, as a method of +investigation, and as a theory of truth. The attitude is that of +looking forward to outcomes rather than back to origins. The method is +the use of actual or possible outcomes of our ideas to determine these +ideas' real meaning. The theory of truth defines the truth of our +beliefs in terms of the outcome of these beliefs. + +Pragmatism as a principle of method, like the Mendelian laws of +heredity, lay for decades in oblivion. It was brought to light and to +the world's notice in 1898 by William James, who by his wonderful +literary style immediately gave it the widest currency. The doctrine +was originally proposed in 1878 by C. S. Peirce in a paper for the +Popular Science Monthly entitled "How To Make Our Ideas Clear." This +article was the second of six on the general topic. "Illustrations of +the Logic of Science." The other articles of the series were +respectively called "The Fixation of Belief," "The Doctrine of +Chances," "The Probability of Induction," "The Order of Nature," and +"Induction, Deduction, and Hypothesis." + +In the famous discussion of How To Make Our Ideas Clear, Peirce +pointed out that by a _clear_ idea is meant, according to the +logicians, one which will be recognized wherever it is met with, so +that no other will be mistaken for it. But since to do this without +exception is impossible to human beings, and since to have such +acquaintance with the idea as to have lost all hesitancy in +recognizing it _in ordinary cases_ amounts only to a subjective +feeling of mastery which may be entirely mistaken, they supplement the +idea of 'clearness' with that of 'distinctness'. A distinct idea is +defined as one that contains nothing which is not clear. By the +_contents_ of an idea logicians understand whatever is contained in +its definition, so that an idea is _distinctly_ apprehended, according +to them, when we can give a precise definition of it, in abstract +terms. Here the professional logicians leave the subject, but it is +easy to show that the doctrine that familiar use and abstract +distinctness make the perfection of apprehension, "has its only true +place in philosophies which have long been extinct", and it is now +time to formulate a method of attaining "a more perfect clearness of +thought such as we see and admire in the thinkers of our own time". + +The action of thought is excited by the irritation of a doubt, and +ceases when belief is attained; so that the production of belief is +the sole function of thought. As thought appeases the irritation of a +doubt, which is the motive for thinking, it relaxes and comes to rest +for a moment when belief is reached. But belief is a rule for action, +and its application requires further thought and further doubt, so +that at the same time that it is a stopping place it is also a new +starting place for thought. The final upshot of thinking is the +exercise of volition. + +"The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different +beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which +they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they +appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no +more differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them +different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is +playing a different tune." + +Imaginary distinctions are made very frequently, it is true, between +beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression. Such false +distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs really +different. "One singular deception of this sort, which often occurs, +is to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of thought +for a character of the object we are thinking. Instead of perceiving +that the obscurity is purely subjective, we fancy that we contemplate +a quality of the object which is essentially mysterious; and if our +conception be afterwards presented to us in a clear form we do not +recognize it as the same, owing to the absence of the feeling of +unintelligibility.... Another such deception is to mistake a mere +difference in the grammatical construction of two words for a +distinction between the ideas they express.... From all these sophisms +we shall be perfectly safe so long as we reflect that the whole +function of thought is to produce habits of action; and that whatever +is connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an +accretion to it, but no part of it". + +"To develop a meaning we have, therefore, simply to determine what +habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it +involves. Now the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us +to act, not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise, +but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable.... +Thus we come down to what is tangible and practical as the root of +every real distinction of thought, no matter how _subtle_ it may be; +and there is no distinction so fine as to consist in anything but a +possible difference in practice". + +As an example, consider the doctrine of transubstantiation. Are the +elements of the sacrament flesh and blood 'only in a tropical sense' +or are they literally just that? Now "we have no conception of wine +except what may enter into a belief either, (1) that this, that, or +the other is wine, or (2) that wine possesses certain properties. Such +beliefs are nothing but self-notifications that we should, upon +occasion, act in regard to such things as we believe to be wine +according to the qualities which we believe wine to possess. The +occasion of such action would be some sensible perception, the motive +of it to produce some sensible result. Thus our action has exclusive +reference to what affects our senses, our habit has the same bearing +as our action, our belief the same as our habit, our conception the +same as our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but +what has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon the senses; and to +talk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet +being in reality blood, is senseless jargon.... Our idea of anything +_is_ our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have +any other, we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation +accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself". + +"It appears, then, that the rule for attaining ... clearness of +apprehension is as follows: _Consider what effects, which might +conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our +conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole +of our conception of the object"._ (Italics mine). + +An application of this method to a conception which particularly +concerns logic occupies the last section of the article,--a use of the +method to make clear our conception of "reality". Considering +clearness in the sense of familiarity, no idea could be clearer than +this, for everyone uses it with perfect confidence. Clearness in the +sense of definition is only slightly more difficult,--"we may define +the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may +think them to be". But however satisfactory this is as a definition, +it does not by any means make our idea of reality perfectly clear. +"Here, then, let us apply our rules. According to them, reality, like +every other quality, consists in the peculiar sensible effects which +things partaking of it produce. The only effect which real things have +is to cause belief, for all the sensations which they excite emerge +into consciousness in the form of beliefs. The question therefore is, +how is true belief (or belief in the real) distinguished from false +belief (belief in fiction)". Briefly this may be answered by saying +that the true belief is the one which will be arrived at after a +complete examination of all the evidence. "That opinion which is fated +to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by +the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real." +(Note: "Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can +nohow be avoided".) The real thus depends indeed upon what is +ultimately thought about it, but not upon what any particular person +thinks about it. This is clearly brought out in contrast to +non-scientific investigation, where personal equation counts for a +great deal more. "It is hard to convince a follower of the _a priori_ +method by adducing facts; but show him that an opinion that he is +defending is inconsistent with what he has laid down elsewhere, and he +will be very apt to retract it. These minds do not seem to believe +that disputation is ever to cease; they seem to think that the opinion +which is natural for one man is not so for another, and that belief +will, consequently, never be settled. In contenting themselves with +fixing their own opinions by a method which would lead another man to +a different result, they betray their feeble hold upon the conception +of what truth is. On the other hand, all the followers of science are +fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed +far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which +they can be applied. One man may investigate the velocity of light by +studying the transits of Venus and the aberration of the stars; +another by the opposition of Mars and eclipses of Jupiter's +satellites; a third by the method of Fizian.... They may at first +obtain different results, but as each perfects his method and his +processes, the results will move steadily together toward a destined +center. So with all scientific research. Different minds may set out +with the most antagonistic views, but the process of investigation +carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same +conclusion". This conclusion, to be sure, may be long postponed, and +might indeed be preceded by a false belief which should be accepted +universally. But "the opinion which would finally result from +investigation does not depend on how anybody may actually think.... +The reality of that which is real does depend on the real fact that +the investigation is destined to lead, at last, if continued long +enough, to a belief in it". + +It will be seen that this article does not intend to put forward any +new theory of truth. It is simply an attempt at expounding a new +theory of clearness. Peirce desires to describe a new way of clearing +up metaphysical disputes, the method, namely, of finding the meaning +of each question by reducing it to its experimental consequences. + +For Peirce a doctrine could be perfectly clear and yet false. This +would be the case where one had a vivid idea of all the outcomes in +experience involved by the idea, but yet was unable to prophesy any +outcome that should be verified by future fact. Our idea of the object +would not in that case 'correspond to the reality' in the sense of +giving us a belief which could be 'verified by all investigators'. + +Peirce, then, instead of having a radical and startling theory of +truth to propose, would consider himself an ultra-conservative on the +question of what shall be called truth. Approaching the matter from +the standpoint of a scientist, (for he says in another connection that +he had at this time spent most of his life in a laboratory), he is +concerned only with an attempt to apply "the fruitful methods of +science" to "the barren field of metaphysics". For metaphysics seems +to him very much in need of outside help. His different conception of +the two disciplines may be seen from the following passage. In +contrast to philosophy, he is eulogizing the natural sciences, "where +investigators, instead of condemning each the work of the others as +misdirected from beginning to end, co-operate, stand upon one +another's shoulders, and multiply incontestable results; where every +observation is repeated, and isolated observations count for little; +where every hypothesis that merits attention is subjected to severe +but fair examination, and only after the predictions to which it leads +have been remarkably borne out by experience is trusted at all, and +then only provisionally; where a radically false step is rarely taken, +even the most faulty of those theories which gain credence being true +in their main experiential predictions". + +It is in a desire to elevate metaphysics to somewhere near this level +that Peirce proposes his new theory of clearness, believing that much +of the useless disputation of philosophy, as he sees it, will end when +we know exactly what we are talking about according to this test. + +On the question of truth he might indeed have referred to another of +his early articles, where the same idea of the independence of truth +from individual opinion is brought out. The much-quoted paper on "How +To Make Our Ideas Clear" was, as we have noted, the second of a series +called "Illustrations of the Logic of Science". In order to get his +doctrine of truth more adequately before us, we may turn for a moment +to the first article of the series, the paper called "The Fixation of +Belief". + +Here Peirce begins by pointing out four methods for fixing belief. In +the first, or 'method of tenacity', one simply picks out the belief +which for some reason he _desires_, and holds to it by closing his +eyes to all evidence pointing the other way. The second, or the +'method of authority', is the same except that the individual is +replaced by the state. The third, or 'a priori method', makes a thing +true when it is 'agreeable to reason'. But this sort of truth varies +between persons, for what is agreeable to reason is more or less a +matter of taste. + +In contrast with these, and especially with the _a priori_ method, a +method must be discovered which will determine truth entirely apart +from individual opinion. This is the method of science. That is, "To +satisfy our doubt ... it is necessary that a method should be found by +which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external +permanency--by something upon which our thinking has no effect.... It +must be something which affects, or might affect, every man. And, +though these affections are necessarily as various as are individual +conditions, yet the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion +of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science. Its +fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: +There are real things whose characters are entirely independent of our +opinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to +regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our +relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of +perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and +any man, if he have sufficient experience, and reason enough about it, +will be led to one true conclusion. The new conception here involved +is that of reality. It may be asked how I know that there are any +realities. If this hypothesis is the sole support of my method of +inquiry, my method of inquiry must not be used to support my +hypothesis. The reply is this: 1. If investigation cannot be regarded +as proving that there are real things, it at least does not lead to a +contrary conclusion; but the method and conception on which it is +based remain ever in harmony. No doubts of the method, therefore, +arise with its practice, as is the case with all the others. 2. The +feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a +dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions. But here already is a +vague concession that there is some _one_ thing to which a proposition +should conform.... Nobody, therefore, can really doubt that there are +realities, or, if he did, doubt would not be a source of +dissatisfaction. The hypothesis, therefore, is one which every mind +admits. So that the social impulse does not cause me to doubt it. 3. +Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and +only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it. 4. +Experience of the method has not led me to doubt it, but, on the +contrary, scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs +in the way of settling opinion. These afford the explanation of my not +doubting the method or the hypothesis which it supposes". (p.12) + +The method of science, therefore, is procedure based on the hypothesis +that there are realities independent of what we may think them to be. +This, it seems, is what Peirce regards as the fundamental principle of +the 'logic of science'. This principle, stated here in the first +paper, is again stated as we have seen, towards the close of the +second paper. There he says again, "All the followers of science are +fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed +far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which +they can be applied.... Different minds may set out with the most +antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by +a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion.... This +great law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. That +opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who +investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in +this opinion is the real. This is the way I would explain reality". +(p.300). + +It is well at this point to call attention to a distinction. It is to +be noticed that in the first paper and in the latter part of the +second he is talking of a method for attaining truth. But in the body +of the second paper he is talking of a method for attaining clearness. +These two should be kept distinct in our minds. The use of the various +methods described for finding the velocity of light were endeavors to +find the truth, not to make our ideas clear. Clearness and truth +Peirce believes to have no invariable connection. He says in ending +the article on "How To Make Our Ideas Clear", "It is certainly +important to know how to make our ideas clear, _but they may be ever +so clear without being true_". (p.302, italics mine.) There are, then, +two methods under consideration: the scientific method for reaching +truth, with its postulate that there are independent realities, and +the logical method for securing clearness, which as he has just +stated, has no necessary connection with truth. + +Now I should like to point out, in criticism, that these two methods +cannot be used together, or rather that the postulate of the +'scientific method' will not endure the test proposed by the 'method +for clearness'. The scientific method postulates a reality unaffected +by our opinions about it. But when we apply the method for clearness +to this reality it seems to vanish. + +The process is this: Peirce, as we will remember, begins his +discussion of the real by defining it as "that whose characters are +independent of what anybody may think them to be." Then passing on to +apply his method for clearness he finds that "reality, like every +other quality, consists in the peculiar sensible effects which things +partaking of it produce", and adds that "the only effects which real +things have is to cause belief, for all the sensations which they +excite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs". Reality is +the sum of its sensible effects, its sensible effects are beliefs, so +reality is a sum of beliefs. + +Now, reality cannot be the sum of _all_ beliefs regarding the real, +because reality is defined in another connection as the object +represented by a _true_ opinion, and a true opinion is that which is +fated to be agreed to after an investigation is complete. Reality then +can consist only in certain selected beliefs. But if reality is this +set of ultimately-adopted beliefs, what is truth itself? For truth has +been defined as the beliefs which will be ultimately adopted. + +In other words, when Peirce applies his method for clearness to the +concept of reality, he reduces reality to truth. He identifies the +two. Then there remains no independent realty which stands as a +_check_ on truth. And this was the postulate of his method of science. + +Since the application of his own method for clearness eliminates +reality, it looks as though Peirce must abandon either this method or +the postulate of science. He cannot use both the method for clearness +and the postulate of the method of science. + +We must remember that Peirce was a pioneer in this movement. And in +making the transition from the older form of thought, he occasionally +uses a word both in the old sense and in the new. Such would seem to +be his difficulty with the word 'reality', which he uses both in the +newer sense which the method for clearness would show it to have, and +in the old orthodox sense of something absolute. When he says "reality +... consists of the peculiar sensible effects which things partaking +of it produce", he seems to have the two senses of the word in one +sentence. Reality consists in sensible effects, or it is that which is +produced somehow by means of our senses. But, when things _partake_ of +reality, reality exists in advance and produces those effects. Reality +is conceived both as the things produced and as the producer of these +things. + +A somewhat similar difficulty occurs, as I may point out again in +criticism, in the use of the words 'meaning' and 'belief'. Here the +confusion is caused, not by using a word in two senses, as in the case +of 'reality', but by using both the words 'meaning' and 'belief' in +the same sense. Peirce defines both 'meaning' and 'belief' as a sum of +habits, and indicates no difference between them. + +Thus he says of meaning, "There is no distinction of meaning so fine +as to consist in anything but a possible difference in practice". +(293) "To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine +what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits +it involves". (p. 292). + +But he says similarly of belief, "Belief involves the establishment in +our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, of a habit". "Since +belief is a rule for action, it is a new starting point for thought". +"The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different +beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which +they give rise". (p. 291). + +Now it will be agreed that instead of defining belief and meaning in +terms of the same thing and thus identifying them, we ought sharply to +distinguish between them. To have the meaning of a thing is not at all +the same as to believe in it. Thus one may have clearly in mind the +meaning of centaurs or of fairies or of any of the characters of +mythology without in the slightest degree believing in them. Defining +these things in terms of sensible effects, we could say that we know +their meaning in the sense that we understand which sensible effects +would be involved if they did exist. But to have a belief about them +would mean that we would _expect_ these sensible effects. In other +words, a belief involves the possibility of fulfillment or frustration +of expectation. To believe in anything is therefore a distinct step +beyond understanding it. + +In inserting these theories of reality and of belief in this +discussion of a method for clear apprehension, Peirce is passing +beyond a doctrine of clearness and involving himself in a doctrine of +truth. We have seen that he does not seem to be able to maintain the +postulated reality underlying his description of the scientific method +for attaining truth. And it now seems that he is in equal difficulty +with belief. If _meaning_ is simply a sum of habits, belief is _not_ +simply a sum of habits, for the two are not the same. And if, as we +have said, the quality that distinguishes belief from meaning is the +fact that it involves expectation, then we appear to be on the verge +of a new theory of truth,--a theory saying that truth is simply the +fulfillment of these expectations. + +Such, we may note, is the interpretation that Dewey puts upon the +pragmatic method,--such is the theory of truth that he finds involved +in it. + +The interpretations of pragmatism which came particularly to the +notice of Peirce, however, were those made by James and Schiller, and +against these, we may say here, he made vigorous protest. These he +regarded as perversions of his doctrine. And he was so desirous of +indicating that his own theory of clearness involved for himself no +such developments as these, that, in order to make the distinctions +clear, he renamed his own doctrine. + +His first article of dissent, appearing in The Monist in 1905, was +directed mainly, however, against the looseness of popular usage. He +traces briefly the doctrine's growth. Referring back to his original +statement in 1878, he says of himself that he "framed the theory that +a _conception_, that is, the rational purpose of a word or other +expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the +conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not +result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if +one can define accurately all the conceivably experimental phenomena +which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will +have therein a complete definition of the concept, and _there is +absolutely nothing more in it_. For this doctrine he [Peirce, now +speaking of himself] invented the name of pragmatism.... His word +'pragmatism' has gained general recognition in a generalized sense +that seems to argue power of growth and vitality. The famed +psychologist, James, first took it up, seeing that his 'radical +empiricism' substantially answered to the writer's definition, albeit +with a certain difference in point of view. Next the admirably clear +and brilliant thinker, Mr. Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, casting about for +a more attractive name for the 'anthropomorphism' of his _Riddle of +the Sphinx_, lit, in that most remarkable paper of his on Axioms as +Postulates, upon the designation 'pragmatism', which in its original +sense was in generic agreement with his own doctrine, for which he has +since found the more appropriate specification 'humanism', while he +still retains pragmatism in a somewhat wider sense. So far all went +happily. But at present the word begins to be met with occasionally in +the literary journals, where it gets abused in the merciless way that +words have to expect when they fall into literary clutches. Sometimes +the manners of the British have effloresced in scolding at the word as +ill-chosen--ill-chosen, that is, to express some meaning that it was +rather designed to exclude. So, then, the writer, finding his bantling +'pragmatism' so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child +good-by and relinquish it in its higher destiny; while to serve the +precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to +announce the birth of the word 'pragmaticism', which is ugly enough to +be safe from kidnappers". (pp. 165-6). + +Three years later Peirce published an article of much more outspoken +protest, this time including in his repudiation the professional +philosophers as well as the popularists. Writing for the Hibbert +Journal (v.7) he states his case as follows: + +"About forty years ago my studies of Kant, Berkeley, and others led +me, after convincing myself that all thinking is performed in signs, +and that mediation takes the form of dialogue, so that it is proper to +speak of the 'meaning' of a concept, to conclude that to acquire full +mastery of that meaning it is requisite, in the first place, to learn +to recognize that concept under every disguise, through extensive +familiarity with instances of it. But this, after all, does not imply +any true understanding of it; so that it is further requisite that we +should make an abstract logical analysis of it into its ultimate +elements, or as complete an analysis as we can compass. But even so, +we may still be without any living comprehension of it; and the only +way to complete our knowledge of its nature is to discover and +recognize just what habits of conduct a belief in the truth of the +concept (of any conceivable subject, and under any conceivable +circumstances) would reasonably develop; that is to say, what habits +would ultimately result from a sufficient consideration of such truth. +It is necessary to understand the word 'conduct', here, in the +broadest sense. If, for example, the predication of a given concept +were to lead to our admitting that a given form of reasoning +concerning the subject of which it was affirmed was valid, when it +would not otherwise be valid, the recognition of that effect in our +reasoning would decidedly be a habit of conduct". (p.108). + +After referring to his own expositions he continues, "... But in 1897 +Professor James remodelled the matter, and transmogrified it into a +doctrine of philosophy, some parts of which I highly approved, while +other and more prominent parts I regarded, and still regard, as +opposed to sound logic. About the same time Professor Papirie +discovered, to the delight of the Pragmatist school, that this +doctrine was incapable of definition, which would certainly seem to +distinguish it from every other doctrine in whatever branch of +science, I was coming to the conclusion that my poor little maxim +should be called by another name; and I accordingly, in April 1905, +renamed it Pragmaticism." (p.109). + +"My original essay, having been written for a popular monthly, +assumes, for no better reason than that real inquiry cannot begin +until a state of real doubt arises, and ends as soon as a real Belief +is attained, that a 'settlement of belief', or in other words, a +_state of satisfaction_, is all that Truth, or the aim of inquiry, +consists in. The reason I gave for this was so flimsy, while the +inference was so nearly the gist of Pragmaticism, that I must confess +the argument of that essay might be said with some justice to beg the +question. The first part of the essay is occupied, however, with +showing that, if Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any +_actual_ satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction that would +ultimately be found if the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and +indefeasible issue. This, I beg to point out, is a very different +position from that of Mr. Schiller and the pragmatists of to-day.... +Their avowedly undefinable position, if it be not capable of logical +characterization, seems to me to be characterized by an angry hatred +of strict logic, and even a disposition to rate any exact thought +which interferes with their doctrine as all humbug. At the same time +it seems to me clear that their approximate acceptance of the +Pragmaticistic principle, and even that very casting aside of +difficult distinctions (although I cannot approve of it), has helped +them to a mightily clear discernment of some fundamental truths that +other philosophers have seen but through a mist, or most of them not +at all. Among such truths,--all of them old, of course, yet +acknowledged by few--I reckon their denial of necessitarianism; their +rejection of any 'consciousness' different from a visceral or other +external sensation; their acknowledgment that there are, in a +Pragmatistical sense, Real habits ... and their insistence upon +interpreting all hypostatic abstractions in terms of what they _would_ +or _might_ (not actually _will_) come to in the concrete. It seems to +me a pity that they should allow a philosophy so instinct with life to +become infected with seeds of death in such notions as that of the +unreality of all ideas of infinity and that of the mutability of +truth, and in such confusions of thought as that of active willing +(willing to control thought, to doubt, and to weigh reasons) with +willing not to exert the will (willing to believe)". (pp.111, 112). + +The difference between the position of Peirce and of James may be +stated in another way as constituted by the fact that James introduces +the factor of _value_ as a criterion for meaning and for truth, while +for Peirce these elements did not enter the question at all. For James +the value of a belief is an apparent evidence for its truth, while for +Peirce value had no relation to truth. For an account of this +development of the pragmatic doctrine we pass on now to a discussion +of James. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO PRAGMATISM BY JAMES. + + +James first uses the term 'pragmatism', as Peirce had done, to refer +to a method for attaining clearness. When, in 1898, he brought again +before the public the original article by Peirce, he was simply +expounding the Peircian doctrine without making any attempt to pass +beyond it. But, as we have just seen, he later gave it a construction, +an interpretation as a theory of truth, with which its originator +could not agree. In this chapter we may, therefore, look first at his +exposition of the doctrine of clearness, and after that, in order to +understand James' development of the doctrine into a theory of truth, +we may turn back for a moment to some of his previous publications on +the question of truth. It will then be possible to trace +chronologically his developing attitude toward the truth controversy. +From this we may pass finally to an indication of some of the +difficulties in which he becomes involved. The most important of +these, it may be said again, is that he construes the test of truth of +an idea to be, not merely that the idea leads to expected +consequences, but that it leads to predominantly desirable +consequences. The outcomes which stand as evidence for truth are then +not merely outcomes bringing fulfilled expectations but outcomes +bringing happiness. + + +JAMES' EXPOSITION OF PEIRCE. + +James in expounding the doctrine of Peirce explains the pragmatic +principle as a method of investigating philosophic controversies, +reducing them to essentials (clear meanings), and selecting those +worthy of discussion.[2] "Suppose", he says, "that there are two +different philosophical definitions, or propositions, or maxims, or +what not, which seem to contradict each other, and about which men +dispute. If, by assuming the truth of the one, you can foresee no +practical consequence to anybody, at any time or place, which is +different from what you would foresee if you assumed the truth of the +other, why then the difference between the two propositions is no real +difference--it is only a specious and verbal difference, unworthy of +future contention.... There can _be_ no difference which does not +_make_ a difference--no difference in the abstract truth which does +not express itself in a difference of concrete fact, and of conduct +consequent upon that fact, imposed upon somebody, somehow, somewhere +and somewhen.... The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find +out what definite difference it would make to you and me, at definite +instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be +the one which is true". (p.675). + + [2] "The Pragmatic Method", University of California + Chronicle 1898. Reprinted in Journal of Philosophy, 1904, + v. 1, p. 673. Page references are to the latter. + +This doctrine is illustrated by using it to secure the essence of two +philosophical questions, materialism vs. theism and the one _vs._ the +many. If we suppose for an instant, he suggests, that this moment is +the last moment of the universe's existence, there will be no +_difference_ between materialism and theism. All the effects that +might be ascribed to either have come about. + +"These facts are in, are bagged, are captured; and the good that's in +them is gained, be the atom or be the God their cause." (p. 677). "The +God, if there, has been doing just what the atom could do--appearing +in the character of atoms, so to speak, and earning such gratitude as +is due to atoms, and no more". Future good or ill is ruled out by +postulate. Taken thus retrospectively, there could be no difference +between materialism and theism. + +But taken prospectively, they point to wholly different consequences. +"For, according to the theory of mechanical evolution, the laws of +redistribution of matter and motion, though they are certainly to +thank for all the good hours which our organisms have ever yielded us +and all the ideals which our minds now frame, are yet fatally certain +to undo their work again, and to redissolve everything that they have +evolved.... We make complaint of |materialism| for what it is +_not_--not a permanent warrant for our more ideal interests, not a +fulfiller of our remotest hopes.... Materialism means simply the +denial that the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of +ultimate hopes; theism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order +and the letting loose of hope. Surely here is an issue genuine enough +for anyone who feels it.... + +"[And] if there be a God, it is not likely that he is confined solely +to making differences in the world's latter end; he probably makes +differences all along its course. Now the principle of practicalism +says that that very meaning of the conception of God lies in the +differences which must be made in experience if the conception be +true. God's famous inventory of perfections, as elaborated by dogmatic +theology, either means nothing, says our principle, or it implies +certain definite things that we can feel and do at certain definite +moments of our lives, things that we could not feel and should not do +were no God present and were the business of the universe carried on +by material atoms instead. So far as our conceptions of the Deity +involve no such experiences, they are meaningless and verbal,--scholastic +entities and abstractions, as the positivists say, and fit objects for +their scorn. But so far as they do involve such definite experiences, +God means something for us, and may be real". (pp.678-680). + +The second illustration of the pragmatic principle--the supposed +opposition between the One and the Many--may be treated more briefly. +James suggests certain definite and practical sets of results in which +to define 'oneness', and tries out the conception to see whether this +result or that is what oneness means. He finds this method to clarify +the difficulty here as well as in the previous case. In summarizing he +says: "I have little doubt myself that this old quarrel might be +completely smoothed out to the satisfaction of all claimants, if only +the maxim of Peirce were methodically followed here. The current +monism on the whole still keeps talking in too abstract a way. It says +that the world must either be pure disconnectedness, no universe at +all, or absolute unity. It insists that there is no stopping-place +half-way. Any connection whatever, says this monism, is only possible +if there be still more connection, until at last we are driven to +admit the absolutely total connection required. But this absolutely +total connection either means nothing, is the mere word 'one' spelt +long, or else it means the sum of all the partial connections that can +possibly be conceived. I believe that when we thus attack the +question, and set ourselves to search for these possible connections, +and conceive each in a definite and practical way, the dispute is +already in a fair way to be settled beyond the chance of +misunderstanding, by a compromise in which the Many and the One both +get their lawful rights". (p. 685). + +In concluding, James relates Peirce to the English Empiricists, +asserting that it was they "who first introduced the custom of +interpreting the meaning of conceptions by asking what differences +they make for life.... The great English way of investigating a +conception is to ask yourself right off, 'What is it known as? In what +facts does it result? What is its _cash-value_ in terms of particular +experience? And what special difference would come into the world +according as it were true or false?' Thus does Locke treat the +conception of personal identity. What you mean by it is just your +chain of memories, says he.... So Berkeley with his 'matter'. The +cash-value of matter is just our physical sensations.... Hume does the +same thing with causation. It is known as habitual antecedence.... +Stewart and Brown, James Mill, John Mill, and Bain, have followed more +or less consistently the same method; and Shadworth Hodgson has used +it almost as explicitly as Mr. Peirce.... The short-comings and +negations and the baldnesses of the English philosophers in question +come, not from their eye to merely practical results, but solely from +their failure to track the practical results completely enough to see +how far they extend". (pp. 685-6). + + * * * * * + +It will be at once observed that James, as well as Peirce, is at this +point saying nothing about a new doctrine of truth, but is concerning +himself only with a new doctrine of clearness. Meaning and clearness +of meanings are his only topics in this paper. Thus he states, "The +only _meaning_ of the conception of God lies in the differences which +must be made in experience _if_ the conception be true. God's famous +inventory of perfection ... either _means_ nothing, says our +principle, or it implies certain definite things that we can feel and +do at certain definite moments in our lives". And again in speaking of +the pluralism-monism controversy, "Any connection whatever, says this +monism, is only possible if there be still more connection, until at +last we are driven to admit the absolutely total connection required. +But this absolutely total connection either _means_ nothing, is the +mere word 'one' spelt long, or else it means the sum of all the +partial connections...." + +But as we all know, James did afterward embrace the new pragmatic +theory of truth. While he did not in 1898 use the word pragmatism to +designate anything except a new method for securing clearness, yet it +can be shown that he had been developing another line of thought, +since a much earlier date, which did lead quite directly toward the +pragmatic theory of truth. It may be well at this point then to go +back and trace the growth of this idea of truth through such writing +as he had done before this time. It will be found, I think, that +James' whole philosophic tendency to move away from the transcendental +and unitary toward the particular was influencing him towards this new +conception. + + +DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE THROUGH THE EARLIER WRITINGS OF JAMES. + +The first article which James wrote on truth, as he later states,[3] +was entitled "The Function of Cognition", and was published in _Mind_ +in 1885. Commenting on this article in 1909 he asserts that many of +the essential theses of the book "Pragmatism", published twenty-two +years later, were already to be found here, and that the difference is +mainly one of emphasis.[4] + + [3] "The Meaning of Truth", Preface, p. viii. + + [4] Same, p. 137. + +This article attempts to give a description of knowing as it actually +occurs,--not how it originated nor how it is antecedently possible. +The thesis is that an idea knows an external reality when it points to +it, resembles it, and is able to affect it. The plan of exposition is +to start with the simplest imaginable material and then gradually +introduce additional matter as it is needed until we have cognition as +it actually occurs. James postulates a single, momentarily-existing, +floating feeling as the entire content, at the instant, of the +universe. What, then, can this momentary feeling know? Calling it a +'feeling of _q_', it can be made any particular feeling (fragrance, +pain, hardness) that the reader likes. We see, first, that the feeling +cannot properly be said to know itself. There is no inner duality of +the knower on the one hand and content or known on the other. "If the +content of the feeling occurs nowhere else in the universe outside of +the feeling itself, and perish with the feeling, common usage refuses +to call it a reality, and brands it as a subjective feature of the +feeling's constitution, or at most as the feeling's dream. For the +feeling to be cognitive in the specific sense, then, it must be +self-transcendent". And we must therefore "create a reality outside of +it to correspond to the intrinsic quality _q_". This can stand as the +first complication of that universe. Agreeing that the feeling cannot +be said to know itself, under what conditions does it know the +external reality? James replies, "If the newly-created reality +_resemble_ the feeling's quality _q_, I say that the feeling may be +held by us to be _cognizant of that reality_". It may be objected that +a momentary feeling cannot properly know a thing because it has no +_time_ to become aware of any of the _relations_ of the thing. But +this rules out only one of the kinds of knowledge, namely "knowledge +about" the thing; knowledge as direct acquaintance remains. We may +then assert that "if there be in the universe a _q_ other than the _q_ +in the feeling the latter may have acquaintance with an entity +ejective to itself; an acquaintance moreover, which, as mere +acquaintance it would be hard to imagine susceptible either of +improvement or increase, being in its way complete; and which would +oblige us (so long as we refuse not to call acquaintance knowledge) to +say not only that the feeling is cognitive, but that all qualities _of +feeling, so long as there is anything outside of them which they +resemble_, are feelings of qualities of existence, and perceptions of +outward fact". But this would be true, as unexceptional rule, only in +our artificially simplified universe. If there were a number of +different _q's_ for the feeling to resemble, while it meant only one +of them, there would obviously be something more than resemblance in +the case of the one which it did know. This fact, that resemblance is +not enough in itself to constitute knowledge, can be seen also from +remembering that many feelings which do resemble each other +closely,--e. g., toothaches--do not on that account know each other. +Really to know a thing, a feeling must not only resemble the thing, +but must also be able to act on it. In brief, "the feeling of _q_ +knows whatever reality it resembles, and either directly or indirectly +operates on. If it resemble without operating, it is a dream; if it +operates without resembling, it is an error". Such is the formula for +perceptual knowledge. Concepts must be reduced to percepts, after +which the same rule holds. We may say, to make the formula complete, +"A percept knows whatever reality it directly or indirectly operates +on and resembles; a conceptual feeling, or thought, knows a reality, +whenever it actually or potentially terminates in a percept that +operates on, or resembles that reality, or is otherwise connected with +it or with its context". + +"The latter percept [the one to which the concept has been reduced] +may be either sensation or sensorial idea; and when I say the thought +must _terminate_ in such a percept, I mean that it must ultimately be +capable of leading up thereto,--by way of practical experience if the +terminal feeling be a sensation; by way of logical or habitual +suggestion, if it be only an image in the mind". "These percepts, +these _termini_, these sensible things, these mere matters of +acquaintance, are the only realities we ever directly know, and the +whole history of our thought is the history of our substitution of one +of them for the other, and the reduction of the substitute to the +status of a conceptual sign. Condemned though they be by some +thinkers, these sensations are the mother-earth, the anchorage, the +stable rock, the first and last limits, the _terminus a quo_ and the +_terminus ad quem_ of the mind. To find such sensational termini +should be our aim with all our higher thought. They end discussion; +they destroy the false conceit of knowledge; and without them we are +all at sea with each other's meanings.... We can never be sure we +understand each other till we are able to bring the matter to this +test. This is why metaphysical discussions are so much like fighting +with the air; they have no practical issue of a sensational kind. +Scientific theories, on the other hand, always terminate in definite +percepts. You can deduce a possible sensation from your theory and, +taking me into your laboratory prove that your theory is true of my +world by giving me the sensation then and there". + +At this point James quotes, in substantiation, the following passage +from Peirce's article of 1878: "There is no distinction in meaning so +fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference in +practice.... It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the highest +grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what +effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive +the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these +effects is the whole of our conception of the object." + +In this early paper of James' are to be found foreshadowings of +pragmatism both as a method and as a theory of truth. Pragmatism as a +method is shown in the whole discussion of the primacy of sensations +and of the necessity for reducing conceptions to perceptions. This is +exactly in line with the pragmatism proposed by Peirce in 1878 and +here quoted from by James. Pragmatism as a theory of truth is +anticipated by the proposal that the idea knows, and knows truly, the +reality which it is able to make changes in. The idea _proves_ its +reference to a given reality by making these specified changes. It is +antecedently true only if it can bring about these changes. The next +step is to say that its truth _consists_ in its ability to forecast +and bring to pass these changes. Then we have pragmatism as a theory +of truth. James did not take this step, as we shall see, until after +1904. + +There is also a suggestion of the 'subjectivity' of James' later +theory of truth, which would differentiate him even at this time from +Peirce on the question of truth. He has said that a true idea must +indeed resemble reality, but who, he asks, is to determine what is +real? He answers that an idea is true when it resembles something +which I, as critic, _think_ to be reality. "When [the enquirer] finds +that the feeling that he is studying contemplates what he himself +regards as a reality he must of course admit the feeling itself to be +truly cognitive". Peirce would say that the idea is not true unless it +points to a reality that would be found by _all_ investigators, quite +irrespective of what the _one_ person acting as critic may think. +James and Pierce would therefore, begin to diverge even at this early +date on the truth question. As to what constitutes clearness, they are +in agreement. + +Something of the same idea is stated again four years later in an +article which appeared in Mind[5] and which was republished the +following year as a chapter of the Principles of Psychology.[6] One +passage will show the general trend; "A conception to prevail, must +_terminate_ in a world of orderly experience. A rare phenomenon, to +displace frequent ones, must belong with others more frequent still. +The history of science is strewn with wrecks and ruins of +theory--essences and principles, fluids and forces--once fondly clung +to, but found to hang together with no facts of sense. The exceptional +phenomena solicit our belief in vain until such time as we chance to +conceive of them as of kinds already admitted to exist. What science +means by 'verification' is no more than this, that _no object of +conception shall be believed which sooner or later has not some +permanent object of sensation for its term_.... Sensible vividness or +pungency is then the vital factor in reality when once the conflict +between objects, and the connecting of them together in the mind, has +begun." (Italics mine). + + [5] "The Psychology of Belief", Mind 1889, v. 14, p. 31. + + [6] Vol. II, chapter XXI. + +And in another connection he expresses the idea as follows: +"Conceptual systems which neither began nor left off in sensations +would be like bridges without piers. Systems about fact must plunge +themselves into sensations as bridges plunge themselves into the rock. +Sensations are the stable rock, the _terminus a quo_ and the _terminus +ad quem_ of thought. To find such termini is our aim with all our +theories---to conceive first when and where a certain sensation may be +had and then to have it. Finding it stops discussion. Failure to find +it kills the false conceit of knowledge. Only when you deduce a +possible sensation for me from your theory, and give it to me when and +where the theory requires, do I begin to be sure that your thought has +anything to do with truth." (11:7). + +In 1902 James contributed to the "Dictionary of Philosophy and +Psychology" published by J. Mark Baldwin the following definition for +Pragmatism. + +"The doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses +itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of +conduct to be recommended, or in that of experience to be expected, if +the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it +were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the +meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second +conception should not appear to have either consequences, then it must +really be only the first conception under a different name. In +methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective +consequences is an admirable way of establishing the different +meanings of different conceptions". + +It will be seem that James has not in 1902 differentiated between +pragmatism as a method and as a theory of truth. Leaving out the one +reference to truth, the definition is an excellent statement of the +Peircian doctrine of clearness. This is especially to be noticed in +the last two sentences, which are perfectly 'orthodox' statements of +method alone. + +In 1904 and 1905 James published two papers in Mind on the truth +question. The first, "Humanism and Truth", may be called his +'border-line' article. In this he is attempting to give a sympathetic +interpretation of the humanistic theory of truth--which he later said +is exactly like his own--but is still making the interpretation as an +outsider. In the second article he has definitely embraced the +humanistic theory and is defending it. + +The first article begins as follows:[7] "Receiving from the editor of +Mind an advance proof of Mr. Bradley's article for July on 'Truth and +Practice', I understand this as a hint to me to join in the +controversy over 'Pragmatism' which seems to have seriously begun. As +my name has been coupled with the movement, I deem it wise to take the +hint, the more so as in some quarters greater credit has been given me +than I deserve, and probably undeserved discredit in other quarters +falls also to my lot. + + [7] Mind, N. S. 13, p. 457. + +"First, as to the word 'pragmatism'. I myself have only used the term +to indicate a method of carrying on abstract discussion. The serious +meaning of a concept, says Mr. Peirce, lies in the concrete difference +to someone which its being true will make. Strive to bring all debated +questions to that 'pragmatic' test, and you will escape vain +wrangling: if it can make no practical difference which of two +statements be true, then they are really one statement in two verbal +forms; if it can make no practical difference whether a given +statement be true or false, then the statement has no real meaning. In +neither case is there anything fit to quarrel about; we may save our +breath, and pass to more important things. + +"All that the pragmatic method implies, then, is that truths should +_have_ practical consequences. In England the word has been used more +broadly, to cover the notion that the truth of any statement consists +in the consequences, and particularly in their being good +consequences. Here we get beyond affairs of method altogether; and +since this pragmatism and the wider pragmatism are so different, and +both are important enough to have different names, I think that Mr. +Schiller's proposal to call the wider pragmatism by the name of +'Humanism' is excellent and ought to be adopted. The narrower +pragmatism may still be spoken of as the 'pragmatic method'. + +"If further egotism be in order. I may say that the account of truth +given by Messrs. Sturt and Schiller and by Professor Dewey and his +school ... goes beyond any theorizing which I personally had ever +indulged in until I read their writings. After reading these, _I feel +almost sure that these authors are right in their main contentions_, +but the originality is wholly theirs, and I can hardly recognize in my +own humble doctrine that concepts are teleological instruments +anything considerable enough to warrant my being called, as I have +been, the 'father' of so important a movement forward in +philosophy".[8] (Italic mine). + + [8] This paragraph appears as a footnote. + +"I think that a decided effort at a sympathetic mental play with +humanism is the provisional attitude to be recommended to the reader. + +"_When I find myself playing sympathetically with humanism_, something +like what follows is what I end by conceiving it to mean". (Italics +mine). + +Such is the conservative tone in which the article is begun. Yet +before it is ended we find these passages: "It seems obvious that the +pragmatic account of all this routine of phenomenal knowledge is +accurate". (p.468). "The humanism, for instance, which I see and try +so hard to defend, is the completest truth attained from my point of +view up to date". (p.472). + +In a supplementary article, "Humanism and Truth Once More", published +a few months later in answer to questions prompted by this one, the +acceptance of humanism is entirely definite. And here James finds that +he has been advocating the doctrine for several years. He says, "I +myself put forth on several occasions a radically pragmatist account +of knowledge". (Mind, v. 14, p. 196). And again he remarks, "When +following Schiller and Dewey, I define the true as that which gives +the maximal combination of satisfaction ...". (p.196). + + +THE THEORY OF TRUTH IN 'PRAGMATISM' AND 'THE MEANING OF TRUTH'. + +In 1907 when he published his book "Pragmatism", James, as we all +know, was willing to accept the new theory of truth unreservedly. The +hesitating on the margin, the mere interpreting of other's views, are +things of the past. From 1907 James' position toward pragmatism as a +truth-theory is unequivocal. + +Throughout the book, as I should like to point out, James is using +'pragmatism' in two senses, and 'truth' in two senses. The two +meanings of pragmatism he recognizes himself, and points out clearly +the difference between pragmatism as a method for attaining clearness +in our ideas and pragmatism as a theory of the truth or falsity of +those ideas. But the two meanings of 'truth' he does not distinguish. +And it is here that he differs from Dewey, as we shall presently see. +He differed from Peirce on the question of the meaning of +pragmatism--as to whether it could be developed to include a doctrine +of truth as well as of clearness. He differs from Dewey on the +question of 'truth'--as to whether truth shall be used in both of the +two specified senses or only in one of them. + +_The Ambiguity of 'Satisfaction'_--The double meaning of truth in +James' writing at this date may be indicated in this way: While truth +is to be defined in terms of satisfaction, what is satisfaction? Does +it mean that I am to be satisfied _of_ a certain quality in the idea, +or that I am to be satisfied _by_ it? In other words, is the criterion +of truth the fact that the idea leads as it promised or is it the fact +that its leading, whether just as it promised or not, is desirable? +Which, in short, are we to take as truth,--fulfilled expectations or +value of results? + +It is in failing to distinguish between these two that James involves +himself, I believe, in most of his difficulties, and it is in the +recognition and explicit indication of this difference that Dewey +differentiates himself from James. We may pass on to cite specific +instances in which James uses each of these criteria. We will find, of +course, that there are passages which can be interpreted as meaning +either value or fulfillment, but there are many in which the use of +value as a criterion seems unmistakable. + +The following quotations may be instanced: "If theological views prove +to have value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in +the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, +will depend entirely on their relation to the other truths that have +also to be acknowledged". For example, in so far as the Absolute +affords comfort, it is not sterile; "it has that amount of value; it +performs a concrete function. I myself ought to call the Absolute true +'in so far forth', then; and I unhesitatingly now do so". (p.72). + +"On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works +satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now +whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it +certainly does work, and that the problem is to build out and +determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other +working truths". (p. 299). + +"The true is the name for whatever proves itself to be good in the way +of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons". (p. 76). + +"Empirical psychologists ... have denied the soul, save as the name +for verifiable cohesions in our inner life. They redescend into the +stream of experience with it, and cash it into so much small-change +value in the way of 'ideas' and their connections with each other. The +soul is good or '_true_' for just so much, but no more". (p. 92, +italics mine). + +"Since almost any object may some day become temporarily important, +the advantage of having a stock of extra truths, of ideas that shall +be true of merely possible situations, is obvious.... Whenever such +extra truths become practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it +passes from cold storage to do work in the world and our belief in it +grows active. You can say of it then either that _'it is useful +because it is true' or that it is 'true because it is useful'_. _Both +these phrases mean exactly the same thing_.... From this simple cue +pragmatism gets her general notion of truth as something essentially +bound up with the way in which one moment in our experience may lead +us towards other moments _which it will be worth while to have been +led to_. Primarily, and on the common-sense level, the truth of a +state of mind means this function of _a leading that is worth while_". +(pp. 204-205, italics mine). + +"To 'agree' in the widest sense with reality can only mean to be +guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put +into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something +connected with it better than if we disagreed. _Better either +intellectually or practically!..._ An idea that helps us to deal, +whether _practically or intellectually_, with either reality or its +belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that +fits, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, +will----hold true of that reality". (pp. 212-213). + +"'The true', to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way +of our thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in the way +of our behaving. _Expedient in almost any fashion_; and expedient in +the long run and on the whole of course". (p. 222). + +We may add a passage with the same bearing, from "The Meaning of +Truth". In this quotation James is retracting the statement made in +the University of California Address that without the future there is +no difference between theism and materialism. He says: "Even if matter +could do every outward thing that God does, the idea of it would not +work as satisfactorily, because the chief call for a God on modern +men's part is for a being who will inwardly recognize them and judge +them sympathetically. Matter disappoints this craving of our ego, and +so God remains for most men the truer hypothesis, and indeed remain so +for definite pragmatic reasons". (p. 189, notes). + +The contrast between 'intellectual' and 'practical' seems to make his +position certain. If truth is tested by practical workings, _as +contrasted with_ intellectual workings, it cannot be said to be +limited to fulfilled expectation. + +The statement that the soul is good _or_ true shows the same thing. +The relation of truth to extraneous values is here beyond question. +The other passages all bear, more or less obviously, in the same +direction. + +As James keeps restating his position, there are many of the +definitions that could be interpreted to mean either values or +fulfillments, and even a few which seem to refer to fulfillment alone. +The two following examples can be taken to mean either: + +"'Truth' in our ideas and beliefs means ... that ideas (which +themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far +as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of +our experience, to summarize them and get about among them by +conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession +of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; +any idea that will carry us prosperously from one part of our +experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working +securely, simplifying, saving labor, is true for just so much, true in +so far forth, true instrumentally". (p.58). + +"A new opinion counts as true just in proportion as it gratifies the +individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his +beliefs in stock. It must both lean on old truth and grasp new fact; +and its success ... in doing this, is a matter for individual +appreciation. When old truth grows, then, by new truth's addition, it +is for subjective reasons. We are in the process and obey the reasons. +The new idea is truest which performs most felicitously its function +of satisfying this double urgency. It makes itself true, gets itself +classed as true, by the way it works." (p.64). + +But we can turn from these to a paragraph in which truth seems to be +limited to fulfilled expectations alone. + +"True ideas are those which we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, +and verify. False ideas are those which we cannot. That is the +practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, +therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known +as.... + +"But what do validation and verification themselves pragmatically +mean? They again signify certain practical consequences of the +verified and validated idea.... They head us ... through the acts and +other ideas which they instigate, into or up to, or towards, other +parts of experience with which we feel all the while ... that the +original ideas remain in agreement. The connections and transitions +come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, +satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an +idea's verification". (pp.201-202). + +_The Relation of Truth to Utility_--It seems certain from the +foregoing that James means, at least at certain times, to define the +true in terms of the valuable. Satisfaction he is using as +satisfaction _by_ rather than satisfaction _of_. As we have pointed +out, one may be satisfied of the correctness of one's idea without +being at all satisfied by it. This distinction has been most clearly +set forth by Boodin, in his discussion of 'What pragmatism is not', in +the following words: "The truth satisfaction may run counter to any +moral or esthetic satisfaction in the particular case. It may consist +in the discovery that the friend we had backed had involved us in +financial failure, that the picture we had bought from the catalogue +description is anything but beautiful. But we are no longer uncertain +as regards the truth. Our restlessness, so far as that particular +curiosity is concerned, has come to an end".[9] + + [9] Boodin: Truth and Reality, pp. 193-4. + +It is clear then, that the discovery of truth is not to be identified +with a predominantly satisfactory state of mind at the moment. Our +state of mind at the moment may have only a grain of satisfaction, yet +this is of so unique a kind and so entirely distinguishable from the +other contents of the mind that it is perfectly practicable as a +criterion. It is simply "the cessation of the irritation of a doubt", +as Peirce puts it, or the feeling that my idea has led as it promised. +The feeling of fulfilled expectation is thus a very distinct and +recognizable _part_ of the whole general feeling commonly described as +'satisfaction'. When 'utility' in our ideas, therefore, means a +momentary feeling of dominant satisfaction, truth cannot be identified +with it. + +And neither, as I wish now to point out, can truth be identified with +utility when utility means a long-run satisfactoriness, or +satisfactoriness of the idea for a considerable number of people +through a considerable period of time. The same objection arises here +which we noted a moment ago--that the satisfaction may be quite +indifferent to the special satisfaction arising from tests. As has +been often shown, many ideas are satisfactory for a long period of +time simply because they are _not_ subjected to tests. "A hope is not +a hope, a fear is not a fear, once either is recognized as +unfounded.... A delusion is delusion only so long as it is not known +to be one. A mistake can be built upon only so long as it is not +suspected". + +Some actual delusions which were not readily subjected to tests have +been long useful in this way. "For instance, basing ourselves on +Lafcadio Hearn, we might quite admit that the opinions summed up under +the title 'Ancestor-Worship' had been ... 'exactly what was required' +by the former inhabitants of Japan". "It was good for primitive man to +believe that dead ancestors required to be fed and honored ... because +it induced savages to bring up their offspring instead of letting it +perish. But although it was useful to hold that opinion, the opinion +was false". "Mankind has always wanted, perhaps always required, and +certainly made itself, a stock of delusions and sophisms".[10] + + [10] Lee: Vital Lies, vol. 1, pp. 11, 31, 33, 72. + +Perhaps we would all agree that the belief that 'God is on our side' +has been useful to the tribe holding it. If has increased zeal and +fighting efficiency tremendously. But since God can't be on both +sides, the belief of one party to the conflict is untrue, no matter +how useful. To believe that (beneficial) tribal customs are enforced +by the tribal gods is useful, but if the tribal gods are non-existent +the belief is false. The beautiful imaginings of poets are sometimes +useful in minimizing and disguising the hard and ugly reality, but +when they will not test out they cannot be said because of their +beauty or desirability to be true. + +We must conclude then, that some delusions are useful. And we may go +on and question James' identification of truth and utility from +another point of view. Instead of agreeing that true ideas and useful +ideas are the same, we have shown that some useful ideas are false: +but the converse is also demonstrable, that some true ideas are +useless. + +There are formulas in pure science which are of no use to anyone +outside the science because their practical bearings, if such there +be, have not yet been discovered, and are of no use to the scientist +himself because, themselves the products of deduction, they as yet +suggest nothing that can be developed farther from them. While these +formulas may later be found useful in either of these senses--for +'practical demands' outside the science, or as a means to something +else within the science--they are now already true quite apart from +utility, because they will test out by fulfilling expectations. + +Knowledge that is not useful is most striking in relation to 'vice'. +One may have a true idea as to how to lie and cheat, may know what +cheating is and how it is done, and yet involve both himself and +others in most _un_satisfactory consequences. The person who is +attempting to stop the use of liquor, and who to this end has located +in a 'dry' district, may receive correct information as to the +location of a 'blind-tiger'--information which while true may bring +about his downfall. Knowledge about any form of vice, true knowledge +that can be tested out, may upon occasion be harmful to any extent we +like. + +We may conclude this section by citing a paragraph which will show the +fallacious reasoning by which James came to identify the truth and the +utility of ideas. At one point in replying to a criticism he says: "I +can conceive no other objective _content_ to the notion of an ideally +perfect truth than that of penetration into [a completely +satisfactory] terminus, nor can I conceive that the notion would ever +have grown up, or that true ideas would ever have been sorted out from +false or idle ones, save for the greater sum of satisfactions, +intellectual or practical, which the truer ones brought with them. Can +we imagine a man absolutely satisfied with an idea and with all his +relations to his other ideas and to his sensible experiences, who +should yet _not_ take its content as a true account of reality? The +_matter_ of the true is thus absolutely identical with the matter of +the satisfactory. You may put either word first in your way of +talking; but leave out that whole notion of satisfactory working or +leading (which is the essence of my pragmatic account) and call truth +a static, logical relation, independent even of possible leadings or +satisfactions, and it seems to me that you cut all ground from under +you". (Meaning of Truth, p. 160).[11] + + [11] It is interesting to see that Peirce had the + following comment to make in 1878 upon the utility of truth. + "Logicality in regard to practical matters is the most + useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore, + result from the action of natural selection; but outside of + these it is probably of more advantage to the animal to have + his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, + independently of their truth; and thus upon impractical + subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious + tendency of thought". (From the first article in the series + "Illustrations of the Logic of Science", Popular Science + Monthly, vol. 12, p. 3). + +Now it is to be observed that this paragraph contains at least three +logical fallacies. In the first sentence there is a false assumption, +namely that 'all that survives is valuable'. 'Then', we are given to +understand, 'since true ideas survive, they must be valuable'. No +biologist would agree to this major premise. 'Correlation' preserves +many things that are not valuable, as also do other factors. + +In the second sentence there is an implied false conversion. The +second sentence says, in substance, that all true ideas are +satisfactory (valuable). This is supposed to prove the assertion of +the first sentence, namely, that all satisfactory (valuable) ideas are +true. + +In the last sentence there is a false disjunction. Truth, it is +stated, must either be satisfactory (valuable) working, or a static +logical relation. We have tried to show that it may simply mean +reliable working or working that leads as it promised. This may be +neither predominantly valuable working nor a static logical relation. + +_The Relation of Satisfaction to Agreement and Consistency._--James +continually reasserts that he has 'remained an epistemological +realist', that he has 'always postulated an independent reality', that +ideas to be true must 'agree with reality', etc.[12] + + [12] For example, in the Meaning of Truth, pages 195 and 233. + +Reality he defines most clearly as follows: + +"'Reality' is in general what truths have to take account of.... + +"The first part of reality from this point of view is the flux of our +sensations. Sensations are forced upon us.... Over their nature, order +and quantity we have as good as no control.... + +"The second part of reality, as something that our beliefs must also +take account of, is the _relations_ that obtain between their copies +in our minds. This part falls into two sub-parts: (1) the relations +that are mutable and accidental, as those of date and place; and (2) +those that are fixed and essential because they are grounded on the +inner nature of their terms. Both sorts of relation are matters of +immediate perception. Both are 'facts'.... + +"The third part of reality, additional to these perceptions (tho +largely based upon them), is the _previous truths_ of which every new +inquiry takes account". (Pragmatism, p. 244). + +An idea's agreement with reality, or better with all those parts of +reality, means a satisfactory relation of the idea to them. Relation +to the sensational part of reality is found satisfactory when the idea +leads to it without jar or discord. "... What do the words +verification and validation themselves pragmatically mean? They again +signify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated +idea. It is hard to find any one phrase that characterizes these +consequences better than the ordinary agreement-formula--just such +consequences being what we have in mind when we say that our ideas +'agree' with reality. They lead us, namely, through the acts and other +ideas which they instigate, into and up to, or towards, other parts of +experience with which we feel all the while ... that the original +ideas remain in agreement. The connections and transitions come to us +from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. +This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's +verification". (Pragmatism, pp. 201-2). + +An idea's relation to the other parts of reality is conceived more +broadly. Thus pragmatism's "only test of probable truth is what works +best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and +combines with the collectivity of life's demands, nothing being +omitted. If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in +particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny +God's existence? She could see no meaning in treating as 'not true' a +notion that was pragmatically so successful. What other kind of truth +could there be, for her, than all this _agreement with concrete +reality_"? (Pragmatism, p. 80, italics mine). Agreement with reality +here means ability to satisfy the sum of life's demands. + +James considers that this leaves little room for license in the choice +of our beliefs. "Between the coercions of the sensible order and those +of the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly". "Our (any) +theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new +experiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as +little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or +other that can be verified exactly. To 'work' means both these things; +and the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any +hypothesis. Our theories are thus wedged and controlled as nothing +else is". "Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees +himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from +the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so +well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under which +our minds perform their operations". (Pragmatism, pp. 211, 217, 233). + +Now on the contrary it immediately occurs to a reader that if reality +be simply "what truths have to take account of", and if +taking-account-of merely means agreeing in such a way as to satisfy +"the collectivity of life's demands", then the proportion in which +these parts of reality will count will vary enormously. One person may +find the 'previous-truths' part of reality to make such a strong +'demand' that he will disregard 'principles' or reasoning almost +entirely. + +Another may disregard the 'sensational' part of reality, and give no +consideration whatever to 'scientific' results. These things, in fact, +are exactly the things that do take place. The opinionated person, the +crank, the fanatic, as well as the merely prejudiced, all refuse to +open their minds and give any particular consideration to such kinds +of evidence. There is therefore a great deal of room for license, and +a great deal of license practiced, when the agreement of our ideas +with reality means nothing more than their satisfactoriness to our +lives' demands. + +How James fell into this error is shown, I believe, by his +overestimation of the common man's regard for truth, and especially +for consistency. Thus he remarks: "As we humans are constituted in +point of fact, we find that to believe in other men's minds, in +independent physical realities, in past events, in eternal logical +relations, is satisfactory.... Above all we find _consistency_ +satisfactory, consistency between the present idea and the entire rest +of our mental equipment...." "After man's interest in breathing +freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates +or remits, as most of his physical interests do), is his interest in +_consistency_, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he +thinks on other occasions". (Meaning of Truth, pp. 192, 211). + +The general method of James on this point, then, is to define truth in +terms of satisfaction and then to try to show that these satisfactions +cannot be secured illegitimately. That is, that we _must_ defer to +experimental findings, to consistency, and to other _checks_ on +opinion. Consistency must be satisfactory because people are so +constituted as to find it so. Agreement with reality, where reality +means epistemological reality, is satisfactory for the same reason. +And agreement with reality, where reality includes in addition +principles and previous truths, must be satisfactory because agreement +in this case merely means such taking-account-of as will satisfy the +greater proportion of the demands of life. In other words, by defining +agreement in this case in terms of satisfactions, he makes it certain +that agreement and satisfaction will coincide by the device of arguing +in a circle. It turns out that, from over-anxiety to assure the +coincidence of agreement and satisfaction, he entirely loses the +possibility of using reality and agreement with reality in the usual +sense of checks on satisfactions. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH BY DEWEY. + + +The position of Dewey is best represented in his paper called "The +Experimental Theory of Knowledge".[13] In the method of presentation, +this article is much like James' account "The Function of Cognition". +Both assume some simple type of consciousness and study it by +gradually introducing more and more complexity. In aim, also, the two +are similar, for the purpose of each is simply to describe. Dewey +attempts here to tell of a knowing just as one describes any other +object, concern, or event. "What we want", he announces "is just +something which takes itself for knowledge, rightly or wrongly". + + [13] Mind, N. S. 15, July 1906. Reprinted in "The Influence + of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays", p. 77. + Page references are to the latter. + +Let us suppose, then, that we have simply a floating odor. If this +odor starts changes that end in picking and enjoying a rose, what sort +of changes must these be to involve some where within their course +that which we call knowledge? + +Now it can be shown, first, that there is a difference between knowing +and mere presence in consciousness. If the smell is simply displaced +by a felt movement, and this in turn is displaced by the enjoyment of +the rose, in such a way that there is no experience of connection +between the three stages of the process,--that is, without the +appearance of memory or anticipation,--then "such an experience +neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge". "Acquaintance is +presence honored by an escort; presence is introduced as familiar, or +an association springs up to greet it. Acquaintance always implies a +little friendliness; a trace of re-knowing, of anticipatory welcome or +dread of the trait to follow.... To be a smell (or anything else) is +one thing, to be _known_ as a smell, another; to be a 'feeling' is one +thing, to be _known_ as a 'feeling' is another. The first is +thinghood; existence indubitable, direct; in this way all things _are_ +that are in 'consciousness' at all. The second is _reflected_ being, +things indicating and calling for other things--something offering the +possibility of truth and hence of falsity. The first is genuine +immediacy; the second (in the instance discussed) a pseudo-immediacy, +which in the same breath that it proclaims its immediacy smuggles in +another term (and one which is unexperienced both in itself and in its +relation) the subject of 'consciousness', to which the immediate is +related.... To be acquainted with a thing is to be assured (from the +standpoint of the experience itself) that it is of such and such a +character; that it will behave, if given an opportunity, in such and +such a way; that the obviously and flagrantly present trait is +associated with fellow traits that will show themselves if the leading +of the present trait is followed out. To be acquainted is to +anticipate to some extent, on the basis of previous experience". (pp. +81, 82). + +Besides mere existence, there is another type of experience which is +often confused with knowledge,--a type which Dewey calls the +'cognitive' as distinct from genuine knowledge or the 'cognitional'. +In this experience "we retrospectively attribute intellectual force +and function to the smell". This involves memory but not anticipation. +As we look back from the enjoyment of the rose, we can say that in a +sense the odor meant the rose, even though it led us here blindly. +That is, if the odor suggests the finding of its cause, without +specifying what the cause is, and if we then search about and find the +rose, we can say that the odor meant the rose in the sense that it +actually led to the discovery of it. "Yet the smell is not cognitional +because it did not knowingly intend to mean this, but is found, after +the event, to have meant it". (p. 84). + +Now, "before the category of confirmation or refutation can be +introduced, there must be something which _means_ to mean something". +Let us therefore introduce a further complexity into the illustration. +Let us suppose that the smell occurs at a later date, and is then +"aware of something else which it means, which it intends to effect by +an operation incited by it and without which its own presence is +abortive, and, so to say, unjustified, senseless". Here we have +something "which is contemporaneously aware of meaning something +beyond itself, instead of having this meaning ascribed to it by +another at a later period. _The odor knows the rose_, _the rose is +known by the odor_, and the import of each term is constituted by the +relationship in which it stands to the other". (p. 88). This is the +genuine 'cognitional' experience. + +When the odor recurs 'cognitionally', both the odor and the rose are +present in the same experience, though both are not present in the +same way. "Things can be presented as absent, just as they can be +presented as hard or soft". The enjoyment of the rose is present as +_going_ to be there in the same way that the odor is. "The situation +is inherently an uneasy one--one in which everything hangs upon the +performance of the operation indicated; upon the adequacy of movement +as a connecting link, or real adjustment of the thing meaning and the +thing meant. Generalizing from this instance, we get the following +definition: An experience is a knowledge, if in its quale there is an +experienced distinction and connection of two elements of the +following sort: one means or intends the presence of the other in the +same fashion in which it itself is already present, while the other is +that which, while not present in the same fashion, must become present +if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be +fulfilled through the operation it sets up". (p. 90). + +Now in the transformation from this tensional situation into a +harmonious situation, there is an experience either of fulfilment or +disappointment. If there is a disappointment of expectation, this may +throw one back in reflection upon the original situation. The smell, +we may say, seemed to mean a rose, yet it did not in fact lead to a +rose. There is something else which enters in. We then begin an +investigation. "Smells may become the object of knowledge. They may +take, _pro tempore_, the place which the rose formerly occupied. One +may, that is, observe the cases in which the odors mean other things +than just roses, may voluntarily produce new cases for the sake of +further inspection; and thus account for the cases where meanings had +been falsified in the issue; discriminate more carefully the +peculiarities of those meanings which the event verified, and thus +safeguard and bulwark to some extent the employing of similar meanings +in the future". (p. 93). When we reflect upon these fulfilments or +refusals, we find in them a quality "quite lacking to them in their +immediate occurrence as just fulfilments and disappointments",--the +quality of affording assurance and correction. "Truth and falsity are +not properties of any experience or thing, in and of itself or in its +first intention; but of things where the problem of assurance +consciously enters in. Truth and falsity present themselves as +significant facts only in situations in which specific meanings and +their already experienced fulfilments and non-fulfilments are +intentionally compared and contrasted with reference to the question +of the worth, as to the reliability of meaning, of the given meaning +or class of meanings. Like knowledge itself, truth is an experienced +relation of things, and it has no meaning outside of such relation". +(p. 95). + +Though this paper is by title a discussion of a theory of knowledge, +we may find in this last paragraph a very clear relating of the whole +to a theory of truth. If we attempt to differentiate in this article +between knowledge and truth, we find that while Dewey uses 'knowledge' +to refer either to the prospective or to the retrospective end of the +experimental experience, he evidently intends to limit truth to the +retrospective or confirmatory end of the experience. When he says, +"Truth and falsity are not properties of any experience or thing in +and of itself or in its first intention, but of things where the +problem of assurance consciously enters in. Truth and falsity present +themselves as significant facts only in situations in which specific +meanings and their already experienced fulfilments are intentionally +compared and contrasted with reference to the question of the worth, +as to reliability of meaning, of the given meaning or class of +meanings", it seems that truth is to be confined to retrospective +experience. The truth of an idea means that it allows one at its +fulfilment to look back at its former meaning and think of it as now +confirmed. The difference between knowledge and truth is then a +difference in the time at which the developing experience is examined. +If one takes the experience at the appearance of the knowing odor, he +gets acquaintance; if one takes it at the stage at which it has +developed into a confirmation, he gets truth. Knowledge may be either +stage of the experience of verification, but truth is confined to the +later, confirmatory, stage. + +Truth, then, is simply a matter of confirmation of prediction or of +fulfilment of expectation. An idea is made true by leading as it +promised. And an idea is made false when it leads to refutation of +expectation. There seems to be no necessity here for an absolute +reality for the ideas to conform to, or 'correspond' to, for truth is +a certain kind of relation between the ideas themselves--the relation, +namely, of leading to fulfilment of expectations. + + +CONTRAST BETWEEN JAMES AND DEWEY. + +If, now, we wish to bring out the difference between the account of +truth which we have just examined and the account that is given by +James, we will find the distinction quite evident. Truth, for Dewey, +is that relation which arises when, at an experience of fulfilment, +one looks back to the former experience and thinks of its leading as +now confirmed. An idea is true, therefore, when we can refer back to +it in this way and say, "That pointing led me to this experience, as +it said it would". The pointing, by bringing a fulfilment, is _made_ +true--at this point of confirmation it _becomes_ true. + +Since a true idea is defined, then, as one which leads as it promised, +it is obvious that truth will not be concerned in any way with +incidental or accidental _values_ which might be led to by the idea. +It has no relation to whether the goal is _worth while_ being led to +or not. James speaks of truth as a leading that is worth while. For +Dewey the goal may be valuable, useless, or even pernicious,--these +are entirely irrelevant to truth, which is determined solely by the +fact that the idea leads _as it promised_. + +The existence of this distinction was pointed out, after the +appearance of James' "Pragmatism", by Dewey himself.[14] After a +careful discussion of some other points of difference, he says of this +matter of the place of the value of an idea in reference to its truth: +"We have the theory that ideas as ideas are always working hypotheses +concerning attaining particular empirical results, and are tentative +programs (or sketches of method) for attaining them. If we stick +consistently to this notion of ideas, only consequences which are +actually produced by the working of the idea in cooperation with, or +application to, prior realities are good consequences in the specific +sense of good which is relevant to establishing the truth of an idea. +This is, at times, unequivocally recognized by Mr. James.... But at +other times any good that flows from acceptance of a belief is treated +as if it were an evidence, _in so far_, of the truth of the idea. This +holds particularly when theological notions are under consideration. +Light would be thrown upon how Mr. James conceives this matter by +statements from him on such points as these: If ideas terminate in +good consequences, but yet the goodness of the consequence was no part +of the intention of the idea, does the goodness have any verifying +force? If the goodness of consequences arises from the context of the +idea rather than from the idea itself, does it have any verifying +force? If an idea leads to consequences which are good in the _one_ +respect only of fulfilling the intent of the idea, (as when one drinks +a liquid to test the idea that it is a poison), does the badness of +the consequences in every other respect detract from the verifying +force of these consequences? + + [14] "What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical?", + Journal of Philosophy, etc., 1908, v. 5, p. 85. + +"Since Mr. James has referred to me as saying 'truth is what gives +satisfaction' (p. 234), I may remark ... that I never identified _any_ +satisfaction with the truth of an idea, save _that_ satisfaction which +arises when the idea as working hypothesis or tentative method is +applied to prior existences in such a way as to fulfil what it +intends.... + +"When he says ... of the idea of an absolute, 'so far as it affords +such comfort it surely is not sterile, it has that amount of value; it +performs a concrete function. As a good pragmatist I ought to call the +absolute true _in so far forth_ then; and I unhesitatingly now do so', +the doctrine seems to be unambiguous: that _any_ good, consequent upon +acceptance of belief, is, in so far forth, a warrant for truth. Of +course Mr. James holds that this 'in so far' goes a very small way.... +But even the slightest concession, is, I think, non-pragmatic unless +the satisfaction is relevant to the idea as intent. Now the +satisfaction in question comes not from the _idea as idea_, but from +its acceptance _as true_. Can a satisfaction dependent upon an +assumption that an idea is already true be relevant to testing the +truth of an idea? And can an idea, like that of the absolute, which, +if true, 'absolutely' precludes any appeal to consequences as test of +truth, be confirmed by use of the pragmatic test without sheer +self-contradiction"?[15] "An explicit statement as to whether the +carrying function, the linking of things, is satisfactory and +prosperous and hence true in so far as it executes the intent of the +idea; or whether the satisfaction and prosperity reside in the +material consequences on their own account and in that aspect make the +idea true, would, I am sure, locate the point at issue and economize +and fructify future discussion. At present pragmatism is accepted by +those whose own notions are thoroughly rationalistic in make-up as a +means of refurbishing, galvanizing, and justifying those very notions. +It is rejected by non-rationalists (empiricists and naturalistic +idealists) because it seems to them identified with the notion that +pragmatism holds that the desirability of certain beliefs overrides +the question of the meaning of the idea involved in them and the +existence of objects denoted by them. Others (like myself) who believe +thoroughly in pragmatism as a method of orientation as defined by Mr. +James, and who would apply the method to the determination of the +meaning of objects, the intent and worth of ideas as ideas, and to the +human and moral value of beliefs, when these problems are carefully +distinguished from one another, do not know whether they are +pragmatists or not, because they are not sure whether the 'practical', +in the sense of the desirable facts which define the worth of a +belief, is confused with the practical as an attitude imposed by +objects, and with the practical as a power and function of idea to +effect changes in prior existences. Hence the importance of knowing +what pragmatism means by practical.... + + [15] The last four sentences appear in a footnote. + +"I would do Mr. James an injustice, however, to stop here. His real +doctrine, I think, is that a belief is true when it satisfies _both_ +the personal needs _and_ the requirements of objective things. +Speaking of pragmatism, he says, 'Her only test of probable truth is +what works best in the way of _leading us_, what fits every part of +life best _and combines with the collectivity of experience's +demands_, nothing being omitted'. And again, 'That new idea is truest +which performs most felicitously its function of satisfying _our +double urgency_'. (p. 64). It does not appear certain from the context +that this 'double urgency' is that of the personal and the objective +demands, but it is probable.... On this basis, the 'in so far forth' +of the truth of the absolute because of the comfort it supplies, means +that _one_ of the two conditions which need to be satisfied has been +met, so that if the absolute met the other one also it would be quite +true. I have no doubt that this is Mr. James' meaning, and it +sufficiently safeguards him from charges that pragmatism means that +anything that is agreeable is true. At the same time, I do not think, +in logical strictness, that satisfying one of two tests, when +satisfaction of both is required, can be said to constitute a belief +true even 'in so far forth'". + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. + + +Writing as a scientist and publishing his work in a scientific +journal, Peirce proposed in 1878 a new method for making our ideas +clear. He was attempting a description of the logic of the sciences. +He believed himself to be showing how the greatest of our modern +thinkers do make clear to themselves their ideas of the objects with +which they work. The meaning of anything, said Peirce, consists in the +actual or possible effects which it might produce. Our idea of the +thing is clear when we have in mind these sensible effects. This +theory of clearness he called pragmatism. + +No one, it seems, paid any especial attention to this theory at the +time. But twenty years later James brought the subject to the +forefront of discussion by explaining it anew in his exceptionally +lucid way and by making a particular application of it to religion. +But for James the method for clearness very soon grew into a new +theory of truth, and in this way, in spite of the fact that the method +had been proposed by a scientist as a description of the procedure of +science, he seems to have lost for it the support of science. The +reason for this outcome was his introduction of value as a criterion +for truth. This, James recognizes, was counter to all the scientific +ideals of many of the workers in science, for the essence of their +procedure, as they saw it, was to put all desire as to outcomes behind +them and to try to find out how things actually prove or test out to +be, quite apart from how we would like them to be. To introduce the +general value of an outcome, then, as a criterion for truth, seems to +destroy what the scientist had been thinking of as 'pure research', +and to involve control by an outside influence that would determine +which things are or are not valuable and worth investigating. It was +sufficiently well known to the scientist that most of the greatest +scientific discoveries were made by men who had no appreciation or +interest in the general utility of the outcome, and whose results were +applied only much later and, as it were, by accident. To say, then, +that the truth of an idea was influenced by its general value was to +run afoul of all the sorely sensitive ideals which the scientist had +acquired in his recent contest with the domination of the church. It +is hardly to be wondered at, therefore, that the interpretation of +pragmatism given by James was not popular with persons of a scientific +temperament. + +Further, if the value or desirability of an idea has an influence upon +its truth, then truth will vary from person to person, for +desirability varies with the taste of the person concerned. Peirce had +warned against individual standards of truth in his discussion of the +Methods of Fixing Belief. The scientific conception, as it had +differentiated itself from other conceptions of truth, had attempted +to secure a kind of truth not determined by what we would like or by +what can be made to seem desirable by oratory or by what can be made +to win out over other opinions by skill in debate, but by some +criterion quite apart from desire and opinion. Peirce had attempted +such a criterion in his postulate of an unchanging eternal reality. +Instead, that is, of consulting with each other, of debating with each +other to find the truth, we ought to consult this reality. In other +words, to undertake scientific experiment. Such had been Peirce's +description of the scientific and modern method of attaining truth as +contrasted, as he says, with that of the medievalists. + +Now the difficulty in Peirce's method, as we have seen, was that this +postulate of an external reality unaffected by our opinions would not +endure the test for clearness. Every object, says Peirce, reduces to +the sum of its effects. The only effect of real things, he says again, +is to produce belief. From these two propositions it would seem to +follow that reality is a sum of beliefs. But this, of course, +eliminates any unchanging reality independent of our opinions about +it. + +We saw further that Peirce defined both belief and meaning as habit +and made no distinction between them. Now as belief and meaning are +obviously not the same, we are in need of new definitions for these +terms. + +At this point we turned to the interpretation of Dewey. For Dewey the +distinction would seem to be that while meaning may well be defined as +habit, belief is to be defined as expectation. If we believe in +anything, this means that we expect certain results from it. To +believe is to suppose that if we were to come into relation with the +thing we would find certain effects to come about. + +From this conception the Deweyan theory of truth would seem to follow +immediately. If belief means a sum of expectations, the truth of a +belief would mean the verification of these expectations. A true +belief simply means one that fulfils expectations. + +The Deweyan development of the pragmatic method is obviously very much +more in harmony with the procedure of science than that of James. +James seems to have 'left the track' in his interpretation of the +pragmatic method when he related truth to the predominantly valuable. +Truth we have found to have no necessary or invariable connection with +general value, for many ideas would be acknowledged to be perfectly +true while at the same time being either useless or harmful. For Dewey +this matter of value has no place in relation to the test of the truth +of an idea, for its truth means nothing more than its ability to lead +as it promises. + +We seem, then, it may be said in conclusion, to be confronted with +something like the following alternatives: + +If we believe that Dewey could not have made a correct deduction from +the pragmatic method when he developed it into a theory of truth +making truth dependent upon fulfilled expectations alone, then very +obviously the next step in this investigation is to find the point at +which his inference went wrong. This means a re-examination of each +step in his reasoning. + +If we believe that Dewey does make a correct deduction from the +pragmatic method in this development toward truth, then we are +confronted with the alternative of either accepting the Deweyan theory +of truth or of rejecting the Peircian theory of clearness. That is, if +we begin with Peirce on method, we must then go clear through to Dewey +on truth. And if we reject Dewey, while believing that Peirce gave a +correct description of the method of science, then it seems that we +must conclude that the method of science and the method of philosophy +are not the same. + + + + +BIBLIOGRAPHY + + +THE WORKS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE + +1865. On an improvement of Boole's calculus of logic. Proc. Am. Acad. + Arts and Sci., v. 7, p. 250. + +1867. Logical Papers. + +1868. Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man. Jour. + Spec. Phil. 2:103. + + Nominalism and realism. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:57. + + On the meaning of 'determined'. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:190. + + Some consequences of four incapacities. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:140. + + Grounds for the validity of the laws of logic. Jour. Spec. + Phil. 2:193. + +1871. Review and discussion of Fraser's "Works of Berkeley." No. Am. + Rev. 113:449. + +1878. 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Monist 20:158. + + +THE WORKS OF WILLIAM JAMES + +A "List of the Published Writings of William James" will be found in +the Psychological Review for March 1911, v. 18, p. 157. + + +THE WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY + +_On Logic and Metaphysics:_ + +1882. The metaphysical assumptions of materialism. Jour. Spec. + Phil. 16:208. + + The pantheism of Spinoza. Jour. Spec. Phil. 16:249. + +1883. Knowledge and the relativity of feeling. Jour. Spec. Phil. 17:56. + +1884. Kant and philosophic method. Jour. Spec. Phil. 18:162. + +1886. The psychological standpoint. Mind 11:1. + + Psychology as philosophic method. Mind 11:153. + +1887. "Illusory psychology." Mind 12:83. + + Knowledge as idealization. Mind 12:382. + +1888. Leibniz's New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. + +1890. On some current conceptions of the term 'self'. Mind 15:58. + +1891. The present position of logical theory. Monist 2:1. + +1892. The superstition of necessity. Monist 3:362. + +1894. The ego as cause. Phil. Rev. 3:337. + +1895. Interest as Related To Will. + +1900. Some stages of logical thought. Phil. Rev. 9:465. + +1903. Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality. + + (And others) Studies in Logical Theory. + +1904. Notes upon logical topics. + I--A classification of contemporary tendencies. Jour. Phil. 1:57. + II--The meaning of the term idea. Jour. Phil. 1:175. + +1905. Immediate empiricism. Jour. Phil. 2:597. + + The knowledge experience and its relationships. Jour. Phil. 2:652. + + The knowledge experience again. Jour. Phil. 2:707. + + The postulate of immediate empiricism. Jour. Phil. 2:393. + + The realism of pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 2:324. + +1906. Reality as experience. Jour. Phil. 3:253. + + The terms 'conscious' and 'consciousness'. Jour. Phil. 3:39. + + Beliefs and realities. Phil. Rev. 15:113. + + Experience and objective idealism. Phil. Rev. 15:465. + + The experimental theory of knowledge. Mind 15:293. + +1907. The control of ideas by facts. Jour. Phil. 4:197, 253, 309. + + Pure experience and reality: a disclaimer. Phil. Rev. 16:419. + + Reality and the criterion for truth of ideas. Mind 15:317. + +1908. What does pragmatism mean by practical? Jour. Phil. 5:85. + + Logical character of ideas. Jour. Phil. 5:375. + +1909. Objects, data, and existence: Reply to Professor McGilvary. + Jour. Phil. 6:13. + + Dilemma of the intellectualistic theory of truth. Jour. Phil. 6:433. + + Darwin's influence on philosophy. Pop. Sci. Mo. 75:90. + +1910. Some implications of anti-intellectualism. Jour. Phil. 7:477. + + Short cuts to realism examined. Jour. Phil. 7:553. + + Valid knowledge and the subjectivity of experience. Jour. + Phil. 7:169. + + Science as subject-matter and as method. Science n. s. 31:121. + + How We Think. + + Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays. + +1911. Rejoinder to Dr. Spaulding. Jour. Phil. 8:77. + + Brief studies in realism. Jour. Phil. 8:393, 546. + + Joint discussion with Dr. Spaulding. Jour. Phil. 8:574. + +1912. Reply to Professor McGilvary's questions. Jour. Phil. 9:19. + + In response to Professor McGilvary. Jour. Phil. 9:544. + + Perception and organic action. Jour. Phil. 9:645. + + Reply to Professor Royce's critique of instrumentalism. Phil. + Rev. 21:69. + + +_On Psychology, Ethics, Education, etc.:_ + +1890. Moral theory and practice. Int. Jour. Ethics 1:186. + +1891. Psychology. + + Outline of a Critical Theory of Ethics. + +1892. Green's theory of the moral motive. Phil. Rev. 1:593. + +1893. Teaching ethics in high school. Ed. Rev. 6:313. + + Self-realization as the moral ideal. Phil. Rev. 2:652. + +1894. The psychology of infant language. Psy. Rev. 1:63. + + The theory of emotion. + I--Emotional attitudes. Psy. Rev. 1:553. + +1895. The theory of emotion. + II--The significance of the emotions. Psy. Rev. 2:13. + +1896. The metaphysical method in ethics. Psy. Rev. 3:181 + + The reflex arc concept in psychology. Psy. Rev. 3:357. + + Influence of the high school upon educational methods. + Ed. Rev. 4:1. + +1897. The psychology of effort. Phil. Rev. 6:43. + + (And J. A. McLellan) Psychology of Number and its Application to + Methods of Teaching Arithmetic. + + Evolution and ethics. Monist 8:321. + + Psychological aspects of school curriculums. Ed. Rev. 13:356. + +1898. Some remarks on the psychology of number. Ped. Sem. 5:426. + + W. T. Harris's Psychological Foundation of Education. Ed. Rev. 16:1. + + Social interpretations. Phil. Rev. 7:631. + +1900. Psychology and social practice. Psy. Rev. 7:105. + +1901. Psychology and Social Practice. + + Are the schools doing what the people want them to do? Ed. + Rev. 21:459. + + The situation as regards the course of study. Ed. Rev. 22:26. + +1902. The evolutionary method as applied to morality. + I--Its scientific necessity. Phil. Rev. 11:107. + II--Its significance for conduct. Phil. Rev. 11:353. + + Interpretation of the savage mind. Psy. 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Abercombie, J.--An Inquiry Concerning the Intellectual Powers and + the Investigation of Truth. + +1842. Thomson, W.--Outlines of the Necessary Laws of Thought. + +1854. Bailey, S.--Essays on the Pursuit of Truth. + +1862. Tiberghien, G.--Logique. v. 2, pp. 322-355. + +1866. Hamilton, Sir Wm.--Logic. Lectures 28-31. + +1875. Forster, W.--Wahrheit und Wahrschleinlichkeit. + +1877. Jevons, W. S.--The Principles of Science. 2nd ed., pp. 374-396. + +1878. Schuppe, W.--Logik. v. 1, pp. 622-696. + +1880. Wundt, W.--Logik. + +1882. Bergmann, J.--Die Grundprobleme der Logik. p. 96ff. + +1884. Schulbert-Soldern, R. von.--Grundlagen einer Erkenntnisstheorie. + p. 156ff. + +1885. Royce, J.--The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. + +1889. Argyle, Duke of--What Is Truth? + + Stephen, L.--On some kinds of necessary truth. Mind 14:50, 188. + +1890. Carus, Paul--The criterion of truth. Monist 1:229. + +1892. Rickert, H.--Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss. Freib. pp. 63-64. + +1893. Bradley, F. H.--Appearance and Reality. Chapters 16, 24. + + Cousin, Victor--Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. + + Soyen, Shakn--Universality of truth. Monist 4:161. + + Miller, D. S.--The meaning of truth and error. Phil. Rev. 2:408. + + Smith, W.--Certitude. Phil. Rev. 2:665. + +1894. Gordy, J. P.--The test of belief. Phil. Rev. 3:257. + +1895. Jerusalem, W.--Die Urteilsfunction. p. 185ff. + + Bosanquet, B.--Essentials of Logic. pp. 69-79. + + Sigwart, C.--Logic. v. 1, pp. 295-326. + +1896. Hodder, A.--Truth and the tests of truth. Phil. Rev. 5:1. + + Wundt, W.--Ueber naiven und kritischen Realismus. Phil. + Studien 12:332. + +1897. Brochard, Victor--De L'Erreur. + + Jordan, D. S.--The stability of truth. Pop. Sci. Mo. 4:642, 749. + + Struempell, Ludw.--Unterchiede der Wahrheiten und irrtuemer. p. 58. + +1898. Baillie, J. B.--Truth and history. Mind 7:506. + + Powell, J. W.--Truth and Error. + +1899. Eisler, W.--Woerterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe. + +1900. Sidgwick, H.--Criteria of truth and error. Mind 9:8. + +1901. Creighton, J. E.--Methodology and truth. Phil. Rev. 10:408. + + French, F. C.--The doctrine of the twofold truth. Phil. + Rev. 10:477. + + Royce, J.--The World and the Individual. + + Smyth, J.--Truth and Reality. + +1902. Baldwin, J. M.--Development and Evolution. Chapter 17. + + Pritchett, H. S.--What is truth? Outlook 70:620. + +1903. Duprat, Guillaume L.--Le Mesonge. Etude de psycho-sociologie + pathologique et normale. + + Pilate's What is truth. Catholic World 77:705. + +1904. Bradley, F. H.--On truth and practice. Mind 13:309. + + Glasenapp, G. v.--Der Wert der Wahrheit. Zeitsch. f. Philos. u. + phil. Kr. 123:186, 124:25. + + Rogers, A. K.--James on humanism and truth. Jour. Phil. 1:693. + +1905. Alexander, H. B.--Phenomenalism and the problem of knowledge. + Jour. Phil. 2:182. + + Alexander, H. B.--Quantity, quality, and the function of + knowledge. Jour. Phil. 2:459. + + Hyslop, J. H.--Problems of Philosophy. Chapter 7. + + Joachim, H. H.--'Absolute' and 'relative' truth. Mind 14:1. + + Joseph, H. W. B.--Professor James on 'humanism and truth'. + Mind 14:28. + + Knox, H. V.--Mr. Bradley's absolute criterion. Mind 14:210. + + Overstreet, H. A.--Conceptual completeness and abstract truth. + Phil. Rev. 14:308. + + Pitkin, W. B.--Psychology of eternal truths. Jour. Phil. 2:449. + + Taylor, A. E.--Truth and practice. Phil. Rev. 14:265. + +1906. Gore, George--Scientific sketch of untruth. Monist 16:96. + + Russell, B.--The nature of truth. Mind 15:528. + + Review of Joachim's The Nature of Truth. Nation 83:42. + + Schiller, F. C. S.---The ambiguity of truth. Mind 15:161. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Joachim's The Nature of Truth. Jour. + Phil. 3:549. + + Taylor, A. E.--Truth and consequences. Mind 15:81. + + Openmindedness. Catholic World 82:756. + +1908. Bakewell, C. M.--On the meaning of truth. Phil. Rev. 17:579. + + Creighton, J. E.--The nature and criterion of truth. Phil. + Rev. 17:592. + + Gardiner, H. N.--The problems of truth. Phil. Rev. 17:113. + + Moore, A. W.--Truth value. Jour. Phil. 5:429. + + Prat, J. B.--Truth and ideas. Jour. Phil. 5:122. + + Urbana, F. M.--On a supposed criterion of the absolute truth of + some propositions. Jour. Phil. 5:701. + +1909. Bradley, F. H.--On truth and coherence. Mind 18:322. + + Bradley, F. H.--Coherence and contradiction. Mind 18:489. + + Buckham, J. W.--Organization of truth. Int. Jour. Eth. 20:63. + + Carritt, E. F.--Truth in art and religion. Hib. Jour. 8:362. + + Knox, H. V.--The evolution of truth. Quarterly Rev. No. 419. + +1910. Alexander, H. B.--Truth and nature. Monist 20:585. + + Boodin, J. E.--The nature of truth. Phil. Rev. 19:395. + + Bradley, F. H.--On appearance, error, and contradiction. + Mind 19:153. + + Jacobson, Edmund--Relational account of truth. Jour. Phil. 7:253. + + Russell, B.--Philosophical Essays. Essays 5, 6, 7. + + Schmidt, Karl--Hertz's theory of truth. Monist 20:445. + + Tsanoff, R. A.--Professor Boodin on the nature of truth. Phil. + Rev. 19:632. + + Plea for the half-truth. Atlantic 105:576. + + Truth as once for all delivered. Bib. World 35:219. + +1911. Alexander, H. B.--Goodness and beauty of truth. Jour. Phil. 5:29. + + Boodin, J. E.--The divine five-fold truth. Monist 21:288. + + Boodin, J. E.--The nature of truth: a reply. Phil. Rev. 20:59. + + Boodin, J. E.--Truth and Reality. + + Bradley, F. F.--On some aspects of truth. Mind 20:305. + + Carus, Paul--Truth on Trial. + + McGilvary, E. B.--The 'fringe' of William James's psychology as + the basis of logic. Phil. Rev. 20:137. + + Rother, A. J.--Certitude. + + Royce, J.--William James, and Other Essays. + + Self-sufficiency of truth. Bib. World 37:147. + +1912. Fawcett, E. D.--Truth's 'original object'. Mind 21:89. + + Larson, C. D.--What Is Truth? + + Leuba, J. H.--Religion and the discovery of truth. Jour. + Phil. 9:406. + + Review of Jordan's Stability of Truth. Int. Jour. Eth. 23:92. + + Zahlfeisch, Johann--Ist die Luege erlaubt? Archiv. f. system. + Philos. 18:241. + +1913. Alexander, S.--Collective willing and truth. Mind 22:14, 161. + + Gerould, K. F.--Boundarie of truth. Atlantic 112:454. + + Lloyd, A. H.--Conformity, consistency, and truth. Jour. + Phil. 10:281. + + Moore, A. W.--The aviary theory of truth and error. Jour. + Phil. 10:542. + + Wright, W. K.--Genesis of the categories. Jour. Phil. 10:645. + + Wright, H. W.--Practical success as the criterion of truth. + Phil. Rev. 22:606. + +1914. Bowman, A. A.--The problem of knowledge from the standpoint of + validity. Phil. Rev. 23:1, 146, 299. + + Bradley, F. H.--Essays on Truth and Reality. + + Broad, C. D.--Mr. Bradley on truth and reality. Mind 23:349. + + Capron, F. H.--Anatomy of Truth. + + Leighton, J. A.--Truth, reality, and relation. Phil. Rev. 23:17. + + Rother, A. J.--Truth and Error. + + Sidgwick, A.--Truth and working. Mind 23:99. + + Strange, E. H.--Objectives, truth, and error. Mind 23:489. + + +WORKS ON PRAGMATISM + +(See also the list under 'Truth'). + +1900. Caldwell, W.--Pragmatism. Mind 9:433. + +1902. Schiller, F. C. S.--'Useless' knowledge. Mind 11:196. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Axioms As Postulates. + +1903. King, Irving--Pragmatism as a philosophical method. Phil. + Rev. 12:511. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Humanism: Philosophical Essays. + +1904. Bawden, Heath--What is pragmatism? Jour. Phil. 1:421. + + Creighton, J. E.--Purpose as a logical category. Phil. Rev. 13:284. + + Leighton, J. A.--Pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 1:148. + +1905. Bode, B. H.--Pure experience and the external world. Jour. + Phil. 2:128. + + Bode, B. H.--The cognitive experience and its object. Jour. + Phil. 2:658. + + Bode, B. H.--The concept of pure experience. Phil. Rev. 14:684. + + Hoernle, R. F. A.--Pragmatism versus absolutism. Mind 14:297, 441. + + King, Irving--Pragmatic interpretation of the Christian dogma. + Monist 15:248. + + Moore, A. W.--Pragmatism and its critics. Phil. Rev. 14:284. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--The definition of 'pragmatism' and + 'humanism'. Mind 14:235. + +1906. Bode, B. H.--Realism and pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 3:393. + + Colvin, S. S.--Pragmatism, old and new. Monist 16:547. + + Rogers, A. K.--Professor James' theory of knowledge. Phil. + Rev. 15:577. + + Rousmaniere, F. H.--A definition of experimentation. Jour. + Phil. 3:673. + + Russell, J. E.--Pragmatism's meaning of truth. Jour. Phil. 3:599. + + Russell, J. E.--Some difficulties with the epistemology of + pragmatism and radical empiricism. Phil. Rev. 15:406. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Pragmatism and pseudo-pragmatism. + + Sturt, H.--Idola Theatri, a Criticism of Oxford Thought and + Thinkers from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism. Mind 15:375. + + Vailati, Giovanni--Pragmatism and mathematical logic. Monist + 16:481. + +1907. Brown, W. A.--Pragmatic value of the absolute. Jour. + Phil. 4:459. + + Bush, W. T.--Papini on Introduzione al prafmatismo. Jour. + Phil. 4:639. + + Foster, G. B.--Pragmatism and knowledge. Am. Jour. Theol. 11:591. + + Moore, A. W.--Perry on pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 4:567. + + Nichols, H.--Pragmatism versus science. Jour. Phil. 4:122. + + Papini, G.--What pragmatism is like. Pop. Sci. Mo. 71:351. + + Perry, R. B.--A review of pragmatism as a philosophical + generalization. Jour. Phil. 4:421. + + Perry, R. B.--A review of pragmatism as a theory of knowledge. + Jour. Phil. 4:365. + + Pratt, J. B.--Truth and its verification. Jour. Phil. 4:320. + + Review of Schiller's Humanism. Nation 84:436. + + Review of Papini's Tragico Quotidiano. Nation 85:521. + + Reviews of James's Pragmatism. Bookman 26:215. No. Am. 185:884. + Science n. s. 26:464. Nation 85:57. Ind. 63:630. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--The pragmatic babe in the woods. Jour. + Phil. 4:42. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Cure of doubt. Jour. Phil. 4:235. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Pragmatism versus skepticism. Jour. + Phil. 4:482. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Studies in Humanism. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Review of James's Pragmatism. Mind 16:593. + + Sellars, R. W.--Dewey's view of agreement. Jour. Phil. 4:432. + + Shorey, P.--Equivocation of pragmatism. Dial 43:273. + + Slosson, E. E.--What is pragmatism? Ind. 62:422. + + Talbot, Ellen B.--The philosophy of Fichte in its relation to + pragmatism. Phil. Rev. 16:488. + + Fascination of the pragmatic method. Cur. Lit. 43:186. + + A new philosophy. Harper's W. 51:1264. + + The newest philosophy. Cur. Lit. 42:652. + + Pragmatic philosophy. Ind. 62:797. + + Pragmatism, a new philosophy. Ed. Rev. 34:227. + + Where pragmatism fails. Cur. Lit. 46:415. + +1908. Armstrong, A. C.--Evolution of pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 5:645. + + Bawden, H. H.--New philosophy called pragmatism. Pop. Sci. + Mo. 73:61. + + Bradley, F. H.--On the ambiguity of pragmatism. Mind 17:226. + + Burke, J. B.--Fashionable philosophy at Oxford and Harvard. Liv. + Age 257:559. + + Bush, W. T.--Provisional and eternal truth. Jour. Phil. 5:181. + + Carus, Paul--Pragmatism. Monist 18:321. + + Hebert, M.--Le Pragmatisme. Etude de ses Diverse Formes. + + Hibben, J. B.--The test of pragmatism. Phil. Rev. 17:365. + + Lovejoy, A. O.--Thirteen pragmatisms. Jour. Phil. 5:5, 29. + + Lovejoy, A. O.--Pragmatism and theology. Am. Jour. Theol. 12:116. + + McGilvary, E. B.--British exponents of pragmatism. Hib. + Jour. 6:632. + + McTaggart, J. E.--Review of James's Pragmatism. Mind 17:104. + + Salter, W. M.--A. new philosophy. Atlantic 101:657. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Is Mr. Bradley a pragmatism? Mind 17:370. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--British exponents of pragmatism. Hib. + Jour. 6:903. + + Schinz, A.--Dewey's pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 5:617. + + Sidgwick, A.--The ambiguity of pragmatism. Mind 17:368. + + Strong, A. L.--Religious aspects of pragmatism. Am. Jour. + Theol. 12:231. + + Strong, C. A.--Pragmatism and its definition of truth. Jour. + Phil. 5:256. + + Vialiti, G.--A pragmatic zoologist. Monist 18:142. + +1909. Agnew, P. G.--What is pragmatism? Forum 41:70. + + Carus, Paul--A German critic of pragmatism. Monist 19:136. + + Carus, Paul--A postscript on pragmatism. Monist 19:85. + + Carus, Paul--Professor John Hibben on 'the test of pragmatism'. + Monist 19:319. + + Corrance, H. C.--Review of Hebert's Le Pragmatisme. Hib. + Jour. 7:218. + + Cox, J. W.--Concepts of truth and reality. Am. Cath. Q. 34:139. + + Huizinga, A. V.--The American philosophy pragmatism. Bib. Sac. 66:78. + + Kallen, H. M.--Affiliations of pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 6:655. + + Kallen, H. M.--Dr. Montague and the pragmatic notion of value. + Jour. Phil. 6:549. + + Knox, H. V.--Pragmatism: the evolution of truth. Quarterly + Rev. 210:379. + + Ladd, G. T.--The confusion of pragmatism. Hib. Jour. 7:784. + + McGilvary, E. B.--British exponents of pragmatism (A rejoinder). + Hib. Jour. 7:443. + + Montague, W. P.--The true, the good, and the beautiful from a + pragmatic standpoint. Jour. Phil. 6:233. + + Montague, W. P.--May a realist be a pragmatist? Jour. + Phil. 6:460, 485, 543, 501. + + Moore, A. W.--"Anti-pragmatisme." Jour. Phil. 6:291. + + Moore, T. V.--Pragmatism of William James. Catholic World 90:341. + + Moore, A. W.--Pragmatism and solipsism. Jour. Phil. 6:378. + + More, P. E.--New stage of pragmatism. Nation 88:456. + + Murray, D. L.--Pragmatic realism. Mind 18:377. + + Pratt, J. B.--What Is Pragmatism? + + Pratt, J. B.--What is pragmatism? Am. Jour. Theol. 13:477. + + Schiller, F. C S.--Humanism and intuition. Mind 18:125. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Logic as psychology. Mind 18:400. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Humanism, intuitionism, and objective + reality. Mind 18:570. + + Schinz, A.--Anti-pragmatisme. + + Schinz, A.--Rousseau a forerunner of pragmatism. Monist 19:481. + + Schinz, A.--A few words in reply to Professor Moore's criticism + of 'Anti-pragmatism'. Jour. Phil. 6:434. + + Shackleford, T. M.--What pragmatism is, as I understand it. + Pop. Sci. Mo. 75:571. + + Taylor, A. E.--Review of James's Pluralistic Universe. + Mind 18:576. + + Tausch, Edwin--William James the pragmatist. Monist 19:1. + + Origin of pragmatism. Nation 88:358. + + Philosophy in the open. Bookman 29:661. + + Pragmatism as a strangler of literature. Cur. Lit. 46:637. + +1910. Boodin, J. E.--Pragmatic realism. Monist 20:602. + + Carus, Paul--Pragmatist view of truth. Monist 20:139. + + Carus, Paul--Truth. Monist 20:481. + + Cockrell, T. D. A.--Is pragmatism pragmatic? Dial 48:422. + + De Laguna, T.--Dogmatism and Evolution. + + Fite, W.--O'Sullivan's Old Criticism and New Pragmatism. Jour. + Phil. 7:499. + + Gillespie, C. M.--The truth of Protagoras. Mind 19:470. + + Jacoby, Gunther--Der Pragmatismus. + + Kallen, H. M.--James, Bergson, and Mr. Pitkin. Jour. + Phil. 7:353. + + Lee, V.--Two pragmatisms. No. Am. 192:449. + + Lloyd, A. H.--Possible idealism of a pluralist. Am. Jour. + Theol. 14:406. + + Macintosh, D. C.--Pragmatic element in the teaching of Paul. Am. + Jour. Theol. 13:361. + + McGiffert, A. C.--The pragmatism of Kant. Jour. Phil. 7:197. + + Miller, D. S.--Some of the tendencies of Professor James's work. + Jour. Phil. 7:645. + + Moore, A. W.--Pragmatism and Its Critics. + + Moore, A. W.--How ideas work. Jour. Phil. 7:617. + + O'Sullivan, J. M.--Old Criticism and New Pragmatism. + + Russell, B.--Philosophical Essays. Chapters 4, 6. + + Reviews of James's Meaning of Truth. Nation 90:88. Hib. Jour. + 8:904. Ed. Rev. 40:201. + + Russell, J. E.--Review of James's Meaning of Truth. Jour. + Phil. 7:22. + + Schinz, A.--Anti-pragmatism. + + Shackelford, T. M.--What is pragmatism? Sci. Am. S. 70:78. + + Sidgwick, A.--The Application of Logic. + + Stettheimer, E.--Rowland's Right To Believe. Jour. Phil. 7:330. + + Walker, L. J.--Theory of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, and + Realism. + +1911. Brown, H. C.--De Laguna's Dogmatism and Evolution. Jour. + Phil. 8:556. + + Cockerell, T. D. A.--Reality and truth. Pop. Sci. Mo. 78:371. + + Eastman, Max--Dewey's How We Think. Jour. Phil. 8:244. + + Fawcett, E. D.--A note on pragmatism. Mind 20:399. + + Jacks, L. P.--William James and his message. Contemp. Rev. 99:20. + + Kallen, H. M.--Boutroux's William James. Jour. Phil. 8:583. + + Kallen, H. M.--Pragmatism and its 'principles'. Jour. Phil. 8:617. + + More, P. E.--The Pragmatism of William James. + + Patten, S. N.--Pragmatism and social science. Jour. Phil. 8:653. + + Pratt, J. B.--The religious philosophy of William James. Hib. + Jour. 10:225. + + Riley, I. W.--Continental critics of pragmatism. Jour. + Phil. 8:225, 289. + + Russell, J. E.--Truth as value and the value of truth. Mind 20:538. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Article 'pragmatism' in Encyclopedia Brittanica. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Review of James's Some Problems of + Philosophy. Mind 20:571. + + Turner, W.--Pragmatism: what does it mean? Cath. World 94:178. + + Vibbert, C. B.--Moore's Pragmatism and its Critics. Jour. + Phil. 8:468. + +1912. Berkeley, H.--The kernel of pragmatism. Mind 21:84. + + Ceulemans, J. B.--Metaphysics of pragmatism. Am. Cath. Q. 37:310. + + Jacoby, Gunther--Bergson, pragmatism, and Schopenhauer. + Monist 22:593. + + Kallen, H. M.--Royce's William James. Jour. Phil. 9:548. + + Lee, Vernon--Vital Lies. v. 1, part 1. + + Lee, Vernon--What is truth? a criticism of pragmatism. Yale + Rev. n. s. 1:600. + + Loewenberg, J.--Vaihinger's Die Philosophie des Als Ob. Jour. + Phil. 9:717. + + Macintosh, D. C.--Representational pragmatism. Mind 21:167. + + Montague, W. P.--Review of James's Some Problems of Philosophy. + Jour. Phil. 9:22. + + Murray, D. L.--Pragmatism. + + Reviews of Moore's Pragmatism and Its Critics. Nation 92:13. Int + Jour. Eth. 22:222. + + Riley, I. W.--Huizinga's The American Philosophy Pragmatism. + Jour. Phil. 9:248. + + Russell, B.--Review of James's Essays in Radical Empiricism. + Mind 21:571. + + Russell, J. E.--Bergson's anti-intellectualism. Jour. + Phil. 9:129. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Formal Logic, A Scientific and Social + Problem. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--The 'working' of 'truth'. Mind 21:532. + +1913. Alexander, S.--Collective willing and truth. Mind 22:14, 161. + + Boodin, J. E.--Pragmatic realism.--The five attributes. + Mind 22:509. + + Carr, H. W.--Logic and life. Mind 22:484. + + Carr, H. W.--The Problem of Truth. + + Caldwell, W.--Pragmatism and Idealism. + + Knox, H. V.--William James and his philosophy. Mind 22:231. + + Moore, A. W.--Pragmatism, science, and truth. + + Perry, R. B.--Realism and pragmatism. Mind 22:544. + + Review of Vernon Lee's Vital Lies. Nation 96:414. + + Royce, J.--Psychological problems emphasized by pragmatism. Pop. + Sci. Mo. 83:394. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--The 'working' of truths and their + 'criterion'. Mind 22:532. + + Schiller, F. C. S.--Humanism. + + Stebbing, L. S.--The 'working' of 'truths'. Mind 22:250. + + Wright, W. K.--Practical success as the criterion of truth. + Phil. Rev. 22:606. + +1914. Knox, H. V.--Philosophy of William James. + + Moore, J. S.--Value in its relation to meaning and purpose. + Jour. Phil. 11:184. + + Ross, G. R. T.--Aristotle and abstract truth--A reply to Mr. + Schiller. Mind 23:396. + + Sidgwick, A.--Truth and working. Mind 23:99. + + Stebbing, L. S.--Pragmatism and French Voluntarism. + + Wilde, N.--The pragmatism of Pascal. Phil. Rev. 23:540. + + Can socialism be identified with pragmatism? Cur. Opinion 56:45. + + + + +VITA. + + +The writer was born in 1884 at Pomeroy, Ohio, and received his earlier +education in the country schools near that city. His college +preparatory work was done in the high school of Roswell, New Mexico, +from which he was graduated in 1906. He then entered immediately the +University of Wisconsin, and from this institution received the +Bachelor's degree in 1910 and the Master's degree in 1911. From 1911 +to 1914, while acting as fellow or as assistant, he studied in the +graduate school of the University of Illinois. + + + + +Transcriber's Notes: + + Page numbers have been removed from the Table of Contents + + Footnotes have been sequentially numbered and placed after the + paragraph where they are noted. + + +Other changes to the text: + + JAMES' EXPOSITION OF PEIRCE. (in the Table of Contents) + (Removed 's in JAMES'S to match the title of Section in + Chapter 2, which is consistent with author's usage throughout) + + consider the doctrine of transubstantiation + (transubstantiation was transsubstantiation) + + true in their main experiential predictions + (experiential was experiental) + + multiply incontestable results + (incontestable was incontestible) + + false belief (belief in fiction)". + (. was ,) + + and then only provisionally; + (then was when) + + towards the close of + (the was th) + + cannot be used together + (together was togethehr) + + if one can define accurately all + (accurately was acurately) + + or false?' Thus does Locke + (missing closing quote added) + + only an image in the mind + (mind was mand) + + try so hard to defend + (so was to) + + In Footnote 12, the word pages was pagges + + Yet the smell is not cognitional + (smell is was small was) + + Let us suppose that the smell occurs + (smell was small) + + thus account for the cases where meanings + (cases was cses) + + their immediate occurrence as + (occurrence was occurence) + + which the developing experience is examined + (experience was experince) + + if one takes it at the stage + (at was t) + + for truth is a certain + (certain was certian) + + the collectivity of experience's demands + (experience's was experiences) + + I have no doubt that this is + (this was his) + + true even 'in so far forth'". + (was missing closing single quote mark) + + The reason for this outcome + (reason was reasons) + + The scientific conception, as it had differentiated itself from + (differentiated was differenciated) + + +Typographic errors in the bibliography have been repaired without +note, with the following exceptions. + + 1854. Bailey, S.--Essays on the Pursuit of Truth. + (S. was originally missing) + + 1780. Beattie, James.--An Essay on the Nature and Immutability + of Truth. + (duplicate entry removed) + + 1902. Pritchett, H. S.--What is truth? Outlook 70:620. + (H. S. originally missing) + + Wright, H. W.--Practical success as the criterion of truth. + (was W. K.) + + 1879. Illustrations of the logic of science. + (added second header for clarity) + + 1895. The theory of emotion. + (added second header for clarity) + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The pragmatic theory of truth as +developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey, by Delton Loring Geyer + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH *** + +***** This file should be named 37552.txt or 37552.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/3/7/5/5/37552/ + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Barbara Tozier and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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