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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Spencer's Philosophy of Science, by C. Lloyd
+Morgan
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Spencer's Philosophy of Science
+       The Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered at the Museum 7 November, 1913
+
+
+Author: C. Lloyd Morgan
+
+
+
+Release Date: September 23, 2011  [eBook #37513]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Adrian Mastronardi, David E. Brown, and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images
+generously made available by Internet Archive/American Libraries
+(http://www.archive.org/details/americana)
+
+
+
+Note: Images of the original pages are available through
+      Internet Archive/American Libraries. See
+      http://www.archive.org/details/spencersphilosop00morgrich
+
+
+Transcriber's note:
+
+      Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
+
+      Text enclosed by curly brackets is subscripted (example:
+      H{2}O) unless preceded by a carat character, in which
+      case it is superscripted (example: ^{2}).
+
+
+
+
+
+SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
+
+The Herbert Spencer Lecture
+Delivered at the Museum
+7 November, 1913
+
+by
+
+C. LLOYD MORGAN, F.R.S.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Price Two Shillings net
+
+Oxford
+At the Clarendon Press
+MCMXIII
+
+Oxford University Press
+London      Edinburgh      Glasgow      New York
+Toronto      Melbourne      Bombay
+Humphrey Milford M.A.
+Publisher to the University
+
+
+
+
+SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
+
+
+Towards the close of 1870, while I was still in my teens, my youthful
+enthusiasm was fired by reading Tyndall's Discourse on _The Scientific
+Use of the Imagination_. The vision of the conquest of nature by
+physical science--a vision which had but lately begun to open up to my
+wondering gaze--was rendered clearer and more extensive. Of the theory
+of evolution I knew but little; but I none the less felt assured that it
+had come to stay and to prevail. Was it not accepted by all of _us_--the
+enlightened and emancipated men of science whose ranks I had joined as a
+raw recruit? Believing that I was independently breaking free of all
+authority, to the authority that appealed to my fancy, and to a new
+loyalty, I was a willing slave. And here in one glowing sentence the
+inner core of evolution lay revealed.
+
+  'Strip it naked and you stand face to face with the notion that
+  not alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular and animal life,
+  not alone the nobler forms of the horse and the lion, not alone
+  the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that
+  the human mind itself--emotion, intellect and all their
+  phenomena--were once latent in a fiery cloud.'[1]
+
+With sparkling eyes I quoted these brave words to a friend of my
+father's, whose comments were often as caustic as his sympathy in my
+interests was kindly. With a grave smile he asked whether the notion was
+not perhaps stripped too naked to preserve the decencies of modest
+thought; he inquired whether I had not learnt from _Sartor Resartus_
+that the philosophy of nature is a Philosophy of Clothes; and he bade me
+devote a little time to quiet and careful consideration of what Tyndall
+really meant--meant in terms of the exact science he professed--by the
+phrase 'latent in a fiery cloud'. I dimly suspected that the old
+gentleman--old in the sense of being my father's contemporary--was
+ignorant of those recent developments of modern science with which I had
+been acquainted for weeks, nay more for months. Perhaps he had never
+even heard of the nebular hypothesis! But I felt that I had done him an
+injustice when, next morning, he sent round a volume of the _Westminster
+Review_ with a slip of paper indicating an article on 'Progress: its Law
+and Cause'.
+
+Such was my introduction to Herbert Spencer, some of whose works I read
+with admiration during the next few years.
+
+I have no very distinct recollection of the impression produced on my
+mind by the germinal essay of 1857, save that it served to quicken that
+craving, which is, I suppose, characteristic of those who have some
+natural bent towards philosophy--the imperative craving to seek and, if
+it may be, to find the one in the many. In any case Tyndall's suggestive
+sentence was here amplified and the underlying law was disclosed.
+
+  'Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development
+  of Life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of
+  Government, of Manufacture, of Commerce, of Language, Literature,
+  Science, Art, the same evolution of the simple into the complex,
+  through successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the
+  earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of
+  civilisation, we shall find that the transformation of the
+  homogeneous into the heterogeneous, is that in which Progress
+  essentially consists.'[2]
+
+Here was just what I wanted--on the one hand the whole wide universe of
+existence; and on the other hand a brief formula with which to label its
+potted essence. How breathlessly one was led on, with only such breaches
+of continuity as separate paragraphs inevitably impose, right away from
+the primitive fire-mist to one of Bach's fugues or the critical
+doctrines of Mr. Ruskin, guided throughout by the magic of
+differentiation. What if the modes of existence, dealt with in
+successive sections, were somewhat startlingly diverse! Was not this
+itself a supreme example of the evolution of that diversity which the
+formula enables us to interpret? For if there were a passage from the
+homogeneous to the heterogeneous, the more heterogeneous the
+products--inorganic, organic, and superorganic, as I learnt to call
+them--the stronger the evidence for the law. Only by shutting one's eyes
+to the light that had been shed on the world by evolution could one fail
+to see how simple and yet how inevitable was the whole business.
+
+If then differentiation be the cardinal law of evolution--for the
+correlative concept of integration receives no emphasis in this early
+essay--does not the universality of the law imply a universal cause?
+Just as gravitation was assignable as a _cause_ of each of the groups of
+phenomena which Kepler formulated; so might some equally simple
+attribute of things be assignable as the cause of each of the groups of
+phenomena formulated in terms of differentiation. Now the only obvious
+respect in which all kinds of Progress are alike, is, that they are
+modes of change; and hence in some characteristic of changes in general,
+the desired solution must be found. Thus we are led up to the statement
+of the all-pervading principle which determines the all-pervading
+process of differentiation. It is this: _Every active force produces
+more than one change--every cause produces more than one effect._[3]
+
+In the first part of the Essay many and varied facts are adduced to show
+that every kind of progress is from the simple to the complex. The aim
+of the second part is to show why this is so: it is 'because each change
+is followed by many changes'. From the beginning, the decomposition of
+every expended force into several forces has been perpetually producing
+a higher complication, and thus Progress is not an accident but a
+beneficent necessity. In a brief third part we are bidden to remember
+that
+
+  'after all that has been said the ultimate mystery remains just as
+  it was. The explanation of that which is explicable does but bring
+  out into greater clearness the inexplicableness of that which
+  remains behind.... The sincere man of science, content to follow
+  wherever the evidence leads him becomes by each new enquiry more
+  profoundly convinced that the Universe is an insoluble problem....
+  In all directions his investigations bring him face to face with
+  the unknowable; and he ever more clearly perceives it to be the
+  unknowable'.[4]
+
+There is I think a growing consensus of opinion that the first of
+these three parts, subsequently expanded and illustrated with
+astonishing wealth of detail in the volumes of the _Synthetic
+Philosophy_, contains the germ of all that is best in the teaching of
+Herbert Spencer; and that it was amid phenomena which admitted of
+interpretation from the biological, or quasi-biological, point of view
+that he found his most congenial sphere of work and the one in which his
+method was most effectively employed. The story of evolution is the
+story of inter-related changes. In any organic whole there are certain
+salient features of the historical sequence.[5] The parts get more
+different from each other, and they also get more effectively connected
+with each other; the individual whole gets more different from its
+environment, and it also preserves and extends its connexion with the
+environment; the several individuals get more different from others,
+while their connexion with others is retained and new connexions are
+established. Nowadays these central ideas may seem familiar enough; but
+that is just because Spencer's thought has been so completely
+assimilated. And then we must remember that these main principles are
+supplemented by a great number of ancillary generalizations, many of
+which have been incorporated in the scientific doctrine which is current
+to-day. We must bear in mind that of the _Biology_ Charles Darwin
+wrote:[6] 'I am astonished at its prodigality of original thought.' Of
+the _Psychology_ William James says[7] that of the systematic treatises
+it will rank as the most original. These are the opinions of experts. No
+discussion of sociology or ethics is complete if it ignores Spencer's
+contributions to these subjects. The _Ethics_, says James[8] is a most
+vital and original piece of attitude-taking in the world of ideals. It
+was his firm and often inflexible 'attitude' which was a source of
+strength in Spencer, though it was the strength of rigidity rather than
+that of sinewy suppleness. This was part of a certain 'narrowness of
+intent and vastness of extent' which characterized his mental vision. He
+was so obsessed with the paramount importance of biological
+relationships that in his _Sociology_, his _Ethics_, his _Psychology_,
+he failed to do justice to, or even to realize the presence of, other
+and higher relationships--higher, that is, in the evolutionary scale.
+But it was his signal merit to work biological interpretation for all,
+and perhaps more than, it was worth. It was on these lines that he was
+led to find a clue to those social and political developments, the
+discussion of which, in the _Nonconformist_ of 1842, constituted the
+first step from the life of an engineer to that other kind of life which
+led to the elaboration of the _Synthetic Philosophy_.[9] In his later
+years he was saddened to see that many of the social and political
+doctrines, for the establishment of which he had striven so strenuously,
+were not accepted by a newer generation of thinkers. Still, to have
+taken a definite and, for all his detractors may say, an honoured
+position in the line of those who make history in the philosophy of life
+and mind--that could never be taken away from him.
+
+It will perhaps be said that this emphasis on the philosophy of life
+and mind does scant justice to the range and sweep of Spencer's
+philosophy as a whole; and no doubt others will contend that the
+emphasis should be laid elsewhere; on the mechanical foundations; on
+evolution as a universal principle. It will be urged that Spencer
+widened to men's view the scope of scientific explanation. He proclaimed
+'the gradual growth of all things by natural processes out of natural
+antecedents'.[10] Even in the _Nonconformist_ letters 'there is', he
+himself says,[11] 'definitely expressed a belief in the universality of
+law--law in the realm of mind as in that of matter--law throughout the
+life of society as throughout the individual life. So, too, is it with
+the correlative idea of universal causation.' And if there be law it
+must at bottom be one law. Thus in _First Principles_ Spencer propounded
+a sweeping and sonorous formula, which every disciple knows by heart,
+embodying the fundamental traits of that unceasing redistribution of
+matter and motion which characterizes evolution as contrasted with
+dissolution. Was it not this that he himself regarded as his main
+contribution to philosophy? Did he not himself provide a summary,
+setting forth the sixteen articles of the Spencerian creed; and is not
+this summary given a prominent position in the Preface he wrote to
+Howard Collins's _Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy_? Do not these
+fundamental articles of his faith deal with ubiquitous causes, with the
+instability of the homogeneous and the multiplication of effects, with
+segregation and equilibration, and with the basal conception of the
+persistence of force? There is here, it may be said, no special
+reference to the organic and the superorganic. And why? Just because
+Spencer's interpretation is all-inclusive; because biology, psychology,
+sociology, ethics are, broadly considered, concerned only with incidents
+of the later scenes of the great mechanical drama of evolution. Are we
+not again and again bidden, now in forecast, now in retrospect, to look
+below the surface, and constantly to bear in mind that the aim of
+philosophy, as completely unified knowledge, is 'the interpretation of
+all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force'?[12] It is true
+that the affairs of the mind give pause and seem to present something of
+a difficulty. But even here 'specifically stated, the problem is to
+interpret mental evolution in terms of the redistribution of matter and
+motion'.[13] An adequate explanation of nervous evolution involves an
+adequate explanation of the concomitant evolution of mind. It is true
+that the antithesis of subject and object is never to be transcended
+'while consciousness lasts'.[14] But if all existence, distinguishable
+as subjective, is resolvable into units of consciousness, which in their
+obverse or objective aspect are oscillations of molecules,[15] what more
+is required to round off the explanation of every thing, save the
+Unknowable--save the Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are
+united? In the end we are baffled by mystery; let us, therefore, make
+the best of it and rejoice.
+
+  'We can think of Matter only in terms of Mind. We can think of
+  Mind only in terms of Matter. When we have pushed our explorations
+  of the first to its uttermost limit we are referred to the second
+  for a final answer; and when we have got the final answer to the
+  second we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of
+  it.'[14]
+
+And so neither answer is final. Finality is only reached when both are
+swallowed up, not in victory, but in defeat. Shall we not then glory in
+defeat and sing its praises often?
+
+I must leave to some future Herbert Spencer lecturer the discussion of
+his doctrine of the Unknowable and the critical consideration of its
+place and value in philosophy. I would fain leave it altogether on one
+side; but that is impossible. Although the _First Principles_ is divided
+into two Parts, dealing respectively with the Unknowable and the
+Knowable, we have not by any means done with the former when we turn
+from the First Part to the Second. With Spencer we have never done with
+the Unknowable, the Unconditioned Reality and the other aliases by which
+it goes. His persistence of force is the persistence of Unknowable
+Force. In a leading passage, at any rate, it is avowedly 'the
+persistence of some Cause which transcends our knowledge and conception.
+In asserting it we assert an Unconditioned Reality without beginning or
+end'.[16] There must, he holds, be something at the back of the
+evolutionary drama which we study--something that is both a principle of
+activity and a permanent _nexus_.[17] The pity of it is that we know
+not, and can never know, what on earth (or in heaven!) it is. We only
+know that it exists, and somehow produces the whole show. Now it would
+much conduce to clearness of thought and of statement if we could agree
+to eliminate those terribly ambiguous words 'force' and 'cause' when we
+are dealing with the fundamental postulate (if such it be) that there
+must be something at the back of evolution to make it what it is; and
+the word Source seems ready to our hand and might well be given this
+special significance. But Spencer uses Agency, Power, Cause, Force, in
+this connexion. In how many senses he uses the word 'force' I am not
+prepared to say. It is often a synonym for cause; it stands alike for
+matter and energy;[18] it is the objective correlate of our subjective
+sense of effort.[19] There is a 'correlation and equivalence between
+external forces and the mental forces generated by them under the form
+of sensations'.[20] And when we pass to human life in society, whatever
+in any way facilitates or impedes social, political, or economic change,
+is spoken of in terms of force.[21] With an apparent vagueness and
+laxity almost unparalleled, force is used in wellnigh every conceivable
+sense of this ambiguous word--except, perhaps, that which is now
+sanctioned by definition in mathematical physics. I say apparent
+vagueness and laxity because, subtly underlying all this varied usage,
+is the unifying conception of Source as the ultimate basis of all
+enforcement. From this flows all necessity whether in things or thoughts
+or any combination of the two. Thus persistence of force is Spencer's
+favourite expression for uniform determinism at or near its Source.
+
+Now, as I understand the position, science has nothing whatever to do
+with the Source or Sources of phenomena. By a wise self-denying
+ordinance it rules all questions of ultimate origin out of court. It
+regards them as beyond its special sphere of jurisdiction. It deals with
+phenomena in terms of connexion within an orderly scheme, and it does
+not profess to explain _why_ the connexions are such as they are found
+to be. In any discussion of this or that sequence of events which may
+fall under the wide and rather vague heading of evolution, it is just a
+consistent story of the events in their total relatedness that science
+endeavours to tell. The question: But what evolves the evolved? is for
+science (or should I say for those who accept this delimitation of the
+province of science?) not so much unanswerable in any terms, as
+unanswerable in scientific terms. For the terms in which an answer must
+be given are incommensurable with the concepts with which science has
+elected to carry on its business as interpreter of nature. To this
+question therefore the man of science, speaking for his order, simply
+replies: We do not know. Is this, then, Spencer's answer? Far from it.
+The man of science here makes, or should make, no positive assertion,
+save in respect of the limits of his field of inquiry. If you beg him to
+tell you what that which he knows not is, or does, he regards such a
+question as meaningless. But Spencer's Unknowable, notwithstanding its
+negative prefix, is the Ultimate Reality, and does all that is in any
+way done. We may not know _what_ it is; but _that_ it is, is the most
+assured of all assured certainties. And when it comes to doing, what can
+be more dramatically positive than that which bears a name of negation?
+Whatever it may not be, it is the Power that drives all the machinery in
+this workshop of a world; it is the Power which lies at the back of such
+wit as man has to interpret it, and, in some measure, to utilize its
+mechanism.
+
+It seems plain enough that Spencer distinguishes, or seeks to
+distinguish, between those knowable effects which we call natural
+phenomena and their Unknowable Cause or Source. And this seems to be in
+line with the distinction which his critic, M. Bergson, draws between
+'the evolved which is a result' and 'evolution itself, which is the act
+by which the result is obtained'.[22] An act implies an agent, and the
+agency of which the evolved is a manifestation is for M. Bergson Life,
+while for Spencer it is that very vigorous agency--the Unknowable. Now
+in criticizing Spencer, M. Bergson says:
+
+  'The usual device of the Spencerian method consists in
+  reconstructing evolution with the fragments of the evolved.... It
+  is not however by dividing the evolved that we shall reach the
+  principle of that which evolves. It is not by recomposing the
+  evolved with itself that we shall reproduce the evolution of which
+  it is the term.'[23]
+
+But does Spencer ever suggest that we shall thus reach the principle of
+that which evolves--by which, if I mistake not, M. Bergson means the
+Source of evolution? Does he not urge that we can neither reach it in
+this way, nor in any other way? For M. Bergson, as for Spencer, it is
+unknowable by the intellect--it can only be known by what M. Bergson
+calls intuition. For both thinkers, the intellect provides only a world
+of symbols; and Spencer's transfigured realism may be matched by what
+Dr. Wildon Carr calls M. Bergson's transformed realism.[24] So long as
+we are dealing with the evolved--which is that with which alone science
+attempts to deal--Spencer, M. Bergson, and the rest of us are in like
+case. We must stumble on intellectually with our symbols as best we may.
+'Whether we posit the present structure of mind or the present
+subdivision of matter in either case we remain in the evolved: we are
+told nothing of what evolves, nothing of evolution.'[25] _Nothing of
+what evolves!_ Spencer might exclaim with a groan. Have I then written
+all those pages and pages on the Unknowable for nought? Is it not a
+fundamental tenet of my philosophy that there must be, and therefore is,
+a Source of the evolved--of the phenomenal world which is merely an
+expression in terms of intellectual symbolism, of that ultimate Power
+which, though its nature may baffle the intellect, is none the less the
+most real of all realities?
+
+It would take us too far from the line of Spencer's thought to consider
+M. Bergson's doctrine that it is the intellect that portions the world
+into lots;[26] that cuts the facts out of the interpenetrating whole of
+reality, and renders them artificially distinct within the continuity of
+becoming. It suffices to note that on such a presupposition 'the
+cardinal error of Spencer is to take experience already allotted as
+given, whereas the true problem is to know how the allotment was
+worked'.[27] I am not prepared to give--indeed I have been unable to
+find--M. Bergson's own solution of the problem. I gather that it was
+Life itself that somehow allotted concepts and objects in such
+correspondence as should be practically useful though metaphysically
+false and illusory. But just how it was done I have still to learn. 'The
+original activity was', we are told, 'a simple thing which became
+diversified through the very construction of mechanisms such as those of
+the brain,'[28] which, as Life's tool, has facilitated the chopping up
+of a continuous interpenetrating reality into mince-meat for
+intellectual assimilation. Such a conception was foreign to Spencer's
+thought. But some of us may find it hard to distinguish M. Bergson's
+'original activity' from Spencer's Unknowable, which, so far as one can
+make out, somehow produced precisely the same results. As a matter of
+fact, M. Bergson seems to put into Life, as Spencer put into the
+Unknowable, the potentiality of producing all that actually exists.
+
+For Spencer, as for M. Bergson, we live in a world of change. But
+neither is content to accept changes as facts to be linked up within a
+scheme of scientific interpretation. Both must seek their Source. Now to
+inquire into the Source or Sources of phenomena is characteristic of man
+as thinker. And if, in common with those whom I follow, I regard this
+quest as beyond the limits of science, I am well aware that such
+delimitation of fields of inquiry is by no means universally accepted.
+M. Bergson, for example, regards metaphysics as the _Science_[29] which
+claims to dispense with symbols, which turns its back on analysis, which
+eschews logic, which dispenses with relativity and pierces to the
+absolute, which, apparently, uses the intellect only to establish its
+utter incompetence in this department of 'science'. Merely saying that
+this, whatever else it may be, is not what I, for one, understand by
+science--and not, by the way, what M. Bergson in other passages seems to
+mean by science[30]--I pass on to Spencer's treatment of the philosophy
+of science which, for him, is 'completely unified knowledge', 'the
+truths of philosophy bearing the same relation to the highest scientific
+truths that each of these bears to lower scientific truths.'
+
+I suppose one of the basal truths in his philosophy of science is for
+Spencer the universality of connexion between cause and effect. Now let
+us eliminate Source as the Ultimate Cause (so far as that is possible in
+Spencer); let us restrict our attention to cause and effect in the realm
+of the knowable. When we try to do this we find his statements
+concerning them scarcely less puzzling than those that refer to force,
+with which cause is so often identified. Thus we are told[31] that
+'motion set up in any direction is itself a cause of further motion in
+that direction since it is a manifestation of a surplus force in that
+direction'; and elsewhere[32] that 'the momentum of a body causes it to
+move in a straight line and at a uniform velocity'. A distinction is
+drawn between cause and conditions. But both produce effects, and only
+on these terms can there be that 'proportionality or equivalence between
+cause and effect' on which Spencer insists.[33] There is, however,
+scarcely a hint of what constitutes the difference between cause and
+conditions, save in so far as he speaks[34] of 'those conspicuous
+antecedents which we call the causes' and 'those accompanying
+antecedents which we call the conditions'. Many of the details of his
+treatment I find most perplexing; but to recite examples would be
+wearisome. And then, in the ninth and tenth articles of the Spencerian
+creed, cause plays a somewhat different part. For, there, the
+instability of the homogeneous and the multiplication of effects are
+given as the chief causes which 'necessitate' that redistribution of
+matter and motion of which evolution is one phase. Similarly, as I have
+noted above, in 'Progress: its Law and Cause', the fundamental attribute
+of all modes of change--that every cause produces more than one
+effect--is itself spoken of as a cause, and likened to 'gravitation as
+the cause of each of the groups of phenomena which Kepler formulated'.
+In these cases a generalization is regarded as the cause of the
+phenomena from which the generalization is drawn. But sometimes it is
+spoken of as the reason for the phenomena.[35] Here again, however, as
+throughout his work, reference to Source is close at hand. Hence, in
+place of the words cause and force, the word agency[36] sometimes stands
+for that which produces effects; or the word factor may be used. Thus we
+are told[37] of phenomena continually complicating under the influence
+of the same original factors'; and we meet with the argument (contra
+Huxley) that states of consciousness are factors, that is, they 'have
+the power of working changes in the nervous system and setting up
+motions'.[38] Always close at hand, constantly underlying Spencer's
+thought, is the notion of power which works changes. In his treatment of
+the philosophy of science we are never far from the noumenal Source of
+phenomena.
+
+  'For that interpretation of things which is alone possible for us
+  this is all we require to know--that the force or energy
+  manifested, now in one way now in another, persists or remains
+  unchanged in amount. But when we ask what this energy is, there is
+  no answer save that it is the noumenal Cause implied by the
+  phenomenal effect.'[39]
+
+Was it partly with Spencer in view that Mr. Bertrand Russell recently
+urged[40] that the word cause 'is so inextricably bound up with
+misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the
+philosophical vocabulary desirable'? Professor Mach[41] had previously
+expressed the hope 'that the science of the future will discard the use
+of cause and effect as formally obscure'. And as long ago as 1870 W. K.
+Clifford[42] tried to show in 'what sort of way an exact knowledge of
+the facts would supersede an enquiry after the causes of them'; and
+urged that the hypothesis of continuity 'involves such an
+interdependence of the facts of the universe as forbids us to speak of
+one fact or set of facts as the cause of another fact or set of facts'.
+Such views may, perhaps, be regarded as extreme; and the word cause is
+not likely to be extruded from the vocabulary of current speech, of the
+less exact branches of science, or of general discussions of
+world-processes. Still, a philosophy of science must take note of this
+criticism of the use of a term which is, to say the least of it,
+ambiguous. We must at any rate try to get rid of ambiguity. Now we live
+in a world of what, in a very broad and inclusive sense, may be called
+things; and these things are in varied ways related to each other. (I
+must beg leave to assume, without discussion, that the relatedness of
+things is no less constitutive of the world with which a philosophy of
+science has to deal than the things which are in relation.) And when
+things stand in certain kinds of relatedness to each other changes take
+place. The trouble is that the kinds of relatedness are so many and the
+kinds of change are also so many! Spencer tried to reduce all kinds of
+relatedness to one quasi-mechanical type; and he signally failed--or
+shall I say that he succeeded only by ignoring all the specific
+differences on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by so smudgy an
+extension of the meaning of mechanical and physical terms as to make
+them do duty in every conceivable connexion?
+
+So long as we can deal with simple types of relatedness, such as that
+which we call gravitative, in any given system of things regarded as
+isolated, we can express in formulae not only the rate of change within
+the system, but also the rate at which the rate of change itself
+changes. And these formulae are found to be generally applicable where
+like things are in a like field of relatedness. So that Spencer's
+persistence of force (at least in one of its many meanings) is replaced
+in such cases by sameness of differential equations. And in such cases
+we have no need for the word cause. Of course the value of the constants
+in any such formula depends upon the nature of the field of relatedness
+and of the things therein; and only certain systems, in which the
+relations are simple, or are susceptible of simplification, can be dealt
+with, at present, in this manner. It is imperative to remember that not
+only the rate of change but the kind of change differs in different
+relational fields--a fact of which Spencer took too little cognizance,
+so bent was he on some sort of unification at all hazards. Revert now to
+a field of gravitative relatedness, in which the motion of things is the
+kind of change, while the rate of change is expressible in a formula;
+may we not say that the co-presence of things in this relationship does
+imply certain motions and changes of motion within the system to which
+the term gravitative applies? There seems little room for ambiguity if
+we call what is thus implied the effect, and if we term those modes of
+relatedness which carry this kind of implication, effective. It may,
+however, be said that it sounds somewhat strange to speak of relations
+as effective. How can mere relatedness as such _do_ anything? What is
+implied by the effect is surely, it will be urged, a cause in the full
+and rich sense of the word--a cause which produces the effect. For what
+is here suggested is nothing more than a generalized statement of the
+truth that the relational constitution of the system being what it is,
+the changes are what they are! And so we come back to the conception of
+an agency which in some way produces the observable change--of a power
+which is active behind the phenomenal scene--of force and cause in the
+Spencerian sense. But, so far as scientific interpretation is concerned,
+this reference to Source--for such it really is--is useless. The
+gravitative system can be dealt with scientifically just as well without
+it as with it.
+
+What, then, becomes of the scientific conception of energy? Is not
+energy that which produces observable change? Is it not active in the
+sense required? And can we say that this conception is useless for
+scientific interpretation? I suppose most of us, in our student days,
+have passed through the phase of regarding energy as an active demon
+which plays a notorious part in the physical drama. Spencer loved it
+dearly. But some of us, under what we consider wiser guidance, hold that
+what we should understand by kinetic energy is nothing of this sort. It
+is a constant ratio of variables, conveniently expressed as 1/2_mv_^{2}.
+That, however, it may be said, is absurd. Energy is not merely a ratio
+or a formula; it is something much more real; perhaps the most real of
+all the realities the being of which has been disclosed by physical
+science. Granted in a sense, and a very true sense. But what is this
+reality? It is the reality of the changes themselves in those fields of
+relatedness to which the formula has reference. There is nothing, I
+conceive, in the modern treatment of energy that affords any scientific
+justification of the Spencerian view[43] that energy is an agent through
+the activity of which the constant ratio of variables is maintained in
+the physical world.
+
+I feel sure that it will still be said that change must inevitably
+imply that which produces change, and that, even if energy be only a
+ratio of variables within a changing field, there is still the
+implication of Force as the real Cause of which the change itself,
+however formulated, is the effect. No doubt this is one of the meanings
+which the ambiguous words force and cause may carry. It is to remove
+this ambiguity that I have suggested that the word Source should be
+substituted for cause in this sense. And what about force? In one of its
+meanings it now generally stands for a measure of change. For those who
+accept Source as a scientific concept it may well stand for the measure
+or degree of its activity gauged by the phenomenal effect; for those who
+do not accept it, the measure or degree of the change itself[44]--to be
+dealt with in mechanics in terms of mass and acceleration. This leaves
+outstanding, however, the use of the word force in the phrase--the
+forces of nature--gravitative force, cohesive force, electromotive
+force, and so on. It was, I take it, with this usage in view that
+Spencer spoke of vital, mental, and social forces. Now the reference in
+each of these cases is to some specific mode of relatedness among the
+things concerned. We need to name it in some way; and this is the way
+that is, rather unfortunately, sanctioned by custom and long usage. When
+we say that a thing is in a field of electromotive force we mean (do we
+not?) that the relatedness is of that particular kind named
+electromotive, and not of another kind. When Spencer spoke of social
+forces he had in view changes which take place within a field of social
+relationships. We do not really need the word force in this sense, since
+the term relatedness would suffice, and has no misleading associations.
+But there it is: our business should be to understand clearly what it
+means. It does not, or should not, I think, mean more, in this
+connexion, than a particular kind of relatedness in virtue of which an
+observable kind of change occurs.
+
+We may now pass to cause and conditions. When Spencer distinguishes
+between those conspicuous antecedents which we call the causes and those
+accompanying antecedents which we call the conditions, he invites the
+question: What, then, is the essential difference between them? If the
+accompanying antecedents are distinguished as inconspicuous, we surely
+need some criterion of the distinction. Furthermore, inconspicuous
+conditions are, in science, every whit as important as those which are
+conspicuous. Now we all know that Mill regarded the cause as 'the sum
+total of the conditions positive and negative taken together.'[45] But
+he expressly distinguishes between _events_ and _states_.[46]
+Discussing, for example, the case of a man who eats of a particular dish
+and dies in consequence, he says:
+
+  'The various conditions, except the single one of eating the food,
+  were not events but states possessing more or less of permanency,
+  and might therefore have preceded the effect by an indefinite
+  length of duration, for want of that event which was requisite to
+  complete the required concurrence of conditions.'
+
+Again he says:
+
+  'When sulphur, charcoal, and nitre are put together in certain
+  proportions and in a certain manner, the effect is, not an
+  explosion, but that the mixture acquires a property by which in
+  given circumstances it will explode. The ingredients of the
+  gunpowder have been brought into a state of preparedness for
+  exploding as soon as the other conditions of an explosion shall
+  have occurred.'
+
+And he tells us that physiological processes 'often have for the chief
+part of their operation to predispose the constitution to some mode of
+action'.
+
+This distinction may profitably be carried further and emphasized in
+our terminology. Take any thing, or any integrated group of things,
+regarded as that higher order of thing which we call a self-contained
+system. Process occurs therein, and process involves change. In so far
+as the system is self-contained its changes and states are inherent in
+its constitution. We need a term by which to designate that which is
+thus inherent and constitutional. The term _ground_ might be reserved
+for this purpose. The word ground has its natural home in logic. It is
+here extended (if it be an extension) to that to which the logic has
+reference in the existing world. One is here following Spencer, who
+claims[47] that 'Logic is a science pertaining to objective existence'.
+On these terms the constitution of any system is the ground of the
+properties, states, and happenings in that system regarded as isolated.
+But the changes or properties will be also in relation to surrounding
+things or systems. _These_ changes, or modifications of change, in
+relation to external things or events, may properly be said to be
+conditioned; and we may well restrict the term conditions to influences
+_outside_ the constitution as ground. Of course, if we accept this
+usage, we must not speak, with Mill, of the constitution of any system
+as the condition of its inherent changes or properties. That is why we
+need some such word and concept as ground. Now we may fix our attention
+on any constituent part of some natural system and make that part the
+centre of our interest. That part may be changing in virtue of its
+constitution; and the rest of the system, regarded as external to this
+selected part, must therefore be regarded as conditioning. It is a
+matter of convenience for purposes of scientific interpretation whether
+we select a larger or a smaller system-group and discuss its
+constitutional character. Thus we may think of the constitution of the
+solar system, or of that of the sun's corona; of the constitution of an
+organism or of that of one of its cells; of the constitution of a
+complex molecule or of that of an atom therein. We have here reached, or
+nearly reached, the limiting case in one direction--that of restricting
+our field of inquiry. The limiting case in the other direction is, I
+suppose, the universe. But could we so expand our thought as to embrace,
+if that were possible, the whole universe, then there are no conditions;
+for _ex hypothesi_ there is nothing for science outside the universe. We
+have reached the limiting concept. Hence, for science, the constitution
+of nature is the ultimate ground of all that is or happens.
+
+Let us now see how we stand. Consider the following statements:
+
+1. The Unknowable is the cause of all the phenomena we observe.
+
+2. The constitution of gunpowder is the cause of its explosiveness.[48]
+
+3. The fall of a spark was the cause of the actual explosion of the
+powder.[49]
+
+Or these:
+
+1. Life is the cause of all vital manifestations.
+
+2. The inherited nature of a hen's egg is the cause of its producing a
+chick and not a duckling.
+
+3. The cause of the development of the chick embryo is the warmth
+supplied by the incubating mother.[50]
+
+In each case the reference under (1) is to a transcendent cause which
+produces the phenomena under consideration. I suggest that the word
+Source should here be used instead of cause. In each case the reference
+under (2) is to the nature or constitution of that within which some
+process occurs. I suggest that the word ground should here be used
+instead of cause. In each case the reference under (3) is to some
+external influence. I suggest that the word condition should here be
+used instead of cause. We thus eliminate the word cause altogether. But
+since, in nine cases out of ten, the conditions, or some salient
+condition, is what is meant by cause in popular speech, and in the less
+exact sciences, the word cause may perhaps be there retained with this
+particular meaning. These are of course merely suggestions towards the
+avoidance of puzzling ambiguity. One could wish that Spencer could have
+thought out some such distinctions to help his sorely perplexed readers.
+
+One could wish, too, that he had devoted his great powers of thought to
+a searching discussion of the different types of relatedness which are
+found in nature, and to a fuller consideration of a synthetic scheme of
+their inter-relatedness. It is imperative that our thought of relations
+should have a concrete backing. 'Every act of knowing', says Spencer,
+'is the formation of a relation in consciousness answering to a relation
+in the environment.' But the knowledge-relations are of so very special
+a type; and the relations in the environment are so many and varied.
+Much more analysis of natural relations is required than Spencer
+provides. I do not mean, of course, that there is any lack of
+analysis--and of very penetrating analysis--in the _Psychology_, the
+_Biology_, the _Sociology_, and the _Ethics_. I mean that in _First
+Principles_, which must be regarded as his general survey of the
+philosophy of science, there is no searching analysis of the salient
+types of relationship which enter into the texture of this very complex
+world. Such omnibus words as differentiation, integration, segregation,
+do duty in various connexions with convenient elasticity of meaning to
+suit the occasion. But apart from qualifying adjectives,[51] such as
+astronomic, geologic, and so on up to artistic and literary, there is
+too little attempt at either a distinguishing of the types of
+relatedness or at a relationing of the relations so distinguished. One
+just jumps from one to another after a break in the text, and finds
+oneself in a wholly new field of inquiry. Little but the omnibus
+terminology remains the same. Nor does the _Essay on the Classification
+of the Sciences_, with all its tabulation, furnish what is really
+required. What one seeks to know is how those specific kinds of
+relatedness which characterize the successive phases of evolutionary
+progress, inorganic, organic, and superorganic, differ from one another
+and how they are connected. This one does not find. The impression one
+gets, here and elsewhere, is that all forms of relatedness must somehow,
+by the omission of all other specific characters, be reduced to the
+mechanical type. This, no doubt, is unification of a sort. But is it the
+sort of unification with which a philosophy of science should rest
+content?
+
+It may be said that unification can only be reached by digging down to
+some ubiquitous type of relation which is common to all processes
+throughout the universe at any stage of evolution. But what, on these
+terms, becomes of evolution itself as a problem to be solved? Surely any
+solution of that problem must render an account of just those specific
+modes of relatedness which have been ignored in digging down to the
+foundations. Surely there must be unification of the superstructure as
+well as of the substructure. Here and now is our world, within the
+texture of which things stand to each other in such varied relations,
+though they may be reducible to a few main types. There, in the faraway
+part, was the primitive fire-mist, dear to Spencer's imagination, in
+which the modes of relationship were so few and so simple, and all
+seemingly of one main type. How do we get in scientific interpretation
+from the one to the other? Will it suffice to breathe over the scene the
+magic words differentiation and integration? Spencer appears to think
+so. Of course he did exceptionally fine work in elucidating the modes of
+differentiation and integration within certain relational fields--though
+he sometimes uses the latter word for mere shrinkage in size.[52] But
+what one asks, and asks of him in vain, is just how, within a connected
+scheme, the several relational fields in the domain of nature are
+themselves related, and how they were themselves differentiated. How,
+for instance, did the specific relationships exhibited in the fabric of
+crystals arise out of the primitive fire-mist relations? At some stage
+of evolution this specific form of relatedness came into being, whereas
+before that stage was reached it was not in being. No doubt we may say
+that the properties of the pre-existing molecules were such that these
+molecules could in due course become thus related, and enter into the
+latticed architecture of the crystal. They already possessed the
+potentiality of so doing. And if we have resort to potentialities, all
+subsequently developed types and modes of relatedness were potentially
+in existence _ab initio_--they were, as Tyndall said, 'once latent in a
+fiery cloud.' But it is difficult to see how the specific modes of
+relatedness which obtain within the crystal, can be said to exist prior
+to the existence of the crystal within which they so obtain.
+
+Preserving the spirit of Spencer's teaching we must regard all modes
+of relatedness which are disclosed by scientific research as part and
+parcel of the constitution of nature, from whatever Source, knowable or
+unknowable, that constitution be derived. Of these modes there are many;
+indeed, if we deal with all concrete cases, their number is legion. For
+purposes of illustration, however, we may reduce them, rather
+drastically, to three main types. There are relations of the
+physico-chemical type,[53] which we may provisionally follow Spencer in
+regarding as ubiquitous; there are those of the vital type, which are
+restricted to living organisms; there are those of the cognitive type,
+which seem to be much more narrowly restricted. How we deal with these
+is of crucial importance. Denoting them by the letters A, B, C we find
+that there are progressively ascending modes of relatedness within any
+given type. There is evolution within each type. Within the
+physico-chemical type A, for example, atoms, molecules, and synthetic
+groups of molecules follow in logical order of evolution. Now the
+successive products, in which this physico-chemical type of relatedness
+obtains, have certain _new and distinctive properties_ which are not
+merely the algebraic sum of the properties of the component things prior
+to synthesis. We may speak of them as constitutive of the products in a
+higher stage of relatedness, thus distinguishing constitutive from
+additive properties.[54] Similarly when B, the vital relations, are
+evolved, the living products, in which these specific relations obtain,
+have new constitutive properties, on the importance of which vitalists
+are right in insisting, though I emphatically dissent from some of the
+conclusions they draw from their presence. For if, beyond the
+physico-chemical, a special agency be invoked to account for the
+presence of new constitutive properties, then, in the name of logical
+consistency, let us invoke special agencies to account for the
+constitutive properties within the physico-chemical--for radio-active
+properties for example. If a Source of phenomena be postulated, why not
+postulate One Source of all phenomena from the very meanest to the very
+highest? There remains the case of C--the synthetic whole in which
+cognitive relatedness obtains. This is unquestionably more difficult of
+scientific interpretation. But I believe that like statements may be
+made in this case also. What we have, I conceive, is just a new and
+higher type of relatedness with specific characters of its own. But of
+this more in the sequel.
+
+It must be remembered that A, B, C stand for _relationships_ and that
+the related things are progressively more complex within more complex
+relational wholes. Relationships are every whit as real as are the terms
+they hold in their grasp. I do not say more real; but I say emphatically
+as real. And if this be so, then they ought somehow to be introduced
+into our formulae, instead of being taken for granted. We give H{2}O as
+the formula for a molecule of water. But that molecule is something very
+much more than two atoms of hydrogen + one atom of oxygen. The
+absolutely distinctive feature of the molecule is the specific
+relatedness of these atoms. This constitutive mode of relatedness is,
+however, just taken for granted. And it is scarcely matter for surprise
+that, when we find not less specific modes of vital relatedness in the
+living organism, they are too apt to be just ignored!
+
+Revert now to the empirical outcome of scientific research, for as such
+I regard it, that new constitutive properties emerge when new modes and
+types of relatedness occur, and when new products are successively
+formed in evolutional synthesis. This, it will be said, involves the
+acceptance of what is now commonly called creative evolution. I am far
+from denying that, in the universe of discourse where Source is under
+consideration, the adjective is justifiable. But, in the universe of
+discourse of science, I regard it as inappropriate. What we have is just
+plain evolution; and we must simply accept the truth--if, as I conceive,
+it be a truth--that in all true evolution there is more in the
+conclusion than is given in the premises; which is only a logical way of
+saying that there is more in the world to-day than there was in the
+primitive fire-mist. Not more 'matter and energy', but more varied
+relationships and new properties, quite unpredictable from what one may
+perhaps speak of as the fire-mist's point of view. This is no new
+doctrine, though it has received of late a new emphasis. Mill, dealing
+with causation,[55] speaks of a 'radical and important distinction'.
+There are, he says in substance, some cases in which the joint effect of
+the several causes is the algebraical sum of their separate effects. He
+speaks of this as the 'composition of causes', and illustrates it from
+the 'composition of forces' in dynamics. 'But in the other description
+of cases', he says, 'the agencies which are brought together cease
+entirely, and a totally different set of phenomena arise.' In these
+cases 'a concurrence of causes takes place which calls into action new
+laws bearing no analogy to any that we can trace in the separate
+operation of the causes'. They might, he suggests, be termed
+'heteropathic laws'. G. H. Lewes, too,[56] in his _Problems of Life and
+Mind_, drew the distinction between properties which are _resultant_ and
+those which are _emergent_. These suggestions were open to Spencer's
+consideration long before the last edition of _First Principles_
+appeared. They were, however, too foreign to the established lines of
+his thought to call for serious consideration.
+
+But if new relationships and new properties appear in the course of
+evolutionary progress, where is the opportunity for that unification of
+scientific knowledge which, according to Spencer, is the goal of
+philosophy? To be frank, I am by no means sure that this question can be
+answered in a manner that is other than tentative. Perhaps we have not
+yet reached the stage at which more than provisional unification is
+possible. Such provisional unification as is suggested by a survey of
+the facts is that of seemingly uniform correlation in a hierarchy of
+logical implication. There are certain modes of relatedness which belong
+to the cognitive type. It would seem that whenever these obtain they may
+be correlated with other modes of relatedness which are of the vital or
+physiological type; and that these, in turn, may be correlated with
+those that are physico-chemical. Thus C implies B, and B implies A. The
+order cannot be reversed. Physico-chemical relations, _as a class_, do
+not imply those that are physiological.[57] The implication is not
+symmetrical. Spencer was within sight of this when he spoke[58] of the
+abstract-concrete sciences as 'instrumental' with respect to the
+concrete sciences, though the latter are not 'instrumental' in the same
+sense with respect to the former. But unfortunately he regarded the
+'chasm' between the two groups as 'absolute'. And for him the proper
+home of properties--of all properties it would appear--is the
+abstract-concrete group--mechanics, physics, and chemistry. This
+seemingly leaves no place for a specific type of properties connected
+with vital relatedness as such. In fact Spencer's method of treatment
+reduces all modes of relatedness to the A type, the laws of which are,
+for him, the primary 'causes' of all kinds of differentiation and
+integration. Hence the laws of biology and psychology can ultimately be
+expressed and explained, he thinks, in mechanical or mechanistic terms.
+But in the doctrine of implication they are just the laws of B and C
+respectively, though laws of A may underlie them in a logical sense. And
+as we ascend the evolutionary plane from A to AB and thence to ABC--from
+the physico-chemical to the vital and thence to the cognitive--we find
+new modes of relatedness, new forms of more complex integration and
+synthesis, new properties successively appearing in serial order. This
+seems to me simply to express, in outline, the net result of
+interpretation based on empirical observation--though much, very much,
+requires to be filled in by future research. And the new properties are
+not merely additive of preceding properties; they are constitutive, and
+characterize the higher evolutionary products as such. Why they are thus
+constitutive, science is unable to say. Spencer, of course, calls in the
+Unknowable to supply the required nexus.[59] Otherwise, in each case, he
+confesses that 'we can learn nothing more than that here is one of the
+uniformities in the order of phenomena'.[60] None the less we may be
+able some day to establish an ordinal correlation[61] of cognitive
+processes with physiological processes, and an ordinal correlation of
+these physiological processes with those of the physico-chemical type.
+That I conceive to be the ideal of strictly scientific interpretation if
+it is to be raised progressively to a level approaching that of the
+exact sciences. It certainly is not yet attained. But I see no reason
+why we should not regard it as attainable. It will involve the very
+difficult determination of many correlation coefficients and
+constants--and for some of these our data are, it must be confessed,
+both scanty and unreliable.
+
+We must here note a much-discussed departure on Spencer's part from his
+earlier position. On the first page of the _Biology_ in the earlier
+editions, and in the last, we are told:
+
+  'The properties of substances, though destroyed to sense by
+  combination are not destroyed in reality. It follows from the
+  persistence of force that the properties of a compound are
+  resultants of the properties of its components, resultants in
+  which the properties of the components are severally in full
+  action, though mutually obscured.'
+
+There is no hint here of Mill's heteropathic laws nor of Lewes's
+emergents. But in the last edition a special chapter is inserted on the
+Dynamic Element in Life. We here find a tardy recognition of the
+presence of specific vital characters.
+
+  'The processes which go on in living things are incomprehensible
+  as the results of any physical actions known to us.... In brief,
+  then, we are obliged to confess that Life in its essence cannot be
+  conceived in physico-chemical terms.'[62]
+
+I speak of this as a tardy recognition; but it is one that does honour
+to the man; it is a frank admission that his previous treatment was in
+some measure inadequate, which a smaller man would not have had the
+honesty or the strength of character to make. Of course it is traced
+down to the Unknowable. 'Life as a principle of activity is unknown and
+unknowable; while phenomena are accessible to thought the implied
+noumenon is inaccessible.'[63] Still, certain specific characteristics
+of living organisms are explicitly recognized as among the accessible
+phenomena; and these cannot be conceived in physico-chemical terms. But
+did Spencer fully realize how big a hole this knocks in the bottom of
+the purely mechanical interpretation of nature he had for so long
+championed?
+
+There remains for consideration the place of the cognitive relation in
+Spencer's philosophy of science. We need not here discuss his
+transfigured realism. Apart from the customary references to the
+Unknowable, of which what is knowable is said to be symbolic, it comes
+to little more than laying special emphasis on the truism that what is
+known in the so-called objective world involves the process of knowing;
+from which it follows that, apart from knowing it the objective world
+cannot be known. From this Spencer draws the conclusion that terms in
+cognitive relatedness have their very nature determined in and through
+that relatedness, and cannot _in themselves_ be what they are, and as
+they are, in the field of cognitive symbolism. This may or may not be
+true. I am one of those who question the validity of the arguments in
+favour of this conclusion. Since, however, the philosophy of science
+deals only with the knowable--of which the so-called appearances with
+which we have direct acquaintance are the primary data--we need not here
+trouble ourselves with the controversy between realists and symbolists.
+Even on Spencer's view the world as symbolized is the real world _for
+science_.
+
+Now one way of expressing the fact that the cognitive relation is
+always present where knowledge is concerned is to proclaim 'the truth
+that our states of consciousness are the only things we can know'.[64]
+But it is a terribly ambiguous way of expressing the fact. What is here
+meant by a state of consciousness? So far as cognition is concerned it
+is, or at any rate it involves, a relationship between something known
+and the organism, as knowing--for Spencer assuredly the organism, though
+a so-called inner aspect therein. Of course it is a very complex
+relationship. It comprises relations in what is known, and relations in
+the organism as knowing. Hence Spencer defines life, psychical as well
+as physical, as 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to
+external relations'.[65]
+
+  'That which distinguishes Psychology is that each of its
+  propositions takes account both of the connected internal
+  phenomena and of the connected external phenomena to which they
+  refer. It is not only the one, nor only the other, that
+  characterises cognition. It is the connexion between these two
+  connexions.'[66]
+
+So far well. Cognition is a very complex network of relatedness
+involving many terms. What are these terms? For Spencer the internal
+terms are ultimately nervous (=psychic) shocks in highly integrated
+aggregates; and the external terms are, proximately at least, things in
+the environment. But both alike are spoken of as states of
+consciousness. There is surely an opening for ambiguity here. Sometimes,
+too, the words subjective affections are used in place of states of
+consciousness. 'Thus we are brought to the conclusion that what we are
+conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and
+resistance, are but subjective affections.'[67] Well, these states of
+consciousness, these subjective affections, fall into two great
+classes--the vivid and the faint. The former, which we know as
+sensations, accompany direct and therefore strong excitations of the
+nerve-centres; the latter, which we know as remembered sensations, or
+ideas of sensations, accompany indirect and therefore weak excitations
+of the same nerve-centres.[68] And then we are told that the aggregate
+of the faint is what we call the mind, the subject, the _ego_; the
+aggregate of the vivid is what we call the external world, the object,
+the _non-ego_.[69] It would seem, then, that the aggregate of vivid
+_subjective_ affections is the _objective_ world so far as knowable. To
+say the least of it, this terminology is somewhat perplexing.
+
+No doubt our knowledge of the external world involves a subtle and
+intricate inter-relation of what is experienced vividly and what is
+experienced faintly--of what is actually presented and what is ideally
+re-presented. The distinction between them is a valid one. But when
+Spencer equates this distinction with that between the external world
+and the mind, as he does in the passages to which I have referred, the
+validity of his procedure is seriously open to question.
+
+It must be confessed that an adequate analysis of cognitive relatedness
+on scientific lines is not to be found in Spencer's works. I am not sure
+that it is yet to be found in the works of any other philosopher, though
+there are many signs that the difficult problems it involves are
+receiving serious attention. This much seems certain, for those who
+accept the spirit, though not perhaps the letter, of Spencer's teaching:
+that there it is as a constitutive mode of relatedness in the realm of
+nature, and that, if it forms part of the evolutionary scheme, if it is
+present in the conclusion, so far reached, though it was absent in the
+physico-chemical premises, if it is to be included in a philosophy of
+science it must be dealt with by that philosophy on lines strictly
+analogous to those on which any other relational problem is treated.
+Firmly as we may believe in the reality of Source, we must not call to
+our aid some psychic entity, some entelechy, some _elan vital_, to help
+us out of our difficulties; for one and all of these lie wholly outside
+the universe of discourse of science; and not one of them affords the
+smallest help in solving a single scientific problem in a manner that is
+itself scientific.
+
+We have seen that Spencer believed that the task of psychology is to
+investigate the correlation of external and internal relations, and, in
+that sense, itself to correlate them within a scientific interpretation.
+Now the outcome of the former correlation is some form of behaviour or
+conduct on the part of the organism. No doubt such behaviour affords
+data to be dealt with in subsequent cognition. But it implies the prior
+cognition which leads up to it; and it is this prior cognition,
+abstracted from the behaviour to which it leads, that we have to
+consider. It is so terribly complex that it is difficult to deal with it
+comprehensibly in a brief space. Let me, however, try to do so, at least
+in tentative outline. There occurs, let us say, an external event in the
+physical world, such as the motion of a billiard-ball across the table;
+and when during its progress this stimulates the retina, there is an
+internal physico-chemical process which runs its course in retina, optic
+nerves, and the central nervous system. We may regard these two
+processes, external and internal, as _so far_, of like physical order.
+With adequate knowledge the two could, in some measure, be serially
+correlated as such. But the physico-chemical processes in the organism
+are not only of this physical type. They are vital or physiological as
+well. And this makes a real difference. Of course this statement is open
+to question. But I, for one, believe that there are specific relations
+present in physiological processes, _qua_ vital, other than those of the
+physico-chemical type--relations which are effective and which require a
+distinctive name. So far I am a vitalist. At some stage of evolution
+these new modes of effective relatedness came into being, whereas in the
+fire-mist and for long afterwards they were not in being. None the less
+when they did actually come into being, under conditions of which we are
+at present ignorant--though not so ignorant as we were--they were
+dependent upon, and, for our interpretation, they logically imply, the
+physico-chemical relations which are also present. In any given case
+they further imply, through heredity-relatedness, the evolutionary
+history of the organism in which they obtain. This so-called historical
+element in biology no doubt involves a characteristic vital
+relationship. But, I take it, the physico-chemical constitution of any
+inorganic compound, and of any molecule therein, has also its
+history--has relationship to past occurrences within its type, which
+have helped to make it what it is. Still, in the organism the relation
+to past happenings has a quite distinctive form which we deal with in
+terms of heredity. See, then, how we stand so far. The internal
+physiological process implies a long chain of heredity-relationships
+through which the organism is prepared for its occurrence. It also
+implies a physico-chemical basis, an underlying[70] physico-chemical
+process. And this implies as a condition of its occurrence, the external
+event, the passage of the billiard-ball across the table. In a broad
+sense we may say that the inner process knows the external event which
+is a condition of its occurrence. But we have not yet reached cognition
+of the psychological type.
+
+Before passing on to indicate, in tentative outline, the nature of this
+higher mode of relatedness, I pause to note two points. The first is
+that knowing in that extended sense which I have borrowed,[71] is
+essentially selective in its nature. The physiological process, in the
+case I have taken, knows only that external event which is directly
+before the eyes and which is serially correlated with changes in the
+retinal images through the stimulation of specialized receptors. Of
+other external events it has no such knowledge. Compare this with the
+gravitative knowledge--if a yet wider extension of the meaning of the
+word be permitted--which the earth has of the sun and all the other
+members of the solar system--nay more, in degrees perhaps infinitesimal,
+of all other material bodies in the universe. The motion of the earth in
+its orbit implies the whole of this vast field of gravitative
+relatedness. The existing orbital motion at any moment implies, too, the
+preceding motion which it has, in a sense, inherited from the past.
+Abolish the rest of the universe at this moment and the earth's motion
+would cease to be orbital. In virtue of its 'inheritance from the past',
+it would continue at uniform velocity in one direction. The continuous
+change of direction and velocity we observe, is a response which implies
+gravitative knowledge. In a sense, then, the whole solar system is known
+by the earth as it swings in its orbit.
+
+The second point may be introduced by a question. Granted that we may
+say, in a very liberal sense, that the earth in its motion has this
+gravitative knowledge--is such knowledge accompanied by awareness? We do
+not know. But the point I have in mind is this, that the question itself
+is vague. Awareness of what? There must be awareness of something; and a
+definite question should be directed towards the nature of that
+something. For example: is the earth aware of its own motion? Or is it
+aware of the solar system? Or is it aware of the relation of the one to
+the other? If it be said that the second of these is meant when we ask
+whether the knowledge is accompanied by awareness, well and good. The
+answer will serve to define the question. Take now a case of biological
+knowledge. Are the plants in the cottager's window, when they grow
+towards the light, aware of a process in their own tissues? Or are they
+aware of the sunshine? Or are they in some measure aware of the
+connexion between the one and the other? To all these questions we must
+answer, I suppose, that we do not know. But it may have been worth while
+to ask them in a definite way.
+
+We pass, then, to cognition in the usual acceptation of the term--to
+what we speak of as knowledge in the proper and narrower sense. My
+contention is that this is a mode of relatedness which science must
+endeavour to treat on precisely the same lines as it deals with any
+other natural kind of relatedness. At some stage of evolution it came
+into being, whereas in the fire-mist, and for long afterwards, it was
+not in being. None the less when it did come into being, it was
+dependent on, and for our interpretation it logically implies,
+underlying physiological processes, as they in turn imply
+physico-chemical processes, in each case serially correlated. It is
+pre-eminently selective. And just as any physiological process, however
+externally conditioned, is grounded in[72] the constitution of the
+organism, as such, so too is any cognitive process grounded in the
+constitution of the organism as one in which this higher type of
+relatedness has supervened. Again, just as the physiological
+constitution implies a prolonged racial preparation, describable in
+terms of that mode of relatedness we name heredity, so, too, does any
+cognitive process imply, not only this racial preparation of the
+biological kind, but also an individual preparation of the psychological
+kind--implies relatedness to what we call, rather loosely, prior
+experience--which itself implies a concurrent physiological preparation.
+
+Now there can be no doubt that awareness is a characteristic feature of
+the knowledge of cognition, whether it be present or absent in knowledge
+in the more extended sense. We must just accept this as what appears to
+be a fact. In science we do not pretend to say why facts are what they
+are and as they are. We take them as they are given, and endeavour to
+trace their connexions and their implications. Accepting, then,
+awareness as given, we must ask: Awareness of what? It is sometimes said
+that cognition is aware of itself. I am not sure that I understand what
+this means. If we are speaking of the cognitive relation, which is an
+awareness relation, the question seems to be whether a relation of
+awareness is related to itself. But of course if a field of cognitive
+relatedness be regarded as a complex whole, any part may be related to
+the rest, and the rest to any part. That kind of self-awareness--if we
+must so call it!--is eminently characteristic of cognition in the higher
+forms of its development. On these terms cognition is aware of
+itself--though the mode of statement savours of ambiguity.
+
+Let us next ask whether there is awareness of the underlying cortical
+process. If we are speaking of direct awareness, apparently not. The
+correlation between the two is only discoverable through a very
+elaborate and complex[73] application of further cognition in
+interpretative knowledge. We only know the correlated cortical process
+by description, as Mr. Bertrand Russell would say,[74] and never by
+direct acquaintance.
+
+Parenthetic reference must here, I suppose, be made to psycho-physical
+parallelism. But it shall be very brief. The sooner this cumbrous term
+with its misleading suggestions is altogether eliminated from the
+vocabulary of science the better. The locus of the so-called parallelism
+is, we are told, the cortex of the brain. But the cortical process is
+only an incident--no doubt a very important one, but still an
+incident--in a much wider physiological process, the occurrence of
+which, in what we may speak of as primary cognition, implies events in
+the external world. It is of these events that there is direct physical,
+physiological, and cognitive knowledge. Of course there are also
+inter-cortical relations which underlie the relations of those ideal
+cognita (Spencer's faint class) that supplement the primary cognita
+which imply direct stimulation of sensory receptors (Spencer's vivid
+class). It is questionable whether any form of cognition, properly so
+called, is possible in their absence. Now I see no objection to
+labelling the fact (if it be a fact) that the cognitive process implies
+a physiological process in which, as in a larger whole, the cortex
+plays its appropriate part, by the use of some such convenient
+correlation-word as psycho-physical; but only so long as this does not
+involve a doctrine of parallelism; so long as it merely means that
+cognition implies, let us say, certain underlying cortical changes. Of
+course it implies a great deal more than cortical process only; but this
+may perhaps be taken for granted. My chief objection to the word
+'parallelism' is that it suggests two separate orders of being, and not
+two types of relationship within one order of being for scientific
+study.[75] We do not speak of parallelism between physiological and
+physico-chemical processes. We just say that scientific interpretation
+proceeds on the working hypothesis that there is a correlation of such a
+kind that physiological process implies a physico-chemical basis. So
+too, I urge, we should be content to say that scientific interpretation
+proceeds on the working hypothesis that there is a correlation of such a
+kind that cognitive process implies a physiological basis.
+
+It may be said that Spencer accepted the so-called identity hypothesis
+which does not lie open to the objection that it suggests two orders of
+being. He believed[76] 'that mind and nervous action are the subjective
+and objective faces of the same thing', though 'we remain utterly
+incapable of seeing or even imagining how the two are related'. Well, we
+may call them in one passage the same thing, we may speak, in another
+passage, of the antithesis between them as never to be transcended, and
+we may try to save the situation by reference to duality of aspect. But
+this kind of treatment does not help as much towards a scientific
+interpretation. It is true that, in yet another passage, speaking of the
+correlation of the physical and the psychical, Spencer says:[77] 'We can
+learn nothing more than that here is one of the uniformities in the
+order of phenomena.' Then why not leave it at that? And if there be a
+constant and uniform correlation which is 'in a certain indirect way
+quantitive', it would seem that we _do_ see, as far as science ever
+professes to see, 'how the two are related.' We see, or conceive, how
+they are related in much the same way as we do in the case of the
+connexion between the physiological and the physico-chemical, and in
+numberless other cases. Both parallelism and identity will have to go by
+the board in a philosophy of science. They must be replaced by the far
+more modest hypothesis, which seems to express all that they really mean
+for science, that cognition always implies certain physiological
+processes in the organism.
+
+If we do speak of mind and nervous action as two faces of the same
+thing, it seems pretty certain that the one face is not directly aware
+of the other. When we speak of awareness in cognition we must therefore,
+it appears, exclude any direct awareness of concurrent physiological
+processes. Of what, then, is there awareness? Primarily perhaps of some
+occurrence in the external world. But the difficulty here is that, in
+the simplest case of human cognition there is awareness of so many
+things and in such varying degrees. There may be primary awareness of
+events in the external world (Spencer's vivid series), awareness of the
+relations involved in these occurrences as such, of the relations of
+these to ideal re-presentations of like kind (Spencer's faint series),
+of the relations of any or all of these to behaviour as actually taking
+place or as ideally re-presented; and all in different degrees within a
+relational meshwork of bewildering complexity, which we have not, as
+yet, adequately unravelled. The essential point to bear in mind is that
+the cognitive relation always involves relatedness of _many terms_, and
+that its discussion involves the analysis of what, in the higher phases
+of its existence, is probably the most complex natural occurrence in
+this complex world.
+
+I cannot here follow up further the difficult problem of
+cognition[78]--save to add one or two supplementary remarks. First: it
+is, I suppose, fairly obvious that any given field of cognitive
+relatedness comprises _all_ that is then and there selectively cognized.
+Just as, in the very extended sense of the word 'knowledge', the earth
+knows, in gravitative fashion, the whole solar system, as does also any
+one of the planets, so, in the restricted sense, is knowledge
+co-extensive with all that is, selectively, in cognitive relationship
+with the organism or that part of the organism which is the locus of
+awareness. I speak here of the locus of awareness in just the same sense
+as I might speak of the earth as a locus of gravitative knowledge of the
+solar system. The locus of awareness is just a specialized portion of
+the whole relational web. In other words, the relatedness is of the
+part-whole kind, where whole means rest of the whole other than the
+specific part. In any such integrated system the part implies the
+whole--which, by the way, is quite a different matter from saying that
+the part includes the whole, or, as I understand the words, is
+equivalent to the whole. But, whereas gravitative knowledge is
+reciprocal--the sun knowing the earth in the same fashion as the earth
+knows the sun--cognitive knowledge is not reciprocal. My cognitive
+awareness of a spinning-top does not imply that the spinning-top is in
+like manner aware of me. The part knows the whole in a way that the
+whole does not know the part. The relationship of the part to the rest
+of the whole is not reciprocal or symmetrical. This we must just accept
+as a given feature of cognitive relatedness.[79]
+
+Another very important point is that cognitive relatedness is
+effective. By this I mean that just as, when the earth is in gravitative
+relation to the sun and the other planets (the constitution of nature
+being what it is), changes take place because the parts of the system as
+a whole are in this field of effective relatedness; so too, when the
+organism is in cognitive relation to its environment, changes in this
+system also take place just because a part of the whole system is in
+cognitive relatedness to the rest of the system. That means that the
+cognitive relation really counts--that it is not merely an epiphenomenal
+accompaniment of changes which would be precisely the same if it were
+absent. The 'sum of energy' presumably remains constant. There is no
+necessary interference with physical principles. But we know of so many
+cases in which the direction of change may be changed without any
+alteration of the 'amount of energy', as the phrase goes, that I see no
+reason, based on physical science,[80] for denying this kind of
+effectiveness, within a field of cognitive relatedness, if the facts
+seem indubitably to point to its existence. To assert that the presence
+or absence of cognitive relatedness makes absolutely no difference
+appears to me, I confess, little short of preposterous; to urge that it
+may be brought under the rubric of physico-chemical relatedness surely
+involves the ignoring of differentiating features, which science should
+not ignore. But, on the other hand, to invoke an immaterial psychic
+entity[81]--unless this merely names the relatedness itself[82] as
+gravitation names the gravitative relatedness--appears to me quite
+unwarranted in the scientific universe of discourse.[83]
+
+I must, however, draw to a conclusion. I cannot but think that Spencer
+failed to bring cognition and the conscious awareness it involves into
+really close touch with the rest of his philosophy of science. No such
+double-aspect theory as he accepted affords a satisfactory avenue of
+scientific approach. But where Spencer failed, who has come within
+measurable sight of success? We are only just beginning to see our way
+to stating the problem in such a form as to bring it within the purview
+of science. What we must insist on, as followers, at a distance, of
+Herbert Spencer, is the treatment of this type of relatedness on lines
+similar to our treatment of other types of relatedness within one order
+of nature.
+
+Surveying his work as a whole, we may confidently assert that Spencer
+brought to a conclusion a great task, and was himself great in its
+execution. The present generation can, perhaps, hardly realize how
+potent his influence was on the thought of the latter half of the last
+century. Many of his conclusions ran counter to those which were, in his
+day, widely accepted. If only they seemed to him to be true, however, he
+held to them with a tenacity which his opponents branded as obstinacy.
+But as he himself said:
+
+  'It is not for nothing that a man has in him sympathies with some
+  principles and repugnance to others. He, with all his capacities,
+  and aspirations, and beliefs, is not an accident but a product of
+  his time. While he is a descendant of the past he is a parent of
+  the future; and his thoughts are as children born to him, which he
+  may not carelessly let die. Not as adventitious therefore will the
+  wise man regard the faith that is in him. The highest truth he
+  sees he will fearlessly utter; knowing that, let what may come of
+  it, he is thus playing his right part in the world.'[84]
+
+
+
+
+NOTES
+
+
+[1] _Fragments of Science_, vol. ii, p. 132.
+
+[2] _Essays_, vol. i (American reprint), p. 3.
+
+[3] _Op. cit._, p. 32.
+
+[4] _Op. cit._, p. 58.
+
+[5] Cf. W. K. Clifford, _Lectures and Essays_, vol. i, p. 95.
+
+[6] _More Letters_, vol. ii, p. 235.
+
+[7] _Memories and Studies_, p. 139.
+
+[8] _Ibid._, p. 140.
+
+[9] _Autobiography_, vol. i, p. 212.
+
+[10] James, _op. cit._, p. 124.
+
+[11] _Autobiography_, vol. i, p. 211.
+
+[12] _First Principles_, Sixth (Popular) Edition, p. 446 (hereafter F.
+P.).
+
+[13] _Principles of Psychology_, Third Edition, vol. i, p. 508
+(hereafter Ps.).
+
+[14] Ps., vol. i, p. 627.
+
+[15] _Ibid._, p. 158.
+
+[16] F. P., p. 155.
+
+[17] Ps., vol. ii, p. 484.
+
+[18] There is '_intrinsic_ force by which a body manifests itself as
+occupying space, and that _extrinsic_ force distinguished as energy'. F.
+P., p. 150.
+
+[19] 'Divest the conceived unit of matter of the objective correlate to
+our subjective sense of effort and the entire fabric of physical
+conceptions disappears.' F. P., p. 151 note. Cf. Ps., vol. ii, pp. 237,
+239.
+
+[20] F. P., p. 171.
+
+[21] e.g. 'Social changes take directions that are due to the joint
+actions of citizens determined as are those of all other changes wrought
+by the composition of forces.' 'The flow of capital into business
+yielding the largest returns, the buying in the cheapest market and
+selling in the dearest, the introduction of more economical modes of
+manufacture, the development of better agencies for distribution,
+exhibit movements taking place in directions where they are met by the
+smallest totals of opposing forces.' F. P., pp. 193-6.
+
+[22] _Creative Evolution_, English translation, p. 53.
+
+[23] _Op. cit._, pp. 385, 6.
+
+[24] According to Dr. Carr's interpretation of M. Bergson, 'The whole
+world, as it is presented to us and thought of by us, is an illusion.
+Our science is not unreal, but it is a transformed reality. The
+illusions may be useful, may, indeed, be necessary and indispensable,
+but nevertheless it is illusion.' _Problem of Truth_, p. 66.
+
+[25] _Creative Evolution_, p. 389.
+
+[26] 'But, when I posit the facts with the shape they have for me
+to-day, I suppose my faculties of perception and intellection such as
+they are in me to-day; for it is they that portion the real into lots,
+they that cut the facts out of the whole of reality.' C. E., p. 389.
+
+[27] _Creative Evolution_, p. 389.
+
+[28] _Op. cit._, p. 387.
+
+[29] _Introduction to Metaphysics_, English translation, p. 8 and
+_passim_.
+
+[30] e.g. 'Organisation can only be studied scientifically if the
+organised body has first been likened to a machine.' C. E., p. 98.
+Science is, I think, generally used by M. Bergson for _intellectual_
+knowledge in contradistinction to intuitional knowledge.
+
+[31] F. P., p. 184.
+
+[32] _Essays_, vol. iii, p. 14.
+
+[33] _Essays_, vol. iii, p. 366.
+
+[34] F. P., p. 156.
+
+[35] 'There remained to assign a reason for that increasingly-distinct
+demarkation of parts, &c.... This reason we discovered to be the
+segregation, &c.... This cause of the definiteness of local
+integrations, &c.' F. P., p. 440.
+
+[36] F. P., p. 43.
+
+[37] _Essays_, vol. iii, p. 47.
+
+[38] F. P., p. 176.
+
+[39] F. P., p. 154.
+
+[40] _Proceedings Aristotelian Society_, 1912-13, p. 1.
+
+[41] _Popular Scientific Lectures_, English translation, p. 254.
+
+[42] _Lectures and Essays_, vol. i, p. 111.
+
+[43] 'But when we ask what this energy is, there is no answer save that
+it is the noumenal cause implied by the phenomenal effect.' F. P., p.
+154. It is towards this and like statements that my criticism is
+directed. There can be no objection to the treatment, by physicists, of
+energy as an entity in the sense given below in note 82. Those phenomena
+to which 1/2 _mv_^{2} has reference are fundamental realities for
+physical science.
+
+[44] In a statement of the law of gravitation we may substitute the
+words 'in a degree' for 'with a force'; we may speak of 'the measure of
+attraction' instead of 'the force of attraction'.
+
+[45] _System of Logic_, Bk. III, ch. v, Sec. 3, Eighth Edition, vol. i,
+p. 383.
+
+[46] _Ibid._, Sec. 3 and Sec. 5, pp. 379 and 389.
+
+[47] Ps., vol. ii, p. 93; cf. p. 97. One has now, however, to add the
+realm of subsistence.
+
+[48] As a more technical example the following may be given:--The
+difference in properties of isomers is caused by difference of internal
+molecular structure notwithstanding identity of chemical composition.
+
+[49] If we take spark as cause and explosion as effect there is
+obviously no proportionality between the cause and its effect. Thus M.
+Bergson speaks of the spark as 'a cause that acts by releasing'; and he
+adds that 'neither quality nor quantity of effect varies with quality or
+quantity of the cause: the effect is invariable'. _Creative Evolution_,
+p. 77. Compare what Spencer introduced into the Sixth edition of F. P.
+(pp. 172-3), concerning 'trigger action which does not produce the power
+but liberates it'. According to the treatment in the text there can be
+no 'proportionality' unless both ground and conditions are taken into
+account.
+
+[50] Spencer says (F. P., pp. 169-70) that 'the transformation of the
+unorganised contents of an egg into the organised chick is a question of
+heat' ['altogether a question of heat', in the Third Edition], and tells
+us that 'the germination of plants presents like relations of cause and
+effect as every season shows'. But he also says that 'the proclivities
+of the molecules determine the typical structure assumed'. Obviously
+here the 'heat supplied' falls under (3) of the text, and 'the
+proclivities of the molecules' is his notion of what should fall under
+(2).
+
+[51] See Index to F. P., _sub verbo_ 'integration'.
+
+[52] e. g. 'Diminish the velocities of the planets and their orbits will
+lessen--the solar system will contract, or become more integrated.'
+_Essays_, vol. iii, p. 28. Mere condensation is often spoken of as
+integration. But then the term is used with bewildering laxity. Cf.
+James, _Memories and Studies_, p. 134.
+
+[53] I retain in this connexion the current term physico-chemical. It
+seems that the basal type of relatedness here is electrical. It may be
+said that when we come down to the atom the _things in_ relation are
+electrical, are electrons, are positive and negative charges. So be it.
+But is it not the _electrical relatedness_ that is constitutive of the
+atom as such?
+
+[54] 'A large number of physical properties', says Nernst, 'have been
+shown to be clearly additive; that is, the value of the property in
+question can be calculated as though the compound were such a mixture of
+its elements that they experience no change in their properties.' But
+other properties are not additive. 'The kind of influence of the atom in
+a compound is primarily dependent on the mode of its union, that is,
+upon the constitution and configuration of the compound. Such
+non-additive properties may be called constitutive.' Quoted by E. G.
+Spaulding in _The New Realism_, p. 238.
+
+[55] _System of Logic_, vol. i, Bk. III, ch. vi.
+
+[56] _Problems of Life and Mind_, Series II, p. 212.
+
+[57] Of course if a particular physico-chemical change (_a_) is
+correlated with a particular physiological or vital change (_b_), then
+(_b_) implies (_a_) as (_a_) implies (_b_). The statement in the text
+refers to the implications of classes of change. There may be
+physico-chemical relatedness without any correlated vital relatedness;
+but there does not appear to be any vital relatedness which is not
+correlated with physico-chemical relatedness.
+
+[58] _Essays_, vol. iii, pp. 31, 55.
+
+[59] Ps., vol. ii, p. 484.
+
+[60] F. P., p. 178.
+
+[61] An ordinal correlation is one that couples every term of a series
+(_a_) with a specific term of another series (_b_) and _vice versa_ in
+the same order in each. Cf. Spaulding in _The New Realism_, p. 175. I
+shall sometimes speak of such correlation as serial.
+
+[62] _Principles of Biology_, Edition of 1898, pp. 117, 120.
+
+[63] _Op. cit._, p. 122.
+
+[64] Ps., vol. i, p. 208.
+
+[65] F. P., p. 61. Cf. Ps., vol. i, p. 134.
+
+[66] Ps., vol. i, p. 132. James well says 'Spencer broke new ground here
+in insisting that, since mind and its environment have evolved together,
+they must be studied together. He gave to the study of mind in isolation
+a definite quietus, and that certainly is a great thing to have
+achieved'. _Memories and Studies_, p. 140.
+
+[67] Ps., vol. i, p. 206.
+
+[68] Ps., vol. i, p. 124.
+
+[69] F. P., p. 120. Ps., vol. ii, p. 472. Cf. Ps., vol. i, p. 98.
+
+[70] The word underlying is used in the sense of occupying a lower
+position in the logical hierarchy above indicated. If any one likes to
+speak of the physico-chemical and the vital as two aspects of one
+process, he is free to do so. And if he likes to say that the vital is
+caused by the physico-chemical, let him do so; but he must define the
+exact sense in which he uses the ambiguous word cause. The word inner in
+the text means within the organism.
+
+[71] See S. Alexander, 'On Relations: and in particular the Cognitive
+Relation.' _Mind._, vol. xxi, N. S., No. 83, p. 318.
+
+[72] I have avoided the use of the word determine. It would be well to
+distinguish between that which is _determined_ from without, that is,
+conditioned, and that which is _determinate_, that is, grounded in the
+constitution. I am here, I think, in line with Bosanquet. (See
+_Principle of Individuality and Value_, e. g. pp. 341, 352.) I have also
+avoided all reference to teleology. Without committing myself to the
+acceptance of all that Mr. Bosanquet says in the fourth lecture of the
+series to which reference has just been made, his treatment, there,
+appears to be on right lines. There is no opposition in teleology, so
+treated, to what is determinate. Indeed, such teleology is the
+expression of the logical structure of the world, or, as Spencer would
+say, the universality of law. For just as higher types of relatedness
+imply a substratum of physico-chemical processes, so do all events imply
+the underlying logic of events. Cf. W. T. Marvin, _A First Book of
+Metaphysics_, ch. xiii, 'On the logical strata of reality.'
+
+[73] Cf. Ps., vol. i, pp. 99 and 140.
+
+[74] _Problems of Philosophy_, ch. v; cf. _Proc. Aristotelian Soc._,
+1910-11, p. 108.
+
+[75] It should be distinctly understood that I here speak of one order
+of being in reference to the phenomena dealt with by science, including
+the cognitive phenomena discussed in the text. Whether we should speak
+of the Source of phenomena as constituting a separate order of being is
+a question I cannot discuss in a note. Does the logic of events imply a
+Logos? That is the question in brief. But, since the implication in
+question is not of the scientific kind, I may leave it on one side in
+considering a philosophy of science.
+
+[76] Ps., vol. i, p. 140.
+
+[77] F. P., p. 178.
+
+[78] I have confined my attention to the cognitive type of relatedness.
+Other higher modes supervene when the course of evolution is traced
+further upwards. Indeed, cognition is only part of the underlying basis
+implied by the richer forms of distinctively human relational life.
+Spencer has much to say of them in his _Sociology_ and his _Ethics_,
+though he fails to realize that the phenomena he is dealing with involve
+essentially new constitutive features in man and in society. Can music
+or any form of art be discussed in terms of cognition only? I merely add
+this note to show that I am not unaware of the patent fact that when we
+have reached the cognitive type of relatedness, we are nowhere near the
+top of the evolutional tree.
+
+[79] The part which is the centre of awareness, may be spoken of as
+experienc_ing_, in contradistinction to what is experienc_ed_. It is
+clear that such experiencing is always correlative to what is
+experienced actually or ideally (Spencer's vividly or faintly). The
+centre of awareness is either the cortex, or some specific part of the
+cortex, or (more generally) the organism as owning the cortex, in each
+case in accordance with the universe of discourse.
+
+[80] Few physicists would, I think, be prepared to deny that, within a
+field of effective relatedness, there may be, and very often is,
+guidance without work done or any change in the 'amount of energy'. What
+physicists are concerned to insist on is their cardinal principle that
+every physical change involves physical terms in physical relatedness.
+This can be fully and freely accepted in accordance with the doctrine of
+implication sketched in the text. It is when Life or Consciousness is
+invoked to play the part of a non-physical term, or thing, which acts
+and reacts as if it were a physical term or thing, that physicists enter
+an emphatic protest. Cognitive relatedness among physical things may
+well be effective in guidance. To claim its presence must not, however,
+be regarded as in any sense equivalent to a denial of underlying
+physico-chemical relatedness.
+
+[81] Until those who seek to furnish evidence of the existence of
+discarnate spirits can make some plausible suggestions as to the nature
+of a comprehensible scheme of correlation which shall serve to link the
+discarnate with the incarnate, one is forced to enter their results in a
+suspense account. It is of little use to proclaim the existence of
+'facts scorned by orthodox science'. The so-called facts must be
+incorporated within a consistent scheme, before they can claim a place
+in the fabric of scientific truth.
+
+[82] As the word entity is now often used, for example by Mr. G. E.
+Moore, cognitive relatedness may be termed an entity. 'When I speak of
+an entity I shall mean to imply absolutely nothing more with regard to
+that which I so call, than that it _is_ or _was_--that it is or was
+contained in the Universe; and of anything whatever which _is_ or _was_,
+I shall take the liberty to say that it is an entity.' G. E. Moore,
+_Proc. Aristotelian Soc._, 1909-10, p. 36.
+
+[83] I have no space to discuss the physiological differentiation which
+is implied by the effectiveness of the cognitive relation. It involves,
+I believe, the differentiation of a superior cortical system from an
+inferior system of nervous arcs. I have dealt with it in some detail
+elsewhere. See _Instinct and Experience_.
+
+[84] F. P., pp. 91-2.
+
+
+  OXFORD: HORACE HART M.A.
+  PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
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