diff options
Diffstat (limited to '37423.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 37423.txt | 7913 |
1 files changed, 7913 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/37423.txt b/37423.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73e4157 --- /dev/null +++ b/37423.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7913 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of How We Think, by John Dewey + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: How We Think + +Author: John Dewey + +Release Date: September 14, 2011 [EBook #37423] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HOW WE THINK *** + + + + +Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Cathy Maxam and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + + + + TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: Minor inconsistencies in hyphenated words have + been adjusted to correspond with the author's most frequent usage. + + On page 60 a printer error from the original text was corrected: the + word "drawings" has been changed to "drawing" in the phrase, "... + drawing has been taught...." + + + + + HOW WE THINK + + BY + JOHN DEWEY + PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY + + D. C. HEATH & CO., PUBLISHERS + BOSTON NEW YORK CHICAGO + + + + + COPYRIGHT, 1910, + BY D. C. HEATH & CO. + + 2 F 8 + + Printed in U. S. A. + + + + +PREFACE + + +Our schools are troubled with a multiplication of studies, each in turn +having its own multiplication of materials and principles. Our teachers +find their tasks made heavier in that they have come to deal with pupils +individually and not merely in mass. Unless these steps in advance are +to end in distraction, some clew of unity, some principle that makes for +simplification, must be found. This book represents the conviction that +the needed steadying and centralizing factor is found in adopting as the +end of endeavor that attitude of mind, that habit of thought, which we +call scientific. This scientific attitude of mind might, conceivably, be +quite irrelevant to teaching children and youth. But this book also +represents the conviction that such is not the case; that the native and +unspoiled attitude of childhood, marked by ardent curiosity, fertile +imagination, and love of experimental inquiry, is near, very near, to +the attitude of the scientific mind. If these pages assist any to +appreciate this kinship and to consider seriously how its recognition in +educational practice would make for individual happiness and the +reduction of social waste, the book will amply have served its purpose. + +It is hardly necessary to enumerate the authors to whom I am indebted. +My fundamental indebtedness is to my wife, by whom the ideas of this +book were inspired, and through whose work in connection with the +Laboratory School, existing in Chicago between 1896 and 1903, the ideas +attained such concreteness as comes from embodiment and testing in +practice. It is a pleasure, also, to acknowledge indebtedness to the +intelligence and sympathy of those who cooeperated as teachers and +supervisors in the conduct of that school, and especially to Mrs. Ella +Flagg Young, then a colleague in the University, and now Superintendent +of the Schools of Chicago. + +NEW YORK CITY, December, 1909. + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PART I + + THE PROBLEM OF TRAINING THOUGHT + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I. WHAT IS THOUGHT? 1 + + II. THE NEED FOR TRAINING THOUGHT 14 + + III. NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT 29 + + IV. SCHOOL CONDITIONS AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT 45 + + V. THE MEANS AND END OF MENTAL TRAINING: THE + PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THE LOGICAL 56 + + + PART II + + LOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS + + VI. THE ANALYSIS OF A COMPLETE ACT OF THOUGHT 68 + + VII. SYSTEMATIC INFERENCE: INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 79 + + VIII. JUDGMENT: THE INTERPRETATION OF FACTS 101 + + IX. MEANING: OR CONCEPTIONS AND UNDERSTANDING 116 + + X. CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT THINKING 135 + + XI. EMPIRICAL AND SCIENTIFIC THINKING 145 + + + PART III + + THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT + + XII. ACTIVITY AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT 157 + + XIII. LANGUAGE AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT 170 + + XIV. OBSERVATION AND INFORMATION IN THE TRAINING + OF MIND 188 + + XV. THE RECITATION AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT 201 + + XVI. SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 214 + + + + +HOW WE THINK + + + + +PART ONE: THE PROBLEM OF TRAINING THOUGHT + + + + +CHAPTER ONE + +WHAT IS THOUGHT? + + +Sec. 1. _Varied Senses of the Term_ + +[Sidenote: Four senses of thought, from the wider to the limited] + +No words are oftener on our lips than _thinking_ and _thought_. So +profuse and varied, indeed, is our use of these words that it is not +easy to define just what we mean by them. The aim of this chapter is to +find a single consistent meaning. Assistance may be had by considering +some typical ways in which the terms are employed. In the first place +_thought_ is used broadly, not to say loosely. Everything that comes to +mind, that "goes through our heads," is called a thought. To think of a +thing is just to be conscious of it in any way whatsoever. Second, the +term is restricted by excluding whatever is directly presented; we think +(or think of) only such things as we do not directly see, hear, smell, +or taste. Then, third, the meaning is further limited to beliefs that +rest upon some kind of evidence or testimony. Of this third type, two +kinds--or, rather, two degrees--must be discriminated. In some cases, a +belief is accepted with slight or almost no attempt to state the grounds +that support it. In other cases, the ground or basis for a belief is +deliberately sought and its adequacy to support the belief examined. +This process is called reflective thought; it alone is truly educative +in value, and it forms, accordingly, the principal subject of this +volume. We shall now briefly describe each of the four senses. + +[Sidenote: Chance and idle thinking] + +I. In its loosest sense, thinking signifies everything that, as we say, +is "in our heads" or that "goes through our minds." He who offers "a +penny for your thoughts" does not expect to drive any great bargain. In +calling the objects of his demand _thoughts_, he does not intend to +ascribe to them dignity, consecutiveness, or truth. Any idle fancy, +trivial recollection, or flitting impression will satisfy his demand. +Daydreaming, building of castles in the air, that loose flux of casual +and disconnected material that floats through our minds in relaxed +moments are, in this random sense, _thinking_. More of our waking life +than we should care to admit, even to ourselves, is likely to be whiled +away in this inconsequential trifling with idle fancy and unsubstantial +hope. + +[Sidenote: Reflective thought is consecutive, not merely a sequence] + +In this sense, silly folk and dullards _think_. The story is told of a +man in slight repute for intelligence, who, desiring to be chosen +selectman in his New England town, addressed a knot of neighbors in this +wise: "I hear you don't believe I know enough to hold office. I wish you +to understand that I am thinking about something or other most of the +time." Now reflective thought is like this random coursing of things +through the mind in that it consists of a succession of things thought +of; but it is unlike, in that the mere chance occurrence of any chance +"something or other" in an irregular sequence does not suffice. +Reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a +_con_sequence--a consecutive ordering in such a way that each +determines the next as its proper outcome, while each in turn leans back +on its predecessors. The successive portions of the reflective thought +grow out of one another and support one another; they do not +come and go in a medley. Each phase is a step from something to +something--technically speaking, it is a term of thought. Each term +leaves a deposit which is utilized in the next term. The stream or flow +becomes a train, chain, or thread. + +[Sidenote: The restriction of _thinking_ to what goes beyond direct +observation] + +[Sidenote: Reflective thought aims, however, at belief] + +II. Even when thinking is used in a broad sense, it is usually +restricted to matters not directly perceived: to what we do not see, +smell, hear, or touch. We ask the man telling a story if he saw a +certain incident happen, and his reply may be, "No, I only thought of +it." A note of invention, as distinct from faithful record of +observation, is present. Most important in this class are successions of +imaginative incidents and episodes which, having a certain coherence, +hanging together on a continuous thread, lie between kaleidoscopic +flights of fancy and considerations deliberately employed to establish a +conclusion. The imaginative stories poured forth by children possess all +degrees of internal congruity; some are disjointed, some are +articulated. When connected, they simulate reflective thought; indeed, +they usually occur in minds of logical capacity. These imaginative +enterprises often precede thinking of the close-knit type and prepare +the way for it. But _they do not aim at knowledge, at belief about facts +or in truths_; and thereby they are marked off from reflective thought +even when they most resemble it. Those who express such thoughts do not +expect credence, but rather credit for a well-constructed plot or a +well-arranged climax. They produce good stories, not--unless by +chance--knowledge. Such thoughts are an efflorescence of feeling; the +enhancement of a mood or sentiment is their aim; congruity of emotion, +their binding tie. + +[Sidenote: Thought induces belief in two ways] + +III. In its next sense, thought denotes belief resting upon some basis, +that is, real or supposed knowledge going beyond what is directly +present. It is marked by _acceptance or rejection of something as +reasonably probable or improbable_. This phase of thought, however, +includes two such distinct types of belief that, even though their +difference is strictly one of degree, not of kind, it becomes +practically important to consider them separately. Some beliefs are +accepted when their grounds have not themselves been considered, others +are accepted because their grounds have been examined. + +When we say, "Men used to think the world was flat," or, "I thought you +went by the house," we express belief: something is accepted, held to, +acquiesced in, or affirmed. But such thoughts may mean a supposition +accepted without reference to its real grounds. These may be adequate, +they may not; but their value with reference to the support they afford +the belief has not been considered. + +Such thoughts grow up unconsciously and without reference to the +attainment of correct belief. They are picked up--we know not how. From +obscure sources and by unnoticed channels they insinuate themselves into +acceptance and become unconsciously a part of our mental furniture. +Tradition, instruction, imitation--all of which depend upon authority in +some form, or appeal to our own advantage, or fall in with a strong +passion--are responsible for them. Such thoughts are prejudices, that +is, prejudgments, not judgments proper that rest upon a survey of +evidence.[1] + + [1] This mode of thinking in its contrast with thoughtful inquiry + receives special notice in the next chapter. + +[Sidenote: Thinking in its best sense is that which considers the basis +and consequences of beliefs] + +IV. Thoughts that result in belief have an importance attached to them +which leads to reflective thought, to conscious inquiry into the nature, +conditions, and bearings of the belief. To _think_ of whales and camels +in the clouds is to entertain ourselves with fancies, terminable at our +pleasure, which do not lead to any belief in particular. But to think of +the world as flat is to ascribe a quality to a real thing as its real +property. This conclusion denotes a connection among things and hence is +not, like imaginative thought, plastic to our mood. Belief in the +world's flatness commits him who holds it to thinking in certain +specific ways of other objects, such as the heavenly bodies, antipodes, +the possibility of navigation. It prescribes to him actions in +accordance with his conception of these objects. + +The consequences of a belief upon other beliefs and upon behavior may be +so important, then, that men are forced to consider the grounds or +reasons of their belief and its logical consequences. This means +reflective thought--thought in its eulogistic and emphatic sense. + +[Sidenote: Reflective thought defined] + +Men _thought_ the world was flat until Columbus _thought_ it to be +round. The earlier thought was a belief held because men had not the +energy or the courage to question what those about them accepted and +taught, especially as it was suggested and seemingly confirmed by +obvious sensible facts. The thought of Columbus was a _reasoned +conclusion_. It marked the close of study into facts, of scrutiny and +revision of evidence, of working out the implications of various +hypotheses, and of comparing these theoretical results with one another +and with known facts. Because Columbus did not accept unhesitatingly the +current traditional theory, because he doubted and inquired, he arrived +at his thought. Skeptical of what, from long habit, seemed most certain, +and credulous of what seemed impossible, he went on thinking until he +could produce evidence for both his confidence and his disbelief. Even +if his conclusion had finally turned out wrong, it would have been a +different sort of belief from those it antagonized, because it was +reached by a different method. _Active, persistent, and careful +consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light +of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it +tends_, constitutes reflective thought. Any one of the first three kinds +of thought may elicit this type; but once begun, it is a conscious and +voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of reasons. + + +Sec. 2. _The Central Factor in Thinking_ + +[Sidenote: There is a common element in all types of thought:] + +There are, however, no sharp lines of demarcation between the various +operations just outlined. The problem of attaining correct habits of +reflection would be much easier than it is, did not the different modes +of thinking blend insensibly into one another. So far, we have +considered rather extreme instances of each kind in order to get the +field clearly before us. Let us now reverse this operation; let us +consider a rudimentary case of thinking, lying between careful +examination of evidence and a mere irresponsible stream of fancies. A +man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time he +observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily with other +things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that it is probably +going to rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between him and the +sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if anything, in such a +situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor the +noting of the cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity; +looking and noting are other modes of activity. The likelihood that it +will rain is, however, something _suggested_. The pedestrian _feels_ the +cold; he _thinks of_ clouds and a coming shower. + +[Sidenote: _viz._ suggestion of something not observed] + +[Sidenote: But reflection involves also the relation of _signifying_] + +So far there is the same sort of situation as when one looking at a +cloud is reminded of a human figure and face. Thinking in both of these +cases (the cases of belief and of fancy) involves a noted or perceived +fact, followed by something else which is not observed but which is +brought to mind, suggested by the thing seen. One reminds us, as we say, +of the other. Side by side, however, with this factor of agreement in +the two cases of suggestion is a factor of marked disagreement. We do +not _believe_ in the face suggested by the cloud; we do not consider at +all the probability of its being a fact. There is no _reflective_ +thought. The danger of rain, on the contrary, presents itself to us as a +genuine possibility--as a possible fact of the same nature as the +observed coolness. Put differently, we do not regard the cloud as +meaning or indicating a face, but merely as suggesting it, while we do +consider that the coolness may mean rain. In the first case, seeing an +object, we just happen, as we say, to think of something else; in the +second, we consider the _possibility and nature of the connection +between the object seen and the object suggested_. The seen thing is +regarded as in some way _the ground or basis of belief_ in the suggested +thing; it possesses the quality of _evidence_. + +[Sidenote: Various synonymous expressions for the function of +signifying] + +This function by which one thing signifies or indicates another, and +thereby leads us to consider how far one may be regarded as warrant for +belief in the other, is, then, the central factor in all reflective or +distinctively intellectual thinking. By calling up various situations to +which such terms as _signifies_ and _indicates_ apply, the student will +best realize for himself the actual facts denoted by the words +_reflective thought_. Synonyms for these terms are: points to, tells of, +betokens, prognosticates, represents, stands for, implies.[2] We also +say one thing portends another; is ominous of another, or a symptom of +it, or a key to it, or (if the connection is quite obscure) that it +gives a hint, clue, or intimation. + + [2] _Implies_ is more often used when a principle or general truth + brings about belief in some other truth; the other phrases are more + frequently used to denote the cases in which one fact or event leads + us to believe in something else. + +[Sidenote: Reflection and belief on evidence] + +Reflection thus implies that something is believed in (or disbelieved +in), not on its own direct account, but through something else which +stands as witness, evidence, proof, voucher, warrant; that is, as +_ground of belief_. At one time, rain is actually felt or directly +experienced; at another time, we infer that it has rained from the looks +of the grass and trees, or that it is going to rain because of the +condition of the air or the state of the barometer. At one time, we see +a man (or suppose we do) without any intermediary fact; at another time, +we are not quite sure what we see, and hunt for accompanying facts that +will serve as signs, indications, tokens of what is to be believed. + +Thinking, for the purposes of this inquiry, is defined accordingly as +_that operation in which present facts suggest other facts (or truths) +in such a way as to induce belief in the latter upon the ground or +warrant of the former_. We do not put beliefs that rest simply on +inference on the surest level of assurance. To say "I think so" implies +that I do not as yet _know_ so. The inferential belief may later be +confirmed and come to stand as sure, but in itself it always has a +certain element of supposition. + + +Sec. 3. _Elements in Reflective Thinking_ + +So much for the description of the more external and obvious aspects of +the fact called _thinking_. Further consideration at once reveals +certain subprocesses which are involved in every reflective operation. +These are: (_a_) a state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt; and (_b_) an +act of search or investigation directed toward bringing to light further +facts which serve to corroborate or to nullify the suggested belief. + +[Sidenote: The importance of uncertainty] + +(_a_) In our illustration, the shock of coolness generated confusion and +suspended belief, at least momentarily. Because it was unexpected, it +was a shock or an interruption needing to be accounted for, identified, +or placed. To say that the abrupt occurrence of the change of +temperature constitutes a problem may sound forced and artificial; but +if we are willing to extend the meaning of the word _problem_ to +whatever--no matter how slight and commonplace in character--perplexes +and challenges the mind so that it makes belief at all uncertain, there +is a genuine problem or question involved in this experience of sudden +change. + +[Sidenote: and of inquiry in order to test] + +(_b_) The turning of the head, the lifting of the eyes, the scanning of +the heavens, are activities adapted to bring to recognition facts that +will answer the question presented by the sudden coolness. The facts as +they first presented themselves were perplexing; they suggested, +however, clouds. The act of looking was an act to discover if this +suggested explanation held good. It may again seem forced to speak of +this looking, almost automatic, as an act of research or inquiry. But +once more, if we are willing to generalize our conceptions of our mental +operations to include the trivial and ordinary as well as the technical +and recondite, there is no good reason for refusing to give such a title +to the act of looking. The purport of this act of inquiry is to confirm +or to refute the suggested belief. New facts are brought to perception, +which either corroborate the idea that a change of weather is imminent, +or negate it. + +[Sidenote: Finding one's way an illustration of reflection] + +Another instance, commonplace also, yet not quite so trivial, may +enforce this lesson. A man traveling in an unfamiliar region comes to a +branching of the roads. Having no sure knowledge to fall back upon, he +is brought to a standstill of hesitation and suspense. Which road is +right? And how shall perplexity be resolved? There are but two +alternatives: he must either blindly and arbitrarily take his course, +trusting to luck for the outcome, or he must discover grounds for the +conclusion that a given road is right. Any attempt to decide the matter +by thinking will involve inquiry into other facts, whether brought out +by memory or by further observation, or by both. The perplexed wayfarer +must carefully scrutinize what is before him and he must cudgel his +memory. He looks for evidence that will support belief in favor of +either of the roads--for evidence that will weight down one suggestion. +He may climb a tree; he may go first in this direction, then in that, +looking, in either case, for signs, clues, indications. He wants +something in the nature of a signboard or a map, and _his reflection is +aimed at the discovery of facts that will serve this purpose_. + +[Sidenote: Possible, yet incompatible, suggestions] + +The above illustration may be generalized. Thinking begins in what may +fairly enough be called a _forked-road_ situation, a situation which is +ambiguous, which presents a dilemma, which proposes alternatives. As +long as our activity glides smoothly along from one thing to another, or +as long as we permit our imagination to entertain fancies at pleasure, +there is no call for reflection. Difficulty or obstruction in the way of +reaching a belief brings us, however, to a pause. In the suspense of +uncertainty, we metaphorically climb a tree; we try to find some +standpoint from which we may survey additional facts and, getting a more +commanding view of the situation, may decide how the facts stand related +to one another. + +[Sidenote: Regulation of thinking by its purpose] + +_Demand for the solution of a perplexity is the steadying and guiding +factor in the entire process of reflection._ Where there is no question +of a problem to be solved or a difficulty to be surmounted, the course +of suggestions flows on at random; we have the first type of thought +described. If the stream of suggestions is controlled simply by their +emotional congruity, their fitting agreeably into a single picture or +story, we have the second type. But a question to be answered, an +ambiguity to be resolved, sets up an end and holds the current of ideas +to a definite channel. Every suggested conclusion is tested by its +reference to this regulating end, by its pertinence to the problem in +hand. This need of straightening out a perplexity also controls the kind +of inquiry undertaken. A traveler whose end is the most beautiful path +will look for other considerations and will test suggestions occurring +to him on another principle than if he wishes to discover the way to a +given city. _The problem fixes the end of thought_ and _the end controls +the process of thinking_. + + +Sec. 4. _Summary_ + +[Sidenote: Origin and stimulus] + +We may recapitulate by saying that the origin of thinking is some +perplexity, confusion, or doubt. Thinking is not a case of spontaneous +combustion; it does not occur just on "general principles." There is +something specific which occasions and evokes it. General appeals to a +child (or to a grown-up) to think, irrespective of the existence in his +own experience of some difficulty that troubles him and disturbs his +equilibrium, are as futile as advice to lift himself by his boot-straps. + +[Sidenote: Suggestions and past experience] + +Given a difficulty, the next step is suggestion of some way out--the +formation of some tentative plan or project, the entertaining of some +theory which will account for the peculiarities in question, the +consideration of some solution for the problem. The data at hand cannot +supply the solution; they can only suggest it. What, then, are the +sources of the suggestion? Clearly past experience and prior knowledge. +If the person has had some acquaintance with similar situations, if he +has dealt with material of the same sort before, suggestions more or +less apt and helpful are likely to arise. But unless there has been +experience in some degree analogous, which may now be represented in +imagination, confusion remains mere confusion. There is nothing upon +which to draw in order to clarify it. Even when a child (or a grown-up) +has a problem, to urge him to think when he has no prior experiences +involving some of the same conditions, is wholly futile. + +[Sidenote: Exploration and testing] + +If the suggestion that occurs is at once accepted, we have uncritical +thinking, the minimum of reflection. To turn the thing over in mind, to +reflect, means to hunt for additional evidence, for new data, that will +develop the suggestion, and will either, as we say, bear it out or else +make obvious its absurdity and irrelevance. Given a genuine difficulty +and a reasonable amount of analogous experience to draw upon, the +difference, _par excellence_, between good and bad thinking is found at +this point. The easiest way is to accept any suggestion that seems +plausible and thereby bring to an end the condition of mental +uneasiness. Reflective thinking is always more or less troublesome +because it involves overcoming the inertia that inclines one to accept +suggestions at their face value; it involves willingness to endure a +condition of mental unrest and disturbance. Reflective thinking, in +short, means judgment suspended during further inquiry; and suspense is +likely to be somewhat painful. As we shall see later, the most important +factor in the training of good mental habits consists in acquiring the +attitude of suspended conclusion, and in mastering the various methods +of searching for new materials to corroborate or to refute the first +suggestions that occur. To maintain the state of doubt and to carry on +systematic and protracted inquiry--these are the essentials of +thinking. + + + + +CHAPTER TWO + +THE NEED FOR TRAINING THOUGHT + + +[Sidenote: Man the animal that thinks] + +To expatiate upon the importance of thought would be absurd. The +traditional definition of man as "the thinking animal" fixes thought as +the essential difference between man and the brutes,--surely an +important matter. More relevant to our purpose is the question how +thought is important, for an answer to this question will throw light +upon the kind of training thought requires if it is to subserve its end. + + +Sec. 1. _The Values of Thought_ + +[Sidenote: The possibility of deliberate and intentional activity] + +I. Thought affords the sole method of escape from purely impulsive or +purely routine action. A being without capacity for thought is moved +only by instincts and appetites, as these are called forth by outward +conditions and by the inner state of the organism. A being thus moved +is, as it were, pushed from behind. This is what we mean by the blind +nature of brute actions. The agent does not see or foresee the end for +which he is acting, nor the results produced by his behaving in one way +rather than in another. He does not "know what he is about." Where there +is thought, things present act as signs or tokens of things not yet +experienced. A thinking being can, accordingly, _act on the basis of the +absent and the future_. Instead of being pushed into a mode of action by +the sheer urgency of forces, whether instincts or habits, of which he +is not aware, a reflective agent is drawn (to some extent at least) to +action by some remoter object of which he is indirectly aware. + +[Sidenote: Natural events come to be a language] + +An animal without thought may go into its hole when rain threatens, +because of some immediate stimulus to its organism. A thinking agent +will perceive that certain given facts are probable signs of a future +rain, and will take steps in the light of this anticipated future. To +plant seeds, to cultivate the soil, to harvest grain, are intentional +acts, possible only to a being who has learned to subordinate the +immediately felt elements of an experience to those values which these +hint at and prophesy. Philosophers have made much of the phrases "book +of nature," "language of nature." Well, it is in virtue of the capacity +of thought that given things are significant of absent things, and that +nature speaks a language which may be interpreted. To a being who +thinks, things are records of their past, as fossils tell of the prior +history of the earth, and are prophetic of their future, as from the +present positions of heavenly bodies remote eclipses are foretold. +Shakespeare's "tongues in trees, books in the running brooks," expresses +literally enough the power superadded to existences when they appeal to +a thinking being. Upon the function of signification depend all +foresight, all intelligent planning, deliberation, and calculation. + +[Sidenote: The possibility of systematized foresight] + +II. By thought man also develops and arranges artificial signs to remind +him in advance of consequences, and of ways of securing and avoiding +them. As the trait just mentioned makes the difference between savage +man and brute, so this trait makes the difference between civilized man +and savage. A savage who has been shipwrecked in a river may note +certain things which serve him as signs of danger in the future. But +civilized man deliberately _makes_ such signs; he sets up in advance of +wreckage warning buoys, and builds lighthouses where he sees signs that +such events may occur. A savage reads weather signs with great +expertness; civilized man institutes a weather service by which signs +are artificially secured and information is distributed in advance of +the appearance of any signs that could be detected without special +methods. A savage finds his way skillfully through a wilderness by +reading certain obscure indications; civilized man builds a highway +which shows the road to all. The savage learns to detect the signs of +fire and thereby to invent methods of producing flame; civilized man +invents permanent conditions for producing light and heat whenever they +are needed. The very essence of civilized culture is that we +deliberately erect monuments and memorials, lest we forget; and +deliberately institute, in advance of the happening of various +contingencies and emergencies of life, devices for detecting their +approach and registering their nature, for warding off what is +unfavorable, or at least for protecting ourselves from its full impact +and for making more secure and extensive what is favorable. All forms of +artificial apparatus are intentionally designed modifications of natural +things in order that they may serve better than in their natural estate +to indicate the hidden, the absent, and the remote. + +[Sidenote: The possibility of objects rich in quality] + +III. Finally, thought confers upon physical events and objects a very +different status and value from that which they possess to a being that +does not reflect. These words are mere scratches, curious variations of +light and shade, to one to whom they are not linguistic signs. To him +for whom they are signs of other things, each has a definite +individuality of its own, according to the meaning that it is used to +convey. _Exactly the same holds of natural objects._ A chair is a +different object to a being to whom it consciously suggests an +opportunity for sitting down, repose, or sociable converse, from what it +is to one to whom it presents itself merely as a thing to be smelled, or +gnawed, or jumped over; a stone is different to one who knows something +of its past history and its future use from what it is to one who only +feels it directly through his senses. It is only by courtesy, indeed, +that we can say that an unthinking animal experiences an _object_ at +all--so largely is anything that presents itself to us as an object made +up by the qualities it possesses as a sign of other things. + +[Sidenote: The nature of the objects an animal perceives] + +An English logician (Mr. Venn) has remarked that it may be questioned +whether a dog _sees_ a rainbow any more than he apprehends the political +constitution of the country in which he lives. The same principle +applies to the kennel in which he sleeps and the meat that he eats. When +he is sleepy, he goes to the kennel; when he is hungry, he is excited by +the smell and color of meat; beyond this, in what sense does he see an +_object_? Certainly he does not see a house--_i.e._ a thing with all the +properties and relations of a permanent residence, _unless_ he is +capable of making what is present a uniform sign of what is +absent--unless he is capable of thought. Nor does he see what he eats +_as_ meat unless it suggests the absent properties by virtue of which it +is a certain joint of some animal, and is known to afford nourishment. +Just what is left of an _object_ stripped of all such qualities of +meaning, we cannot well say; but we can be sure that the object is then +a very different sort of thing from the objects that we perceive. There +is moreover no particular limit to the possibilities of growth in the +fusion of a thing as it is to sense and as it is to thought, or as a +sign of other things. The child today soon regards as constituent parts +of objects qualities that once it required the intelligence of a +Copernicus or a Newton to apprehend. + +[Sidenote: Mill on the business of life and the occupation of mind] + +These various values of the power of thought may be summed up in the +following quotation from John Stuart Mill. "To draw inferences," he +says, "has been said to be the great business of life. Every one has +daily, hourly, and momentary need of ascertaining facts which he has not +directly observed: not from any general purpose of adding to his stock +of knowledge, but because the facts themselves are of importance to his +interests or to his occupations. The business of the magistrate, of the +military commander, of the navigator, of the physician, of the +agriculturist, _is merely to judge of evidence and to act +accordingly_.... As they do this well or ill, so they discharge well or +ill the duties of their several callings. _It is the only occupation in +which the mind never ceases to be engaged._"[3] + + [3] Mill, _System of Logic_, Introduction, Sec. 5. + + +Sec. 2. _Importance of Direction in order to Realize these Values_ + +[Sidenote: Thinking goes astray] + +What a person has not only daily and hourly, but momentary need of +performing, is not a technical and abstruse matter; nor, on the other +hand, is it trivial and negligible. Such a function must be congenial to +the mind, and must be performed, in an unspoiled mind, upon every +fitting occasion. Just because, however, it is an operation of drawing +inferences, of basing conclusions upon evidence, of reaching belief +_indirectly_, it is an operation that may go wrong as well as right, +and hence is one that needs safeguarding and training. The greater its +importance the greater are the evils when it is ill-exercised. + +[Sidenote: Ideas are our rulers--for better or for worse] + +An earlier writer than Mill, John Locke (1632-1704), brings out the +importance of thought for life and the need of training so that its best +and not its worst possibilities will be realized, in the following +words: "No man ever sets himself about anything but upon some view or +other, which serves him for a reason for what he does; and whatsoever +faculties he employs, the understanding with such light as it has, well +or ill informed, constantly leads; and by that light, true or false, all +his operative powers are directed.... Temples have their sacred images, +and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of +mankind. But in truth the ideas and images in men's minds are the +invisible powers that constantly govern them, and to these they all, +universally, pay a ready submission. It is therefore of the highest +concernment that great care should be taken of the understanding, to +conduct it aright in the search of knowledge and in the judgments it +makes."[4] If upon thought hang all deliberate activities and the uses +we make of all our other powers, Locke's assertion that it is of the +highest concernment that care should be taken of its conduct is a +moderate statement. While the power of thought frees us from servile +subjection to instinct, appetite, and routine, it also brings with it +the occasion and possibility of error and mistake. In elevating us above +the brute, it opens to us the possibility of failures to which the +animal, limited to instinct, cannot sink. + + [4] Locke, _Of the Conduct of the Understanding_, first paragraph. + + +Sec. 3. _Tendencies Needing Constant Regulation_ + +[Sidenote: Physical and social sanctions of correct thinking] + +Up to a certain point, the ordinary conditions of life, natural and +social, provide the conditions requisite for regulating the operations +of inference. The necessities of life enforce a fundamental and +persistent discipline for which the most cunningly devised artifices +would be ineffective substitutes. The burnt child dreads the fire; the +painful consequence emphasizes the need of correct inference much more +than would learned discourse on the properties of heat. Social +conditions also put a premium on correct inferring in matters where +action based on valid thought is socially important. These sanctions of +proper thinking may affect life itself, or at least a life reasonably +free from perpetual discomfort. The signs of enemies, of shelter, of +food, of the main social conditions, have to be correctly apprehended. + +[Sidenote: The serious limitations of such sanctions] + +But this disciplinary training, efficacious as it is within certain +limits, does not carry us beyond a restricted boundary. Logical +attainment in one direction is no bar to extravagant conclusions in +another. A savage expert in judging signs of the movements and location +of animals that he hunts, will accept and gravely narrate the most +preposterous yarns concerning the origin of their habits and structures. +When there is no directly appreciable reaction of the inference upon the +security and prosperity of life, there are no natural checks to the +acceptance of wrong beliefs. Conclusions may be generated by a modicum +of fact merely because the suggestions are vivid and interesting; a +large accumulation of data may fail to suggest a proper conclusion +because existing customs are averse to entertaining it. Independent of +training, there is a "primitive credulity" which tends to make no +distinction between what a trained mind calls fancy and that which it +calls a reasonable conclusion. The face in the clouds is believed in as +some sort of fact, merely because it is forcibly suggested. Natural +intelligence is no barrier to the propagation of error, nor large but +untrained experience to the accumulation of fixed false beliefs. Errors +may support one another mutually and weave an ever larger and firmer +fabric of misconception. Dreams, the positions of stars, the lines of +the hand, may be regarded as valuable signs, and the fall of cards as an +inevitable omen, while natural events of the most crucial significance +go disregarded. Beliefs in portents of various kinds, now mere nook and +cranny superstitions, were once universal. A long discipline in exact +science was required for their conquest. + +[Sidenote: Superstition as natural a result as science] + +In the mere function of suggestion, there is no difference between the +power of a column of mercury to portend rain, and that of the entrails +of an animal or the flight of birds to foretell the fortunes of war. For +all anybody can tell in advance, the spilling of salt is as likely to +import bad luck as the bite of a mosquito to import malaria. Only +systematic regulation of the conditions under which observations are +made and severe discipline of the habits of entertaining suggestions can +secure a decision that one type of belief is vicious and the other +sound. The substitution of scientific for superstitious habits of +inference has not been brought about by any improvement in the acuteness +of the senses or in the natural workings of the function of suggestion. +It is the result of regulation _of the conditions_ under which +observation and inference take place. + +[Sidenote: General causes of bad thinking: Bacon's "idols"] + +It is instructive to note some of the attempts that have been made to +classify the main sources of error in reaching beliefs. Francis Bacon, +for example, at the beginnings of modern scientific inquiry, enumerated +four such classes, under the somewhat fantastic title of "idols" (Gr. +[Greek: eidola], images), spectral forms that allure the mind into false +paths. These he called the idols, or phantoms, of the (_a_) tribe, (_b_) +the marketplace, (_c_) the cave or den, and (_d_) the theater; or, less +metaphorically, (_a_) standing erroneous methods (or at least +temptations to error) that have their roots in human nature generally; +(_b_) those that come from intercourse and language; (_c_) those that +are due to causes peculiar to a specific individual; and finally, (_d_) +those that have their sources in the fashion or general current of a +period. Classifying these causes of fallacious belief somewhat +differently, we may say that two are intrinsic and two are extrinsic. Of +the intrinsic, one is common to all men alike (such as the universal +tendency to notice instances that corroborate a favorite belief more +readily than those that contradict it), while the other resides in the +specific temperament and habits of the given individual. Of the +extrinsic, one proceeds from generic social conditions--like the +tendency to suppose that there is a fact wherever there is a word, and +no fact where there is no linguistic term--while the other proceeds from +local and temporary social currents. + +[Sidenote: Locke on the influence of] + +Locke's method of dealing with typical forms of wrong belief is less +formal and may be more enlightening. We can hardly do better than quote +his forcible and quaint language, when, enumerating different classes of +men, he shows different ways in which thought goes wrong: + +[Sidenote: (_a_) dependence on others,] + +1. "The first is of those who seldom reason at all, but do and think +according to the example of others, whether parents, neighbors, +ministers, or who else they are pleased to make choice of to have an +implicit faith in, for the saving of themselves the pains and troubles +of thinking and examining for themselves." + +[Sidenote: (_b_) self-interest,] + +2. "This kind is of those who put passion in the place of reason, and +being resolved that shall govern their actions and arguments, neither +use their own, nor hearken to other people's reason, any farther than it +suits their humor, interest, or party."[5] + + [5] In another place he says: "Men's prejudices and inclinations + impose often upon themselves.... Inclination suggests and slides + into discourse favorable terms, which introduce favorable ideas; + till at last by this means that is concluded clear and evident, thus + dressed up, which, taken in its native state, by making use of none + but precise determined ideas, would find no admittance at all." + +[Sidenote: (_c_) circumscribed experience] + +3. "The third sort is of those who readily and sincerely follow reason, +but for want of having that which one may call large, sound, roundabout +sense, have not a full view of all that relates to the question.... They +converse but with one sort of men, they read but one sort of books, they +will not come in the hearing but of one sort of notions.... They have a +pretty traffic with known correspondents in some little creek ... but +will not venture out into the great ocean of knowledge." Men of +originally equal natural parts may finally arrive at very different +stores of knowledge and truth, "when all the odds between them has been +the different scope that has been given to their understandings to range +in, for the gathering up of information and furnishing their heads with +ideas and notions and observations, whereon to employ their mind."[6] + + [6] _The Conduct of the Understanding_, Sec. 3. + +In another portion of his writings,[7] Locke states the same ideas in +slightly different form. + + [7] _Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. IV, ch. XX, "Of + Wrong Assent or Error." + +[Sidenote: Effect of dogmatic principles,] + +1. "That which is inconsistent with our _principles_ is so far from +passing for probable with us that it will not be allowed possible. The +reverence borne to these principles is so great, and their authority so +paramount to all other, that the testimony, not only of other men, but +the evidence of our own senses are often rejected, when they offer to +vouch anything contrary to these _established rules_.... There is +nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into their minds +propositions ... from their parents, nurses, or those about them; which +being insinuated in their unwary as well as unbiased understandings, and +fastened by degrees, are at last (and this whether true or false) +riveted there by long custom and education, beyond all possibility of +being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon +their opinions and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their +minds as their very memories, not having observed their early +insinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence +them as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, +or questioned." They take them as standards "to be the great and +unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to which they +are to appeal in all manner of controversies." + +[Sidenote: of closed minds,] + +2. "Secondly, next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a +mold, and fashioned just to the size of a received hypothesis." Such +men, Locke goes on to say, while not denying the existence of facts and +evidence, cannot be convinced by the evidence that would decide them if +their minds were not so closed by adherence to fixed belief. + +[Sidenote: of strong passion,] + +3. "Predominant Passions. Thirdly, probabilities which cross men's +appetites and prevailing passions run the same fate. Let ever so much +probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning, and money on +the other, it is easy to foresee which will outweigh. Earthly minds, +like mud walls, resist the strongest batteries. + +[Sidenote: of dependence upon authority of others] + +4. "Authority. The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall +take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than +all the others together, is the giving up our assent to the common +received opinions, either of our friends or party, neighborhood or +country." + +[Sidenote: Causes of bad mental habits are social as well as inborn] + +Both Bacon and Locke make it evident that over and above the sources of +misbelief that reside in the natural tendencies of the individual (like +those toward hasty and too far-reaching conclusions), social conditions +tend to instigate and confirm wrong habits of thinking by authority, by +conscious instruction, and by the even more insidious half-conscious +influences of language, imitation, sympathy, and suggestion. Education +has accordingly not only to safeguard an individual against the +besetting erroneous tendencies of his own mind--its rashness, +presumption, and preference of what chimes with self-interest to +objective evidence--but also to undermine and destroy the accumulated +and self-perpetuating prejudices of long ages. When social life in +general has become more reasonable, more imbued with rational +conviction, and less moved by stiff authority and blind passion, +educational agencies may be more positive and constructive than at +present, for they will work in harmony with the educative influence +exercised willy-nilly by other social surroundings upon an individual's +habits of thought and belief. At present, the work of teaching must not +only transform natural tendencies into trained habits of thought, but +must also fortify the mind against irrational tendencies current in the +social environment, and help displace erroneous habits already produced. + + +Sec. 4. _Regulation Transforms Inference into Proof_ + +[Sidenote: A leap is involved in all thinking] + +Thinking is important because, as we have seen, it is that function in +which given or ascertained facts stand for or indicate others which are +not directly ascertained. But the process of reaching the absent from +the present is peculiarly exposed to error; it is liable to be +influenced by almost any number of unseen and unconsidered causes,--past +experience, received dogmas, the stirring of self-interest, the arousing +of passion, sheer mental laziness, a social environment steeped in +biased traditions or animated by false expectations, and so on. The +exercise of thought is, in the literal sense of that word, _inference_; +by it one thing _carries us over_ to the idea of, and belief in, another +thing. It involves a jump, a leap, a going beyond what is surely known +to something else accepted on its warrant. Unless one is an idiot, one +simply cannot help having all things and events suggest other things not +actually present, nor can one help a tendency to believe in the latter +on the basis of the former. The very inevitableness of the jump, the +leap, to something unknown, only emphasizes the necessity of attention +to the conditions under which it occurs so that the danger of a false +step may be lessened and the probability of a right landing increased. + +[Sidenote: Hence, the need of regulation which, when adequate, makes +proof] + +Such attention consists in regulation (1) of the conditions under which +the function of suggestion takes place, and (2) of the conditions under +which credence is yielded to the suggestions that occur. Inference +controlled in these two ways (the study of which in detail constitutes +one of the chief objects of this book) forms _proof_. To prove a thing +means primarily to try, to test it. The guest bidden to the wedding +feast excused himself because he had to _prove_ his oxen. Exceptions are +said to prove a rule; _i.e._ they furnish instances so extreme that they +try in the severest fashion its applicability; if the rule will stand +such a test, there is no good reason for further doubting it. Not until +a thing has been tried--"tried out," in colloquial language--do we know +its true worth. Till then it may be pretense, a bluff. But the thing +that has come out victorious in a test or trial of strength carries its +credentials with it; it is approved, because it has been proved. Its +value is clearly evinced, shown, _i.e._ demonstrated. So it is with +inferences. The mere fact that inference in general is an invaluable +function does not guarantee, nor does it even help out the correctness +of any particular inference. Any inference may go astray; and as we have +seen, there are standing influences ever ready to assist its going +wrong. _What is important, is that every inference shall be a tested +inference_; _or_ (since often this is not possible) _that we shall +discriminate between beliefs that rest upon tested evidence and those +that do not, and shall be accordingly on our guard as to the kind and +degree of assent yielded_. + +[Sidenote: The office of education in forming skilled] + +[Sidenote: powers of thinking] + +While it is not the business of education to prove every statement made, +any more than to teach every possible item of information, it is its +business to cultivate deep-seated and effective habits of +discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, and +opinions; to develop a lively, sincere, and open-minded preference for +conclusions that are properly grounded, and to ingrain into the +individual's working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate +to the various problems that present themselves. No matter how much an +individual knows as a matter of hearsay and information, if he has not +attitudes and habits of this sort, he is not intellectually educated. He +lacks the rudiments of mental discipline. And since these habits are not +a gift of nature (no matter how strong the aptitude for acquiring them); +since, moreover, the casual circumstances of the natural and social +environment are not enough to compel their acquisition, the main office +of education is to supply conditions that make for their cultivation. +The formation of these habits is the Training of Mind. + + + + +CHAPTER THREE + +NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT + + +[Sidenote: Only native powers can be trained.] + +In the last chapter we considered the need of transforming, through +training, the natural capacities of inference into habits of critical +examination and inquiry. The very importance of thought for life makes +necessary its control by education because of its natural tendency to go +astray, and because social influences exist that tend to form habits of +thought leading to inadequate and erroneous beliefs. Training must, +however, be itself based upon the natural tendencies,--that is, it must +find its point of departure in them. A being who could not think without +training could never be trained to think; one may have to learn to think +_well_, but not to _think_. Training, in short, must fall back upon the +prior and independent existence of natural powers; it is concerned with +their proper direction, not with creating them. + +[Sidenote: Hence, the one taught must take the initiative] + +Teaching and learning are correlative or corresponding processes, as +much so as selling and buying. One might as well say he has sold when no +one has bought, as to say that he has taught when no one has learned. +And in the educational transaction, the initiative lies with the learner +even more than in commerce it lies with the buyer. If an individual can +learn to think only in the sense of learning to employ more economically +and effectively powers he already possesses, even more truly one can +teach others to think only in the sense of appealing to and fostering +powers already active in them. Effective appeal of this kind is +impossible unless the teacher has an insight into existing habits and +tendencies, the natural resources with which he has to ally himself. + +[Sidenote: Three important natural resources] + +Any inventory of the items of this natural capital is somewhat arbitrary +because it must pass over many of the complex details. But a statement +of the factors essential to thought will put before us in outline the +main elements. Thinking involves (as we have seen) the suggestion of a +conclusion for acceptance, and also search or inquiry to test the value +of the suggestion before finally accepting it. This implies (_a_) a +certain fund or store of experiences and facts from which suggestions +proceed; (_b_) promptness, flexibility, and fertility of suggestions; +and (_c_) orderliness, consecutiveness, appropriateness in what is +suggested. Clearly, a person may be hampered in any of these three +regards: His thinking may be irrelevant, narrow, or crude because he has +not enough actual material upon which to base conclusions; or because +concrete facts and raw material, even if extensive and bulky, fail to +evoke suggestions easily and richly; or finally, because, even when +these two conditions are fulfilled, the ideas suggested are incoherent +and fantastic, rather than pertinent and consistent. + + +Sec. 1. _Curiosity_ + +[Sidenote: Desire for fullness of experience:] + +The most vital and significant factor in supplying the primary material +whence suggestion may issue is, without doubt, curiosity. The wisest of +the Greeks used to say that wonder is the mother of all science. An +inert mind waits, as it were, for experiences to be imperiously forced +upon it. The pregnant saying of Wordsworth: + + "The eye--it cannot choose but see; + We cannot bid the ear be still; + Our bodies feel, where'er they be, + Against or with our will"-- + +holds good in the degree in which one is naturally possessed by +curiosity. The curious mind is constantly alert and exploring, seeking +material for thought, as a vigorous and healthy body is on the _qui +vive_ for nutriment. Eagerness for experience, for new and varied +contacts, is found where wonder is found. Such curiosity is the only +sure guarantee of the acquisition of the primary facts upon which +inference must base itself. + +[Sidenote: (_a_) physical] + +(_a_) In its first manifestations, curiosity is a vital overflow, an +expression of an abundant organic energy. A physiological uneasiness +leads a child to be "into everything,"--to be reaching, poking, +pounding, prying. Observers of animals have noted what one author calls +"their inveterate tendency to fool." "Rats run about, smell, dig, or +gnaw, without real reference to the business in hand. In the same way +Jack [a dog] scrabbles and jumps, the kitten wanders and picks, the +otter slips about everywhere like ground lightning, the elephant fumbles +ceaselessly, the monkey pulls things about."[8] The most casual notice +of the activities of a young child reveals a ceaseless display of +exploring and testing activity. Objects are sucked, fingered, and +thumped; drawn and pushed, handled and thrown; in short, experimented +with, till they cease to yield new qualities. Such activities are hardly +intellectual, and yet without them intellectual activity would be feeble +and intermittent through lack of stuff for its operations. + + [8] Hobhouse, _Mind in Evolution_, p. 195. + +[Sidenote: (_b_) social] + +(_b_) A higher stage of curiosity develops under the influence of social +stimuli. When the child learns that he can appeal to others to eke out +his store of experiences, so that, if objects fail to respond +interestingly to his experiments, he may call upon persons to provide +interesting material, a new epoch sets in. "What is that?" "Why?" become +the unfailing signs of a child's presence. At first this questioning is +hardly more than a projection into social relations of the physical +overflow which earlier kept the child pushing and pulling, opening and +shutting. He asks in succession what holds up the house, what holds up +the soil that holds the house, what holds up the earth that holds the +soil; but his questions are not evidence of any genuine consciousness of +rational connections. His _why_ is not a demand for scientific +explanation; the motive behind it is simply eagerness for a larger +acquaintance with the mysterious world in which he is placed. The search +is not for a law or principle, but only for a bigger fact. Yet there is +more than a desire to accumulate just information or heap up +disconnected items, although sometimes the interrogating habit threatens +to degenerate into a mere disease of language. In the feeling, however +dim, that the facts which directly meet the senses are not the whole +story, that there is more behind them and more to come from them, lies +the germ of _intellectual_ curiosity. + +[Sidenote: (_c_) intellectual] + +(_c_) Curiosity rises above the organic and the social planes and +becomes intellectual in the degree in which it is transformed into +interest in _problems_ provoked by the observation of things and the +accumulation of material. When the question is not discharged by being +asked of another, when the child continues to entertain it in his own +mind and to be alert for whatever will help answer it, curiosity has +become a positive intellectual force. To the open mind, nature and +social experience are full of varied and subtle challenges to look +further. If germinating powers are not used and cultivated at the right +moment, they tend to be transitory, to die out, or to wane in intensity. +This general law is peculiarly true of sensitiveness to what is +uncertain and questionable; in a few people, intellectual curiosity is +so insatiable that nothing will discourage it, but in most its edge is +easily dulled and blunted. Bacon's saying that we must become as little +children in order to enter the kingdom of science is at once a reminder +of the open-minded and flexible wonder of childhood and of the ease with +which this endowment is lost. Some lose it in indifference or +carelessness; others in a frivolous flippancy; many escape these evils +only to become incased in a hard dogmatism which is equally fatal to the +spirit of wonder. Some are so taken up with routine as to be +inaccessible to new facts and problems. Others retain curiosity only +with reference to what concerns their personal advantage in their chosen +career. With many, curiosity is arrested on the plane of interest in +local gossip and in the fortunes of their neighbors; indeed, so usual is +this result that very often the first association with the word +_curiosity_ is a prying inquisitiveness into other people's business. +With respect then to curiosity, the teacher has usually more to learn +than to teach. Rarely can he aspire to the office of kindling or even +increasing it. His task is rather to keep alive the sacred spark of +wonder and to fan the flame that already glows. His problem is to +protect the spirit of inquiry, to keep it from becoming blase from +overexcitement, wooden from routine, fossilized through dogmatic +instruction, or dissipated by random exercise upon trivial things. + + +Sec. 2. _Suggestion_ + +Out of the subject-matter, whether rich or scanty, important or trivial, +of present experience issue suggestions, ideas, beliefs as to what is +not yet given. The function of suggestion is not one that can be +produced by teaching; while it may be modified for better or worse by +conditions, it cannot be destroyed. Many a child has tried his best to +see if he could not "stop thinking," but the flow of suggestions goes on +in spite of our will, quite as surely as "our bodies feel, where'er they +be, against or with our will." Primarily, naturally, it is not we who +think, in any actively responsible sense; thinking is rather something +that happens in us. Only so far as one has acquired control of the +method in which the function of suggestion occurs and has accepted +responsibility for its consequences, can one truthfully say, "_I_ think +so and so." + +[Sidenote: The dimensions of suggestion:] + +[Sidenote: (_a_) ease] + +The function of suggestion has a variety of aspects (or dimensions as we +may term them), varying in different persons, both in themselves and in +their mode of combination. These dimensions are ease or promptness, +extent or variety, and depth or persistence. (_a_) The common +classification of persons into the dull and the bright is made primarily +on the basis of the readiness or facility with which suggestions follow +upon the presentation of objects and upon the happening of events. As +the metaphor of dull and bright implies, some minds are impervious, or +else they absorb passively. Everything presented is lost in a drab +monotony that gives nothing back. But others reflect, or give back in +varied lights, all that strikes upon them. The dull make no response; +the bright flash back the fact with a changed quality. An inert or +stupid mind requires a heavy jolt or an intense shock to move it to +suggestion; the bright mind is quick, is alert to react with +interpretation and suggestion of consequences to follow. + +Yet the teacher is not entitled to assume stupidity or even dullness +merely because of irresponsiveness to school subjects or to a lesson as +presented by text-book or teacher. The pupil labeled hopeless may react +in quick and lively fashion when the thing-in-hand seems to him worth +while, as some out-of-school sport or social affair. Indeed, the school +subject might move him, were it set in a different context and treated +by a different method. A boy dull in geometry may prove quick enough +when he takes up the subject in connection with manual training; the +girl who seems inaccessible to historical facts may respond promptly +when it is a question of judging the character and deeds of people of +her acquaintance or of fiction. Barring physical defect or disease, +slowness and dullness in _all_ directions are comparatively rare. + +[Sidenote: (_b_) range] + +(_b_) Irrespective of the difference in persons as to the ease and +promptness with which ideas respond to facts, there is a difference in +the number or range of the suggestions that occur. We speak truly, in +some cases, of the flood of suggestions; in others, there is but a +slender trickle. Occasionally, slowness of outward response is due to a +great variety of suggestions which check one another and lead to +hesitation and suspense; while a lively and prompt suggestion may take +such possession of the mind as to preclude the development of others. +Too few suggestions indicate a dry and meager mental habit; when this is +joined to great learning, there results a pedant or a Gradgrind. Such a +person's mind rings hard; he is likely to bore others with mere bulk of +information. He contrasts with the person whom we call ripe, juicy, and +mellow. + +A conclusion reached after consideration of a few alternatives may be +formally correct, but it will not possess the fullness and richness of +meaning of one arrived at after comparison of a greater variety of +alternative suggestions. On the other hand, suggestions may be too +numerous and too varied for the best interests of mental habit. So many +suggestions may rise that the person is at a loss to select among them. +He finds it difficult to reach any definite conclusion and wanders more +or less helplessly among them. So much suggests itself _pro_ and _con_, +one thing leads on to another so naturally, that he finds it difficult +to decide in practical affairs or to conclude in matters of theory. +There is such a thing as too much thinking, as when action is paralyzed +by the multiplicity of views suggested by a situation. Or again, the +very number of suggestions may be hostile to tracing logical sequences +among them, for it may tempt the mind away from the necessary but trying +task of search for real connections, into the more congenial occupation +of embroidering upon the given facts a tissue of agreeable fancies. The +best mental habit involves a balance between paucity and redundancy of +suggestions. + +[Sidenote: (_c_) profundity] + +(_c_) _Depth._ We distinguish between people not only upon the basis of +their quickness and fertility of intellectual response, but also with +respect to the plane upon which it occurs--the intrinsic quality of the +response. + +One man's thought is profound while another's is superficial; one goes +to the roots of the matter, and another touches lightly its most +external aspects. This phase of thinking is perhaps the most untaught of +all, and the least amenable to external influence whether for +improvement or harm. Nevertheless, the conditions of the pupil's contact +with subject-matter may be such that he is compelled to come to quarters +with its more significant features, or such that he is encouraged to +deal with it upon the basis of what is trivial. The common assumptions +that, if the pupil only thinks, one thought is just as good for his +mental discipline as another, and that the end of study is the amassing +of information, both tend to foster superficial, at the expense of +significant, thought. Pupils who in matters of ordinary practical +experience have a ready and acute perception of the difference between +the significant and the meaningless, often reach in school subjects a +point where all things seem equally important or equally unimportant; +where one thing is just as likely to be true as another, and where +intellectual effort is expended not in discriminating between things, +but in trying to make verbal connections among words. + +[Sidenote: Balance of mind] + +Sometimes slowness and depth of response are intimately connected. Time +is required in order to digest impressions, and translate them into +substantial ideas. "Brightness" may be but a flash in the pan. The "slow +but sure" person, whether man or child, is one in whom impressions sink +and accumulate, so that thinking is done at a deeper level of value +than with a slighter load. Many a child is rebuked for "slowness," for +not "answering promptly," when his forces are taking time to gather +themselves together to deal effectively with the problem at hand. In +such cases, failure to afford time and leisure conduce to habits of +speedy, but snapshot and superficial, judgment. The depth to which a +sense of the problem, of the difficulty, sinks, determines the quality +of the thinking that follows; and any habit of teaching which encourages +the pupil for the sake of a successful recitation or of a display of +memorized information to glide over the thin ice of genuine problems +reverses the true method of mind training. + +[Sidenote: Individual differences] + +It is profitable to study the lives of men and women who achieve in +adult life fine things in their respective callings, but who were called +dull in their school days. Sometimes the early wrong judgment was due +mainly to the fact that the direction in which the child showed his +ability was not one recognized by the good old standards in use, as in +the case of Darwin's interest in beetles, snakes, and frogs. Sometimes +it was due to the fact that the child dwelling habitually on a deeper +plane of reflection than other pupils--or than his teachers--did not +show to advantage when prompt answers of the usual sort were expected. +Sometimes it was due to the fact that the pupil's natural mode of +approach clashed habitually with that of the text or teacher, and the +method of the latter was assumed as an absolute basis of estimate. + +[Sidenote: Any subject may be intellectual] + +In any event, it is desirable that the teacher should rid himself of the +notion that "thinking" is a single, unalterable faculty; that he should +recognize that it is a term denoting the various ways in which things +acquire significance. It is desirable to expel also the kindred notion +that some subjects are inherently "intellectual," and hence possessed of +an almost magical power to train the faculty of thought. Thinking is +specific, not a machine-like, ready-made apparatus to be turned +indifferently and at will upon all subjects, as a lantern may throw its +light as it happens upon horses, streets, gardens, trees, or river. +Thinking is specific, in that different things suggest their own +appropriate meanings, tell their own unique stories, and in that they do +this in very different ways with different persons. As the growth of the +body is through the assimilation of food, so the growth of mind is +through the logical organization of subject-matter. Thinking is not like +a sausage machine which reduces all materials indifferently to one +marketable commodity, but is a power of following up and linking +together the specific suggestions that specific things arouse. +Accordingly, any subject, from Greek to cooking, and from drawing to +mathematics, is intellectual, if intellectual at all, not in its fixed +inner structure, but in its function--in its power to start and direct +significant inquiry and reflection. What geometry does for one, the +manipulation of laboratory apparatus, the mastery of a musical +composition, or the conduct of a business affair, may do for another. + + +Sec. 3. _Orderliness: Its Nature_ + +[Sidenote: Continuity] + +Facts, whether narrow or extensive, and conclusions suggested by them, +whether many or few, do not constitute, even when combined, reflective +thought. The suggestions must be _organized_; they must be arranged with +reference to one another and with reference to the facts on which they +depend for proof. When the factors of facility, of fertility, and of +depth are properly balanced or proportioned, we get as the outcome +continuity of thought. We desire neither the slow mind nor yet the +hasty. We wish neither random diffuseness nor fixed rigidity. +Consecutiveness means flexibility and variety of materials, conjoined +with singleness and definiteness of direction. It is opposed both to a +mechanical routine uniformity and to a grasshopper-like movement. Of +bright children, it is not infrequently said that "they might do +anything, if only they settled down," so quick and apt are they in any +particular response. But, alas, they rarely settle. + +On the other hand, it is not enough _not_ to be diverted. A deadly and +fanatic consistency is not our goal. Concentration does not mean fixity, +nor a cramped arrest or paralysis of the flow of suggestion. It means +variety and change of ideas combined into a _single steady trend moving +toward a unified conclusion_. Thoughts are concentrated not by being +kept still and quiescent, but by being kept moving toward an object, as +a general concentrates his troops for attack or defense. Holding the +mind to a subject is like holding a ship to its course; it implies +constant change of place combined with unity of direction. Consistent +and orderly thinking is precisely such a change of subject-matter. +Consistency is no more the mere absence of contradiction than +concentration is the mere absence of diversion--which exists in dull +routine or in a person "fast asleep." All kinds of varied and +incompatible suggestions may sprout and be followed in their growth, and +yet thinking be consistent and orderly, provided each one of the +suggestions is viewed in relation to the main topic. + +[Sidenote: Practical demands enforce some degree of continuity] + +In the main, for most persons, the primary resource in the development +of orderly habits of thought is indirect, not direct. Intellectual +organization originates and for a time grows as an accompaniment of the +organization of the acts required to realize an end, not as the result +of a direct appeal to thinking power. The need of thinking to accomplish +something beyond thinking is more potent than thinking for its own sake. +All people at the outset, and the majority of people probably all their +lives, attain ordering of thought through ordering of action. Adults +normally carry on some occupation, profession, pursuit; and this +furnishes the continuous axis about which their knowledge, their +beliefs, and their habits of reaching and testing conclusions are +organized. Observations that have to do with the efficient performance +of their calling are extended and rendered precise. Information related +to it is not merely amassed and then left in a heap; it is classified +and subdivided so as to be available as it is needed. Inferences are +made by most men not from purely speculative motives, but because they +are involved in the efficient performance of "the duties involved in +their several callings." Thus their inferences are constantly tested by +results achieved; futile and scattering methods tend to be discounted; +orderly arrangements have a premium put upon them. The event, the issue, +stands as a constant check on the thinking that has led up to it; and +this discipline by efficiency in action is the chief sanction, in +practically all who are not scientific specialists, of orderliness of +thought. + +Such a resource--the main prop of disciplined thinking in adult life--is +not to be despised in training the young in right intellectual habits. +There are, however, profound differences between the immature and the +adult in the matter of organized activity--differences which must be +taken seriously into account in any educational use of activities: (_i_) +The external achievement resulting from activity is a more urgent +necessity with the adult, and hence is with him a more effective means +of discipline of mind than with the child; (_ii_) The ends of adult +activity are more specialized than those of child activity. + +[Sidenote: Peculiar difficulty with children] + +(_i_) The selection and arrangement of appropriate lines of action is a +much more difficult problem as respects youth than it is in the case of +adults. With the latter, the main lines are more or less settled by +circumstances. The social status of the adult, the fact that he is a +citizen, a householder, a parent, one occupied in some regular +industrial or professional calling, prescribes the chief features of the +acts to be performed, and secures, somewhat automatically, as it were, +appropriate and related modes of thinking. But with the child there is +no such fixity of status and pursuit; there is almost nothing to dictate +that such and such a consecutive line of action, rather than another, +should be followed, while the will of others, his own caprice, and +circumstances about him tend to produce an isolated momentary act. The +absence of continued motivation cooeperates with the inner plasticity of +the immature to increase the importance of educational training and the +difficulties in the way of finding consecutive modes of activities which +may do for child and youth what serious vocations and functions do for +the adult. In the case of children, the choice is so peculiarly exposed +to arbitrary factors, to mere school traditions, to waves of pedagogical +fad and fancy, to fluctuating social cross currents, that sometimes, in +sheer disgust at the inadequacy of results, a reaction occurs to the +total neglect of overt activity as an educational factor, and a recourse +to purely theoretical subjects and methods. + +[Sidenote: Peculiar opportunity with children] + +(_ii_) This very difficulty, however, points to the fact that the +_opportunity for selecting truly educative activities_ is indefinitely +greater in child life than in adult. The factor of external pressure is +so strong with most adults that the educative value of the pursuit--its +reflex influence upon intelligence and character--however genuine, is +incidental, and frequently almost accidental. The problem and the +opportunity with the young is selection of orderly and continuous modes +of occupation, which, while they lead up to and prepare for the +indispensable activities of adult life, have their own _sufficient +justification in their present reflex influence upon the formation of +habits of thought_. + +[Sidenote: Action and reaction between extremes] + +Educational practice shows a continual tendency to oscillate between two +extremes with respect to overt and exertive activities. One extreme is +to neglect them almost entirely, on the ground that they are chaotic and +fluctuating, mere diversions appealing to the transitory unformed taste +and caprice of immature minds; or if they avoid this evil, are +objectionable copies of the highly specialized, and more or less +commercial, activities of adult life. If activities are admitted at all +into the school, the admission is a grudging concession to the necessity +of having occasional relief from the strain of constant intellectual +work, or to the clamor of outside utilitarian demands upon the school. +The other extreme is an enthusiastic belief in the almost magical +educative efficacy of any kind of activity, granted it is an activity +and not a passive absorption of academic and theoretic material. The +conceptions of play, of self-expression, of natural growth, are +appealed to almost as if they meant that opportunity for any kind of +spontaneous activity inevitably secures the due training of mental +power; or a mythological brain physiology is appealed to as proof that +any exercise of the muscles trains power of thought. + +[Sidenote: Locating the problem of education] + +While we vibrate from one of these extremes to the other, the most +serious of all problems is ignored: the problem, namely, of discovering +and arranging the forms of activity (_a_) which are most congenial, best +adapted, to the immature stage of development; (_b_) which have the most +ulterior promise as preparation for the social responsibilities of adult +life; and (_c_) which, _at the same time_, have the maximum of influence +in forming habits of acute observation and of consecutive inference. As +curiosity is related to the acquisition of material of thought, as +suggestion is related to flexibility and force of thought, so the +ordering of activities, not themselves primarily intellectual, is +related to the forming of intellectual powers of consecutiveness. + + + + +CHAPTER FOUR + +SCHOOL CONDITIONS AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT + + +Sec. 1. _Introductory: Methods and Conditions_ + +[Sidenote: Formal discipline] + +The so-called faculty-psychology went hand in hand with the vogue of the +formal-discipline idea in education. If thought is a distinct piece of +mental machinery, separate from observation, memory, imagination, and +common-sense judgments of persons and things, then thought should be +trained by special exercises designed for the purpose, as one might +devise special exercises for developing the biceps muscles. Certain +subjects are then to be regarded as intellectual or logical subjects +_par excellence_, possessed of a predestined fitness to exercise the +thought-faculty, just as certain machines are better than others for +developing arm power. With these three notions goes the fourth, that +method consists of a set of operations by which the machinery of thought +is set going and kept at work upon any subject-matter. + +[Sidenote: versus real thinking] + +We have tried to make it clear in the previous chapters that there is no +single and uniform power of thought, but a multitude of different ways +in which specific things--things observed, remembered, heard of, read +about--evoke suggestions or ideas that are pertinent to the occasion and +fruitful in the sequel. Training is such development of curiosity, +suggestion, and habits of exploring and testing, as increases their +scope and efficiency. A subject--any subject--is intellectual in the +degree in which _with any given person_ it succeeds in effecting this +growth. On this view the fourth factor, method, is concerned with +providing conditions so adapted to individual needs and powers as to +make for the permanent improvement of observation, suggestion, and +investigation. + +[Sidenote: True and false meaning of method] + +The teacher's problem is thus twofold. On the one side, he needs (as we +saw in the last chapter) to be a student of individual traits and +habits; on the other side, he needs to be a student of the conditions +that modify for better or worse the directions in which individual +powers habitually express themselves. He needs to recognize that method +covers not only what he intentionally devises and employs for the +purpose of mental training, but also what he does without any conscious +reference to it,--anything in the atmosphere and conduct of the school +which reacts in any way upon the curiosity, the responsiveness, and the +orderly activity of children. The teacher who is an intelligent student +both of individual mental operations and of the effects of school +conditions upon those operations, can largely be trusted to develop for +himself methods of instruction in their narrower and more technical +sense--those best adapted to achieve results in particular subjects, +such as reading, geography, or algebra. In the hands of one who is not +intelligently aware of individual capacities and of the influence +unconsciously exerted upon them by the entire environment, even the best +of technical methods are likely to get an immediate result only at the +expense of deep-seated and persistent habits. We may group the +conditioning influences of the school environment under three heads: (1) +the mental attitudes and habits of the persons with whom the child is +in contact; (2) the subjects studied; (3) current educational aims and +ideals. + + +Sec. 2. _Influence of the Habits of Others_ + +Bare reference to the imitativeness of human nature is enough to suggest +how profoundly the mental habits of others affect the attitude of the +one being trained. Example is more potent than precept; and a teacher's +best conscious efforts may be more than counteracted by the influence of +personal traits which he is unaware of or regards as unimportant. +Methods of instruction and discipline that are technically faulty may be +rendered practically innocuous by the inspiration of the personal method +that lies back of them. + +[Sidenote: Response to environment fundamental in method] + +To confine, however, the conditioning influence of the educator, whether +parent or teacher, to imitation is to get a very superficial view of the +intellectual influence of others. Imitation is but one case of a deeper +principle--that of stimulus and response. _Everything the teacher does, +as well as the manner in which he does it, incites the child to respond +in some way or other, and each response tends to set the child's +attitude in some way or other._ Even the inattention of the child to the +adult is often a mode of response which is the result of unconscious +training.[9] The teacher is rarely (and even then never entirely) a +transparent medium of access by another mind to a subject. With the +young, the influence of the teacher's personality is intimately fused +with that of the subject; the child does not separate nor even +distinguish the two. And as the child's response is _toward_ or _away +from_ anything presented, he keeps up a running commentary, of which he +himself is hardly distinctly aware, of like and dislike, of sympathy and +aversion, not merely to the acts of the teacher, but also to the subject +with which the teacher is occupied. + + [9] A child of four or five who had been repeatedly called to the + house by his mother with no apparent response on his own part, was + asked if he did not hear her. He replied quite judicially, "Oh, yes, + but she doesn't call very mad yet." + +[Sidenote: Influence of teacher's own habits] + +[Sidenote: Judging others by ourselves] + +The extent and power of this influence upon morals and manners, upon +character, upon habits of speech and social bearing, are almost +universally recognized. But the tendency to conceive of thought as an +isolated faculty has often blinded teachers to the fact that this +influence is just as real and pervasive in intellectual concerns. +Teachers, as well as children, stick more or less to the main points, +have more or less wooden and rigid methods of response, and display more +or less intellectual curiosity about matters that come up. And every +trait of this kind is an inevitable part of the teacher's method of +teaching. Merely to accept without notice slipshod habits of speech, +slovenly inferences, unimaginative and literal response, is to indorse +these tendencies, and to ratify them into habits--and so it goes +throughout the whole range of contact between teacher and student. In +this complex and intricate field, two or three points may well be +singled out for special notice. (_a_) Most persons are quite unaware of +the distinguishing peculiarities of their own mental habit. They take +their own mental operations for granted, and unconsciously make them the +standard for judging the mental processes of others.[10] Hence there is +a tendency to encourage everything in the pupil which agrees with this +attitude, and to neglect or fail to understand whatever is incongruous +with it. The prevalent overestimation of the value, for mind-training, +of _theoretic_ subjects as compared with practical pursuits, is +doubtless due partly to the fact that the teacher's calling tends to +select those in whom the theoretic interest is specially strong and to +repel those in whom executive abilities are marked. Teachers sifted out +on this basis judge pupils and subjects by a like standard, encouraging +an intellectual one-sidedness in those to whom it is naturally +congenial, and repelling from study those in whom practical instincts +are more urgent. + + [10] People who have _number-forms_--_i.e._ project number series + into space and see them arranged in certain shapes--when asked why + they have not mentioned the fact before, often reply that it never + occurred to them; they supposed that everybody had the same power. + +[Sidenote: Exaggeration of direct personal influence] + +(_b_) Teachers--and this holds especially of the stronger and better +teachers--tend to rely upon their personal strong points to hold a child +to his work, and thereby to substitute their personal influence for that +of subject-matter as a motive for study. The teacher finds by experience +that his own personality is often effective where the power of the +subject to command attention is almost nil; then he utilizes the former +more and more, until the pupil's relation to the teacher almost takes +the place of his relation to the subject. In this way the teacher's +personality may become a source of personal dependence and weakness, an +influence that renders the pupil indifferent to the value of the subject +for its own sake. + +[Sidenote: Independent thinking _versus_ "getting the answer"] + +(_c_) The operation of the teacher's own mental habit tends, unless +carefully watched and guided, to make the child a student of the +teacher's peculiarities rather than of the subjects that he is supposed +to study. His chief concern is to accommodate himself to what the +teacher expects of him, rather than to devote himself energetically to +the problems of subject-matter. "Is this right?" comes to mean "Will +this answer or this process satisfy the teacher?"--instead of meaning, +"Does it satisfy the inherent conditions of the problem?" It would be +folly to deny the legitimacy or the value of the study of human nature +that children carry on in school; but it is obviously undesirable that +their chief intellectual problem should be that of producing an answer +approved by the teacher, and their standard of success be successful +adaptation to the requirements of another. + + +Sec. 3. _Influence of the Nature of Studies_ + +[Sidenote: Types of studies] + +Studies are conventionally and conveniently grouped under these +heads: (1) Those especially involving the acquisition of skill +in performance--the school arts, such as reading, writing, +figuring, and music. (2) Those mainly concerned with acquiring +knowledge--"informational" studies, such as geography and history. (3) +Those in which skill in doing and bulk of information are relatively +less important, and appeal to abstract thinking, to "reasoning," is most +marked--"disciplinary" studies, such as arithmetic and formal +grammar.[11] Each of these groups of subjects has its own special +pitfalls. + + [11] Of course, any one subject has all three aspects: _e.g._ in + arithmetic, counting, writing, and reading numbers, rapid adding, + etc., are cases of skill in doing; the tables of weights and + measures are a matter of information, etc. + +[Sidenote: The abstract as the isolated] + +(_a_) In the case of the so-called disciplinary or pre-eminently logical +studies, there is danger of the isolation of intellectual activity from +the ordinary affairs of life. Teacher and student alike tend to set up +a chasm between logical thought as something abstract and remote, and +the specific and concrete demands of everyday events. The abstract tends +to become so aloof, so far away from application, as to be cut loose +from practical and moral bearing. The gullibility of specialized +scholars when out of their own lines, their extravagant habits of +inference and speech, their ineptness in reaching conclusions in +practical matters, their egotistical engrossment in their own subjects, +are extreme examples of the bad effects of severing studies completely +from their ordinary connections in life. + +[Sidenote: Overdoing the mechanical and automatic] + +[Sidenote: "Drill"] + +(_b_) The danger in those studies where the main emphasis is upon +acquisition of skill is just the reverse. The tendency is to take the +shortest cuts possible to gain the required end. This makes the subjects +_mechanical_, and thus restrictive of intellectual power. In the mastery +of reading, writing, drawing, laboratory technique, etc., the need of +economy of time and material, of neatness and accuracy, of promptness +and uniformity, is so great that these things tend to become ends in +themselves, irrespective of their influence upon general mental +attitude. Sheer imitation, dictation of steps to be taken, mechanical +drill, may give results most quickly and yet strengthen traits likely to +be fatal to reflective power. The pupil is enjoined to do this and that +specific thing, with no knowledge of any reason except that by so doing +he gets his result most speedily; his mistakes are pointed out and +corrected for him; he is kept at pure repetition of certain acts till +they become automatic. Later, teachers wonder why the pupil reads with +so little expression, and figures with so little intelligent +consideration of the terms of his problem. In some educational dogmas +and practices, the very idea of training mind seems to be hopelessly +confused with that of a drill which hardly touches _mind_ at all--or +touches it for the worse--since it is wholly taken up with training +skill in external execution. This method reduces the "training" of human +beings to the level of animal training. Practical skill, modes of +effective technique, can be intelligently, non-mechanically _used_, only +when intelligence has played a part in their _acquisition_. + +[Sidenote: Wisdom _versus_ information] + +(_c_) Much the same sort of thing is to be said regarding studies where +emphasis traditionally falls upon bulk and accuracy of information. The +distinction between information and wisdom is old, and yet requires +constantly to be redrawn. Information is knowledge which is merely +acquired and stored up; wisdom is knowledge operating in the direction +of powers to the better living of life. Information, merely as +information, implies no special training of intellectual capacity; +wisdom is the finest fruit of that training. In school, amassing +information always tends to escape from the ideal of wisdom or good +judgment. The aim often seems to be--especially in such a subject as +geography--to make the pupil what has been called a "cyclopedia of +useless information." "Covering the ground" is the primary necessity; +the nurture of mind a bad second. Thinking cannot, of course, go on in a +vacuum; suggestions and inferences can occur only upon a basis of +information as to matters of fact. + +But there is all the difference in the world whether the acquisition of +information is treated as an end in itself, or is made an integral +portion of the training of thought. The assumption that information +which has been accumulated apart from use in the recognition and +solution of a problem may later on be freely employed at will by thought +is quite false. The skill at the ready command of intelligence is the +skill acquired with the aid of intelligence; the only information which, +otherwise than by accident, can be put to logical use is that acquired +in the course of thinking. Because their knowledge has been achieved in +connection with the needs of specific situations, men of little +book-learning are often able to put to effective use every ounce of +knowledge they possess; while men of vast erudition are often swamped by +the mere bulk of their learning, because memory, rather than thinking, +has been operative in obtaining it. + + +Sec.4. _The Influence of Current Aims and Ideals_ + +It is, of course, impossible to separate this somewhat intangible +condition from the points just dealt with; for automatic skill and +quantity of information are educational ideals which pervade the whole +school. We may distinguish, however, certain tendencies, such as that to +judge education from the standpoint of external results, instead of from +that of the development of personal attitudes and habits. The ideal of +the _product_, as against that of the mental _process_ by which the +product is attained, shows itself in both instruction and moral +discipline. + +[Sidenote: External results _versus_ processes] + +(_a_) In instruction, the external standard manifests itself in the +importance attached to the "correct answer." No one other thing, +probably, works so fatally against focussing the attention of teachers +upon the training of mind as the domination of _their_ minds by the idea +that the chief thing is to get pupils to recite their lessons +correctly. As long as this end is uppermost (whether consciously or +unconsciously), training of mind remains an incidental and secondary +consideration. There is no great difficulty in understanding why this +ideal has such vogue. The large number of pupils to be dealt with, and +the tendency of parents and school authorities to demand speedy and +tangible evidence of progress, conspire to give it currency. Knowledge +of subject-matter--not of children--is alone exacted of teachers by this +aim; and, moreover, knowledge of subject-matter only in portions +definitely prescribed and laid out, and hence mastered with comparative +ease. Education that takes as its standard the improvement of the +intellectual attitude and method of students demands more serious +preparatory training, for it exacts sympathetic and intelligent insight +into the workings of individual minds, and a very wide and flexible +command of subject-matter--so as to be able to select and apply just +what is needed when it is needed. Finally, the securing of external +results is an aim that lends itself naturally to the mechanics of school +administration--to examinations, marks, gradings, promotions, and so on. + +[Sidenote: Reliance upon others] + +(_b_) With reference to behavior also, the external ideal has a great +influence. Conformity of acts to precepts and rules is the easiest, +because most mechanical, standard to employ. It is no part of our +present task to tell just how far dogmatic instruction, or strict +adherence to custom, convention, and the commands of a social superior, +should extend in moral training; but since problems of conduct are the +deepest and most common of all the problems of life, the ways in which +they are met have an influence that radiates into every other mental +attitude, even those far remote from any direct or conscious moral +consideration. Indeed, the _deepest plane of the mental attitude of +every one is fixed by the way in which problems of behavior are +treated_. If the function of thought, of serious inquiry and reflection, +is reduced to a minimum in dealing with them, it is not reasonable to +expect habits of thought to exercise great influence in less important +matters. On the other hand, habits of active inquiry and careful +deliberation in the significant and vital problems of conduct afford the +best guarantee that the general structure of mind will be reasonable. + + + + +CHAPTER FIVE + +THE MEANS AND END OF MENTAL TRAINING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THE LOGICAL + + +Sec. 1. _Introductory: The Meaning of Logical_ + +[Sidenote: Special topic of this chapter] + +In the preceding chapters we have considered (_i_) what thinking is; +(_ii_) the importance of its special training; (_iii_) the natural +tendencies that lend themselves to its training; and (_iv_) some of the +special obstacles in the way of its training under school conditions. We +come now to the relation of _logic_ to the purpose of mental training. + +[Sidenote: Three senses of term _logical_] + +[Sidenote: The practical is the important meaning of _logical_] + +In its broadest sense, any thinking that ends in a conclusion is +logical--whether the conclusion reached be justified or fallacious; that +is, the term _logical_ covers both the logically good and the illogical +or the logically bad. In its narrowest sense, the term _logical_ refers +only to what is demonstrated to follow necessarily from premises that +are definite in meaning and that are either self-evidently true, or that +have been previously proved to be true. Stringency of proof is here the +equivalent of the logical. In this sense mathematics and formal logic +(perhaps as a branch of mathematics) alone are strictly logical. +Logical, however, is used in a third sense, which is at once more vital +and more practical; to denote, namely, the systematic care, negative and +positive, taken to safeguard reflection so that it may yield the best +results under the given conditions. If only the word _artificial_ were +associated with the idea of _art_, or expert skill gained through +voluntary apprenticeship (instead of suggesting the factitious and +unreal), we might say that logical refers to artificial thought. + +[Sidenote: Care, thoroughness, and exactness the marks of the logical] + +In this sense, the word _logical_ is synonymous with wide-awake, +thorough, and careful reflection--thought in its best sense (_ante_, p. +5). Reflection is turning a topic over in various aspects and in various +lights so that nothing significant about it shall be overlooked--almost +as one might turn a stone over to see what its hidden side is like or +what is covered by it. _Thoughtfulness_ means, practically, the same +thing as careful attention; to give our mind to a subject is to give +heed to it, to take pains with it. In speaking of reflection, we +naturally use the words _weigh_, _ponder_, _deliberate_--terms implying +a certain delicate and scrupulous balancing of things against one +another. Closely related names are _scrutiny_, _examination_, +_consideration_, _inspection_--terms which imply close and careful +vision. Again, to think is to relate things to one another definitely, +to "put two and two together" as we say. Analogy with the accuracy and +definiteness of mathematical combinations gives us such expressions as +_calculate_, _reckon_, _account for_; and even _reason_ itself--_ratio_. +Caution, carefulness, thoroughness, definiteness, exactness, +orderliness, methodic arrangement, are, then, the traits by which we +mark off the logical from what is random and casual on one side, and +from what is academic and formal on the other. + +[Sidenote: Whole object of intellectual education is formation of +logical disposition] + +[Sidenote: False opposition of the logical and psychological] + +No argument is needed to point out that the educator is concerned with +the logical in its practical and vital sense. Argument is perhaps needed +to show that the _intellectual_ (as distinct from the _moral_) _end of +education is entirely and only the logical in this sense_; _namely, the +formation of careful, alert, and thorough habits of thinking_. The chief +difficulty in the way of recognition of this principle is a false +conception of the relation between the psychological tendencies of an +individual and his logical achievements. If it be assumed--as it is so +frequently--that these have, intrinsically, nothing to do with each +other, then logical training is inevitably regarded as something foreign +and extraneous, something to be ingrafted upon the individual from +without, so that it is absurd to identify the object of education with +the development of logical power. + +[Sidenote: Opposing the _natural_ to the logical] + +The conception that the psychology of individuals has no intrinsic +connections with logical methods and results is held, curiously enough, +by two opposing schools of educational theory. To one school, the +_natural_[12] is primary and fundamental; and its tendency is to make +little of distinctly intellectual nurture. Its mottoes are freedom, +self-expression, individuality, spontaneity, play, interest, natural +unfolding, and so on. In its emphasis upon individual attitude and +activity, it sets slight store upon organized subject-matter, or the +material of study, and conceives _method_ to consist of various devices +for stimulating and evoking, in their natural order of growth, the +native potentialities of individuals. + + [12] Denoting whatever has to do with the natural constitution and + functions of an individual. + +[Sidenote: Neglect of the innate logical resources] + +[Sidenote: Identification of logical with subject-matter, exclusively] + +The other school estimates highly the value of the logical, but +conceives the natural tendency of individuals to be averse, or +at least indifferent, to logical achievement. It relies upon +_subject-matter_--upon matter already defined and classified. Method, +then, has to do with the devices by which these characteristics may be +imported into a mind naturally reluctant and rebellious. Hence its +mottoes are discipline, instruction, restraint, voluntary or conscious +effort, the necessity of tasks, and so on. From this point of view +studies, rather than attitudes and habits, embody the logical factor in +education. The mind becomes logical only by learning to conform to an +external subject-matter. To produce this conformity, the study should +first be analyzed (by text-book or teacher) into its logical elements; +then each of these elements should be defined; finally, all of the +elements should be arranged in series or classes according to logical +formulae or general principles. Then the pupil learns the definitions one +by one; and progressively adding one to another builds up the logical +system, and thereby is himself gradually imbued, from without, with +logical quality. + +[Sidenote: Illustration from geography,] + +This description will gain meaning through an illustration. Suppose the +subject is geography. The first thing is to give its definition, marking +it off from every other subject. Then the various abstract terms upon +which depends the scientific development of the science are stated and +defined one by one--pole, equator, ecliptic, zone,--from the simpler +units to the more complex which are formed out of them; then the more +concrete elements are taken in similar series: continent, island, coast, +promontory, cape, isthmus, peninsula, ocean, lake, coast, gulf, bay, and +so on. In acquiring this material, the mind is supposed not only to gain +important information, but, by accommodating itself to ready-made +logical definitions, generalizations, and classifications, gradually to +acquire logical habits. + +[Sidenote: from drawing] + +This type of method has been applied to every subject taught in the +schools--reading, writing, music, physics, grammar, arithmetic. Drawings +for example, has been taught on the theory that since all pictorial +representation is a matter of combining straight and curved lines, the +simplest procedure is to have the pupil acquire the ability first to +draw straight lines in various positions (horizontal, perpendicular, +diagonals at various angles), then typical curves; and finally, to +combine straight and curved lines in various permutations to construct +actual pictures. This seemed to give the ideal "logical" method, +beginning with analysis into elements, and then proceeding in regular +order to more and more complex syntheses, each element being defined +when used, and thereby clearly understood. + +[Sidenote: Formal method] + +Even when this method in its extreme form is not followed, few schools +(especially of the middle or upper elementary grades) are free from an +exaggerated attention to forms supposedly employed by the pupil if he +gets his result logically. It is thought that there are certain steps +arranged in a certain order, which express preeminently an understanding +of the subject, and the pupil is made to "analyze" his procedure into +these steps, _i.e._ to learn a certain routine formula of statement. +While this method is usually at its height in grammar and arithmetic, it +invades also history and even literature, which are then reduced, under +plea of intellectual training, to "outlines," diagrams, and schemes of +division and subdivision. In memorizing this simulated cut and dried +copy of the logic of an adult, the child generally is induced to +stultify his own subtle and vital logical movement. The adoption by +teachers of this misconception of logical method has probably done more +than anything else to bring pedagogy into disrepute; for to many persons +"pedagogy" means precisely a set of mechanical, self-conscious devices +for replacing by some cast-iron external scheme the personal mental +movement of the individual. + +[Sidenote: Reaction toward lack of form and method] + +A reaction inevitably occurs from the poor results that accrue from +these professedly "logical" methods. Lack of interest in study, habits +of inattention and procrastination, positive aversion to intellectual +application, dependence upon sheer memorizing and mechanical routine +with only a modicum of understanding by the pupil of what he is about, +show that the theory of logical definition, division, gradation, and +system does not work out practically as it is theoretically supposed to +work. The consequent disposition--as in every reaction--is to go to the +opposite extreme. The "logical" is thought to be wholly artificial and +extraneous; teacher and pupil alike are to turn their backs upon it, and +to work toward the expression of existing aptitudes and tastes. Emphasis +upon natural tendencies and powers as the only possible starting-point +of development is indeed wholesome. But the reaction is false, and hence +misleading, in what it ignores and denies: the presence of genuinely +intellectual factors in existing powers and interests. + +[Sidenote: Logic of subject-matter is logic of adult or trained mind] + +What is conventionally termed logical (namely, the logical from the +standpoint of subject-matter) represents in truth the logic of the +trained adult mind. Ability to divide a subject, to define its elements, +and to group them into classes according to general principles +represents logical capacity at its best point reached _after_ thorough +training. The mind that habitually exhibits skill in divisions, +definitions, generalizations, and systematic recapitulations no longer +needs training in logical methods. But it is absurd to suppose that a +mind which needs training because it cannot perform these operations +can begin where the expert mind stops. _The logical from the standpoint +of subject-matter represents the goal, the last term of training, not +the point of departure._ + +[Sidenote: The immature mind has its own logic] + +[Sidenote: Hence, the _psychological_ and the _logical_ represent the +two ends of the same movement] + +In truth, the mind at every stage of development has its own logic. The +error of the notion that by appeal to spontaneous tendencies and by +multiplication of materials we may completely dismiss logical +considerations, lies in overlooking how large a part curiosity, +inference, experimenting, and testing already play in the pupil's life. +Therefore it underestimates the _intellectual_ factor in the more +spontaneous play and work of individuals--the factor that alone is truly +educative. Any teacher who is alive to the modes of thought naturally +operative in the experience of the normal child will have no difficulty +in avoiding the identification of the logical with a ready-made +organization of subject-matter, as well as the notion that the only way +to escape this error is to pay no attention to logical considerations. +Such a teacher will have no difficulty in seeing that the real problem +of intellectual education is the transformation of natural powers into +expert, tested powers: the transformation of more or less casual +curiosity and sporadic suggestion into attitudes of alert, cautious, and +thorough inquiry. He will see that the _psychological_ and the +_logical_, instead of being opposed to each other (or even independent +of each other), are connected _as the earlier and the later stages in +one continuous process of normal growth_. The natural or psychological +activities, even when not consciously controlled by logical +considerations, have their own intellectual function and integrity; +conscious and deliberate skill in thinking, when it is achieved, makes +habitual or second nature. The first is already logical in spirit; the +last, in presenting an ingrained disposition and attitude, is then as +_psychological_ (as personal) as any caprice or chance impulse could be. + + +Sec. 2. _Discipline and Freedom_ + +[Sidenote: True and false notions of discipline] + +Discipline of mind is thus, in truth, a result rather than a cause. Any +mind is disciplined in a subject in which independent intellectual +initiative and control have been achieved. Discipline represents +original native endowment turned, through gradual exercise, into +effective power. So far as a mind is disciplined, control of method in a +given subject has been attained so that the mind is able to manage +itself independently without external tutelage. The aim of education is +precisely to develop intelligence of this independent and effective +type--a _disciplined mind_. Discipline is positive and constructive. + +[Sidenote: Discipline as drill] + +Discipline, however, is frequently regarded as something negative--as a +painfully disagreeable forcing of mind away from channels congenial to +it into channels of constraint, a process grievous at the time but +necessary as preparation for a more or less remote future. Discipline is +then generally identified with drill; and drill is conceived after the +mechanical analogy of driving, by unremitting blows, a foreign substance +into a resistant material; or is imaged after the analogy of the +mechanical routine by which raw recruits are trained to a soldierly +bearing and habits that are naturally wholly foreign to their +possessors. Training of this latter sort, whether it be called +discipline or not, is not mental discipline. Its aim and result are not +_habits of thinking_, but uniform _external modes of action_. By failing +to ask what he means by discipline, many a teacher is misled into +supposing that he is developing mental force and efficiency by methods +which in fact restrict and deaden intellectual activity, and which tend +to create mechanical routine, or mental passivity and servility. + +[Sidenote: As independent power or freedom] + +[Sidenote: Freedom and external spontaneity] + +When discipline is conceived in intellectual terms (as the habitual +power of effective mental attack), it is identified with freedom in its +true sense. For freedom of mind means mental power capable of +independent exercise, emancipated from the leading strings of others, +not mere unhindered external operation. When spontaneity or naturalness +is identified with more or less casual discharge of transitory impulses, +the tendency of the educator is to supply a multitude of stimuli in +order that spontaneous activity may be kept up. All sorts of interesting +materials, equipments, tools, modes of activity, are provided in order +that there may be no flagging of free self-expression. This method +overlooks some of the essential conditions of the attainment of genuine +freedom. + +[Sidenote: Some obstacle necessary for thought] + +(_a_) Direct immediate discharge or expression of an impulsive tendency +is fatal to thinking. Only when the impulse is to some extent checked +and thrown back upon itself does reflection ensue. It is, indeed, a +stupid error to suppose that arbitrary tasks must be imposed from +without in order to furnish the factor of perplexity and difficulty +which is the necessary cue to thought. Every vital activity of any depth +and range inevitably meets obstacles in the course of its effort to +realize itself--a fact that renders the search for artificial or +external problems quite superfluous. The difficulties that present +themselves within the development of an experience are, however, to be +cherished by the educator, not minimized, for they are the natural +stimuli to reflective inquiry. Freedom does not consist in keeping up +uninterrupted and unimpeded external activity, but is something achieved +through conquering, by personal reflection, a way out of the +difficulties that prevent an immediate overflow and a spontaneous +success. + +[Sidenote: Intellectual factors are _natural_] + +(_b_) The method that emphasizes the psychological and natural, but yet +fails to see what an important part of the natural tendencies is +constituted at every period of growth by curiosity, inference, and the +desire to test, cannot secure a _natural development_. In natural growth +each successive stage of activity prepares unconsciously, but +thoroughly, the conditions for the manifestation of the next stage--as +in the cycle of a plant's growth. There is no ground for assuming that +"thinking" is a special, isolated natural tendency that will bloom +inevitably in due season simply because various sense and motor +activities have been freely manifested before; or because observation, +memory, imagination, and manual skill have been previously exercised +without thought. Only when thinking is constantly employed in using the +senses and muscles for the guidance and application of observations and +movements, is the way prepared for subsequent higher types of thinking. + +[Sidenote: Genesis of thought contemporaneous with genesis of any human +mental activity] + +At present, the notion is current that childhood is almost entirely +unreflective--a period of mere sensory, motor, and memory development, +while adolescence suddenly brings the manifestation of thought and +reason. + +Adolescence is not, however, a synonym for magic. Doubtless youth should +bring with it an enlargement of the horizon of childhood, a +susceptibility to larger concerns and issues, a more generous and a more +general standpoint toward nature and social life. This development +affords an opportunity for thinking of a more comprehensive and +abstract type than has previously obtained. But thinking itself remains +just what it has been all the time: a matter of following up and testing +the conclusions suggested by the facts and events of life. Thinking +begins as soon as the baby who has lost the ball that he is playing with +begins to foresee the possibility of something not yet existing--its +recovery; and begins to forecast steps toward the realization of this +possibility, and, by experimentation, to guide his acts by his ideas and +thereby also test the ideas. Only by making the most of the +thought-factor, already active in the experiences of childhood, is there +any promise or warrant for the emergence of superior reflective power at +adolescence, or at any later period. + +[Sidenote: Fixation of bad mental habits] + +(_c_) In any case _positive habits are being formed_: if not habits of +careful looking into things, then habits of hasty, heedless, impatient +glancing over the surface; if not habits of consecutively following up +the suggestions that occur, then habits of haphazard, grasshopper-like +guessing; if not habits of suspending judgment till inferences have been +tested by the examination of evidence, then habits of credulity +alternating with flippant incredulity, belief or unbelief being based, +in either case, upon whim, emotion, or accidental circumstances. The +only way to achieve traits of carefulness, thoroughness, and continuity +(traits that are, as we have seen, the elements of the "logical") is by +exercising these traits from the beginning, and by seeing to it that +conditions call for their exercise. + +[Sidenote: Genuine freedom is intellectual, not external] + +Genuine freedom, in short, is intellectual; it rests in the trained +_power of thought_, in ability to "turn things over," to look at matters +deliberately, to judge whether the amount and kind of evidence requisite +for decision is at hand, and if not, to tell where and how to seek such +evidence. If a man's actions are not guided by thoughtful conclusions, +then they are guided by inconsiderate impulse, unbalanced appetite, +caprice, or the circumstances of the moment. To cultivate unhindered, +unreflective external activity is to foster enslavement, for it leaves +the person at the mercy of appetite, sense, and circumstance. + + + + +PART TWO: LOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS + + + + +CHAPTER SIX + +THE ANALYSIS OF A COMPLETE ACT OF THOUGHT + + +[Sidenote: Object of Part Two] + +After a brief consideration in the first chapter of the nature of +reflective thinking, we turned, in the second, to the need for its +training. Then we took up the resources, the difficulties, and the aim +of its training. The purpose of this discussion was to set before the +student the general problem of the training of mind. The purport of the +second part, upon which we are now entering, is giving a fuller +statement of the nature and normal growth of thinking, preparatory to +considering in the concluding part the special problems that arise in +connection with its education. + +In this chapter we shall make an analysis of the process of thinking +into its steps or elementary constituents, basing the analysis upon +descriptions of a number of extremely simple, but genuine, cases of +reflective experience.[13] + + [13] These are taken, almost verbatim, from the class papers of + students. + +[Sidenote: A simple case of practical deliberation] + +1. "The other day when I was down town on 16th Street a clock caught my +eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12.20. This suggested that I had an +engagement at 124th Street, at one o'clock. I reasoned that as it had +taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be +twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty +minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I +might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought +of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But +where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the +street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went +back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I +remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th +Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the +journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination +by one o'clock." + +[Sidenote: A simple case of reflection upon an observation] + +2. "Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat +on which I daily cross the river, is a long white pole, bearing a gilded +ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, +shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed +to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented +themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a +flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which +to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere two vertical staffs from +which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole +was not there for flag-flying. + +"I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of such a pole, and to +consider for which of these it was best suited: (_a_) Possibly it was an +ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried like +poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (_b_) Possibly it was the terminal +of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this +improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be +the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (_c_) Its +purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving. + +"In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower +than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. +Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the +pilot's position, it must appear to project far out in front of the +boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would +need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles +for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the +others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set +up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat +pointed, to enable him to steer correctly." + +[Sidenote: A simple case of reflection involving experiment] + +3. "In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward +on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers +and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I +note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on +the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in +bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance +entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase +of heat or by decrease of pressure, or by both. Could the air have +become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not +the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the +cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the +suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking +several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping +cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to +prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every +one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my +inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of +the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the +outside. + +"But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and +also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared +inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the +tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse." + +[Sidenote: The three cases form a series] + +These three cases have been purposely selected so as to form a series +from the more rudimentary to more complicated cases of reflection. The +first illustrates the kind of thinking done by every one during the +day's business, in which neither the data, nor the ways of dealing with +them, take one outside the limits of everyday experience. The last +furnishes a case in which neither problem nor mode of solution would +have been likely to occur except to one with some prior scientific +training. The second case forms a natural transition; its materials lie +well within the bounds of everyday, unspecialized experience; but the +problem, instead of being directly involved in the person's business, +arises indirectly out of his activity, and accordingly appeals to a +somewhat theoretic and impartial interest. We shall deal, in a later +chapter, with the evolution of abstract thinking out of that which is +relatively practical and direct; here we are concerned only with the +common elements found in all the types. + +[Sidenote: Five distinct steps in reflection] + +Upon examination, each instance reveals, more or less clearly, five +logically distinct steps: (_i_) a felt difficulty; (_ii_) its location +and definition; (_iii_) suggestion of possible solution; (_iv_) +development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (_v_) +further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or +rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief. + +[Sidenote: 1. The occurrence of a difficulty] + +[Sidenote: (_a_) in the lack of adaptation of means to end] + +1. The first and second steps frequently fuse into one. The difficulty +may be felt with sufficient definiteness as to set the mind at once +speculating upon its probable solution, or an undefined uneasiness and +shock may come first, leading only later to definite attempt to find out +what is the matter. Whether the two steps are distinct or blended, there +is the factor emphasized in our original account of reflection--_viz._ +the perplexity or problem. In the first of the three cases cited, the +difficulty resides in the conflict between conditions at hand and a +desired and intended result, between an end and the means for reaching +it. The purpose of keeping an engagement at a certain time, and the +existing hour taken in connection with the location, are not congruous. +The object of thinking is to introduce congruity between the two. The +given conditions cannot themselves be altered; time will not go backward +nor will the distance between 16th Street and 124th Street shorten +itself. The problem is _the discovery of intervening terms which when +inserted between the remoter end and the given means will harmonize them +with each other_. + +[Sidenote: (_b_) in identifying the character of an object] + +In the second case, the difficulty experienced is the incompatibility of +a suggested and (temporarily) accepted belief that the pole is a +flagpole, with certain other facts. Suppose we symbolize the qualities +that suggest _flagpole_ by the letters _a_, _b_, _c_; those that oppose +this suggestion by the letters _p_, _q_, _r_. There is, of course, +nothing inconsistent in the qualities themselves; but in pulling the +mind to different and incongruous conclusions they conflict--hence the +problem. Here the object is the discovery of some object (_O_), of which +_a_, _b_, _c_, and _p_, _q_, _r_, may all be appropriate traits--just +as, in our first case, it is to discover a course of action which will +combine existing conditions and a remoter result in a single whole. The +method of solution is also the same: discovery of intermediate qualities +(the position of the pilot house, of the pole, the need of an index to +the boat's direction) symbolized by _d_, _g_, _l_, _o_, which bind +together otherwise incompatible traits. + +[Sidenote: (_c_) in explaining an unexpected event] + +In the third case, an observer trained to the idea of natural laws or +uniformities finds something odd or exceptional in the behavior of the +bubbles. The problem is to reduce the apparent anomalies to instances of +well-established laws. Here the method of solution is also to seek for +intermediary terms which will connect, by regular linkage, the seemingly +extraordinary movements of the bubbles with the conditions known to +follow from processes supposed to be operative. + +[Sidenote: 2. Definition of the difficulty] + +2. As already noted, the first two steps, the feeling of a discrepancy, +or difficulty, and the acts of observation that serve to define the +character of the difficulty may, in a given instance, telescope +together. In cases of striking novelty or unusual perplexity, the +difficulty, however, is likely to present itself at first as a shock, +as emotional disturbance, as a more or less vague feeling of the +unexpected, of something queer, strange, funny, or disconcerting. In +such instances, there are necessary observations deliberately calculated +to bring to light just what is the trouble, or to make clear the +specific character of the problem. In large measure, the existence or +non-existence of this step makes the difference between reflection +proper, or safeguarded _critical_ inference and uncontrolled thinking. +Where sufficient pains to locate the difficulty are not taken, +suggestions for its resolution must be more or less random. Imagine a +doctor called in to prescribe for a patient. The patient tells him some +things that are wrong; his experienced eye, at a glance, takes in other +signs of a certain disease. But if he permits the suggestion of this +special disease to take possession prematurely of his mind, to become an +accepted conclusion, his scientific thinking is by that much cut short. +A large part of his technique, as a skilled practitioner, is to prevent +the acceptance of the first suggestions that arise; even, indeed, to +postpone the occurrence of any very definite suggestion till the +trouble--the nature of the problem--has been thoroughly explored. In the +case of a physician this proceeding is known as diagnosis, but a similar +inspection is required in every novel and complicated situation to +prevent rushing to a conclusion. The essence of critical thinking is +suspended judgment; and the essence of this suspense is inquiry to +determine the nature of the problem before proceeding to attempts at its +solution. This, more than any other thing, transforms mere inference +into tested inference, suggested conclusions into proof. + +[Sidenote: 3. Occurrence of a suggested explanation or possible +solution] + +3. The third factor is suggestion. The situation in which the +perplexity occurs calls up something not present to the senses: the +present location, the thought of subway or elevated train; the stick +before the eyes, the idea of a flagpole, an ornament, an apparatus for +wireless telegraphy; the soap bubbles, the law of expansion of bodies +through heat and of their contraction through cold. (_a_) Suggestion is +the very heart of inference; it involves going from what is present to +something absent. Hence, it is more or less speculative, adventurous. +Since inference goes beyond what is actually present, it involves a +leap, a jump, the propriety of which cannot be absolutely warranted in +advance, no matter what precautions be taken. Its control is indirect, +on the one hand, involving the formation of habits of mind which are at +once enterprising and cautious; and on the other hand, involving the +selection and arrangement of the particular facts upon perception of +which suggestion issues. (_b_) The suggested conclusion so far as it is +not accepted but only tentatively entertained constitutes an idea. +Synonyms for this are _supposition_, _conjecture_, _guess_, +_hypothesis_, and (in elaborate cases) _theory_. Since suspended belief, +or the postponement of a final conclusion pending further evidence, +depends partly upon the presence of rival conjectures as to the best +course to pursue or the probable explanation to favor, _cultivation of a +variety of alternative suggestions_ is an important factor in good +thinking. + +[Sidenote: 4. The rational elaboration of an idea] + +4. The process of developing the bearings--or, as they are more +technically termed, the _implications_--of any idea with respect to any +problem, is termed _reasoning_.[14] As an idea is inferred from given +facts, so reasoning sets out from an idea. The _idea_ of elevated road +is developed into the idea of difficulty of locating station, length of +time occupied on the journey, distance of station at the other end from +place to be reached. In the second case, the implication of a flagpole +is seen to be a vertical position; of a wireless apparatus, location on +a high part of the ship and, moreover, absence from every casual +tugboat; while the idea of index to direction in which the boat moves, +when developed, is found to cover all the details of the case. + + [14] This term is sometimes extended to denote the entire reflective + process--just as _inference_ (which in the sense of _test_ is best + reserved for the third step) is sometimes used in the same broad + sense. But _reasoning_ (or _ratiocination_) seems to be peculiarly + adapted to express what the older writers called the "notional" or + "dialectic" process of developing the meaning of a given idea. + +Reasoning has the same effect upon a suggested solution as more intimate +and extensive observation has upon the original problem. Acceptance of +the suggestion in its first form is prevented by looking into it more +thoroughly. Conjectures that seem plausible at first sight are often +found unfit or even absurd when their full consequences are traced out. +Even when reasoning out the bearings of a supposition does not lead to +rejection, it develops the idea into a form in which it is more apposite +to the problem. Only when, for example, the conjecture that a pole was +an index-pole had been thought out into its bearings could its +particular applicability to the case in hand be judged. Suggestions at +first seemingly remote and wild are frequently so transformed by being +elaborated into what follows from them as to become apt and fruitful. +The development of an idea through reasoning helps at least to supply +the intervening or intermediate terms that link together into a +consistent whole apparently discrepant extremes (_ante_, p. 72). + +[Sidenote: 5. Corroboration of an idea and formation of a concluding +belief] + +5. The concluding and conclusive step is some kind of _experimental +corroboration_, or verification, of the conjectural idea. Reasoning +shows that _if_ the idea be adopted, certain consequences follow. So far +the conclusion is hypothetical or conditional. If we look and find +present all the conditions demanded by the theory, and if we find the +characteristic traits called for by rival alternatives to be lacking, +the tendency to believe, to accept, is almost irresistible. Sometimes +direct observation furnishes corroboration, as in the case of the pole +on the boat. In other cases, as in that of the bubbles, experiment is +required; that is, _conditions are deliberately arranged in accord with +the requirements of an idea or hypothesis to see if the results +theoretically indicated by the idea actually occur_. If it is found that +the experimental results agree with the theoretical, or rationally +deduced, results, and if there is reason to believe that _only_ the +conditions in question would yield such results, the confirmation is so +strong as to induce a conclusion--at least until contrary facts shall +indicate the advisability of its revision. + +[Sidenote: Thinking comes between observations at the beginning and at +the end] + +Observation exists at the beginning and again at the end of the process: +at the beginning, to determine more definitely and precisely the nature +of the difficulty to be dealt with; at the end, to test the value of +some hypothetically entertained conclusion. Between those two termini of +observation, we find the more distinctively _mental_ aspects of the +entire thought-cycle: (_i_) inference, the suggestion of an explanation +or solution; and (_ii_) reasoning, the development of the bearings and +implications of the suggestion. Reasoning requires some experimental +observation to confirm it, while experiment can be economically and +fruitfully conducted only on the basis of an idea that has been +tentatively developed by reasoning. + +[Sidenote: The trained mind one that judges the extent of each step +advisable in a given situation] + +The disciplined, or logically trained, mind--the aim of the educative +process--is the mind able to judge how far each of these steps needs to +be carried in any particular situation. No cast-iron rules can be laid +down. Each case has to be dealt with as it arises, on the basis of its +importance and of the context in which it occurs. To take too much pains +in one case is as foolish--as illogical--as to take too little in +another. At one extreme, almost any conclusion that insures prompt and +unified action may be better than any long delayed conclusion; while at +the other, decision may have to be postponed for a long period--perhaps +for a lifetime. The trained mind is the one that best grasps the degree +of observation, forming of ideas, reasoning, and experimental testing +required in any special case, and that profits the most, in future +thinking, by mistakes made in the past. What is important is that the +mind should be sensitive to problems and skilled in methods of attack +and solution. + + + + +CHAPTER SEVEN + +SYSTEMATIC INFERENCE: INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION + + +Sec. 1. _The Double Movement of Reflection_ + +[Sidenote: Back and forth between facts and meanings] + +The characteristic outcome of thinking we saw to be the organization of +facts and conditions which, just as they stand, are isolated, +fragmentary, and discrepant, the organization being effected through the +introduction of connecting links, or middle terms. The facts as they +stand are the data, the raw material of reflection; their lack of +coherence perplexes and stimulates to reflection. There follows the +suggestion of some meaning which, _if_ it can be substantiated, will +give a whole in which various fragmentary and seemingly incompatible +data find their proper place. The meaning suggested supplies a mental +platform, an intellectual point of view, from which to note and define +the data more carefully, to seek for additional observations, and to +institute, experimentally, changed conditions. + +[Sidenote: Inductive and deductive] + +There is thus a double movement in all reflection: a movement from the +given partial and confused data to a suggested comprehensive (or +inclusive) entire situation; and back from this suggested whole--which +as suggested is a _meaning_, an idea--to the particular facts, so as to +connect these with one another and with additional facts to which the +suggestion has directed attention. Roughly speaking, the first of these +movements is inductive; the second deductive. A complete act of thought +involves both--it involves, that is, a fruitful interaction of observed +(or recollected) particular considerations and of inclusive and +far-reaching (general) meanings. + +[Sidenote: Hurry _versus_ caution] + +This double movement _to_ and _from_ a meaning may occur, however, in a +casual, uncritical way, or in a cautious and regulated manner. To think +means, in any case, to bridge a gap in experience, to bind together +facts or deeds otherwise isolated. But we may make only a hurried jump +from one consideration to another, allowing our aversion to mental +disquietude to override the gaps; or, we may insist upon noting the road +traveled in making connections. We may, in short, accept readily any +suggestion that seems plausible; or we may hunt out additional factors, +new difficulties, to see whether the suggested conclusion really ends +the matter. The latter method involves definite formulation of the +connecting links; the statement of a principle, or, in logical phrase, +the use of a universal. If we thus formulate the whole situation, the +original data are transformed into premises of reasoning; the final +belief is a logical or _rational_ conclusion, not a mere _de facto_ +termination. + +[Sidenote: Continuity of relationship the mark of the latter] + +The importance of _connections binding isolated items into a coherent +single whole_ is embodied in all the phrases that denote the relation of +premises and conclusions to each other. (1) The premises are called +grounds, foundations, bases, and are said to underlie, uphold, support +the conclusion. (2) We "descend" from the premises to the conclusion, +and "ascend" or "mount" in the opposite direction--as a river may be +continuously traced from source to sea or vice versa. So the conclusion +springs, flows, or is drawn from its premises. (3) The conclusion--as +the word itself implies--closes, shuts in, locks up together the various +factors stated in the premises. We say that the premises "contain" the +conclusion, and that the conclusion "contains" the premises, thereby +marking our sense of the inclusive and comprehensive unity in which the +elements of reasoning are bound tightly together.[15] Systematic +inference, in short, means the _recognition of definite relations of +interdependence between considerations previously unorganized and +disconnected, this recognition being brought about by the discovery and +insertion of new facts and properties_. + + [15] See Vailati, _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific + Methods_, Vol. V, No. 12. + +[Sidenote: Scientific induction and deduction] + +This more systematic thinking is, however, like the cruder forms in its +double movement, the movement _toward_ the suggestion or hypothesis and +the movement _back_ to facts. The difference is in the greater conscious +care with which each phase of the process is performed. _The conditions +under which suggestions are allowed to spring up and develop are +regulated._ Hasty acceptance of any idea that is plausible, that seems +to solve the difficulty, is changed into a conditional acceptance +pending further inquiry. The idea is accepted as a _working hypothesis_, +as something to guide investigation and bring to light new facts, not as +a final conclusion. When pains are taken to make each aspect of the +movement as accurate as possible, the movement toward building up the +idea is known as _inductive discovery_ (_induction_, for short); the +movement toward developing, applying, and testing, as _deductive proof_ +(_deduction_, for short). + +[Sidenote: Particular and universal] + +While induction moves from fragmentary details (or particulars) to a +connected view of a situation (universal), deduction begins with the +latter and works back again to particulars, connecting them and binding +them together. The inductive movement is toward _discovery_ of a binding +principle; the deductive toward its _testing_--confirming, refuting, +modifying it on the basis of its capacity to interpret isolated details +into a unified experience. So far as we conduct each of these processes +in the light of the other, we get valid discovery or verified critical +thinking. + +[Sidenote: Illustration from everyday experience] + +A commonplace illustration may enforce the points of this formula. A man +who has left his rooms in order finds them upon his return in a state of +confusion, articles being scattered at random. Automatically, the notion +comes to his mind that burglary would account for the disorder. He has +not seen the burglars; their presence is not a fact of observation, but +is a thought, an idea. Moreover, the man has no special burglars in +mind; it is the _relation_, the meaning of burglary--something +general--that comes to mind. The state of his room is perceived and is +particular, definite,--exactly as it is; burglars are inferred, and have +a general status. The state of the room is a _fact_, certain and +speaking for itself; the presence of burglars is a possible _meaning_ +which may explain the facts. + +[Sidenote: of induction,] + +So far there is an inductive tendency, suggested by particular and +present facts. In the same inductive way, it occurs to him that his +children are mischievous, and that they may have thrown the things +about. This rival hypothesis (or conditional principle of explanation) +prevents him from dogmatically accepting the first suggestion. Judgment +is held in suspense and a positive conclusion postponed. + +[Sidenote: of deduction] + +Then deductive movement begins. Further observations, recollections, +reasonings are conducted on the basis of a development of the ideas +suggested: _if_ burglars were responsible, such and such things would +have happened; articles of value would be missing. Here the man is going +from a general principle or relation to special features that accompany +it, to particulars,--not back, however, merely to the original +particulars (which would be fruitless or take him in a circle), but to +new details, the actual discovery or nondiscovery of which will test the +principle. The man turns to a box of valuables; some things are gone; +some, however, are still there. Perhaps he has himself removed the +missing articles, but has forgotten it. His experiment is not a decisive +test. He thinks of the silver in the sideboard--the children would not +have taken that nor would he absent-mindedly have changed its place. He +looks; all the solid ware is gone. The conception of burglars is +confirmed; examination of windows and doors shows that they have been +tampered with. Belief culminates; the original isolated facts have been +woven into a coherent fabric. The idea first suggested (inductively) has +been employed to reason out hypothetically certain additional +particulars not yet experienced, that _ought_ to be there, if the +suggestion is correct. Then new acts of observation have shown that the +particulars theoretically called for are present, and by this process +the hypothesis is strengthened, corroborated. This moving back and forth +between the observed facts and the conditional idea is kept up till a +coherent experience of an object is substituted for the experience of +conflicting details--or else the whole matter is given up as a bad job. + +[Sidenote: Science is the same operations carefully performed] + +Sciences exemplify similar attitudes and operations, but with a higher +degree of elaboration of the instruments of caution, exactness and +thoroughness. This greater elaboration brings about specialization, an +accurate marking off of various types of problems from one another, and +a corresponding segregation and classification of the materials of +experience associated with each type of problem. We shall devote the +remainder of this chapter to a consideration of the devices by which the +discovery, the development, and the testing of meanings are +scientifically carried on. + + +Sec. 2. _Guidance of the Inductive Movement_ + +[Sidenote: Guidance is indirect] + +Control of the formation of suggestion is necessarily _indirect_, not +direct; imperfect, not perfect. Just because all discovery, all +apprehension involving thought of the new, goes from the known, the +present, to the unknown and absent, no rules can be stated that will +guarantee correct inference. Just what is suggested to a person in a +given situation depends upon his native constitution (his originality, +his genius), temperament, the prevalent direction of his interests, his +early environment, the general tenor of his past experiences, his +special training, the things that have recently occupied him +continuously or vividly, and so on; to some extent even upon an +accidental conjunction of present circumstances. These matters, so far +as they lie in the past or in external conditions, clearly escape +regulation. A suggestion simply does or does not occur; this or that +suggestion just happens, occurs, springs up. If, however, prior +experience and training have developed an attitude of patience in a +condition of doubt, a capacity for suspended judgment, and a liking for +inquiry, _indirect_ control of the course of suggestions is possible. +The individual may return upon, revise, restate, enlarge, and analyze +_the facts out of which suggestion springs_. Inductive methods, in the +technical sense, all have to do with regulating the conditions under +which _observation, memory, and the acceptance of the testimony of +others_ (_the operations supplying the raw data_) proceed. + +[Sidenote: Method of indirect regulation] + +Given the facts _A B C D_ on one side and certain individual habits on +the other, suggestion occurs automatically. But if the facts _A B C D_ +are carefully looked into and thereby resolved into the facts _A' B'' R +S_, a suggestion will automatically present itself different from that +called up by the facts in their first form. To inventory the facts, to +describe exactly and minutely their respective traits, to magnify +artificially those that are obscure and feeble, to reduce artificially +those that are so conspicuous and glaring as to be distracting,--these +are ways of modifying the facts that exercise suggestive force, and +thereby indirectly guiding the formation of suggested inferences. + +[Sidenote: Illustration from diagnosis] + +Consider, for example, how a physician makes his diagnosis--his +inductive interpretation. If he is scientifically trained, he +suspends--postpones--reaching a conclusion in order that he may not be +led by superficial occurrences into a snap judgment. Certain conspicuous +phenomena may forcibly suggest typhoid, but he avoids a conclusion, or +even any strong preference for this or that conclusion until he has +greatly (_i_) _enlarged_ the scope of his data, and (_ii_) rendered them +more _minute_. He not only questions the patient as to his feelings and +as to his acts prior to the disease, but by various manipulations with +his hands (and with instruments made for the purpose) brings to light a +large number of facts of which the patient is quite unaware. The state +of temperature, respiration, and heart-action is accurately noted, and +their fluctuations from time to time are exactly recorded. Until this +examination has worked _out_ toward a wider collection and _in_ toward a +minuter scrutiny of details, inference is deferred. + +[Sidenote: Summary: definition of scientific induction] + +Scientific induction means, in short, _all the processes by which the +observing and amassing of data are regulated with a view to facilitating +the formation of explanatory conceptions and theories_. These devices +are all directed toward selecting the precise facts to which weight and +significance shall attach in forming suggestions or ideas. Specifically, +this selective determination involves devices of (1) elimination by +analysis of what is likely to be misleading and irrelevant, (2) emphasis +of the important by collection and comparison of cases, (3) deliberate +construction of data by experimental variation. + +[Sidenote: Elimination of irrelevant meanings] + +(1) It is a common saying that one must learn to discriminate between +observed facts and judgments based upon them. Taken literally, such +advice cannot be carried out; in every observed thing there is--if the +thing have any meaning at all--some consolidation of meaning with what +is sensibly and physically present, such that, if this were entirely +excluded, what is left would have no sense. A says: "I saw my brother." +The term _brother_, however, involves a relation that cannot be sensibly +or physically observed; it is inferential in status. If A contents +himself with saying, "I saw a man," the factor of classification, of +intellectual reference, is less complex, but still exists. If, as a last +resort, A were to say, "Anyway, I saw a colored object," some +relationship, though more rudimentary and undefined, still subsists. +Theoretically, it is possible that no object was there, only an unusual +mode of nerve stimulation. None the less, the advice to discriminate +what is observed from what is inferred is sound practical advice. Its +working import is that one should eliminate or exclude _those_ +inferences as to which experience has shown that there is greatest +liability to error. This, of course, is a relative matter. Under +ordinary circumstances no reasonable doubt would attach to the +observation, "I see my brother"; it would be pedantic and silly to +resolve this recognition back into a more elementary form. Under other +circumstances it might be a perfectly genuine question as to whether A +saw even a colored _thing_, or whether the color was due to a +stimulation of the sensory optical apparatus (like "seeing stars" upon a +blow) or to a disordered circulation. In general, the scientific man is +one who knows that he is likely to be hurried to a conclusion, and that +part of this precipitancy is due to certain habits which tend to make +him "read" certain meanings into the situation that confronts him, so +that he must be on the lookout against errors arising from his +interests, habits, and current preconceptions. + +[Sidenote: The technique of conclusion] + +The technique of scientific inquiry thus consists in various processes +that tend to exclude over-hasty "reading in" of meanings; devices that +aim to give a purely "objective" unbiased rendering of the data to be +interpreted. Flushed cheeks usually mean heightened temperature; +paleness means lowered temperature. The clinical thermometer records +automatically the actual temperature and hence checks up the habitual +associations that might lead to error in a given case. All the +instrumentalities of observation--the various -meters and -graphs +and -scopes--fill a part of their scientific role in helping to eliminate +meanings supplied because of habit, prejudice, the strong momentary +preoccupation of excitement and anticipation, and by the vogue of +existing theories. Photographs, phonographs, kymographs, actinographs, +seismographs, plethysmographs, and the like, moreover, give records that +are permanent, so that they can be employed by different persons, and by +the same person in different states of mind, _i.e._ under the influence +of varying expectations and dominant beliefs. Thus purely personal +prepossessions (due to habit, to desire, to after-effects of recent +experience) may be largely eliminated. In ordinary language, the facts +are _objectively_, rather than _subjectively_, determined. In this way +tendencies to premature interpretation are held in check. + +[Sidenote: Collection of instances] + +(2) Another important method of control consists in the multiplication +of cases or instances. If I doubt whether a certain handful gives a fair +sample, or representative, for purposes of judging value, of a whole +carload of grain, I take a number of handfuls from various parts of the +car and compare them. If they agree in quality, well and good; if they +disagree, we try to get enough samples so that when they are thoroughly +mixed the result will be a fair basis for an evaluation. This +illustration represents roughly the value of that aspect of scientific +control in induction which insists upon multiplying observations instead +of basing the conclusion upon one or a few cases. + +[Sidenote: This method not the whole of induction] + +So prominent, indeed, is this aspect of inductive method that it is +frequently treated as the whole of induction. It is supposed that all +inductive inference is based upon collecting and comparing a number of +like cases. But in fact such comparison and collection is a secondary +development within the process of securing a correct conclusion in some +single case. If a man infers from a single sample of grain as to the +grade of wheat of the car as a whole, it is induction and, under certain +circumstances, a _sound_ induction; other cases are resorted to simply +for the sake of rendering that induction more guarded, and more probably +correct. In like fashion, the reasoning that led up to the burglary idea +in the instance already cited (p. 83) was inductive, though there was +but one single case examined. The particulars upon which the general +meaning (or relation) of burglary was grounded were simply the sum total +of the unlike items and qualities that made up the one case examined. +Had this case presented very great obscurities and difficulties, +recourse might _then_ have been had to examination of a number of +similar cases. But this comparison would not make inductive a process +which was not previously of that character; it would only render +induction more wary and adequate. _The object of bringing into +consideration a multitude of cases is to facilitate the selection of the +evidential or significant features upon which to base inference in some +single case._ + +[Sidenote: Contrast as important as likeness] + +Accordingly, points of _unlikeness_ are as important as points of +_likeness_ among the cases examined. _Comparison_, without _contrast_, +does not amount to anything logically. In the degree in which other +cases observed or remembered merely duplicate the case in question, we +are no better off for purposes of inference than if we had permitted our +single original fact to dictate a conclusion. In the case of the various +samples of grain, it is the fact that the samples are unlike, at least +in the part of the carload from which they are taken, that is important. +Were it not for this unlikeness, their likeness in quality would be of +no avail in assisting inference.[16] If we are endeavoring to get a +child to regulate his conclusions about the germination of a seed by +taking into account a number of instances, very little is gained if the +conditions in all these instances closely approximate one another. But +if one seed is placed in pure sand, another in loam, and another on +blotting-paper, and if in each case there are two conditions, one with +and another without moisture, the unlike factors tend to throw into +relief the factors that are significant (or "essential") for reaching a +conclusion. Unless, in short, the observer takes care to have the +differences in the observed cases as extreme as conditions allow, and +unless he notes unlikenesses as carefully as likenesses, he has no way +of determining the evidential force of the data that confront him. + + [16] In terms of the phrases used in logical treatises, the + so-called "methods of agreement" (comparison) and "difference" + (contrast) must accompany each other or constitute a "joint method" + in order to be of logical use. + +[Sidenote: Importance of exceptions and contrary cases] + +Another way of bringing out this importance of unlikeness is the +emphasis put by the scientist upon _negative_ cases--upon instances +which it would seem ought to fall into line but which as matter of fact +do not. Anomalies, exceptions, things which agree in most respects but +disagree in some crucial point, are so important that many of the +devices of scientific technique are designed purely to detect, record, +and impress upon memory contrasting cases. Darwin remarked that so easy +is it to pass over cases that oppose a favorite generalization, that he +had made it a habit not merely to hunt for contrary instances, but also +to write down any exception he noted or thought of--as otherwise it was +almost sure to be forgotten. + + +Sec. 3. _Experimental Variation of Conditions_ + +[Sidenote: Experiment the typical method of introducing contrast +factors] + +We have already trenched upon this factor of inductive method, the one +that is the most important of all wherever it is feasible. +Theoretically, one sample case _of the right kind_ will be as good a +basis for an inference as a thousand cases; but cases of the "right +kind" rarely turn up spontaneously. We have to search for them, and we +may have to _make_ them. If we take cases just as we find them--whether +one case or many cases--they contain much that is irrelevant to the +problem in hand, while much that is relevant is obscure, hidden. The +object of experimentation is the _construction, by regular steps taken +on the basis of a plan thought out in advance, of a typical, crucial +case_, a case formed with express reference to throwing light on the +difficulty in question. All inductive methods rest (as already stated, +p. 85) upon regulation of the conditions of observation and memory; +experiment is simply the most adequate regulation possible of these +conditions. We try to make the observation such that every factor +entering into it, together with the mode and the amount of its +operation, may be open to recognition. Such making of observations +constitutes experiment. + +[Sidenote: Three advantages of experiment] + +Such observations have many and obvious advantages over observations--no +matter how extensive--with respect to which we simply wait for an event +to happen or an object to present itself. Experiment overcomes the +defects due to (_a_) the _rarity_, (_b_) the _subtlety_ and minuteness +(or the violence), and (_c_) the rigid _fixity_ of facts as we +ordinarily experience them. The following quotations from Jevons's +_Elementary Lessons in Logic_ bring out all these points: + +(_i_) "We might have to wait years or centuries to meet accidentally +with facts which we can readily produce at any moment in a laboratory; +and it is probable that most of the chemical substances now known, and +many excessively useful products would never have been discovered at all +by waiting till nature presented them spontaneously to our observation." + +This quotation refers to the infrequency or rarity of certain facts of +nature, even very important ones. The passage then goes on to speak of +the minuteness of many phenomena which makes them escape ordinary +experience: + +(_ii_) "Electricity doubtless operates in every particle of matter, +perhaps at every moment of time; and even the ancients could not but +notice its action in the loadstone, in lightning, in the Aurora +Borealis, or in a piece of rubbed amber. But in lightning electricity +was too intense and dangerous; in the other cases it was too feeble to +be properly understood. The science of electricity and magnetism could +only advance by getting regular supplies of electricity from the common +electric machine or the galvanic battery and by making powerful +electromagnets. Most, if not all, the effects which electricity produces +must go on in nature, but altogether too obscurely for observation." + +Jevons then deals with the fact that, under ordinary conditions of +experience, phenomena which can be understood only by seeing them under +varying conditions are presented in a fixed and uniform way. + +(_iii_) "Thus carbonic acid is only met in the form of a gas, proceeding +from the combustion of carbon; but when exposed to extreme pressure and +cold, it is condensed into a liquid, and may even be converted into a +snowlike solid substance. Many other gases have in like manner been +liquefied or solidified, and there is reason to believe that every +substance is capable of taking all three forms of solid, liquid, and +gas, if only the conditions of temperature and pressure can be +sufficiently varied. Mere observation of nature would have led us, on +the contrary, to suppose that nearly all substances were fixed in one +condition only, and could not be converted from solid into liquid and +from liquid into gas." + +Many volumes would be required to describe in detail all the methods +that investigators have developed in various subjects for analyzing and +restating the facts of ordinary experience so that we may escape from +capricious and routine suggestions, and may get the facts in such a form +and in such a light (or context) that exact and far-reaching +explanations may be suggested in place of vague and limited ones. But +these various devices of inductive inquiry all have one goal in view: +the indirect regulation of the function of suggestion, or formation of +ideas; and, in the main, they will be found to reduce to some +combination of the three types of selecting and arranging subject-matter +just described. + + +Sec. 4. _Guidance of the Deductive Movement_ + +[Sidenote: Value of deduction for guiding induction] + +Before dealing directly with this topic, we must note that systematic +regulation of induction depends upon the possession of a body of general +principles that may be applied deductively to the examination or +construction of particular cases as they come up. If the physician does +not know the general laws of the physiology of the human body, he has +little way of telling what is either peculiarly significant or +peculiarly exceptional in any particular case that he is called upon to +treat. If he knows the laws of circulation, digestion, and respiration, +he can deduce the conditions that should normally be found in a given +case. These considerations give a base line from which the deviations +and abnormalities of a particular case may be measured. In this way, +_the nature of the problem at hand is located and defined_. Attention is +not wasted upon features which though conspicuous have nothing to do +with the case; it is concentrated upon just those traits which are out +of the way and hence require explanation. A question well put is half +answered; _i.e._ a difficulty clearly apprehended is likely to suggest +its own solution,--while a vague and miscellaneous perception of the +problem leads to groping and fumbling. Deductive systems are necessary +in order to put the question in a fruitful form. + +[Sidenote: "Reasoning a thing out"] + +The control of the origin and development of hypotheses by deduction +does not cease, however, with locating the problem. Ideas as they first +present themselves are inchoate and incomplete. _Deduction is their +elaboration into fullness and completeness of meaning_ (see p. 76). The +phenomena which the physician isolates from the total mass of facts that +exist in front of him suggest, we will say, typhoid fever. Now this +conception of typhoid fever is one that is capable of development. _If_ +there is typhoid, _wherever_ there is typhoid, there are certain +results, certain characteristic symptoms. By going over mentally the +full bearing of the concept of typhoid, the scientist is instructed as +to further phenomena to be found. Its development gives him an +instrument of inquiry, of observation and experimentation. He can go to +work deliberately to see whether the case presents those features that +it should have if the supposition is valid. The deduced results form a +basis for comparison with observed results. Except where there is a +system of principles capable of being elaborated by theoretical +reasoning, the process of testing (or proof) of a hypothesis is +incomplete and haphazard. + +[Sidenote: Such reasoning implies systematized knowledge,] + +These considerations indicate the method by which the deductive movement +is guided. Deduction requires a system of allied ideas which may be +translated into one another by regular or graded steps. The question is +whether the facts that confront us can be identified as typhoid fever. +To all appearances, there is a great gap between them and typhoid. But +if we can, by some method of substitutions, go through a series of +intermediary terms (see p. 72), the gap may, after all, be easily +bridged. Typhoid may mean _p_ which in turn means _o_, which means _n_ +which means _m_, which is very similar to the data selected as the key +to the problem. + +[Sidenote: or definition and classification] + +One of the chief objects of science is to provide for every typical +branch of subject-matter a set of meanings and principles so closely +interknit that any one implies some other according to definite +conditions, which under certain other conditions implies another, and so +on. In this way, various substitutions of equivalents are possible, and +reasoning can trace out, without having recourse to specific +observations, very remote consequences of any suggested principle. +Definition, general formulae, and classification are the devices by which +the fixation and elaboration of a meaning into its detailed +ramifications are carried on. They are not ends in themselves--as they +are frequently regarded even in elementary education--but +instrumentalities for facilitating the development of a conception into +the form where its applicability to given facts may best be tested.[17] + + [17] These processes are further discussed in Chapter IX. + +[Sidenote: The final control of deduction] + +The final test of deduction lies in experimental observation. +Elaboration by reasoning may make a suggested idea very rich and very +plausible, but it will not settle the validity of that idea. Only if +facts can be observed (by methods either of collection or of +experimentation), that agree in detail and without exception with the +deduced results, are we justified in accepting the deduction as giving a +valid conclusion. Thinking, in short, must end as well as begin in the +domain of concrete observations, if it is to be complete thinking. And +the ultimate educative value of all deductive processes is measured by +the degree to which they become working tools in the creation and +development of new experiences. + + +Sec. 5. _Some Educational Bearings of the Discussion_ + +[Sidenote: Educational counterparts of false logical theories] + +[Sidenote: Isolation of "facts"] + +Some of the points of the foregoing logical analysis may be clinched by +a consideration of their educational implications, especially with +reference to certain practices that grow out of a false separation by +which each is thought to be independent of the other and complete in +itself. (_i_) In some school subjects, or at all events in some topics +or in some lessons, the pupils are immersed in details; their minds are +loaded with disconnected items (whether gleaned by observation and +memory, or accepted on hearsay and authority). Induction is treated as +beginning and ending with the amassing of facts, of particular isolated +pieces of information. That these items are educative only as suggesting +a view of some larger situation in which the particulars are included +and thereby accounted for, is ignored. In object lessons in elementary +education and in laboratory instruction in higher education, the subject +is often so treated that the student fails to "see the forest on account +of the trees." Things and their qualities are retailed and detailed, +without reference to a more general character which they stand for and +mean. Or, in the laboratory, the student becomes engrossed in the +processes of manipulation,--irrespective of the reason for their +performance, without recognizing a typical problem for the solution of +which they afford the appropriate method. Only deduction brings out and +emphasizes consecutive relationships, and only when _relationships_ are +held in view does learning become more than a miscellaneous scrap-bag. + +[Sidenote: Failure to follow up by reasoning] + +(_ii_) Again, the mind is allowed to hurry on to a vague notion of the +whole of which the fragmentary facts are portions, without any attempt +to become conscious of _how_ they are bound together as parts of this +whole. The student feels that "in a general way," as we say, the facts +of the history or geography lesson are related thus and so; but "in a +general way" here stands only for "in a vague way," somehow or other, +with no clear recognition of just how. + +The pupil is encouraged to form, on the basis of the particular facts, a +general notion, a conception of how they stand related; but no pains are +taken to make the student follow up the notion, to elaborate it and see +just what its bearings are upon the case in hand and upon similar cases. +The inductive inference, the guess, is formed by the student; if it +happens to be correct, it is at once accepted by the teacher; or if it +is false, it is rejected. If any amplification of the idea occurs, it +is quite likely carried through by the teacher, who thereby assumes the +responsibility for its intellectual development. But a complete, an +integral, act of thought requires that the person making the suggestion +(the guess) be responsible also for reasoning out its bearings upon the +problem in hand; that he develop the suggestion at least enough to +indicate the ways in which it applies to and accounts for the specific +data of the case. Too often when a recitation does not consist in simply +testing the ability of the student to display some form of technical +skill, or to repeat facts and principles accepted on the authority of +text-book or lecturer, the teacher goes to the opposite extreme; and +after calling out the spontaneous reflections of the pupils, their +guesses or ideas about the matter, merely accepts or rejects them, +assuming himself the responsibility for their elaboration. In this way, +the function of suggestion and of interpretation is excited, but it is +not directed and trained. Induction is stimulated but is not carried +over into the _reasoning_ phase necessary to complete it. + +In other subjects and topics, the deductive phase is isolated, and is +treated as if it were complete in itself. This false isolation may show +itself in either (and both) of two points; namely, at the beginning or +at the end of the resort to general intellectual procedure. + +[Sidenote: Isolation of deduction by commencing with it] + +(_iii_) Beginning with definitions, rules, general principles, +classifications, and the like, is a common form of the first error. This +method has been such a uniform object of attack on the part of all +educational reformers that it is not necessary to dwell upon it further +than to note that the mistake is, logically, due to the attempt to +introduce deductive considerations without first making acquaintance +with the particular facts that create a need for the generalizing +rational devices. Unfortunately, the reformer sometimes carries his +objection too far, or rather locates it in the wrong place. He is led +into a tirade against _all_ definition, all systematization, all use of +general principles, instead of confining himself to pointing out their +futility and their deadness when not properly motivated by familiarity +with concrete experiences. + +[Sidenote: Isolation of deduction from direction of new observations] + +(_iv_) The isolation of deduction is seen, at the other end, wherever +there is failure to clinch and test the results of the general reasoning +processes by application to new concrete cases. The final point of the +deductive devices lies in their use in assimilating and comprehending +individual cases. No one understands a general principle fully--no +matter how adequately he can demonstrate it, to say nothing of repeating +it--till he can employ it in the mastery of new situations, which, if +they _are_ new, differ in manifestation from the cases used in reaching +the generalization. Too often the text-book or teacher is contented with +a series of somewhat perfunctory examples and illustrations, and the +student is not forced to carry the principle that he has formulated over +into further cases of his own experience. In so far, the principle is +inert and dead. + +[Sidenote: Lack of provision for experimentation] + +(_v_) It is only a variation upon this same theme to say that +every complete act of reflective inquiry makes provision for +experimentation--for testing suggested and accepted principles by +employing them for the active construction of new cases, in which new +qualities emerge. Only slowly do our schools accommodate themselves to +the general advance of scientific method. From the scientific side, it +is demonstrated that effective and integral thinking is possible only +where the experimental method in some form is used. Some recognition of +this principle is evinced in higher institutions of learning, colleges +and high schools. But in elementary education, it is still assumed, for +the most part, that the pupil's natural range of observations, +supplemented by what he accepts on hearsay, is adequate for intellectual +growth. Of course it is not necessary that laboratories shall be +introduced under that name, much less that elaborate apparatus be +secured; but the entire scientific history of humanity demonstrates that +the conditions for complete mental activity will not be obtained till +adequate provision is made for the carrying on of activities that +actually modify physical conditions, and that books, pictures, and even +objects that are passively observed but not manipulated do not furnish +the provision required. + + + + +CHAPTER EIGHT + +JUDGMENT: THE INTERPRETATION OF FACTS + + +Sec. 1. _The Three Factors of Judging_ + +[Sidenote: Good judgment] + +A man of good judgment in a given set of affairs is a man in so far +educated, trained, whatever may be his literacy. And if our schools turn +out their pupils in that attitude of mind which is conducive to good +judgment in any department of affairs in which the pupils are placed, +they have done more than if they sent out their pupils merely possessed +of vast stores of information, or high degrees of skill in specialized +branches. To know what is _good_ judgment we need first to know what +judgment is. + +[Sidenote: Judgment and inference] + +That there is an intimate connection between judgment and inference is +obvious enough. The aim of inference is to terminate itself in an +adequate judgment of a situation, and the course of inference goes on +through a series of partial and tentative judgments. What are these +units, these terms of inference when we examine them on their own +account? Their significant traits may be readily gathered from a +consideration of the operations to which the word _judgment_ was +originally applied: namely, the authoritative decision of matters in +legal controversy--the procedure of the _judge on the bench_. There are +three such features: (1) a controversy, consisting of opposite claims +regarding the same objective situation; (2) a process of defining and +elaborating these claims and of sifting the facts adduced to support +them; (3) a final decision, or sentence, closing the particular matter +in dispute and also serving as a rule or principle for deciding future +cases. + +[Sidenote: Uncertainty the antecedent of judgment] + +1. Unless there is something doubtful, the situation is read off at a +glance; it is taken in on sight, _i.e._ there is merely apprehension, +perception, recognition, not judgment. If the matter is wholly doubtful, +if it is dark and obscure throughout, there is a blind mystery and again +no judgment occurs. But if it suggests, however vaguely, different +meanings, rival possible interpretations, there is some _point at +issue_, some _matter at stake_. Doubt takes the form of dispute, +controversy; different sides compete for a conclusion in their favor. +Cases brought to trial before a judge illustrate neatly and +unambiguously this strife of alternative interpretations; but any case +of trying to clear up intellectually a doubtful situation exemplifies +the same traits. A moving blur catches our eye in the distance; we ask +ourselves: "What is it? Is it a cloud of whirling dust? a tree waving +its branches? a man signaling to us?" Something in the total situation +suggests each of these possible meanings. Only one of them can possibly +be sound; perhaps none of them is appropriate; yet _some_ meaning the +thing in question surely has. Which of the alternative suggested +meanings has the rightful claim? What does the perception really mean? +How is it to be interpreted, estimated, appraised, placed? Every +judgment proceeds from some such situation. + +[Sidenote: Judgment defines the issue,] + +2. The hearing of the controversy, the trial, _i.e._ the weighing of +alternative claims, divides into two branches, either of which, in a +given case, may be more conspicuous than the other. In the consideration +of a legal dispute, these two branches are sifting the evidence and +selecting the rules that are applicable; they are "the facts" and "the +law" of the case. In judgment they are (_a_) the determination of the +data that are important in the given case (compare the inductive +movement); and (_b_) the elaboration of the conceptions or meanings +suggested by the crude data (compare the deductive movement). (_a_) What +portions or aspects of the situation are significant in controlling the +formation of the interpretation? (_b_) Just what is the full meaning and +bearing of the conception that is used as a method of interpretation? +These questions are strictly correlative; the answer to each depends +upon the answer to the other. We may, however, for convenience, consider +them separately. + +[Sidenote: (_a_) by selecting what facts are evidence] + +(_a_) In every actual occurrence, there are many details which are part +of the total occurrence, but which nevertheless are not significant in +relation to the point at issue. All parts of an experience are equally +present, but they are very far from being of equal value as signs or as +evidences. Nor is there any tag or label on any trait saying: "This is +important," or "This is trivial." Nor is intensity, or vividness or +conspicuousness, a safe measure of indicative and proving value. The +glaring thing may be totally insignificant in this particular situation, +and the key to the understanding of the whole matter may be modest or +hidden (compare p. 74). Features that are not significant are +distracting; they proffer their claims to be regarded as clues and cues +to interpretation, while traits that are significant do not appear on +the surface at all. Hence, judgment is required _even in reference_ to +the situation or event that is present to the senses; elimination or +rejection, selection, discovery, or bringing to light must take place. +Till we have reached a final conclusion, rejection and selection must be +tentative or conditional. We select the things that we hope or trust are +cues to meaning. But if they do not suggest a situation that accepts and +includes them (see p. 81), we reconstitute our data, the facts of the +case; for we mean, intellectually, by the facts of the case _those +traits that are used as evidence in reaching a conclusion or forming a +decision_. + +[Sidenote: Expertness in selecting evidence] + +No hard and fast rules for this operation of selecting and rejecting, or +fixing upon the facts, can be given. It all comes back, as we say, to +the good judgment, the good sense, of the one judging. To be a good +judge is to have a sense of the relative indicative or signifying values +of the various features of the perplexing situation; to know what to let +go as of no account; what to eliminate as irrelevant; what to retain as +conducive to outcome; what to emphasize as a clue to the difficulty.[18] +This power in ordinary matters we call _knack_, _tact_, _cleverness_; in +more important affairs, _insight_, _discernment_. In part it is +instinctive or inborn; but it also represents the funded outcome of long +familiarity with like operations in the past. Possession of this ability +to seize what is evidential or significant and to let the rest go is the +mark of the expert, the connoisseur, the _judge_, in any matter. + + [18] Compare what was said about _analysis_. + +[Sidenote: Intuitive judgments] + +Mill cites the following case, which is worth noting as an instance of +the extreme delicacy and accuracy to which may be developed this power +of sizing up the significant factors of a situation. "A Scotch +manufacturer procured from England, at a high rate of wages, a working +dyer, famous for producing very fine colors, with the view of teaching +to his other workmen the same skill. The workman came; but his method +of proportioning the ingredients, in which lay the secret of the effects +he produced, was by taking them up in handfuls, while the common method +was to weigh them. The manufacturer sought to make him turn his handling +system into an equivalent weighing system, that the general principles +of his peculiar mode of proceeding might be ascertained. This, however, +the man found himself quite unable to do, and could therefore impart his +own skill to nobody. He had, from individual cases of his own +experience, established a connection in his mind between fine effects of +color and tactual perceptions in handling his dyeing materials; and from +these perceptions he could, in any particular case, _infer the means to +be employed_ and the effects which would be produced." Long brooding +over conditions, intimate contact associated with keen interest, +thorough absorption in a multiplicity of allied experiences, tend to +bring about those judgments which we then call intuitive; but they are +true judgments because they are based on intelligent selection and +estimation, with the solution of a problem as the controlling standard. +Possession of this capacity makes the difference between the artist and +the intellectual bungler. + +Such is judging ability, in its completest form, as to the data of the +decision to be reached. But in any case there is a certain feeling along +for the way to be followed; a constant tentative picking out of certain +qualities to see what emphasis upon them would lead to; a willingness to +hold final selection in suspense; and to reject the factors entirely or +relegate them to a different position in the evidential scheme if other +features yield more solvent suggestions. Alertness, flexibility, +curiosity are the essentials; dogmatism, rigidity, prejudice, caprice, +arising from routine, passion, and flippancy are fatal. + +[Sidenote: (_b_) To decide an issue, the appropriate principles must +also be selected] + +(_b_) This selection of data is, of course, for the sake of controlling +the _development and elaboration of the suggested meaning in the light +of which they are to be interpreted_ (compare p. 76). An evolution of +conceptions thus goes on simultaneously with the determination of the +facts; one possible meaning after another is held before the mind, +considered in relation to the data to which it is applied, is developed +into its more detailed bearings upon the data, is dropped or tentatively +accepted and used. We do not approach any problem with a wholly naive or +virgin mind; we approach it with certain acquired habitual modes of +understanding, with a certain store of previously evolved meanings, or +at least of experiences from which meanings may be educed. If the +circumstances are such that a habitual response is called directly into +play, there is an immediate grasp of meaning. If the habit is checked, +and inhibited from easy application, a possible meaning for the facts in +question presents itself. No hard and fast rules decide whether a +meaning suggested is the right and proper meaning to follow up. The +individual's own good (or bad) judgment is the guide. There is no label +on any given idea or principle which says automatically, "Use me in this +situation"--as the magic cakes of Alice in Wonderland were inscribed +"Eat me." The thinker has to decide, to choose; and there is always a +risk, so that the prudent thinker selects warily, subject, that is, to +confirmation or frustration by later events. If one is not able to +estimate wisely what is relevant to the interpretation of a given +perplexing or doubtful issue, it avails little that arduous learning +has built up a large stock of concepts. For learning is not wisdom; +information does not guarantee good judgment. Memory may provide an +antiseptic refrigerator in which to store a stock of meanings for future +use, but judgment selects and adopts the one used in a given +emergency--and without an emergency (some crisis, slight or great) there +is no call for judgment. No conception, even if it is carefully and +firmly established in the abstract, can at first safely be more than a +_candidate_ for the office of interpreter. Only greater success than +that of its rivals in clarifying dark spots, untying hard knots, +reconciling discrepancies, can elect it or prove it a valid idea for the +given situation. + +[Sidenote: Judging terminates in a _decision_ or statement] + +3. The judgment when formed is a _decision_; it closes (or concludes) +the question at issue. This determination not only settles that +particular case, but it helps fix a rule or method for deciding similar +matters in the future; as the sentence of the judge on the bench both +terminates that dispute and also forms a precedent for future decisions. +If the interpretation settled upon is not controverted by subsequent +events, a presumption is built up in favor of similar interpretation in +other cases where the features are not so obviously unlike as to make it +inappropriate. In this way, principles of judging are gradually built +up; a certain manner of interpretation gets weight, authority. In short, +meanings get _standardized_, they become logical concepts (see below, p. +118). + + +Sec. 2. _The Origin and Nature of Ideas_ + +[Sidenote: Ideas are conjectures employed in judging] + +This brings us to the question of _ideas in relation to judgments_.[19] +Something in an obscure situation suggests something else as its +meaning. If this meaning is at once accepted, there is no reflective +thinking, no genuine judging. Thought is cut short uncritically; +dogmatic belief, with all its attending risks, takes place. But if the +meaning suggested is held _in suspense_, pending examination and +inquiry, there is true judgment. We stop and think, we _de-fer_ +conclusion in order to _in-fer_ more thoroughly. In this process of +being only conditionally accepted, accepted only for examination, +_meanings become ideas_. _That is to say, an idea is a meaning that is +tentatively entertained, formed, and used with reference to its fitness +to decide a perplexing situation,--a meaning used as a tool of +judgment._ + + [19] The term _idea_ is also used popularly to denote (_a_) a mere + fancy, (_b_) an accepted belief, and also (_c_) judgment itself. But + _logically_ it denotes a certain _factor_ in judgment, as explained + in the text. + +[Sidenote: Or tools of interpretation] + +Let us recur to our instance of a blur in motion appearing at a +distance. We wonder what _the thing is_, _i.e._ what the _blur means_. A +man waving his arms, a friend beckoning to us, are suggested as +possibilities. To accept at once either alternative is to arrest +judgment. But if we treat what is suggested as only a suggestion, a +supposition, a possibility, it becomes an idea, having the following +traits: (_a_) As merely a suggestion, it is a conjecture, a guess, which +in cases of greater dignity we call a hypothesis or a theory. That is to +say, it is _a possible but as yet doubtful mode of interpretation_. +(_b_) Even though doubtful, it has an office to perform; namely, that of +directing inquiry and examination. If this blur means a friend +beckoning, then careful observation should show certain other traits. If +it is a man driving unruly cattle, certain other traits should be found. +Let us look and see if these traits are found. Taken merely as a doubt, +an idea would paralyze inquiry. Taken merely as a certainty, it would +arrest inquiry. Taken as a doubtful possibility, it affords a +standpoint, a platform, a method of inquiry. + +[Sidenote: Pseudo-ideas] + +Ideas are not then genuine ideas unless they are tools in a reflective +examination which tends to solve a problem. Suppose it is a question of +having the pupil grasp _the idea_ of the sphericity of the earth. This +is different from teaching him its sphericity _as a fact_. He may be +shown (or reminded of) a ball or a globe, and be told that the earth is +round like those things; he may then be made to repeat that statement +day after day till the shape of the earth and the shape of the ball are +welded together in his mind. But he has not thereby acquired any idea of +the earth's sphericity; at most, he has had a certain image of a sphere +and has finally managed to image the earth after the analogy of his ball +image. To grasp sphericity as an idea, the pupil must first have +realized certain perplexities or confusing features in observed facts +and have had the idea of spherical shape suggested to him as a possible +way of accounting for the phenomena in question. Only by use as a method +of interpreting data so as to give them fuller meaning does sphericity +become a genuine idea. There may be a vivid image and no idea; or there +may be a fleeting, obscure image and yet an idea, if that image performs +the function of instigating and directing the observation and relation +of facts. + +[Sidenote: Ideas furnish the only alternative to "hit or miss" methods] + +Logical ideas are like keys which are shaping with reference to opening +a lock. Pike, separated by a glass partition from the fish upon which +they ordinarily prey, will--so it is said--butt their heads against the +glass until it is literally beaten into them that they cannot get at +their food. Animals learn (when they learn at all) by a "cut and try" +method; by doing at random first one thing and another thing and then +preserving the things that happen to succeed. Action directed +consciously by ideas--by suggested meanings accepted for the sake of +experimenting with them--is the sole alternative both to bull-headed +stupidity and to learning bought from that dear teacher--chance +experience. + +[Sidenote: They are methods of indirect attack] + +It is significant that many words for intelligence suggest the idea of +circuitous, evasive activity--often with a sort of intimation of even +moral obliquity. The bluff, hearty man goes straight (and stupidly, it +is implied) at some work. The intelligent man is cunning, shrewd +(crooked), wily, subtle, crafty, artful, designing--the idea of +indirection is involved.[20] An idea is a method of evading, +circumventing, or surmounting through reflection obstacles that +otherwise would have to be attacked by brute force. But ideas may lose +their intellectual quality as they are habitually used. When a child was +first learning to recognize, in some hesitating suspense, cats, dogs, +houses, marbles, trees, shoes, and other objects, ideas--conscious and +tentative meanings--intervened as methods of identification. Now, as a +rule, the thing and the meaning are so completely fused that there is no +judgment and no idea proper, but only automatic recognition. On the +other hand, things that are, as a rule, directly apprehended and +familiar become subjects of judgment when they present themselves in +unusual contexts: as forms, distances, sizes, positions when we attempt +to draw them; triangles, squares, and circles when they turn up, not in +connection with familiar toys, implements, and utensils, but as problems +in geometry. + + [20] See Ward, _Psychic Factors of Civilization_, p. 153. + + +Sec. 3. _Analysis and Synthesis_ + +[Sidenote: Judging clears up things: analysis] + +Through judging confused data are cleared up, and seemingly incoherent +and disconnected facts brought together. Things may have a peculiar +feeling for us, they may make a certain indescribable impression upon +us; the thing may _feel_ round (that is, present a quality which we +afterwards define as round), an act may seem rude (or what we afterwards +classify as rude), and yet this quality may be lost, absorbed, blended +in the total value of the situation. Only as we need to use just that +aspect of the original situation as a tool of grasping something +perplexing or obscure in another situation, do we abstract or detach the +quality so that it becomes individualized. Only because we need to +characterize the shape of some new object or the moral quality of some +new act, does the element of roundness or rudeness in the old experience +detach itself, and stand out as a distinctive feature. If the element +thus selected clears up what is otherwise obscure in the new experience, +if it settles what is uncertain, it thereby itself gains in positiveness +and definiteness of meaning. This point will meet us again in the +following chapter; here we shall speak of the matter only as it bears +upon the questions of analysis and synthesis. + +[Sidenote: Mental analysis is not like physical division] + +[Sidenote: Misapprehension of analysis in education] + +Even when it is definitely stated that intellectual and physical +analyses are different sorts of operations, intellectual analysis is +often treated after the analogy of physical; as if it were the breaking +up of a whole into all its constituent parts in the mind instead of in +space. As nobody can possibly tell what breaking a whole into its parts +in the mind means, this conception leads to the further notion that +logical analysis is a mere enumeration and listing of all conceivable +qualities and relations. The influence upon education of this +conception has been very great.[21] Every subject in the curriculum has +passed through--or still remains in--what may be called the phase of +anatomical or morphological method: the stage in which understanding the +subject is thought to consist of multiplying distinctions of quality, +form, relation, and so on, and attaching some name to each distinguished +element. In normal growth, specific properties are emphasized and so +individualized only when they serve to clear up a present difficulty. +Only as they are involved in judging some specific situation is there +any motive or use for analyses, _i.e._ for emphasis upon some element or +relation as peculiarly significant. + + [21] Thus arise all those falsely analytic methods in geography, + reading, writing, drawing, botany, arithmetic, which we have already + considered in another connection. (See p. 59.) + +[Sidenote: Effects of premature formulation] + +The same putting the cart before the horse, the product before the +process, is found in that overconscious formulation of methods of +procedure so current in elementary instruction. (See p. 60.) The method +that is employed in discovery, in reflective inquiry, cannot possibly be +identified with the method that emerges _after_ the discovery is made. +In the genuine operation of inference, the mind is in the attitude of +_search_, of _hunting_, of _projection_, of _trying this and that_; when +the conclusion is reached, the search is at an end. The Greeks used to +discuss: "How is learning (or inquiry) possible? For either we know +already what we are after, and then we do not learn or inquire; or we do +not know, and then we cannot inquire, for we do not know what to look +for." The dilemma is at least suggestive, for it points to the true +alternative: the use in inquiry of doubt, of tentative suggestion, of +experimentation. After we have reached the conclusion, a +reconsideration of the steps of the process to see what is helpful, what +is harmful, what is merely useless, will assist in dealing more promptly +and efficaciously with analogous problems in the future. In this way, +more or less explicit method is gradually built up. (Compare the earlier +discussion on p. 62 of the psychological and the logical.) + +[Sidenote: Method comes before its formulation] + +It is, however, a common assumption that unless the pupil from the +outset _consciously recognizes and explicitly states_ the method +logically implied in the result he is to reach, he will have _no_ +method, and his mind will work confusedly or anarchically; while if he +accompanies his performance with conscious statement of some form of +procedure (outline, topical analysis, list of headings and subheadings, +uniform formula) his mind is safeguarded and strengthened. As a matter +of fact, the development of _an unconscious logical attitude and habit_ +must come first. A conscious setting forth of the method logically +adapted for reaching an end is possible only after the result has first +been reached by more unconscious and tentative methods, while it is +valuable only when a review of the method that achieved success in a +given case will throw light upon a new, similar case. The ability to +fasten upon and single out (abstract, analyze) those features of one +experience which are logically best is hindered by premature insistence +upon their explicit formulation. It is repeated use that gives a +_method_ definiteness; and given this definiteness, precipitation into +formulated statement should follow naturally. But because teachers find +that the things which they themselves best understand are marked off and +defined in clear-cut ways, our schoolrooms are pervaded with the +superstition that children are to begin with already crystallized +formulae of method. + +[Sidenote: Judgment reveals the bearing or significance of facts: +synthesis] + +As analysis is conceived to be a sort of picking to pieces, so synthesis +is thought to be a sort of physical piecing together; and so imagined, +it also becomes a mystery. In fact, synthesis takes place wherever we +grasp the bearing of facts on a conclusion, or of a principle on facts. +As analysis is _emphasis_, so synthesis is _placing_; the one causes the +emphasized fact or property to stand out as significant; the other gives +what is selected its _context_, or its connection with what is +signified. Every judgment is analytic in so far as it involves +discernment, discrimination, marking off the trivial from the important, +the irrelevant from what points to a conclusion; and it is synthetic in +so far as it leaves the mind with an inclusive situation within which +the selected facts are placed. + +[Sidenote: Analysis and synthesis are correlative] + +Educational methods that pride themselves on being exclusively analytic +or exclusively synthetic are therefore (so far as they carry out their +boasts) incompatible with normal operations of judgment. Discussions +have taken place, for example, as to whether the teaching of geography +should be analytic or synthetic. The synthetic method is supposed to +begin with the partial, limited portion of the earth's surface already +familiar to the pupil, and then gradually piece on adjacent regions (the +county, the country, the continent, and so on) till an idea of the +entire globe is reached, or of the solar system that includes the globe. +The analytic method is supposed to begin with the physical whole, the +solar system or globe, and to work down through its constituent portions +till the immediate environment is reached. The underlying conceptions +are of physical wholes and physical parts. As matter of fact, we cannot +assume that the portion of the earth already familiar to the child is +such a definite object, mentally, that he can at once begin with it; his +knowledge of it is misty and vague as well as incomplete. Accordingly, +mental progress will involve analysis of it--emphasis of the features +that are significant, so that they will stand out clearly. Moreover, his +own locality is not sharply marked off, neatly bounded, and measured. +His experience of it is already an experience that involves sun, moon, +and stars as parts of the scene he surveys; it involves a changing +horizon line as he moves about; that is, even his more limited and local +experience involves far-reaching factors that take his imagination clear +beyond his own street and village. Connection, relationship with a +larger whole, is already involved. But his recognition of these +relations is inadequate, vague, incorrect. He needs to utilize the +features of the local environment which are understood to help clarify +and enlarge his conceptions of the larger geographical scene to which +they belong. At the same time, not till he has grasped the larger scene +will many of even the commonest features of his environment become +intelligible. Analysis leads to synthesis; while synthesis perfects +analysis. As the pupil grows in comprehension of the vast complicated +earth in its setting in space, he also sees more definitely the meaning +of the familiar local details. This intimate interaction between +selective emphasis and interpretation of what is selected is found +wherever reflection proceeds normally. Hence the folly of trying to set +analysis and synthesis over against each other. + + + + +CHAPTER NINE + +MEANING: OR CONCEPTIONS AND UNDERSTANDING + + +Sec. 1. _The Place of Meanings in Mental Life_ + +[Sidenote: Meaning is central] + +As in our discussion of judgment we were making more explicit what is +involved in inference, so in the discussion of meaning we are only +recurring to the central function of all reflection. For one thing to +_mean_, _signify_, _betoken_, _indicate_, or _point to_, another we saw +at the outset to be the essential mark of thinking (see p. 8). To find +out what facts, just as they stand, mean, is the object of all +discovery; to find out what facts will carry out, substantiate, support +a given meaning, is the object of all testing. When an inference reaches +a satisfactory conclusion, we attain a goal of meaning. The act of +judging involves both the growth and the application of meanings. In +short, in this chapter we are not introducing a new topic; we are only +coming to closer quarters with what hitherto has been constantly +assumed. In the first section, we shall consider the equivalence of +meaning and understanding, and the two types of understanding, direct +and indirect. + + +I. MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING + +[Sidenote: To understand is to grasp meaning] + +If a person comes suddenly into your room and calls out "Paper," various +alternatives are possible. If you do not understand the English +language, there is simply a noise which may or may not act as a physical +stimulus and irritant. But the noise is not an intellectual object; it +does not have intellectual value. (Compare above, p. 15.) To say that +you do not understand it and that it has no meaning are equivalents. If +the cry is the usual accompaniment of the delivery of the morning paper, +the sound will have meaning, intellectual content; you will understand +it. Or if you are eagerly awaiting the receipt of some important +document, you may assume that the cry means an announcement of its +arrival. If (in the third place) you understand the English language, +but no context suggests itself from your habits and expectations, the +_word_ has meaning, but not the whole event. You are then perplexed and +incited to think out, to hunt for, some explanation of the apparently +meaningless occurrence. If you find something that accounts for the +performance, it gets meaning; you come to understand it. As intelligent +beings, we presume the existence of meaning, and its absence is an +anomaly. Hence, if it should turn out that the person merely meant to +inform you that there was a scrap of paper on the sidewalk, or that +paper existed somewhere in the universe, you would think him crazy or +yourself the victim of a poor joke. To grasp a meaning, to understand, +to identify a thing in a situation in which it is important, are thus +equivalent terms; they express the nerves of our intellectual life. +Without them there is (_a_) lack of intellectual content, or (_b_) +intellectual confusion and perplexity, or else (_c_) intellectual +perversion--nonsense, insanity. + +[Sidenote: Knowledge and meaning] + +All knowledge, all science, thus aims to grasp the meaning of objects +and events, and this process always consists in taking them out of their +apparent brute isolation as events, and finding them to be parts of +some larger whole _suggested by them_, which, in turn, _accounts for_, +_explains_, _interprets them_; _i.e._ renders them significant. (Compare +above, p. 75.) Suppose that a stone with peculiar markings has been +found. What do these scratches mean? So far as the object forces the +raising of this question, it is not understood; while so far as the +color and form that we see mean to us a stone, the object is understood. +It is such peculiar combinations of the understood and the nonunderstood +that provoke thought. If at the end of the inquiry, the markings are +decided to mean glacial scratches, obscure and perplexing traits have +been translated into meanings already understood: namely, the moving and +grinding power of large bodies of ice and the friction thus induced of +one rock upon another. Something already understood in one situation has +been transferred and applied to what is strange and perplexing in +another, and thereby the latter has become plain and familiar, _i.e._ +understood. This summary illustration discloses that our power to think +effectively depends upon possession of a capital fund of meanings which +may be applied when desired. (Compare what was said about deduction, p. +94.) + + +II. DIRECT AND INDIRECT UNDERSTANDING + +[Sidenote: Direct and circuitous understanding] + +In the above illustrations two types of grasping of meaning are +exemplified. When the English language is understood, the person grasps +at once the meaning of "paper." He may not, however, see any meaning or +sense in the performance as a whole. Similarly, the person identifies +the object on sight as a stone; there is no secret, no mystery, no +perplexity about that. But he does not understand the markings on it. +They have some meaning, but what is it? In one case, owing to familiar +acquaintance, the thing and its meaning, up to a certain point, are one. +In the other, the thing and its meaning are, temporarily at least, +sundered, and meaning has to be sought in order to understand the thing. +In one case understanding is direct, prompt, immediate; in the other, it +is roundabout and delayed. + +[Sidenote: Interaction of the two types] + +Most languages have two sets of words to express these two modes of +understanding; one for the direct taking in or grasp of meaning, the +other for its circuitous apprehension, thus: [Greek: gnonai] and +[Greek: eidenai] in Greek; _noscere_ and _scire_ in Latin; _kennen_ and +_wissen_ in German; _connaitre_ and _savoir_ in French; while in English +to be _acquainted with_ and to _know of or about_ have been suggested as +equivalents.[22] Now our intellectual life consists of a peculiar +interaction between these two types of understanding. All judgment, all +reflective inference, presupposes some lack of understanding, a partial +absence of meaning. We reflect in order that we may get hold of the full +and adequate significance of what happens. Nevertheless, _something_ +must be already understood, the mind must be in possession of some +meaning which it has mastered, or else thinking is impossible. We think +in order to grasp meaning, but none the less every extension of +knowledge makes us aware of blind and opaque spots, where with less +knowledge all had seemed obvious and natural. A scientist brought into a +new district will find many things that he does not understand, where +the native savage or rustic will be wholly oblivious to any meanings +beyond those directly apparent. Some Indians brought to a large city +remained stolid at the sight of mechanical wonders of bridge, trolley, +and telephone, but were held spellbound by the sight of workmen climbing +poles to repair wires. Increase of the store of meanings makes us +conscious of new problems, while only through translation of the new +perplexities into what is already familiar and plain do we understand or +solve these problems. This is the constant spiral movement of knowledge. + + [22] James, _Principles of Psychology_, vol. I, p. 221. To _know_ + and to _know that_ are perhaps more precise equivalents; compare "I + know him" and "I know that he has gone home." The former expresses a + fact simply; for the latter, evidence might be demanded and + supplied. + +[Sidenote: Intellectual progress a rhythm] + +Our progress in genuine knowledge always consists _in part in the +discovery of something not understood in what had previously been taken +for granted as plain, obvious, matter-of-course, and in part in the use +of meanings that are directly grasped without question, as instruments +for getting hold of obscure, doubtful, and perplexing meanings_. No +object is so familiar, so obvious, so commonplace that it may not +unexpectedly present, in a novel situation, some problem, and thus +arouse reflection in order to understand it. No object or principle is +so strange, peculiar, or remote that it may not be dwelt upon till its +meaning becomes familiar--taken in on sight without reflection. We may +come to _see_, _perceive_, _recognize_, _grasp_, _seize_, _lay hold of_ +principles, laws, abstract truths--_i.e._ to understand their meaning in +very immediate fashion. Our intellectual progress consists, as has been +said, in a rhythm of direct understanding--technically called +_ap_prehension--with indirect, mediated understanding--technically +called _com_prehension. + + +Sec. 2. _The Process of Acquiring Meanings_ + +[Sidenote: Familiarity] + +The first problem that comes up in connection with direct understanding +is how a store of directly apprehensible meanings is built up. How do +we learn to view things on sight as significant members of a situation, +or as having, as a matter of course, specific meanings? Our chief +difficulty in answering this question lies in the thoroughness with +which the lesson of familiar things has been learnt. Thought can more +easily traverse an unexplored region than it can undo what has been so +thoroughly done as to be ingrained in unconscious habit. We apprehend +chairs, tables, books, trees, horses, clouds, stars, rain, so promptly +and directly that it is hard to realize that as meanings they had once +to be acquired,--the meanings are now so much parts of the things +themselves. + +[Sidenote: Confusion is prior to familiarity] + +In an often quoted passage, Mr. James has said: "The baby, assailed by +eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one great +blooming, buzzing confusion."[23] Mr. James is speaking of a baby's +world taken as a whole; the description, however, is equally applicable +to the way any new thing strikes an adult, so far as the thing is really +new and strange. To the traditional "cat in a strange garret," +everything is blurred and confused; the wonted marks that label things +so as to separate them from one another are lacking. Foreign languages +that we do not understand always seem jabberings, babblings, in which it +is impossible to fix a definite, clear-cut, individualized group of +sounds. The countryman in the crowded city street, the landlubber at +sea, the ignoramus in sport at a contest between experts in a +complicated game, are further instances. Put an unexperienced man in a +factory, and at first the work seems to him a meaningless medley. All +strangers of another race proverbially look alike to the visiting +foreigner. Only gross differences of size or color are perceived by an +outsider in a flock of sheep, each of which is perfectly individualized +to the shepherd. A diffusive blur and an indiscriminately shifting +suction characterize what we do not understand. The problem of the +acquisition of meaning by things, or (stated in another way) of forming +habits of simple apprehension, is thus the problem of introducing (_i_) +_definiteness_ and _distinction_ and (_ii_) _consistency_ or _stability_ +of meaning into what is otherwise vague and wavering. + + [23] _Principles of Psychology_, vol. I, p. 488. + +[Sidenote: Practical responses clarify confusion] + +The acquisition of definiteness and of coherency (or constancy) of +meanings is derived primarily from practical activities. By rolling an +object, the child makes its roundness appreciable; by bouncing it, he +singles out its elasticity; by throwing it, he makes weight its +conspicuous distinctive factor. Not through the senses, but by means of +the reaction, the responsive adjustment, is the impression made +distinctive, and given a character marked off from other qualities that +call out unlike reactions. Children, for example, are usually quite slow +in apprehending differences of color. Differences from the standpoint of +the adult so glaring that it is impossible not to note them are +recognized and recalled with great difficulty. Doubtless they do not all +_feel_ alike, but there is no intellectual recognition of what makes the +difference. The redness or greenness or blueness of the object does not +tend to call out a reaction that is sufficiently peculiar to give +prominence or distinction to the color trait. Gradually, however, +certain characteristic habitual responses associate themselves with +certain things; the white becomes the sign, say, of milk and sugar, to +which the child reacts favorably; blue becomes the sign of a dress that +the child likes to wear, and so on: and the distinctive reactions tend +to single out color qualities from other things in which they had been +submerged. + +[Sidenote: We identify by use or function] + +Take another example. We have little difficulty in distinguishing from +one another rakes, hoes, plows and harrows, shovels and spades. Each has +its own associated characteristic use and function. We may have, +however, great difficulty in recalling the difference between serrate +and dentate, ovoid and obovoid, in the shapes and edges of leaves, or +between acids in _ic_ and in _ous_. There is some difference; but just +what? Or, we know what the difference is; but which is which? Variations +in form, size, color, and arrangement of parts have much less to do, and +the uses, purposes, and functions of things and of their parts much more +to do, with distinctness of character and meaning than we should be +likely to think. What misleads us is the fact that the qualities of +form, size, color, and so on, are _now_ so distinct that we fail to see +that the problem is precisely to account for the way in which they +originally obtained their definiteness and conspicuousness. So far as we +sit passive before objects, they are not distinguished out of a vague +blur which swallows them all. Differences in the pitch and intensity of +sounds leave behind a different feeling, but until we assume different +attitudes toward them, or _do_ something special in reference to them, +their vague difference cannot be _intellectually_ gripped and retained. + +[Sidenote: Children's drawings illustrate domination by value] + +Children's drawings afford a further exemplification of the same +principle. Perspective does not exist, for the child's interest is not +in _pictorial representation_, but in the _things_ represented; and +while perspective is essential to the former, it is no part of the +characteristic uses and values of the things themselves. The house is +drawn with transparent walls, because the rooms, chairs, beds, people +inside, are the important things in the house-meaning; smoke always +comes out of the chimney--otherwise, why have a chimney at all? At +Christmas time, the stockings may be drawn almost as large as the house +or even so large that they have to be put outside of it:--in any case, +it is the scale of values in use that furnishes the scale for their +qualities, the pictures being diagrammatic reminders of these values, +not impartial records of physical and sensory qualities. One of the +chief difficulties felt by most persons in learning the art of pictorial +representation is that habitual uses and results of use have become so +intimately read into the character of things that it is practically +impossible to shut them out at will. + +[Sidenote: As do sounds used as language signs] + +The acquiring of meaning by sounds, in virtue of which they become +words, is perhaps the most striking illustration that can be found of +the way in which mere sensory stimuli acquire definiteness and constancy +of meaning and are thereby themselves defined and interconnected for +purposes of recognition. Language is a specially good example because +there are hundreds or even thousands of words in which meaning is now so +thoroughly consolidated with physical qualities as to be directly +apprehended, while in the case of words it is easier to recognize that +this connection has been gradually and laboriously acquired than in the +case of physical objects such as chairs, tables, buttons, trees, stones, +hills, flowers, and so on, where it seems as if the union of +intellectual character and meaning with the physical fact were +aboriginal, and thrust upon us passively rather than acquired through +active explorations. And in the case of the meaning of words, we see +readily that it is by making sounds and noting the results which +follow, by listening to the sounds of others and watching the activities +which accompany them, that a given sound finally becomes the stable +bearer of a meaning. + +[Sidenote: Summary] + +Familiar acquaintance with meanings thus signifies that we have acquired +in the presence of objects definite attitudes of response which lead us, +without reflection, to anticipate certain possible consequences. The +definiteness of the expectation defines the meaning or takes it out of +the vague and pulpy; its habitual, recurrent character gives the meaning +constancy, stability, consistency, or takes it out of the fluctuating +and wavering. + + +Sec. 3. _Conceptions and Meaning_ + +[Sidenote: A conception is a definite meaning] + +The word _meaning_ is a familiar everyday term; the words _conception_, +_notion_, are both popular and technical terms. Strictly speaking, they +involve, however, nothing new; any meaning sufficiently individualized +to be directly grasped and readily used, and thus fixed by a word, is a +conception or notion. Linguistically, every common noun is the carrier +of a meaning, while proper nouns and common nouns with the word _this_ +or _that_ prefixed, refer to the things in which the meanings are +exemplified. That thinking both employs and expands notions, +conceptions, is then simply saying that in inference and judgment we use +meanings, and that this use also corrects and widens them. + +[Sidenote: which is standardized] + +Various persons talk about an object not physically present, and yet all +get the same material of belief. The same person in different moments +often refers to the same object or kind of objects. The sense +experience, the physical conditions, the psychological conditions, vary, +but the same meaning is conserved. If pounds arbitrarily changed their +weight, and foot rules their length, while we were using them, obviously +we could not weigh nor measure. This would be our intellectual position +if meanings could not be maintained with a certain stability and +constancy through a variety of physical and personal changes. + +[Sidenote: By it we identify the unknown] + +[Sidenote: and supplement the sensibly present] + +[Sidenote: and also systematize things] + +To insist upon the fundamental importance of conceptions would, +accordingly, only repeat what has been said. We shall merely summarize, +saying that conceptions, or standard meanings, are instruments (_i_) of +identification, (_ii_) of supplementation, and (_iii_) of placing in a +system. Suppose a little speck of light hitherto unseen is detected in +the heavens. Unless there is a store of meanings to fall back upon as +tools of inquiry and reasoning, that speck of light will remain just +what it is to the senses--a mere speck of light. For all that it leads +to, it might as well be a mere irritation of the optic nerve. Given the +stock of meanings acquired in prior experience, this speck of light is +mentally attacked by means of appropriate concepts. Does it indicate +asteroid, or comet, or a new-forming sun, or a nebula resulting from +some cosmic collision or disintegration? Each of these conceptions has +its own specific and differentiating characters, which are then sought +for by minute and persistent inquiry. As a result, then, the speck is +identified, we will say, as a comet. Through a standard meaning, it gets +identity and stability of character. Supplementation then takes place. +All the known qualities of comets are read into this particular thing, +even though they have not been as yet observed. All that the astronomers +of the past have learned about the paths and structure of comets becomes +available capital with which to interpret the speck of light. Finally, +this comet-meaning is itself not isolated; it is a related portion of +the whole system of astronomic knowledge. Suns, planets, satellites, +nebulae, comets, meteors, star dust--all these conceptions have a certain +mutuality of reference and interaction, and when the speck of light is +identified as meaning a comet, it is at once adopted as a full member in +this vast kingdom of beliefs. + +[Sidenote: Importance of system to knowledge] + +Darwin, in an autobiographical sketch, says that when a youth he told +the geologist, Sidgwick, of finding a tropical shell in a certain gravel +pit. Thereupon Sidgwick said it must have been thrown there by some +person, adding: "But if it were really embedded there, it would be the +greatest misfortune to geology, because it would overthrow all that we +know about the superficial deposits of the Midland Counties"--since they +were glacial. And then Darwin adds: "I was then utterly astonished at +Sidgwick not being delighted at so wonderful a fact as a tropical shell +being found near the surface in the middle of England. Nothing before +had made me thoroughly realize _that science consists in grouping facts +so that general laws or conclusions may be drawn from them_." This +instance (which might, of course, be duplicated from any branch of +science) indicates how scientific notions make explicit the +systematizing tendency involved in all use of concepts. + + +Sec. 4. _What Conceptions are Not_ + +The idea that a conception is a meaning that supplies a standard rule +for the identification and placing of particulars may be contrasted with +some current misapprehensions of its nature. + +[Sidenote: A concept is not a bare residue] + +1. Conceptions are not derived from a multitude of different definite +objects by leaving out the qualities in which they differ and retaining +those in which they agree. The origin of concepts is sometimes described +to be as if a child began with a lot of different particular things, say +particular dogs; his own Fido, his neighbor's Carlo, his cousin's Tray. +Having all these different objects before him, he analyzes them into a +lot of different qualities, say (_a_) color, (_b_) size, (_c_) shape, +(_d_) number of legs, (_e_) quantity and quality of hair, (_f_) +digestive organs, and so on; and then strikes out all the unlike +qualities (such as color, size, shape, hair), retaining traits such as +quadruped and domesticated, which they all have in general. + +[Sidenote: but an active attitude] + +As a matter of fact, the child begins with whatever significance he has +got out of the one dog he has seen, heard, and handled. He has found +that he can carry over from one experience of this object to subsequent +experience certain expectations of certain characteristic modes of +behavior--may expect these even before they show themselves. He tends to +assume this attitude of anticipation whenever any clue or stimulus +presents itself; whenever the object gives him any excuse for it. Thus +he might call cats little dogs, or horses big dogs. But finding that +other expected traits and modes of behavior are not fulfilled, he is +forced to throw out certain traits from the dog-meaning, while by +contrast (see p. 90) certain other traits are selected and emphasized. +As he further applies the meaning to other dogs, the dog-meaning gets +still further defined and refined. He does not begin with a lot of +ready-made objects from which he extracts a common meaning; he tries to +apply to every new experience whatever from his old experience will help +him understand it, and as this process of constant assumption and +experimentation is fulfilled and refuted by results, his conceptions get +body and clearness. + +[Sidenote: It is general because of its application] + +2. Similarly, conceptions are general because of their use and +application, not because of their ingredients. The view of the origin of +conception in an impossible sort of analysis has as its counterpart the +idea that the conception is made up out of all the like elements that +remain after dissection of a number of individuals. Not so; the moment a +meaning is gained, it is a working tool of further apprehensions, an +instrument of understanding other things. Thereby the meaning is +_extended_ to cover them. Generality resides in application to the +comprehension of new cases, not in constituent parts. A collection of +traits left as the common residuum, the _caput mortuum_, of a million +objects, would be merely a collection, an inventory or aggregate, not a +_general idea_; a striking trait emphasized in any one experience which +then served to help understand some one other experience, would become, +in virtue of that service of application, in so far general. Synthesis +is not a matter of mechanical addition, but of application of something +discovered in one case to bring other cases into line. + + +Sec. 5. _Definition and Organization of Meanings_ + +[Sidenote: Definiteness _versus_ vagueness] + +[Sidenote: In the abstract meaning is intension] + +[Sidenote: In its application it is extension] + +A being that cannot understand at all is at least protected from +_mis_-understandings. But beings that get knowledge by means of +inferring and interpreting, by judging what things signify in relation +to one another, are constantly exposed to the danger of +_mis_-apprehension, _mis_-understanding, _mis_-taking--taking a thing +amiss. A constant source of misunderstanding and mistake is +indefiniteness of meaning. Through vagueness of meaning we +misunderstand other people, things, and ourselves; through its ambiguity +we distort and pervert. Conscious distortion of meaning may be enjoyed +as nonsense; erroneous meanings, if clear-cut, may be followed up and +got rid of. But vague meanings are too gelatinous to offer matter for +analysis, and too pulpy to afford support to other beliefs. They evade +testing and responsibility. Vagueness disguises the unconscious mixing +together of different meanings, and facilitates the substitution of one +meaning for another, and covers up the failure to have any precise +meaning at all. It is the aboriginal logical sin--the source from which +flow most bad intellectual consequences. Totally to eliminate +indefiniteness is impossible; to reduce it in extent and in force +requires sincerity and vigor. To be clear or perspicuous a meaning must +be detached, single, self-contained, homogeneous as it were, throughout. +The technical name for any meaning which is thus individualized is +_intension_. The process of arriving at such units of meaning (and of +stating them when reached) is _definition_. The intension of the terms +_man_, _river_, _seed_, _honesty_, _capital_, _supreme court_, is the +meaning that _exclusively_ and _characteristically_ attaches to those +terms. This meaning is set forth in the definitions of those words. The +test of the distinctness of a meaning is that it shall successfully mark +off a group of things that exemplify the meaning from other groups, +especially of those objects that convey nearly allied meanings. The +river-meaning (or character) must serve to _designate_ the Rhone, the +Rhine, the Mississippi, the Hudson, the Wabash, in spite of their +varieties of place, length, quality of water; and must be such as _not_ +to suggest ocean currents, ponds, or brooks. This use of a meaning to +mark off and group together a variety of distinct existences constitutes +its _extension_. + +[Sidenote: Definition and division] + +As definition sets forth intension, so division (or the reverse process, +classification) expounds extension. Intension and extension, definition +and division, are clearly correlative; in language previously used, +_intension_ is meaning as a principle of identifying particulars; +extension is the group of particulars identified and distinguished. +Meaning, as extension, would be wholly in the air or unreal, did it not +point to some object or group of objects; while objects would be as +isolated and independent intellectually as they seem to be spatially, +were they not bound into groups or classes on the basis of +characteristic meanings which they constantly suggest and exemplify. +Taken together, definition and division put us in possession of +individualized or definite meanings and indicate to what group of +objects meanings refer. They typify the fixation and the organization of +meanings. In the degree in which the meanings of any set of experiences +are so cleared up as to serve as principles for grouping those +experiences in relation to one another, that set of particulars becomes +a science; _i.e._ definition and classification are the marks of a +science, as distinct from both unrelated heaps of miscellaneous +information and from the habits that introduce coherence into our +experience without our being aware of their operation. + +Definitions are of three types, _denotative_, _expository_, +_scientific_. Of these, the first and third are logically important, +while the expository type is socially and pedagogically important as an +intervening step. + +[Sidenote: We define by picking out] + +I. Denotative. A blind man can never have an adequate understanding of +the meaning of _color_ and _red_; a seeing person can acquire the +knowledge only by having certain things designated in such a way as to +fix attention upon some of their qualities. This method of delimiting a +meaning by calling out a certain attitude toward objects may be called +_denotative_ or _indicative_. It is required for all sense +qualities--sounds, tastes, colors--and equally for all emotional and +moral qualities. The meanings of _honesty_, _sympathy_, _hatred_, +_fear_, must be grasped by having them presented in an individual's +first-hand experience. The reaction of educational reformers against +linguistic and bookish training has always taken the form of demanding +recourse to personal experience. However advanced the person is in +knowledge and in scientific training, understanding of a new subject, or +a new aspect of an old subject, must always be through these acts of +experiencing directly the existence or quality in question. + +[Sidenote: and also by combining what is already more definite,] + +2. Expository. Given a certain store of meanings which have been +directly or denotatively marked out, language becomes a resource by +which imaginative combinations and variations may be built up. A color +may be defined to one who has not experienced it as lying between green +and blue; a tiger may be defined (_i.e._ the idea of it made more +definite) by selecting some qualities from known members of the cat +tribe and combining them with qualities of size and weight derived from +other objects. Illustrations are of the nature of expository +definitions; so are the accounts of meanings given in a dictionary. By +taking better-known meanings and associating them,--the attained store +of meanings of the community in which one resides is put at one's +disposal. But in themselves these definitions are secondhand and +conventional; there is danger that instead of inciting one to effort +after personal experiences that will exemplify and verify them, they +will be accepted on authority as _substitutes_. + +[Sidenote: and by discovering method of production] + +3. Scientific. Even popular definitions serve as rules for identifying +and classifying individuals, but the purpose of such identifications and +classifications is mainly practical and social, not intellectual. To +conceive the whale as a fish does not interfere with the success of +whalers, nor does it prevent recognition of a whale when seen, while to +conceive it not as fish but as mammal serves the practical end equally +well, and also furnishes a much more valuable principle for scientific +identification and classification. Popular definitions select certain +fairly obvious traits as keys to classification. Scientific definitions +select _conditions of causation, production, and generation_ as their +characteristic material. The traits used by the popular definition do +not help us to understand why an object has its common meanings and +qualities; they simply state the fact that it does have them. Causal and +genetic definitions fix upon the way an object is constructed as the key +to its being a certain kind of object, and thereby explain why it has +its class or common traits. + +[Sidenote: Contrast of causal and descriptive definitions] + +[Sidenote: Science is the most perfect type of knowledge because it uses +causal definitions] + +If, for example, a layman of considerable practical experience were +asked what he meant or understood by _metal_, he would probably reply in +terms of the qualities useful (_i_) in recognizing any given metal and +(_ii_) in the arts. Smoothness, hardness, glossiness, and brilliancy, +heavy weight for its size, would probably be included in his definition, +because such traits enable us to identify specific things when we see +and touch them; the serviceable properties of capacity for being +hammered and pulled without breaking, of being softened by heat and +hardened by cold, of retaining the shape and form given, of resistance +to pressure and decay, would probably be included--whether or not such +terms as _malleable_ or _fusible_ were used. Now a scientific +conception, instead of using, even with additions, traits of this kind, +determines _meaning on a different basis_. The present definition of +metal is about like this: Metal means any chemical element that enters +into combination with oxygen so as to form a base, _i.e._ a compound +that combines with an acid to form a salt. This scientific definition is +founded, not on directly perceived qualities nor on directly useful +properties, but on the _way in which certain things are causally related +to other things_; _i.e._ it denotes a relation. As chemical concepts +become more and more those of relationships of interaction in +constituting other substances, so physical concepts express more and +more relations of operation: mathematical, as expressing functions of +dependence and order of grouping; biological, relations of +differentiation of descent, effected through adjustment of various +environments; and so on through the sphere of the sciences. In short, +our conceptions attain a maximum of definite individuality and of +generality (or applicability) in the degree to which they show how +things depend upon one another or influence one another, instead of +expressing the qualities that objects possess statically. The ideal of a +system of scientific conceptions is to attain continuity, freedom, and +flexibility of transition in passing from any fact and meaning to any +other; this demand is met in the degree in which we lay hold of the +dynamic ties that hold things together in a continuously changing +process--a principle that states insight into mode of production or +growth. + + + + +CHAPTER TEN + +CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT THINKING + + +[Sidenote: False notions of concrete and abstract] + +The maxim enjoined upon teachers, "to proceed from the concrete to the +abstract," is perhaps familiar rather than comprehended. Few who read +and hear it gain a clear conception of the starting-point, the concrete; +of the nature of the goal, the abstract; and of the exact nature of the +path to be traversed in going from one to the other. At times the +injunction is positively misunderstood, being taken to mean that +education should advance from things to thought--as if any dealing with +things in which thinking is not involved could possibly be educative. So +understood, the maxim encourages mechanical routine or sensuous +excitation at one end of the educational scale--the lower--and academic +and unapplied learning at the upper end. + +Actually, all dealing with things, even the child's, is immersed in +inferences; things are clothed by the suggestions they arouse, and are +significant as challenges to interpretation or as evidences to +substantiate a belief. Nothing could be more unnatural than instruction +in things without thought; in sense-perceptions without judgments based +upon them. And if the abstract to which we are to proceed denotes +thought apart from things, the goal recommended is formal and empty, +for effective thought always refers, more or less directly, to things. + +[Sidenote: Direct and indirect understanding again] + +Yet the maxim has a meaning which, understood and supplemented, states +the line of development of logical capacity. What is this signification? +Concrete denotes a meaning definitely marked off from other meanings so +that it is readily apprehended by itself. When we hear the words, +_table_, _chair_, _stove_, _coat_, we do not have to reflect in order to +grasp what is meant. The terms convey meaning so directly that no effort +at translating is needed. The meanings of some terms and things, +however, are grasped only by first calling to mind more familiar things +and then tracing out connections between them and what we do not +understand. Roughly speaking, the former kind of meanings is concrete; +the latter abstract. + +[Sidenote: What is familiar is mentally concrete] + +To one who is thoroughly at home in physics and chemistry, the notions +of _atom_ and _molecule_ are fairly concrete. They are constantly used +without involving any labor of thought in apprehending what they mean. +But the layman and the beginner in science have first to remind +themselves of things with which they already are well acquainted, and go +through a process of slow translation; the terms _atom_ and _molecule_ +losing, moreover, their hard-won meaning only too easily if familiar +things, and the line of transition from them to the strange, drop out of +mind. The same difference is illustrated by any technical terms: +_coefficient_ and _exponent_ in algebra, _triangle_ and _square_ in +their geometric as distinct from their popular meanings; _capital_ and +_value_ as used in political economy, and so on. + +[Sidenote: Practical things are familiar] + +The difference as noted is purely relative to the intellectual progress +of an individual; what is abstract at one period of growth is concrete +at another; or even the contrary, as one finds that things supposed to +be thoroughly familiar involve strange factors and unsolved problems. +There is, nevertheless, a general line of cleavage which, deciding upon +the whole what things fall within the limits of familiar acquaintance +and what without, marks off the concrete and the abstract in a more +permanent way. _These limits are fixed mainly by the demands of +practical life._ Things such as sticks and stones, meat and potatoes, +houses and trees, are such constant features of the environment of which +we have to take account in order to live, that their important meanings +are soon learnt, and indissolubly associated with objects. We are +acquainted with a thing (or it is familiar to us) when we have so much +to do with it that its strange and unexpected corners are rubbed off. +The necessities of social intercourse convey to adults a like +concreteness upon such terms as _taxes_, _elections_, _wages_, _the +law_, and so on. Things the meaning of which I personally do not take in +directly, appliances of cook, carpenter, or weaver, for example, are +nevertheless unhesitatingly classed as concrete, since they are so +directly connected with our common social life. + +[Sidenote: The theoretical, or strictly intellectual, is abstract] + +By contrast, the abstract is the _theoretical_, or that not intimately +associated with practical concerns. The abstract thinker (the man of +pure science as he is sometimes called) deliberately abstracts from +application in life; that is, he leaves practical uses out of account. +This, however, is a merely negative statement. What remains when +connections with use and application are excluded? _Evidently only what +has to do with knowing considered as an end in itself._ Many notions of +science are abstract, not only because they cannot be understood +without a long apprenticeship in the science (which is equally true of +technical matters in the arts), but also because the whole content of +their meaning has been framed for the sole purpose of facilitating +further knowledge, inquiry, and speculation. _When thinking is used as a +means to some end, good, or value beyond itself, it is concrete; when it +is employed simply as a means to more thinking, it is abstract._ To a +theorist an idea is adequate and self-contained just because it engages +and rewards thought; to a medical practitioner, an engineer, an artist, +a merchant, a politician, it is complete only when employed in the +furthering of some interest in life--health, wealth, beauty, goodness, +success, or what you will. + +[Sidenote: Contempt for theory] + +For the great majority of men under ordinary circumstances, the +practical exigencies of life are almost, if not quite, coercive. Their +main business is the proper conduct of their affairs. Whatever is of +significance only as affording scope for thinking is pallid and +remote--almost artificial. Hence the contempt felt by the practical and +successful executive for the "mere theorist"; hence his conviction that +certain things may be all very well in theory, but that they will not do +in practice; in general, the depreciatory way in which he uses the terms +_abstract_, _theoretical_, and _intellectual_--as distinct from +_intelligent_. + +[Sidenote: But theory is highly practical] + +This attitude is justified, of course, under certain conditions. But +depreciation of theory does not contain the whole truth, as common or +practical sense recognizes. There is such a thing, even from the +common-sense standpoint, as being "too practical," as being so intent +upon the immediately practical as not to see beyond the end of one's +nose or as to cut off the limb upon which one is sitting. The question +is one of limits, of degrees and adjustments, rather than one of +absolute separation. Truly practical men give their minds free play +about a subject without asking too closely at every point for the +advantage to be gained; exclusive preoccupation with matters of use and +application so narrows the horizon as in the long run to defeat itself. +It does not pay to tether one's thoughts to the post of use with too +short a rope. Power in action requires some largeness and +imaginativeness of vision. Men must at least have enough interest in +thinking for the sake of thinking to escape the limits of routine and +custom. Interest in knowledge for the sake of knowledge, in thinking for +the sake of the free play of thought, is necessary then to the +_emancipation_ of practical life--to make it rich and progressive. + +We may now recur to the pedagogic maxim of going from the concrete to +the abstract. + +[Sidenote: Begin with the concrete means begin with practical +manipulations] + +1. Since the _concrete_ denotes thinking applied to activities for the +sake of dealing effectively with the difficulties that present +themselves practically, "beginning with the concrete" signifies that we +should at the outset make much of _doing_; especially, make much in +occupations that are not of a routine and mechanical kind and hence +require intelligent selection and adaptation of means and materials. We +do not "follow the order of nature" when we multiply mere sensations or +accumulate physical objects. Instruction in number is not concrete +merely because splints or beans or dots are employed, while whenever the +use and bearing of number relations are clearly perceived, the number +idea is concrete even if figures alone are used. Just what sort of +symbol it is best to use at a given time--whether blocks, or lines, or +figures--is entirely a matter of adjustment to the given case. If +physical things used in teaching number or geography or anything else do +not leave the mind illuminated with recognition of a _meaning_ beyond +themselves, the instruction that uses them is as abstract as that which +doles out ready-made definitions and rules; for it distracts attention +from ideas to mere physical excitations. + +[Sidenote: Confusion of the concrete with the sensibly isolated] + +The conception that we have only to put before the senses particular +physical objects in order to impress certain ideas upon the mind amounts +almost to a superstition. The introduction of object lessons and +sense-training scored a distinct advance over the prior method of +linguistic symbols, and this advance tended to blind educators to the +fact that only a halfway step had been taken. Things and sensations +develop the child, indeed, but only because he _uses_ them in mastering +his body and in the scheme of his activities. Appropriate continuous +occupations or activities involve the use of natural materials, tools, +modes of energy, and do it in a way that compels thinking as to what +they mean, how they are related to one another and to the realization of +ends; while the mere isolated presentation of things remains barren and +dead. A few generations ago the great obstacle in the way of reform of +primary education was belief in the almost magical efficacy of the +symbols of language (including number) to produce mental training; at +present, belief in the efficacy of objects just as objects, blocks the +way. As frequently happens, the better is an enemy of the best. + +[Sidenote: Transfer of interest to intellectual matters] + +2. The interest in results, in the successful carrying on of an +activity, should be gradually transferred to study of objects--their +properties, consequences, structures, causes, and effects. The adult +when at work in his life calling is rarely free to devote time or +energy--beyond the necessities of his immediate action--to the study of +what he deals with. (_Ante_, p. 43.) The educative activities of +childhood should be so arranged that direct interest in the activity and +its outcome create a demand for attention to matters that have a more +and more _indirect and remote_ connection with the original activity. +The direct interest in carpentering or shop work should yield +organically and gradually an interest in geometric and mechanical +problems. The interest in cooking should grow into an interest in +chemical experimentation and in the physiology and hygiene of bodily +growth. The making of pictures should pass to an interest in the +technique of representation and the aesthetics of appreciation, and so +on. This development is what the term _go_ signifies in the maxim "_go_ +from the concrete to the abstract"; it represents the dynamic and truly +educative factor of the process. + +[Sidenote: Development of delight in the activity of thinking] + +3. The outcome, the _abstract_ to which education is to proceed, is an +interest in intellectual matters for their own sake, a delight in +thinking for the sake of thinking. It is an old story that acts and +processes which at the outset are incidental to something else develop +and maintain an absorbing value of their own. So it is with thinking and +with knowledge; at first incidental to results and adjustments beyond +themselves, they attract more and more attention to themselves till they +become ends, not means. Children engage, unconstrainedly and +continually, in reflective inspection and testing for the sake of what +they are interested in doing successfully. Habits of thinking thus +generated may increase in volume and extent till they become of +importance on their own account. + +[Sidenote: Examples of the transition] + +The three instances cited in Chapter Six represented an ascending cycle +from the practical to the theoretical. Taking thought to keep a personal +engagement is obviously of the concrete kind. Endeavoring to work out +the meaning of a certain part of a boat is an instance of an +intermediate kind. The reason for the existence and position of the pole +is a practical reason, so that to the architect the problem was purely +concrete--the maintenance of a certain system of action. But for the +passenger on the boat, the problem was theoretical, more or less +speculative. It made no difference to his reaching his destination +whether he worked out the meaning of the pole. The third case, that of +the appearance and movement of the bubbles, illustrates a strictly +theoretical or abstract case. No overcoming of physical obstacles, no +adjustment of external means to ends, is at stake. Curiosity, +intellectual curiosity, is challenged by a seemingly anomalous +occurrence; and thinking tries simply to account for an apparent +exception in terms of recognized principles. + +[Sidenote: Theoretical knowledge never the whole end] + +(_i_) Abstract thinking, it should be noted, represents _an_ end, not +_the_ end. The power of sustained thinking on matters remote from direct +use is an outgrowth of practical and immediate modes of thought, but not +a substitute for them. The educational end is not the destruction of +power to think so as to surmount obstacles and adjust means and ends; it +is not its replacement by abstract reflection. Nor is theoretical +thinking a higher type of thinking than practical. A person who has at +command both types of thinking is of a higher order than he who +possesses only one. Methods that in developing abstract intellectual +abilities weaken habits of practical or concrete thinking, fall as much +short of the educational ideal as do the methods that in cultivating +ability to plan, to invent, to arrange, to forecast, fail to secure some +delight in thinking irrespective of practical consequences. + +[Sidenote: Nor that most congenial to the majority of pupils] + +(_ii_) Educators should also note the very great individual differences +that exist; they should not try to force one pattern and model upon all. +In many (probably the majority) the executive tendency, the habit of +mind that thinks for purposes of conduct and achievement, not for the +sake of knowing, remains dominant to the end. Engineers, lawyers, +doctors, merchants, are much more numerous in adult life than scholars, +scientists, and philosophers. While education should strive to make men +who, however prominent their professional interests and aims, partake of +the spirit of the scholar, philosopher, and scientist, no good reason +appears why education should esteem the one mental habit inherently +superior to the other, and deliberately try to transform the type from +practical to theoretical. Have not our schools (as already suggested, p. +49) been one-sidedly devoted to the more abstract type of thinking, thus +doing injustice to the majority of pupils? Has not the idea of a +"liberal" and "humane" education tended too often in practice to the +production of technical, because overspecialized, thinkers? + +[Sidenote: Aim of education is a working balance] + +The aim of education should be to secure a balanced interaction of the +two types of mental attitude, having sufficient regard to the +disposition of the individual not to hamper and cripple whatever powers +are naturally strong in him. The narrowness of individuals of strong +concrete bent needs to be liberalized. Every opportunity that occurs +within their practical activities for developing curiosity and +susceptibility to intellectual problems should be seized. Violence is +not done to natural disposition, but the latter is broadened. As regards +the smaller number of those who have a taste for abstract, purely +intellectual topics, pains should be taken to multiply opportunities and +demands for the application of ideas; for translating symbolic truths +into terms of social life and its ends. Every human being has both +capabilities, and every individual will be more effective and happier if +both powers are developed in easy and close interaction with each +other. + + + + +CHAPTER ELEVEN + +EMPIRICAL AND SCIENTIFIC THINKING + + +Sec. 1. _Empirical Thinking_ + +[Sidenote: Empirical thinking depends on past habits] + +Apart from the development of scientific method, inferences depend upon +habits that have been built up under the influence of a number of +particular experiences not themselves arranged for logical purposes. A +says, "It will probably rain to-morrow." B asks, "Why do you think so?" +and A replies, "Because the sky was lowering at sunset." When B asks, +"What has that to do with it?" A responds, "I do not know, but it +generally does rain after such a sunset." He does not perceive any +_connection_ between the appearance of the sky and coming rain; he is +not aware of any continuity in the facts themselves--any law or +principle, as we usually say. He simply, from frequently recurring +conjunctions of the events, has associated them so that when he sees one +he thinks of the other. One _suggests_ the other, or is _associated_ +with it. A man may believe it will rain to-morrow because he has +consulted the barometer; but if he has no conception how the height of +the mercury column (or the position of an index moved by its rise and +fall) is connected with variations of atmospheric pressure, and how +these in turn are connected with the amount of moisture in the air, his +belief in the likelihood of rain is purely empirical. When men lived in +the open and got their living by hunting, fishing, or pasturing flocks, +the detection of the signs and indications of weather changes was a +matter of great importance. A body of proverbs and maxims, forming an +extensive section of traditionary folklore, was developed. But as long +as there was no understanding _why_ or _how_ certain events were signs, +as long as foresight and weather shrewdness rested simply upon repeated +conjunction among facts, beliefs about the weather were thoroughly +empirical. + +[Sidenote: It is fairly adequate in some matters,] + +In similar fashion learned men in the Orient learned to predict, with +considerable accuracy, the recurrent positions of the planets, the sun +and the moon, and to foretell the time of eclipses, without +understanding in any degree the laws of the movements of heavenly +bodies--that is, without having a notion of the continuities existing +among the facts themselves. They had learned from repeated observations +that things happened in about such and such a fashion. Till a +comparatively recent time, the truths of medicine were mainly in the +same condition. Experience had shown that "upon the whole," "as a rule," +"generally or usually speaking," certain results followed certain +remedies, when symptoms were given. Our beliefs about human nature in +individuals (psychology) and in masses (sociology) are still very +largely of a purely empirical sort. Even the science of geometry, now +frequently reckoned a typical rational science, began, among the +Egyptians, as an accumulation of recorded observations about methods of +approximate mensuration of land surfaces; and only gradually assumed, +among the Greeks, scientific form. + +The _disadvantages_ of purely empirical thinking are obvious. + +[Sidenote: but is very apt to lead to false beliefs,] + +1. While many empirical conclusions are, roughly speaking, correct; +while they are exact enough to be of great help in practical life; while +the presages of a weatherwise sailor or hunter may be more accurate, +within a certain restricted range, than those of a scientist who relies +wholly upon scientific observations and tests; while, indeed, empirical +observations and records furnish the raw or crude material of scientific +knowledge, yet the empirical method affords no way of discriminating +between right and wrong conclusions. Hence it is responsible for a +multitude of _false_ beliefs. The technical designation for one of the +commonest fallacies is _post hoc, ergo propter hoc_; the belief that +because one thing comes _after_ another, it comes _because_ of the +other. Now this fallacy of method is the animating principle of +empirical conclusions, even when correct--the correctness being almost +as much a matter of good luck as of method. That potatoes should be +planted only during the crescent moon, that near the sea people are born +at high tide and die at low tide, that a comet is an omen of danger, +that bad luck follows the cracking of a mirror, that a patent medicine +cures a disease--these and a thousand like notions are asseverated on +the basis of empirical coincidence and conjunction. Moreover, habits of +expectation and belief are formed otherwise than by a number of repeated +similar cases. + +[Sidenote: and does not enable us to cope with the novel,] + +2. The more numerous the experienced instances and the closer the watch +kept upon them, the greater is the trustworthiness of constant +conjunction as evidence of connection among the things themselves. Many +of our most important beliefs still have only this sort of warrant. No +one can yet tell, with certainty, the necessary cause of old age or of +death--which are empirically the most certain of all expectations. But +even the most reliable beliefs of this type fail when they confront the +_novel_. Since they rest upon past uniformities, they are useless when +further experience departs in any considerable measure from ancient +incident and wonted precedent. Empirical inference follows the grooves +and ruts that custom wears, and has no track to follow when the groove +disappears. So important is this aspect of the matter that Clifford +found the difference between ordinary skill and scientific thought right +here. "Skill enables a man to deal with the same circumstances that he +has met before, scientific thought enables him to deal with different +circumstances that he has never met before." And he goes so far as to +define scientific thinking as "the application of old experience to new +circumstances." + +[Sidenote: and leads to laziness and presumption,] + +3. We have not yet made the acquaintance of the most harmful feature of +the empirical method. Mental inertia, laziness, unjustifiable +conservatism, are its probable accompaniments. Its general effect upon +mental attitude is more serious than even the specific wrong conclusions +in which it has landed. Wherever the chief dependence in forming +inferences is upon the conjunctions observed in past experience, +failures to agree with the usual order are slurred over, cases of +successful confirmation are exaggerated. Since the mind naturally +demands some principle of continuity, some connecting link between +separate facts and causes, forces are arbitrarily invented for that +purpose. Fantastic and mythological explanations are resorted to in +order to supply missing links. The pump brings water because nature +abhors a vacuum; opium makes men sleep because it has a dormitive +potency; we recollect a past event because we have a faculty of memory. +In the history of the progress of human knowledge, out and out myths +accompany the first stage of empiricism; while "hidden essences" and +"occult forces" mark its second stage. By their very nature, these +"causes" escape observation, so that their explanatory value can be +neither confirmed nor refuted by further observation or experience. +Hence belief in them becomes purely traditionary. They give rise to +doctrines which, inculcated and handed down, become dogmas; subsequent +inquiry and reflection are actually stifled. (_Ante_, p. 23.) + +[Sidenote: and to dogmatism] + +Certain men or classes of men come to be the accepted guardians and +transmitters--instructors--of established doctrines. To question the +beliefs is to question their authority; to accept the beliefs is +evidence of loyalty to the powers that be, a proof of good citizenship. +Passivity, docility, acquiescence, come to be primal intellectual +virtues. Facts and events presenting novelty and variety are slighted, +or are sheared down till they fit into the Procrustean bed of habitual +belief. Inquiry and doubt are silenced by citation of ancient laws or a +multitude of miscellaneous and unsifted cases. This attitude of mind +generates dislike of change, and the resulting aversion to novelty is +fatal to progress. What will not fit into the established canons is +outlawed; men who make new discoveries are objects of suspicion and even +of persecution. Beliefs that perhaps originally were the products of +fairly extensive and careful observation are stereotyped into fixed +traditions and semi-sacred dogmas accepted simply upon authority, and +are mixed with fantastic conceptions that happen to have won the +acceptance of authorities. + + +Sec. 2. _Scientific Method_ + +[Sidenote: Scientific thinking analyzes the present case] + +In contrast with the empirical method stands the scientific. Scientific +method replaces the repeated conjunction or coincidence of separate +facts by discovery of a single comprehensive fact, effecting this +replacement by _breaking up the coarse or gross facts of observation +into a number of minuter processes not directly accessible to +perception_. + +[Sidenote: Illustration from _suction_ of empirical method,] + +If a layman were asked why water rises from the cistern when an ordinary +pump is worked, he would doubtless answer, "By suction." Suction is +regarded as a force like heat or pressure. If such a person is +confronted by the fact that water rises with a suction pump only about +thirty-three feet, he easily disposes of the difficulty on the ground +that all forces vary in their intensities and finally reach a limit at +which they cease to operate. The variation with elevation above the sea +level of the height to which water can be pumped is either unnoticed, +or, if noted, is dismissed as one of the curious anomalies in which +nature abounds. + +[Sidenote: of scientific method] + +[Sidenote: Relies on differences,] + +Now the scientist advances by assuming that what seems to observation to +be a single total fact is in truth complex. He attempts, therefore, to +break up the single fact of water-rising-in-the-pipe into a number of +lesser facts. His method of proceeding is by _varying conditions one by +one_ so far as possible, and noting just what happens when a given +condition is eliminated. There are two methods for varying +conditions.[24] The first is an extension of the empirical method of +observation. It consists in comparing very carefully the results of a +great number of observations which have occurred under accidentally +_different_ conditions. The difference in the rise of the water at +different heights above the sea level, and its total cessation when the +distance to be lifted is, even at sea level, more than thirty-three +feet, are emphasized, instead of being slurred over. The purpose is to +find out what _special conditions_ are present when the effect occurs +and absent when it fails to occur. These special conditions are then +substituted for the gross fact, or regarded as its principle--the key to +understanding it. + + [24] The next two paragraphs repeat, for purposes of the present + discussion, what we have already noted in a different context. See + p. 88 and p. 99. + +[Sidenote: and creates differences] + +The method of analysis by comparing cases is, however, badly +handicapped; it can do nothing until it is presented with a certain +number of diversified cases. And even when different cases are at hand, +it will be questionable whether they vary in just these respects in +which it is important that they should vary in order to throw light upon +the question at issue. The method is passive and dependent upon external +accidents. Hence the superiority of the active or experimental method. +Even a small number of observations may suggest an explanation--a +hypothesis or theory. Working upon this suggestion, the scientist may +then _intentionally_ vary conditions and note what happens. If the +empirical observations have suggested to him the possibility of a +connection between air pressure on the water and the rising of the water +in the tube where air pressure is absent, he deliberately empties the +air out of the vessel in which the water is contained and notes that +suction no longer works; or he intentionally increases atmospheric +pressure on the water and notes the result. He institutes experiments to +calculate the weight of air at the sea level and at various levels +above, and compares the results of reasoning based upon the pressure of +air of these various weights upon a certain volume of water with the +results actually obtained by observation. _Observations formed by +variation of conditions on the basis of some idea or theory constitute +experiment._ Experiment is the chief resource in scientific reasoning +because it facilitates the picking out of significant elements in a +gross, vague whole. + +[Sidenote: Analysis and synthesis again] + +Experimental thinking, or scientific reasoning, is thus a conjoint +process of _analysis and synthesis_, or, in less technical language, of +discrimination and assimilation or identification. The gross fact of +water rising when the suction valve is worked is resolved or +discriminated into a number of independent variables, some of which had +never before been observed or even thought of in connection with the +fact. One of these facts, the weight of the atmosphere, is then +selectively seized upon as the key to the entire phenomenon. This +disentangling constitutes _analysis_. But atmosphere and its pressure or +weight is a fact not confined to this single instance. It is a fact +familiar or at least discoverable as operative in a great number of +other events. In fixing upon this imperceptible and minute fact as the +essence or key to the elevation of water by the pump, the pump-fact has +thus been assimilated to a whole group of ordinary facts from which it +was previously isolated. This assimilation constitutes _synthesis_. +Moreover, the fact of atmospheric pressure is itself a case of one of +the commonest of all facts--weight or gravitational force. Conclusions +that apply to the common fact of weight are thus transferable to the +consideration and interpretation of the _relatively_ rare and +exceptional case of the suction of water. The suction pump is seen to be +a case of the same kind or sort as the siphon, the barometer, the +rising of the balloon, and a multitude of other things with which at +first sight it has no connection at all. This is another instance of the +synthetic or assimilative phase of scientific thinking. + +If we revert to the advantages of scientific over empirical thinking, we +find that we now have the clue to them. + +[Sidenote: Lessened liability to error] + +(_a_) The increased security, the added factor of certainty or proof, is +due to the substitution of the _detailed and specific fact_ of +atmospheric pressure for the gross and total and relatively +miscellaneous fact of suction. The latter is complex, and its complexity +is due to many unknown and unspecified factors; hence, any statement +about it is more or less random, and likely to be defeated by any +unforeseen variation of circumstances. _Comparatively_, at least, the +minute and detailed fact of air pressure is a measurable and definite +fact--one that can be picked out and managed with assurance. + +[Sidenote: Ability to manage the new] + +(_b_) As analysis accounts for the added certainty, so synthesis +accounts for ability to cope with the novel and variable. Weight is a +much commoner fact than atmospheric weight, and this in turn is a much +commoner fact than the workings of the suction pump. To be able to +substitute the common and frequent fact for that which is relatively +rare and peculiar is to reduce the seemingly novel and exceptional to +cases of a general and familiar principle, and thus to bring them under +control for interpretation and prediction. + +As Professor James says: "Think of heat as motion and whatever is true +of motion will be true of heat; but we have a hundred experiences of +motion for every one of heat. Think of rays passing through this lens as +cases of bending toward the perpendicular, and you substitute for the +comparatively unfamiliar lens the very familiar notion of a particular +change in direction of a line, of which notion every day brings us +countless examples."[25] + + [25] _Psychology_, vol. II. p. 342. + +[Sidenote: Interest in the future or in progress] + +(_c_) The change of attitude from conservative reliance upon the past, +upon routine and custom, to faith in progress through the intelligent +regulation of existing conditions, is, of course, the reflex of the +scientific method of experimentation. The empirical method inevitably +magnifies the influences of the past; the experimental method throws +into relief the possibilities of the future. The empirical method says, +"_Wait_ till there is a sufficient number of cases;" the experimental +method says, "_Produce_ the cases." The former depends upon nature's +accidentally happening to present us with certain conjunctions of +circumstances; the latter deliberately and intentionally endeavors to +bring about the conjunction. By this method the notion of progress +secures scientific warrant. + +[Sidenote: Physical _versus_ logical force] + +Ordinary experience is controlled largely by the direct strength and +intensity of various occurrences. What is bright, sudden, loud, secures +notice and is given a conspicuous rating. What is dim, feeble, and +continuous gets ignored, or is regarded as of slight importance. +Customary experience tends to the control of thinking by considerations +of _direct and immediate strength_ rather than by those of importance in +the long run. Animals without the power of forecast and planning must, +upon the whole, respond to the stimuli that are most urgent at the +moment, or cease to exist. These stimuli lose nothing of their direct +urgency and clamorous insistency when the thinking power develops; and +yet thinking demands the subordination of the immediate stimulus to the +remote and distant. The feeble and the minute may be of much greater +importance than the glaring and the big. The latter may be signs of a +force that is already exhausting itself; the former may indicate the +beginnings of a process in which the whole fortune of the individual is +involved. The prime necessity for scientific thought is that the thinker +be freed from the tyranny of sense stimuli and habit, and this +emancipation is also the necessary condition of progress. + +[Sidenote: Illustration from moving water] + +Consider the following quotation: "When it first occurred to a +reflecting mind that moving water had a property identical with human or +brute force, namely, the property of setting other masses in motion, +overcoming inertia and resistance,--when the sight of the stream +suggested through this point of likeness the power of the animal,--a new +addition was made to the class of prime movers, and when circumstances +permitted, this power could become a substitute for the others. It may +seem to the modern understanding, familiar with water wheels and +drifting rafts, that the similarity here was an extremely obvious one. +But if we put ourselves back into an early state of mind, when running +water affected the mind _by its brilliancy, its roar and irregular +devastation_, we may easily suppose that to identify this with animal +muscular energy was by no means an obvious effort."[26] + + [26] Bain, _The Senses and Intellect_, third American ed., 1879, p. + 492 (italics not in original). + +[Sidenote: Value of abstraction] + +If we add to these obvious sensory features the various social customs +and expectations which fix the attitude of the individual, the evil of +the subjection of free and fertile suggestion to empirical +considerations becomes clear. A certain power of _abstraction_, of +deliberate turning away from the habitual responses to a situation, was +required before men could be emancipated to follow up suggestions that +in the end are fruitful. + +[Sidenote: Experience as inclusive of thought] + +In short, the term _experience_ may be interpreted either with reference +to the _empirical_ or the _experimental_ attitude of mind. Experience is +not a rigid and closed thing; it is vital, and hence growing. When +dominated by the past, by custom and routine, it is often opposed to the +reasonable, the thoughtful. But experience also includes the reflection +that sets us free from the limiting influence of sense, appetite, and +tradition. Experience may welcome and assimilate all that the most exact +and penetrating thought discovers. Indeed, the business of education +might be defined as just such an emancipation and enlargement of +experience. Education takes the individual while he is relatively +plastic, before he has become so indurated by isolated experiences as to +be rendered hopelessly empirical in his habit of mind. The attitude of +childhood is naive, wondering, experimental; the world of man and nature +is new. Right methods of education preserve and perfect this attitude, +and thereby short-circuit for the individual the slow progress of the +race, eliminating the waste that comes from inert routine. + + + + +PART THREE: THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT + + + + +CHAPTER TWELVE + +ACTIVITY AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT + + +In this chapter we shall gather together and amplify considerations that +have already been advanced, in various passages of the preceding pages, +concerning the relation of _action to thought_. We shall follow, though +not with exactness, the order of development in the unfolding human +being. + + +Sec. 1. _The Early Stage of Activity_ + +[Sidenote: 1. The baby's problem determines his thinking] + +The sight of a baby often calls out the question: "What do you suppose +he is thinking about?" By the nature of the case, the question is +unanswerable in detail; but, also by the nature of the case, we may be +sure about a baby's chief interest. His primary problem is mastery of +his body as a tool of securing comfortable and effective adjustments to +his surroundings, physical and social. The child has to learn to do +almost everything: to see, to hear, to reach, to handle, to balance the +body, to creep, to walk, and so on. Even if it be true that human beings +have even more instinctive reactions than lower animals, it is also true +that instinctive tendencies are much less perfect in men, and that most +of them are of little use till they are intelligently combined and +directed. A little chick just out of the shell will after a few trials +peck at and grasp grains of food with its beak as well as at any later +time. This involves a complicated cooerdination of the eye and the head. +An infant does not even begin to reach definitely for things that the +eye sees till he is several months old, and even then several weeks' +practice is required before he learns the adjustment so as neither to +overreach nor to underreach. It may not be literally true that the child +will grasp for the moon, but it is true that he needs much practice +before he can tell whether an object is within reach or not. The arm is +thrust out instinctively in response to a stimulus from the eye, and +this tendency is the origin of the ability to reach and grasp exactly +and quickly; but nevertheless final mastery requires observing and +selecting the successful movements, and arranging them in view of an +end. _These operations of conscious selection and arrangement constitute +thinking_, though of a rudimentary type. + +[Sidenote: Mastery of the body is an intellectual problem] + +Since mastery of the bodily organs is necessary for all later +developments, such problems are both interesting and important, and +solving them supplies a very genuine training of thinking power. The joy +the child shows in learning to use his limbs, to translate what he sees +into what he handles, to connect sounds with sights, sights with taste +and touch, and the rapidity with which intelligence grows in the first +year and a half of life (the time during which the more fundamental +problems of the use of the organism are mastered), are sufficient +evidence that the development of physical control is not a physical but +an intellectual achievement. + +[Sidenote: 2. The problem of social adjustment and intercourse] + +Although in the early months the child is mainly occupied in learning +to use his body to accommodate himself to physical conditions in a +comfortable way and to use things skillfully and effectively, yet social +adjustments are very important. In connection with parents, nurse, +brother, and sister, the child learns the signs of satisfaction of +hunger, of removal of discomfort, of the approach of agreeable light, +color, sound, and so on. His contact with physical things is regulated +by persons, and he soon distinguishes persons as the most important and +interesting of all the objects with which he has to do. Speech, the +accurate adaptation of sounds heard to the movements of tongue and lips, +is, however, the great instrument of social adaptation; and with the +development of speech (usually in the second year) adaptation of the +baby's activities to and with those of other persons gives the keynote +of mental life. His range of possible activities is indefinitely widened +as he watches what other persons do, and as he tries to understand and +to do what they encourage him to attempt. The outline pattern of mental +life is thus set in the first four or five years. Years, centuries, +generations of invention and planning, may have gone to the development +of the performances and occupations of the adults surrounding the child. +Yet for him their activities are direct stimuli; they are part of his +natural environment; they are carried on in physical terms that appeal +to his eye, ear, and touch. He cannot, of course, appropriate their +meaning directly through his senses; but they furnish stimuli to which +he responds, so that his attention is focussed upon a higher order of +materials and of problems. Were it not for this process by which the +achievements of one generation form the stimuli that direct the +activities of the next, the story of civilization would be writ in +water, and each generation would have laboriously to make for itself, if +it could, its way out of savagery. + +[Sidenote: Social adjustment results in imitation but is not caused by +it] + +Imitation is one (though only one, see p. 47) of the means by which the +activities of adults supply stimuli which are so interesting, so varied, +so complex, and so novel, as to occasion a rapid progress of thought. +Mere imitation, however, would not give rise to thinking; if we could +learn like parrots by simply copying the outward acts of others, we +should never have to think; nor should we know, after we had mastered +the copied act, what was the meaning of the thing we had done. Educators +(and psychologists) have often assumed that acts which reproduce the +behavior of others are acquired merely by imitation. But a child rarely +learns by conscious imitation; and to say that his imitation is +unconscious is to say that it is not from his standpoint imitation at +all. The word, the gesture, the act, the occupation of another, falls in +line with _some impulse already active_ and suggests some satisfactory +mode of expression, some end in which it may find fulfillment. Having +this end of his own, the child then notes other persons, as he notes +natural events, to get further suggestions as to means of its +realization. He selects some of the means he observes, tries them on, +finds them successful or unsuccessful, is confirmed or weakened in his +belief in their value, and so continues selecting, arranging, adapting, +testing, till he can accomplish what he wishes. The onlooker may then +observe the resemblance of this act to some act of an adult, and +conclude that it was acquired by imitation, while as a matter of fact it +was acquired by attention, observation, selection, experimentation, and +confirmation by results. Only because this method is employed is there +intellectual discipline and an educative result. The presence of adult +activities plays an enormous role in the intellectual growth of the +child because they add to the natural stimuli of the world new stimuli +which are more exactly adapted to the needs of a human being, which are +richer, better organized, more complex in range, permitting more +flexible adaptations, and calling out novel reactions. But in utilizing +these stimuli the child follows the same methods that he uses when he is +forced to think in order to master his body. + + +Sec. 2. _Play, Work, and Allied Forms of Activity_ + +[Sidenote: Play indicates the domination of activity by meanings or +ideas] + +[Sidenote: Organization of ideas involved in play] + +When things become signs, when they gain a representative capacity as +standing for other things, play is transformed from mere physical +exuberance into an activity involving a mental factor. A little girl who +had broken her doll was seen to perform with the leg of the doll all the +operations of washing, putting to bed, and fondling, that she had been +accustomed to perform with the entire doll. The part stood for the +whole; she reacted not to the stimulus sensibly present, but to the +meaning suggested by the sense object. So children use a stone for a +table, leaves for plates, acorns for cups. So they use their dolls, +their trains, their blocks, their other toys. In manipulating them, they +are living not with the physical things, but in the large world of +meanings, natural and social, evoked by these things. So when children +play horse, play store, play house or making calls, they are +subordinating the physically present to the ideally signified. In this +way, a world of meanings, a store of concepts (so fundamental to all +intellectual achievement), is defined and built up. Moreover, not only +do meanings thus become familiar acquaintances, but they are organized, +arranged in groups, made to cohere in connected ways. A play and a story +blend insensibly into each other. The most fanciful plays of children +rarely lose all touch with the mutual fitness and pertinency of various +meanings to one another; the "freest" plays observe some principles of +coherence and unification. They have a beginning, middle, and end. In +games, rules of order run through various minor acts and bind them into +a connected whole. The rhythm, the competition, and cooeperation involved +in most plays and games also introduce organization. There is, then, +nothing mysterious or mystical in the discovery made by Plato and remade +by Froebel that play is the chief, almost the only, mode of education +for the child in the years of later infancy. + +[Sidenote: The playful attitude] + +_Playfulness_ is a more important consideration than play. The former is +an attitude of mind; the latter is a passing outward manifestation of +this attitude. When things are treated simply as vehicles of suggestion, +what is suggested overrides the thing. Hence the playful attitude is one +of freedom. The person is not bound to the physical traits of things, +nor does he care whether a thing really means (as we say) what he takes +it to represent. When the child plays horse with a broom and cars with +chairs, the fact that the broom does not really represent a horse, or a +chair a locomotive, is of no account. In order, then, that playfulness +may not terminate in arbitrary fancifulness and in building up an +imaginary world alongside the world of actual things, it is necessary +that the play attitude should gradually pass into a work attitude. + +[Sidenote: The work attitude is interested in means and ends] + +What is work--work not as mere external performance, but as attitude of +mind? It signifies that the person is not content longer to accept and +to act upon the meanings that things suggest, but demands congruity of +meaning with the things themselves. In the natural course of growth, +children come to find irresponsible make-believe plays inadequate. A +fiction is too easy a way out to afford content. There is not enough +stimulus to call forth satisfactory mental response. When this point is +reached, the ideas that things suggest must be applied to the things +with some regard to fitness. A small cart, resembling a "real" cart, +with "real" wheels, tongue, and body, meets the mental demand better +than merely making believe that anything which comes to hand is a cart. +Occasionally to take part in setting a "real" table with "real" dishes +brings more reward than forever to make believe a flat stone is a table +and that leaves are dishes. The interest may still center in the +meanings, the things may be of importance only as amplifying a certain +meaning. So far the attitude is one of play. But the meaning is now of +such a character that it must find appropriate embodiment in actual +things. + +The dictionary does not permit us to call such activities work. +Nevertheless, they represent a genuine passage of play into work. For +work (as a mental attitude, not as mere external performance) _means +interest in the adequate embodiment of a meaning_ (a suggestion, +purpose, aim) _in objective form through the use of appropriate +materials and appliances_. Such an attitude takes advantage of the +meanings aroused and built up in free play, but _controls their +development by seeing to it that they are applied to things in ways +consistent with the observable structure of the things themselves_. + +[Sidenote: and in processes on account of their results] + +The point of this distinction between play and work may be cleared up by +comparing it with a more usual way of stating the difference. In play +activity, it is said, the interest is in the activity for its own sake; +in work, it is in the product or result in which the activity +terminates. Hence the former is purely free, while the latter is tied +down by the end to be achieved. When the difference is stated in this +sharp fashion, there is almost always introduced a false, unnatural +separation between process and product, between activity and its +achieved outcome. The true distinction is not between an interest in +activity for its own sake and interest in the external result of that +activity, but between an interest in an activity just as it flows on +from moment to moment, and an interest in an activity as tending to a +culmination, to an outcome, and therefore possessing a thread of +continuity binding together its successive stages. Both may equally +exemplify interest in an activity "for its own sake"; but in one case +the activity in which the interest resides is more or less casual, +following the accident of circumstance and whim, or of dictation; in the +other, the activity is enriched by the sense that it leads somewhere, +that it amounts to something. + +[Sidenote: Consequences of the sharp separation of play and work] + +Were it not that the false theory of the relation of the play and the +work attitudes has been connected with unfortunate modes of school +practice, insistence upon a truer view might seem an unnecessary +refinement. But the sharp break that unfortunately prevails between the +kindergarten and the grades is evidence that the theoretical distinction +has practical implications. Under the title of play, the former is +rendered unduly symbolic, fanciful, sentimental, and arbitrary; while +under the antithetical caption of work the latter contains many _tasks +externally assigned_. The former has no end and the latter an end so +remote that only the educator, not the child, is aware that it is an +end. + +There comes a time when children must extend and make more exact their +acquaintance with existing things; must conceive ends and consequences +with sufficient definiteness to guide their actions by them, and must +acquire some technical skill in selecting and arranging means to realize +these ends. Unless these factors are gradually introduced in the earlier +play period, they must be introduced later abruptly and arbitrarily, to +the manifest disadvantage of both the earlier and the later stages. + +[Sidenote: False notions of imagination and utility] + +The sharp opposition of play and work is usually associated with false +notions of utility and imagination. Activity that is directed upon +matters of home and neighborhood interest is depreciated as merely +utilitarian. To let the child wash dishes, set the table, engage in +cooking, cut and sew dolls' clothes, make boxes that will hold "real +things," and construct his own playthings by using hammer and nails, +excludes, so it is said, the aesthetic and appreciative factor, +eliminates imagination, and subjects the child's development to material +and practical concerns; while (so it is said) to reproduce symbolically +the domestic relationships of birds and other animals, of human father +and mother and child, of workman and tradesman, of knight, soldier, and +magistrate, secures a liberal exercise of mind, of great moral as well +as intellectual value. It has been even stated that it is over-physical +and utilitarian if a child plants seeds and takes care of growing plants +in the kindergarten; while reproducing dramatically operations of +planting, cultivating, reaping, and so on, either with no physical +materials or with symbolic representatives, is highly educative to the +imagination and to spiritual appreciation. Toy dolls, trains of cars, +boats, and engines are rigidly excluded, and the employ of cubes, balls, +and other symbols for representing these social activities is +recommended on the same ground. The more unfitted the physical object +for its imagined purpose, such as a cube for a boat, the greater is the +supposed appeal to the imagination. + +[Sidenote: Imagination a medium of realizing the absent and significant] + +There are several fallacies in this way of thinking. (_a_) The healthy +imagination deals not with the unreal, but with the mental realization +of what is suggested. Its exercise is not a flight into the purely +fanciful and ideal, but a method of expanding and filling in what is +real. To the child the homely activities going on about him are not +utilitarian devices for accomplishing physical ends; they exemplify a +wonderful world the depths of which he has not sounded, a world full of +the mystery and promise that attend all the doings of the grown-ups whom +he admires. However prosaic this world may be to the adults who find its +duties routine affairs, to the child it is fraught with social meaning. +To engage in it is to exercise the imagination in constructing an +experience of wider value than any the child has yet mastered. + +[Sidenote: Only the already experienced can be symbolized] + +(_b_) Educators sometimes think children are reacting to a great moral +or spiritual truth when the children's reactions are largely physical +and sensational. Children have great powers of dramatic simulation, and +their physical bearing may seem (to adults prepossessed with a +philosophic theory) to indicate they have been impressed with some +lesson of chivalry, devotion, or nobility, when the children themselves +are occupied only with transitory physical excitations. To symbolize +great truths far beyond the child's range of actual experience is an +impossibility, and to attempt it is to invite love of momentary +stimulation. + +[Sidenote: Useful work is not necessarily labor] + +(_c_) Just as the opponents of play in education always conceive of play +as mere amusement, so the opponents of direct and useful activities +confuse occupation with labor. The adult is acquainted with responsible +labor upon which serious financial results depend. Consequently he seeks +relief, relaxation, amusement. Unless children have prematurely worked +for hire, unless they have come under the blight of child labor, no such +division exists for them. Whatever appeals to them at all, appeals +directly on its own account. There is no contrast between doing things +for utility and for fun. Their life is more united and more wholesome. +To suppose that activities customarily performed by adults only under +the pressure of utility may not be done perfectly freely and joyously by +children indicates a lack of imagination. Not the thing done but the +quality of mind that goes into the doing settles what is utilitarian and +what is unconstrained and educative. + + +Sec. 3. _Constructive Occupations_ + +[Sidenote: The historic growth of sciences out of occupations] + +The history of culture shows that mankind's scientific knowledge and +technical abilities have developed, especially in all their earlier +stages, out of the fundamental problems of life. Anatomy and physiology +grew out of the practical needs of keeping healthy and active; geometry +and mechanics out of demands for measuring land, for building, and for +making labor-saving machines; astronomy has been closely connected with +navigation, keeping record of the passage of time; botany grew out of +the requirements of medicine and of agronomy; chemistry has been +associated with dyeing, metallurgy, and other industrial pursuits. In +turn, modern industry is almost wholly a matter of applied science; year +by year the domain of routine and crude empiricism is narrowed by the +translation of scientific discovery into industrial invention. The +trolley, the telephone, the electric light, the steam engine, with all +their revolutionary consequences for social intercourse and control, are +the fruits of science. + +[Sidenote: The intellectual possibilities of school occupations] + +These facts are full of educational significance. Most children are +preeminently active in their tendencies. The schools have also taken +on--largely from utilitarian, rather than from strictly educative +reasons--a large number of active pursuits commonly grouped under the +head of manual training, including also school gardens, excursions, and +various graphic arts. Perhaps the most pressing problem of education at +the present moment is to organize and relate these subjects so that they +will become instruments for forming alert, persistent, and fruitful +intellectual habits. That they take hold of the more primary and native +equipment of children (appealing to their desire to do) is generally +recognized; that they afford great opportunity for training in +self-reliant and efficient social service is gaining acknowledgment. But +they may also be used for presenting _typical problems to be solved by +personal reflection and experimentation, and by acquiring definite +bodies of knowledge leading later to more specialized scientific +knowledge_. There is indeed no magic by which mere physical activity or +deft manipulation will secure intellectual results. (See p. 43.) Manual +subjects may be taught by routine, by dictation, or by convention as +readily as bookish subjects. But intelligent consecutive work in +gardening, cooking, or weaving, or in elementary wood and iron, may be +planned which will inevitably result in students not only amassing +information of practical and scientific importance in botany, zooelogy, +chemistry, physics, and other sciences, but (what is more significant) +in their becoming versed in methods of experimental inquiry and proof. + +[Sidenote: Reorganization of the course of study] + +That the elementary curriculum is overloaded is a common complaint. The +only alternative to a reactionary return to the educational traditions +of the past lies in working out the intellectual possibilities resident +in the various arts, crafts, and occupations, and reorganizing the +curriculum accordingly. Here, more than elsewhere, are found the means +by which the blind and routine experience of the race may be transformed +into illuminated and emancipated experiment. + + + + +CHAPTER THIRTEEN + +LANGUAGE AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT + + +Sec. 1. _Language as the Tool of Thinking_ + +[Sidenote: Ambiguous position of language] + +Speech has such a peculiarly intimate connection with thought as to +require special discussion. Although the very word logic comes from +logos ([Greek: logos]), meaning indifferently both word or speech, and +thought or reason, yet "words, words, words" denote intellectual +barrenness, a sham of thought. Although schooling has language as its +chief instrument (and often as its chief matter) of study, educational +reformers have for centuries brought their severest indictments against +the current use of language in the schools. The conviction that language +is necessary to thinking (is even identical with it) is met by the +contention that language perverts and conceals thought. + +[Sidenote: Language a necessary tool of thinking,] + +[Sidenote: for it alone fixes meanings] + +Three typical views have been maintained regarding the relation of +thought and language: first, that they are identical; second, that words +are the garb or clothing of thought, necessary not for thought but only +for conveying it; and third (the view we shall here maintain) that while +language is not thought it is necessary for thinking as well as for its +communication. When it is said, however, that thinking is impossible +without language, we must recall that language includes much more than +oral and written speech. Gestures, pictures, monuments, visual images, +finger movements--anything consciously employed as a _sign_ is, +logically, language. To say that language is necessary for thinking is +to say that signs are necessary. Thought deals not with bare things, but +with their _meanings_, their suggestions; and meanings, in order to be +apprehended, must be embodied in sensible and particular existences. +Without meaning, things are nothing but blind stimuli or chance sources +of pleasure and pain; and since meanings are not themselves tangible +things, they must be anchored by attachment to some physical existence. +Existences that are especially set aside to fixate and convey meanings +are _signs_ or _symbols_. If a man moves toward another to throw him out +of the room, his movement is not a sign. If, however, the man points to +the door with his hand, or utters the sound _go_, his movement is +reduced to a vehicle of meaning: it is a sign or symbol. In the case of +signs we care nothing for what they are in themselves, but everything +for what they signify and represent. _Canis_, _hund_, _chien_, dog--it +makes no difference what the outward thing is, so long as the meaning is +presented. + +[Sidenote: Limitations of natural symbols] + +Natural objects are signs of other things and events. Clouds stand for +rain; a footprint represents game or an enemy; a projecting rock serves +to indicate minerals below the surface. The limitations of natural signs +are, however, great. (_i_) The physical or direct sense excitation tends +to distract attention from what is meant or indicated.[27] Almost every +one will recall pointing out to a kitten or puppy some object of food, +only to have the animal devote himself to the hand pointing, not to the +thing pointed at. (_ii_) Where natural signs alone exist, we are mainly +at the mercy of external happenings; we have to wait until the natural +event presents itself in order to be warned or advised of the +possibility of some other event. (_iii_) Natural signs, not being +originally intended to be signs, are cumbrous, bulky, inconvenient, +unmanageable. + + [27] Compare the quotation from Bain on p. 155. + +[Sidenote: Artificial signs overcome these restrictions.] + +It is therefore indispensable for any high development of thought that +there should be also intentional signs. Speech supplies the requirement. +Gestures, sounds, written or printed forms, are strictly physical +existences, but their native value is intentionally subordinated to the +value they acquire as representative of meanings. (_i_) The direct and +sensible value of faint sounds and minute written or printed marks is +very slight. Accordingly, attention is not distracted from their +_representative_ function. (_ii_) Their production is under our direct +control so that they may be produced when needed. When we can make the +word _rain_, we do not have to wait for some physical forerunner of rain +to call our thoughts in that direction. We cannot make the cloud; we can +make the sound, and as a token of meaning the sound serves the purpose +as well as the cloud. (_iii_) Arbitrary linguistic signs are convenient +and easy to manage. They are compact, portable, and delicate. As long as +we live we breathe; and modifications by the muscles of throat and mouth +of the volume and quality of the air are simple, easy, and indefinitely +controllable. Bodily postures and gestures of the hand and arm are also +employed as signs, but they are coarse and unmanageable compared with +modifications of breath to produce sounds. No wonder that oral speech +has been selected as the main stuff of intentional intellectual signs. +Sounds, while subtle, refined, and easily modifiable, are transitory. +This defect is met by the system of written and printed words, +appealing to the eye. _Litera scripta manet._ + +Bearing in mind the intimate connection of meanings and signs (or +language), we may note in more detail what language does (1) for +specific meanings, and (2) for the organization of meanings. + +I. Individual Meanings. A verbal sign (_a_) selects, detaches, a meaning +from what is otherwise a vague flux and blur (see p. 121); (_b_) it +retains, registers, stores that meaning; and (_c_) applies it, when +needed, to the comprehension of other things. Combining these various +functions in a mixture of metaphors, we may say that a linguistic sign +is a fence, a label, and a vehicle--all in one. + +[Sidenote: A sign makes a meaning distinct] + +(_a_) Every one has experienced how learning an appropriate name for +what was dim and vague cleared up and crystallized the whole matter. +Some meaning seems almost within reach, but is elusive; it refuses to +condense into definite form; the attaching of a word somehow (just how, +it is almost impossible to say) puts limits around the meaning, draws it +out from the void, makes it stand out as an entity on its own account. +When Emerson said that he would almost rather know the true name, the +poet's name, for a thing, than to know the thing itself, he presumably +had this irradiating and illuminating function of language in mind. The +delight that children take in demanding and learning the names of +everything about them indicates that meanings are becoming concrete +individuals to them, so that their commerce with things is passing from +the physical to the intellectual plane. It is hardly surprising that +savages attach a magic efficacy to words. To name anything is to give it +a title; to dignify and honor it by raising it from a mere physical +occurrence to a meaning that is distinct and permanent. To know the +names of people and things and to be able to manipulate these names is, +in savage lore, to be in possession of their dignity and worth, to +master them. + +[Sidenote: A sign preserves a meaning] + +(_b_) Things come and go; or we come and go, and either way things +escape our notice. Our direct sensible relation to things is very +limited. The suggestion of meanings by natural signs is limited to +occasions of direct contact or vision. But a meaning fixed by a +linguistic sign is conserved for future use. Even if the thing is not +there to represent the meaning, the word may be produced so as to evoke +the meaning. Since intellectual life depends on possession of a store of +meanings, the importance of language as a tool of preserving meanings +cannot be overstated. To be sure, the method of storage is not wholly +aseptic; words often corrupt and modify the meanings they are supposed +to keep intact, but liability to infection is a price paid by every +living thing for the privilege of living. + +[Sidenote: A sign transfers a meaning] + +(_c_) When a meaning is detached and fixed by a sign, it is possible to +use that meaning in a new context and situation. This transfer and +reapplication is the key to all judgment and inference. It would little +profit a man to recognize that a given particular cloud was the +premonitor of a given particular rainstorm if his recognition ended +there, for he would then have to learn over and over again, since the +next cloud and the next rain are different events. No cumulative growth +of intelligence would occur; experience might form habits of physical +adaptation but it would not teach anything, for we should not be able to +use a prior experience consciously to anticipate and regulate a further +experience. To be able to use the past to judge and infer the new and +unknown implies that, although the past thing has gone, its _meaning_ +abides in such a way as to be applicable in determining the character of +the new. Speech forms are our great carriers: the easy-running vehicles +by which meanings are transported from experiences that no longer +concern us to those that are as yet dark and dubious. + +[Sidenote: Logical organization depends upon signs] + +II. Organization of Meanings. In emphasizing the importance of signs in +relation to specific meanings, we have overlooked another aspect, +equally valuable. Signs not only mark off specific or individual +meanings, but they are also instruments of grouping meanings in relation +to one another. Words are not only names or titles of single meanings; +they also form _sentences_ in which meanings are organized in relation +to one another. When we say "That book is a dictionary," or "That blur +of light in the heavens is Halley's comet," we express a _logical_ +connection--an act of classifying and defining that goes beyond the +physical thing into the logical region of genera and species, things and +attributes. Propositions, sentences, bear the same relation to judgments +that distinct words, built up mainly by analyzing propositions in their +various types, bear to meanings or conceptions; and just as words imply +a sentence, so a sentence implies a larger whole of consecutive +discourse into which it fits. As is often said, grammar expresses the +unconscious logic of the popular mind. _The chief intellectual +classifications that constitute the working capital of thought have been +built up for us by our mother tongue._ Our very lack of explicit +consciousness in using language that we are employing the intellectual +systematizations of the race shows how thoroughly accustomed we have +become to its logical distinctions and groupings. + + +Sec. 2. _The Abuse of Linguistic Methods in Education_ + +[Sidenote: Teaching merely things, not educative] + +Taken literally, the maxim, "Teach things, not words," or "Teach things +before words," would be the negation of education; it would reduce +mental life to mere physical and sensible adjustments. Learning, in the +proper sense, is not learning things, but the _meanings_ of things, and +this process involves the use of signs, or language in its generic +sense. In like fashion, the warfare of some educational reformers +against symbols, if pushed to extremes, involves the destruction of the +intellectual life, since this lives, moves, and has its being in those +processes of definition, abstraction, generalization, and classification +that are made possible by symbols alone. Nevertheless, these contentions +of educational reformers have been needed. The liability of a thing to +abuse is in proportion to the value of its right use. + +[Sidenote: But words separated from things are not true signs] + +Symbols are themselves, as pointed out above, particular, physical, +sensible existences, like any other things. They are symbols only by +virtue of what they suggest and represent, _i.e._ meanings. (_i_) They +stand for these meanings to any individual only when he has had +_experience_ of some situation to which these meanings are actually +relevant. Words can detach and preserve a meaning only when the meaning +has been first involved in our own direct intercourse with things. To +attempt to give a meaning through a word alone without any dealings with +a thing is to deprive the word of intelligible signification; against +this attempt, a tendency only too prevalent in education, reformers have +protested. Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that whenever there +is a definite word or form of speech there is also a definite idea; +while, as a matter of fact, adults and children alike are capable of +using even precise verbal formulae with only the vaguest and most +confused sense of what they mean. Genuine ignorance is more profitable +because likely to be accompanied by humility, curiosity, and +open-mindedness; while ability to repeat catch-phrases, cant terms, +familiar propositions, gives the conceit of learning and coats the mind +with a varnish waterproof to new ideas. + +[Sidenote: Language tends to arrest personal inquiry and reflection] + +(_ii_) Again, although new combinations of words without the +intervention of physical things may supply new ideas, there are limits +to this possibility. Lazy inertness causes individuals to accept ideas +that have currency about them without personal inquiry and testing. A +man uses thought, perhaps, to find out what others believe, and then +stops. The ideas of others as embodied in language become substitutes +for one's own ideas. The use of linguistic studies and methods to halt +the human mind on the level of the attainments of the past, to prevent +new inquiry and discovery, to put the authority of tradition in place of +the authority of natural facts and laws, to reduce the individual to a +parasite living on the secondhand experience of others--these things +have been the source of the reformers' protest against the preeminence +assigned to language in schools. + +[Sidenote: Words as mere stimuli] + +Finally, words that originally stood for ideas come, with repeated use, +to be mere counters; they become physical things to be manipulated +according to certain rules, or reacted to by certain operations without +consciousness of their meaning. Mr. Stout (who has called such terms +"substitute signs")remarks that "algebraical and arithmetical signs are +to a great extent used as mere substitute signs.... It is possible to +use signs of this kind whenever fixed and definite rules of operation +can be derived from the nature of the things symbolized, so as to be +applied in manipulating the signs, without further reference to their +signification. A word is an instrument for thinking about the meaning +which it expresses; a substitute sign is a means of _not_ thinking about +the meaning which it symbolizes." The principle applies, however, to +ordinary words, as well as to algebraic signs; they also enable us to +use meanings so as to get results without thinking. In many respects, +signs that are means of not thinking are of great advantage; standing +for the familiar, they release attention for meanings that, being novel, +require conscious interpretation. Nevertheless, the premium put in the +schoolroom upon attainment of technical facility, upon skill in +producing external results (_ante_, p. 51), often changes this advantage +into a positive detriment. In manipulating symbols so as to recite well, +to get and give correct answers, to follow prescribed formulae of +analysis, the pupil's attitude becomes mechanical, rather than +thoughtful; verbal memorizing is substituted for inquiry into the +meaning of things. This danger is perhaps the one uppermost in mind when +verbal methods of education are attacked. + + +Sec. 3. _The Use of Language in its Educational Bearings_ + +Language stands in a twofold relation to the work of education. On the +one hand, it is continually used in all studies as well as in all the +social discipline of the school; on the other, it is a distinct object +of study. We shall consider only the ordinary use of language, since its +effects upon habits of thought are much deeper than those of conscious +study. + +[Sidenote: Language not primarily intellectual in purpose] + +The common statement that "language is the expression of thought" +conveys only a half-truth, and a half-truth that is likely to result in +positive error. Language does express thought, but not primarily, nor, +at first, even consciously. The primary motive for language is to +influence (through the expression of desire, emotion, and thought) the +activity of others; its secondary use is to enter into more intimate +sociable relations with them; its employment as a conscious vehicle of +thought and knowledge is a tertiary, and relatively late, formation. The +contrast is well brought out by the statement of John Locke that words +have a double use,--"civil" and "philosophical." "By their civil use, I +mean such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words as may serve +for the upholding of common conversation and commerce about the ordinary +affairs and conveniences of civil life.... By the philosophical use of +words, I mean such a use of them as may serve to convey the precise +notions of things, and to express in general propositions certain and +undoubted truths." + +[Sidenote: Hence education has to transform it into an intellectual +tool] + +This distinction of the practical and social from the intellectual use +of language throws much light on the problem of the school in respect to +speech. That problem is _to direct pupils' oral and written speech, used +primarily for practical and social ends, so that gradually it shall +become a conscious tool of conveying knowledge and assisting thought_. +How without checking the spontaneous, natural motives--motives to which +language owes its vitality, force, vividness, and variety--are we to +modify speech habits so as to render them accurate and flexible +_intellectual_ instruments? It is comparatively easy to encourage the +original spontaneous flow and not make language over into a servant of +reflective thought; it is comparatively easy to check and almost +destroy (so far as the schoolroom is concerned) native aim and interest, +and to set up artificial and formal modes of expression in some isolated +and technical matters. The difficulty lies in making over habits that +have to do with "ordinary affairs and conveniences" into habits +concerned with "precise notions." The successful accomplishing of the +transformation requires (_i_) enlargement of the pupil's vocabulary; +(_ii_) rendering its terms more precise and accurate, and (_iii_) +formation of habits of consecutive discourse. + +[Sidenote: To enlarge vocabulary, the fund of concepts should be +enlarged] + +(_i_) Enlargement of vocabulary. This takes place, of course, by wider +intelligent contact with things and persons, and also vicariously, by +gathering the meanings of words from the context in which they are heard +or read. To grasp by either method a word in its meaning is to exercise +intelligence, to perform an act of intelligent selection or analysis, +and it is also to widen the fund of meanings or concepts readily +available in further intellectual enterprises (_ante_, p. 126). It is +usual to distinguish between one's active and one's passive vocabulary, +the latter being composed of the words that are understood when they are +heard or seen, the former of words that are used intelligently. The fact +that the passive vocabulary is ordinarily much larger than the active +indicates a certain amount of inert energy, of power not freely +controlled by an individual. Failure to use meanings that are +nevertheless understood reveals dependence upon external stimulus, and +lack of intellectual initiative. This mental laziness is to some extent +an artificial product of education. Small children usually attempt to +put to use every new word they get hold of, but when they learn to read +they are introduced to a large variety of terms that there is no +ordinary opportunity to use. The result is a kind of mental +suppression, if not smothering. Moreover, the meaning of words not +actively used in building up and conveying ideas is never quite +clear-cut or complete. + +[Sidenote: Looseness of thinking accompanies a limited vocabulary] + +While a limited vocabulary may be due to a limited range of experience, +to a sphere of contact with persons and things so narrow as not to +suggest or require a full store of words, it is also due to carelessness +and vagueness. A happy-go-lucky frame of mind makes the individual +averse to clear discriminations, either in perception or in his own +speech. Words are used loosely in an indeterminate kind of reference to +things, and the mind approaches a condition where practically everything +is just a thing-um-bob or a what-do-you-call-it. Paucity of vocabulary +on the part of those with whom the child associates, triviality and +meagerness in the child's reading matter (as frequently even in his +school readers and text-books), tend to shut down the area of mental +vision. + +[Sidenote: Command of language involves command of things] + +We must note also the great difference between flow of words and command +of language. Volubility is not necessarily a sign of a large vocabulary; +much talking or even ready speech is quite compatible with moving round +and round in a circle of moderate radius. Most schoolrooms suffer from a +lack of materials and appliances save perhaps books--and even these are +"written down" to the supposed capacity, or incapacity, of children. +Occasion and demand for an enriched vocabulary are accordingly +restricted. The vocabulary of things studied in the schoolroom is very +largely isolated; it does not link itself organically to the range of +the ideas and words that are in vogue outside the school. Hence the +enlargement that takes place is often nominal, adding to the inert, +rather than to the active, fund of meanings and terms. + +(_ii_) Accuracy of vocabulary. One way in which the fund of words and +concepts is increased is by discovering and naming shades of +meaning--that is to say, by making the vocabulary more precise. Increase +in definiteness is as important relatively as is the enlargement of the +capital stock absolutely. + +[Sidenote: The _general_ as the vague and as the distinctly generic] + +The first meanings of terms, since they are due to superficial +acquaintance with things, are general in the sense of being vague. The +little child calls all men papa; acquainted with a dog, he may call the +first horse he sees a big dog. Differences of quantity and intensity are +noted, but the fundamental meaning is so vague that it covers things +that are far apart. To many persons trees are just trees, being +discriminated only into deciduous trees and evergreens, with perhaps +recognition of one or two kinds of each. Such vagueness tends to persist +and to become a barrier to the advance of thinking. Terms that are +miscellaneous in scope are clumsy tools at best; in addition they are +frequently treacherous, for their ambiguous reference causes us to +confuse things that should be distinguished. + +[Sidenote: Twofold growth of words in sense or signification] + +The growth of precise terms out of original vagueness takes place +normally in two directions: toward words that stand for relationships +and words that stand for highly individualized traits (compare what was +said about the development of meanings, p. 122); the first being +associated with abstract, the second with concrete, thinking. Some +Australian tribes are said to have no words for _animal_ or for _plant_, +while they have specific names for every variety of plant and animal in +their neighborhoods. This minuteness of vocabulary represents progress +toward definiteness, but in a one-sided way. Specific properties are +distinguished, but not relationships.[28] On the other hand, students of +philosophy and of the general aspects of natural and social science are +apt to acquire a store of terms that signify relations without balancing +them up with terms that designate specific individuals and traits. The +ordinary use of such terms as _causation_, _law_, _society_, +_individual_, _capital_, illustrates this tendency. + + [28] The term _general_ is itself an ambiguous term, meaning (in its + best logical sense) the related and also (in its natural usage) the + indefinite, the vague. _General_, in the first sense, denotes the + discrimination of a principle or generic relation; in the second + sense, it denotes the absence of discrimination of specific or + individual properties. + +[Sidenote: Words alter their meanings so as to change their logical +functions] + +In the history of language we find both aspects of the growth of +vocabulary illustrated by changes in the sense of words: some words +originally wide in their application are narrowed to denote shades of +meaning; others originally specific are widened to express +relationships. The term _vernacular_, now meaning mother speech, has +been generalized from the word _verna_, meaning a slave born in the +master's household. _Publication_ has evolved its meaning of +communication by means of print, through restricting an earlier meaning +of any kind of communication--although the wider meaning is retained in +legal procedure, as publishing a libel. The sense of the word _average_ +has been generalized from a use connected with dividing loss by +shipwreck proportionately among various sharers in an enterprise.[29] + + [29] A large amount of material illustrating the twofold change in + the sense of words will be found in Jevons, _Lessons in Logic_. + +[Sidenote: Similar changes occur in the vocabulary of every student] + +These historical changes assist the educator to appreciate the changes +that occur with individuals together with advance in intellectual +resources. In studying geometry, a pupil must learn both to narrow and +to extend the meanings of such familiar words as _line_, _surface_, +_angle_, _square_, _circle_; to narrow them to the precise meanings +involved in demonstrations; to extend them to cover generic relations +not expressed in ordinary usage. Qualities of color and size must be +excluded; relations of direction, of variation in direction, of limit, +must be definitely seized. A like transformation occurs, of course, in +every subject of study. Just at this point lies the danger, alluded to +above, of simply overlaying common meanings with new and isolated +meanings instead of effecting a genuine working-over of popular and +practical meanings into adequate logical tools. + +[Sidenote: The value of technical terms] + +Terms used with intentional exactness so as to express a meaning, the +whole meaning, and only the meaning, are called _technical_. For +educational purposes, a technical term indicates something relative, not +absolute; for a term is technical not because of its verbal form or its +unusualness, but because it is employed to fix a meaning precisely. +Ordinary words get a technical quality when used intentionally for this +end. Whenever thought becomes more accurate, a (relatively) technical +vocabulary grows up. Teachers are apt to oscillate between extremes in +regard to technical terms. On the one hand, these are multiplied in +every direction, seemingly on the assumption that learning a new piece +of terminology, accompanied by verbal description or definition, is +equivalent to grasping a new idea. When it is seen how largely the net +outcome is the accumulation of an isolated set of words, a jargon or +scholastic cant, and to what extent the natural power of judgment is +clogged by this accumulation, there is a reaction to the opposite +extreme. Technical terms are banished: "name words" exist but not +nouns; "action words" but not verbs; pupils may "take away," but not +subtract; they may tell what four fives are, but not what four times +five are, and so on. A sound instinct underlies this reaction--aversion +to words that give the pretense, but not the reality, of meaning. Yet +the fundamental difficulty is not with the word, but with the idea. If +the idea is not grasped, nothing is gained by using a more familiar +word; if the idea is perceived, the use of the term that exactly names +it may assist in fixing the idea. Terms denoting highly exact meanings +should be introduced only sparingly, that is, a few at a time; they +should be led up to gradually, and great pains should be taken to secure +the circumstances that render precision of meaning significant. + +[Sidenote: Importance of consecutive discourse] + +(_iii_) Consecutive discourse. As we saw, language connects and +organizes meanings as well as selects and fixes them. As every meaning +is set in the context of some situation, so every word in concrete use +belongs to some sentence (it may itself represent a condensed sentence), +and the sentence, in turn, belongs to some larger story, description, or +reasoning process. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said about +the importance of continuity and ordering of meanings. We may, however, +note some ways in which school practices tend to interrupt +consecutiveness of language and thereby interfere harmfully with +systematic reflection. (_a_) Teachers have a habit of monopolizing +continued discourse. Many, if not most, instructors would be surprised +if informed at the end of the day of the amount of time they have talked +as compared with any pupil. Children's conversation is often confined to +answering questions in brief phrases, or in single disconnected +sentences. Expatiation and explanation are reserved for the teacher, +who often admits any hint at an answer on the part of the pupil, and +then amplifies what he supposes the child must have meant. The habits of +sporadic and fragmentary discourse thus promoted have inevitably a +disintegrating intellectual influence. + +[Sidenote: Too minute questioning] + +(_b_) Assignment of too short lessons when accompanied (as it usually is +in order to pass the time of the recitation period) by minute "analytic" +questioning has the same effect. This evil is usually at its height in +such subjects as history and literature, where not infrequently the +material is so minutely subdivided as to break up the unity of meaning +belonging to a given portion of the matter, to destroy perspective, and +in effect to reduce the whole topic to an accumulation of disconnected +details all upon the same level. More often than the teacher is aware, +_his_ mind carries and supplies the background of unity of meaning +against which pupils project isolated scraps. + +[Sidenote: Making avoidance of error the aim] + +(_c_) Insistence upon avoiding error instead of attaining power tends +also to interruption of continuous discourse and thought. Children who +begin with something to say and with intellectual eagerness to say it +are sometimes made so conscious of minor errors in substance and form +that the energy that should go into constructive thinking is diverted +into anxiety not to make mistakes, and even, in extreme cases, into +passive quiescence as the best method of minimizing error. This tendency +is especially marked in connection with the writing of compositions, +essays, and themes. It has even been gravely recommended that little +children should always write on trivial subjects and in short sentences +because in that way they are less likely to make mistakes, while the +teaching of writing to high school and college students occasionally +reduces itself to a technique for detecting and designating mistakes. +The resulting self-consciousness and constraint are only part of the +evil that comes from a negative ideal. + + + + +CHAPTER FOURTEEN + +OBSERVATION AND INFORMATION IN THE TRAINING OF MIND + + +[Sidenote: No thinking without acquaintance with facts] + +Thinking is an ordering of subject-matter with reference to discovering +what it signifies or indicates. Thinking no more exists apart from this +arranging of subject-matter than digestion occurs apart from the +assimilating of food. The way in which the subject-matter is furnished +marks, therefore, a fundamental point. If the subject-matter is provided +in too scanty or too profuse fashion, if it comes in disordered array or +in isolated scraps, the effect upon habits of thought is detrimental. If +personal observation and communication of information by others (whether +in books or speech) are rightly conducted, half the logical battle is +won, for they are the channels of obtaining subject-matter. + + +Sec. 1. _The Nature and Value of Observation_ + +[Sidenote: Fallacy of making "facts" an end in themselves] + +The protest, mentioned in the last chapter, of educational reformers +against the exaggerated and false use of language, insisted upon +personal and direct observation as the proper alternative course. The +reformers felt that the current emphasis upon the linguistic factor +eliminated all opportunity for first-hand acquaintance with real things; +hence they appealed to sense-perception to fill the gap. It is not +surprising that this enthusiastic zeal failed frequently to ask how and +why observation is educative, and hence fell into the error of making +observation an end in itself and was satisfied with any kind of material +under any kind of conditions. Such isolation of observation is still +manifested in the statement that this faculty develops first, then that +of memory and imagination, and finally the faculty of thought. From this +point of view, observation is regarded as furnishing crude masses of raw +material, to which, later on, reflective processes may be applied. Our +previous pages should have made obvious the fallacy of this point of +view by bringing out the fact that simple concrete thinking attends all +our intercourse with things which is not on a purely physical level. + +[Sidenote: The sympathetic motive in extending acquaintance] + +I. All persons have a natural desire--akin to curiosity--for a widening +of their range of acquaintance with persons and things. The sign in art +galleries that forbids the carrying of canes and umbrellas is obvious +testimony to the fact that simply to see is not enough for many people; +there is a feeling of lack of acquaintance until some direct contact is +made. This demand for fuller and closer knowledge is quite different +from any conscious interest in observation for its own sake. Desire for +expansion, for "self-realization," is its motive. The interest is +sympathetic, socially and aesthetically sympathetic, rather than +cognitive. While the interest is especially keen in children (because +their actual experience is so small and their possible experience so +large), it still characterizes adults when routine has not blunted its +edge. This sympathetic interest provides the medium for carrying and +binding together what would otherwise be a multitude of items, diverse, +disconnected, and of no intellectual use. These systems are indeed +social and aesthetic rather than consciously intellectual; but they +provide the natural medium for more conscious intellectual explorations. +Some educators have recommended that nature study in the elementary +schools be conducted with a love of nature and a cultivation of aesthetic +appreciation in view rather than in a purely analytic spirit. Others +have urged making much of the care of animals and plants. Both of these +important recommendations have grown out of experience, not out of +theory, but they afford excellent exemplifications of the theoretic +point just made. + +[Sidenote: Analytic inspection for the sake of doing] + +[Sidenote: Direct and indirect sense training] + +II. In normal development, specific analytic observations are originally +connected almost exclusively with the imperative need for noting means +and ends in carrying on activities. When one is _doing_ something, one +is compelled, if the work is to succeed (unless it is purely routine), +to use eyes, ears, and sense of touch as guides to action. Without a +constant and alert exercise of the senses, not even plays and games can +go on; in any form of work, materials, obstacles, appliances, failures, +and successes, must be intently watched. Sense-perception does not occur +for its own sake or for purposes of training, but because it is an +indispensable factor of success in doing what one is interested in +doing. Although not designed for sense-training, this method effects +sense-training in the most economical and thoroughgoing way. Various +schemes have been designed by teachers for cultivating sharp and prompt +observation of forms, as by writing words,--even in an unknown +language,--making arrangements of figures and geometrical forms, and +having pupils reproduce them after a momentary glance. Children often +attain great skill in quick seeing and full reproducing of even +complicated meaningless combinations. But such methods of +training--however valuable as occasional games and diversions--compare +very unfavorably with the training of eye and hand that comes as an +incident of work with tools in wood or metals, or of gardening, cooking, +or the care of animals. Training by isolated exercises leaves no +deposit, leads nowhere; and even the technical skill acquired has little +radiating power, or transferable value. Criticisms made upon the +training of observation on the ground that many persons cannot correctly +reproduce the forms and arrangement of the figures on the face of their +watches misses the point because persons do not look at a watch to find +out whether four o'clock is indicated by IIII or by IV, but to find out +what time it is, and, if observation decides this matter, noting other +details is irrelevant and a waste of time. In the training of +observation the question of end and motive is all-important. + +[Sidenote: Scientific observations are linked to problems] + +[Sidenote: "Object-lessons" rarely supply problems] + +III. The further, more intellectual or scientific, development of +observation follows the line of the growth of practical into theoretical +reflection already traced (_ante_, Chapter Ten). As problems emerge and +are dwelt upon, observation is directed less to the facts that bear upon +a practical aim and more upon what bears upon a problem as such. What +makes observations in schools often intellectually ineffective is (more +than anything else) that they are carried on independently of a sense of +a problem that they serve to define or help to solve. The evil of this +isolation is seen through the entire educational system, from the +kindergarten, through the elementary and high schools, to the college. +Almost everywhere may be found, at some time, recourse to observations +as if they were of complete and final value in themselves, instead of +the means of getting material that bears upon some difficulty and its +solution. In the kindergarten are heaped up observations regarding +geometrical forms, lines, surfaces, cubes, colors, and so on. In the +elementary school, under the name of "object-lessons," the form and +properties of objects,--apple, orange, chalk,--selected almost at +random, are minutely noted, while under the name of "nature study" +similar observations are directed upon leaves, stones, insects, selected +in almost equally arbitrary fashion. In high school and college, +laboratory and microscopic observations are carried on as if the +accumulation of observed facts and the acquisition of skill in +manipulation were educational ends in themselves. + +Compare with these methods of isolated observations the statement of +Jevons that observation as conducted by scientific men is effective +"only when excited and guided by hope of verifying a theory"; and again, +"the number of things which can be observed and experimented upon are +infinite, and if we merely set to work to record facts without any +distinct purpose, our records will have no value." Strictly speaking, +the first statement of Jevons is too narrow. Scientific men institute +observations not merely to test an idea (or suggested explanatory +meaning), but also to locate the nature of a problem and thereby guide +the formation of a hypothesis. But the principle of his remark, namely, +that scientific men never make the accumulation of observations an end +in itself, but always a means to a general intellectual conclusion, is +absolutely sound. Until the force of this principle is adequately +recognized in education, observation will be largely a matter of +uninteresting dead work or of acquiring forms of technical skill that +are not available as intellectual resources. + + +Sec. 2. _Methods and Materials of Observation in the Schools_ The best +methods in use in our schools furnish many suggestions for giving +observation its right place in mental training. + +[Sidenote: Observation should involve discovery] + +I. They rest upon the sound assumption that observation is an _active_ +process. Observation is exploration, inquiry for the sake of discovering +something previously hidden and unknown, this something being needed in +order to reach some end, practical or theoretical. Observation is to be +discriminated from recognition, or perception of what is familiar. The +identification of something already understood is, indeed, an +indispensable function of further investigation (_ante_, p. 119); but it +is relatively automatic and passive, while observation proper is +searching and deliberate. Recognition refers to the already mastered; +observation is concerned with mastering the unknown. The common notions +that perception is like writing on a blank piece of paper, or like +impressing an image on the mind as a seal is imprinted on wax or as a +picture is formed on a photographic plate (notions that have played a +disastrous role in educational methods), arise from a failure to +distinguish between automatic recognition and the searching attitude of +genuine observation. + +[Sidenote: and suspense during an unfolding change] + +II. Much assistance in the selection of appropriate material for +observation may be derived from considering the eagerness and closeness +of observation that attend the following of a story or drama. Alertness +of observation is at its height wherever there is "plot interest." Why? +Because of the balanced combination of the old and the new, of the +familiar and the unexpected. We hang on the lips of the story-teller +because of the element of mental suspense. Alternatives are suggested, +but are left ambiguous, so that our whole being questions: What befell +next? Which way did things turn out? Contrast the ease and fullness with +which a child notes all the salient traits of a story, with the labor +and inadequacy of his observation of some dead and static thing where +nothing raises a question or suggests alternative outcomes. + +[Sidenote: This "plot interest" manifested in activity,] + +When an individual is engaged in doing or making something (the activity +not being of such a mechanical and habitual character that its outcome +is assured), there is an analogous situation. Something is going to come +of what is present to the sense, but just what is doubtful. The plot is +unfolding toward success or failure, but just when or how is uncertain. +Hence the keen and tense observation of conditions and results that +attends constructive manual operations. Where the subject-matter is of a +more impersonal sort, the same principle of movement toward a denouement +may apply. It is a commonplace that what is moving attracts notice when +that which is at rest escapes it. Yet too often it would almost seem as +if pains had been taken to deprive the material of school observations +of all life and dramatic quality, to reduce it to a dead and inert form. +Mere change is not enough, however. Vicissitude, alteration, motion, +excite observation; but if they merely excite it, there is no thought. +The changes must (like the incidents of a well-arranged story or plot) +take place in a certain cumulative order; each successive change must at +once remind us of its predecessor and arouse interest in its successor +if observations of change are to be logically fruitful. + +[Sidenote: and in cycles of growth] + +Living beings, plants, and animals, fulfill the twofold requirement to +an extraordinary degree. Where there is growth, there is motion, +change, process; and there is also arrangement of the changes in a +cycle. The first arouses, the second organizes, observation. Much of the +extraordinary interest that children take in planting seeds and watching +the stages of their growth is due to the fact that a drama is enacting +before their eyes; there is something doing, each step of which is +important in the destiny of the plant. The great practical improvements +that have occurred of late years in the teaching of botany and zooelogy +will be found, upon inspection, to involve treating plants and animals +as beings that act, that do something, instead of as mere inert +specimens having static properties to be inventoried, named, and +registered. Treated in the latter fashion, observation is inevitably +reduced to the falsely "analytic" (_ante_, p. 112),--to mere dissection +and enumeration. + +[Sidenote: Observation of structure grows out of noting function] + +There is, of course, a place, and an important place, for observation of +the mere static qualities of objects. When, however, the primary +interest is in _function_, in what the object does, there is a motive +for more minute analytic study, for the observation of _structure_. +Interest in noting an activity passes insensibly into noting how the +activity is carried on; the interest in what is accomplished passes over +into an interest in the organs of its accomplishing. But when the +beginning is made with the morphological, the anatomical, the noting of +peculiarities of form, size, color, and distribution of parts, the +material is so cut off from significance as to be dead and dull. It is +as natural for children to look intently for the _stomata_ of a plant +after they have become interested in its function of breathing, as it is +repulsive to attend minutely to them when they are considered as +isolated peculiarities of structure. + +[Sidenote: Scientific observation] + +III. As the center of interest of observations becomes less personal, +less a matter of means for effecting one's own ends, and less aesthetic, +less a matter of contribution of parts to a total emotional effect, +observation becomes more consciously intellectual in quality. Pupils +learn to observe for the sake (_i_) of finding out what sort of +perplexity confronts them; (_ii_) of inferring hypothetical explanations +for the puzzling features that observation reveals; and (_iii_) of +testing the ideas thus suggested. + +[Sidenote: should be extensive] + +[Sidenote: and intensive] + +In short, observation becomes scientific in nature. Of such observations +it may be said that they should follow a rhythm between the extensive +and the intensive. Problems become definite, and suggested explanations +significant by a certain alternation between a wide and somewhat loose +soaking in of relevant facts and a minutely accurate study of a few +selected facts. The wider, less exact observation is necessary to give +the student a feeling for the reality of the field of inquiry, a sense +of its bearings and possibilities, and to store his mind with materials +that imagination may transform into suggestions. The intensive study is +necessary for limiting the problem, and for securing the conditions of +experimental testing. As the latter by itself is too specialized and +technical to arouse intellectual growth, the former by itself is too +superficial and scattering for control of intellectual development. In +the sciences of life, field study, excursions, acquaintance with living +things in their natural habitats, may alternate with microscopic and +laboratory observation. In the physical sciences, phenomena of light, of +heat, of electricity, of moisture, of gravity, in their broad setting in +nature--their physiographic setting--should prepare for an exact study +of selected facts under conditions of laboratory control. In this way, +the student gets the benefit of technical scientific methods of +discovery and testing, while he retains his sense of the identity of the +laboratory modes of energy with large out-of-door realities, thereby +avoiding the impression (that so often accrues) that the facts studied +are peculiar to the laboratory. + + +Sec. 3. _Communication of Information_ + +[Sidenote: Importance of hearsay acquaintance] + +When all is said and done the field of fact open to any one observer by +himself is narrow. Into every one of our beliefs, even those that we +have worked out under the conditions of utmost personal, first-hand +acquaintance, much has insensibly entered from what we have heard or +read of the observations and conclusions of others. In spite of the +great extension of direct observation in our schools, the vast bulk of +educational subject-matter is derived from other sources--from +text-book, lecture, and viva-voce interchange. No educational question +is of greater import than how to get the most logical good out of +learning through transmission from others. + +[Sidenote: Logically, this ranks only as evidence or testimony] + +Doubtless the chief meaning associated with the word _instruction_ is +this conveying and instilling of the results of the observations and +inferences of others. Doubtless the undue prominence in education of the +ideal of amassing information (_ante_, p. 52) has its source in the +prominence of the learning of other persons. The problem then is how to +convert it into an intellectual asset. In logical terms, the material +supplied from the experience of others is _testimony_: that is to say, +_evidence_ submitted by others to be employed by one's own judgment in +reaching a conclusion. How shall we treat the subject-matter supplied by +text-book and teacher so that it shall rank as material for reflective +inquiry, not as ready-made intellectual pabulum to be accepted and +swallowed just as supplied by the store? + +[Sidenote: Communication by others should not encroach on observation,] + +In reply to this question, we may say (_i_) that the communication of +material should be _needed_. That is to say, it should be such as cannot +readily be attained by personal observation. For teacher or book to cram +pupils with facts which, with little more trouble, they could discover +by direct inquiry is to violate their intellectual integrity by +cultivating mental servility. This does not mean that the material +supplied through communication of others should be meager or scanty. +With the utmost range of the senses, the world of nature and history +stretches out almost infinitely beyond. But the fields within which +direct observation is feasible should be carefully chosen and sacredly +protected. + +[Sidenote: should not be dogmatic in tone,] + +(_ii_) Material should be supplied by way of stimulus, not with dogmatic +finality and rigidity. When pupils get the notion that any field of +study has been definitely surveyed, that knowledge about it is +exhaustive and final, they may continue docile pupils, but they cease to +be students. All thinking whatsoever--so be it _is_ thinking--contains a +phase of originality. This originality does not imply that the student's +conclusion varies from the conclusions of others, much less that it is a +radically novel conclusion. His originality is not incompatible with +large use of materials and suggestions contributed by others. +Originality means personal interest in the question, personal initiative +in turning over the suggestions furnished by others, and sincerity in +following them out to a tested conclusion. Literally, the phrase "Think +for yourself" is tautological; any thinking is thinking for one's self. + +[Sidenote: should have relation to a personal problem,] + +(_iii_) The material furnished by way of information should be relevant +to a question that is vital in the student's own experience. What has +been said about the evil of observations that begin and end in +themselves may be transferred without change to communicated learning. +Instruction in subject-matter that does not fit into any problem already +stirring in the student's own experience, or that is not presented in +such a way as to arouse a problem, is worse than useless for +intellectual purposes. In that it fails to enter into any process of +reflection, it is useless; in that it remains in the mind as so much +lumber and debris, it is a barrier, an obstruction in the way of +effective thinking when a problem arises. + +[Sidenote: and to prior systems of experience] + +Another way of stating the same principle is that material furnished by +communication must be such as to enter into some existing system or +organization of experience. All students of psychology are familiar with +the principle of apperception--that we assimilate new material with what +we have digested and retained from prior experiences. Now the +"apperceptive basis" of material furnished by teacher and text-book +should be found, as far as possible, in what the learner has derived +from more direct forms of his own experience. There is a tendency to +connect material of the schoolroom simply with the material of prior +school lessons, instead of linking it to what the pupil has acquired in +his out-of-school experience. The teacher says, "Do you not remember +what we learned from the book last week?"--instead of saying, "Do you +not recall such and such a thing that you have seen or heard?" As a +result, there are built up detached and independent systems of school +knowledge that inertly overlay the ordinary systems of experience +instead of reacting to enlarge and refine them. Pupils are taught to +live in two separate worlds, one the world of out-of-school experience, +the other the world of books and lessons. + + + + +CHAPTER FIFTEEN + +THE RECITATION AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT + + +[Sidenote: Importance of the recitation] + +In the recitation the teacher comes into his closest contact with the +pupil. In the recitation focus the possibilities of guiding children's +activities, influencing their language habits, and directing their +observations. In discussing the significance of the recitation as an +instrumentality of education, we are accordingly bringing to a head the +points considered in the last three chapters, rather than introducing a +new topic. The method in which the recitation is carried on is a crucial +test of a teacher's skill in diagnosing the intellectual state of his +pupils and in supplying the conditions that will arouse serviceable +mental responses: in short, of his art as a teacher. + +[Sidenote: Re-citing _versus_ reflecting] + +The use of the word _recitation_ to designate the period of most +intimate intellectual contact of teacher with pupil and pupil with pupil +is a fateful fact. To re-cite is to cite again, to repeat, to tell over +and over. If we were to call this period _reiteration_, the designation +would hardly bring out more clearly than does the word _recitation_, the +complete domination of instruction by rehearsing of secondhand +information, by memorizing for the sake of producing correct replies at +the proper time. Everything that is said in this chapter is +insignificant in comparison with the primary truth that the recitation +is a place and time for stimulating and directing reflection, and that +reproducing memorized matter is only an incident--even though an +indispensable incident--in the process of cultivating a thoughtful +attitude. + + +Sec. 1. _The Formal Steps of Instruction_ + +[Sidenote: Herbart's analysis of method of teaching] + +But few attempts have been made to formulate a method, resting on +general principles, of conducting a recitation. One of these is of great +importance and has probably had more and better influence upon the +"hearing of lessons" than all others put together; namely, the analysis +by Herbart of a recitation into five successive steps. The steps are +commonly known as "the formal steps of instruction." The underlying +notion is that no matter how subjects vary in scope and detail there is +one and only one best way of mastering them, since there is a single +"general method" uniformly followed by the mind in effective attack upon +any subject. Whether it be a first-grade child mastering the rudiments +of number, a grammar-school pupil studying history, or a college student +dealing with philology, in each case the first step is preparation, the +second presentation, followed in turn by comparison and generalization, +ending in the application of the generalizations to specific and new +instances. + +[Sidenote: Illustration of method] + +By preparation is meant asking questions to remind pupils of familiar +experiences of their own that will be useful in acquiring the new topic. +What one already knows supplies the means with which one apprehends the +unknown. Hence the process of learning the new will be made easier if +related ideas in the pupil's mind are aroused to activity--are brought +to the foreground of consciousness. When pupils take up the study of +rivers, they are first questioned about streams or brooks with which +they are already acquainted; if they have never seen any, they may be +asked about water running in gutters. Somehow "apperceptive masses" are +stirred that will assist in getting hold of the new subject. The step of +preparation ends with statement of the aim of the lesson. Old knowledge +having been made active, new material is then "presented" to the pupils. +Pictures and relief models of rivers are shown; vivid oral descriptions +are given; if possible, the children are taken to see an actual river. +These two steps terminate the acquisition of particular facts. + +The next two steps are directed toward getting a general principle or +conception. The local river is compared with, perhaps, the Amazon, the +St. Lawrence, the Rhine; by this comparison accidental and unessential +features are eliminated and the river _concept_ is formed: the elements +involved in the river-meaning are gathered together and formulated. This +done, the resulting principle is fixed in mind and is clarified by being +applied to other streams, say to the Thames, the Po, the Connecticut. + +[Sidenote: Comparison with our prior analysis of reflection] + +If we compare this account of the methods of instruction with our own +analysis of a complete operation of thinking, we are struck by obvious +resemblances. In our statement (compare Chapter Six) the "steps" are the +occurrence of a problem or a puzzling phenomenon; then observation, +inspection of facts, to locate and clear up the problem; then the +formation of a hypothesis or the suggestion of a possible solution +together with its elaboration by reasoning; then the testing of the +elaborated idea by using it as a guide to new observations and +experimentations. In each account, there is the sequence of (_i_) +specific facts and events, (_ii_) ideas and reasonings, and (_iii_) +application of their result to specific facts. In each case, the +movement is inductive-deductive. We are struck also by one difference: +the Herbartian method makes no reference to a difficulty, a discrepancy +requiring explanation, as the origin and stimulus of the whole process. +As a consequence, it often seems as if the Herbartian method deals with +thought simply as an incident in the process of acquiring information, +instead of treating the latter as an incident in the process of +developing thought. + +[Sidenote: The formal steps concern the teacher's preparation rather +than the recitation itself] + +Before following up this comparison in more detail, we may raise the +question whether the recitation should, in any case, follow a uniform +prescribed series of steps--even if it be admitted that this series +expresses the normal logical order. In reply, it may be said that just +because the order is logical, it represents the survey of subject-matter +made by one who already understands it, not the path of progress +followed by a mind that is learning. The former may describe a uniform +straight-way course, the latter must be a series of tacks, of zigzag +movements back and forth. In short, the formal steps indicate the points +that should be covered by the teacher in preparing to conduct a +recitation, but should not prescribe the actual course of teaching. + +[Sidenote: The teacher's problem] + +Lack of any preparation on the part of a teacher leads, of course, to a +random, haphazard recitation, its success depending on the inspiration +of the moment, which may or may not come. Preparation in simply the +subject-matter conduces to a rigid order, the teacher examining pupils +on their exact knowledge of their text. But the teacher's problem--as a +teacher--does not reside in mastering a subject-matter, but in adjusting +a subject-matter to the nurture of thought. Now the formal steps +indicate excellently well the questions a teacher should ask in working +out the problem of teaching a topic. What preparation have my pupils for +attacking this subject? What familiar experiences of theirs are +available? What have they already learned that will come to their +assistance? How shall I present the matter so as to fit economically and +effectively into their present equipment? What pictures shall I show? To +what objects shall I call their attention? What incidents shall I +relate? What comparisons shall I lead them to draw, what similarities to +recognize? What is the general principle toward which the whole +discussion should point as its conclusion? By what applications shall I +try to fix, to clear up, and to make real their grasp of this general +principle? What activities of their own may bring it home to them as a +genuinely significant principle? + +[Sidenote: Only flexibility of procedure gives a recitation vitality] + +[Sidenote: Any step may come first] + +No teacher can fail to teach better if he has considered such questions +somewhat systematically. But the more the teacher has reflected upon +pupils' probable intellectual response to a topic from the various +stand-points indicated by the five formal steps, the more he will be +prepared to conduct the recitation in a flexible and free way, and yet +not let the subject go to pieces and the pupils' attention drift in all +directions; the less necessary will he find it, in order to preserve a +semblance of intellectual order, to follow some one uniform scheme. He +will be ready to take advantage of any sign of vital response that shows +itself from any direction. One pupil may already have some +inkling--probably erroneous--of a general principle. Application may +then come at the very beginning in order to show that the principle will +not work, and thereby induce search for new facts and a new +generalization. Or the abrupt presentation of some fact or object may so +stimulate the minds of pupils as to render quite superfluous any +preliminary preparation. If pupils' minds are at work at all, it is +quite impossible that they should wait until the teacher has +conscientiously taken them through the steps of preparation, +presentation, and comparison before they form at least a working +hypothesis or generalization. Moreover, unless comparison of the +familiar and the unfamiliar is introduced at the beginning, both +preparation and presentation will be aimless and without logical motive, +isolated, and in so far meaningless. The student's mind cannot be +prepared at large, but only for something in particular, and +presentation is usually the best way of evoking associations. The +emphasis may fall now on the familiar concept that will help grasp the +new, now on the new facts that frame the problem; but in either case it +is comparison and contrast with the other term of the pair which gives +either its force. In short, to transfer the logical steps from the +points that the teacher needs to consider to uniform successive steps in +the conduct of a recitation, is to impose the logical review of a mind +that already understands the subject, upon the mind that is struggling +to comprehend it, and thereby to obstruct the logic of the student's own +mind. + + +Sec. 2. _The Factors in the Recitation_ + +Bearing in mind that the formal steps represent intertwined factors of a +student's progress and not mileposts on a beaten highway, we may +consider each by itself. In so doing, it will be convenient to follow +the example of many of the Herbartians and reduce the steps to three: +first, the apprehension of specific or particular facts; second, +rational generalization; third, application and verification. + +[Sidenote: Preparation is getting the sense of a problem] + +I. The processes having to do with particular facts are preparation and +presentation. The best, indeed the only preparation is arousal to a +perception of something that needs explanation, something unexpected, +puzzling, peculiar. When the feeling of a genuine perplexity lays hold +of any mind (no matter how the feeling arises), that mind is alert and +inquiring, because stimulated from within. The shock, the bite, of a +question will force the mind to go wherever it is capable of going, +better than will the most ingenious pedagogical devices unaccompanied by +this mental ardor. It is the sense of a problem that forces the mind to +a survey and recall of the past to discover what the question means and +how it may be dealt with. + +[Sidenote: Pitfalls in preparation] + +The teacher in his more deliberate attempts to call into play the +familiar elements in a student's experience, must guard against certain +dangers. (_i_) The step of preparation must not be too long continued or +too exhaustive, or it defeats its own end. The pupil loses interest and +is bored, when a plunge _in medias res_ might have braced him to his +work. The preparation part of the recitation period of some +conscientious teachers reminds one of the boy who takes so long a run in +order to gain headway for a jump that when he reaches the line, he is +too tired to jump far. (_ii_) The organs by which we apprehend new +material are our habits. To insist too minutely upon turning over +habitual dispositions into conscious ideas is to interfere with their +best workings. Some factors of familiar experience must indeed be +brought to conscious recognition, just as transplanting is necessary +for the best growth of some plants. But it is fatal to be forever +digging up either experiences or plants to see how they are getting +along. Constraint, self-consciousness, embarrassment, are the +consequence of too much conscious refurbishing of familiar experiences. + +[Sidenote: Statement of aim of lesson] + +Strict Herbartians generally lay it down that statement--by the +teacher--of the aim of a lesson is an indispensable part of preparation. +This preliminary statement of the aim of the lesson hardly seems more +intellectual in character, however, than tapping a bell or giving any +other signal for attention and transfer of thoughts from diverting +subjects. To the teacher the statement of an end is significant, because +he has already been at the end; from a pupil's standpoint the statement +of what he is _going_ to learn is something of an Irish bull. If the +statement of the aim is taken too seriously by the instructor, as +meaning more than a signal to attention, its probable result is +forestalling the pupil's own reaction, relieving him of the +responsibility of developing a problem and thus arresting his mental +initiative. + +[Sidenote: How much the teacher should tell or show] + +It is unnecessary to discuss at length presentation as a factor in the +recitation, because our last chapter covered the topic under the +captions of observation and communication. The function of presentation +is to supply materials that force home the nature of a problem and +furnish suggestions for dealing with it. The practical problem of the +teacher is to preserve a balance between so little showing and telling +as to fail to stimulate reflection and so much as to choke thought. +Provided the student is genuinely engaged upon a topic, and provided the +teacher is willing to give the student a good deal of leeway as to what +he assimilates and retains (not requiring rigidly that everything be +grasped or reproduced), there is comparatively little danger that one +who is himself enthusiastic will communicate too much concerning a +topic. + +[Sidenote: The pupil's responsibility for making out a reasonable case] + +II. The distinctively rational phase of reflective inquiry consists, as +we have already seen, in the elaboration of an idea, or working +hypothesis, through conjoint comparison and contrast, terminating in +definition or formulation. (_i_) So far as the recitation is concerned, +the primary requirement is that the student be held responsible for +working out mentally every suggested principle so as to show what he +means by it, how it bears upon the facts at hand, and how the facts bear +upon it. Unless the pupil is made responsible for developing on his own +account the _reasonableness_ of the guess he puts forth, the recitation +counts for practically nothing in the training of reasoning power. A +clever teacher easily acquires great skill in dropping out the inept and +senseless contributions of pupils, and in selecting and emphasizing +those in line with the result he wishes to reach. But this method +(sometimes called "suggestive questioning") relieves the pupils of +intellectual responsibility, save for acrobatic agility in following the +teacher's lead. + +[Sidenote: The necessity for mental leisure] + +(_ii_) The working over of a vague and more or less casual idea into +coherent and definite form is impossible without a pause, without +freedom from distraction. We say "Stop and think"; well, all reflection +involves, at some point, stopping external observations and reactions so +that an idea may mature. Meditation, withdrawal or abstraction from +clamorous assailants of the senses and from demands for overt action, is +as necessary at the reasoning stage, as are observation and experiment +at other periods. The metaphors of digestion and assimilation, that so +readily occur to mind in connection with rational elaboration, are +highly instructive. A silent, uninterrupted working-over of +considerations by comparing and weighing alternative suggestions, is +indispensable for the development of coherent and compact conclusions. +Reasoning is no more akin to disputing or arguing, or to the abrupt +seizing and dropping of suggestions, than digestion is to a noisy +champing of the jaws. The teacher must secure opportunity for leisurely +mental digestion. + +[Sidenote: A typical central object necessary] + +(_iii_) In the process of comparison, the teacher must avert the +distraction that ensues from putting before the mind a number of facts +on the same level of importance. Since attention is selective, some one +object normally claims thought and furnishes the center of departure and +reference. This fact is fatal to the success of the pedagogical methods +that endeavor to conduct comparison on the basis of putting before the +mind a row of objects of equal importance. In comparing, the mind does +not naturally begin with objects _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, and try to find the +respect in which they agree. It begins with a single object or situation +more or less vague and inchoate in meaning, and makes excursions to +other objects in order to render understanding of the central object +consistent and clear. The mere multiplication of objects of comparison +is adverse to successful reasoning. Each fact brought within the field +of comparison should clear up some obscure feature or extend some +fragmentary trait of the primary object. + +[Sidenote: Importance of types] + +In short, pains should be taken to see that the object on which thought +centers is _typical_: material being typical when, although individual +or specific, it is such as readily and fruitfully suggests the +principles of an entire class of facts. No sane person begins to think +about rivers wholesale or at large. He begins with the one river that +has presented some puzzling trait. Then he studies other rivers to get +light upon the baffling features of this one, and at the same time he +employs the characteristic traits of his original object to reduce to +order the multifarious details that appear in connection with other +rivers. This working back and forth preserves unity of meaning, while +protecting it from monotony and narrowness. Contrast, unlikeness, throws +significant features into relief, and these become instruments for +binding together into an organized or coherent meaning dissimilar +characters. The mind is defended against the deadening influence of many +isolated particulars and also against the barrenness of a merely formal +principle. Particular cases and properties supply emphasis and +concreteness; general principles convert the particulars into a single +system. + +[Sidenote: All insight into meaning effects generalization] + +(_iv_) Hence generalization is not a separate and single act; it is +rather a constant tendency and function of the entire discussion or +recitation. Every step forward toward an idea that comprehends, that +explains, that unites what was isolated and therefore puzzling, +generalizes. The little child generalizes as truly as the adolescent or +adult, even though he does not arrive at the same generalities. If he is +studying a river basin, his knowledge is generalized in so far as the +various details that he apprehends are found to be the effects of a +single force, as that of water pushing downward from gravity, or are +seen to be successive stages of a single history of formation. Even if +there were acquaintance with only one river, knowledge of it under such +conditions would be generalized knowledge. + +[Sidenote: Insight into meaning requires formulation] + +The factor of formulation, of conscious stating, involved in +generalization, should also be a constant function, not a single formal +act. Definition means essentially the growth of a meaning out of +vagueness into _definiteness_. Such final verbal definition as takes +place should be only the culmination of a steady growth in distinctness. +In the reaction against ready-made verbal definitions and rules, the +pendulum should never swing to the opposite extreme, that of neglecting +to summarize the net meaning that emerges from dealing with particular +facts. Only as general summaries are made from time to time does the +mind reach a conclusion or a resting place; and only as conclusions are +reached is there an intellectual deposit available in future +understanding. + +[Sidenote: Generalization means capacity for application to the new] + +III. As the last words indicate, application and generalization lie +close together. Mechanical skill for further use may be achieved without +any explicit recognition of a principle; nay, in routine and narrow +technical matters, conscious formulation may be a hindrance. But without +recognition of a principle, without generalization, the power gained +cannot be transferred to new and dissimilar matters. The inherent +significance of generalization is that it frees a meaning from local +restrictions; rather, generalization _is_ meaning so freed; it is +meaning emancipated from accidental features so as to be available in +new cases. The surest test for detecting a spurious generalization (a +statement general in verbal form but not accompanied by discernment of +meaning), is the failure of the so-called principle spontaneously to +extend itself. The essence of the general is application. (_Ante_, p. +29.) + +[Sidenote: Fossilized _versus_ flexible principles] + +The true purpose of exercises that apply rules and principles is, then, +not so much to drive or drill them in as to give adequate insight into +an idea or principle. To treat application as a separate final step is +disastrous. In every judgment some meaning is employed as a basis for +estimating and interpreting some fact; by this application the meaning +is itself enlarged and tested. When the general meaning is regarded as +complete in itself, application is treated as an external, +non-intellectual use to which, for practical purposes alone, it is +advisable to put the meaning. The principle is one self-contained thing; +its use is another and independent thing. When this divorce occurs, +principles become fossilized and rigid; they lose their inherent +vitality, their self-impelling power. + +[Sidenote: Self-application a mark of genuine principles] + +A true conception is a _moving_ idea, and it seeks outlet, or +application to the interpretation of particulars and the guidance of +action, as naturally as water runs downhill. In fine, just as reflective +thought requires particular facts of observation and events of action +for its origination, so it also requires particular facts and deeds for +its own consummation. "Glittering generalities" are inert because they +are spurious. Application is as much an intrinsic part of genuine +reflective inquiry as is alert observation or reasoning itself. Truly +general principles tend to apply themselves. The teacher needs, indeed, +to supply conditions favorable to use and exercise; but something is +wrong when artificial tasks have arbitrarily to be invented in order to +secure application for principles. + + + + +CHAPTER SIXTEEN + +SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS + + +We shall conclude our survey of how we think and how we should think by +presenting some factors of thinking which should balance each other, but +which constantly tend to become so isolated that they work against each +other instead of cooperating to make reflective inquiry efficient. + + +Sec. 1. _The Unconscious and the Conscious_ + +[Sidenote: The _understood_ as the unconsciously assumed] + +It is significant that one meaning of the term _understood_ is something +so thoroughly mastered, so completely agreed upon, as to be _assumed_; +that is to say, taken as a matter of course without explicit statement. +The familiar "goes without saying" means "it is understood." If two +persons can converse intelligently with each other, it is because a +common experience supplies a background of mutual understanding upon +which their respective remarks are projected. To dig up and to formulate +this common background would be imbecile; it is "understood"; that is, +it is silently supplied and implied as the taken-for-granted medium of +intelligent exchange of ideas. + +[Sidenote: Inquiry as conscious formulation] + +If, however, the two persons find themselves at cross-purposes, it is +necessary to dig up and compare the presuppositions, the implied +context, on the basis of which each is speaking. The implicit is made +explicit; what was unconsciously assumed is exposed to the light of +conscious day. In this way, the root of the misunderstanding is +removed. Some such rhythm of the unconscious and the conscious is +involved in all fruitful thinking. A person in pursuing a consecutive +train of thoughts takes some system of ideas for granted (which +accordingly he leaves unexpressed, "unconscious") as surely as he does +in conversing with others. Some context, some situation, some +controlling purpose dominates his explicit ideas so thoroughly that it +does not need to be consciously formulated and expounded. Explicit +thinking goes on within the limits of what is implied or understood. Yet +the fact that reflection originates in a problem makes it necessary _at +some points_ consciously to inspect and examine this familiar +background. We have to turn upon some unconscious assumption and make it +explicit. + +[Sidenote: Rules cannot be given for attaining a balance] + +No rules can be laid down for attaining the due balance and rhythm of +these two phases of mental life. No ordinance can prescribe at just what +point the spontaneous working of some unconscious attitude and habit is +to be checked till we have made explicit what is implied in it. No one +can tell in detail just how far the analytic inspection and formulation +are to be carried. We can say that they must be carried far enough so +that the individual will know what he is about and be able to guide his +thinking; but in a given case just how far is that? We can say that they +must be carried far enough to detect and guard against the source of +some false perception or reasoning, and to get a leverage on the +investigation; but such statements only restate the original difficulty. +Since our reliance must be upon the disposition and tact of the +individual in the particular case, there is no test of the success of an +education more important than the extent to which it nurtures a type of +mind competent to maintain an economical balance of the unconscious and +the conscious. + +[Sidenote: The over-_analytic_ to be avoided] + +The ways of teaching criticised in the foregoing pages as false +"analytic" methods of instruction (_ante_, p. 112), all reduce +themselves to the mistake of directing explicit attention and +formulation to what would work better if left an unconscious attitude +and working assumption. To pry into the familiar, the usual, the +automatic, simply for the sake of making it conscious, simply for the +sake of formulating it, is both an impertinent interference, and a +source of boredom. To be forced to dwell consciously upon the accustomed +is the essence of ennui; to pursue methods of instruction that have that +tendency is deliberately to cultivate lack of interest. + +[Sidenote: The detection of error, the clinching of truth, demand +conscious statement] + +On the other hand, what has been said in criticism of merely routine +forms of skill, what has been said about the importance of having a +genuine problem, of introducing the novel, and of reaching a deposit of +general meaning weighs on the other side of the scales. It is as fatal +to good thinking to fail to make conscious the standing source of some +error or failure as it is to pry needlessly into what works smoothly. To +over-simplify, to exclude the novel for the sake of prompt skill, to +avoid obstacles for the sake of averting errors, is as detrimental as to +try to get pupils to formulate everything they know and to state every +step of the process employed in getting a result. Where the shoe +pinches, analytic examination is indicated. When a topic is to be +clinched so that knowledge of it will carry over into an effective +resource in further topics, conscious condensation and summarizing are +imperative. In the early stage of acquaintance with a subject, a good +deal of unconstrained unconscious mental play about it may be +permitted, even at the risk of some random experimenting; in the later +stages, conscious formulation and review may be encouraged. Projection +and reflection, going directly ahead and turning back in scrutiny, +should alternate. Unconsciousness gives spontaneity and freshness; +consciousness, conviction and control. + + +Sec. 2. _Process and Product_ + +[Sidenote: Play and work again] + +A like balance in mental life characterizes process and product. We met +one important phase of this adjustment in considering play and work. In +play, interest centers in activity, without much reference to its +outcome. The sequence of deeds, images, emotions, suffices on its own +account. In work, the end holds attention and controls the notice given +to means. Since the difference is one of direction of interest, the +contrast is one of emphasis, not of cleavage. When comparative +prominence in consciousness of activity or outcome is transformed into +isolation of one from the other, play degenerates into fooling, and work +into drudgery. + +[Sidenote: Play should not be fooling,] + +By "fooling" we understand a series of disconnected temporary overflows +of energy dependent upon whim and accident. When all reference to +outcome is eliminated from the sequence of ideas and acts that make +play, each member of the sequence is cut loose from every other and +becomes fantastic, arbitrary, aimless; mere fooling follows. There is +some inveterate tendency to fool in children as well as in animals; nor +is the tendency wholly evil, for at least it militates against falling +into ruts. But when it is excessive in amount, dissipation and +disintegration follow; and the only way of preventing this consequence +is to make regard for results enter into even the freest play activity. + +[Sidenote: nor work, drudgery] + +Exclusive interest in the result alters work to drudgery. For by +drudgery is meant those activities in which the interest in the outcome +does not suffuse the means of getting the result. Whenever a piece of +work becomes drudgery, the process of doing loses all value for the +doer; he cares solely for what is to be had at the end of it. The work +itself, the putting forth of energy, is hateful; it is just a necessary +evil, since without it some important end would be missed. Now it is a +commonplace that in the work of the world many things have to be done +the doing of which is not intrinsically very interesting. However, the +argument that children should be kept doing drudgery-tasks because +thereby they acquire power to be faithful to distasteful duties, is +wholly fallacious. Repulsion, shirking, and evasion are the consequences +of having the repulsive imposed--not loyal love of duty. Willingness to +work for ends by means of acts not naturally attractive is best attained +by securing such an appreciation of the value of the end that a sense of +its value is transferred to its means of accomplishment. Not interesting +in themselves, they borrow interest from the result with which they are +associated. + +[Sidenote: Balance of playfulness and seriousness the intellectual +ideal] + +[Sidenote: Free play of mind] + +[Sidenote: is normal in childhood] + +The intellectual harm accruing from divorce of work and play, product +and process, is evidenced in the proverb, "All work and no play makes +Jack a dull boy." That the obverse is true is perhaps sufficiently +signalized in the fact that fooling is so near to foolishness. To be +playful and serious at the same time is possible, and it defines the +ideal mental condition. Absence of dogmatism and prejudice, presence of +intellectual curiosity and flexibility, are manifest in the free play of +the mind upon a topic. To give the mind this free play is not to +encourage toying with a subject, but is to be interested in the +unfolding of the subject on its own account, apart from its subservience +to a preconceived belief or habitual aim. Mental play is +open-mindedness, faith in the power of thought to preserve its own +integrity without external supports and arbitrary restrictions. Hence +free mental play involves seriousness, the earnest following of the +development of subject-matter. It is incompatible with carelessness or +flippancy, for it exacts accurate noting of every result reached in +order that every conclusion may be put to further use. What is termed +the interest in truth for its own sake is certainly a serious matter, +yet this pure interest in truth coincides with love of the free play of +thought. + +In spite of many appearances to the contrary--usually due to social +conditions of either undue superfluity that induces idle fooling or +undue economic pressure that compels drudgery--childhood normally +realizes the ideal of conjoint free mental play and thoughtfulness. +Successful portrayals of children have always made their wistful +intentness at least as obvious as their lack of worry for the morrow. To +live in the present is compatible with condensation of far-reaching +meanings in the present. Such enrichment of the present for its own sake +is the just heritage of childhood and the best insurer of future growth. +The child forced into premature concern with economic remote results may +develop a surprising sharpening of wits in a particular direction, but +this precocious specialization is always paid for by later apathy and +dullness. + +[Sidenote: The attitude of the artist] + +That art originated in play is a common saying. Whether or not the +saying is historically correct, it suggests that harmony of mental +playfulness and seriousness describes the artistic ideal. When the +artist is preoccupied overmuch with means and materials, he may achieve +wonderful technique, but not the artistic spirit _par excellence_. When +the animating idea is in excess of the command of method, aesthetic +feeling may be indicated, but the art of presentation is too defective +to express the feeling thoroughly. When the thought of the end becomes +so adequate that it compels translation into the means that embody it, +or when attention to means is inspired by recognition of the end they +serve, we have the attitude typical of the artist, an attitude that may +be displayed in all activities, even though not conventionally +designated arts. + +[Sidenote: The art of the teacher culminates in nurturing this attitude] + +That teaching is an art and the true teacher an artist is a familiar +saying. Now the teacher's own claim to rank as an artist is measured by +his ability to foster the attitude of the artist in those who study with +him, whether they be youth or little children. Some succeed in arousing +enthusiasm, in communicating large ideas, in evoking energy. So far, +well; but the final test is whether the stimulus thus given to wider +aims succeeds in transforming itself into power, that is to say, into +the attention to detail that ensures mastery over means of execution. If +not, the zeal flags, the interest dies out, the ideal becomes a clouded +memory. Other teachers succeed in training facility, skill, mastery of +the technique of subjects. Again it is well--so far. But unless +enlargement of mental vision, power of increased discrimination of final +values, a sense for ideas--for principles--accompanies this training, +forms of skill ready to be put indifferently to any end may be the +result. Such modes of technical skill may display themselves, according +to circumstances, as cleverness in serving self-interest, as docility in +carrying out the purposes of others, or as unimaginative plodding in +ruts. To nurture inspiring aim and executive means into harmony with +each other is at once the difficulty and the reward of the teacher. + + +Sec. 3. _The Far and the Near_ + +[Sidenote: "Familiarity breeds contempt,"] + +Teachers who have heard that they should avoid matters foreign to +pupils' experience, are frequently surprised to find pupils wake up when +something beyond their ken is introduced, while they remain apathetic in +considering the familiar. In geography, the child upon the plains seems +perversely irresponsive to the intellectual charms of his local +environment, and fascinated by whatever concerns mountains or the sea. +Teachers who have struggled with little avail to extract from pupils +essays describing the details of things with which they are well +acquainted, sometimes find them eager to write on lofty or imaginary +themes. A woman of education, who has recorded her experience as a +factory worker, tried retelling _Little Women_ to some factory girls +during their working hours. They cared little for it, saying, "Those +girls had no more interesting experience than we have," and demanded +stories of millionaires and society leaders. A man interested in the +mental condition of those engaged in routine labor asked a Scotch girl +in a cotton factory what she thought about all day. She replied that as +soon as her mind was free from starting the machinery, she married a +duke, and their fortunes occupied her for the remainder of the day. + +[Sidenote: since only the novel demands attention,] + +Naturally, these incidents are not told in order to encourage methods of +teaching that appeal to the sensational, the extraordinary, or the +incomprehensible. They are told, however, to enforce the point that the +familiar and the near do not excite or repay thought on their own +account, but only as they are adjusted to mastering the strange and +remote. It is a commonplace of psychology that we do not attend to the +old, nor consciously mind that to which we are thoroughly accustomed. +For this, there is good reason: to devote attention to the old, when new +circumstances are constantly arising to which we should adjust +ourselves, would be wasteful and dangerous. Thought must be reserved for +the new, the precarious, the problematic. Hence the mental constraint, +the sense of being lost, that comes to pupils when they are invited to +turn their thoughts upon that with which they are already familiar. The +old, the near, the accustomed, is not that _to_ which but that _with_ +which we attend; it does not furnish the material of a problem, but of +its solution. + +[Sidenote: which, in turn, can be given only through the old] + +The last sentence has brought us to the balancing of new and old, of the +far and that close by, involved in reflection. The more remote supplies +the stimulus and the motive; the nearer at hand furnishes the point of +approach and the available resources. This principle may also be stated +in this form: the best thinking occurs when the easy and the difficult +are duly proportioned to each other. The easy and the familiar are +equivalents, as are the strange and the difficult. Too much that is easy +gives no ground for inquiry; too much of the hard renders inquiry +hopeless. + +[Sidenote: The given and the suggested] + +The necessity of the interaction of the near and the far follows +directly from the nature of thinking. Where there is thought, something +present suggests and indicates something absent. Accordingly unless the +familiar is presented under conditions that are in some respect +unusual, it gives no jog to thinking, it makes no demand upon what is +not present in order to be understood. And if the subject presented is +totally strange, there is no basis upon which it may suggest anything +serviceable for its comprehension. When a person first has to do with +fractions, for example, they will be wholly baffling so far as they do +not signify to him some relation that he has already mastered in dealing +with whole numbers. When fractions have become thoroughly familiar, his +perception of them acts simply as a signal to do certain things; they +are a "substitute sign," to which he can react without thinking. +(_Ante_, p. 178.) If, nevertheless, the situation as a whole presents +something novel and hence uncertain, the entire response is not +mechanical, because this mechanical operation is put to use in solving a +problem. There is no end to this spiral process: foreign subject-matter +transformed through thinking into a familiar possession becomes a +resource for judging and assimilating additional foreign subject-matter. + +[Sidenote: Observation supplies the near, imagination the remote] + +The need for both imagination and observation in every mental enterprise +illustrates another aspect of the same principle. Teachers who have +tried object-lessons of the conventional type have usually found that +when the lessons were new, pupils were attracted to them as a diversion, +but as soon as they became matters of course they were as dull and +wearisome as was ever the most mechanical study of mere symbols. +Imagination could not play about the objects so as to enrich them. The +feeling that instruction in "facts, facts" produces a narrow Gradgrind +is justified not because facts in themselves are limiting, but because +facts are dealt out as such hard and fast ready-made articles as to +leave no room to imagination. Let the facts be presented so as to +stimulate imagination, and culture ensues naturally enough. The converse +is equally true. The imaginative is not necessarily the imaginary; that +is, the unreal. The proper function of imagination is vision of +realities that cannot be exhibited under existing conditions of +sense-perception. Clear insight into the remote, the absent, the obscure +is its aim. History, literature, and geography, the principles of +science, nay, even geometry and arithmetic, are full of matters that +must be imaginatively realized if they are realized at all. Imagination +supplements and deepens observation; only when it turns into the +fanciful does it become a substitute for observation and lose logical +force. + +[Sidenote: Experience through communication of others' experience] + +A final exemplification of the required balance between near and far is +found in the relation that obtains between the narrower field of +experience realized in an individual's own contact with persons and +things, and the wider experience of the race that may become his through +communication. Instruction always runs the risk of swamping the pupil's +own vital, though narrow, experience under masses of communicated +material. The instructor ceases and the teacher begins at the point +where communicated matter stimulates into fuller and more significant +life that which has entered by the strait and narrow gate of +sense-perception and motor activity. Genuine communication involves +contagion; its name should not be taken in vain by terming communication +that which produces no community of thought and purpose between the +child and the race of which he is the heir. + + + + +INDEX + + + Abstract, 135-144 + + Abstraction, 155 f. + + Action, activity, activities, 46, 140 f., 157-169, 190 f. + + Active attitude and the concept, 128 + + Analysis, 111-115, 152 f.; + in education, 112 + + Apperception, 199; + apperceptive masses, 203 + + Application, 129 f., 212 f. + + Apprehension, 119 f.; + _see_ Understanding. + + Artist, attitude of, 219 f. + + Articulation, 3 + + Authority, 4, 25 + + + Bacon, 22, 25, 33 + + Bain, 155 + + Balance, 38 + + Behavior, 5, 42-4, 54 f.; + _see_ Action, Occupations + + Belief, 1, 3-7; + reached indirectly, 18 + + + Central factor in thinking, 7 + + Children, 42 f. + + Clifford, 148 + + Coherence, 3, 80 + + Comparison, 89 f., 202 + + Comprehension, 120; + _see_ Understanding. + + Concentration, 40 + + Concept, conception, 107, 125-9, 213; + _see_ Meaning. + + Conclusion, 3, 5 f., 40, 77, 80 f.; + technique of, 87 f. + + Concrete, 135-44 + + Congruity, 3, 72 + + Connection, 7; + _see_ Relation. + + Consecutive, 2, 40, 42 + + Consequence, consequential, 2; + consequences, 5 + + Consistency, 40 + + Continuity, 3, 40, 80 + + Control, 18-28; + of deduction, 93-100; + of induction, 84-93; + of suggestion, 84 f., 93; + _see_ Regulation. + + Corroborate, corroboration, 9, 77 + + Curiosity, 31 ff., 105 + + + Darwin, 38, 90, 127 + + Data, 79 f., 95, 103 f., 106 + + Decision, 107 + + Deduction, 79, 93-100, 103; + control of, 93-100 + + Definition, 130 f.; + definitions, 131-4, 212 + + Development, of ideas, 83; + _see_ Elaboration, Ratiocination, Reasoning. + + Discipline, 63, 78; + formal, 45, 50 + + Discourse, consecutive, 185 f. + + Discovery, inductive, 81, 116 + + Division, 131 + + Dogmatism, 149, 198 + + Doing, 139, 190 + + Doubt, 6, 9, 13, 102; + _see_ Perplexity, Uncertainty. + + Drill, 52, 63 + + Drudgery, 218 + + + Education, intellectual, 57, 62; + aim of, 143 f., 156 + + Elaboration, of ideas, 75 f., 84, 94 f., 103, 106, 209; + _see_ Development, Ratiocination, Reasoning. + + Emerson, 173 + + Emotion, 4, 11, 74 + + Emphasis, 112, 114 f. + + Empirical thinking, 145-9 + + End, 11 f. + + Evidence, 5, 7 f., 27, 103 f.; + _see_ Grounds. + + Experience, 132, 156, 199 f., 224 + + Experiment, experimental, 70 f., 77, 91 f., 99 f., 151 f., 154 + + Extension, 130 f. + + + Fact _vs_ idea, 109; + facts, 3, 5 + + Faculty psychology, 45 + + Familiar, familiarity, 120-25, 136 f., 206, 214 f., 221 f. + + Fooling, 217 + + Formalism; + _see_ Discipline. + + Formal steps of instruction, 202, 206 + + Formulation, 112 f., 209, 212, 214-17 + + Freedom, 64 f.; + intellectual, 66 + + Function, 123; + function of signifying, 7, 15 + + + General 80, 82, 99, 182 f.; + _see_ Principles, Universal. + + Generality, 129, 134 + + Generalization, 211 f. + + Grounds, 1, 4-8, 80; + _see_ Evidence. + + Guiding factor in reflection, 11 + + + Habits; + _see_ Action. + + Herbart, 202 + + Herbartian method, 202-6 + + Hobhouse, 31 + + Hypothesis, 5, 75, 77, 81 f., 94 f., 108, 209 + + + Idea, 75, 77, 79, 107-10; + _see_ Meaning. + + Idle thinking, 2 + + Image, 109 + + Imagination, 165 f., 223 f. + + Imitation, 47, 51, 160 + + Implication, 5, 75, 77 + + Impulse, 64 + + Induction, 79-93, 103; + control of, 84-93; + scientific, 86 + + Inference, 26 f., 75, 77, 101; + critical, 74, 82; + systematic, 81 + + Information, 52 f., 197-200 + + Inquiry, 5, 9 f. + + Intellect, intellectual activity, 44, 50, 62 + + Intension, 130 f. + + Internal congruity, 3 + + Isolation, 96-100, 117, 191 + + + James, 119, 121, 153 f. + + Jevons, 91 f., 183, 192 + + Judgment, 5; + factors of, 101; + good judgment, 101, 103, 106 f.; + and inference, 101 ff.; + intuitive, 104 f.; + principles of, 106 f.; + suspended, 74, 82, 105, 108; + tentative, 101 + + + Knowledge, 3 f., 6, 95; + spiral movement of, 120, 223 + + + Language, 170-87; + and education, 176-87; + and meaning, 171; + technical, 184 f.; + as a tool of thought, 170 ff., 179 + + Leap, in inference, 26, 75 + + Leisure, 209 f. + + Locke, 19 n., 22-5 + + Logical, 56 f.; + _vs._ psychological, 62 f. + + + Meaning, meanings, 7, 17, 79 f., 82, 94, 116-34; + capital fund of, store of, 118, 120, 126, 161, 174, 180; + individual, 173 f.; + organization of, 175, 185; + as tools, keys, instruments, 108 f., 120, 125 f., 129; + _See_ Concept. + + Memory, 107 + + Method, 46-50, 58; + analytic and synthetic, 114; + formal, 60 + + Mill, 18 n. + + Mood, 5 + + Motivation, 42 + + + Negative cases, 90 + + Notion. _See_ Concept. + + + Object lessons, 140, 192 + + Observation, 3, 7, 69 f., 76 f., 85, 91, 96, 188-97, 223 f.; + in schools, 193-7; + scientific, 196 + + Occupation, occupations, 43, 99, 167 f. + + Openmindedness, 219 + + Order, orderliness, 2, 39, 41, 46, 57; + _see_ Consecutive. + + Organization, 39, 41; + of subject matter, 62 + + Originality, 198 + + + Particulars, 80, 82; + _cf._ General, Universal. + + Passion, 4, 23, 25, 106 + + Perception, 3, 190; + _cf._ Observation + + Perplexity, 9, 11, 72 + + Placing, 114, 126 + + Play, 161-7, 217-21; + of mind, 219 + + Playfulness, 162, 218 f. + + Practical deliberation, 68 f. + + Prejudice, 4 + + Principles, 212 f. + + Problem, 9, 12, 33, 72, 74, 76, 109, 120, 191 f., 199, 207 + + Proof, 7, 27, 81 + + Pseudo-idea, 109 + + Psychological (_vs._ logical), 62 f. + + Purpose, 11 + + + Ratiocination, 75 f., 83 + + Reason, reasoning, 75-8, 94 f., 98 + + Reasons, 5 f. + + Recitation, 201-13; + factors in, 206-13 + + Reflection, 2 f., 5 f.; + central function of, 116; + double movement of, 79-84; + five steps in, 72-8, 203 f. + + Regulation, 18-28; + _see_ Control. + + Relation, relationship, 82, 97; + _see_ Connection. + + + Scientific thinking, 145-6 + + Sense training, 190-97 + + Sequence, 2; _cf._ Consequence. + + Sidgwick, 127 + + Signify, 7, 15 + + Signs, 16, 171-6 + + Spiral movement, _see_ Knowledge. + + Stimulus-response, 47 + + Studies, types of, 50 + + Subject matter, 58 f.; + intellectual, 45 f.; + logical, 61 f.; + practical, 49; + theoretical, 49; + and the teacher, 204 f. + + Substitute signs, 177 f., 223 + + Succession, 3 + + Suggestion, 7, 12, 27, 74 f., 84 f.; + control of, 84 f., 93; + dimensions of, 34-7 + + Supposition, 4, 9 + + Suspense of judgment, 13, 74, 82 + + Symbols, _see_ Signs. + + Synthesis, 114 f. + + + Terms, 3, 72 f., 76, 79, 95 + + Testing, 9, 13, 41, 82, 116; + of deduction, 96, 99 + + Theory, 138 + + Theoretical, 137 + + Thinking, complete, 96, 98 f., 100; + _see_ Reasoning, Reflection. + + Thought, 8 f.; + educative value of, 2; + reflective, 2; + train of, 3; + types of, 1 + + Truth, truths, 3 + + + Uncertainty, _see_ Doubt, Perplexity. + + Unconscious, 214 ff. + + Uncritical thinking, 12 + + Understanding, 116-20; + direct and indirect, 118-20, 136 + + Universal, 9 + + + Vagueness, 129 f., 182, 212 + + Vailati, 81 n. + + Venn, 17 + + Verification, 77 + + Vocabulary, 180-4 + + + Ward, 110 n. + + Warrant, 7 + + Wisdom, 52 + + Wonder, 31, 33 f. + + Wordsworth, 31 + + Work, 162-7, 217-19 + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of How We Think, by John Dewey + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HOW WE THINK *** + +***** This file should be named 37423.txt or 37423.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/7/4/2/37423/ + +Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Cathy Maxam and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |