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diff --git a/37358.txt b/37358.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a045f0b --- /dev/null +++ b/37358.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3526 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Determinism or Free-Will?, by Chapman Cohen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Determinism or Free-Will? + +Author: Chapman Cohen + +Release Date: September 8, 2011 [EBook #37358] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DETERMINISM OR FREE-WILL? *** + + + + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + + + + DETERMINISM OR FREE-WILL? + + + + + Printed and Published by + THE PIONEER PRESS + (G. W. FOOTE & CO., LTD.), + 61 Farringdon Street, London, E.C. 4. + + + + + Determinism + + OR + + Free-Will? + + BY + + CHAPMAN COHEN. + + New Edition. Revised and Enlarged. + + LONDON: + THE PIONEER PRESS, + 61 FARRINGDON STREET, E.C. 4. + + 1919. + + + + +CONTENTS. + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I.--THE QUESTION STATED 9 + + II.--"FREEDOM" AND "WILL" 23 + + III.--CONSCIOUSNESS, DELIBERATION, AND CHOICE 36 + + IV.--SOME ALLEGED CONSEQUENCES OF DETERMINISM 50 + + V.--PROFESSOR JAMES ON THE "DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM" 63 + + VI.--THE NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 76 + + VII.--DETERMINISM AND CHARACTER 92 + + VIII.--A PROBLEM IN DETERMINISM 101 + + IX.--ENVIRONMENT 117 + + + + +PREFACE TO NEW EDITION. + + +The demand for a new edition of _Determinism or Free-Will_ is gratifying +as affording evidence of the existence of a public, apart from the class +catered for by more expensive publications, interested in philosophic +questions[1]. It was, indeed, in the conviction that such a public +existed that the book was written. Capacity, in spite of a popular +impression to the contrary, has no very close relation to cash, nor is +interest in philosophic questions indicated solely by the ability to +spend a half-guinea or guinea on a work that might well have been +published at three or four shillings. There exists a fairly large public +of sufficient capacity and education intelligently to discuss the deeper +aspects of life, but which has neither time nor patience to give to the +study of bulky works that so often leave a subject more obscure at the +end than it was at the beginning. + + [1] When the Mss. of this work was submitted to a + well-known firm of publishers, the reply came in + the form of an offer to publish the work provided + it could be expanded so as to admit of its + publication at 7/6. It would have been quite easy + to have done this; the difficulty is to compress, + and the less a subject is understood the easier it + is to write at length on it. But the offer, though + financially tempting, would have defeated the + purpose for which the work was written, and so was + declined. + +Nor does there appear any adequate reason why it should be otherwise. A +sane philosophy must base itself on the common things of life, and must +deal with the common experience of all men. The man who cannot find +material for philosophic study by reflecting on those which are near at +hand is not likely to achieve success by travelling all over the globe. +He will only succeed in presenting to his readers a more elaborately +acquired and a more expensively gained confusion. Nor is there any +reason why philosophy should be discussed only in the jargon of the +schools, except to keep it, like the religious mysteries, the property +of the initiated few. We all talk philosophy, as we all talk prose, and +doubtless many are as surprised as was M. Jourdain, when the fact is +pointed out to them. + +So whatever merit this little work has is chiefly due to the avoidance, +so far as possible, of a stereotyped phraseology, and to the elimination +of irrelevant matter that has gathered round the subject. The present +writer has long had the conviction that the great need in the discussion +of ethical and psychological questions is their restatement in the +simplest possible terms. The most difficult thing that faces the +newcomer to these questions is to find out what they are really all +about. Writer follows writer, each apparently more concerned to discuss +what others have said than to deal with a straightforward discussion of +the subject itself. Imposing as this method may be, it is fatal to +enlightenment. For the longer the discussion continues the farther away +from the original question it seems to get. One has heard of "The +Religion of Philosophy," and its acquisition of obscurity in thought and +prolixity in language seems to have gone some distance towards earning +the title. + +Being neither anxious to parade the extent of my reading, nor greatly +overawed by the large number of eminent men who have written on the +subject, I decided that what was needed was a plain statement of the +problem itself. My concern, therefore, has been to keep out all that has +not a direct bearing on the essential question, and only to deal with +other writers so far as a discussion of what they say may help to make +plain the point at issue. If the result does not carry conviction it at +least makes clear the ground of disagreement. And that is certainly +something gained. + +Moreover, there is a real need for a clearing away of all the verbal +lumber that has been allowed to gather round subjects concerning which +intelligent men and women will think even though they may be unable to +reach reliable or satisfactory conclusions. And I have good grounds for +believing that so far this little work has achieved the purpose for +which it was written. If I may say it without being accused of conceit, +it has made the subject clear to many who before found it +incomprehensible. And, really, philosophy would not be so very obscure, +if it were not for the philosophers. We may not always be able to find +answers to our questions, but we ought always to understand what the +questions are about. That it is not always the case is largely due to +those who mistake obscurity for profundity, and in their haste to rise +from the ground lose altogether their touch with the earth. + + C. C. + + + + +DETERMINISM OR FREE-WILL? + +I. + +THE QUESTION STATED. + + +At the tail end of a lengthy series of writers, from Augustine to +Martineau, and from Spinoza to William James, one might well be excused +the assumption that nothing new remains to be said on so well-worn a +topic as that of Free-Will. Against this, however, lies the feeling that +in the case of any subject which continuously absorbs attention some +service to the cause of truth is rendered by a re-statement of the +problem in contemporary language, with such modifications in terminology +as may be necessary, and with such illustrations from current positive +knowledge as may serve to make the issue clear to a new generation. In +the course of time new words are created, while old ones change their +meanings and implications. This results not only in the terminology of a +few generations back taking on the character of a dead language to the +average contemporary reader, but may occasion the not unusual spectacle +of disputants using words with such widely different meanings that even +a clear comprehension of the question at issue becomes impossible. + +So much may be assumed without directly controverting or endorsing +Professor Paulsen's opinion that the "Free-Will problem is one which +arose under certain conditions and has disappeared with the +disappearance of those conditions;" or the opposite opinion of Professor +William James that there is no other subject on which an inventive +genius has a better chance of breaking new ground. If mankind--even +educated mankind--were composed of individuals whose brains functioned +with the accuracy of the most approved text-books of logic, Professor +Paulsen's opinion would be self-evidently true. Granting that the +conditions which gave rise to the belief in Free-Will have disappeared, +the belief itself should have disappeared likewise. Professor Paulsen's +own case proves that he is either wrong in thinking that these +conditions have disappeared, or in assuming that, this being the case, +the belief has also died out. + +The truth is that beliefs do not always, or even usually, die with the +conditions that gave them birth. Society always has on hand a plentiful +stock of beliefs that are, like so many intellectual vagrants, without +visible means of support. Human history would not present the clash and +conflict of opinion it does were it otherwise. Indeed, if a belief is in +possession its ejection is the most difficult of all operations. +Possession is here not merely nine points of the law, it is often all +the law that is acknowledged. Beliefs once established acquire an +independent vitality of their own, and may defy all destructive efforts +for generations. One may, therefore, agree with the first half of +Professor Paulsen's statement without endorsing the concluding portion. +The problem has not, so far as the generality of civilized mankind is +concerned, disappeared. The originating conditions have gone, but the +belief remains, and its real nature and value can only be rightly +estimated by a mental reconstruction of the conditions that gave it +birth. As Spencer has reminded us, the pedigree of a belief is as +important as is the pedigree of a horse. We cannot be really certain +whether a belief is with us because of its social value, or because of +sheer unreasoning conservatism, until we know something of its history. +In any case we understand better both it and the human nature that gives +it hospitality by knowing its ancestry. And of this truth no subject +could better offer an illustration than the one under discussion. + +Reserving this point for a moment, let us ask, "What is the essential +issue between the believers in Free-Will and the upholders of the +doctrine of Determinism?" One may put the Deterministic position in a +few words. Essentially it is a thorough-going application of the +principle of causation to human nature. What Copernicus and Kepler did +for the world of astronomy, Determinism aims at doing for the world of +psychological phenomena. Human nature, it asserts, is part and parcel of +nature as a whole, and bears to it the same relation that a part does to +the whole. When the Determinist refers to the "Order of Nature" he +includes all, and asserts that an accurate analysis of human nature will +be found to exemplify the same principle of causation that is seen to +obtain elsewhere. True, mental phenomena have laws of their own, as +chemistry and biology have their own peculiar laws, but these are +additional, not contradictory to other natural laws. Any exception to +this is apparent, not real. Man's nature, physical, biological, +psychological, and sociological, is to be studied as we study other +natural phenomena, and the closer our study the clearer the recognition +that its manifestations are dependent upon processes with which no one +dreams of associating the conception of "freedom." Determinism asserts +that if we knew the quality and inclination of all the forces bearing +upon human nature, in the same way that we know the forces determining +the motions of a planet, then the forecasting of conduct would become a +mere problem in moral mathematics. That we cannot do this, nor may ever +be able to do it, is due to the enormous and ever-changing complexity of +the forces that determine conduct. But this ought not to blind us to the +general truth of the principle involved. To some extent we do forecast +human conduct; that we cannot always do so, or cannot do so completely, +only proves weakness or ignorance. The Determinist claims, therefore, +that his view of human nature is thoroughly scientific, and that he is +only applying here principles that have borne such excellent fruit +elsewhere; and, finally, that unless this view of human nature be +accepted the scientific cultivation of character becomes an +impossibility. + +So far the Determinist. The believer in Free-Will--for the future it +will be briefer and more convenient to use the term "Volitionist" or +"Indeterminist"--does not on his part deny the influence on the human +organism of those forces on which the Determinist lays stress. What he +denies is that any of them singly, or all of them collectively, can ever +furnish an adequate and exhaustive account of human action. He affirms +that after analysis has done its utmost there remains an unexplained +residuum beyond the reach of the instruments or the methods of positive +science. He denies that conduct--even theoretically--admits of +explanation and prediction in the same way that explanation and +prediction apply to natural phenomena as a whole. It is admitted that +circumstances may influence conduct, but only in the way that a cheque +for five pounds enables one to become possessed of a certain quantity of +bullion--provided the cheque is honoured by the bank. So the "Will" may +honour or respond to certain circumstances or it may not. In other +words, the deterministic influence of circumstances is contingent, not +necessary. Circumstances determine conduct only when a "free" volition +assents to their operation. So against the proposition that conduct is +ultimately the conditioned expression of one aspect of the cosmic order, +there is the counter-proposition that intentional action is the +unconditioned expression of absolutely free beings, and is what it is +because of the selective action of an undetermined will. + +Further, against all deterministic analysis the Volitionist stubbornly +opposes the testimony of consciousness, and the necessity for the belief +in Free-Will as a moral postulate. Thus, even when the deterministic +analysis of an action--from its source in some external stimuli, to the +final neural discharge that secures its performance is complete, it is +still urged that no possible analysis can override man's conviction of +"freedom." The existence of this conviction is, of course, indisputable, +and it forms the bed-rock of all forms of anti-determinism. But the +scientific or logical value of a conviction, as such, is surely open to +question. Equally strong convictions were once held concerning the +flatness of the earth's surface, the existence of witches, and a hundred +and one other matters. Besides, a belief or a conviction is not a basal +fact in human nature, it is the last stage of a process, and can +therefore prove nothing save the fact of its own existence. Human nature +at any stage of its existence is an evolution from past human nature, +and many prevalent beliefs are as reminiscent in their character as our +rudimentary tails are reminiscent of a simian ancestry. I hope later to +make it clear that the much talked of testimony of consciousness is +quite irrelevant to the question at issue; and also that the assumed +necessity for the conception of "freedom" as a moral postulate is really +due to a misconception of both the nature of morality and of voluntary +action. + +Ultimately the question, as already indicated, resolves itself into one +of how far we are justified in applying the principle of causation. The +Determinist denies any limit to its theoretical application. The +Volitionist insists on placing man in a distinct and unique category. +But this conception of causation is in itself of the nature of a growth, +and a study of its development may well throw light on the present +question. + +A conception of causation in some form or other could hardly have been +altogether absent from the most primitive races of mankind. Some +experiences are so uniform, so persistent, and so universal that they +would inevitably be connected in terms of cause and effect. +Nevertheless, the primitive mind was so dominated by volitional +conception of nature that a sense of necessary connection between events +could only have been of a weak character. Experience may have shown that +certain physical phenomena succeeded each other in a certain order, but +the belief that these phenomena embodied the action of supernormal +conscious forces would break in upon that sense of inevitability which +is the very essence of scientific causation. Modern thought fixes its +attention upon a given series of events and declines to go further. With +us the order is inevitable. With primitive man the order, even when +perceived, is conditional upon the non-interference of assumed +supernormal intelligences. Each phenomenon, or each group of phenomena, +thus possesses to the primitive mind precisely that quality of "freedom" +which is now claimed for the human will. + +How difficult is the task of establishing causal connections between +physical phenomena the whole history of science bears witness. To +establish causal connections between external conditions and subjective +states, where the forces are more numerous and immensely more complex in +their combinations, is a task of infinitely greater difficulty. Amongst +savages it would never be attempted. Feelings arise without any +traceable connection with surrounding conditions, nor does a recurrence +of the same external circumstances produce exactly the same result. A +circumstance that produces anger one day may give rise to laughter on +another occasion. Something that produces a striking effect on one +person leaves another quite unaffected. Numerous feelings arise in +consciousness that have all the superficial signs of being +self-generated. The phenomena are too diverse in character, and the +connections too complex and obscure, for uninstructed man to reach a +deterministic conclusion. The conclusion is inevitable; man himself is +the absolute cause of his own actions; he is veritably master of his own +fate, subject only to the malign and magical influence of other +extra-human personalities. + +Primitive thinking about man is thus quite in line with primitive +thinking about other things. In a way man's earliest philosophy of +things is more coherent and more rigorously logical than that of modern +times. The same principle is applied all round. All force is conceived +as vital force; "souls" or "wills" govern all. The division between +animate and inanimate things is of the vaguest possible character; that +between man and animals can hardly be said to exist. Only very gradually +do the distinctions between animate and inanimate, voluntary and +involuntary actions, which are taken for granted by the modern mind, +arise. And it is easy to conceive that in the growth of these +distinctions, modes of thinking characteristic of primitive man, would +linger longest in the always obscure field of psychology. Broadly, +however, the growth of knowledge has consisted, as Huxley pointed out, +in the substitution of a mechanical for a volitional interpretation of +things. In one department after another purposeful action yields to +inevitable causation. In physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy, and +kindred sciences this process is now complete. The volitional +interpretation still betrays a feeble vitality in biology; but even here +the signs of an early demise are unmistakable. Its last stronghold is in +psychology, and this because it is at once the newest of the sciences to +be placed upon a positive basis, and also the most obscure in its +ramifications. Yet there can be no reasonable doubt that the same +principle which has been found to hold good in other directions will +sooner or later be shown to obtain here also. Science is by its very +nature progressive; and its progress is manifested by the degree to +which phenomena hitherto unrelated are brought under constantly +enlarging and more comprehensive generalisations. Men were once +satisfied to explain the "wetness" of water as due to a spirit of +"aquosity," the movement of the blood as due to a "certain spirit" +dwelling in the veins and arteries. These were not statements of +knowledge, but verbose confessions of ignorance. To this same class of +belief belongs the "Free-Will" of the anti-determinist. It is the living +representative of that immense family of souls and spirits with which +early animistic thought peopled the universe. The surviving member of a +once numerous family, it carries with it the promise of the same fate +that has already overtaken its predecessors. + +The origin of the belief in free-will once understood, the reasons for +its perpetuation are not difficult to discover. First comes the +obscurity of the processes underlying human action. This alone would +secure a certain vitality for a belief that has always made the +impossibility of explaining the origin, sequence, and relation of mental +states its principal defence. Beyond offering as evidence the +questionable affirmation of consciousness volitionists have been +unanimous in resting their case upon their adversary's want of +knowledge. And it is further characteristic that while holding to a +theory on behalf of which not a single shred of positive evidence has +ever been produced, they yet demand the most rigorous and the most +complete demonstration of determinism before they will accept it as +true; this despite the presumptive evidence in its favour arising from +the fact of its harmony with our knowledge in other directions. + +Secondly, the human mind does not at any time commence its philosophic +speculations _de novo_. It necessarily builds upon the materials +accumulated by previous generations; and usually retains the form in +which previous thinking has been cast, even when the contents undergo +marked modifications. Thus the ghost-soul of the savage, a veritable +material copy of the body, by centuries of philosophizing gets refined +into the distinct "spiritual" substance of the metaphysician. And this, +not because the notion of a "soul" was derived from current knowledge or +thinking, but because it was one of the inherited forms of thought to +which philosophy had to accommodate itself. The result of this pressure +of the past upon contemporary thinking is that a large proportion of +mental activity is in each generation devoted to reconciling past +theories of things with current knowledge. In our own time the number +of volumes written to reconcile the theory of evolution with already +existing religious views is a striking example of this phenomenon. And +beyond the philosophic few there lies the mass of the people with whom +an established opinion of any kind takes on something of a sacred +character. Unfortunately, too, many writers work with an eye to the +prejudices of this class, which prejudices are in turn strengthened by +the tacit support of men of ability, or at least by their not openly +controverting them. It is, however, of the greatest significance that +since the opening of the modern scientific period, wherever qualified +thinkers have deliberately based their conclusions upon contemporary +knowledge the theory of determinism has been generally upheld. + +A third cause of the persistence of the belief in "Free-Will" is its +association with theology. For at least four centuries, whenever the +discussion of the subject has assumed an acute form, it has been due to +theological requirements rather than to ethical or psychological +considerations. True, many other reasons have been advanced, but these +have been little more than cloaks for the theological interest. Apart +from theology there does not seem any valid reason why the principle of +determinism should rouse more opposition in connection with human +character than it does in connection with the course of physical nature. +Or if it be pointed out that the establishment of the principle of +universal causation, as applied to nature at large, was not established +without opposition, then the reply is that here again it was the +religious interest that dictated the opposition. It was felt that the +reduction of all physical phenomena to a mechanical sequence was +derogatory to the majesty of God, excluded the deity from his own +universe, and generally weakened the force of religious beliefs. And, as +a mere matter of historic fact, the establishment of the scientific +conception of nature did have, with the bulk of mankind, precisely the +consequences predicted. And when in the course of events theological +considerations were banished from one department of science after +another, it was only natural that theologians should fight with the +greater tenacity to maintain a footing in the region of human nature. + +Although the subject is in origin pre-Christian, it was in connection +with Christian theology that it assumed an important place in European +thinking. The development of monotheism gave the problem a sharper point +and a deeper meaning. The issue here was a simple one. Given the belief +in God as sole creator and governor of the world, and he may conceivably +be related to mankind in one of two ways. Either he induces man to carry +out his will by an appeal to human reason and emotion, or he has so +arranged matters that certain events will inevitably come to pass at a +certain time, human effort being one of the contributory agencies to +that end. The first supposition leaves man "free"--at least in his +relation to deity. The second leads straight to the Christian doctrine +of predestination. Either supposition has, from the theological point of +view, its disadvantages. The first leaves man free as against God, but +it limits the power of deity by creating an autonomous force that may +act contrary to the divine will. The second opens up the question of +the divine wisdom and goodness, and by making God responsible for evil +conflicts with the demands of the moral sense. Evil and goodness are +made parts of the divine plan, and as man must fit in with the general +pre-arranged scheme, personal merit and demerit disappear. These +considerations explain why in the course of the Free-Will controversy +official Christianity has ranged itself now on one side and now on the +other. It has championed Determinism or Indeterminism as the occasion +served its interest. To-day, owing to easily discoverable reasons, +Christian writers are, in the main, markedly anti-deterministic. + +The first clear statement of the Christian position, if we omit the +Pauline teaching that we are all as clay in the hands of the potter, +appears in the writings of Augustine. In opposition to the Pelagians, +Augustine maintained a doctrine of absolute predestination. No room was +allowed for human self-determination to anyone but the first man. Adam +was created and endowed with free-will, and chose evil--a curious +verification of Voltaire's definition of Free-Will as a capacity by +means of which man gets himself damned. And as in Adam there were +contained, potentially, all future generations, all are pre-destined to +eternal damnation except such as are saved through the free gift of +divine grace. This theory of Augustine's, carried to the point of +asserting the damnation of infants, was modified in several respects by +that great medieval Christian teacher, Thomas Aquinas, who held that +while the will might be "free" from external restraint, it was +determined by our reason, but was reinstated in full force by John +Calvin. He denied that the goodness or badness of man had anything +whatever to do with the bestowal or withholding of grace. God dooms men +either to heaven or hell, for no other reason than that he chooses to do +so. Most of the leading Protestants of the early Reformation period were +strongly opposed to "free-will." For instance, Zwingli asserted that God +was the "author, mover, and impeller to sin." Still more emphatic was +Luther. The will of man he compared to a horse, "If mounted by God it +wills and wends whithersoever God may will; if mounted by Satan it wills +and wends whithersoever Satan may will; neither hath it any liberty of +choice to which of the riders it shall run, or which it shall choose; +but the riders themselves contend for its acquisition and possession." +Among the most powerful essays ever written in defence of Determinism +was Jonathan Edwards's, the famous Protestant divine, "Inquiry into the +Modern Prevailing Notions respecting that Freedom of Will which is +supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and +punishment, praise and blame," and to which I shall have occasion to +refer later. Finally, the explicit declarations of the Westminster +Confession of Faith and the Articles of the Church of England, that +man's will,--in the absence of grace,--cannot accomplish good works, +throw a curious light on the theological opponents of Determinism who +denounce it as anti-Christian and immoral. + + + + +II. + +"FREEDOM" AND "WILL." + + +To David Hume the dispute between the advocates of "Free-Will" and the +advocates of "Necessity" was almost entirely a matter of words. The +essence of the question, he thought, both sides were agreed on, and +consequently expressed the opinion that "a few intelligible definitions +would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy." That Hume +was over sanguine is shown by the controversy being still with us. Yet +his recommendation as to intelligible definitions, while pertinent to +all controversy, is specially so with regard to such a subject as that +of "Free-Will." For much of the anti-Determinist case actually rests +upon giving a misleading significance to certain phrases, while applying +others in a direction where they have no legitimate application. +Consider, for instance, the controversial significance of such a phrase +as "Liberty _versus_ Necessity"--the older name for Determinism. We all +love liberty, we all resent compulsion, and, as Mill pointed out, he who +announces himself as a champion of Liberty has gained the sympathies of +his hearers before he has commenced to argue his case. Such words play +the same part that "catchy" election cries do in securing votes. Such +phrases as "Power of Choice," "Sense of Responsibility," "Testimony of +Consciousness," "Consciousness of Freedom," are all expressions that, +while helpful and legitimate when used with due care and understanding, +as usually employed serve only to confuse the issue and prevent +comprehension. + +Not that the dispute between the Volitionist and the Determinist is a +merely verbal one. The controversy carries with it a significance of the +deepest kind. Fundamentally the issue expresses the antagonism of two +culture stages, an antagonism which finds expression in many other +directions. We are in fact concerned with what Tylor well calls the +deepest of all distinctions in human thought, the distinction that +separates Animism from Materialism. Much as philosophic ingenuity may do +in the way of inventing defences against the application of the +principle of causation to human action, the deeper our analysis of the +controversy, the more clearly is it seen that we are dealing with an +attenuated form of that primitive animism which once characterised all +human thinking. The persistence of types is a phenomenon that occurs as +frequently in the world of mind as it does in the world of biology. Or +just as when a country is overrun by a superior civilisation, primitive +customs are found lingering in remote districts, so unscientific modes +of thinking linger in relation to the more obscure mental processes in +spite of the conquests of science in other directions. + +It is well to bear these considerations in mind, even while admitting +that a great deal of the dispute does turn upon the fitness of the +language employed, and the accuracy with which it is used. And if +intelligible definition may not, as Hume hoped, end the controversy, it +will at least have the merit of making the issue plain. + +What is it that people have in their minds when they speak of the +"Freedom of the Will"? Curiously enough, the advocates of "free-will" +seldom condescend to favour us with anything so commonplace as a +definition, or if they do it tells us little. We are consequently +compelled to dig out the meanings of their cardinal terms from the +arguments used. Now the whole of the argument for "free-will" makes the +word "free" or "freedom" the equivalent to _an absence of determining +conditions_; either this, or the case for "free-will" is surrendered. +For if a man's decisions are in any way influenced--"influenced" is here +only another word for "determined"--Determinism is admitted. I need not +argue whether decisions are wholly or partly determined, the real and +only question being whether they are determined at all. What is called +by some a limited free-will is really only another name for unlimited +nonsense. + +"Freedom," as used by the Volitionist, being an equivalent for "absence +of determining conditions," let us ask next what this means. Here I am +brought to a dead halt. I do not know what it means. I cannot even +conceive it as meaning anything at all. At any rate, I am quite certain +that it is outside the region of scientific thought and nomenclature. +Scientifically, atoms of matter are not _free_ to move in any direction, +the planets are not _free_ to move in any shaped orbit, the blood is not +_free_ to circulate, the muscles are not _free_ to contract, the brain +is not _free_ to function. In all these cases what takes place is the +result of all converging circumstances and conditions. Given these and +the result follows. Scientifically, the thing that occurs is the only +thing possible. If the word "free" is used in science, it is as a figure +of speech, as when one speaks of a free gas, or of the blood not being +free to circulate owing to the existence of a constricted artery. But in +either case all that is meant is that a change in the nature of the +conditions gives rise to a corresponding change of result. The +determination of the gas or the blood to behave in a definite way is as +great in any case. From the point of view of science, then, to speak of +an absence of determining conditions is the most complete nonsense. All +science is a search for the conditions that determine phenomena. Save as +a metaphor, "freedom" has no place whatever in positive science. + +Are we then to discard the use of such a word as "freedom" altogether? +By no means. Properly applied, the word is intelligible and useful +enough. When, for instance, we speak of a free man, a free state, a free +country, or free trade, we are using the word "free" in a legitimate +manner, and can give to it a precise significance. A free state is one +in which the people composing it pursue their way uncoerced by other +states. A free man is one who is at liberty to exert bodily action or +express his opinions. We do not mean that in the first instance the +people are not governed by laws, or that physical conditions are without +influence on them; nor do we mean, in the second instance, that the +actions and opinions of the free man are not the result of heredity, +bodily structure, education, social position, etc. The obvious meaning +of "freedom" in each of these cases is an absence of external and +non-essential coercion. It does not touch the question of why we act as +we do, or of why we please to act in this or that manner. As Jonathan +Edwards puts it: "The plain, obvious meaning of the words 'freedom' and +'liberty' is power and opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do +as he pleases." Or as Hume put it more elaborately:-- + + "What is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions? We + cannot surely mean that actions have so little connection with + motives, inclinations, and circumstances that one does not + follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other. For + these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, + then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, + according to the determination of the will--that is, if we + choose to remain at rest we may; and if we choose to move, we + also may." + +The ultimate significance of "liberty" or "freedom" is thus +sociological. Here it expresses a fact; in positive science it is a mere +metaphor, and, as experience shows, a misleading one. Its use in +philosophy dates from the time of the Greeks, and when they spoke of a +free man they were borrowing an illustration from their social life. +There were slaves and there were free men, and in speaking of a free man +people were not so likely as they were at a later date to be misled by +a metaphor. Unfortunately, its use in philosophy has continued, while +its limitations have been ignored. To ask if a man is free is an +intelligible question. To ask whether actions are free from the +determining associations of organization and environment admits of but +one intelligible reply. Personally, I agree with Professor Bain that the +term "is brought in by main force, into a phenomenon to which it is +altogether incommensurable," and it would be well if it could be +excluded altogether from serious discussion[2]. + + [2] "The subjective sense of freedom, sometimes + alleged against Determinism, has no bearing on the + question whatever. The view that it has a bearing + rests upon the belief that causes compel their + effects, or that nature enforces obedience to its + laws as governments do. These are mere + anthropomorphic superstitions, due to assimilation + of causes with volitions, and of natural laws with + human edicts. We feel that our will is not + compelled, but that only means that it is not + other than we choose it to be. It is one of the + demerits of the traditional theory of causality + that it has created an artificial opposition + between determinism and the freedom of which we + are introspectively conscious." (Bertrand Russell, + _Mysticism and Logic_, p. 206.) + + So also Wundt: "Freedom and constraint are + reciprocal concepts; they are both necessarily + connected with consciousness; outside of + consciousness they are both imaginary concepts, + which only a mythologising imagination could relate + to things." (_Human and Animal Psychology_, p. + 426.) + +Now let us take that equally confusing word "will." Unfortunately, few +of those who champion the freedom of the will think it worth while to +trouble their readers with a clear definition of what they mean by it. +The orthodox definition of the will as "a faculty of the soul" tells us +nothing. It is explaining something the existence of which is +questioned by reference to something else the existence of which is +unknown. Or the definition is volunteered, "Will is the power to +decide," a description which only tells us that to will is to will. +Professor James tells us that "Desire, wish, will, are states of mind +which every one knows, and which no definition can make plainer." This +may be true of desire and wish; it certainly is not true of "will." +There is no question as to "will" being a state of mind, but as to every +one knowing its character, and above all possessing the knowledge +enabling him to discriminate between "will" and "desire" and "wish," +this is highly questionable. One may also be permitted the opinion that +if advocates of "free-will" were to seriously set themselves the task of +discovering what they do mean by "will," and also in what way it may be +differentiated from other mental states, the number of the champions of +that curious doctrine would rapidly diminish. + +What is it that constitutes an act of volition, or supplies us with the +fact of will? The larger part of our bodily movements do not come under +the heading of volition at all. The primary bodily movements are reflex, +instinctive, emotional, the action following without any interposition +of consciousness. Of course, an action that is performed quite +automatically at one time may be voluntarily performed at another time. +I may close my eyelid deliberately, or it may be because of the approach +of some foreign object. Or an action, if it be performed frequently, +tends to become automatic. To come within the category of a voluntary +action, it must be performed consciously, and there is also present +some consciousness of an end to be realized. Every voluntary action is +thus really dependent upon memory. A newly-born child has no volitions, +only reflexes. It is only when experience has supplied us with an idea +of what _may_ be done that we _will_ it shall be done. This +consideration alone is enough to shatter the case for the supposed +freedom of the will.[3] + + [3] The essential issue is again confused by the + language employed. If all volitional action is + action performed with the view to an end, a quite + correct and completely adequate word would be + "intentional"! If we were to speak of an + "intentional" action instead of a voluntary one, + the nature of the act would be clear, the factors + of experience, memory, consciousness of an end, + would be indicated, and the misleading + associations of "willing" avoided. It is + difficult, however, to introduce a new + terminology, and so I must beg the reader, in the + interests of clarity, to bear in mind that + whenever "voluntary action" is referred to, it is + "intentional" action that is connoted by the + phrase. + +If we analyze any simple act of volition what has just been said will be +made quite clear. I am sitting in a room and _will_ to open a window; it +may be to get fresh air, to look out, or for some other reason. Assume +that the first is the correct reason, the room being close and "stuffy." +First of all, then, I become aware of a more or less unpleasant feeling; +my experience tells me this is because the air in the room needs +purifying. Experience also tells me that by opening a window the desired +result will be obtained. Finally, I open the window and experience a +feeling of relief and satisfaction. Now had the room been without a +window, and the door bolted from the outside, or had the window been too +heavy for me to raise, no "volition" would have arisen. I should still +have had the desire for fresh air, but not seeing any means by which +this could be obtained, I should have had no _motive_ for action, and +should have remained perfectly passive. In order that my desire may +operate as a motive there must be not only a consciousness of a need, +but also a mental representation of the means by which that need is to +be gratified. I _will_ to do a thing, when allied to the desire for that +thing there is a conception of _how_ it is to be done, of the means to +be employed. Without this I have no motive, only a desire; without a +consciousness of the nature of the desire, there is nothing but pure +feeling. "Willing terminates with the prevalence of the idea...." +"Attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies." (Prof. +W. James, _Princip. of Psychology_, II. 560-1.) + +The stages of the process are, feeling rising into consciousness as +desire, the perception of the means to realize an end which raises the +desire from the statical to the dynamic stage of motive, and finally a +voluntary or intentional action. Now at no stage of this process is +there room for the intervention of any power or faculty not expressed in +a strictly sequential process. Of course, the action I have taken as an +example is an exceedingly simple one, but the more complex actions only +offer greater difficulties of analysis without leading to any different +result. This will be seen more clearly when we come to deal with +"choice" and "deliberation." From the moment that a certain stimulus +creates a desire in an organism, to the time that desire expresses +itself in action, there is no gap in the chain through which a +"Free-Will" may manifest its being. The physiologist points out that at +the basis of all our feelings and ideas there lie certain neural +processes. The psychologist takes up the story and from the dawn of +desire to action finds no break--or at least none that future knowledge +may not reasonably hope to make good. Want of knowledge may at present +prevent our tracing all the details of the process, but this is surely a +very inadequate ground on which to affirm the existence of a power at +variance with our knowledge of nature in other directions.[4] + + [4] Whether we work backward or forward the result + is the same. Strip off from the mind all feelings, + desires, all consciousness of ends and means to + ends, and what there is left is not a "will" ready + to throw the weight of its preference in this or + that direction, but a complete blank. + +Now in thus tracing the course of a voluntary action are we doing any +more than observing the action of desire in consciousness? If, yes, the +writer is quite unaware of the fact. If I remove all feeling, all +desire, all motive, "the will" disappears. Excite feeling, generate +desire, and there is the occasion for a voluntary action. Multiply the +number of desires and the operation of "will" becomes evident. Thus when +a writer like Professor Hyslop says, "If two motives offer different +attractions to the will," the reply is that the "will" is not one thing, +and motives other things, but two aspects of one fact. The "will" is not +something that decides or chooses between motives; the "will" is nothing +more than the name given to that motive or cluster of motives which is +sufficiently strong to overcome resistance and to express itself in +action. I emphasize the expression "overcome resistance" because without +competing motives and a sense of resistance we have no clear +consciousness of volition. Where only one desire is present in +consciousness, or where it is of overwhelming strength, feeling is +succeeded by action without any recognizable hiatus. It is the sense of +conflict, the break, that is essential to creating a lively sense of +volition, and also, as shall see later, to the sense of choice and +deliberation. But in speaking of an action as the expression of motives, +or as an expression of "will," both statements are identical so far as +the fact is concerned. We have not desires, motives, and "will," there +is simply a desire or desires that assume the quality of a motive by +being strong enough to result in action. As Spencer has put it, "Will is +no more an existence apart from the predominant feeling than a king is +an existence apart from the man occupying the throne." + +All that is to be found in any act of "will" is a desire accompanied by +the consciousness of an end. To put the same thing in another way, we +have a desire, the consciousness of an end and the means of realizing +it, and, finally, action. To the physiological and psychological +processes that culminate in action we give the name of motive. Properly +speaking a motive that does not issue in action--or inhibition--is not a +motive at all, it is a mere desire. And apart from the presence of +desire, or of desires, "will" does not exist. It is a pure abstraction, +valuable enough as an abstraction, but having no more real existence +apart from particular motives, than "tree" is a real existence apart +from particular trees. Physiologically, says Dr. Maudsley:-- + + "We cannot choose but reject _the_ will.... As physiologists we + have to deal with volition as a function of the supreme centres, + following reflection, varying in quantity and quality as its + cause varies, strengthened by education and exercise, enfeebled + by disuse, decaying with decay of structure.... We have to deal + with will not as a single undecomposable faculty unaffected by + bodily conditions, but as a result of organic changes in the + supreme centres, affected as certainly and as seriously by + disorders of them as our motor faculties are by disorders of + their centres." + +And, says Professor Sully, referring to _the_ will:-- + + "Modern scientific psychology knows nothing of such an entity. + As a science of phenomena and their laws, it confines itself to + a consideration of the processes of volition, and wholly + discards the hypothesis of a substantial will as unnecessary and + unscientific." + +Neither physiology nor psychology, neither a sane science nor a sound +philosophy, knows anything of, or can find use for, an autonomous +"will." "Will" as the final term of a discoverable series may be +admitted; "will" as a self-directing force, deciding whether particular +desires shall or shall not prevail, answers to nothing conformable to +our knowledge of man, and is plainly but the ghost of the wills and +souls of our savage ancestors. If instead of speaking of the freedom of +the will, we spoke of uncaused volitions, the position of the +volitionist would be clear, and its indefensible character plain to all. +But by giving the abstraction "will" a concrete existence, and by taking +from sociology a word such as "freedom" and using it in a sphere in +which it has no legitimate application, the issue is confused, and a +scientifically absurd theory given an air of plausibility. The dispute +between the Determinist and the Indeterminist is certainly not one of +words only, but it is one in which the cardinal terms employed need the +most careful examination if we are to clear away from the subject the +verbal fog created by theologians and metaphysicians. + + + + +III. + +CONSCIOUSNESS, DELIBERATION, AND CHOICE. + + +The one argument used by the Indeterminist against the Deterministic +position with some degree of universality is that of the testimony of +consciousness. It is the one to which practically all have appealed, and +which all have flattered themselves was simple in nature and convincing +in character. Professor Sidgwick, although he admitted that this +testimony might be illusory, yet asserted "There is but one opposing +argument of real force, namely, the immediate affirmation of +consciousness in the moment of deliberate action." And by the testimony +of consciousness must be meant, not, of course, a consciousness of +acting, but that at the moment of acting we could, _under identical +conditions_, have selected and acted upon an alternative that has been +rejected. I emphasize the phrase "under identical conditions," because +otherwise nothing is in dispute, and because, as we shall see, this +important consideration has not been always or even frequently borne in +mind. + +The question is, What does consciousness really tell us, and how far is +its testimony valid? In some directions it must be admitted that the +testimony of consciousness is absolute. In others it cannot, without +verification, claim any authority whatever. When I say that I have a +feeling of heat or coldness, of pleasure or pain, there is here a +direct deliverance of consciousness against which there is no appeal. +But consciousness does not and cannot tell me why I feel hot or cold, or +what is the cause of a pain I am experiencing. In this last case the +testimony of consciousness may be distinctly misleading. As it tells us +nothing of the existence of a brain, a nervous system, viscera, etc., +its testimony as to the cause of pain is obviously of no value. We are +conscious of states of mind, and that is all. A man seized with sudden +paralysis may be conscious of his power to move a limb, only to discover +by experience his impotence. In short, consciousness cannot, indeed does +not, tell us the causes of our states of mind. For this information we +are thrown back upon observation, experiment, and experience. We must, +then, make quite sure when we interrogate consciousness, exactly what it +is that consciousness says, and whether what it says is on a subject +that comes within its province. + +What is, then, the testimony of consciousness? When it is said that we +are conscious of our ability to have selected one alternative at the +time that another is chosen, I think this may be fairly met with the +retort that consciousness is unable to inform us as to our actual +ability to _do_ anything at all. I may be quite conscious of a desire to +jump a six foot fence, or lift a weight of half a ton, but whether I am +actually able to do so or not, only experience can decide. What I am +really conscious of is a desire to vault a given height or lift a given +weight, and it is surely an inexcusable confusion to speak of a desire +to do a particular thing as the equivalent of an ability to do it. If a +consciousness of desire equalled the ability to perform failure would be +but little known among men. + +All that consciousness really tells us is of the existence of passing +states of mind. It can tell us nothing of their origin, their value, or +their consequences. In the particular instance under consideration +consciousness informs us of the fact of choice, and this no Determinist +has ever dreamed of denying. He does assert that choice, as the +Indeterminist persists in using the term, is a delusion, but otherwise, +as will be shown later, he claims that it is only on deterministic lines +that choice can have any meaning or ethical significance. In any +voluntary action I am conscious of the possibility of choice and of +having chosen, and that is really all. What is the nature of that +possibility, and why I choose one thing rather than another--on these +points consciousness can give us no information whatever. One might as +reasonably argue that a consciousness of hunger gives us a knowledge of +the process of digestion, as argue that a consciousness of choice +supplies us with a knowledge of the mechanism of the process. We are +conscious of the presence of several desires, we are also conscious that +out of these several desires one is strong enough to rank as a motive, +but it tells us absolutely nothing of the causes or conditions that have +resulted in the emergence of that motive. Instead of telling us that we +could have acted in opposition to the strongest motive--which is really +the indeterminist position--consciousness simply reveals which desire is +the most powerful. We are conscious that other desires were present, we +are also aware of the possibility that another desire than the one that +actually prevailed might have been the most powerful; but when we admit +this and say that we _could_ have acted differently, we have really +displaced the actual conditions by imaginary ones. We _might_ have +preferred to act differently. This is not denied. It is not questioned +that we do choose, or that the same person chooses, differently or +different occasions. The question really is, Why have we chosen thus or +thus? And so far as consciousness is concerned we are quite in the dark +as to why one choice is made rather than another, what are the +conditions that give rise to our conscious desires, or why one desire is +more powerful than another. + +Consciousness, then, can testify only to the reality of its own states; +no more. It can tell us nothing of their causes. It cannot tell us that +man has a brain and nervous system, and can tell us nothing of the +connection between mental states and the condition of the bodily organs. +The chief factor in conduct (habit) lies outside the region of +consciousness altogether. In most cases we act as we have been in the +habit of acting, and our present conduct expresses the sum of our +previous actions and inclinations. Every action we perform assists the +formation of a habit, and with every repetition of a particular action +we find its performance easier. Indeed, a very powerful criticism of the +trustworthiness of consciousness is found in the fact that the +determining causes of conduct lie largely in the region of the +unconscious or subconscious, and of this territory consciousness can +tell us no more than a ripple on the surface of a river can tell us of +its depths. + +Next to the emphasis upon the testimony of consciousness the +Indeterminist lays special stress upon the facts of choice and +deliberation. Can we really say, it is asked, that man chooses and +deliberates, or even that in any genuine sense he does anything at all, +if all his actions are pre-determined by his constitution and +environment? If every act of man is determined and man himself a mere +stage in the process unending and unbroken, is it not idle to speak of +man deliberating on alternatives and choosing that which seems to him +best? We continue using words that on deterministic lines have lost all +meaning. And if Determinists do not realise this, it is because the +logical implications of their doctrines have never been fully explored. + +Well, it entirely depends upon the sense in which one uses the cardinal +terms in the discussion. If deliberation and choice when applied to +mental processes are used in the same sense as when these terms are used +as descriptive of the proceedings of a committee, then we can all agree +that deliberation would be as great a sham as it would be if the members +of a committee before meeting had determined upon their decision. But, +we may note in passing, that even here, when the deliberations are +genuine, the votes of each member are supposed to be decided by the +reasons advanced during the discussion--that is the decision of each +individual member is determined by the forces evoked during the +deliberations. + +The scientific method, and it may be added, the sane and profitable +method, is not to come to the study of a problem with ready-made +meanings and compel the facts, under penalty of disqualification, to +agree with them, but to let the facts determine what meaning is to be +attached to the words used. It is mere childish petulance for the +Indeterminist to say that unless certain words are used with _his_ +meaning they shall not be used at all, but shall be expelled from our +vocabulary. When gravity was conceived as a force moving downward +through infinite space, the existence of people on the other side of the +earth was denied as being contrary to the law of gravitation. A more +correct knowledge of the phenomena did not lead people to discard +gravity; the meaning of the word was revised. And really neither +language nor morality is the private property of the Indeterminist, and +he is, therefore, not at liberty to annihilate either for not coming up +to his expectations. He must submit to such revision of his ideas, or +his language, or of both, as more accurate knowledge may demand. + +The question is not, then, whether Determinism destroys deliberation and +choice and responsibility, but what meaning Determinism can legitimately +place upon these words, and is this meaning in harmony with what we know +to be true. With responsibility we will deal at length later. For the +present let us see what is really involved in the fact of choice. +Determinism, we are advised, must deny the reality of choice, because +choice assumes alternatives, and there can be no genuine alternatives if +events are determined. Let us see. If I am watching a stone rolling down +a hillside, and am in doubt as to whether it will pass to the right or +to the left of a given point, I shall not recognize any resident +capacity in the stone for choosing one path rather than the other. The +absence of consciousness in the stone precludes such an assumption. But +suppose we substitute for the stone a barefooted human being, and assume +that one path is smooth while the other is liberally sprinkled with +sharp pointed stones. There would then be an obvious reason for the +selection of one path, and no one would hesitate to say that here was an +illustration of the exercise of choice. Choice, then, is a phenomenon of +consciousness, and it implies a recognition of alternatives. But a +recognition of alternatives does not by any means imply that either of +two are equally eligible. It is merely a consciousness of the fact that +they exist, and that either might be selected were circumstances +favourable to its selection. Without labouring the point we may safely +say that all that is given in the fact of choice is the consciousness of +a choice. There is nothing in it that tells us of the conditions of the +selection, or whether it was possible for the agent to have chosen +differently or not. + +So far there is nothing in Determinism that is discordant with the fact +of choice, indeed, it has a perfectly reasonable theory of the process. +Why is there a choice or selection of things or actions? Clearly the +reason must be looked for in the nature of the thing selected, or in the +nature of the agent that selects, or in a combination of both factors. +Either there is an organic prompting in favour of the thing selected, as +when a baby takes a bottle of milk and rejects a bottle of vinegar, or +there is a recognition that the selection will enable the agent to +better realize whatever end he has in view. The alternatives are there, +and they are real in the only sense in which they can be real. But they +are not real in the sense of their being equally eligible--which is the +sense in which the Indeterminist uses the word. For that would destroy +choice altogether. Unless a selection is made because certain things +offer greater attractions than other things to the agent, no +intelligible meaning can be attached to such a word as "Choice." We +should have a mere blind explosion of energy, the direction taken no +more involving choice than the stone's path down a hillside. And if the +"Will" chooses between alternatives because one is more desirable than +the other, its "freedom" (in the Indeterminist sense) is sacrificed, and +the selection is correspondingly determined. There can be no real choice +in the absence of a determinative influence exercised by one of the +things chosen. + +But it is urged that this line of reasoning does not explain the feeling +of possibility that we have at the moment of action. I think it explains +possibility as it explains choice, provided we allow facts to determine +the meaning of words instead of torturing facts to suit certain forms of +language. If by possibility we mean that under identical conditions, +other things than those which actually occur are possible, then this may +be confidently met with a flat denial. If, on the other hand, it is +meant that by varying the conditions other possibilities become +actualities, this is a statement that to a Determinist is self-evident. +As a matter of fact, there are only two senses in which the word +"possibility" may be rightly used, and neither sense yields any evidence +against Determinism. + +One of these meanings is simply an expression of our own ignorance on +the matter that happens to be before us. If I am asked what kind of +weather we are likely to have a month hence, I should reply that it is +equally possible the day may be dry or wet, bright or dull. I do not +mean to imply that had I adequate knowledge it would not be as easy to +predict the kind of weather on that date as it is to predict the +position of Neptune. It is simply an expression of my own ignorance. +But, as Spinoza pointed out, possibility narrows as knowledge grows. To +complete ignorance anything is possible because the course of events is +unknown. As a comprehension of natural causation develops, people speak +less of what may possibly occur, and more of what will occur. +Possibility here has no reference to the course of events, only to our +knowledge, or want of knowledge, concerning their order. To say that it +is possible for a man to do either this or that is, so far as a +spectator is concerned, only to say that our knowledge concerning the +man's whole nature is not extensive enough, or exact enough for us to +predict what he will do. Nor is the case altered if instead of an +outsider, it is the agent himself who is incapable of prediction. For +all that amounts to is the assertion that the agent is ignorant of the +relative strength of desires that may be aroused under a particular +conjuncture of circumstances. + +The second sense of "possibility" depends upon our ability to imagine +conditions not actually present at the moment of action. By a trick of +imagination I can picture myself acting differently, or, on looking +back, I can see that I might have acted differently. But in either case +I have altered in thought the conditions that actually existed at the +moment of action. Generally, all it means is that with a number of +conflicting desires present, I am conscious that a very slight variation +in the relative strength of these desires would result in a different +course of conduct. And the conditions affecting conduct are so complex +and so easily varied that it is small wonder there is lacking in this +instance that sense of inevitability present when one is dealing with +physical processes. But the essential question is not whether a slight +change of conditions would produce a different result, but whether under +identical conditions two opposite courses of action are equally +possible? And this is not only untrue in fact, it is unthinkable, as a +formal proposition. Even the old adage, "There, but for the grace of +God, go I," while recognizing a different possibility, also recognized +that a variation in the factors--the elimination of the grace of God--is +essential if the possibility was to become an actuality. That the sense +of possibility implies more than this may be safely denied, let who will +make the opposite affirmation. + +This discussion of the nature and function of choice will help us to +realize more clearly than would otherwise be the case the nature of +deliberation. This question has always played an important part in the +Free-Will controversy, because it has stood as the very antithesis of a +reflex or obviously mechanical action. Deliberation, it has been argued, +does very clearly point to a determinative power exercised by the human +will, and a power that cannot be explained in the same terms with which +we explain other events. One anti-determinist writer remarks that "if a +volition is the effect of a 'motive,' it should follow immediately upon +the occurrence of the motive. But if there is deliberation between +motives, they do not seem to have casual power to initiate a volition +until a prior causal power directs them, and this would be the +deliberating subject." + +Now there are numerous cases, the majority probably, where action does +follow immediately upon the presence of desire. And in such cases we are +not aware of any process of deliberation, although there may be a truly +intentional action. And from this single case we have a whole series of +examples that will take us to the other extreme where the desires are so +numerous and so conflicting that an excess of deliberation may prevent +action altogether. Let us take an illustration. Sitting in my room on a +fine day I am conscious of a desire for a walk. Provided no opposing +feeling or desire is present I should at once rise and go out. But I may +be conscious of a number of other feelings based upon various +considerations. There is the fact of leaving the task on which I am +engaged, and the desire to get it finished. There is the trouble of +dressing, the consideration that once out I may wish I had stayed in, or +that it may rain, or that I may be needed at home: all these result in +a state of indecision, and induce deliberation. Imagination is excited, +ideal feelings are aroused, and eventually a choice is made. I decide on +the walk. What is it, now, that has occurred? My first desire for a walk +has been enforced by a representation of all the advantages that may be +gained by going out, and these have proved themselves strong enough to +bear down all opposition. Had any other desire gained strength, or had +the conviction that it would rain been strong enough, a different motive +would have emerged from this conflict of desires and ideas. No matter +how we vary the circumstances, this is substantially what occurs in +every case where deliberation and choice are involved. Not only is this +what does occur, but it is impossible to picture clearly any other +process. The only evidence we can have of the relative strength of ideas +is that one triumphs over others. To say that the weaker desire triumphs +is to make a statement the absurdity of which is self-evident. + +This conclusion cannot be invalidated by the argument that a particular +desire becomes the stronger because the "will" declares in its favour. +One need only ask, by way of reply, Why does the "will" declare in +favour of one desire rather than another? There is no dispute that a +choice is made. Those who say that a man can choose what he likes are +not making a statement that conflicts in the slightest degree with +Determinism. The Determinist says as clearly as anyone that I do what I +choose to do. The real question is why do I choose this rather than +that? Why does the "will" pronounce in favour of one desire rather than +another? No one can believe that all desires are of equal strength or +value to the agent. Such an assumption would be too absurd for serious +argument. But if all desires are not of equal strength and value, the +only conclusion left is that certain ones operate because they are, in +relation to the particular organism, of greater value than others. And +in that case we are simply restating Determinism. The action of the +environment is conditioned by the nature of the organism. The reaction +of the organism is conditioned by the character of the environment. The +resultant is a compound of the two. + +It is, moreover, an absurdity to speak of the "will" or the self as +though this were something apart from the various phases of +consciousness. In the contest of feelings and desires that calls forth +deliberation _I_ am equally involved in every aspect of the process. As +Professor James points out, "both effort and resistance are ours, and +the identification of our _self_ with one of these factors is an +illusion and a trick of speech." My self and my mental states are not +two distinct things; they constitute myself, and if these are eliminated +there is no self left to talk about. + +Further, in the growth of each individual, conscious and deliberative +action can be seen developing out of automatic action--the simplest and +earliest type of action. Not only does deliberative action develop from +reflex action, but it sinks into reflex action again. One of the +commonest of experiences is that actions performed at one time slowly +and after deliberation are at another time performed rapidly and +automatically. Every action contributes to the formation of a habit, and +frequently repetition results in the habit becoming a personal +characteristic. Deliberation and choice are not even always the mark of +a highly developed character; they may denote a poorly-developed +one--one that is ill adapted to social requirements. One man, on going +into a room where there is a purse of money, may only after long +deliberation and from conscious choice refrain from stealing it. Another +person, under the same conditions, may be conscious of no choice, no +effort, the desire to steal the purse being one that is foreign to his +nature. In two such by no means uncommon instances, we should have no +doubt as to which represented the higher type of character. Morally, it +is not the feeling, "I could have acted dishonestly instead of honestly +had I so chosen," that marks the ethically developed character, but the +performance of the right action at the right moment, without a +consciousness of tendency in the opposite direction. But the aim of +education is, in the one direction, to weaken the sense of choice by the +formation of right habits, moral and intellectual; and on the other hand +by bringing man into a more direct contact with a wider and more complex +environment, deliberation becomes one of the conditions of a +co-ordination of ideas and actions that will result in a more perfect +adaptation. + + + + +IV. + +SOME ALLEGED CONSEQUENCES OF DETERMINISM. + + +Not the least curious aspect of the Free-Will controversy is that those +who oppose Determinism base a large part of their argumentation upon the +supposed evil consequences that will follow its acceptance. In a work +from which I have already cited, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller falls foul of +Determinism because, he says, while incompatible with morality, its +champions nevertheless imagine they are leaving morality undisturbed. +The real difficulty of Determinism is, he says, that in its world, +events being fully determined, there can be no alternatives. Things are +what they must be. They must be because they are. No man can help doing +what he does. Man himself belongs to a sequence unending and unbroken. +"To imagine therefore that Determinism, after annihilating the moral +agent, remains compatible with morality, simply means that the logical +implications of the doctrine have never been fully explored." And he +adds: "The charge against it is not merely that it fails to do full +justice to the ethical fact of responsibility, but that it utterly +annihilates the moral agent." This, he says, is the real dilemma, and +Determinism has never answered it. + +It is curious that so clever a writer as Mr. Schiller should fail to +realize that taking Determinism in its most drastic form, and accepting +it in the most unequivocal manner, nothing can suffer, because +everything remains as it must be--including the facts, feelings, and +consequences of the moral life. Observe, it is part of Mr. Schiller's +case against Determinism that on determinist lines everything, down to +the minutest happenings, is the necessary result of all antecedent and +co-operating conditions. But this being the case, if Determinism leaves +no room for chance or absolute origination, how comes it that an +acceptance of Determinism initiates an absolutely new thing--the +destruction of morality? Surely it is coming very near the absurd to +charge Determinism with breaking an unbreakable sequence. It is surely +idle to credit Determinism with doing what is impossible for it to +accomplish. So far as morality is a real thing, so far as the facts of +the moral life are real things, Determinism must leave them +substantially unaltered. The problem is, as has been already said, to +find out for what exactly all these things stand. To read wrong meanings +into the facts of life, and then to declare that the facts cease to +exist if the meanings are corrected, is unphilosophical petulance. + +It is, indeed, quite open to the Determinist to meet these grave fears +as to the consequences of Determinism with a denial that morality is +vitally concerned with the question of whether man's "will" be "free" or +not. The question of Determinism may enter into the subject of how to +develop character along desirable lines; and, apart from Determinism, it +is difficult to see how there can be anything like a scientific +cultivation of character. But the fact of morality and the value of +morality are not bound up with whether conduct be the expression of +theoretically calculable factors, or whether it is, on the one side, +determined by a self which originates its own impulses. Determinism or +no Determinism, murder, to take an extreme illustration, is never likely +to become an every-day occupation in human society. Neither can any +other action that is obviously injurious to the well-being of society be +practised beyond certain well-defined limits. The laws of social health +operate to check socially injurious actions, as the laws of individual +health operate to check injurious conduct in dietary or in hygiene. +Determinists and Indeterminists, as may easily be observed, manifest a +fairly uniform measure of conduct, and whatever variations from the +normal standard each displays cannot well be put down to their +acceptance or rejection of Determinism. + +The real nature of morality is best seen if one asks oneself the +question, "What is morality?" Let us imagine the human race reduced to a +single individual. What would then be the scope and character of +morality? It is without question that a large part of our moral rules +would lose all meaning. Theft, murder, unchastity, slander, etc., would +be without meanings, for the simple reason that there would be none +against whom such offences could be committed. Would there be any moral +laws or moral feelings left? Would there even be a man left under such +conditions? One might safely query both statements. For if we take away +from this solitary individual all that social culture and intercourse +have given him--language, knowledge, habits both mental and moral, all, +in short, that has been developed through the agency of the social +medium--man, as we know him, disappears, and a mere animal is left in +his place. Even the feeling that a man has a duty to himself, and that +to realize his highest possibilities is the most imperative of moral +obligations, is only an illustration of the same truth. For very little +analysis serves to show that even this derives its value from the +significance of the individual to the social structure. + +Morality, then, is wholly a question of relationship. Not whether my +actions spring from a self-determined "will" or even whether they are +the inevitable consequent of preceding conditions makes them moral or +immoral, but their influence in forwarding or retarding certain ideal +social relations. The rightness or wrongness of an action lies in its +consequences. Whether one is of the Utilitarian or other school of +morals does not substantially affect the truth of this statement. Action +without consequences--assuming its possibility--would have no moral +significance whatever. And consequences remain whether we accept or +reject Determinism. Determinism cannot alter or regulate the +consequences of actions, it can only indicate their causes and their +results. What a science of morals is really concerned with is, +objectively, the consequences of actions, and subjectively the feelings +that lead to their performance. When a science of morals has determined +what actions best promote desirable relations between human beings, and +what states of mind are most favourable to the performance of such +actions, its task as a science of morals is concluded. The genesis of +such states of mind belongs to psychology, just as to sociology belong +the creation and maintenance of such social conditions as will best give +them expression and actuality. + +The question of the moral consequences of Determinism is not, therefore, +discussed because we believe there is any relevancy in the issue thus +raised, but solely because it is raised, and not to deal with it may +create a prejudice against Determinism. Many of those who quite admit +the scientific character of Determinism, yet insist on the necessity for +some sort of Indeterminism in the region of morals. Professor William +James, for instance, admits that a profitable study of mental phenomena +is impossible unless we postulate Determinism (_Prin. Psych._ ii. 573). +But having admitted this, and in fact illustrated it through the whole +of his two volumes, his next endeavour is to find a place for +"free-will" as a "moral postulate." The region of morals is thus made to +play the part of a haven of refuge for illegitimate and unscientific +theories, a kind of workhouse for all mental vagrants found at large +without visible means of support. The moral postulate which is to +reinstate "Free-Will," is that "What ought to be can be, and that bad +acts cannot be fated, but that good ones must be possible in their +place." In a writer usually so clear this somewhat ambiguous deliverance +is far more indicative of a desire to befriend an oppressed theory than +of the possession of any good evidence in its behalf. + +The matter really turns upon what is meant by "ought" and "possible." It +has already been pointed out that if by "possible" it is meant that +although one thing actually occurs, another thing--a different +thing--might have occurred without any alteration in the accompanying +conditions, the statement is not only untrue in fact, but it is +inconceivable as possibly true. And if it does not mean this, then +Professor James is merely stating what every Determinist most cheerfully +endorses. But in that case the "possibility" gives no support whatever +to the Indeterminist. Further, Professor James says that Determinism is +a clear and seductive conception so long as one "stands by the great +scientific postulate that the world must be one unbroken fact, and that +prediction of all things without exception must be ideally, even if not +actually, possible." On which one may enquire, how prediction could be +at all possible unless, given the co-operating conditions, a definite +and particular result is inevitable? But if prediction be possible--and +the whole power of science lies in its power of prediction--what becomes +of the value of "possibility" to the Indeterminist? Is it any more than +an expression of our ignorance of the power of particular factors, and a +consequent ignorance of their resultant? + +To say that certain things "ought" to be, or that one "ought" to act in +this or that particular manner, are common expressions, and within +limits, relevant and intelligible expressions. But "ought" here clearly +stands for no more than ideal conception. Its reference is to the +future, not to the past. It does not imply a belief that things could +have resulted other than those which actually did result, but a belief +that given a suitable alteration in the conditions different results +might ensue in the future. When, for example, I say that men ought to +think wisely, I do not affirm either that all men do think wisely, or +that foolish men can do so without some change in their mental make-up. +I merely eliminate all those conditions that make for unwise thinking, +leaving wise thinking as the only possible result. That is, recognizing +that from different conditions different consequences will follow, in +imagination, all forces that are inimical to the ideal end are +eliminated. We say that no man ought to commit murder, and yet if we +take as an illustration the congenital homicide, no one can assert that +in his case, at least, anything but murder is possible, given favourable +conditions for its perpetration. Or if it is said that congenital +homicide is a purely pathological case, it may surely be asserted that +the same general considerations apply to cases that are not classified +as pathological. The more we know of the criminal's heredity, +environment, and education, the more clearly it is seen that his deeds +result from the inter-action of these factors, and that these must be +modified if we are reasonably to expect any alteration in his conduct. +In fact, the criminal--or the saint--being what he is as the result of +the inter-action of possibly calculable factors is the essential +condition towards making "the prediction of all things" ideally, if not +actually possible. In saying, then, that a man ought not to do wrong, +we are only saying that our ideal of a perfect man eliminates the idea +of wrong-doing, and that our imagination is powerful enough to construct +a human character to which wrong-doing shall be alien. + +The fallacy here is due to a confusion of the actual with the desirable. +If we are looking to the past we are bound to say that "ought" is +meaningless, because what has been is the only thing that could have +been. Thus it is meaningless to say that a piece of string capable of +withstanding a strain of half a hundredweight ought to have withstood a +strain of half a ton. It is equally absurd to say that a man ought to +have withstood the germ of malarial fever, when his constitution +rendered him susceptible to attack. Both of these instances will be +readily admitted. Is it, then, any more reasonable to say that a man +ought to have withstood a temptation to drunkenness, or theft, or +cruelty--in the sense that given his nature he _could_ have withstood +it--when all the circumstances of character, heredity, and environment +made for his downfall? We say that certain considerations "ought" to +have restrained Jones because they were enough to restrain Smith. Are +we, then, to conclude that Smith and Jones are so much alike--are, in +fact, identical in character--that the same forces will influence each +in the same manner and to the same degree? The assumption is obviously +absurd. What ought to have happened with Smith and Jones, bearing in +mind all the conditions of the problem, is what did happen. What ought +to happen to Smith and Jones in the future will be equally dependent +upon the extent to which the character of the two becomes modified. In +this sense our conception of what "ought" to be in the future will guide +us as to the nature of the influences we bring to bear upon Smith and +Jones. We believe that good actions may be possible in the future where +bad ones occurred in the past, because we see that a change of +conditions may produce the desired result. The "moral postulate," +therefore, does not contain anything, or imply anything, in favour of +Indeterminism. It does assert that certain things ought to be, but it +can only realize this by recognizing, and acting upon the recognition, +that just as certain forces in the past have issued in certain results, +so a modification in the nature or incidence of these forces will +produce a corresponding modification of conduct in the future. Whatever +else there appears to be in the "ought" is a mere trick of the +imagination; and the surprising thing is that a writer of the calibre of +Professor James should not have been perfectly alive to this. + +A cruder form of the same position, although introducing other issues, +was upheld by Dr. Martineau in the categorical statement, "either +free-will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion." His reason for this +remarkable statement is:-- + + "We could never condemn one turn of act or thought did we not + believe the agent to have command of another; and just in + proportion as we perceive, in his temperament or education or + circumstances, the certain preponderance of particular + suggestions, and the near approach to an inner necessity, do we + criticize him rather as a natural object than as a responsible + being, and deal with his aberrations as maladies instead of + sins."[5] + + [5] _Types of Ethical Theory_, vol. ii. p. 41. + +Well, human nature might easily have been nearer perfection than it is +had moral aberrations been treated as maladies rather than sins, and one +certainly would not have felt greater regret had judges and critics +always been capable of rising to this level of judgment. Social, +political, and religious malevolence might not have received the +gratification and support it has received had this been the rule of +judgment and the guide to methods of treatment, but our social +consciousness would have been of a superior texture than is now the +case. And one may ask whether there is any human action conceivable for +which an adequate cause cannot be found in temperament or education or +circumstances, or in a combination of the three? It would tax any one's +ingenuity to name an action that lies outside the scope of these +influences. Temperament, education, circumstances, are the great and +controlling conditions of human action, and only in proportion as this +is recognized and acted upon do we approach a science of human nature +and begin to realize methods of profitable modification. + +Against Determinism Dr. Martineau argues that "the moral life dwells +exclusively in the voluntary sphere," and also that "impulses of +spontaneous action do not constitute character." The first of these +statements is at least very debatable, although it may turn upon a +matter of definition. But the second statement is distinctly inaccurate. +One may assert the exact opposite, and instead of saying that the +impulses of spontaneous action do not constitute character, argue that +they are the truest indications of character. Of course, from one point +of view, all that a man does, whether it be spontaneous or reflective, +must be equally the expression of the whole man. But from another point +of view the more permanent and enduring characteristics of a man may be +overborne by a passing flood of emotion or by a casual combination of +unusual circumstances. By these means an habitually mean man may be +roused to acts of generosity, an habitual thief roused to acts of +honesty. Long reflection may cause a person to decide this or that, when +his spontaneous impulses are in the contrary direction. And while these +reflections and floods of emotion are equally with the spontaneous +impulses part of a given personality, yet it will hardly be disputed +that the latter are the more deeply seated, will express themselves in a +more uniform manner, and are thus a truer and more reliable index to the +character of the person with whom we are dealing. + +How far we are to accept morality as dwelling exclusively in the +voluntary, that is the intentional, sphere, is, as I have said, largely +a matter of definition. We may so define morality that it shall cover +only intentional acts, in which case the statement must be accepted, or +we can define morality in a wider sense, as covering all action by means +of which desirable relations between people are maintained, in which +case the statement is not true. For we should then be committed to the +curious position that all moral development tends to make man less +moral. To have the quality of voluntariness an act must be consciously +performed with a particular end in view. But a large part of the more +important functions of life do not come under this category, while a +still larger portion are only semi-voluntary. The whole set of instincts +that cluster round the family, the feelings which urge human beings to +seek others' society, and which are the essential conditions of all +social phenomena, do not properly come under the head of volition. Our +conduct in any of these directions may easily be justified by reason, +but it would be absurd to argue that there is any intentional choice +involved. + +Moreover, the chief aim of education, of the moralization of character, +is to divest actions of their quality of reflectiveness or intention. +Our aim here is so to fashion character that it will unquestioningly and +instinctively place itself on the right side. This is a force that +operates on all individuals more or less, and from the cradle to the +grave. Family influences curb and fashion the egotism of the child until +there is an unconscious and often unreasoning adherence to the family +circle. Social influences continue the work and train the individual +into an instinctive harmony, more or less complete with the structure of +the society to which he belongs. The mere repetition of a particular +action involves the formation of a habit, and habit is meaningless in +the absence of a modified nerve structure which reacts in a special +manner. Persistence in right action, therefore, no matter how +consciously it may be performed in its initial stages, inevitably passes +over into unconscious or instinctive action. And let it be noted, too, +that it is only when this change has been brought about that a person +can be said to be a thoroughly moralized character. It is not the man +who does right after a long internal struggle that is most moral, but +the one with whom doing right is the most imperative of organic +necessities. We praise the man who does right after struggle, but +chiefly because of our admiration at the triumph of right over wrong, or +because his weakness cries for support, or because he has in him the +making of a more perfect character. But to place him as the superior of +one whose right doing is the efflorescence of his whole nature is to +misunderstand the ethical problem. And equally to confine morality to +merely voluntary or intentional action is to truncate the sphere of +morals to an extent that would meet with the approval of very few +writers on ethics. In brief, one may not merely say with Lessing, +"Determinism has nothing to fear from the side of morals," one may add +that it is only on the theory of Determinism that the moralization of +character becomes a rational possibility. + + + + +V. + +PROFESSOR JAMES ON "THE DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM." + + +We have seen in what has gone before how much of the case for Free-Will +is based upon the wrong use of language, and upon a display of petulance +arising from the degree to which it is assumed that the universe ought +to fulfil certain _a priori_ expectations. In this last respect the +Volitionist behaves as if he were on a kind of shopping excursion, with +full liberty to purchase or reject the goods brought out for inspection. +Both of these points are well illustrated in an apology for +Indeterminism offered by Professor William James, and although in +examining his argument it may be necessary to repeat in substance some +of the arguments already used, this will not be without its value in +enabling the reader to realize the shifts to which the defender of +Free-Will is compelled to resort. In justice to Professor James, +however, it is only fair to point out that it is not quite clear that he +is thoroughly convinced of the position he sees fit to state. Much of +his argument reads as though he were merely stating a speculation that +might prove valuable, but which might also turn out valueless. Still, +whatever conviction he has, or had, appears to lean to the side of +Indeterminism, and I shall accordingly deal with his argument as though +he were quite convinced of its soundness. + +In his chief work, _The Principles of Psychology_, Professor James took +up the perfectly sane position that a man would be foolish not to +espouse "the great scientific postulate" that the prediction of all +things without exception must be possible, and drew a proper distinction +between what is ideally possible--that is to complete knowledge--and +what is actually possible to incomplete knowledge. In a later +deliverance he, for the time at least, forsakes this position and +champions a case which rests for its coherence very largely upon the +neglect of those precautions previously insisted on.[6] To suit the +necessities of the argument the Determinist is made to say things that I +think few, if any, determinists ever dreamed of saying, while certain +leading words are used with a meaning obviously framed to meet the +requirements of the case. + + [6] See the lecture on "The Dilemma of + Determinism" in the volume _The Will to Believe, + and other Essays_. London; 1903. + +At the outset of his essay Professor James remarks that if a certain +formula--in this case the Determinist formula--"for expressing the +nature of the world violates my moral demands, I shall feel as free to +throw it overboard, or at least to doubt it, as if it disappointed my +demand for uniformity of sequence." And he proceeds to argue that all +our scientific "laws" are ideal constructions, built up in order to +satisfy certain demands of our nature. Uniformity in nature is thus as +much a formula framed to this end as is Free-Will. "If this be +admitted," he says, "we can debate on even terms." + +Unfortunately for the Professor's argument the two instances are not +analogous--not, at least, in the direction required. The sense of +causality is not something that is innate in human nature. Children at +an early age hardly possess it, and primitive man has it in only a very +vague manner. The conviction that all things are bound together in terms +of causation is one that belongs, even to-day, to the educated, +thoughtful mind. At any rate it is a conviction that has been forced +upon the human mind by the sheer pressure of experience. It is a growth +consequent upon the mind's intercourse with the objective universe. And +its validity is not called into question. On the other hand, this +assumed "moral demand" for "Free-Will" is the very point in dispute. +Whether there is such a demand, and if so is it a legitimate one, are +the questions upon which the discussion turns. And it will not do for +Professor James to claim Free-Will in the name of certain "moral +demands" and reserve the right to throw overboard any theory that does +not grant them. Man's moral nature, equally with his intellectual +nature, must in the last resort yield to facts. It will not do to exalt +into a moral instinct what may be no more than a personal idiosyncrasy. +There is certainly no more than this in such expressions as "something +must be fatally unreasonable, absurd, and wrong in the world," or "I +deliberately refuse to keep on terms of loyalty with the universe," if +certain things turn out to be true. Such phrases are completely out of +place in a scientific enquiry. The universe will remain what it is +whether we call it absurd or rational, and may even survive the raising +of the standard of revolt by so eminent a psychologist as Professor +James, to whom we would commend, were he still alive, Schopenhauer's +profound remark that there are no moral phenomena, only moral +interpretations of phenomena. + +What, now, is the insuperable dilemma which Professor James places +before upholders of Determinism? The whole of it turns out to be little +more than a play upon the words "possible" and "actual." Determinism, he +says, professes that "those parts of the universe already laid down +absolutely appoint and decree (Why 'appoint' and 'decree'? Why not the +impersonal word 'determine?') what the other parts shall be." The future +is determined by the past; and given the past, only one future is +possible. Indeterminism says that "the parts have a certain amount of +loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does +not necessarily determine what the others shall be." Thus, still +following Professor James's exposition, given a special instance, both +sides admit the occurrence of a volition. The Determinist asserts that +no other volition could have occurred. The Indeterminist asserts that +another volition might have occurred, other things remaining the same. +And, asks the Professor, can science tell us which is correct? His reply +is, No. "How can any amount of assurance that something actually +happened give us the least grain of information as to whether another +thing might or might not have happened in its place? Only facts can be +proved by other facts. With things that are possibilities and not +facts, facts have no concern." + +The position may be made clearer by taking the Professor's own +illustration. When, he says, I leave this lecture hall I may go home +_via_ Divinity Avenue, or traverse Oxford Street. It is a matter of +chance which route is selected. But assume that by some miracle, after +having walked down Divinity Avenue, ten minutes of time are annihilated, +and reaching the Hall door again Oxford Street is the route selected. +Spectators thus have two alternative universes. One universe with the +Professor walking through Divinity Avenue, the other with him walking +through Oxford Street. If the spectators are Determinists they will +believe only one universe to have been from eternity possible. But, asks +Professor James, looking outwardly at these two universes, can anyone +say which is the accidental and which is the necessary one? "In other +words, either universe _after the fact_ and once there would, to our +means of observation and understanding, appear just as rational as the +other." There is no means by which we can distinguish chance from a +rational necessity. A universe which allows a certain loose play of the +parts is as rational as one which submits to the most rigid determinism. + +Before dealing with the above, it is necessary to take another phrase on +which much of the above argument depends. Professor James says that the +stronghold of the Determinist sentiment is antipathy to the idea of +"Chance," and chance is a notion not to be entertained by any sane mind. +And the sting, he says, seems to rest on the assumption that chance is +something positive, and if a thing happens by chance it must needs be +irrational and preposterous. But I am not aware that any scientific +Determinist ever used "chance" as being a positive term at all. +Certainly the last thing the present writer would dream of doing would +be to predicate chance of any portion of the objective universe +whatsoever. The only legitimate use of the word is in reference to _the +state of our knowledge concerning phenomena_. To say that a thing +chanced, or happened by chance, is only saying that we are not aware of +the causes that produced it. We say nothing of the thing itself, we only +express the state of our mind in relation to it. + +Professor James says all you mean by "chance" is that a thing is not +guaranteed, it may fall out otherwise. Not guaranteed by our knowledge +about the thing, certainly; in any other sense, his definition seems +invented for the express purpose of bolstering up his hypothesis. For, +he says, a chance thing means that the general system of things has no +hold on it. It appears in relation to other things, but it escapes their +determining influence, and appears as "a free gift." Thus whether he +walked down Divinity Avenue or Oxford Street was a matter of chance; and +the future of the world is full of similar chances--events that may take +one of several forms, either of which is consistent with the whole. + +We now have the essence of Professor James's case, and can consider it +in detail. First of all we may note the curiously double sense in which +Professor James uses the word "fact" and the agility with which he skips +from one meaning to another, as it suits his argument. In a broad and +general sense a mental fact is as much a fact as any other fact. A man +riding on horseback is a fact. My vision or conception of a horse with +the head of a man is equally a fact, though nothing like it exists in +nature. We should discriminate between the two by saying that one is a +mental fact strictly relative to a particular mind, the other is an +objective fact relative to all minds normally constituted. Now science +does not deny possibilities as _mental facts_. But it would be a very +queer science indeed that allowed all sorts of possibilities of a given +group of phenomena _under identical conditions_. Like "chance," the +possibilities of the Universe are strictly relative to our knowledge +concerning it. If opposite things appear equally possible, it is only +because we are not sufficiently conversant with the processes to say +which thing is certain. A universe with Professor James walking down +Divinity Avenue appears as orderly and as natural as one with him +parading Oxford Street. But this is because we cannot unravel the +complex conditions that may determine the selection of one route or the +other. Or if it be said in reply, that the walker is unaware of any +choice in the matter, the answer is that there is present the desire to +get away from the lecture hall and arrive at home, and this is strong +enough to make the choice of means to that end unimportant. If the +choice lay between walking down a sunlit street or wading through a mile +of water, five feet deep, while the latter would still remain a +possibility, since it could be done were the inducement to do it strong +enough, there is not much doubt as to what the choice would actually be. + +The complete reply therefore to Professor James's illustration is that +from the standpoint of mere possibility, bearing in mind the proper +significance of possibility, opposite alternatives may be equally real. +We can, that is, conceive conditions under which a certain thing may +occur, and we can conceive another set of conditions under which exactly +the opposite may occur. And either alternative presents us with a +universe that is equally "rational," because in either case we vary the +co-operating conditions in order to produce the imagined consequence. +But given a complete knowledge of all the co-operating conditions, and +not only do two views of the universe cease to be equally rational, but +one of them ceases to be even conceivable. For let us note that the +resultant of any calculation is no more and no less than a synthesis of +the factors that are included in the calculation. If we do not +understand the factors included in a given synthesis it will be a matter +of "chance" what the resultant may be. But if we do understand the +nature of the factors, and the consequence of their synthesis, +possibility and actuality become convertible terms. Finally, whether a +man on leaving a lecture hall turns to the right or the left appears, +under ordinary conditions, equally rational and natural only because we +are aware that it may be a matter of indifference which direction he +takes, and in that case his action will be governed by the simple +desire to get away, or to get to a particular spot. It is a simple +deduction from experience presented by Professor James in a needlessly +confusing manner. + +The next, and practically the only example cited by Professor James to +prove that this world is a world of "chances," is concerned with a +question of morals. We constantly, he says, have occasion to make +"judgments of regret." In illustration of this, he cites the case of a +particularly brutal murder, and adds, "We feel that, although a perfect +mechanical fit to the rest of the universe, it is a bad moral fit, and +that something else would really have been better in its place." But +"calling a thing bad means, if it means anything at all, that the thing +ought not to be, that something else ought to be in its stead." If +Determinism denies this it is defining the universe as a place "in which +what ought to be is impossible," and this lands us in pessimism, or if +we are to escape pessimism we can only do so by abandoning the judgment +of regret. But if our regrets are necessitated nothing else can be in +their place, and the universe is what it was before--a place in which +what ought to be appears impossible. Murder and treachery cannot be good +without regret being bad, regret cannot be good without murder and +treachery being bad. As both, however, are foredoomed, something must be +fatally wrong and absurd in the world. + +Now, I must confess all this seems a deal of bother concerning a fairly +simple matter. Indeed, Professor James seems to be engaged in raising a +dust and then complaining of the murkiness of the atmosphere. Coming +from a writer of less standing I might, in view of what has been said +elsewhere in this essay, have left the reply to the careful reader's +understanding of the subject. But from so eminent a psychologist as +William James, silence might well be construed as deterministic +inability to reply to the position laid down. + +In the first place, I may be pardoned for again reminding the reader +that, in this connection, "ought" stands upon precisely the same level +as "possible." Whether we say that a man ought to do a certain thing, or +that it is possible for him to do a certain thing, we are making +identical statements, for no one would dream of saying that a man ought +to do that which it is impossible for him to perform. When we say that +murder and treachery ought not to be, we do not imply--if we use +language properly--that these are not as much part of the cosmic order, +and as much the expression of co-operating conditions, as are kindness +and loyalty. It is saying no more than that in our judgment human nature +may be so trained and conditioned as to practise neither murder nor +treachery. We are expressing a judgment as to what our ideal of human +nature is, and our ideal of what human nature should be is based upon +what experience has taught us concerning its possibilities. Man's +"judgment of regret" is justifiable and admirable, not because he +recognizes that the past could have been different from what it was, but +because it furnishes him with the requisite experience for a better +direction of action in the future, and because the feeling of regret is +itself one of the determining conditions that will decide conduct in +the future. + +"The question," says Professor James, "is of things, not of eulogistic +names for them." With this I cordially agree; but in that case what are +we to make of the following:-- + + "The only consistent way of representing ... a world whose parts + may affect one another through their conduct being either good + or bad is the indeterminate way. What interest, zest, or + excitement can there be in achieving the right way, unless we + are enabled to feel that the wrong way is also a possible and a + natural way--nay, more, a menacing and an imminent way? And what + sense can there be in condemning ourselves for taking the wrong + way, unless we need have done nothing of the sort, unless the + right way was open to us as well? I cannot understand the + willingness to act, no matter how we feel, without the belief + that acts are really good or bad. I cannot understand the belief + that an act is bad, without regret at its happening. I cannot + understand regret without the admission of real genuine + possibilities in the world." + +Eliminate from this all that is matter of common agreement between +Determinists and Indeterminists, and what have we left but sheer verbal +confusion? The pleasurable feeling that results from a sense of +achievement is real no matter what are the lines on which the universe +is constructed. One might as reasonably ask, Why feel a greater +interest in a first-class orchestral performance, than in the harmonic +outrages of a hurdy-gurdy, since both are, from the physical side, +vibratory phenomena? And is it not clear, to repeat a truth already +emphasized, that a most important factor in our condemning ourselves for +doing a wrong action is the fact that we have done so. It is one of the +determining conditions of doing better actions in future. Of course, +Professor James cannot understand the belief that an act is bad, without +regret at its happening. Neither can anyone else, for the simple reason +that one involves the other. The statement is as much a truism as is the +one that we can have no willingness to act unless we believe that acts +are either good or bad. Equally true is it that regret implies real +possibilities in the world--not always, though, for we may regret death +or the radiation into extra terrestrial space of solar energy without +believing that the prevention of either is possible. But our +possibilities in relation to conduct do not, as the argument implies, +relate to the past, but to the future. Indeed, the sense of possibility +would be morally worthless were it otherwise. + +Finally, and this brings me to what is one of the cardinal weaknesses of +so much of the writing on psychology, Professor James's argument is +vitiated by non-recognition of the fact that regret and satisfaction, +praise and blame, with most of the cardinal moral qualities, are +_social_ in their origin and application. They represent the reaction of +our social feelings against anti-social conduct, or their expression of +satisfaction at conduct of an opposite character. They are consequently +the creations, not of an indwelling "will," but of an outdwelling social +relationship. They are not impressed by the "ego" upon the world, they +are impressed by the world upon the ego. Character is not something that +each individual brings ready fashioned to the service of society; it is +something that society itself creates. It has been fashioned by +countless generations of social evolution, and, in the main, that +evolution has of necessity placed due emphasis upon those intellectual +and moral qualities on which social welfare depends. + + + + +VI. + +THE NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY. + + +If Hume was not right in asserting that a few intelligible definitions +would put an end to the Free-Will controversy, his error lay in assuming +a greater receptivity of mind than most people possess. For it may +safely be asserted that once the legitimate meanings of the terms +employed are acknowledged, and they are properly applied to the matter +in dispute, it may be shown that the opponents of Determinism have been +beating the air. The Determinism they attack is not the Determinism that +is either professed or defended. The consequences they forecast follow +only from a distorted, and often meaningless, use of the terms employed. +Instead of the Determinist denying the moral and mental value of certain +qualities of which the Indeterminist announces himself the champion, he +admits their value, gives them a definite meaning, and proves that it is +only by an assumption of the truth of the cardinal principle of +Determinism that they have any reality. This has already been shown to +be true in the case of Freedom, Choice, Deliberation, etc.; it remains +to pursue the same method with such conceptions as praise and blame or +punishment and reward, and responsibility. + +The charge is, again, that Determinism robs praise and blame and +responsibility of all meaning, and reduces them to mere verbal +expressions which some may mistake for the equivalents of reality, but +which clearer thinkers will estimate at their true worth. What is the +use of praising or blaming if each one does what heredity, constitution, +and environment compels? Why punish a man for being what he is? Why hold +him responsible for the expressions of a character provided for him, and +for the influence of an environment which he had no part in forming? So +the string of questions run on. None of them, it may safely be said, +would ever be asked if all properly realized the precise meaning and +application of the terms employed. For as with the previous terms +examined, it is an acceptance of Indeterminism that would rob these +words of all value. Rationally conceived they are not only consonant +with Determinism, but each of them implies it. + +Of the four terms mentioned above--Praise, Blame, Punishment, and +Responsibility, the cardinal and governing one is the last. It will be +well, therefore, to endeavour to fix this with some degree of clearness. + +To commence with we may note that in contra-distinction to "freedom" +where the testimony of consciousness is illegitimately invoked, a +consciousness of responsibility is essential to its existence. A person +in whom it was manifestly impossible to arouse such a consciousness +would be unhesitatingly declared to be irresponsible. There is here, +consequently, both the fact of responsibility and our consciousness of +it that calls for explanation. And both require for an adequate +explanation a larger area than is offered by mere individual psychology. +Indeed, so long as we restrict ourselves to the individual we cannot +understand either the fact or the consciousness of responsibility. By +limiting themselves in this manner some Determinists have been led to +deny responsibility altogether. The individual, they have said, does not +create either his own organism or its environment, and consequently all +reasonable basis for responsibility disappears. To which there is the +effective reply that the datum for responsibility is found in the nature +of the organism and in the possibility of its being affected by certain +social forces, and not in the absolute origination of its own impulses +and actions. It is playing right into the hands of the Indeterminist to +deny so large and so important a social phenomenon as responsibility. +And to the Indeterminist attack, that if action is the expression of +heredity, organism, and environment, there is no room for +responsibility, there is the effective reply that it is precisely +because the individual's actions are the expression of all the forces +brought to bear upon him that he may be accounted responsible. The +Determinist has often been too ready to take the meanings and +implications of words from his opponent, instead of checking the sense +in which they were used. + +The general sense of responsibility--omitting all secondary meanings--is +that of accountability, to be able to reply to a charge, or to be able +to answer a claim made upon us. This at once gives us the essential +characteristic of responsibility, and also stamps it as a phenomenon of +social ethics. A man living on a desert island would not be responsible, +unless we assume his responsibility to deity; and even here we have the +essential social fact--relation to a person--reintroduced. It is our +relations to others, that and the influence of our actions upon others, +combined with the possibility of our natures being affected by the +praise or censure of the social body to which we belong, which sets up +the fact of responsibility. Conduct creates a social reaction, good or +bad, agreeable or disagreeable, and the reacting judgment of society +awakens in each of us a consciousness of responsibility, more or less +acute, and more or less drastic, to society at large. The individual +sees himself in the social mirror. His nature is fashioned by the social +medium, his personal life becomes an expression of the social life. Just +as the social conscience, in the shape of a legal tribunal, judges each +for actions that are past, so the larger social conscience, as expressed +in a thousand and one different forms, customs, and associations, judges +us for those desires and dispositions that may result in action in the +future. Responsibility as a phenomenon of social psychology is obvious, +educative, inescapable, and admirable. Responsibility as a phenomenon of +individual psychology, whether from the Determinist or Indeterminist +point of view, is positively meaningless. + +Taking, then, responsibility as a fact of social life, with its true +significance of accountability, let us see its meaning on deterministic +lines. For the sake of clearness we will first take legal responsibility +as illustrating the matter. In law a man is accounted guilty provided he +knows the law he is breaking, and also that he is capable of +appreciating the consequences of his actions. A further consideration of +no mean importance is that the consequences attending the infringement +of the law are assumed to be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the +inducements to break the regulation. And as all citizens are assumed to +know the law, we may confine our attention to the last two aspects. +What, then, is meant by ability to appreciate consequences? There can be +no other meaning than the capacity to create an ideal presentment of the +penalties attaching to certain actions. Every promise of reward or +threat of punishment assumes this, and assumes also that provided the +ideal presentment is strong enough, certain general results will follow. +It is on this principle alone that punishments are proportioned to +offences, and that certain revisions of penalties take place from time +to time. Negatively the same thing is shown by the fact that young +children, idiots, and lunatics are not legally held responsible for +their actions. The ground here is that the power to represent ideally +the full consequences of actions is absent, or operates in an abnormal +manner. Moreover, the whole line of proof to establish insanity in a +court of law is that a person is not amenable to certain desires and +impulses in the same manner as are normally constituted people. + +Substantially the same thing is seen if we take the fact of +responsibility in non-legal matters. A very young child, incapable of +ideally representing consequences, is not considered a responsible +being. An older child has a limited responsibility in certain simple +matters. As it grows older, and growth brings with it the power of more +fully appreciating the consequence of actions, its responsibility +increases in the home, in the school, in business, social, religious, +and political circles it is held accountable for its conduct, in +proportion as the power of estimating the consequences of actions is +assumed. In other words, we assume not that there is at any stage an +autonomous or self-directing "will" in operation, but that a particular +quality of motive will operate at certain stages of mental development, +and the whole of the educative process, in the home, the school, and in +society, aims at making these motives effective. That is, the whole fact +of responsibility assumes as a datum the very condition that the +Indeterminist regards as destroying responsibility altogether. He argues +that if action is the expression of character, responsibility is a +farce. But it is precisely because action is the expression of character +that responsibility exists. When the law, or when society, calls a man +to account for something he has done, it does not deny that had he +possessed a different character he would have acted differently. It does +not assert that at the time of action he could have helped doing what he +did. Both may be admitted. What it does say is that having a character +of such and such a kind certain things are bound to follow. But +inasmuch as that character may be modified by social opinion or social +coercion, inasmuch as it will respond to certain influences brought to +bear upon it, it is a responsible character, and so may be held +accountable for its actions. + +There is, therefore, nothing incompatible between Determinism and +Responsibility. The incompatibility lies between Indeterminism and +Responsibility. What meaning can we attach to it, on what ground can we +call a person to account, if our calling him to account is not one of +the considerations that will affect his conduct? Grant that a +consciousness of responsibility decides how a person shall act, and the +principle of Determinism is admitted. Deny that a consciousness of +responsibility determines action, and the phrase loses all meaning and +value. The difficulty arises, as has been said, by ignoring the fact +that responsibility is of social origin, and in looking for an +explanation in individual psychology. It would, of course, be absurd to +make man responsible for being what he is, but so long as he is amenable +to the pressure of normal social forces he is responsible or accountable +for what he may be. Whatever his character be, so long as it has the +capacity of being affected by social pressure, it is a responsible +character. And this is the sole condition that makes responsibility +intelligible. + +Having said this, it is not difficult to see the place of punishment and +reward, or praise and blame, in the Determinist scheme of things. +Another word than punishment might be selected, and one that would be +without its unpleasant associations, but on the whole it is advisable +perhaps to retain the word in order to see the nature of the problem +clearly. Of course, punishment in the sense of the infliction of pain +merely because certain actions have been committed, no Determinist would +countenance. So far as punishment is inflicted in this spirit of sheer +retaliation it serves only to gratify feelings of malevolence. A society +that punishes merely to gratify resentment is only showing that it can +be as brutal collectively as individuals can be singly. And if +punishment begins and ends with reference to the past, then it is +certainly revolting to inflict pain upon a person because he has done +what education and organization impelled him to do. So far one can agree +with Professor Sidgwick that when a man's conduct is "compared with a +code, to the violation of which punishments are attached, the question +whether he really could obey the rule by which he is judged is obvious +and inevitable." But when he goes on to reply "If he could not, it seems +contrary to our sense of justice to punish him," the reply is, Not if +the code is one that normal human nature can obey, and the individual +one who can be modified in a required direction in both his own interest +and the interest of others. For if our punishment is prospective instead +of retrospective, or at least retrospective only so far as to enable us +to understand the character of the individual with whom we are dealing, +and using punishment as one of the means of securing a desirable +modification of character, then punishment is merged in correction, and +receives a complete justification upon Deterministic lines. + +The problem is comparatively simple. Actions being decided by motives, +the problem with a socially defective character is how to secure the +prevalence of desires that will issue in desirable conduct. A man +steals; the problem then is, How can we so modify the character of which +stealing is the expression, so that we may weaken the desire to steal +and strengthen feelings that will secure honesty of action? On the lower +plane society resorts to threats of pains and penalties, so that when +the desire to steal arises again, the knowledge that certain measures +will be taken against the offender will arrest this desire. This is one +of the principal grounds on which a measure like the First Offenders Act +is based. On a higher plane the approval and respect of society serve to +awaken a positive liking for honesty and the formation of desirable +mental habits. Praise and blame rest upon a precisely similar basis. Man +being the socialized animal he is, the approbation and disapprobation of +his fellows must always exert considerable influence on his conduct. The +memory of censure passed or of praise bestowed acts as one of the many +influences that will determine conduct when the critical moment for +action arrives. Man does not always consciously put the question of what +his social circle will think of his actions, but this feeling rests upon +a deeper and more secure basis than that of consciousness. It has been, +so to speak, worked into his nature by all the generations of social +life that have preceded his existence, and to escape it means to put +off all that is distinctly human in his character. Every time we praise +or blame an action we are helping to mould character, for both will +serve as guides in the future. And it is just because at the moment of +action a person "could not help doing" what he did that there is any +reasonable justification for either approval or censure. Social approval +and disapproval become an important portion of the environment to which +the human being must perforce adapt himself. + +What use could there be in punishing or blaming a man if his actions are +determined, not by realizable motives, but by a mysterious will that in +spite of our endeavours remains uninfluenced? If neither the promise nor +the recollection of punishment creates feelings that will determine +conduct, then one might as well whip the wind. Its only purpose is to +gratify our own feelings of anger or malevolence. It is equally futile +to look for the cause of wrong-doing in education, organization, or +environment. For in proportion as we recognize any or all of these +factors as determining conduct we are deserting the Indeterminist +position, and relinquishing the "freedom" of the will. If Indeterminism +be true we are forced to believe that although as a consequence of +ill-conduct evil feelings may arise with greater frequency, yet they +must be wholly ineffective as influencing action. It cannot even be +argued that certain motives offer stronger attraction than others to the +will, for this in itself would be a form of determinism. There is no +middle course. Either the "will" remains absolutely uninfluenced by +threat of punishment or desire for praise, serenely indifferent to the +conflict of desires, and proof against the influence of education, or it +forms a part of the causative sequence and the truth of Determinism is +admitted. You cannot at the same time hold that man does not act in +accordance with the strongest motive, and decide that the "will" +maintains its freedom by deciding which motive shall be the +strongest--its own determination not being the product of previous +training. One need, indeed, only state the Indeterminist position +plainly to see its inherent absurdity. + +If ever in any case the argument _ad absurdum_ was applicable it is +surely here. It may safely be said that the larger part of the life of +each of us is passed in anticipating the future in the light of +experience. But if "Free-Will" be a fact, on what ground can we forecast +the future. If motives do not determine conduct, any prophecy of what +certain people may do in a given situation is futile. The will being +indetermined, what they have done in the past is no guide as to what +they will do in the future. If motives did not decide then they will not +decide now. Whether we read backward or forward makes no difference. We +have no right to say that the actions of certain statesmen prove them to +have been animated by the desire for wealth or power. That would imply +Determinism. We cannot say that because a murder has been committed a +certain person who bore the deceased ill-will is rightly suspected. This +is assuming that conduct is determined by motives. If we see a person +jump into the river, we have no right to argue that depressed health, +or financial worry, or impending social disgrace, has caused him to +commit suicide. The mother may as easily murder her child as nurse it. +The workman may labour as well for a bare pittance as for a comfortable +wage. A man outside a house in the early hours of the morning, armed +with a dark lantern and a jemmy, may have no desire to commit a +burglary. A person with a game bag and a gun furnishes no reliable data +for believing that he intends to shoot something. In all of these cases, +and in hundreds of others, if "free-will" be a fact we have no right to +argue from actions to motives, or infer motives from actions. Motives do +not rule, and we are witnessing the uncaused and unaccountable vagaries +of an autonomous will. + +It is sometimes said that no matter how convinced a Determinist one may +be, one always acts as though the will were free. This, so far from +being true, is the reverse of what really happens. In all the affairs of +life people of all shades of opinion concerning Determinism really act +as though "Free-Will" had no existence. It would, indeed, be strange +were it otherwise. Facts are more insistent than theories, and in the +last resort it is the nature of things which determines the course of +our actions. Nature, while permitting considerable latitude in matters +of theory or opinion, allows comparatively little play in matters of +conduct. And it may be asserted that a society which failed to +acknowledge in its conduct the principle of Determinism would stand but +small chance of survival. As a matter of fact, when it comes to +practical work the theory of "Free-Will" is ignored and the theory of +Determinism acted upon. The unfortunate thing is that the maintenance of +"Free-Will" in the sphere of opinion serves to check the wholesome +application of the opposite principle. Theory is used to check action +instead of serving its proper function as a guide to conduct. + +Still, it is instructive to note to what extent in the sphere of +practice the principle of Determinism is admitted. In dealing with the +drink question, for instance, temperance reformers argue that a +diminution in the number of public-houses, and the creation of +opportunities for healthy methods of enjoyment, will diminish temptation +and weaken the desire for alcoholic stimulants. In the training of +children stress is rightly laid upon the importance of the right kind of +associates, the power of education, and of healthy physical +surroundings. With adults, the beneficial influences of fresh air, good +food, well-built houses, open spaces, and healthy conditions of labour +have become common-places of sociology. In every rational biography +attention is paid to the formative influences of parents, friends, and +general environment. Medical men seek the cause of frames of mind in +nervous structure, and predisposition to physical, mental, and moral +disease in heredity. Statisticians point to absolute uniformity of +general human action under certain social conditions. Moralists point to +the power of ideals on people's minds. Religious teachers emphasize the +power of certain teachings in reducing particular habits. In all these +cases no allowance whatever is made for the operation of an undetermined +will. The motive theory of action may not be consciously in the minds +of all, but it is everywhere and at all times implied in practice. + +In strict truth, we cannot undertake a single affair in life without +making the assumption that people will act in accordance with certain +motives, and that these in turn will be the outcome of specific desires. +If I journey from here to Paris I unconsciously assume that certain +forces--the desire to retain a situation, to earn a living, to satisfy a +sense of duty--will cause all the officials connected with boat and +train service to carry out their duties in a given manner. If I appeal +for the protection of the police I am again counting upon certain +motives influencing the official mind in a particular manner. All +commercial transactions rest upon the same unconscious assumption. A +merchant who places an order with a firm in Russia, America, or Japan, +or who sends goods abroad, counts with absolute confidence upon certain +desires and mental states so influencing a number of people with whom he +has no direct connection, that they will co-operate in landing the goods +at the point desired. Or if the goods are not transmitted as desired, it +is not because the principle upon which he relied is invalid, but +because other desires have operated in a more powerful manner. A general +commanding an army acts on precisely the same principle. The ideal of +duty, of the honour of the regiment, the desire for distinction, are all +counted upon as being powerful enough to serve as motives that will +cause men to join in battle, storm a risky position, or take part in a +forlorn hope. History is read upon the same principle. The statement +that Nero was cruel, that Henry the Eighth was of an amatory nature, +that Charles I. was tyrannical, or that Louis the Fifteenth was +licentious, could not be made unless we argue that their actions imply +the existence of certain motives. That the motive theory of the will is +true is admitted in practice by all. The Indeterminist admits it even in +his appeal to "Liberty." He is counting upon the desire for freedom +(sociologically) as being strong enough to lead people to reject a +theory which denies its applicability to morals. + +Human nature becomes a chaos if Determinism is denied. Neither a science +of human conduct nor of history is possible in its absence; for both +assume a fundamental identity of human nature beneath all the +comparatively superficial distinctions of colour, creed, or national +divisions. The determination of the influence of climate, food, +inter-tribal or international relations, of the power of ideals--moral, +religious, military, national, etc.--are all so many exercises in the +philosophy of Determinism. In none of these directions do we make the +least allowance for the operation of an uncaused "will." We say with +absolute confidence that given a people with a military environment, and +either its discomforts produce an anti-militarist feeling, or its +glamour evokes a strong militarist feeling. So with all other +consideration that comes before us. And as Determinism enables us to +read and understand history and life, so it also provides a basis upon +which we can work for reform. In the belief that certain influences will +produce, in the main, a particular result, we can lay our plans and +work with every prospect of ultimate success. Instead of our best +endeavours being left at the mercy of an undetermined "will," they take +their place as part of the determining influences that are moulding +human nature. Every action becomes a portion of the environment with +which each has to deal. More, it becomes a portion of the agent's own +environment, a part of that ideal world in which we all more or less +live. And the heightened consciousness that every action leaves a +certain residuum for either good or ill, supplies in itself one of the +strongest incentives for the exercise of self-control and furnishes an +unshakable basis for self-development. + + + + +VII. + +DETERMINISM AND CHARACTER. + + +In spite of what has been said, it may be that a protest will still be +raised by some on behalf of character. A man's character, it will be +argued, is an alienable personal possession. What he does belongs to him +in a sense that is peculiar to his personality. In many important +instances his actions bear the stamp of individuality in so plain a +manner that while we cannot predict what he will do, once it is done we +recognize by the peculiar nature of the action that it must have been +done by him and by none other. In painting, in music, in literature, and +in many other walks of life, we are able to infer authorship by the +personality stamped upon the production. Moreover, nothing that we can +do or say will ever destroy the conviction that my actions are _mine_. +They proceed from _me_; they are the expressions of _my_ character; it +is this feeling that induces me to plead guilty to the charge of +responsibility, and this conviction remains after all argument has been +urged. But, it is further asked, how can this be aught but an illusion +if I am not the real and determining cause of my conduct? If I and my +actions are the products of a converging series of calculable or +indetermined forces, are we not compelled to dismiss this conviction as +pure myth? Must I not conclude that I am no more the determining cause +of my conduct than a stone determines whether it shall fall to the +ground or not? And is not the cultivation of character, therefore, an +absurd futility? + +Now although the Determinist will dissent from the conclusions of those +who argue in this way, with a great deal of the argument he would agree; +more than that, he would enforce the same line of reasoning as a +legitimate inference from his own position. And he might also submit +that it is only by an acceptance of the deterministic position that such +reasoning can receive full justification. + +What do we mean by character? Suppose we reply with T. H. Green by +defining character as the way in which a man seeks self-satisfaction.[7] +We are next faced with the problem of accounting for the different ways +in which self-satisfaction is sought. One man is a drunkard and another +temperate, one is benevolent and another grasping, one is cruel and +another kind; there are endless diversities of human conduct, and all +come within the scope of Green's definition of character. We have to +look farther and deeper. A satisfactory answer clearly cannot be found +in the assumption that each person's actions proceed from an unfettered, +autonomous will. The reason for the choice would still have to be +discovered. Nor will it do to attribute the difference of choice to +different environmental influences in which the "self" is placed. This +would indeed be reducing the man to the level of a machine, or to a +lower level still. And the same environmental influences do _not_ +produce identical results. This is one of the commonest facts of daily +experience. Stimulus from the environment is the essential condition of +action, but the precise nature of the action elicited is an affair of +the organism. If I am courageous by nature I shall stay and face a +threatened danger. If I am cowardly I shall run away. Thus, while +circumstances are the cause of my acting, how I shall act is in turn +caused by my character, the net result being due to their interaction. +This seems so obvious that it may well be accepted as a datum common to +both parties in the dispute. + + [7] _Works_, vol. ii. p. 142. + +We may, then, freely grant the Indeterminist--what he foolishly assumes +is inconsistent with the Deterministic position--that environment may be +modified by character, that a man is not the creature of circumstances, +if we restrict that word to external circumstances, as is so often done. +A man, we will say, allowing for the influence of external +circumstances, acts according to his character. The question then +becomes, "What is his character? How does he acquire it?[8] And whence +the varieties of character?" To these queries the only intelligible +reply is that a man's character represents his psychic heritage, as his +body represents his physical heritage, both of them being subject to +development and modification by post-natal influences. Each one thus +brings a different psychic force, or a different character, to bear upon +the world around him. He is thus the author of his acts, not in the +unintelligible sense of absolutely originating the sequence that +proceeds from his actions, but in the rational sense of being that point +in the sequence that is represented by his personality. And his actions +bear the stamp of his personality because had his antecedents been +different his actions would have varied accordingly. Each is properly +judged in terms of character, because it is the character which +determines the form taken by the reaction of the organism on the +environment. + + [8] Of course, the man and his character are not + two distinct things. The character is the man. But + it would involve needless circumlocution to insist + on superfine distinctions, and it may even help to + a comprehension of the argument to keep to + familiar forms of speech. + +We may go even further than this and say that it is only actions which +proceed from character that are properly the subject of moral judgment. +Let us take a concrete illustration of this. A man distributes a large +sum of money among the inhabitants of a town, some of it in the form of +personal gifts among its needy inhabitants, the rest in endowing various +institutions connected with its social and municipal life. Twelve months +later he comes forward as candidate in a parliamentary election. The +question of his donations at once comes up for judgment, and in defence +he may plead that he was only invited to contest the seat after the +money was given. How shall we determine what his motives were? Obviously +by an appeal to his character. If he were well known as a wealthy person +of recognized benevolent disposition, it would be argued that while his +candidature would inevitably reap benefit from his donations it was +highly probable that in giving the money he was only acting as one would +expect him to act. If, on the other hand, he was well known as a person +of a mean and grasping disposition, it would be concluded that the +donation was an attempt to bribe the electorate, his giving the money so +long before being an intelligent anticipation of events. In either case +we should be appealing to character, and judging the man by what of his +character was known. Numerous instances of a like kind might be given, +but in every case it would be found that we infer from an action a +particular kind of motive, and that our judgment of the motive is +determined by the character of the individual. This is so far the case +that we are apt to mistrust our own judgment when we find a benevolent +person doing what looks like a mean action, or a brave person committing +what looks like an act of cowardice. While action is thus--so far as it +is intentional--always the registration of motive, and motive the +expression of a preponderating desire, the desire, whether it be +licentious or chaste, noble or ignoble, is the outcome of character. + +Determinism thus finds a fit and proper place for character in its +philosophy of things. It does not say that the fact or the consideration +of character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it says it is +all-important. And in saying this it challenges the position of the +Indeterminist by the implication that it is only on lines of Determinism +that character is important or that it can be profitably cultivated. For +consider what is meant by saying that conduct implies and proceeds from +character. It clearly implies that a man acts in this or that manner +because he has been in the habit of acting in this or that manner. We do +not gather grapes from thistles, and we do not experience noble actions +from a depraved character. The actions of each are determined by the +character of each, and character is in turn the outcome of psychic +inheritance, plus the effects of the interaction of organism and +environment from the moment of birth onward. Personal characteristics, +honesty, courage, truthfulness, loyalty, thus imply strictly determined +qualities. They are qualities determined by the nature of the organism. +They could not be expressed unless the surrounding circumstances were +favourable to their expression; but neither could they be manifested +unless the character was of a particular order. Conduct is, in fact, +always a product of the two things. + +Let us also note that it is this determination of qualities that is +implied when we speak of a good or a bad, a strong or a weak character. +We should not call a man a good character who to-day fed a starving +child, and to-morrow kicked it from his doorstep. We should describe him +as, at best, a person of an exceedingly variable disposition who +satisfied the caprice of the moment irrespective of the feelings and +needs of others. We should not call a person strong who withstood a +temptation one hour and yielded to it the next. He would be described as +weak, and lacking the compelling force of a stable disposition. It is +also true that the moralization of character is the more complete as the +determined nature of impulses is the more evident. Most people would not +only resent the imputation of having committed a mean action, they would +also resent the likelihood of their committing one. And in common +speech, and in fact, the highest tribute we can pay a man is to say +that a certain kind of action is beneath him. We say that we know A +would not have committed a theft, but we are quite willing to believe it +of B. In each case we make no allowance for the operation of an +undetermined will; such doubts as we have being connected with our +inability to completely analyze the character in question. But our +prognostications are strictly based upon our knowledge of character and +upon the conviction that given a certain character and the operation of +particular motives, specific action follows with mathematical certainty. + +And this, as has previously been pointed out, gives the only reliable +basis for the cultivation of character. The whole aim of education, +whether it be that received in the home, in the school, or the larger +and more protracted education of social life, has the aim and purpose of +securing the spontaneous response of a particular action to a particular +stimulus, or on the negative side that certain circumstances shall not +arouse desires of a socially unwelcome character. The phrase +"Patriotism" thus serves to arouse a group of feelings that cluster +round the state and social life. "Home" awakens its own groups of +domestic and parental feelings. "Duty," again, covers a wider sphere, +but involves the same process. By instruction and by training, certain +conditions, circumstances, words, or associations are made to call up +trains of connected feelings which, culminating in a desire, +imperatively demand conduct along a given line. The more complete the +education, the stronger the desire; the stronger the desire, the more +certain the action. The more defective the education the less the +certainty with which we can count upon specific conduct. The man who +acts to-day in one way and to-morrow in another way is not a man of +strong desires, so much as he is a man whose desires are undisciplined. +The man who acts with uniform certainty is not a man of weak desire, but +one whose desires run with strength and swiftness in a uniform +direction. And it is a curious feature of indeterministic psychology +that it should take as clear evidence of the subordination of desire to +"will" the man whose desire is so strong as to preclude hesitation +between it and action. + +The whole of education, the whole of the discipline of life, is thus +based upon the determination of conduct by circumstances and character. +If the principle of cause and effect does not fully apply to conduct, +all our training is so much waste of time. But it is because we cannot +really think of the past not influencing the present, once we bring the +two into relation, that we, Determinist and Indeterminist alike, proceed +with our deterministic methods of training, and in this instance at +least wisdom is justified of her children. + +Finally, if the above be granted, can we longer attach meaning to the +expression that man forms his own character? Well, if it means that a +man has any share in his psychic endowments, or that they being what +they are at any given time he could at that time act differently from +the way in which he does act, the expression is meaningless. It is +absolute nonsense. But in another sense it does convey an important +truth. We must, however, always bear in mind that in speaking of a +man's character we are not dealing with two things, but with one thing. +The character is the man, the man is the character. Or to be quite +accurate, body and mind, physical and psychical qualities together, form +the man, and any separation of these is for purposes of analysis and +study only. If we say, then, that a man is master of his own character, +or that a man may mould his own character, we do not imply the existence +of an independent entity moulding or mastering something else. We are +saying no more than that every experience carries its resultant into the +sum of character. Action generates habit, and habit means a more or less +permanent modification of character. What a man is, is the outcome of +what he has been, and a perception of this truth no more conflicts with +the principles of Determinism as above explained, than a stone being +intercepted in its fall down the side of a hill by lodging against a +tree is an infraction of the law of gravitation. In this sense, using +figurative language, a man may be said to be master of himself. What he +does proceeds from himself; it is the expression of his character, and +his doing cuts deeper the grooves of habit, and so makes more certain +the performance of similar actions in the future. It is the fact of the +motive springing from character which determines the act that makes the +man its author. And the knowledge of this supplies him with, not alone +the most powerful incentive towards the determination of his own +character, but, what is equally important, the only method whereby to +fashion the character of others. + + + + +VIII. + +A PROBLEM IN DETERMINISM. + + +If human feeling followed logical conviction the discussion of +Determinism might, so far as the present writer is concerned, be +considered as finished. Ultimately this doubtless occurs; but in the +interim one has to reckon with the play of feeling, fashioned by +long-standing conviction, upon convictions that are of recent origin. +Thus it happens that many who realise the logical force of arguments +similar to those hitherto advanced, find themselves in a state of +fearfulness concerning the ultimate effect on human life of a convinced +Determinism. The conflict between feeling and conviction that exists in +their own minds they naturally ascribe to others, and endow it with a +permanency which mature consideration might show to be unwarranted. It +would indeed be strange and lamentable if the divorce between feeling +and conviction--to adopt a popular classification--was not simply +incidental to change, but was also an inexpugnable part of fundamental +aspects of human life. + +Mr. A. J. Balfour has indeed gone so far as to suggest,[9] as a theory +to meet this phenomenon, that the immediate consciousness of our +actions being determined would be so paralyzing to action, that Nature +has by "a process of selective slaughter" made a consciousness of this +character a practical impossibility. But it would seem that the fact of +a consciousness of determination developing at all affords strong +presumptions in favour of the belief that no such selective slaughter is +really necessary to the maintenance of vital social relations. Mr. +Balfour's argument might have some weight against Fatalism, which says +that what is to be will be in despite of all that may be done to prevent +its occurrence; but we are on different ground with a theory which makes +what _I_ do part of the sequence that issues in a particular result. + + [9] _International Journal of Ethics_, vol. iv. + pp. 421-422. + +The problem is put very plainly in the following two quotations. The +first is from a private source, written by one who fears the +consequences of Determinism on conduct. The writer says:-- + + "In a moral crisis, and with the consciousness of a strong + tendency in the direction of what is felt to be wrong, is there + no danger of this desire gaining further strength and becoming + the predominant feeling by accepting Determinism, causing a + weakened sense of responsibility, besides providing a convenient + excuse for giving way to the lower instead of the higher? Thus + in a question of alternatives is it not conceivable that by + dwelling on this thought, the agent is resisting possibilities + which might otherwise have a different effect had Determinism no + advocacy and with a different competitive factor to oppose? + This, it seems to me, is what the Indeterminist fears, and I + think it must be admitted not without some reason." + +The second comes from Mr. F. W. Headley's work, _Life and Evolution_. +Mr. Headley, after discussing the evolution of mind, and after admitting +the impregnable nature of the determinist position, says that +notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary we cannot help cherishing +the belief that we are in some sense "free," and adds:-- + + "For practical purposes what is wanted is not free-will but a + working belief in it. When the time for decision and for action + comes, a man must feel that he is free to choose or he is lost. + And this working belief in free-will, even though the thing + itself be proved to be a phantom and an illusion, is the + inalienable property of every healthy man." + +Both these criticisms might be met by the method of analysing the use +made of certain leading words. For example, the Determinist would quite +agree that for conduct to be fruitful a man must feel that he is free to +choose. But unless his freedom consists in liberty to obey the dictates +of his real nature, the term is without significance. The fact of +choice, as has been pointed out, is common ground for both Determinist +and Indeterminist. The real question is whether the choice itself is +determined or not. What a man needs to feel is that his choice is +decisive, and that it is based upon an impartial review of the +alternatives as they appear to him. Determinism makes full allowance for +this; it is Indeterminism which in denying the application of causality +to the will substantially asserts that the whole training of a lifetime +may be counteracted by the decision of an uncaused will, and so renders +the whole process unintelligible. And as to Determinism causing a +weakened sense of responsibility, surely one may fairly argue that the +consciousness of the cumulative force of practice may well serve to warn +us against yielding to a vicious propensity, and so strengthen the +feeling of resistance to it. There could hardly be conceived a stronger +incentive to right action, or to struggle against unwholesome desires, +than this conviction. Moreover, the practical testimony of those who are +convinced Determinists is all in this direction. The fears are expressed +by those whose advocacy of Determinism is at best of but a lukewarm +description. + +But in order that the full weight of the difficulty may be realized let +us put the matter in a still more forcible form. Determinism, it is to +be remembered, is an attempt to apply to mind and morals that principle +of causation which is of universal application in the physical world, +and where it has proved itself so fruitful and suggestive. On this +principle all that is flows from all that has been in such a way that, +given a complete knowledge of the capacities of all the forces in +operation at any one time, the world a century hence could be predicted +with mathematical accuracy. So likewise with human nature. Human conduct +being due to the interaction of organism with environment, our +inability to say what a person will do under given circumstances is no +more than an expression of our ignorance of the quantitative and +qualitative value of the forces operating. The possibilities of action +are co-extensive with the actualities of ignorance. There is no break in +the working of causation, no matter what the sphere of existence with +which we happen to be dealing. + +It is at this point that Determinism lands one in what is apparently an +ethical _cul-de-sac_. If all that is, is the necessary result of all +that has been, if nothing different from what does occur could occur, +what is the meaning of the sense of power over circumstances that we +possess? And why urge people to make an effort in this or that direction +if everything, including the effort or its absence, is determined? I may +flatter myself with the notion that things are better because of some +action of mine. But beyond the mere fact that my action is part of the +stream of causation, all else is a trick of the imagination. My conduct +is, all the time, the result of the co-operation of past conditions with +present circumstances. To say that praise or blame of other people's +conduct, or approval or disapproval of my own conduct, is itself a +determinative force, hardly meets the point. For these, too, are part of +the determined order. + +It might be urged that the knowledge that by exciting certain feelings +others are proportionately weakened operates in the direction of +improvement. Quite so; and as a mere description of what occurs the +statement is correct. But to the Determinist there is no "I" that +determines which feeling or cluster of feelings shall predominate. "I" +am the expression of the succession and co-ordination of mental states; +we are still within a closed circle of causation. Whether I am good or +bad, wise or unwise, I shall be what I must be, and nothing else; do as +I must do, and no more. + +This is, I think, putting the Indeterminists' case as strongly as it can +be put. How is the Determinist to meet the attack? A common retort is +that all this being granted things remain as they were. If the criminal +action is determined so is that of the judge, and so no harm is done. We +shall go on praising or blaming, punishing or rewarding, doing or not +doing, exactly as before, simply because we cannot do otherwise. This, +however, while effective as a mere retort, is not very satisfactory as +an answer. For it neither explains the sense of power people feel they +possess, nor does it meet the criticism raised. On the one hand there is +the fact that character does undergo modification, and the conviction +that _my_ effort does play a part in securing that modification. And +with this there goes the feeling--with some--that if everything, mental +states and dispositions included, is part of an unbroken and unbreakable +order, why delude ourselves with the notion of personal power? Why not +let things drift? And on the other hand there is the conviction that +scientific Determinism holds the field. The state of mind is there, and +it is fairly expressed in the two quotations already given; particularly +in Mr. Headley's statement that we ought to act as though Free-Will were +a fact, even though we know it to be otherwise. The difficulty is +there, and one must admit that it is not always fairly faced by writers +on Determinism. An appeal is made to man's moral sense, and this, while +legitimate enough in some connections, is quite irrelevant in this. Or +it is said that a knowledge of the causational nature of morals should +place people on their guard against encouraging harmful states of mind. +This is also good counsel, but it clearly does not touch the point that, +whether I encourage harmful or beneficial states of mind, it is all part +of the determined order of things. + +As an example of what has been said we may take a passage from John +Stuart Mill. In his criticism of Sir William Hamilton, Mill remarks:-- + + "The true doctrine of the causation of human actions maintains + ... that not only our conduct, but our character, is, in part, + amenable to our will; that we can by employing the proper means, + improve our character; and that if our character is such that + while it remains what it is, it necessitates us to do wrong, it + will be just to apply motives which will necessitate us to + strive for its improvement, and so emancipate ourselves from the + other necessity; in other words, we are under a moral obligation + to seek the improvement of our moral character." + +Admirable as is this passage it is clearly no reply to the criticism +that whether we seek moral improvement or not, either course is as much +necessitated as is the character that needs improving. To give a real +relevance to this passage we should have to assume the existence of an +ego outside the stream of causation deciding at what precise point it +should exert a determining influence. That so clear a thinker as Mill +should have overlooked this gives point to what has been said as to +writers on Determinism having failed to squarely face the issue. + +A more valid reply to Mr. Headley's position would be that so long as we +believe a theory to be sound there is no real gain in acting as though +we were convinced otherwise. Granting that an illusion may have its +uses, it can only be of service so long as we do not know it to be an +illusion. A mirage of cool trees and sparkling pools may inspire tired +travellers in a desert to renewed efforts of locomotion. But if they +_know_ it to be a mirage it only serves to discourage effort. And once +we believe in Determinism, our right course, and our only profitable +course, is to face all the issues as courageously as may be. Not that a +correct reading of Determinism leads to our sitting with folded hands +lacking the spirit to strive for better things. + +It may be that certain people so read Determinism, but one cannot +reasonably hold a theory responsible for every misreading of it that +exists. Theologians in particular would be in a very uncomfortable +position if this rule were adopted. A theory is responsible for such +conclusions or consequences as are logically deducible therefrom, but no +more. And what we are now concerned with is, first, will Determinism, +properly understood, really have the effect feared; and, second, is it +possible for Determinism to account adequately for the belief that it is +possible to modify other people's character, and in so doing modify our +own? In Mill's words, can we exchange the necessity to do wrong for the +necessity to do right? I believe that a satisfactory reply can be given +to both questions. + +In the first place we have to get rid of the overpowering influence of +an atomistic psychology. A very little study of works on +psychology--particularly of the more orthodox schools--is enough to show +that the social medium as a factor determining man's mental nature has +been either ignored, or given a quite subordinate position. Because in +studying the mental qualities of man we are necessarily dealing with an +individual brain, it has been assumed that mental phenomena may be +explained with no more than a casual reference to anything beyond the +individual organism. This assumption may be sound so long as we are +dealing with mind as the function of definitely localized organs, or if +we are merely describing mental phenomena. It is when we pass to the +contents of the mind, and study the significance of mental states, or +enquire how they came into existence, that we find the atomistic +psychology breaking down, and we find ourselves compelled to deal with +mind as a psycho-sociologic phenomenon, with its relation to the social +medium. Then we discover that it is man's social relationships, the +innumerable generations of reaction between individual organisms and the +social medium, which supply the key to problems that are otherwise +insoluble. + +It has already been pointed out that the whole significance of morality +is social. If we restrict ourselves to the individual no adequate +explanation can be given of such qualities as sympathy, honesty, +truthfulness, chastity, kindness, etc. Separate it in thought from the +social medium and morality becomes meaningless. Properly studied, +psychology yields much the same result. When we get beyond the +apprehension of such fundamental qualities as time and space, heat and +cold, colour and sound, the contour of man's mind, so to speak, is a +social product. His feelings and impulses imply a social medium as +surely as does morality. From this point of view the phrase "Social +sense" is no mere figure of speech; it is the expression of a pregnant +truth, the statement of something as real as any scientific law with +which we are acquainted. + +For the essence of a scientific law is the expression of a relation. The +law of gravitation, for instance, formulates the relations existing +between particles of matter. If there existed but one particle of matter +in the universe gravitation would be a meaningless term. Introduce a +second particle, and a relation is established between the two, and the +material for a scientific "law" created. In the same way a description +of individual human qualities is fundamentally a statement of the +relations existing between individuals living in groups; and any attempt +to understand human nature without considering these relations is as +certainly foredoomed to failure as would be the attempt to study a +particle of matter apart from the operation of all known forces. The +individual as he exists to-day is not something that exists apart from +the social forces; he is an expression, an epitome, of all their past +and present operations. The really essential thing in the study of human +nature is not so much the discrete individual A or B, but the relations +existing between A and B. It is these which make each end of the term +what it is--determines the individual's language, feelings, thoughts, +and character. + +It is along these lines that we have to look for an explanation of the +feeling that we can initiate a reform in character, and of a sense of +power in determining events. We start with a sense of power over the +course of events--which is interpreted as the equivalent of our ability +to initiate absolutely a change in our own character or in that of +others. But a little reflection convinces us--particularly if we call +ourselves Determinists--that this interpretation is quite erroneous. An +absolute beginning is no more conceivable in the mental or moral sphere +than it is in the physical world. The sum of all that is is the product +of all that has been, and in this, desires, feelings, dispositions are +included no less than physical properties. Now, curiously enough, the +conviction that an absolute change in character can be initiated exists +with much greater strength in regard to oneself than it does with regard +to others. It is easier to observe others than to analyze one's own +mental states, with the result that most people can more readily realize +that what others do is the product of their heredity and their +environment than they can realize it in their own case. Of course, +reflection shows that the same principle applies in both directions, but +we are here dealing with moods rather than with carefully reasoned out +convictions. And, generally speaking, while we _feel_ ourselves masters +of our own fate, we only suspect a similar strength in others. But each +one realizes, and with increasing vividness, the power he possesses in +modifying other people's character by a change of circumstances. We see +this illustrated by the increased emphasis placed upon the importance of +better sanitation, better housing, better conditions of labour, and of +an improved education. More from observing others than by studying +ourselves we see how modifiable a thing human nature is. We see how +character is modified by an alteration of the material environment, and +we also note our own individual function as a determinative influence in +effecting this modification. + +Now I quite fail to see that there is in this sense of power over +circumstances anything more than a recognition of our own efforts as +part of the determinative sequence. The added factor to the general +causative series is the consciousness of man himself. We are conscious, +more or less clearly, of our place in the sequence; we are able to +recognize and study our relations to past and present events, and our +probable relation to future ones. We see ourselves as so many efficient +causes of those social reactions that go to make up a science of +sociology, and it is this which gives us a sense of _power_ of +determining events. I say "power" because "freedom" is an altogether +different thing. The question of whether we are free to determine +events is, as I have shown, meaningless when applied to scientific +matters. But the question of whether or not we have the _power_ of +determining events may be answered in the affirmative--an answer not in +the least affected by the belief that this power is strictly conditioned +by past and present circumstances. The sense of power is real, and it +expresses a fact, even though the fact be an inevitable one. We are all +shapers of each other's character, moulders of each other's destiny. The +recognition of our power to act in this relation is not contrary to +Determinism, Determinism implies it. It is this which gives a real +meaning to the expression "social sense." For the social sense can have +no other meaning or value than as a recognition of the action of one +individual upon another, which, as in the case of a chemical compound, +results in the production of something that is not given by the mere sum +of individual qualities. + +So, too, do we get by this method a higher meaning to the word +"freedom." In an earlier part of this essay it was pointed out that +"freedom" was of social origin and application. Its essential meaning is +liberty to carry out the impulses of one's nature unrestricted by the +coercive action of one's fellows. But there is a higher and a more +positive meaning than this. Man is a social animal; his character is a +social product. The purely human qualities not only lose their value +when divorced from social relationships, it is these relationships that +provide the only medium for their activity. To say that a person is +free to express moral qualities in the absence of his fellows is +meaningless, since it is only in their presence that the manifestation +of them is possible. It is the intercourse of man with man that gives to +each whatever freedom he possesses. The restraints imposed upon each +member of a society in the interests of all are not a curtailing of +human freedom but the condition of its realization. To chafe against +them is, to use Kant's famous illustration, as unreasonable as a bird's +revolt against the opposing medium or atmosphere, in ignorance of the +fact that it is this opposition which makes flight possible. The only +genuine freedom that man can know and enjoy is that provided by social +life. Human freedom has its origin in social relationships, and to these +we are ultimately driven to discover its meaning and significance. + +So far, then, the sense of power in controlling events which each +possesses presents no insuperable difficulty to a theory of Determinism. +Only one other point remains on which to say a word, and that is whether +a conviction of the causative character of human action would lead to a +weakening of effort or to moral depression. Why should it have this +effect? It is curious that those who fear this result seem to have only +in mind the tendencies to wrongdoing. But if it operates at all it must +operate in all directions, and this would certainly strengthen good +resolutions as well as bad ones. And even though no more were to be +said, this would justify the assertion that merit and demerit would +remain unaffected, and that any harm done in one direction would be +compensated by good done in another. But another important +consideration is to be added. This is that while a consciousness of the +power of habit acts as a retarding influence on wrongdoing, it has an +accelerating influence in the reverse direction--that is, unless we +assume a character acting with the deliberate intention of cultivating +an evil disposition. Besides, the really vicious characters are not +usually given to reflecting upon the origin and nature of their desires, +and are therefore quite unaffected by any theory of volition; while +those who are given to such reflection are not usually of a vicious +disposition. We are really crediting the vicious with a degree of +intelligence and reflective power quite unwarranted by the facts of the +case. + +Finally, the criticism with which I have been dealing takes a too purely +intellectual view of conduct. It does not allow for the operation of +sympathy, or for the power of social reaction. And these are not only +real, they are of vital importance when we are dealing with human +nature. For man cannot, even if he would, remain purely passive. The +power of sympathy, the desire for social intercourse, the invincible +feeling that in some way he is vitally concerned with the well-being of +the society to which he belongs, these are always in operation, even +though their degree of intensity varies with different individuals. We +cannot possibly isolate man in considering conduct, because his whole +nature has been moulded by social intercourse, and craves continuously +for social approval. And it is such feelings that are powerful agents in +the immediate determination of conduct. The mental perception of the +causes and conditions of conduct are feeble by comparison and can only +operate with relative slowness. And in their operation they are all the +time checked and modified by the fundamental requirements of the social +structure. + + + + +IX. + +ENVIRONMENT. + + +In the course of the foregoing pages we have made frequent reference to +"environment," without the word being precisely described or defined. +The subject was of too great importance to be dismissed with a bald +definition, and to have dealt with it earlier at suitable length might +have diverted attention from the main argument. But so much turns on a +correct understanding of the word "environment" that a discussion of +Determinism would be incomplete that failed to fix its meaning with a +fair degree of accuracy. + +A very casual study of anti-deterministic literature is enough to show +that a great deal of the opposition to a scientific interpretation of +human conduct has its origin in a quite wrong conception of what the +determinist has in mind when he speaks of the part played by the +environment in the determination of conduct. Even writings ostensibly +deterministic in aim have not been free from blame in their use of the +word. Thus on the one hand we find it said that man is a creature of his +environment, and by "environment" we are to understand, by implication, +only the material forces, which are assumed to somehow drive man hither +and thither in much the same way as a tennis ball is driven this way or +that by the player. Against this there has been a natural and, let it +be said, a justifiable reaction. Expressed in this way it was felt that +man was not at the mercy of his surroundings. It was felt that, whatever +be its nature the organism does exert some influence over environmental +forces, and that it is not a merely passive register of their +operations. Neither of these views expresses the whole truth. It may be +that each expresses a truth, and it is still more probable, as is the +case with some terms already examined, that the confusion arises from a +mis-use of the language employed. + +To-day we are all familiar with the dictum that the maintenance of life +is a question of adaptation to environment--a truth that is equally +applicable to ideas and institutions. But the general truth admitted, +there is next required a consideration of its application to the +particular subject in hand, and in connection with our present topic +some attention must be paid both to the nature of the organism and of +the environment with which we are dealing. We then discover that not +alone are we dealing with an organism which is extremely plastic in its +nature, but that the environment may also vary within very wide limits. +On the one side, and in relation to man, we may be dealing with an +environment that is mainly physical in character, or it may be a +combination of physical conditions and biological forces, or, yet again, +it may be predominantly psychological in its nature. And, on the other +hand, the reaction of the organism on the environment may vary from +extreme feebleness to an almost overpowering determination. We may, +indeed, anticipate our argument by saying that one of the chief features +of human progress is the gradual subordination of the material +environment to the psychologic powers of man. + +If, now, we contrast the environment of an uncivilized with that of a +civilized people the difference is striking. The environment of an +uncivilized race will consist of the immediate physical surroundings, +the animals that are hunted for sport or killed for food, and a +comparatively meagre stock of customs and traditions. The environment of +a modern European will add to the physical surroundings an enormously +enlarged mass of social traditions and customs, an extensive literature, +contact with numerous other societies in various stages of culture, and +relations, more or less obscure, to a vast literary and social past. The +environment thus includes not merely the living, but also the dead. +Roman law, Greek philosophy, Eastern religious ideas, etc., all affect +the twentieth century European. It would require a lengthy essay to +enumerate all the influences that dominate the life of a particular +people of to-day, but enough has been said to illustrate the truth that +we must use the term "environment" so as to include _all_ that affects +the organism. And when this is done it soon becomes clear that by the +very growth of humanity the influence of the physical portion of the +environment becomes of relatively less importance with the progress of +the race--it is the subordination of the physical environment that is +the principal condition of the advance of civilization. + +But even when our conception of the meaning of environment has been thus +enlarged, we need to be on our guard against misconception from another +side. For the environment is only one factor in the problem; the +organism is another, and the relative importance of the two is a matter +of vital significance. We may still make the mistake of treating the +environment as active and the organism as passive. This would be a +similar mistake to that which is made when morality and religion are +treated as being no more than a reflection of economic conditions. The +action of the environment is given a place of first importance, while +the reaction of the organism on its environment is treated as a +negligible quantity. Historically this may be taken as a reaction +against the extreme spiritualistic view which, in upholding, a theory of +Free-Will made no allowance for the influence of the surroundings. An +extreme view in one direction usually sets up an extreme view by way of +opposition, and it must be confessed that in social philosophy the power +of the environment has often been made omnipotent. The medium has been +presented as active and the organism as passive. Different results occur +because the susceptibilities of organisms vary. Good or bad influences +affect individuals differently for much the same reason that soils +differ in their capacity for absorbing water. + +From the scientific and the philosophic side this conception derived a +certain adventitious strength. In the first place there was the now +generally discarded psychology which taught that the individual mind +was as a sheet of blank paper on which experience inscribed its lessons. +And in the second place the growth of biological science brought out +with great distinctness the influence of the environment on organic +life. It was very plain that the quality and quantity of the food +supply, the action of air and light, and other purely environmental +forces exercised an important influence. In the plant world it was seen +how much could be effected by a mere change of habitat. In the animal +world markings and structure seemed to have an obvious reference to the +nature of the environment. It, therefore, seemed nothing but a logical +inference to extend the same reasoning to man, and treat not only his +structure but his mental capacities as being the outcome of the same +kind of correspondence. + +But a too rigid application of biological principles lands one in error. +Society is more than a mere biological group, and no reasoning that +proceeds on the assumption that it is no more than that can avoid +confusion. And we certainly cannot square the facts with a theory which +treats the human organism as passive under the operation of +environmental forces. The conviction that man plays a positive part in +life is general, powerful, and, I think, justifiable. But if what _I_ do +is at any time the product of the environmental forces, physical and +other, there does not seem any room for _me_ as an active participant. +And the facts seem to demand that the individual should appear in some +capacity other than that of representing the total in an environmental +calculation. This would leave man with no other function than that of a +billiard ball pushed over a table by rival players. Given the force +exerted by the player, added to the size, weight, and position of the +ball, and the product of the combination gives us the correct answer. +But this kind of calculation will not do in the case of man. Here we +must allow, in addition to external influences, the positive action of +man on his surroundings. The conception of the organism as a plexus of +forces capable of this reaction is, indeed, vital to our conception of a +living being. Granted that in either case, that of the billiard ball and +that of the man, the result expresses the exact sum of all the forces +aiding at the time, there still remains an important distinction in the +two cases. Whether the billiard ball is struck by a professional player +or by an amateur, provided it be struck in a particular way the result +is in both cases identical. An identity of result is produced by an +identity of external conditions. + +With the human organism--with, in fact, any organism--this rule does not +apply. In any two cases the external factors may be identical, but the +results may be entirely different. A temptation that leaves one +unaffected may prove overpowering with another. Exactly the same +conditions of food, occupation, residence, and social position may +co-exist with entirely different effects on the organism. These +differences will be manifested from the earliest years and are a direct +consequence of the positive reaction of the organism on its environment, +a reaction that is more profound in the case of man than in that of any +other animal. + +To put the matter briefly. In the case of the billiard player the ball +remains a constant factor in a problem in which external conditions +represent a variant. In the case of man and his environment we are +dealing with two sets of factors, neither of which is constant and one +of which--the human one--varies enormously. And the reaction of man on +his environment becomes so great as to result in its practical +transformation. + +It may, of course, be urged that all this is covered and allowed for by +heredity. This may be so, but I am arguing against those who while +recognizing heredity fail to make adequate allowance for its operations. +Or it may be said that "environment" covers all forces, including +heredity. But in that case the distinction between organism and +environment is useless--in fact, it disappears. If, however, the +distinction between the two is retained, our theorizing must give full +appreciation to both. And in that case we must not fail to allow for the +transforming power of man over his surroundings. Nor must we overlook +another and a very vital fact, that in a large measure the environment +to which civilised mankind must adapt itself is largely a thing of human +creation. + +Viewed as merely external circumstances, the physical environment of man +remains constant. At any rate, such changes as do take place occur with +such slowness that for generations we may safely deal with them as +unchanged. The dissipation of the heat of the earth may be a fact, but +no one takes this into account in dealing with the probabilities of +human life during the next few generations. On the other hand, the +organism represents the cumulative, and consequently, ever-changing +power of human nature, and it is this that gives us the central fact of +human civilization. Whether acquired characters be inherited or not may +be still an open question, but in any case there is no denying that +capacity is heritable, and natural selection will move along the line of +favouring the survival of that capacity which is most serviceable. And +how does increasing capacity express itself? It can do so only in the +direction of giving man a greater ability to control and mould to his +own uses the material environment in which he is placed. Looking at the +course of social evolution, we see this increased and increasing +capacity expressed in art, industries, inventions, etc., all of which +mean in effect a transformation of the material surroundings and their +subjugation to the needs of man. These inventions, etc., not only +involve a transformation of the existing environment; they also mean the +creating of a new environment for succeeding generations. Each +mechanical invention, for example, is dependent upon the inventions and +discoveries that have preceded it, and to that extent it is dependent +upon the environment. But each invention places a new power in the hands +of man, and so enables him to still further modify and control his +surroundings. Human heredity is thus expressed in capacity as +represented by a definite organic structure. This is one factor in the +phenomenon of social evolution. The other factor is the environment in +which the organism is placed and to which it responds. The two factors, +organism and environment, remain constant throughout the animal world. +It is when we come to deal with human society specifically, that we find +a radical change in the nature of the environment to be considered. +Granted that some influence must always be exerted by the purely +material conditions, the fact remains that they become relatively less +powerful with the advance of civilization. The development of +agriculture, the invention of weapons and tools, the discovery of the +nature of natural forces, all help to give the developing human a +greater measure of control over both the physical and organic portion of +his environment, and to manifest a measure of independence concerning +them. + +But the supreme and peculiar feature of human society is the creation of +a new medium to which the individual must adapt himself. By means of +language and writing the knowledge and experience gained by one +generation are transmitted to its successors. The human intellect +elaborates definite theories concerning the universe of which it forms a +part. These theories and beliefs form and fashion institutions that are +transmitted from generation to generation. Language stereotypes +tradition and slowly creates a literature. In this way a new medium is +created which is psychological in character, and ultimately dominates +life. + +When a dog is about to rest it often tramps round and round the spot on +which it is to recline. Naturalists explain this as the survival of an +instinct which in the wild dog served the useful function of guarding it +against the presence of harmful creatures hidden in the grass. The +domesticated dog is here exhibiting an instinct that belongs to a past +condition of life. But man has few instincts--fewer perhaps than any +other animal. In their stead he has a greater plasticity of nature, and +a more educable intelligence. And it is in the exercise of this educable +organization that the psychological medium as expressed in art, +literature, and inventions, plays its part for good and ill. So soon as +he is able to understand, the individual finds himself surrounded by +ideas concerning home, the State, the monarchy, the Church, and a +thousand and one other things. He is brought into relation with a vast +literature, and also with the play of myriads of minds similar to his +own. Henceforth, it is this environment with which he has chiefly to +reckon in terms of either harmony or conflict. He can no more escape it +than he can dispense with the atmosphere. It is part and parcel of +himself. Without it he ceases to be himself; for if we cut away from man +all that this psychological heredity gives him he ceases to be man as we +understand the term. He becomes a mere animated object. + +Finally, we have to note that this psychological environment is +cumulative in character as being is all powerful in its influence. By +its own unceasing activity humanity is continually triumphing over the +difficulties of its material environment and adding to the complexity +and power of its mental one. Inevitably the environment thus becomes +more psychic in character and more powerful in its operations. We may +overcome the difficulties of climate, poor soil, geographical position, +etc., but it is impossible to ignore the great and growing pressure of +this past mental life of the race. It defies all attempts at material +coercion, and gradually transforms a material medium into what is +substantially a psychological one. Man cannot escape the domination of +his own mental life. Its unfettered exercise supplies the only freedom +he is capable of realising, as it constitutes the source of his +influence as a link in the causative process of determining his own +destiny and moulding that of his successors. + + + + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + +Transcriber's Note: + + +Minor punctuation errors have been corrected without note. Inconsistent +hyphenation has not been changed. In the plain-text version, decorative +italics have not been represented. + +The following corrections were made to the text: + +p. 17: contantly to constantly (constantly enlarging and more +comprehensive) + +p. 24: admiting to admitting (even while admitting) + +p. 24: which which to with which (with which it is used) + +p. 28 (Footnote 2): contraint to constraint (Freedom and constraint) + +p. 30 (Footnote 3): acton to action (all volitional action) + +p. 34: Maudesley to Maudsley (says Dr. Maudsley) + +p. 41: missing "from" added (shall be expelled from our) + +p. 58: occured to occurred (occurred in the past) + +p. 86: absurdem to absurdum (argument _ad absurdum_) + +p. 98: condiitons to conditions (certain conditions, circumstances) + +p. 107: Hamiliton to Hamilton (Sir William Hamilton) + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Determinism or Free-Will?, by Chapman Cohen + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DETERMINISM OR FREE-WILL? *** + +***** This file should be named 37358.txt or 37358.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/3/7/3/5/37358/ + +Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, S.D., and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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