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Blount + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912 + +Author: James H. Blount + +Release Date: June 28, 2011 [EBook #36542] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES *** + + + + +Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by the +Digital & Multimedia Center, Michigan State University +Libraries.) + + + + + + +</pre> + +<div class="front"> +<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"></p> +<div class="figure xd20e112width" id="frontispiece"><img src= +"images/frontispiece.jpg" alt= +"The capture of Aguinaldo, March 22, 1901. The central fact of the American military occupation." +width="720" height="466"> +<p class="figureHead">The capture of Aguinaldo, March 22, 1901. The +central fact of the American military occupation.</p> +</div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"></p> +<div class="figure xd20e119width"><img src="images/titlepage.jpg" alt= +"Original Title Page." width="425" height="720"></div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="titlePage"> +<div class="docTitle"> +<div class="mainTitle">The American Occupation of the Philippines</div> +<div class="subTitle">1898–1912</div> +</div> +<div class="byline">By<br> +<span class="docAuthor">James H. Blount</span><br> +Officer of United States Volunteers in the Philippines, +1899–1901<br> +United States District Judge in the Philippines, 1901–1905</div> +<div class="docImprint"><i>With a Map</i><br> +G. P. Putnam’s Sons<br> +New York and London<br> +<i>The Knickerbocker Press</i><br> +<span class="docDate">1912</span></div> +</div> +<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first xd20e159"><span class="sc">Copyright</span>, 1912<br> +By<br> +James H. Blount</p> +<p class="xd20e159"><i>The Knickerbocker Press, New York</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first xd20e159"><i>To</i><br> +<span class="xd20e178">JOHN DOWNEY WORKS</span><br> +OF CALIFORNIA<br> +AS FINE A TYPE OF CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN<br> +AS EVER<br> +GRACED A SEAT IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES<br> +WHO<br> +BELIEVING, WITH THE WRITER, AS TO THE PHILIPPINES, THAT<br> +INDEFINITE RETENTION WITH UNDECLARED INTENTION<br> +IS<br> +INDEFINITE DRIFTING<br> +HAS READ THE MANUSCRIPT OF THIS WORK<br> +AS IT PROGRESSED<br> +LENDING TO ITS PREPARATION THE AID AND COUNSEL OF<br> +AN OLDER AND A WISER MAN<br> +AND<br> +THE CONTAGIOUS SERENITY OF<br> +CONFIDENCE THAT RIGHT WILL PREVAIL<br> +THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED BY<br> +<span class="sc">The Author</span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"xd20e222" href="#xd20e222" name="xd20e222">v</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">Preface</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line xd20e228">Pardon, gentles all,</p> +<p class="line">The flat unraised spirit that hath dared</p> +<p class="line">On this unworthy scaffold to bring forth</p> +<p class="line">So great an object.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Henry V.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">To have gone out to the other side of the world with +an army of invasion, and had a part, however small, in the subjugation +of a strange people, and then to see a new government set up, and, as +an official of that government, watch it work out through a number of +years, is an unusual and interesting experience, especially to a +lawyer. What seem to me the most valuable things I learned in the +course of that experience are herein submitted to my fellow-countrymen, +in connection with a narrative covering the whole of the American +occupation of the Philippines to date.</p> +<p>This book is an attempt, by one whose intimate acquaintance with two +remotely separated peoples will be denied in no quarter, to interpret +each to the other. How intelligent that acquaintance is, is of course +altogether another matter, which the reader will determine for +himself.</p> +<p>The task here undertaken is to make audible to a great free nation +the voice of a weaker subject people who passionately and rightly long +to be also free, but whose longings have been systematically denied for +the last fourteen years, sometimes ignorantly, sometimes viciously, and +always cruelly, on the wholly erroneous <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"xd20e246" href="#xd20e246" name="xd20e246">vi</a>]</span>idea that +where the <i>end</i> is benevolent, it justifies the <i>means</i>, +regardless of the means necessary to the end.</p> +<p>At a time when all our military and fiscal experts agree that having +the Philippines on our hands is a grave strategic and economic mistake, +fraught with peril to the nation’s prestige in the early stages +of our next great war, we are keeping the Filipinos in industrial +bondage through unrighteous Congressional legislation for which special +interests in America are responsible, in bald repudiation of the Open +Door policy, and against their helpless but universal protest, a wholly +unprotected and easy prey to the first first-class Power with which we +become involved in war. Yet all the while the very highest +considerations of national honor require us to choose between making +the Filipino people free and independent without unnecessary delay, as +they of right ought to be, or else imperilling the perpetuity of our +own institutions by the creation and maintenance of a great standing +army, sufficient properly to guard overseas possessions.</p> +<p>A cheerful blindness to the inevitable worthy of Mark Tapley +himself, the stale Micawberism that “something is bound to turn +up,” and a Mrs. Jellyby philanthropy hopelessly callous to +domestic duties, expenses, and distresses, have hitherto successfully +united to prevent the one simple and supreme need of the +situation—a frank, formal, and definite declaration, by <i>the +law-making power</i> of the government, of the nation’s purpose +in the premises. What is needed is a formal legislative announcement +that the governing of a remote and alien people is to have no permanent +place in the purposes of our national life, and that we do <i>bona +fide</i> intend, just as soon as a stable government, republican in +form, can be established by the people of the Philippine Islands, to +turn over, upon terms which <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e264" +href="#xd20e264" name="xd20e264">vii</a>]</span>shall be reasonable and +just, the government and control of the islands to the people +thereof.</p> +<p>The essentials of the problem, being at least as immutable as human +nature and geography, will not change much with time. And whenever the +American people are ready to abandon the strange gods whose guidance +has necessitated a new definition of Liberty consistent with taxation +without representation and unanimous protest by the governed, they will +at once set about to secure to a people who have proven themselves +brave and self-sacrificing in war, and gentle, generous, and tractable +in peace, the right to pursue happiness in <i>their own</i> way, in +lieu of somebody else’s way, as the spirit of our Constitution, +and the teachings of our God, Who is also theirs, alike demand.</p> +<p>After seven years spent at the storm-centre of so-called +“Expansion,” the first of the seven as a volunteer officer +in Cuba during and after the Spanish War, the next two in a like +capacity in the Philippines, and the remainder as a United States judge +in the last-named country, the writer was finally invalided home in +1905, sustained in spirit, at parting, by cordial farewells, oral and +written, personal and official, but convinced that foreign kindness +will not cure the desire of a people, once awakened, for what used to +be known as Freedom before we freed Cuba and then subjugated the +Philippines; and that to permanently eradicate sedition from the +Philippine Islands, the American courts there must be given +jurisdiction over thought as well as over overt act, and must learn the +method of drawing an indictment against a whole people.</p> +<p>Seven other years of interested observation from the Western +Hemisphere end of the line have confirmed and fortified the convictions +above set forth.</p> +<p>If we give the Filipinos this independence they so <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="xd20e277" href="#xd20e277" name= +"xd20e277">viii</a>]</span>ardently desire and ever clamor for until +made to shut up, “the holy cause,” as their brilliant young +representative in the American House of Representatives, Mr. Quezon, +always calls it, will <i>not</i> be at once spoiled, as the American +hemp and other special interests so contemptuously insist, by the +gentleman named, and his compatriot, Señor Osmeña, the +Speaker of the Philippine Assembly, and the rest of the leaders of the +patriot cause, in a general mutual throat-cutting incidental to a +scramble for the offices. This sort of contention is merely the hiss of +the same old serpent of tyranny which has always beset the pathway of +man’s struggle for free institutions.</p> +<p>When first the talk in America, after the battle of Manila Bay, +about keeping the Philippines, reached the islands, one of the Filipino +leaders wrote to another during the negotiations between their +commanding general and our own looking to preservation of the peace +until the results of the Paris Peace Conference which settled the fate +of the islands should be known, in effect, thus: “The Filipinos +will not be fit for independence in ten, twenty, or a hundred years if +it be left to American colonial office-holders drawing good salaries to +determine the question.” Is there not some human nature in that +remark? Suppose, reader, you were in the enjoyment of a salary of five, +ten, or twenty thousand dollars a year as a government official in the +Philippines, how precipitately would you hasten to recommend yourself +out of office, and evict yourself into this cold Western world with +which you had meantime lost all touch?</p> +<p>The Filipinos can run a far better government than the Cubans. In +1898, when Admiral Dewey read in the papers that we were going to give +Cuba independence, he wired home from Manila: <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="xd20e287" href="#xd20e287" name= +"xd20e287">ix</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">These people are far superior in their intelligence, +and more capable of self-government than the people of Cuba, and I am +familiar with both races.</p> +</div> +<p>After a year in Cuba and nearly six in the Philippines, two as an +officer of the army that subjugated the Filipinos, and the remainder as +a judge over them, I cordially concur in the opinion of Admiral Dewey, +but with this addition, viz., that the people of those islands, +whatever of conscious political unity they may have lacked in 1898, +were welded into absolute oneness as a people by their original +struggle for independence against us, and will remain forever so welded +by their incurable aspirations for a national life of their own under a +republic framed in imitation of ours. Furthermore, the one great +difference between Cuba and the Philippines is that the latter country +has no race cancer forever menacing its peace, and sapping its +self-reliance. The Philippine people are absolutely one people, as to +race, color, and previous condition. Again, American sugar and tobacco +interests will never permit the competitive Philippine sugar and +tobacco industries to grow as Nature and Nature’s God intended; +and the American importers of Manila hemp—which is to the +Philippines what cotton is to the South—have, through special +Congressional legislation still standing on our statute books—to +the shame of the nation—so depressed the hemp industry of the +islands that the market price it brings to-day is just one half what it +brought ten years ago.</p> +<p>If three strong and able Americans, familiar with insular conditions +and still young enough to undertake the task, were told by a President +of the United States, by authority of Congress, “Go out there and +set up a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e296" href="#xd20e296" name= +"xd20e296">x</a>]</span>stable native government by July 4, +1921,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e298src" href="#xd20e298" name= +"xd20e298src">1</a> and then come away,” they could and would do +it; and that government would be a success; and one of the greatest +moral victories in the annals of free government would have been +written by the gentlemen concerned upon the pages of their +country’s history.</p> +<p>We ought to give the Filipinos their independence, even if we have +to guarantee it to them. But, by neutralization treaties with the other +great Powers similar to those which safeguard the integrity and +independence of Switzerland to-day, whereby the other Powers would +agree not to seize the islands after we give them their independence, +the Philippines can be made as permanently neutral territory in Asiatic +politics as Switzerland is to-day in European politics.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">James H. Blount.</span></p> +<p class="dateline">1406 G Street, N. W.,<br> +<span class="sc">Washington, D. C.</span>,<br> +July 4, 1912.</p> +<p>P.S.—The preparation of this book has entailed examination of +a vast mass of official documents, as will appear from the foot-note +citations to the page and volume from which quotations have been made. +The object has been to place all material statements of fact beyond +question. For the purpose of this research work, Mr. Herbert Putnam, +Librarian of Congress, was kind enough to extend me the privileges of +the national library, and it would be most ungracious to fail to +acknowledge the obligation I am under, in this regard, to one whom the +country is indeed fortunate <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e318" +href="#xd20e318" name="xd20e318">xi</a>]</span>in having at the head of +that great institution. I should also make acknowledgment of the +obligation I am under to Mr. W. W. Bishop, the able superintendent of +the reading-room, for aid rendered whenever asked, and to my life-long +friends, John and Hugh Morrison, the most valuable men, to the general +public, except the two gentlemen above named, on the whole great roll +of employees of the Library of Congress.</p> +<p class="signed">J. H. B. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e322" +href="#xd20e322" name="xd20e322">xiii</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e298" href="#xd20e298src" name="xd20e298">1</a></span> The date +contemplated by the pending Philippine Independence Bill, introduced in +the House of Representatives in March, 1912, by Hon. W. A. Jones, +Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="toc" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">Contents</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"> <span class= +"tocPagenum">Pages</span></p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter I</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch1">Mr. Pratt’s +Serenade</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">1–15</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United +States at Singapore, in the British Straits Settlements, finding +Aguinaldo a political refugee at that place at the outbreak of our war +with Spain, April 21, 1898, arranges by cable with Admiral Dewey, then +at Hong Kong with his squadron, for Aguinaldo to come to Hong Kong and +thence to Manila, to co-operate by land with Admiral Dewey against the +Spaniards, Pratt promising Aguinaldo independence, without authority. +Mr. Pratt is later quietly separated from the consular service.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter II</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch2">Dewey and +Aguinaldo</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">16–45</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">After the battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, +Admiral Dewey brings Aguinaldo down from Hong Kong, whither he had +proceeded from Singapore, lands him at Cavite, and chaperones his +insurrection against the Spaniards until the American troops arrive, +June 30th.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter III</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch3">Anderson and +Aguinaldo</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">46–66</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">General Anderson’s official dealings with +Aguinaldo from June 30, 1898, until General Merritt’s arrival, +July 25th,</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter IV</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch4">Merritt and +Aguinaldo</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">67–87</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">General Merritt’s five weeks’ +sojourn in the Islands, from July 25, 1898, to the end of August, +including fall of Manila, August 13th, and our relations with Aguinaldo +during period indicated. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e379" href= +"#xd20e379" name="xd20e379">xiv</a>]</span></p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter V</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch5">Otis and +Aguinaldo</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">88–106</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Dealings and relations between, +September–December, 1898.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter VI</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch6">The +Wilcox-Sargent Trip</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">107–120</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Two American naval officers make an extended +tour through the interior of Luzon by permission of Admiral Dewey and +with Aguinaldo’s consent, in October–November, 1898, while +the Paris peace negotiations were in progress. What they saw and +learned.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter VII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch7">The Treaty of +Paris</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">121–138</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">An account of the negotiations, +October-December, 1898. How we came to pay Spain $20,000,000 for a +$200,000,000 insurrection. Treaty signed December 10, 1898.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter VIII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch8">The Benevolent +Assimilation Proclamation</a></span> +<span class="tocPagenum">139–151</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">President McKinley’s celebrated +proclamation of December 21, 1898, cabled out to the Islands, December +27, 1898, after the signing of the Treaty of Paris on the 10th, and +intended as a fire-extinguisher, in fact acted merely as a firebrand, +the Filipinos perceiving that Benevolent Assimilation meant such +measure of slaughter as might be necessary to “spare them from +the dangers of” the independence on which they were bent.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter IX</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch9">The Iloilo +Fiasco</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">152–163</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">By order of President McKinley, General Otis +abstains from hostilities to await Senate action on Treaty of +Paris.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter X</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch10">Otis and +Aguinaldo</a></span> (<i>Continued</i>) +<span class="tocPagenum">164–185</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Still waiting for the Senate to act. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e456" href="#xd20e456" name= +"xd20e456">xv</a>]</span></p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XI</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch11">Otis and the +War</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">186–223</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Covering the period from the outbreak of +February 4, 1899, until the fall of that year.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch12">Otis and the +War</a></span> (<i>Continued</i>) <span class= +"tocPagenum">224–269</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">From the fall of 1899 to the spring of 1900.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XIII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch13">Macarthur and +the War</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">270–281</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Carries the story up to the date of the arrival +of the Taft Commission, sent out in the spring of 1900, to help General +MacArthur run the war.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XIV</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch14">The Taft +Commission</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">282–344</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Shows how the Taft Commission, born of the +McKinley Benevolent Assimilation theory that there was no real +fundamental opposition to American rule, lived up to that theory, in +their telegrams sent home during the presidential campaign of 1900, and +in 1901 set up a civil government predicated upon their obstinate but +opportune delusions of the previous year.</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">“The papers ’id it ’andsome</p> +<p class="line">But you bet the army knows.”</p> +</div> +<p class="first tocChapter">Chapter XV</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch15">Governor +Taft</a></span>—1901–2 +<span class="tocPagenum">345–402</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Shows the prematurity of a civil government set +up under pressure of political expediency, and the disorders which +followed.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XVI</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch16">Governor +Taft</a></span>—1903 <span class= +"tocPagenum">403–436</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Shows divers serious insurrections in various +provinces amounting to what the Commission itself termed, in one +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e539" href="#xd20e539" name= +"xd20e539">xvi</a>]</span>instance, “a reign of +terror”—situations so endangering the public safety that to +fail to order out the army to quell the disturbances was neglect of +plain duty, such neglect being due to a set policy of preserving the +official fiction that peace prevailed, and that Benevolent Assimilation +was a success.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XVII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch17">Governor +Taft</a></span>—1903 (<i>Continued</i>) +<span class="tocPagenum">437–445</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Shows the essentially despotic, though +theoretically benevolent, character of the Taft civil government of the +Philippines, and its attitude toward the American business community in +the Islands.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XVIII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch18">Governor +Wright</a></span>—1904 <span class= +"tocPagenum">446–498</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Shows the change of the tone of the government +under Governor Taft’s successor, his consequent popularity with +his fellow-country men in the Islands, and his corresponding +unpopularity with the Filipinos. Shows also a long series of massacres +of <i>pacificos</i> by enemies of the American government between July +and November, 1904, permitted out of super-solicitude lest ordering out +the army and summarily putting a stop to said massacres might affect +the presidential election in the United States unfavorably to Mr. +Roosevelt, by reviving the notion that neither the Roosevelt +Administration nor its predecessor had ever been frank with the country +concerning the state of public order in the Islands.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XIX</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch19">Governor +Wright</a></span>—1905 <span class= +"tocPagenum">499–514</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Shows the prompt ordering of the army to the +scene of the disturbances after the presidential election of 1904 was +safely over, and the nature and extent of the insurrections of +1905.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XX</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch20">Governor +Ide</a></span>—1906 <span class= +"tocPagenum">515–523</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Describes the last outbreak prior to the final +establishment of a state of general and complete peace. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="xd20e596" href="#xd20e596" name= +"xd20e596">xvii</a>]</span></p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXI</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch21">Governor +Smith</a></span>—1907–9 +<span class="tocPagenum">524–557</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Describes divers matters, including a +certificate made March 28, 1907, declaring that a state of general and +complete peace had prevailed for the two years immediately the +preceding. Describes also the formal opening of First Philippine +Assembly by Secretary of War Taft in October, 1907, and his final +announcement to them that he had no authority to end the uncertainty +concerning their future which is the corner-stone of the Taft policy of +Indefinite Tutelage, and that Congress only could end that +uncertainty.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch22">Governor +Forbes</a></span>—1909–12 +<span class="tocPagenum">558–570</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Suggests the hypocrisy of boasting about +“the good we are doing” the Filipinos when predatory +special interests are all the while preying upon the Philippine people +even more shamelessly than they do upon the American people, and by the +same methods, viz.: legislation placed or kept on the statute-books of +the United States for their special benefit, the difference being that +the American people can help themselves if they will, but the +Philippine people cannot.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXIII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href= +"#ch23">“Non-Christian” Worcester</a></span> + <span class= +"tocPagenum">571–586</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Professor Worcester, the P. T. Barnum of the +“non-Christian tribe” industry, and his menagerie of +certain rare and interesting wild tribes still extant in the Islands, +specimens of which you saw at the St. Louis Exposition of 1903–4; +by which device the American people have been led to believe the +Igorrotes, Negritos, etc., to be samples of the Filipino people.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXIV</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch24">The Philippine +Civil Service</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">587–594</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Showing how imperatively simple justice demands +that Americans, who go out to enter the Philippine Civil Service +should, after a tour of duty out there, be entitled, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="xd20e646" href="#xd20e646" name= +"xd20e646">xviii</a>]</span>as matter of right, to be transferred back +to the Civil Service in the United States, instead of being left wholly +dependent on political influence to “place” them after +their final return home.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXV</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch25">Cost of the +Philippines</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">595–603</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">In life, and money, together with certain +consolatory reflections thereon.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXVI</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch26">Congressional +Legislation</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">604–622</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Showing how a small group of American importers +of Manila hemp—hemp being to the Philippines what cotton is to +the South—have so manipulated the Philippine hemp industry as to +depress the market price of the main source of wealth of the Islands +below the cost of production; also other evils of taxation without +representation.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXVII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch27">The Rights of +Man</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">623–632</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Industrial slavery to predatory interests and +physical slavery compared.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXVIII</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch28">The Road to +Autonomy</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">633–646</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Shows how entirely easy would be the task of +evolving the American Ireland we have laid up for ourselves in the +Philippines into complete Home Rule by 1921, the date proposed for +Philippine independence in the pending Jones bill, introduced in the +House of Representatives in March, 1912.</p> +<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXIX</p> +<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch29">The Way +Out</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">647–655</span></p> +<p class="tocArgument">Shows how, by neutralization treaties with the +other powers, as proposed in many different resolutions, of both +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e710" href="#xd20e710" name= +"xd20e710">xix</a>]</span>Republican and Democratic origin, now pending +in Congress, whereby the other powers should agree not to annex the +Islands after we give them their independence, the Philippines can be +made <i>permanently neutral territory in Asiatic politics</i> exactly +as both Switzerland and Belgium have been for nearly a hundred years in +European politics.</p> +<p class="tocChapter"><span class="sc"><a href= +"#index">Index</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">657</span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e723" href= +"#xd20e723" name="xd20e723">xxi</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">Illustrations</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"> <span class= +"tocPagenum">Page</span></p> +<p><span class="sc"><a href="#frontispiece">The Capture of Aguinaldo, +March 23, 1901—The Central Fact of the American Military +Occupation</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum"><i>Frontispiece</i></span><br> +From the Drawing by F. C. Yohn<br> +Copyright by Charles Scribner’s Sons</p> +<p><span class="sc"><a href="#p228">Bird’s-eye View of the +Philippine Archipelago, Showing Preponderating Importance of +Luzon</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum">228</span></p> +<p><span class="sc"><a href="#p232">Outline Sketch of the Theatre of +Operations in Luzon, 1899</a></span> +<span class="tocPagenum">232</span></p> +<p><span class="sc"><a href="#map">Sketch Map of the +Philippines</a></span> <span class= +"tocPagenum"><i>At End</i></span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb1" +href="#pb1" name="pb1">1</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="body"> +<div id="ch1" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="super">The American Occupations of the Philippines</h2> +<h2 class="label">Chapter I</h2> +<h2 class="main">Mr. Pratt’s Serenade</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Had I but served my God with half the zeal</p> +<p class="line">I served my king, he would not in mine age</p> +<p class="line">Have left me naked to mine enemies.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>King Henry VIII.</i>, Act III., Sc. 2.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Any narrative covering our acquisition of the +Philippine Islands must, of course, centre in the outset about Admiral +Dewey, and the destruction by him of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on +Sunday morning, May 1, 1898. But as the Admiral had brought Aguinaldo +down from Hong Kong to Manila after the battle, and landed him on May +19th to start an auxiliary insurrection, which insurrection kept the +Spaniards bottled up in Manila on the land side for three and a half +months while Dewey did the same by sea, until ten thousand American +troops arrived, and easily completed the reduction and capture of the +beleaguered and famished city on August 13th, it is necessary to a +clear understanding of the <i>de facto</i> alliance between the +Americans and Aguinaldo thus created, to <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb2" href="#pb2" name="pb2">2</a>]</span>know who brought the Admiral +and Aguinaldo together and how, and why.</p> +<p>The United States declared war against Spain, April 21, 1898, to +free Cuba, and at once arranged an understanding with the Cuban +revolutionists looking to co-operation between their forces and ours to +that end. For some years prior to this, political conditions in the +Philippines had been quite similar to those in Cuba, so that when, two +days after war broke out, the Honorable Spencer Pratt, Consul-General +of the United States at Singapore, in the British Straits Settlements, +found Aguinaldo, who had headed the last organized outbreak against +Spain in the Philippines, temporarily sojourning as a political refugee +at Singapore, in the Filipino colony there, he naturally sought to +arrange for his co-operating with us against Spain, as Gomez and Garcia +were doing in Cuba. Thereby hangs the story of “Mr. Pratt’s +Serenade.” However, before we listen to the band whose strains +spoke the gratitude of the Filipinos to Mr. Pratt for having introduced +Aguinaldo to Dewey, let us learn somewhat of Aguinaldo’s +antecedents, as related to the purposes of the introduction.</p> +<p>The first low rumbling of official thunder premonitory to the war +with Spain was heard in Mr. McKinley’s annual message to Congress +of December, 1897,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e804src" href="#xd20e804" +name="xd20e804src">1</a> wherein he said, among other things:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The most important problem with which this government +is now called upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns +its duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection.</p> +</div> +<p>In that very month of December, 1897, Aguinaldo was heading a +formidable insurrection against Spanish <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb3" href="#pb3" name="pb3">3</a>]</span>tyranny in the Philippines, +and the Filipinos and their revolutionary committees everywhere were +watching with eager interest the course of “The Great North +American Republic,” as they were wont to term our government.</p> +<p>The Report of the First Philippine Commission sent out to the +Islands by President McKinley in February, 1899, of which President +Schurman of Cornell University was Chairman, contains a succinct +memorandum concerning the Filipino revolutionary movement of +1896–7, which had been begun by Aguinaldo in 1896, and had +culminated in what is known as the Treaty of Biac-na-Bato,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e819src" href="#xd20e819" name="xd20e819src">2</a> +signed December 14, 1897. This treaty had promised certain reforms, +such as representation in the Spanish Cortez, sending the Friars away, +etc., and had also promised the leaders $400,000 if Aguinaldo and his +Cabinet would leave the country and go to Hong Kong. “No definite +time was fixed,” says President Schurman (vol. I., p. 171), +“during which these men were to remain away from the Philippines; +and if the promises made by Spain were not fulfilled, they had the +right to return.” Of course, “the promises made by +Spain” were <i>not</i> fulfilled. Spain thought she had bought +Aguinaldo and his crowd off. “Two hundred thousand +dollars,” says Prof. Schurman, “was paid to Aguinaldo when +he arrived in Hong Kong.” But instead of using this money in +riotous living, the little group of exiles began to take notice of the +struggles of their brothers in wretchedness in Cuba, and the +ever-increasing probability of intervention by the United States in +that unhappy Spanish colony, which, of course, would be <i>their</i> +opportunity to strike for Independence. They had only been in Hong Kong +about two months when the <i>Maine</i> blew up <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb4" href="#pb4" name="pb4">4</a>]</span>February 15, +1898, Then they knew there would be “something doing.” Hong +Kong being the cross-roads of the Far East and the gateway to Asia, and +being only sixty hours across the choppy China Sea from Manila, was the +best place in that part of the world to brew another insurrection +against Spain. But Singapore is also a good place for a branch office +for such an enterprise, being on the main-travelled route between the +Philippines and Spain by way of the Suez Canal, about four or five days +out of Hong Kong by a good liner, and but little farther from Manila, +as the crow flies, than Hong Kong itself. Owing to political unrest in +the Philippines in 1896–7–8, there was quite a colony of +Filipino political refugees living at Singapore during that period. +Aguinaldo had gone over from Hong Kong to Singapore in the latter half +of April, 1898, arriving there, it so chanced, the day we declared war +against Spain, April 21st. He was immediately sought out by Mr. Pratt, +who had learned of his presence in the community through an Englishman +of Singapore, a former resident of Manila, a Mr. Bray, who seems to +have been a kind of striker for the Filipino general. Aguinaldo had +come <i>incognito</i>. Out of Mr. Pratt’s interview with the +insurgent chief thus obtained, and its results, grew the episode which +is the subject of this chapter.</p> +<p>A word just here, preliminary to this interview, concerning the +personal equation of Aguinaldo, would seem to be advisable.</p> +<p>While I personally chased him and his outfit a good deal in the +latter part of 1899, in the northern advance of a column of General +Lawton’s Division from San Isidro across the Rio Grande de +Pampanga, over the boggy passes of the Caraballa Mountains to the China +Sea, and up the Luzon West Coast road, we never did <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb5" href="#pb5" name="pb5">5</a>]</span>catch him, +and I never personally met him but once, and that was after he was +captured in 1901. He was as insignificant looking physically as a +Japanese diplomat. But his presence suggested, equally with that of his +wonderful racial cousins who represent the great empire of the Mikado +abroad, both a high order of intelligence and baffling reserve. And +Major-General J. Franklin Bell, recently Chief of Staff, United States +Army, who was a Major on General Merritt’s staff in 1898, having +charge of the “Office of Military Information,” in a +confidential report prepared for his chief dated August 29, 1898, +“sizing up” the various insurgent leaders, in view of the +then apparent probability of trouble with them, gives these notes on +Aguinaldo, the head and front of the revolution: “Aguinaldo: +Honest, sincere, and * * * a natural leader of +men.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e843src" href="#xd20e843" name= +"xd20e843src">3</a></p> +<p>Any one acquainted with General Bell knows that he knows what he is +talking about when he speaks of “a natural leader of men,” +for he is one himself. Our ablest men in the early days were the first +to cease considering the little brown soldiers a joke, and their +government an <i>opera-bouffe</i> affair. General Bell also says in the +same report that he, Aguinaldo, is undoubtedly endowed in a wonderful +degree with “the power of creating among the people confidence in +himself.” He was, indeed, the very incarnation of “the +legitimate aspirations of” his people, to use one of the favorite +phrases of his early state papers, and the faithful interpreter +thereof. That was the secret of his power, that and a most remarkable +talent for surrounding himself with an atmosphere of impenetrable +reserve. This last used to make our young army officers suspect him of +being what they called a “four-flusher,” which being +interpreted means a man who is partially successful <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb6" href="#pb6" name="pb6">6</a>]</span>in making +people think him far more important than he really is. But we have seen +General Bell’s estimate. And the day Aguinaldo took the oath of +allegiance to the United States, in 1901, General MacArthur, then +commanding the American forces in the Philippines, signalized the event +by liberating 1000 Filipino prisoners of war. General Funston, the man +who captured him in 1901, says in <i>Scribner’s Magazine</i> for +November, 1911, “He is a man of many excellent qualities and +* * * far and away the best Filipino I was ever brought in +contact with.”</p> +<p>Aguinaldo was born in 1869. To-day, 1912, he is farming about twenty +miles out of Manila in his native province of Cavite; has always +scrupulously observed his oath of allegiance aforesaid; occasionally +comes to town and plays chess with Governor-General Forbes; and in all +respects has played for the last ten years with really fine dignity the +rôle of Chieftain of a Lost Cause on which his all had been +staked. He was a school-teacher at Cavite at one time, but is not a +college graduate, and so far as mere book education is concerned, he is +not a highly educated man. Whether or not he can give the principal +parts of the principal irregular Greek verbs I do not know, but his +place in the history of his country, and in the annals of wars for +independence, cannot, and for the honor of human nature should not, be +a small one. Dr. Rizal, the Filipino patriot whose picture we print on +the Philippine postage stamps, and who was shot for sedition by the +Spaniards before our time out there, was what Colonel Roosevelt would +jocularly call “one of these darned literary fellows.” He +was a sort of “Sweetness and Light” proposition, who only +<i>wrote</i> about “The Rights of Man,” and finally +<i>let</i> the Spaniards shoot him—stuck his head in the +lion’s mouth, so to speak. Aguinaldo was a born <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb7" href="#pb7" name="pb7">7</a>]</span>leader of +men, who knew how to put the fear of God into the hearts of the ancient +oppressors of his people. Mr. Pratt’s own story of how he earned +his serenade is preserved to future ages in the published records of +the State Department.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e869src" href= +"#xd20e869" name="xd20e869src">4</a> We will now attempt to summarize, +not so eloquently as Mr. Pratt, but more briefly, the manner of its +earning, the serenade itself, and its resultant effects both upon the +personal fortunes of Mr. Pratt and upon Filipino confidence in American +official assurances.</p> +<p>It was on the evening of Saturday, April 23, 1898, that Mr. Pratt +was confidentially informed of Aguinaldo’s arrival at Singapore, +<i>incognito</i>. “Being aware,” says Mr. Pratt, “of +the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that +no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same +influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see +him.” Accordingly, he did see him the following Sunday morning, +the 24th.</p> +<p>At this interview, it was arranged that if Admiral Dewey, then at +Hong Kong with his squadron awaiting orders, should so desire, +Aguinaldo should proceed to Hong Kong to arrange for co-operation of +the insurgents at Manila with our naval forces in the prospective +operations against the Spaniards.</p> +<p>Accordingly, that Sunday, Mr. Pratt telegraphed Dewey through our +consul at Hong Kong:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong +arrange with Commodore for general co-operation insurgents Manila if +desired. Telegraph.</p> +</div> +<p>Admiral Dewey (then Commodore) replied:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb8" href="#pb8" name= +"pb8">8</a>]</span></p> +<p>This message was received late Sunday night, April 24th, and was at +once communicated to Aguinaldo. Mr. Pratt then did considerable +bustling around for the benefit of his new-found ally, whom, with his +aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names he +“succeeded in getting off,” to use his phrase, by the +British steamer <i>Malacca</i>, which left Singapore for Hong Kong, +April 26th. In the letter reporting all this to the State Department, +Mr. Pratt adds that he trusts this action “in arranging for his +[Aguinaldo’s] direct co-operation with the commander of our +forces” will meet with the Government’s approval. A little +later Mr. Pratt sends the State Department a copy of the <i>Singapore +Free Press</i> of May 4, 1898, containing an impressive account of the +above transaction and the negotiations leading up to it. This account +describes the political conditions among the population of the +Philippine archipelago, “which,” it goes on to say, +“merely awaits the signal from General Aguinaldo to rise <i>en +masse</i>.” Speaking of Pratt’s interview with Aguinaldo, +it says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">General Aguinaldo’s policy embraces the +independence of the Philippines. * * * American protection +would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might +be instituted hereafter in Cuba.</p> +</div> +<p>Mr. Pratt also forwards a proclamation gotten up by the Filipino +insurgent leaders at Hong Kong and sent over to the Philippines in +advance of Admiral Dewey’s coming, calling upon the Filipinos not +to heed any appeals of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans, but to +rally to the support of the latter. This manifesto of the Filipinos is +headed, prominently—for all we know it may have had a heading as +big as a Hearst newspaper <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb9" href= +"#pb9" name="pb9">9</a>]</span>box-car type announcement of the latest +violation of the Seventh Commandment—: “America’s +Allies.”</p> +<p>It begins thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place +independence within our reach. * * * The Americans, not from +mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of +so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune * * * +etc. [Here follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present moment an +American squadron is preparing to sail for the Philippines. +* * * The Americans will attack by sea and prevent any +reinforcements coming from Spain; * * * we insurgents must +attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient arms, +because the Americans have arms and will find means to assist us. +<i>There where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; +they are our redeemers!</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e924src" href= +"#xd20e924" name="xd20e924src">5</a></p> +</div> +<p>For twelve days after his letter to the State Department enclosing +the above proclamation, Mr. Pratt, so far as the record discloses, +contemplated his <i lang="fr">coup <span class="corr" id="xd20e933" +title="Source: d’ état">d’état</span></i> in +silent satisfaction. Since its successful pulling off, Admiral Dewey +had smashed the Spanish fleet, and Aguinaldo had started his auxiliary +insurrection. The former was patting the latter on the back, as it +were, and saying, “Go it little man.” But nobody was +patting Pratt on the back, yet. Therefore, on June 2d, Mr. Pratt writes +the State Department, purring for patting thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Considering the enthusiastic manner General Aguinaldo +has been received by the natives and the confidence with which he +already appears to have inspired Admiral Dewey, it will be admitted, I +think, that I did not over-rate his importance and <i>that I have +materially assisted</i> the cause of the United States in the +Philippines in securing his co-operation.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e942src" href="#xd20e942" name="xd20e942src">6</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb10" href="#pb10" name= +"pb10">10</a>]</span></p> +<p>A glow of conscious superiority, in value to the Government, over +his consular colleague and neighbor, Mr. Wildman, at Hong Kong, next +suffuses Mr. Pratt’s diction, being manifested thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Why this co-operation should not have been secured to +us during the months General Aguinaldo remained awaiting events in Hong +Kong, and that he was allowed to leave there without having been +approached in the interest of our Government, I cannot understand.</p> +</div> +<p>Considering that in his letter accepting the nomination for the +Vice-Presidency two years after this Mr. Roosevelt compared Aguinaldo +and his people to that squalid old Apache medicine man, Sitting Bull, +and his band of dirty paint-streaked cut-throats, Mr. Pratt’s +next Pickwickian sigh of complacent, if neglected, worth is +particularly interesting:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">No <i>close observer</i> of what had transpired in the +Philippines during the past four years could have failed to recognize +that General Aguinaldo enjoyed above all others the confidence of the +Filipino insurgents and the respect alike of Spaniards and foreigners +in the islands, all of whom vouched for his high sense of justice and +honor.</p> +</div> +<p>In other words, knowing the proverbial ingratitude of republics, Mr. +Pratt is determined to impress upon his Government and on the +discerning historian of the future that he was “the original +Aguinaldo man.” A week later (June 9th) Mr. Pratt writes the +Department enclosing copies of the Singapore papers of that date, +giving an account of a generous outburst of Filipino enthusiasm at +Singapore in honor of America, Admiral Dewey, and, last, if not least, +Mr. Pratt. He encloses duplicate copies of these newspaper notices +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb11" href="#pb11" name= +"pb11">11</a>]</span>“for the press, should you consider their +publication desirable.” His letter begins:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I have the honor to report that this afternoon, on the +occasion of the receipt of the news of General Aguinaldo’s recent +successes near Manila, I was waited upon by the Philippine residents in +Singapore and presented an address. * * *</p> +</div> +<p>He then proceeds with further details of the event, without +self-laudation. The Singapore papers which he encloses, however, not +handicapped by the inexorable modesty of official correspondence, give +a glowing account of the presentation of the “address,” and +of the serenade and toasts which followed. Says one of them, the +<i>Straits Times:</i></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The United States consulate at Singapore was yesterday +afternoon in an unusual state of bustle. That bustle extended itself to +Raffles Hotel, of which the consulate forms an outlying part. From a +period shortly prior to 5 o’clock, afternoon, the natives of the +Philippines resident in Singapore began to assemble at the consulate. +Their object was to present an address to Hon. Spencer Pratt, United +States Consul-General, and, partly, to serenade him, for which purpose +some twenty-five or thirty of the Filipinos came equipped with musical +instruments.</p> +</div> +<p>First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal reading +and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos, representing the +Filipino community of Singapore. The address pledged the “eternal +gratitude” of the Filipino people to Admiral Dewey and the +honored addressee, alluded to the glories of independence, and to how +Aguinaldo had been enabled by the arrangement so happily effected with +Admiral Dewey by Consul Pratt to arouse 8,000,000 of Filipinos to take +up <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb12" href="#pb12" name= +"pb12">12</a>]</span>arms “in defence of those principles of +justice and liberty of which your country is the foremost +champion” and trusted “that the United States +* * * will efficaciously second the programme arranged +between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and +secure to us our independence under the protection of the United +States.”</p> +<p>Mr. Pratt arose and “proceeded speaking in French,” says +the newspaper—it does not say Alabama French, but that is +doubtless what it was—“to state his belief that the +Filipinos would prove and were now proving themselves fit for +self-government.” The gentleman from Alabama then went on to +review the mighty events and developments of the preceding six weeks, +Dewey’s victory of May 1st,</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished +leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, <i>co-operating on land with the +Americans at sea</i>, etc. You have just reason to be proud of what has +been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your +fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned +that General Aguinaldo had arrived <i>incognito</i> in Singapore, I +immediately <i>sought him out</i>. An hour’s interview convinced +me that he was <i>the man for the occasion</i>; and, having +communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join +the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.</p> +</div> +<p>Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt oration: +“At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt’s speech refreshments were +served, and as the Filipinos, <i>being Christians, drink +alcohol</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1008src" href="#xd20e1008" +name="xd20e1008src">7</a> there was no difficulty in arranging as to +refreshments.”</p> +<p>Then followed a general drinking of toasts to America, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb13" href="#pb13" name="pb13">13</a>]</span>Dewey, +Pratt, and Aguinaldo. Then the band played. Then the meeting broke up. +Then the Honorable Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States, +retired to the seclusion of his apartments in Raffles Hotel, and, under +the soothing swish of his <i>plunkah</i>, forgot the accursed heat of +that stepping-off place, Singapore, and dreamed of future +greatness.</p> +<p>A few days later the even tenor of Mr. Pratt’s meditations was +disturbed by a letter from the State Department saying, in effect, that +it was all right to get Aguinaldo’s assistance “<i>if</i> +in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be +practicable to gratify.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1023src" +href="#xd20e1023" name="xd20e1023src">8</a> But it did <i>not</i> tell +him to tell the Filipinos so. For Aguinaldo was keeping the Spaniards +bottled up in the old walled city of Manila on short and ever +shortening rations, and American troops were on the way to join him, +and the shorter the food supply grew in Manila the readier the garrison +would be to surrender when they did arrive, and the fewer American +soldiers’ lives would have to be sacrificed in the final capture +of the town. Every day of Aguinaldo’s service under the +Dewey-Pratt arrangement was worth an American life, perhaps many. It +was too valuable to repudiate, just yet. July 20th, the State +Department wrote Mr. Pratt a letter acknowledging receipt of his of +June 9th “enclosing printed copies of a report from the +<i>Straits Times</i> of the same day, entitled ‘Mr. Spencer +Pratt’s Serenade,’ with a view to its communication to the +press,” and not only not felicitating him <i>on</i> his serenade, +but making him sorry he had ever <i>had</i> a serenade. It said, among +other things:</p> +<p>“The extract now communicated by you from the <i>Straits +Times</i> of the 9th of June has occasioned <i>a feeling of disquietude +and a doubt as to whether some of your acts <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb14" href="#pb14" name="pb14">14</a>]</span>may not +have borne a significance and produced an impression which this +government would feel compelled to regret</i>.”<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e1051src" href="#xd20e1051" name="xd20e1051src">9</a> Hapless +Pratt! “Feel compelled to regret” is State Department for +“You are liable to be fired.”</p> +<p>The letter of reprimand proceeds:</p> +<p>“The address * * * discloses an understanding on +their part that * * * the ultimate object of our action is +* * * the independence of the Philippines * * *. +Your address does not repel this implication +* * *”.</p> +<p>The letter then scores Pratt for having called Aguinaldo “the +man for the occasion,” and for having said that the +“arrangement” between Aguinaldo and Dewey had +“resulted so happily,” and after a few further +animadversions, concludes with this great blow to the reading public of +Alabama:</p> +<p>“For these reasons the Department has not caused the article +to be given to the press lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction +to views the expression of which it had not authorized.”</p> +<p>“The Department” was very scrupulous about even the +appearance, at the American end of the line, of “lending a +sanction” to Pratt’s arrangement with Aguinaldo, while all +the time it was knowingly permitting the latter to daily risk his own +life and the lives of his countrymen on the faith of that very +“arrangement,” and it was so permitting this to be done +because the “arrangement” was daily operating to reduce the +number of American lives which it would be necessary to sacrifice in +the final taking of Manila. The day the letter of reprimand was written +our troop-ships were on the ocean, speeding toward the Philippines. And +Aguinaldo and his people were fighting the Spaniards with the pent-up +feeling of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb15" href="#pb15" name= +"pb15">15</a>]</span>centuries impelling their little steel-jacketed +messengers of death, thinking of “Cuba Libre,” and dreaming +of a Star of Philippine Independence risen in the Far East.</p> +<p>Such are the circumstances from which the Filipino people derived +their first impressions concerning the faith and honor of a strange +people they had never theretofore seen, who succeeded the Spaniards as +their overlords. Mr. Pratt was subsequently quietly separated from the +consular service, and doubtless lived to regret that he had ever +unloosed the fountains of his Alabama French on the Filipino colony of +Singapore. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb16" href="#pb16" name= +"pb16">16</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e804" href="#xd20e804src" name="xd20e804">1</a></span> +<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 6, 1897, p. 3.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e819" href="#xd20e819src" name="xd20e819">2</a></span> Split +Rock.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e843" href="#xd20e843src" name="xd20e843">3</a></span> <i>Senate +Document 62</i>, p. 381.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e869" href="#xd20e869src" name="xd20e869">4</a></span> See pages +341 <i>et seq.</i>, <i>Senate Document 62</i>, part 1, 55th Cong., 3d +Sess., 1898–9.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e924" href="#xd20e924src" name="xd20e924">5</a></span> <i>Senate +Document 62</i>, p. 346.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e942" href="#xd20e942src" name="xd20e942">6</a></span> <i>Ib.</i>, +349.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1008" href="#xd20e1008src" name="xd20e1008">7</a></span> The +natives in and about Singapore are Mohammedans, forbidden by their +religion to use alcoholic beverages.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1023" href="#xd20e1023src" name="xd20e1023">8</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 62</i>, p. 354.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1051" href="#xd20e1051src" name="xd20e1051">9</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 62</i>, p. 356.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch2" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter II</h2> +<h2 class="main">Dewey and Aguinaldo</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Armaments that thunderstrike the walls</p> +<p class="line">Of rock-built cities, bidding nations quake</p> +<p class="line">And monarchs tremble in their capitals.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Childe Harold.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">The battle of Manila Bay was fought May 1, 1898. Until +the thunder of Dewey’s guns reverberated around the world, there +was perhaps no part of it the American people knew less about than the +Philippine Islands.</p> +<p>We have all heard much of what happened after the battle, but +comparatively few, probably, have ever had a glimpse at our great +sailor while he was there in Hong Kong harbor, getting ready to go to +sea to destroy the Spanish armada. Such a glimpse is modestly afforded +by the Admiral in his testimony before the Senate Committee in +1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1092src" href="#xd20e1092" name= +"xd20e1092src">1</a></p> +<p>Asked by the Committee when he first heard from Aguinaldo and his +people in 1898, Admiral Dewey said<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1100src" +href="#xd20e1100" name="xd20e1100src">2</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I should think about a month before leaving Hong Kong, +that is, about the first of April, when it became pretty certain that +there was to be war with Spain, I heard that <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb17" href="#pb17" name="pb17">17</a>]</span>there +were a number of Filipinos in the city of Hong Kong who were anxious to +accompany the squadron to Manila in case we went over. I saw these men +two or three times myself. They seemed to be all very young earnest +boys. I did not attach much importance to what they said or to +themselves. Finally, before we left Hong Kong for Mirs Bay<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e1110src" href="#xd20e1110" name="xd20e1110src">3</a> +I received a telegram from Consul-General Pratt at Singapore saying +that Aguinaldo was there and anxious to see me. I said to him +“All right; tell him to come on,” but I attached so little +importance to Aguinaldo that I did not wait for him. He did not arrive, +and we sailed from Mirs Bay without any Filipinos.</p> +</div> +<p>From his testimony before the Committee it is clear that Admiral +Dewey’s first impressions of the Filipinos, like those of most +Americans after him, were not very favorable, that is to say, he did +not in the outset take them very seriously. It will be interesting to +consider these impressions, and then to compare them with those he +gathered on better acquaintance from observing their early struggles +for independence. The more intimate acquaintance, as has been the case +with all his fellow countrymen since, caused him to revise his first +verdict. Answering a question put by Senator Carmack concerning what +transpired between him and the Philippine Revolutionists at Hong Kong +before he sailed in search of the Spanish fleet, the Admiral +said<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1119src" href="#xd20e1119" name= +"xd20e1119src">4</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">They were bothering me. I was getting my squadron +ready for battle, and these little men were coming on board my ship at +Hong Kong and taking a good deal of my time, and I did not attach the +slightest importance to anything they could do, and they did nothing; +that is, none of them went with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had +been a good deal of talk, but when the time came they did not +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb18" href="#pb18" name= +"pb18">18</a>]</span>go. <i>One of them didn’t go because he +didn’t have any tooth-brush.</i></p> +<p><span class="sc">Senator Burrows</span>: “Did he give that as +his reason?”</p> +<p><span class="sc">Admiral Dewey</span>: “Yes, he said ‘I +have no tooth-brush.’”</p> +<p>They used to come aboard my ship and take my time, and finally I +would not see them at all, but turned them over to my staff.</p> +</div> +<p>Now the lack of a tooth-brush is hardly a valid excuse for not going +into battle, however great a convenience it may be in campaign. But the +absence of orders from your commanding officer stands on a very +different footing. Aguinaldo had not yet arrived. Three hundred years +of Spanish misgovernment and cruelty is not conducive to aversion to +fictitious excuses by the lowly in the presence of supreme authority. +The answer was amusingly uncandid, but disproved neither patriotism nor +intelligence.</p> +<p>Aguinaldo arrived at Hong Kong from Singapore a day or so after +Admiral Dewey had sailed for Manila. Of the battle of May 1st, no +detailed mention is essential here. Every schoolboy is familiar with +it. It will remain, as long as the republic lasts, a part of the +heritage of the nation. But the true glory of that battle, to my mind, +rests, not upon the circumstance that we have the Philippines, but upon +the tremendous fact that before it occurred the attitude of our State +Department toward an American citizen sojourning in distant lands and +becoming involved in difficulties there had long been, “Why +didn’t he stay at home? Let him stew in his own juice”; +whereas, since then, to be an American has been more like it was in the +days of St. Paul to be a Roman citizen.</p> +<p>May 16th, our consul at Hong Kong, Mr. Wildman, succeeded in getting +the insurgent leader and his staff <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb19" +href="#pb19" name="pb19">19</a>]</span>off for Manila on board the U. +S. S. <i>McCulloch</i> by authority of Admiral Dewey. Like his +colleague over at Singapore, Consul Wildman was bent on the rôle +of Warwick. Admiral Dewey was quite busy there in Manila Bay the first +two or three weeks after the battle, but yielding to the letters of +Wildman, who meantime had constituted himself a kind of fiscal agent at +Hong Kong for the prospective revolution in the matter of the purchase +of guns and otherwise, the Admiral told the commanding officer of the +<i>McCulloch</i> that on his next trip to Hong Kong he might bring down +a dozen or so of the Filipinos there. The frame of mind they were in on +reaching Manila, as a result of the assurances of Pratt and Wildman, is +well illustrated by a letter the latter wrote Aguinaldo a little later +(June 25th) which is undoubtedly in keeping with what he had been +telling him earlier:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Do not forget that the United States undertook this +war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties +under which they were suffering, and not for the love of conquest or +the hope of gain. <i>They are actuated by precisely the same feelings +for the Filipinos.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e1162src" href= +"#xd20e1162" name="xd20e1162src">5</a></p> +</div> +<p><i>And at the time, they were.</i></p> +<p>“Every American citizen who came in contact with the Filipinos +at the inception of the Spanish War, or at any time within a few months +after hostilities began,” said General Anderson in an interview +published in the <i>Chicago Record</i> of February 24, 1900, +“probably told those he talked with * * * that we +intended to free them from Spanish oppression. The general expression, +was ‘We intend to whip the Spaniards and set you +free.’”</p> +<p>The <i>McCulloch</i> arrived in Manila Bay with Aguinaldo +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb20" href="#pb20" name= +"pb20">20</a>]</span>and his outfit, May 19th. Let Admiral Dewey tell +what happened then<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1184src" href= +"#xd20e1184" name="xd20e1184src">6</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Aguinaldo came to see me. I said, “Well now, go +ashore there; we have got our forces at the arsenal at Cavite, go +ashore and start your army.” He came back in the course of a few +hours and said, “I want to leave here; I want to go to +Japan.” I said, “Don’t give it up, Don Emilio.” +<i>I wanted his help, you know.</i> He did not sleep ashore that night; +he slept on board the ship. The next morning he went on shore, <i>still +inside my lines</i>, and began recruiting men.</p> +</div> +<p>Enterprises of great pith and moment have often turned awry and lost +the name of action for lack of a word spoken in season by a stout +heart. Admiral Dewey spoke the word, and Aguinaldo, his +protégé, did the rest. “Then he began operations +toward Manila, and he did wonderfully well. He whipped the Spaniards +battle after battle * * *.”<a class="noteref" id= +"n48.2src" href="#n48.2" name="n48.2src">7</a> In fact, the desperate +bravery of those little brown men after they got warmed up reminds one +of the Japs at the walls of Peking, in the advance of the Allied Armies +to the relief of the foreign legations during the Boxer troubles of +1900. Admiral Dewey told the Senate Committee in 1902 that Aguinaldo +actually wanted to put one of the old smooth-bore Spanish guns he found +at Cavite <i>on a barge</i> and have him (Dewey) <i>tow it</i> up in +front of Manila so he could attack the city with it. “I said, +‘Oh no, no; we can do nothing until our troops +come.’”</p> +<p>Otherwise he was constantly advising and encouraging him. Why? Let +the Admiral answer: “I knew that what he was doing—driving +the Spaniards in—was <i>saving our troops</i>.”<a class= +"pseudonoteref" href="#n48.2">7</a> In other words they were daily +dying that American soldiers might live, on the faith of the reasons +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb21" href="#pb21" name= +"pb21">21</a>]</span>for which we had declared war, and trusting, +because of the words of our consuls and the acts of our admiral, in the +sentiment subsequently so nobly expressed by Mr. McKinley in his +instructions to the Paris peace Commissioners:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The United States in making peace should follow the +same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e1224src" href="#xd20e1224" name= +"xd20e1224src">8</a></p> +</div> +<p>“I did not know what the action of our Government would +be,” said the Admiral to the Committee,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1231src" href="#xd20e1231" name="xd20e1231src">9</a> adding that +he simply used his best judgment on the spot at the time; presumably +supposing that his Government would do the decent thing by these people +who considered us their liberators. “They looked on us as their +liberators,” said he.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1236src" href= +"#xd20e1236" name="xd20e1236src">10</a> “Up to the time the army +came he (Aguinaldo) did everything I requested. He was most obedient; +whatever I told him to do he did. I saw him almost daily.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e1241src" href="#xd20e1241" name= +"xd20e1241src">11</a> I had not much to do with him after the army +came.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1246src" href="#xd20e1246" +name="xd20e1246src">12</a></p> +<p>That was no ordinary occasion, that midsummer session of the Senate +Committee in 1902. It was a case of the powerful of the earth +discussing a question of ethics, even as they do in Boston. The nation +had been intoxicated in 1898 with the pride of power—power +revealed to it by the Spanish War; and in a spirit thus mellowed had +taken the Philippines as a sort of political foreign mission, +forgetting the injunction of the Fathers to keep Church and State +separate, but not forgetting the possible profits of trade with the +saved. A long war with the prospective saved had followed, developing +many barbarities avenged in kind, and the breezes from the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb22" href="#pb22" name="pb22">22</a>]</span>South +Seas were suggesting the aroma of shambles. “How did we get into +all this mess, anyhow?” said the people. “Let us pause, and +consider.” Hear the still small voice of a nation’s +conscience mingling with demagogic nonsense perpetrated by potent, +grave, and reverend Senators:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Admiral Dewey: “I do not think it makes any +difference what my opinion is on these things.”</p> +<p>Senator Patterson: “There is no man whose opinion goes farther +with the country than yours does, Admiral, and therefore I think you +ought to be very prudent in expressing your views.”</p> +<p>Senator Beveridge (Acting Chairman): “The Chairman will not +permit any member to lecture Admiral Dewey on his prudence or +imprudence.”</p> +</div> +<p>This of course would read well to “Mary of the Vine-clad +Cottage” out in Indiana, whose four-year-old boy was named George +Dewey—, or to her counterpart up in Vermont who might name her +next boy after the brilliant and distinguished Acting Chairman, in +token of her choice for the Presidency.</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Senator Patterson: “I was not lecturing +him.”</p> +<p>Senator Beveridge: “Yes; you said he ought to be +prudent.”</p> +<p>Senator Patterson: “And I think it was well enough to suggest +those things.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1273src" href= +"#xd20e1273" name="xd20e1273src">13</a></p> +</div> +<p>Thawed into theorizing by these indubitably genuine evidences of a +nation’s high regard, the man of action tried to help the nation +out. He said he had used the Filipinos as the Federal troops used the +negroes in the Civil War. Senator Patterson struck this suggestion +amidships and sunk it with the remark that the negroes <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb23" href="#pb23" name="pb23">23</a>]</span>were +expecting freedom. Admiral Dewey had said “The Filipinos were +slaves too” and considered him their liberator.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e1282src" href="#xd20e1282" name="xd20e1282src">14</a> But he +never did elaborate on the new definition of freedom which had followed +in the wake of his ships to Manila, viz., that Freedom does not +necessarily mean freedom from alien domination, but only a change of +masters deemed by the new master beneficial to the +“slave.”</p> +<p>Apropos of why he accepted Aguinaldo’s help, the Admiral also +said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I was waiting for troops to arrive, and I felt sure +the Filipinos could not take Manila, and I thought that <i>the closer +they invested the city the easier it would be when our troops arrived +to march in</i>. The Filipinos were our friends, assisting us; they +were doing our work.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1295src" href= +"#xd20e1295" name="xd20e1295src">15</a></p> +</div> +<p>Asked as to how big a force Aguinaldo had under arms then and +afterwards, the Admiral said maybe 25,000, adding, by way of +illustration of the pluck, vim, and patriotism of his valuable new-made +friends, “They could have had any number of <i>men</i>; it was +just a question of <i>arming</i> them. <i>They could have had the whole +population.</i>”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1311src" href= +"#xd20e1311" name="xd20e1311src">16</a> Eleven months after that, when +we captured the first insurgent capital, Malolos, General MacArthur, +the ablest and one of the bravest generals we ever set to slaughtering +Filipinos, said to a newspaper man just after a bloody and of course +victorious fight: “When I first started in against these rebels, +I believed that Aguinaldo’s troops represented only a +faction.” “<i>I did not like</i>,” said this veteran +of three wars, who was always “on the job” in action out +there as elsewhere, “<i>I did not like to believe that the +whole</i> population of Luzon * * * was opposed to us +* * * but after having come thus far, and having been brought +much in <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb24" href="#pb24" name= +"pb24">24</a>]</span>contact with both <i>insurrectos</i> and +<i>amigos, I have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the +Filipino masses are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he +heads</i>”.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1331src" href="#xd20e1331" +name="xd20e1331src">17</a></p> +<p>Is it at all unlikely that Admiral Dewey did in fact say of his +protégés, the Filipinos, to an American visiting Manila +in January, 1899, three or four weeks before the war broke out, +“Rather than make a war of conquest upon the Filipino people, I +would up anchor and sail out of the harbor.”<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e1345src" href="#xd20e1345" name="xd20e1345src">18</a></p> +<p>If Dewey and MacArthur were right, then, about the situation around +Manila in 1898, it was a case of an entire people united in an +aspiration, and looking to us for its fulfilment.</p> +<p>When the American troops reached the Philippines and perfected their +battle formations about Manila, and the order to advance was given, +they did “march in,” to use Admiral Dewey’s +expression above quoted. But they did not let the Filipinos have a +finger in the pie. The conquest and retention of the islands had then +been determined upon. The Admiral’s reasons for saddling his +protégé with a series of bloody battles and a long and +arduous campaign are certainly stated with the proverbial frankness of +the sailorman: “I wanted his help, you know.” But what was +Aguinaldo to get out of the transaction, from the Dewey point of view? +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb25" href="#pb25" name= +"pb25">25</a>]</span></p> +<p>“They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards. I do not think they +looked much beyond that,”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1359src" +href="#xd20e1359" name="xd20e1359src">19</a> said the Admiral to the +Senate Committee. Let us see whether they did or not. Aguinaldo had +been shipped by the Honorable E. Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the +United States at Singapore, from that point to Hong Kong on April 26th, +consigned to his fellow Warwick, the Honorable Rounseville Wildman, +Consul-General of the United States at the last-named place, and had +been received in due course by the consignee. May 5th, at Hong Kong, +the Filipino Revolutionary Committee had a meeting, the minutes of +which we subsequently came into possession of, along with other +captured insurgent papers. The following is an extract from those +minutes:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Once the President [Aguinaldo] is in the Philippines +with his prestige, he will be able to arouse the masses to combat the +demands of the United States, if they should colonize that country, and +will drive them, the Filipinos, if circumstances render it necessary, +to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even if later they should +succumb to the weight of the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington +proposes to carry out the fundamental principles of its Constitution, +<i>it is most improbable that an attempt will be made to colonize the +Philippines or annex them. It is probable then that independence will +be guaranteed.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e1369src" href= +"#xd20e1369" name="xd20e1369src">20</a></p> +</div> +<p>The truth is that instead of leaving everything to the chance of our +continuing in the same unselfish frame of mind we were really in when +the Spanish-American War started, Aguinaldo and his people, not sure +but what in the wind-up they might even be thrown back upon the tender +mercies of Spain, played their cards <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb26" href="#pb26" name="pb26">26</a>]</span>boldly and consistently +from the beginning with a view of organizing a <i>de facto</i> +government and getting it recognized by the Powers as such at the very +earliest practicable moment. They believed that the Lord helps those +who help themselves. They had anticipated our change of heart and +already had it discounted before we were aware of it ourselves. They +were already acting on the idea that eternal vigilance is the price of +liberty while public opinion in the United States concerning them was +in a chrysalis state, and trying to develop a new definition of Liberty +which should comport with the subjugation of distant island subjects by +a continental commonwealth on the other side of the world based on +representative government. The prospective subjects did not believe +that a legislature ten thousand miles away in which they had no vote +would ever give them a square deal about tariff and other laws dictated +by special interests. They had had three hundred years of just that +very sort of thing under Spain and instinctively dreaded continuance of +it. That their instincts did not deceive them, our later study of +Congressional legislation will show. The Filipinos had greatly pondered +their future in their hearts during the last twelve months of +Spain’s colonial empire, watching her Cuban embarrassments with +eager eye.</p> +<p>Having seen the frame of mind in which they approached the contract +implied in Admiral Dewey’s cheery words, “Well now, go +ashore there and start your army,” what were the facts of recent +history within the knowledge of both parties at the time? What had been +the screams of the American eagle, if any, concerning his moral +leadership of the family of unfeathered bipeds?</p> +<p>President McKinley’s annual message to Congress <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb27" href="#pb27" name="pb27">27</a>]</span>of +December, 1897,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1387src" href="#xd20e1387" +name="xd20e1387src">21</a> calling attention to conditions in Cuba as +intolerable, had declared that if we should intervene to put a stop to +them, we certainly would not make it the occasion of a land-grab. The +other nations said: “We are from Missouri.” But Mr. +McKinley said, “forcible annexation” was not to be thought +of by us. “That by <i>our</i> code of morality would be +criminal,” etc. So the world said, “We shall see what we +shall see.” Then had come the war message of April 11, +1898,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1395src" href="#xd20e1395" name= +"xd20e1395src">22</a> reiterating the declaration of the Cuban message +of December previous, that “forcible annexation by <i>our</i> +code of morality would be criminal aggression.” In other words we +announced to the overcrowded monarchies of the old world, whose +land-lust is ever tempted by the broad acres of South America, and ever +cooled by the virile menace of the Monroe doctrine, that we not only +were against the <i>principle</i> of land-grabbing, but would not +indulge in the <i>practice</i>. Immediately upon the conclusion of the +reading of the war message, Senator Stewart was recognized, and said, +among other things: “Under the law of nations, intervention for +conquest is condemned, and is opposed to the universal sentiment of +mankind. It is unjust, it is robbery, to intervene for conquest.” +Then Mr. Lodge stood up, “in the Senate House a Senator,” +and said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We are there [meaning in this present Cuban situation] +because we represent the spirit of liberty and the spirit of the new +time, and Spain is over against us because she is mediæval, +cruel, dying. We have grasped no man’s territory, we have taken +no man’s property, we have invaded no man’s rights. <i>We +do not ask their lands.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e1418src" href= +"#xd20e1418" name="xd20e1418src">23</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb28" href="#pb28" name= +"pb28">28</a>]</span></p> +<p>These speeches went forth to the world almost like a part of the +message itself. And Admiral Dewey, like every other American, in his +early dealings with Aguinaldo, after war broke out, must have assumed a +mental attitude in harmony with these announcements. But the world +said, “All this is merely what you Americans yourselves call +‘hot air.’ We repeat, ‘We are from +Missouri.’” Then we said: “Oh very well, we will show +you.” So in the declaration of war against Spain we inserted the +following:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Fourth: That the United States hereby disclaims any +disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or +control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and +asserts its determination when that is accomplished, to leave the +government and control of the island to its people.</p> +</div> +<p>This meant, “It is true we do love the Almighty Dollar very +dearly, oh, Sisters of the Family of Nations, but there are some +axiomatic principles of human liberty that we love better, and one of +them is the ‘unalienable right’ of every people to pursue +happiness in their own way, free from alien domination.” All +these things were well known to both the contracting parties when +Admiral Dewey set Aguinaldo ashore at Cavite, May 20, 1898, and got him +to start his insurrection “under the protection of our +guns,” as he expressed it.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1434src" +href="#xd20e1434" name="xd20e1434src">24</a> Accordingly, when the +insurgent leader went ashore, the declaration of war was his major +premise, the assurances of our consuls and the acts of our Admiral +pursuant thereto were his minor premise, and Independence was his +conclusion. Trusting to the faith and honor of the American people, he +took his life in his hands, left the panoplied safety of our mighty +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb29" href="#pb29" name= +"pb29">29</a>]</span>squadron, and plunged, single-handed, into the +struggle for Freedom.</p> +<p>What was the state of the public mind on shore, and how was it +prepared to receive his assurances of American aid? Consider the +following picture in the light of its sombre sequel.</p> +<p>Just as the war broke out, Consul Williams had left Manila and gone +over to Hong Kong, where he joined Admiral Dewey, and accompanied him +back to Manila, and was thus privileged to be present at the battle of +Manila Bay, May 1st. Under date of May 12th, from his consular +headquarters aboard the U. S. S. <i>Baltimore</i>, he reports<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e1448src" href="#xd20e1448" name= +"xd20e1448src">25</a> going ashore at Cavite and being received with +enthusiastic greetings by vast crowds of Filipinos. “They crowded +around me,” says Brother Williams, “hats off, shouting +‘<i lang="es">Viva los Americanos</i>,’ thronged about me +by hundreds to shake either hand, even several at a time, men, women, +and children, striving to get even a finger to shake. So I moved +<i>half a mile</i>, shaking continuously with both hands.”</p> +<p>Tut! tut! says the casual reader. What did the Government at +Washington know of all these goings on, that it should be charged later +with having violated as binding a moral obligation as ever a nation +assumed? It is true that the news of the Williams ovation, as in the +case of the Pratt serenade, reached Washington only by the slow +channels of the mail. But Washington did in fact receive the said news +by due course of mail. When it came, however, Washington was nursing +visions of savages in blankets smoking the pipe of peace with the +agents of the Great White Father in the White House—<i>i.e.</i>, +thought, or hoped, the Filipinos were savages—and remained as +deaf to the sounds <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb30" href="#pb30" +name="pb30">30</a>]</span>of the Williams ovation as it had been to the +strains of the Pratt serenade.</p> +<p>However, hardly had Admiral Dewey taken his binoculars from the gig +that carried Aguinaldo ashore to raise his auxiliary insurrection, when +he called his Flag Secretary, or the equivalent, and dictated the +following cablegram to the Secretary of the Navy:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief, was brought +down by the <i>McCulloch</i>. Organizing forces near Cavite, and <i>may +render assistance that will be valuable</i>.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1478src" href="#xd20e1478" name="xd20e1478src">26</a></p> +</div> +<p>This sounds a little more serious than “earnest boys” +alleging the lack of a toothbrush as an excuse for declining mortal +combat, does it not? <i>How</i> valuable did this assistance prove? +Admiral Dewey had to wait three and one half months for the army to +arrive, and this is how the commanding general of the American forces +describes conditions as he found them in the latter part of August:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">For three and one half months Admiral Dewey with his +squadron and the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled. +All commerce had been interdicted, internal trade paralyzed, and food +supplies were nearly exhausted.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1491src" +href="#xd20e1491" name="xd20e1491src">27</a></p> +</div> +<p>And, he might have added, the taking of the city was thus made +perfectly easy. Otherwise, as Aguinaldo put it in one of his letters to +General Otis, we would not have taken a city, but only <i>the ruins</i> +of a city. Admiral Dewey said to the Senate Committee in 1902: +“They [the Spaniards] surrendered on August 13th, and they had +not gotten a thing in after the 1st of May.”<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e1501src" href="#xd20e1501" name="xd20e1501src">28</a> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb31" href="#pb31" name= +"pb31">31</a>]</span></p> +<p>In the early part of the next year, 1899, President McKinley sent +out a kind of olive-branch commission, of which President Schurman of +Cornell University was Chairman. The olive branch got withered in the +sulphur of exploding gun-powder, so the Commission contented itself +with making a report. And this is what they said concerning what +followed the Dewey-Aguinaldo <i>entente</i>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Shortly afterwards, the Filipinos began to attack the +Spanish. Their number was rapidly augmented by the militia who had been +given arms by Spain, all of whom revolted and joined the insurgents. +Great Filipino successes followed, many Spaniards were taken prisoners, +and while the Spanish troops now remained quietly in Manila, the +Filipino forces made themselves masters of <i>the entire island</i> [of +Luzon] except that city.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1518src" href= +"#xd20e1518" name="xd20e1518src">29</a></p> +</div> +<p>Of conditions in July, sixty days after Admiral Dewey had on May +20th said to Aguinaldo in effect, “Go it, little man, we need you +in our business,” Mr. Wildman, our Consul at Hong Kong, writing +to the State Department, said, in defending himself for his share in +the business of getting Aguinaldo’s help under promises, both +express and implied, which were subsequently repudiated, that after he, +Wildman, put the insurgent chief aboard the <i>McCulloch</i>, May 16th, +bound for Manila to co-operate by land with our navy: “He +* * * organized a government * * * and from that +day to this he has been uninterruptedly successful in the field and +dignified and just as the head of his government,”<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e1528src" href="#xd20e1528" name= +"xd20e1528src">30</a> a statement which Admiral Dewey subsequently +endorsed.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1533src" href="#xd20e1533" name= +"xd20e1533src">31</a></p> +<p>We have seen the preliminaries of this “government” +started under the auspices of our Admiral and under <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb32" href="#pb32" name="pb32">32</a>]</span>what he +himself called “the protection of our guns” (<i>ante</i>). +Let us note its progress. If you turn the leaves of the contemporaneous +official reports, you see quite a moving picture show, and the action +is rapid. On May 24th, still “under the protection of our +guns,” Aguinaldo proclaimed his revolutionary government and +summoned the people to his standard for the purpose of driving the +Spaniards out forever. The situation was an exact counterpart of the +cotemporary Cuban one as regards identity of purpose between +“liberator” and “oppressed.” His proclamation +promised a constitutional convention to be called later (and which +<i>was</i> duly called later) to elect a President and Cabinet, in +whose favor he would resign the emergency authority now assumed; +referred to the United States as “undoubtedly +disinterested” and as considering the Filipinos “capable of +governing for ourselves our unfortunate country”; and formally +announced the temporary assumption of supreme authority as dictator. +Copies of these proclamations were duly furnished Admiral Dewey. The +latter was too busy looking after the men behind his guns and watching +the progress of his plucky little ally to study Spanish, so he +forwarded them to the Navy Department without +comment—“without reading them,” said he to the Senate +Committee in 1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1548src" href= +"#xd20e1548" name="xd20e1548src">32</a> When his attention was called +to them before the Committee by one of the members reading them, his +comment was, “Nothing about independence there, is +there?”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1553src" href="#xd20e1553" +name="xd20e1553src">33</a> It seems to me it did not take an +international lawyer to see <i>a good deal</i> “there,” +about independence. In a proclamation published at Tarlac in the latter +part of 1899, which appears to have been a sort of swan-song of the +Philippine Republic, Aguinaldo had said, in effect, “Certainly +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb33" href="#pb33" name= +"pb33">33</a>]</span>Admiral Dewey did not bring me from Hong Kong to +Manila to fight the Spaniards for the benefit of American Trade +Expansion,” and in this proclamation he claimed that Admiral +Dewey promised him independence. It is true, that in a letter to +Senator Lodge, which that distinguished gentleman read on the floor of +the Senate on January 31, 1900, Admiral Dewey denounced this last +statement as false. It is also true that those Americans are few and +far between who will take Aguinaldo’s word in preference to +Admiral Dewey’s. Certainly the writer is not one of them. But +Aguinaldo is no Spanish scholar, being more of a leader of men than a +master of language, and what sort of an interpreter acted between him +and the Admiral does not appear. Certainly he never did get anything in +writing from Admiral Dewey. But after the latter brought him to Manila, +set him to fighting the common enemy, and helped him with guns and +otherwise in quickly organizing an army for the purpose, the Admiral +was at least put on inquiry as to just what Aguinaldo supposed he +<i>was</i> fighting for. What did the Admiral probably suppose? He told +the Senate Committee that the idea that they wanted independence +“never entered his head.” The roar of mighty guns seems to +have made it difficult for him to hear the prattlings of what +Aguinaldo’s proclamations of the time called “the +legitimate aspirations of a people.” The milk in the cocoanut is +this: How could it ever occur to a great naval commander, such as +Admiral Dewey, familiar with the four quarters of the globe, that a +coterie of politicians at home would be so foolish as to buy a vast +straggly archipelago of jungle-covered islands in the South Seas which +had been a nuisance to every government that ever owned them? But let +us turn from the Senate Committee’s studies of <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb34" href="#pb34" name="pb34">34</a>]</span>1902 to +the progress of the infant republic of 1898 at Cavite.</p> +<p>The same day the above proclamations of May 24th were issued, we +find Consul Williams, now become a sort of amphibious civilian aide to +Dewey, having his consular headquarters afloat, on the U. S. S. +<i>Baltimore</i>, of the squadron, writing the State Department, +describing the great successes of the insurgents, his various +conferences with Aguinaldo and the other leaders, and his own +activities in arranging the execution of a power of attorney whereby +Aguinaldo released to certain parties in Hong Kong $400,000 then on +deposit to his credit in a Hong Kong bank, for the purpose of enabling +them to pay for 3000 stand of arms bought there and expected to arrive +at Cavite on the morrow, and for other needed expenses of the +revolutionary movement. He says, in part: “Officers have visited +me during the darkness of the night to inform <i>the fleet and me</i> +of their operations, and to report increase of strength. When General +Merritt arrives he will find large auxiliary land forces adapted to his +service and used to the climate.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1577src" href="#xd20e1577" name="xd20e1577src">34</a> Throughout +this period Admiral Dewey reports various cordial conferences with +Aguinaldo, though he is not so literary as to vivify his accounts with +allusions to the weather. In one despatch he states that he has +“refrained from assisting him * * * with the forces +under my command”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1582src" href= +"#xd20e1582" name="xd20e1582src">35</a>—explaining to him that +“the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United +States troops.”</p> +<p>Six days after the issuance of the Dictatorship proclamations above +mentioned, viz., on May 30th, Admiral Dewey cables the Navy +Department<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1589src" href="#xd20e1589" name= +"xd20e1589src">36</a>: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb35" href="#pb35" +name="pb35">35</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited +<i>Olympia</i> yesterday. He expects to make general attack May +31st.</p> +</div> +<p>He did not succeed entirely, but there was hard fighting, and the +cordon around the doomed Spaniards in Manila and its suburbs was drawn +ever closer and closer.</p> +<p>The remarkable feat of Aguinaldo’s raising a right formidable +fighting force in twelve days after his little “Return from +Elba,” which force kept growing like a snowball, is difficult, +for one who does not know the Filipinos, and the conditions then, to +credit. It is explained by the fact that Admiral Dewey let him have the +captured guns in the Cavite arsenal, that Cavite was a populous hotbed +of insurrection, and that many native regiments, or parts of regiments, +quite suited to be the nucleus of an army, having lots of veteran +non-commissioned officers, deserted the Spaniards and went over to the +insurgents, their countrymen, as soon as Aguinaldo arrived.</p> +<p>On June 6th, we have another bulletin sent to the Navy Department by +Admiral Dewey, transmitting with perceptible satisfaction further +information as to the progress of his indefatigable +protégé:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Insurgents have been engaged actively within the +province of Cavite during the last week; they have had several small +victories, taking prisoners about 1800 men, 50 officers; Spanish +troops, not native.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1611src" href= +"#xd20e1611" name="xd20e1611src">37</a></p> +</div> +<p>Along about this period Aguinaldo happens to get hold of a belated +copy of the <i>London Times</i> of May 5, 1898. It contains +considerable speculation on the future of the Philippines which casts a +shadow over the soul of the president of the incipient republic. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb36" href="#pb36" name= +"pb36">36</a>]</span>Having read President McKinley’s immortal +State papers about the moral obliquity of “forcible +annexation,” he is moved to write direct to the source of those +noble sentiments. The letter is dated June 10, 1898. It is addressed, +with a quaintness now pathetic, “To the President of the Republic +of the Great North American Nation.” It greets the addressee with +“the most tender effusion of” the writer’s soul, +expresses his “deep and sincere gratitude,” in the name of +his people, “for the efficient and <i>disinterested</i> +protection which you have decided to give it to shake off the yoke of +the cruel and corrupt Spanish domination, as you are doing to the +equally unfortunate Cuba” and then proceeds to tell of “the +great sorrow which all of us Filipinos felt on reading in the +<i>Times</i> the astounding statement that you, sir, will retain these +islands,” etc. He proceeds:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The Philippine people * * * have seen in +your nation, ever since your fleet destroyed in a moment the Spanish +fleet which was here * * * <i>the angel who is the harbinger +of their liberty</i>; and they <i>rose like a single wave</i> +* * * as soon as I trod these shores; and captured in ten +days nearly the whole garrison of this Province of Cavite <i>in whose +port I have my government—by the consent of the Admiral of your +triumphant fleet</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1642src" href= +"#xd20e1642" name="xd20e1642src">38</a></p> +</div> +<p>The writer closes his letter with an impassioned protest against the +occurrence of what is suggested in the <i>Times</i>, and speaks of his +fellow-countrymen as “a people which trusts blindly in you not to +abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and +independent,” and adds his “fervent prayers for the +ever-increasing prosperity of your powerful nation.”<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e1652src" href="#xd20e1652" name= +"xd20e1652src">39</a></p> +<p>But the signer of the foregoing letter did not spend <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb37" href="#pb37" name="pb37">37</a>]</span>all his +time <i>praying</i> for us, as may be observed in this bulletin from +Admiral Dewey concerning the way he was lambasting the common enemy, +sent the Navy Department, June 12th:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically +surrounded Manila. They have taken 2500 Spanish prisoners, whom they +treat most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until the +arrival of United States troops thither; I have advised.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e1667src" href="#xd20e1667" name= +"xd20e1667src">40</a></p> +</div> +<p>Four days later Washington chided the hapless Pratt at Singapore +about having talked to Aguinaldo of “direct co-operation” +with Admiral Dewey, saying: “To obtain the unconditional personal +assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, +if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be +practicable to gratify.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1674src" +href="#xd20e1674" name="xd20e1674src">41</a> This communication goes on +to advise Mr. Pratt that the Department cannot approve anything he may +have said to Aguinaldo on behalf of the United States which would +concede that in accepting his co-operation we would owe him anything. +Yet it did not tell Admiral Dewey to quit coaching him, because <i>the +service he was rendering was too valuable</i>. There is no +communication to Admiral Dewey about “hopes which it might not be +practicable to gratify” in the official archives of those times. +There was Admiral Dewey coaching Aguinaldo and telling him to wait for +the main attack until General Merritt should arrive with our troops. +Why? Because he expected Merritt to co-operate with Aguinaldo, and of +course Aguinaldo expected exactly what Dewey expected.</p> +<p>In reviewing the history of those times the writer has not been so +careless as to have overlooked Senator <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb38" href="#pb38" name="pb38">38</a>]</span>Lodge’s elaborate +speech in the Senate on March 7, 1900, wherein attention is called to +the circumstance that a few days after Aguinaldo landed at Cavite, the +Navy Department cabled cautioning Dewey to have no alliance with him +that might complicate us, and that the Admiral answered he had made no +alliance and would make none. But if actions speak louder than words, +the Senator’s point does not rise above the dignity of a +technicality.</p> +<p>The same day the State Department reprimanded Pratt, as above +indicated, viz., June 16th, Consul Williams at Manila wrote them a +glowing communication<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1688src" href= +"#xd20e1688" name="xd20e1688src">42</a> about how “active and +almost uniformly successful” Aguinaldo was continuing to be. But +no resultant enthusiasm is of record. Two days later, on June 18th, +Aguinaldo issued his first formal Declaration of Independence. The +infant republic was now less than a month old, but it already had a +fine set of teeth. The Spaniards had seen them. The proclamation was of +course addressed to the Filipino people, and called on them to rally to +the cause, but he was also driving at recognition by the Powers. It +read in part: “In the face of the whole world I have proclaimed +that the aspiration of my whole life, the final object of all my wishes +and efforts, is your independence, because I have the inner conviction +that it is also your constant longing.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1693src" href="#xd20e1693" name="xd20e1693src">43</a> Many +Americans insist that this is mere “hot air” and that the +average Filipino peasant does not think much more than his plough +animal, the scoffer himself being stupidly unaware that this has been +precisely the argument of tyranny in all ages. But the pride a people +will have in seeing the best educated and most able men of their own +race in charge of their affairs seems to me too obvious to need +elaboration. It was <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb39" href="#pb39" +name="pb39">39</a>]</span>always accepted by us as axiomatic until we +took the Philippines. It is a cruel species of wickedness for an +American to tell his countrymen that the Filipino people <i>do not +want</i> independence, for some of them may believe it.</p> +<p>The Declaration of Independence of June 18th is known to students of +Philippine political archæology as the Proclamation establishing +the “dictatorial” government. The principal thing it did +was to supplement the absolute dictatorship proclaimed May 24th by +provisions for organizing in detail. It also declared independence. A +more elaborate Declaration followed on June 23d, known as the +proclamation establishing the “revolutionary” government. +This made provision for a Congress, a Cabinet, and courts. Of course it +was only a paper government the day the ink dried on it. But we will +follow it through its teething, and adolescence, to the attainment of +its majority at an inauguration where the president was driven to the +place of the taking of the oath of office in a coach and four, through +a short and very self-respecting heyday, and a longer peripatetic +existence, to final dissolution. The document of June 23d reminds us of +a fact which in reading it at this late date we are apt to forget, +viz., that the Filipinos did not know at what moment their powerful +ally, the American squadron, might up anchor and sail away to the high +seas, to meet another Spanish fleet; thus leaving them to the tender +mercies of the Spaniards, possibly forever. So they were losing no +time. In fact, they had set to work from the very beginning with a +determination to try and secure recognition from the Powers at the +earliest moment. In appealing to the public opinion of the world with a +view of paving the way to recognition by the Powers—which +recognition would mean getting arms for war <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb40" href="#pb40" name="pb40">40</a>]</span>with +Spain or any other power without the inconveniences of +filibustering—Aguinaldo says on behalf of his people in the +proclamation of June 23d, above mentioned, that they “now no +longer limit themselves to asking for assimilation with the political +constitution of Spain, but ask for a complete separation (and) strive +for independence, completely assured that the time has come when they +can and ought to govern themselves.”</p> +<p>Mr. Frank D. Millet, who reached Manila soon enough (in July) to see +the ripples of this proclamation, describes the effect on the people. +While Mr. Millet is one of the best men that anybody ever knew, a +proposition as to which I am quite sure the President of the United +States and many people great and small in many lands would affirm my +judgment,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1709src" href="#xd20e1709" name= +"xd20e1709src">44</a> still, he writes from a frankly White Man’s +Burden or land-grabbing standpoint—is in harmony with his +environment. At page 50 of his book,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1715src" href="#xd20e1715" name="xd20e1715src">45</a> he +reproduces the proclamation last above quoted from, and adds the +following satirical comment: “This flowery production was widely +circulated and had a great effect on the imagination of the people, +who, in the elation of their present success in investing the town and +<i>in their belief that the United States was beginning a campaign in +the Philippines to free them from Spanish oppression</i> (italics mine) +shortly came to think that they were already a nation.”</p> +<p>Copies of these June proclamations also, as in the case of those of +May 24th, were duly forwarded by Aguinaldo to Admiral Dewey<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e1724src" href="#xd20e1724" name= +"xd20e1724src">46</a> and by him forwarded to Washington without +comment. In his letter transmitting <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb41" +href="#pb41" name="pb41">41</a>]</span>them to Dewey, Aguinaldo +announces that his government has “<i>taken possession of the +various provinces of the archipelago</i>.” Just exactly how many +provinces he had control of on June 23d will be examined later. <i>The +very same day the proclamation of June 23d declaring independence was +issued</i>, Admiral Dewey cabled the Navy Department<a class="noteref" +id="n69.1src" href="#n69.1" name="n69.1src">47</a>: “Aguinaldo +has acted independently of the squadron, but <i>has kept me advised of +his progress which has been wonderful</i>. I have allowed him to take +from the arsenal such Spanish arms and ammunition as he needed.” +After adding that “Aguinaldo expects to capture Manila without +any assistance,” the Admiral, evidently divining the temptation +that was then luring the political St. Anthonies at Washington, +volunteers this timely suggestion:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">In my opinion these people are superior in +intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of +Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.<a class="pseudonoteref" href= +"#n69.1">47</a></p> +</div> +<p>That there may be no doubt about the motive behind that suggestion, +it may be noted here that the Admiral told the Senate Committee in +1902: “<i>I</i> wrote that <i>because I saw in the newspapers +that Congress contemplated giving the Cubans +independence</i>.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1761src" href= +"#xd20e1761" name="xd20e1761src">48</a></p> +<p>But this is not all. On August 13th, the day after the Peace +Protocol was signed, Mr. McKinley wired Admiral Dewey asking about +“the desirability of the several islands,” the “coal +<i>and mineral</i> deposits,” and in reply on August 29th, the +Admiral wrote:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">In a telegram sent the Department on June 23d, I +expressed the opinion that “these people are far superior in +their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb42" href="#pb42" name= +"pb42">42</a>]</span>natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both +races.” <i>Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this +opinion.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e1779src" href="#xd20e1779" +name="xd20e1779src">49</a></p> +</div> +<p>As a result of one year’s stay in Cuba, and six in the +Philippines—two in the army that subjugated the Filipinos and +four as a judge over them—I heartily concur in the above opinion +of Admiral Dewey, but with this addition: Whatever of solidarity for +governmental purposes the Filipinos may have lacked at the date of the +Admiral’s communications, they were certainly welded into +conscious political unity, <i>as one people</i>, in their war for +independence against us.</p> +<p>In the 1609 or Douay (pronounce Dewey) version of the Bible, the +Latin Vulgate, Luke’s version of the Lord’s Prayer only +says “Lead us not into temptation,” while Matthew adds +“but deliver us from evil.” The Dewey suggestions to the +Washington Government in 1898 remind a regretful nation of both the +evangelical versions mentioned, for the first seems to say what Luke +says, and the second seems to add what Matthew adds.</p> +<p>There is not an American who has known the Filipinos since the +beginning of the American occupation who doubts for a moment that but +for our intervention a Republic would have been established out there +under the lead of Aguinaldo, Mabini, and their associates, which would +have compared well with the republican governments between the United +States and Cape Horn. The writer doubts very much if President Taft is +of a contrary opinion. The real issue is, now that we have them, should +we keep them in spite of the tariff iniquities which the Trusts +perpetrate on them through Congress, until they have received the best +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb43" href="#pb43" name= +"pb43">43</a>]</span>possible tuition we can give them, or be content +to give them their independence when they are already at least as fit +for it as the Republics to the South of us, guaranteeing them +independence by international agreement like that which protects +Belgium and Switzerland?</p> +<p>Now why did Admiral Dewey repeat to his home government and +emphasize on August 29th a suggestion so extremely pertinent to the +capacity of the Filipinos for self-government which he had already made +in lucid language on June 23d previous? The answer is not far to seek. +General Anderson had arrived between the two dates, with the first +American troops that reached the islands after the naval battle of May +1st, and brought the Admiral the first intimation, which came somewhat +as a surprise of course, that there was serious talk in the United +States of retaining the Philippines. “I was the first to tell +Admiral Dewey,” says General Anderson in the <i>North American +Review</i> for February, 1900, “that there was any disposition on +the part of the American people to hold the Philippines if they were +captured.” He adds: “Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls +Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances +that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly +thought so, judging from their acts rather than from their words. +Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at +his request.”</p> +<p>General Anderson might have added that whenever the Admiral captured +prisoners from the Spaniards he would promptly turn them over to the +Filipinos—1300 at one clip in the month of June at +Olongapo.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1803src" href="#xd20e1803" name= +"xd20e1803src">50</a> These 1300 were men a German man-of-war prevented +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb44" href="#pb44" name= +"pb44">44</a>]</span>the Filipinos from taking until Aguinaldo reported +the matter to Admiral Dewey, whereupon, he promptly sent Captain +Coghlan with the <i>Raleigh</i> and another of his ships to the scene +of the trouble, and Captain Coghlan said to the German +“<span lang="de">Hoch der Kaiser</span>” etc. or words to +that effect, and made him go about his business and let our ally alone. +Then Captain Coghlan took the 1300 prisoners himself and turned them +over to Aguinaldo by direction of Admiral Dewey. The motive for, as +well as the test of, an alliance, is that the other fellow can bring +into the partnership something you lack. The navy had no way to keep +prisoners of war. There can be no doubt that if Admiral Dewey’s +original notions about meeting the problems presented by his great +victory of May 1, 1898, had been followed, we never would have had any +trouble with the Filipinos; nor can there be any doubt that he made +them his allies and used them as such. They were very obedient allies +at that, until they saw the Washington Government was going to +repudiate the “alliance,” and withhold from them what they +had a right to consider the object and meaning of the alliance, if it +meant anything.</p> +<p>The truth is, as Secretary of War Taft said in 1905, before the +National Geographic Society in Washington, “We blundered into +colonization.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1819src" href= +"#xd20e1819" name="xd20e1819src">51</a> As we have seen, Admiral Dewey +repeatedly expressed the opinion, in the summer of 1898, that the +Filipinos were far superior in intelligence to the Cubans and more +capable of self-government. He of course saw quite clearly then, when +he was sending home those commendations of Filipino fitness for +self-government, just as we have all come to realize since, that a +coaling station would be; the main thing we should need in that part of +the world in time of war; that Manila, being quite away from the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb45" href="#pb45" name= +"pb45">45</a>]</span>mainland of Asia, could never supersede Hong Kong +as the gateway to the markets of Asia, since neither shippers nor the +carrying trade of the world will ever see their way to unload cargo at +Manila by way of rehearsal before unloading on the mainland; and that +the taking of the islands was a dubious step from a financial +standpoint, and a still more dubious one from the strategic standpoint +of defending them by land, in the event of war with Japan, Germany, or +any other first-class power. At this late date, when the passions and +controversies of that period have long since subsided, is it not +perfectly clear that after he destroyed the Spanish fleet, Admiral +Dewey not only dealt with the Filipinos, until the army came out, +substantially as Admiral Sampson and General Shatter did with the +Cubans, but also that he did all he properly could to save President +McKinley from the one great blunder of our history, the taking of the +Philippine Islands? <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb46" href="#pb46" +name="pb46">46</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1092" href="#xd20e1092src" name="xd20e1092">1</a></span> Hearings +on Philippine affairs, <i>Senate Document 331</i>, part 3, 57th Cong., +1st Sess., 1901–2, proceedings of June 26–8, 1902.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1100" href="#xd20e1100src" name="xd20e1100">2</a></span> <i>S. D. +331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2927.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1110" href="#xd20e1110src" name="xd20e1110">3</a></span> The +<i>Senate Document</i> has it backwards “left Mirs Bay for Hong +Kong,” clearly an error.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1119" href="#xd20e1119src" name="xd20e1119">4</a></span> <i>S. D. +331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2932.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1162" href="#xd20e1162src" name="xd20e1162">5</a></span> <i>Cong. +Record</i>, April 17, 1900, p. 4287.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1184" href="#xd20e1184src" name="xd20e1184">6</a></span> <i>S. D. +331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2928.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id="n48.2" +href="#n48.2src" name="n48.2">7</a></span> <i>Ib.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1224" href="#xd20e1224src" name="xd20e1224">8</a></span> <i>S. D. +148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 6.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1231" href="#xd20e1231src" name="xd20e1231">9</a></span> <i>S. D. +331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2937.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1236" href="#xd20e1236src" name="xd20e1236">10</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2934.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1241" href="#xd20e1241src" name="xd20e1241">11</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 2967.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1246" href="#xd20e1246src" name="xd20e1246">12</a></span> See pp. +2928 and 2956, <i>S. D. 331</i>, part 3.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1273" href="#xd20e1273src" name="xd20e1273">13</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, pt.3, p. 2965.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1282" href="#xd20e1282src" name="xd20e1282">14</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2939.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1295" href="#xd20e1295src" name="xd20e1295">15</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 2936.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1311" href="#xd20e1311src" name="xd20e1311">16</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 2940.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1331" href="#xd20e1331src" name="xd20e1331">17</a></span> See +letter of H. Irving Hancock, American war correspondent in the field, +dated Manila, May 3, 1899, published <i>New York Criterion</i>, June +17, 1899. This Hancock interview with General MacArthur was quoted in +debate on the floor of the Senate on April 17, 1900 (see <i>Cong. +Rec.</i> of that date), and was corroborated by General MacArthur +himself as substantially correct in that officer’s testimony +before the Senate in 1902, <i>S. D. 331</i>, pt. 2, 57th Congress, 1st +Session, p. 1942, in answer to questions put by Senator Culberson.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1345" href="#xd20e1345src" name="xd20e1345">18</a></span> Rev. +Clay Macaulay, who afterwards made that statement in a letter to the +<i>Boston Transcript</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1359" href="#xd20e1359src" name="xd20e1359">19</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2939.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1369" href="#xd20e1369src" name="xd20e1369">20</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, part 2, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., pp. 7, 8.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1387" href="#xd20e1387src" name="xd20e1387">21</a></span> +<i>Cong. Record</i>, December, 1897.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1395" href="#xd20e1395src" name="xd20e1395">22</a></span> See +<i>Cong. Record</i>, April 11, 1898, pp. 3699 <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1418" href="#xd20e1418src" name="xd20e1418">23</a></span> +<i>Cong. Record</i>, April 13, 1898, pp. 3701 <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1434" href="#xd20e1434src" name="xd20e1434">24</a></span> <i>Navy +Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 103.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1448" href="#xd20e1448src" name="xd20e1448">25</a></span> <i>S. +D. 62</i>, p. 327.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1478" href="#xd20e1478src" name="xd20e1478">26</a></span> <i>Navy +Dept. Report</i>, 1898, App., p. 100. Dispatch May 20, 1898.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1491" href="#xd20e1491src" name="xd20e1491">27</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 13.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1501" href="#xd20e1501src" name="xd20e1501">28</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2930.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1518" href="#xd20e1518src" name="xd20e1518">29</a></span> +<i>Report Schurman Commission</i>, vol. i., p. 172.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1528" href="#xd20e1528src" name="xd20e1528">30</a></span> <i>S. +D. 62</i>, p. 337.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1533" href="#xd20e1533src" name="xd20e1533">31</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, pt. 3, 1902, p. 2951.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1548" href="#xd20e1548src" name="xd20e1548">32</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, p. 2955.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1553" href="#xd20e1553src" name="xd20e1553">33</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 2954.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1577" href="#xd20e1577src" name="xd20e1577">34</a></span> <i>S. +D. 62</i>, pp. 328–9.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1582" href="#xd20e1582src" name="xd20e1582">35</a></span> <i>Navy +Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 103.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1589" href="#xd20e1589src" name="xd20e1589">36</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 102.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1611" href="#xd20e1611src" name="xd20e1611">37</a></span> <i>Navy +Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 102.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1642" href="#xd20e1642src" name="xd20e1642">38</a></span> <i>S. +D. 62</i>, p. 362.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1652" href="#xd20e1652src" name="xd20e1652">39</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, pp. 360–1.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1667" href="#xd20e1667src" name="xd20e1667">40</a></span> <i>Navy +Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 106.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1674" href="#xd20e1674src" name="xd20e1674">41</a></span> <i>S. +D. 62</i>, p. 354.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1688" href="#xd20e1688src" name="xd20e1688">42</a></span> <i>S. +D. 62</i>, p. 329.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1693" href="#xd20e1693src" name="xd20e1693">43</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 432.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1709" href="#xd20e1709src" name="xd20e1709">44</a></span> Alas, +that rare man, Frank Millet, perished in the <i>Titanic</i> disaster of +April, 1912, since the above was written.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1715" href="#xd20e1715src" name="xd20e1715">45</a></span> +<i>Expedition to the Philippines.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1724" href="#xd20e1724src" name="xd20e1724">46</a></span> <i>Navy +Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 111.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id="n69.1" +href="#n69.1src" name="n69.1">47</a></span> See p. 2934, <i>S. D. +331</i>, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1761" href="#xd20e1761src" name="xd20e1761">48</a></span> See p. +2934, <i>S. D. 331</i>, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1779" href="#xd20e1779src" name="xd20e1779">49</a></span> <i>S. +D. 62</i>, p. 383.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1803" href="#xd20e1803src" name="xd20e1803">50</a></span> See +Admiral Dewey’s testimony before the Senate Committee of 1902, +<i>S. D. 331</i>, pp. 2942, 2957.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1819" href="#xd20e1819src" name="xd20e1819">51</a></span> See +<i>National Geographic Magazine</i>, August, 1905.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch3" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter III</h2> +<h2 class="main">Anderson and Aguinaldo</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Well, honor is the subject of my story.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Julius Cæsar</i>, Act. I, Sc. 2.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">The destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on +May 1, 1898, ten days after the outbreak of the war with Spain, having +necessitated sending troops to the Philippines to complete the +reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter, Major-General Wesley +Merritt was on May 16th selected to organize and command such an +expedition.</p> +<p>“The First Expedition,” as it was always distinguished, +by the officers and men of the Eighth Army Corps, there having been +many subsequent expeditions sent out before our war with the Filipinos +was over, was itself subdivided into a number of different expeditions, +troops being hurried to Manila as fast as they could be assembled and +properly equipped in sufficient numbers. The first batch that were +whipped into shape left San Francisco under command of +Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, on May 25th, and arrived off +Manila, June 30th. General Merritt did not arrive until July 25th. It +was General Anderson, therefore, who broke the ice of the American +occupation of the Philippines.</p> +<p>In his annual message to Congress of December, following,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e1847src" href="#xd20e1847" name="xd20e1847src">1</a> +summing up the War with Spain and its <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb47" href="#pb47" name="pb47">47</a>]</span>results, Mr. McKinley +gives a brief account of the First Expedition. After recounting Admiral +Dewey’s victory of May 1st previous, he states that “on the +seventh day of May the Government was advised officially of the victory +at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of the fleet what +troops would be required.” President McKinley does not give the +Admiral’s answer, though he does state that it was received on +the 15th day of May. The Admiral’s answer appears, however, in +the <i>Report of the Navy Department</i> for 1898, Appendix, page 98. +It was: “In my best judgment, a well-equipped force of 5000 +men.” But the President’s message does state that he at +once sent a “total force consisting of 641 officers and 15,058 +enlisted men.”</p> +<p>The difference of view-point of the Admiral and the President is +clear from the language of both. In recommending 5000 troops, the +Admiral had said they would be necessary “to retain possession +[of Manila] and thus control Philippine Islands.” This counted, +of course, on the friendship of the people, as in Cuba. “I had in +view simply taking possession of the city.” said Admiral Dewey to +the Senate Committee in 1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1859src" href= +"#xd20e1859" name="xd20e1859src">2</a></p> +<p>The purpose of the President in sending three times as many troops +as were needed for the purpose Admiral Dewey had in mind is indicated +in his account of what happened. After describing the taking of Manila +by our troops on August 13th, the presidential message says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">By this <i>the conquest of the Philippine Islands</i>, +virtually accomplished when the Spanish capacity for resistance was +destroyed by Admiral Dewey’s victory of May 1st, <i>was formally +sealed</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1876src" href="#xd20e1876" name= +"xd20e1876src">3</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb48" href="#pb48" name= +"pb48">48</a>]</span></p> +<p>Admiral Dewey contemplated that we should merely remain masters of +the situation out where he was until the end of the war. President +McKinley set about to effect “the conquest of the Philippine +Islands.” The naval victory of Manila Bay having made it certain +that at the conclusion of our war against a decadent monarchy we would +at last have an adequate coaling station and naval base in the Far +East, the sending of troops to the Philippines, in appropriate +prosecution of the war, to reduce and capture Manila, the capital and +chief port, raised the question at once “And then +what?”</p> +<p>The genesis of the idea of taking over the archipelago is traceable +to within a few days after the destruction of the Spanish fleet.</p> +<p>Within a few days after the official news of the battle of Manila +Bay reached Washington, the Treasury Department set a man to work +making a “Report on Financial and Industrial Conditions of the +Philippine Islands.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1888src" href= +"#xd20e1888" name="xd20e1888src">4</a> The Interior Department also +awoke, about the same time to possibilities of an El Dorado in the new +overseas conquest. “In May, 1898,” says Secretary of the +Interior, C. N. Bliss, in a letter intended for the Peace Commissioners +who met at Paris that fall, “by arrangement between the Secretary +of War with this Department”—Mr. Bliss’s grammar is +bad, but his meaning is plain—“a geologist of the United +States Geological Survey accompanied the military expedition to the +Philippines for the purpose of procuring information touching the +geological <i>and mineral</i> resources of said +islands.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1896src" href="#xd20e1896" +name="xd20e1896src">5</a> This report, which accompanies the Bliss +letter, reads like a mining stock prospectus. That summer an Assistant +Secretary of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb49" href="#pb49" name= +"pb49">49</a>]</span>Treasury, presumably echoing the sentiments of the +Administration, came out in one of the great magazines of the period, +the <i>Century</i>, with an article in which he said: “We see +with sudden clearness that some of the most revered of our political +maxims have outlived their force. * * * A new mainspring +* * * has become the directing force * * * the +mainspring of commercialism.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1906src" +href="#xd20e1906" name="xd20e1906src">6</a> Of course, the writer did +not mention that Manila is an out-of-the-way place, so far as regards +the main-travelled routes across the Pacific Ocean, and also forgot +that, as has been suggested once before, the carrying trade of the +world, and the shippers on which it depends, in the contest of the +nations for the markets of Asia, would never take to the practice of +unloading at Manila by way of rehearsal, before finally discharging +cargo on the mainland of Asia, where the name of the Ultimate Consumer +is legion. Nevertheless “Expansion”—of Trade, +mainly—was the slogan of the hour, and any one who did not catch +the contagion of exuberant allusion to “Our New +Possessions” was considered crusty and out of date. People who +referred back to the political maxims of Washington’s Farewell +Address, and the cognate set represented by the Monroe Doctrine, were +regarded merely as not knowing a good thing when they saw it. So on +rode the country, on the crest of the wave of war. When President +McKinley sent the troops to the Philippines, their job was to hurry up +and effect what his subsequent message to Congress describing their +work called “the conquest of the Philippine Islands.” That +is, they were to effect a <i>constructive</i> conquest of the +archipelago before Spain should sue for peace. It never seemed to occur +to anybody at home that the Filipinos would object. If the country had, +through some divine interposition, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb50" +href="#pb50" name="pb50">50</a>]</span>gotten it into its head that the +Filipinos were quite a decent lot and really did object very bitterly, +it would have risen in its wrath and smitten down any suggestion of +forcing a government on them against their will. But nobody knew +anything about them. They were a wholly new proposition.</p> +<p>General Anderson was of course furnished with a copy of the +President’s instructions to his chief, General Merritt. They are +quite long, and go into details about a number of administrative +matters that would necessarily come up after the city should surrender, +such as the raising of revenue, the military commander’s duty +under the law of nations with regard to the seizure of transportation +lines by land or sea, the protection of places of worship from +desecration or destruction, and the like. The only portion of them that +is essential to a clear understanding of subsequent events is now +submitted: They are dated Executive Mansion, May 18, 1898, and read in +part<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1920src" href="#xd20e1920" name= +"xd20e1920src">7</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">PRESIDENT McKINLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL +MERRITT</p> +<p>The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, followed by the +taking of the naval station at Cavite, the paroling of the garrisons, +and acquisition of control of the bay, have rendered it necessary, in +the further prosecution of the measures adopted by this Government for +the purpose of bringing about an honorable and durable peace with +Spain, to send an army of occupation to the Philippines for <i>the +twofold purpose</i> of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in +that quarter, and of <i>giving order and security</i> to the islands +while in the possession of the United States.</p> +<p>For the command of this expedition I have designated Major-General +Wesley Merritt, and it now becomes my duty to give instructions as to +the manner in which the movements shall be conducted. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb51" href="#pb51" name="pb51">51</a>]</span></p> +<p>The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy’s +territory is the severance of the former political relations of the +inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under this +changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they perform +their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property +and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the +people of the Philippines should be acquainted with the purpose of the +United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in +this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the +expedition, <i>immediately upon his arrival</i> in the islands, to +publish a proclamation declaring that we come not to make war upon the +people of the Philippines nor upon any party or <i>faction</i> among +them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in +their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active +aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its +efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the +reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free +from severity as possible. Though <i>the powers of the military +occupant are absolute and supreme and operate immediately upon the +political condition of the inhabitants</i>, the municipal laws of the +conquered territory, such as affect private rights of persons and +property and provide for the punishment of crime, are to be considered +as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new +order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the +occupying belligerents; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, +but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the +ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. +This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on +the present occasion. * * * The freedom of the people to +pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it may +be necessary to do so.</p> +<p>While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be +such as has just been defined, it will be his <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb52" href="#pb52" name="pb52">52</a>]</span>duty to +adopt measures of a different kind if, unfortunately, the course of the +people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of +law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the +native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his +own constitution for those that now exist, or to create such +supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the exercise of these +high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and experience +and a high sense of justice.</p> +</div> +<p>While this document declares the purpose of our government to be a +“two fold purpose,” viz., first, to make an appropriate +move in the game of war, and, second, to police the Islands +“while in the possession of the United States,” it is +wholly free from inherent evidence of any intention out of harmony with +the policy as to Cuba. In fact when the city of Santiago de Cuba +surrendered to our forces in July thereafter, and it became necessary +to issue instructions for the guidance of the military commander there, +exactly the same instructions were given him,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1958src" href="#xd20e1958" name="xd20e1958src">8</a> <i lang= +"la">verbatim et literatim</i>. But in respect of the Cuban +instructions there was never any concealment practised or necessary +because the Cubans had been assured by the Teller amendment to the +resolutions declaring war against Spain that we had no ulterior designs +on their country, and that, as soon as peace and public order were +restored, we intended “to leave the government and control of the +island to its people.” The Cuban instructions were therefore +frankly and promptly published in General Orders No. 101 by the War +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb53" href="#pb53" name= +"pb53">53</a>]</span>Department, July 18, 1898, five days after they +were received from the President, and were then translated into Spanish +and spread broadcast over Santiago province without unnecessary delay. +I remember poring over a Spanish copy of General Orders 101, at +Santiago de Cuba, shortly after the fall of that city, which copy was +one of many already posted about that city by direction of General +Wood. The words “the powers of the military occupant are +<i>absolute and supreme and operate immediately upon the political +condition of the inhabitants</i>” never disturbed the Cuban +leaders in the least, because they were read in the light of the +disclaimer contained in the declaration of war. On the other hand, the +proclamation which the military commander in the Philippines was +enjoined by his instructions to publish “immediately upon his +arrival in the islands,” which arrival occurred July 25th, was +not so published until after we had taken Manila, August 13th, and then +it copied only the glittering generalities of the instructions +themselves, such as the part assuring the people that we had not come +to make war on them and that vested rights would be respected, but it +carefully omitted the words about the powers of the military occupant +being absolute and supreme, because when the army arrived it found a +native government that had already issued its declaration of +independence, was making wonderful progress against the common enemy, +and was able to put up a right good fight against us also, in case we +should deny them independence.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1972src" +href="#xd20e1972" name="xd20e1972src">9</a></p> +<p>General Anderson arrived in Manila Bay, June 30, 1898, with about +2500 men, and when General Merritt arrived, July 25th, we had about +10,000 all told, while the Filipinos had half again that many, and +there were <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb54" href="#pb54" name= +"pb54">54</a>]</span>12,000 Spanish soldiers in Manila. General +Anderson had not been long camped on the bayshore, under cover of the +Navy’s guns and in the neighborhood of Aguinaldo’s +headquarters, before he understood the whole situation clearly and +wrote the War Department as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Since reading the President’s instructions to +General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the establishment +of a provisional government on our part will probably bring us in +conflict with insurgents.</p> +</div> +<p>This letter is dated July 18, 1898.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1988src" href="#xd20e1988" name="xd20e1988src">10</a></p> +<p>When General Anderson arrived in the islands on June 30th, the +Washington Government was still wrestling with the angel of its +announced creed about “Forcible Annexation” being +“criminal aggression,” and Mr. McKinley had to get both +that angel’s shoulders on the mat and put him out of business +before he could get his own consent to giving any instructions to his +generals which might sanction their killing people for objecting to +forcible annexation. Hence his early anxiety to avoid a rupture with +the Filipino leaders. The first stage of this wrestling coincides in +point of time with General Anderson’s tenure as the ranking +military officer commanding our forces in the Philippines, which was +from June 30th until the date of General Merritt’s arrival, July +25th. As already made plain, the President’s instructions for the +guidance of the military commander were entirely free from any +land-grabbing suggestion. On the other hand, when General Anderson left +San Francisco for Manila, May 25th, there was already talk in the +United States about retaining the Islands, if they were captured, for +he so informed <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb55" href="#pb55" name= +"pb55">55</a>]</span>Admiral Dewey in the first interview they had +after the transports which brought his command cast anchor near our +squadron in Manila Bay on the last day of June. “I was the first +to tell Admiral Dewey,” says he, in the <i>North American +Review</i> for February, 1900, “that there was any disposition on +the part of the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were +captured. The current opinion was setting that way when the +expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had no +reason to surmise.”</p> +<p>Relegated by the circumstances to his own discretion as to how he +should act until Washington knew its mind, General Anderson’s +attitude in the outset represented a “peace-at-any-price” +policy, suffused with benevolent pride at championing the cause of the +oppressed, but secretly knowing from the beginning that it might become +necessary later to slaughter said “oppressed,” should they +seriously object to a change of masters.</p> +<p>“On July 1st,” says General Anderson, in the <i>North +American Review</i> article above quoted, “I called on Aguinaldo +with Admiral Dewey.” Of the Admiral’s dealings with the +insurgent chief prior to this time, the General says in this same +article:</p> +<p>“Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and +Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino +government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, +probably <span class="corr" id="xd20e2009" title= +"Source: infering">inferring</span> this from their acts rather than +from their statements.” This last quoted passage was read to +Admiral Dewey by a member of the Senate Committee in 1902, along with +other parts of the magazine article cited, and he was asked to comment +on the same. He said:</p> +<p>“These are General Anderson’s statements. They +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb56" href="#pb56" name= +"pb56">56</a>]</span>are very interesting, indeed; I am here to make my +own statements.”</p> +<p>He had stated that he never did specifically promise Aguinaldo +independence, and the questioner was trying to show that his +<i>acts</i> had amounted to assurances and therefore had committed the +Government to giving the Filipinos their independence. Then Senator +Patterson began another question, and had gotten as far as “I +want to know whether your views—” when out came this, as of +a sailor-man clearing decks for action:</p> +<p>“I do not like your questions a bit. I did not like them +yesterday and I do not like them to-day.” So the Admiral’s +feelings were respected and the question was not pressed. There is no +doubt at all that in the Philippines in the summer of 1898 the army +turned the back of its hand to Aguinaldo as soon as it got there and +baldly repudiated what the navy had done in the way of befriending the +Filipinos. But both had acted under the authority of the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy—the President. The +Admiral’s sensitiveness on the subject <i>ought</i> to have been +respected. And it was.</p> +<p>By the time Admiral Dewey and General Anderson decided to call on +“Don Emilio,” the day after the General’s arrival, +the unexpected intimations which the latter brought, as to the +Washington programme for the Philippine revolutionists being different +from that as to Cuba, had begun to get in its work on the former. Not +being a politician, the gallant Admiral was there ready and able to +carry out any orders his government might send him, whenever the +politicians should decide what they wanted to do. But in the absence of +orders, he began to trim his sails a bit, so as to be prepared for +whatever might be the policy. Accordingly, before he <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb57" href="#pb57" name="pb57">57</a>]</span>and the +General started out to pay their call on “Don Emilio Aguinaldo y +Famy, President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines and +General in Chief of its Army”—as he had styled himself in +his proclamation of June 23d,—the Admiral said, “Do not +take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your blouse. Do +not go with any ceremony.” And says he, in telling this, +“We went in that way.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2031src" +href="#xd20e2031" name="xd20e2031src">11</a> The reason of thus +avoiding too much ceremony toward our “ally” claiming to +represent an existing government which had lately declared its +independence, is explained by an expression of the Admiral’s +concerning said Declaration of Independence itself: “That was my +idea, not taking it seriously.” At that same hearing the Admiral +explained with much genuine feeling that from the day of the naval +battle of May 1st until the arrival of the army “these great +questions” were coming up constantly and he simply met them as +they arose by acting on his best judgment on the spot at the time. But +what a terrible mistake it was not to take that Declaration of +Independence of June 23d, seriously, backed as it was by an army of +15,000 men flushed with victory, and under the absolute control of the +author of the Declaration! Of course the Declaration had been published +to the army. Could its author have checked them by repudiating it even +if he had wanted to? As Aguinaldo himself expressed what would happen +in such a contingency, “They would fail to recognize me as <i>the +interpreter of their aspirations</i> and would punish me as a traitor, +replacing me by another more careful of his own honor and +dignity.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2039src" href="#xd20e2039" +name="xd20e2039src">12</a></p> +<p>This Dewey-Anderson call on Aguinaldo was on July 1st. Admiral Dewey +now began to foresee that <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb58" href= +"#pb58" name="pb58">58</a>]</span>the Washington programme was going to +put him in an awkward position. So he began to take Aguinaldo more +seriously. On July 4th, he wired Washington: “Aguinaldo +proclaimed himself President of the Revolutionary Republic on July +1st.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2048src" href="#xd20e2048" name= +"xd20e2048src">13</a> It was on July 7th that Admiral Dewey captured +1300 armed Spanish prisoners, the garrison of Isla la Grande, off +Olongapo, and turned them over to the forces of the Aguinaldo +government because he had no way to keep them.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2053src" href="#xd20e2053" name="xd20e2053src">14</a> Was not +that taking that government a bit seriously? How wholly unauthorized by +the facts was this of “not taking it seriously,” on the +part of “The Liberator of the Filipinos,”<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e2062src" href="#xd20e2062" name="xd20e2062src">15</a> the +immortal victor of Manila Bay, who two months before had taught the +nation the magnitude of its power for good, in a cause as righteous as +the crusades of old, and more sensible!</p> +<p>But to return to General Anderson’s account in the <i>North +American Review</i> of his call, with Admiral Dewey, on the insurgent +chief: “He asked me at once whether the ‘United States of +the North’ either had, or would recognize his government. I am +not quite sure as to the form of the question, whether it was +‘had’ or ‘would’? <i>In either form it was +embarrassing.</i>” General Anderson then tells of +Aguinaldo’s returning his call: “A few days thereafter he +made an official call, coming with cabinet, staff, and band. He asked +if we, the North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the +Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that, but that +in 122 years we had established no colonies. He then made this +remarkable statement: ‘<i>I have studied attentively the +Constitution of the United <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb59" href= +"#pb59" name="pb59">59</a>]</span>States, and I find in it no authority +for colonies, and I have no fear.</i>’” General Anderson +adds: “It may seem that my answer was evasive, but I was at the +time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, fuel, and +forage.”</p> +<p>While this history must not lapse into an almanac, it may not be +amiss to follow these early stages of this matter through a few more +successive dates, because the history of that period was all indelibly +branded into Filipino memory shortly afterward with the red-hot iron of +war.</p> +<p>July 4th, General Anderson writes the Filipino candidate for +Independence inviting him to “co-operate with us in military +operations against the Spanish forces.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2084src" href="#xd20e2084" name="xd20e2084src">16</a> This was +written not to arrange any <i>plan</i> of co-operation but in order to +get room about Cavite as a military base without a row. In his <i>North +American Review</i> article General Anderson says that on that same +day, the Fourth of July, Aguinaldo was invited to witness a parade and +review “in honor of our national holiday.” “He did +not come,” says the article, “because he was not invited as +President but as General Aguinaldo.” An odd situation, was it +not? Here was a man claiming to be President of a newly established +republic based on the principles set forth in our Declaration of +Independence, which republic had just issued a like Declaration, and he +was invited to come and hear <i>our</i> declaration read, and declined +<i>because we would not <span class="corr" id="xd20e2100" title= +"Source: recognise">recognize</span> his right to assert the same +truths</i>. On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines +it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our Declaration +before gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion.</p> +<p>July 6th, General Anderson writes telling Aguinaldo <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb60" href="#pb60" name="pb60">60</a>]</span>that he +is expecting more troops soon and therefore “<i>I would like to +have your excellency’s advice and +co-operation.</i>”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2111src" href= +"#xd20e2111" name="xd20e2111src">17</a></p> +<p>July 9th, General Anderson writes the War Department that Aguinaldo +tells him he has about 15,000 fighting men, 11,000 armed with guns, and +some 4000 prisoners,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2118src" href= +"#xd20e2118" name="xd20e2118src">18</a> and adds: “When we first +landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly but I have +now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more +friendly and seems <i>willing to co-operate</i>.”</p> +<p>July 13th, we find Admiral Dewey also still in a co-operative mood. +On that day he cables the Navy Department of the capture of the 1,300 +prisoners on July 7th, mentioned above, which capture was made, it +appears, because Aguinaldo complained to him that a German war-ship was +interfering with his operations,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2126src" +href="#xd20e2126" name="xd20e2126src">19</a> the prisoners being at +once turned over to Aguinaldo, as stated above.</p> +<p>July 18th, is the date of the letter to the War Department in which +General Anderson states that the establishment of a provisional +government by us will probably mean a conflict with the insurgents. +This was equivalent to saying that they will probably be ready to fight +whenever we assert the “absolute and supreme” authority +that the President’s instructions had directed to be asserted by +the army as soon as it should arrive in the Philippines. Yet in the +fall of 1899, President McKinley said he “never dreamed” +that Aguinaldo’s “little band” would oppose our rule +to the extent of war against it. It would have been more accurate if +the martyred Christian gentleman who used those words had said he +“always hoped” they would not, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb61" href="#pb61" name="pb61">61</a>]</span>instead +of “never dreamed” they would. This letter of July 18th, +informs the Department:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Aguinaldo has declared himself dictator and +self-appointed president. He has declared martial law and promulgated a +minute method of procedure under it.</p> +</div> +<p>July 19th, General Anderson sends Major (now Major-General) J. F. +Bell, to Aguinaldo, and asks of him a number of favors, such as any +soldier may properly ask of an ally, for example, permission to see his +military maps, etc., and that Aguinaldo “place at his +[Bell’s] disposal any <i>information you may have</i> on the +above subjects, and also give him [Bell] a letter or pass addressed to +your subordinates which will <i>authorize them to furnish him any +information they can</i> * * * and to facilitate his passage +along the lines, upon a reconnaissance around Manila, on which I +propose to send him.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2151src" href= +"#xd20e2151" name="xd20e2151src">20</a> All of which Aguinaldo did.</p> +<p>Military training is very keen on honor. Talk about what the French +call <i lang="fr">foi d’officier</i>,—the “word of an +officer”! Did ever a letter from one soldier to another more +completely commit the faith and honor of his government, to recognition +of the existence of an alliance? “In 122 years we have +established no colonies,” he had told Aguinaldo. “It looks +like we are about to go into the colonizing business,” he had, in +effect, said to Admiral Dewey, about the same time.</p> +<p>July 21st, General Anderson writes the Adjutant-General of the army +as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Since I last wrote, Aguinaldo has put in operation an +elaborate system of military government. * * * It may seem +strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as +dictator, his declaration of martial law, etc. I wrote such a protest +but did not publish it at Admiral Dewey’s request.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e2167src" href="#xd20e2167" name= +"xd20e2167src">21</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb62" href="#pb62" name= +"pb62">62</a>]</span></p> +<p>When he wrote this letter, General Anderson was evidently beginning +to have some compunctions about the trouble he now saw ahead. He was a +veteran of the Civil War, whose gallantry had then been proven on many +a field against an enemy compared with whom these people would be a +picnic. But things did not look to the grim old hero like there was +going to be a square deal. So he put this in the letter:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore +underrated the natives. They are <i>not</i> ignorant savage tribes, but +have a civilization of their own, and although insignificant in +appearance are fierce fighters and for a tropical people they are +industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work than a +regiment of volunteers.</p> +</div> +<p>Of course, this slam at “volunteers” <i>was</i> a bit +rough. But the battle-scarred veteran’s sense of fair play was +getting on his nerves. He foresaw the coming conflict, and though he +did not shirk it, he did not relish it. He understood the +“game,” and it seemed to him the cards were stacked, to +meet the necessity of demonstrating that forcible annexation, instead +of being criminal aggression, was merely Trade Expansion, and that his +government was right then irrevocably committing itself, without any +knowledge of, or acquaintance with, the Filipinos, to the assumption +that they were incapable of running a government of their own.</p> +<p>The next day, July 22d, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo a letter +advising him that he was without orders as yet concerning the question +of recognizing his government. But that this letter was neither a +protest nor in the nature of a protest, is evident from its text:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I observe that Your Excellency has announced yourself +dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb63" href="#pb63" name="pb63">63</a>]</span>simply +in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize such an +assumption. <i>I have no orders from my government on the +subject.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e2196src" href="#xd20e2196" +name="xd20e2196src">22</a></p> +</div> +<p>Yet General Anderson’s letter to the Adjutant-General of the +army of July 18th<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2203src" href="#xd20e2203" +name="xd20e2203src">23</a> uses the words “since reading the +President’s instructions to General Merritt,” etc., showing +that he had a copy of them; and those instructions order and direct +(see <i>ante</i>) that as soon as the commanding general of the +American troops arrives he is to let the Filipinos know that “the +powers of the military occupant are <i>absolute and supreme and +immediately operate</i> upon the political condition of the +inhabitants.” A charitable view of the matter would be that, +technically, those were Merritt’s orders, not Anderson’s. +But the whole scheme was to conceal the intention to assume supreme +authority and keep Aguinaldo quiet “until,” as General +Merritt afterwards expressed it in his report, “I should be in +possession of the city of Manila, * * * as I would not until +then be in a position to * * * enforce my authority, in the +event that his [Aguinaldo’s] pretensions should clash with my +designs.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2214src" href="#xd20e2214" +name="xd20e2214src">24</a></p> +<p>The same day that General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo his <i>billet +doux</i> about the dictatorship, viz., July 22d, he cabled Washington a +much franker and more serious message; which read: “Aguinaldo +declares dictatorship and martial law over all islands. <span class= +"sc">The people expect independence.</span>” The very next day, +July 23d, he wrote Aguinaldo asking his assistance in getting five +hundred horses, and fifty oxen and ox-carts, and manifesting +considerable impatience that he had not already complied with a +<span class="corr" id="xd20e2228" title= +"Source: similiar">similar</span> request previously <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb64" href="#pb64" name="pb64">64</a>]</span>made +“<i>as it was to fight in the cause of your +people</i>.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2237src" href= +"#xd20e2237" name="xd20e2237src">25</a> The following day, July 24th, +replying to General Anderson’s letter of the 22d wherein General +Anderson had advised him that he was as yet without orders concerning +the question of recognizing his government, Aguinaldo wrote:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It is true that my government has not been +acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the +great North American nation, which had struggled first for its +independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, <i>and is +now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba</i>, would look +upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e2248src" href="#xd20e2248" name= +"xd20e2248src">26</a></p> +</div> +<p>That cablegram of July 22d, above quoted, in which the commanding +general of our forces in the Philippines advises the Washington +government, “The people expect independence,” is the +hardest thing in the published archives of our government covering that +momentous period for those who love the memory of Mr. McKinley to get +around.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2255src" href="#xd20e2255" name= +"xd20e2255src">27</a> After the war with the Filipinos broke out Mr. +McKinley said repeatedly in public speeches, “I never dreamed +they would turn against us.” You do not find the Anderson +cablegram of July 22d in the published report of the War Department +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb65" href="#pb65" name= +"pb65">65</a>]</span>covering the period under consideration. General +Anderson addressed it to the Secretary of War and signed it, and, +probably for lack of army cable facilities, got Admiral Dewey to send +it to the Secretary of the Navy for transmission to the Secretary of +War.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2266src" href="#xd20e2266" name= +"xd20e2266src">28</a> Certain it must be that at some Cabinet meeting +on or after July 22, 1898, either the Secretary of the Navy or the +Secretary of War read in the hearing of the President and the rest of +his advisers that message from General Anderson, “<span class= +"sc">The people expect independence.</span>” The object here is +<i>not</i> to inveigh against Mr. McKinley. It is to show that, as +Gibbon told us long ago, in speaking of the discontent of far distant +possessions and the lack of hold of the possessor on the affections of +the inhabitants thereof, “the cry of remote distress is ever +faintly heard.” The average American to-day, if told the +Filipinos want independence, will give the statement about the same +consideration Mr. McKinley did then, and if told that the desire among +them for a government <i>of</i> their people <i>by their</i> people +<i>for</i> their people has not been diminished since the late war by +tariff taxation without representation, and the steady development of +race prejudice between the dominant alien race and the subject one, he +will begin to realize by personal experience how faintly the uttered +longings of a whole people may fall on distant ears.</p> +<p>We saw above that in a letter written July 21st, the day before the +telegram about the “people expect independence,” which +letter must have reached Washington within thirty days, General +Anderson not only notified Washington all about Aguinaldo’s +government and its pretensions, but stated that at the request of +Admiral Dewey he had made no protest against it.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2290src" href="#xd20e2290" name="xd20e2290src">29</a> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb66" href="#pb66" name= +"pb66">66</a>]</span>Yet straight on through the period of General +Merritt’s sojourn in the Islands, which began July 25th, and +terminated August 29th, we find no protest ordered by Washington, and +we further find the purpose of the President as announced in the +instructions to Merritt, “The powers of the military occupant are +<i>absolute and supreme</i>” throughout the Islands, not only +<i>not</i> communicated to the Filipino people, but deliberately +suppressed from the proclamation published by General Merritt pursuant +to those instructions.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2303src" href= +"#xd20e2303" name="xd20e2303src">30</a></p> +<p>Comments and conclusions are usually impertinent and unwelcome save +as mere addenda to <i>facts</i>, but in the light of the facts +derivable from our own official records, is it any wonder that General +Anderson, a gallant veteran of the Civil War, and perhaps the most +conspicuous figure of the early fighting in the Philippines, delivered +an address some time after he came back home before the Oregon +Commandery of the Loyal Legion of the United States<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e2314src" href="#xd20e2314" name="xd20e2314src">31</a> on the +subject, “Should republics have colonies?” and answered the +question emphatically “No!” <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb67" href="#pb67" name="pb67">67</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1847" href="#xd20e1847src" name="xd20e1847">1</a></span> +<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1898.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1859" href="#xd20e1859src" name="xd20e1859">2</a></span> See p. +2938, <i>S. D. 331</i> (1902).</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1876" href="#xd20e1876src" name="xd20e1876">3</a></span> +<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1898, p. 5.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1888" href="#xd20e1888src" name="xd20e1888">4</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 169</i>, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. (1898).</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1896" href="#xd20e1896src" name="xd20e1896">5</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1906" href="#xd20e1906src" name="xd20e1906">6</a></span> Hon. +Frank A. Vanderlip, August, 1898 <i>Century Magazine</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1920" href="#xd20e1920src" name="xd20e1920">7</a></span> See p. +85, <i>S. D. 208</i>, 1900.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1958" href="#xd20e1958src" name="xd20e1958">8</a></span> See +General Orders No. 101, series 1898, Adjutant-General’s Office, +Washington, July 18, 1898, a copy of which accompanied the +President’s message to Congress of December, 1898, and may be +seen at p. 783, <i>House Document No. 1</i>, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., +1898–9.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1972" href="#xd20e1972src" name="xd20e1972">9</a></span> For a +copy of this proclamation, see p. 86, <i>S. D. 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st +Sess.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e1988" href="#xd20e1988src" name="xd20e1988">10</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, p. 8.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2031" href="#xd20e2031src" name="xd20e2031">11</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, p. 2976, Hearings before Senate Committee, 1902.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2039" href="#xd20e2039src" name="xd20e2039">12</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 16.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2048" href="#xd20e2048src" name="xd20e2048">13</a></span> +<i>Correspondence, War with Spain,</i> vol. ii., p. 720.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2053" href="#xd20e2053src" name="xd20e2053">14</a></span> For +Admiral Dewey’s cable report of this, see <i>Navy Dept. +Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 110. For particulars, given by him +subsequently, see <i>S. D. 331</i>, 1902, p. 2942.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2062" href="#xd20e2062src" name="xd20e2062">15</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, pt. 3, 1902, p. 2942, and thereabouts.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2084" href="#xd20e2084src" name="xd20e2084">16</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 4.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2111" href="#xd20e2111src" name="xd20e2111">17</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, p. 4.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2118" href="#xd20e2118src" name="xd20e2118">18</a></span> +Anderson only had about 2500 troops then.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2126" href="#xd20e2126src" name="xd20e2126">19</a></span> See +<i>Navy Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 110; <i>S. D. 331</i>, +1902, p. 2942.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2151" href="#xd20e2151src" name="xd20e2151">20</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 1900, p. 8.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2167" href="#xd20e2167src" name="xd20e2167">21</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, pp. 12–13.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2196" href="#xd20e2196src" name="xd20e2196">22</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, 1900, p. 9.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2203" href="#xd20e2203src" name="xd20e2203">23</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 8.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2214" href="#xd20e2214src" name="xd20e2214">24</a></span> See +page 40 of General Merritt’s Report, <i>War Dept. Report</i>, +1898, vol. i., part 2.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2237" href="#xd20e2237src" name="xd20e2237">25</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, 1900, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2248" href="#xd20e2248src" name="xd20e2248">26</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 10.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2255" href="#xd20e2255src" name="xd20e2255">27</a></span> The +writer is certainly one of these, and while calling in question the +wisdom and righteousness of our Philippine policy, he cannot refrain +from avowing just here a feeling of individual obligation to Mr. Root +for his exquisite tribute to the <i>personal</i> equation of Mr. +McKinley, delivered at the National Republican Convention of 1904, +which was, in part, as follows: “How wise and skilful he was. How +modest and self-effacing. How deep his insight into the human heart. +<i>How swift the intuitions of his sympathy. How compelling the charm +of his gracious presence.</i> He was so unselfish, so genuine a lover +of his kind. And he was the kindest and tenderest friend who ever +grasped another’s hand. Alas, that his virtues did plead in vain +against his cruel fate.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2266" href="#xd20e2266src" name="xd20e2266">28</a></span> See +<i>Navy Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 117.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2290" href="#xd20e2290src" name="xd20e2290">29</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, 1900, p. 13.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2303" href="#xd20e2303src" name="xd20e2303">30</a></span> For the +Merritt proclamation, see <i>S. D. 208</i>, p. 86.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2314" href="#xd20e2314src" name="xd20e2314">31</a></span> In +1906.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch4" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter IV</h2> +<h2 class="main">Merritt and Aguinaldo</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">There are no tricks in plain and simple faith.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Julius Cæsar</i>, Act IV., Sc. +2.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Major-General Wesley Merritt’s account of the +operations of the troops under his command in the First Expedition to +the Philippines may be found in volume i., part 2, <i>War Department +Report</i> for 1898. He left San Francisco accompanied by his staff, +June 29, 1898, arrived at Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25th, received the +surrender of the city of Manila August 13th, and sailed thence August +30th, in obedience to orders from Washington to proceed without +unnecessary delay to Paris, France, for conference with the Peace +Commissioners. According to General Merritt’s report, about the +time he arrived Aguinaldo had some 12,000 men under arms, with plenty +of ammunition, and a number of field-pieces. The late lamented Frank D. +Millet has preserved for us, in his <i>Expedition to the +Philippines</i>, some valuable and intimate studies of this army of +Filipino besiegers whom our troops found busily at work when they +arrived in the Islands:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It was an interesting sight at Camp Dewey to see the +insurgents strolling to and from the front. Pretty much all day long +they were coming and going, never in military formation, but singly, +and in small groups, perfectly clean <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb68" href="#pb68" name="pb68">68</a>]</span>and tidy in dress, often +accompanied by their wives and children, and all chatting as merrily as +if they were going off on a pigeon shoot. The men who sold fish and +vegetables in camp in the morning would be seen every day or two +dressed in holiday garments, with rifle and cartridge boxes, strolling +off to take their turn at the Spaniards.</p> +</div> +<p>The reader will readily understand that there were many times as +many volunteers as guns. Mr. Millet continues:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">When they had been at the front twenty-four hours they +were relieved and returned home for a rest. They generally passed their +rifles and equipments on to another man and thus a limited number of +weapons served to arm a great many besiegers. They had no distinctive +uniform, the only badge of service being a red and blue cockade with a +white triangle bearing the Malay symbol of the sun and three stars, and +sometimes a red and blue band pinned diagonally across the lower part +of the left sleeve. * * * Many of them * * * had +belonged to the native volunteer force. * * * The recruits +were soon hammered into shape by the veterans of the rank and file. +* * * Their men were perfectly obedient to orders +* * * and they made the most devoted soldiers. There was no +visible Commissary or Quartermaster’s Departments, but the +insurgent force was always supplied with food and ammunition and there +was no lack of transportation. The food issued at the front was mostly +rice <i>brought up in carromatas to within a few hundred yards of the +trenches, when it was cooked by the women</i>. * * * Each man +had a double handful of rice, sometimes enriched by a small proportion +of meat and fish, which was served him in a square of plantain leaf. +Thus he was unencumbered with a plate or knife or fork and threw away +his primitive but excellent dish when he had “licked the platter +clean.” It was noticeable that the insurgents carried no water +bottles nor haversacks, and no <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb69" +href="#pb69" name="pb69">69</a>]</span>equipments indeed, but cartridge +boxes. They did not seem to be worried by thirst like our men.</p> +</div> +<p>“Although insignificant in appearance, they are fierce +fighters,” wrote General Anderson to the Adjutant-General of the +army in July.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2358src" href="#xd20e2358" +name="xd20e2358src">1</a></p> +<p>General Merritt states in his report that Aguinaldo had +“proclaimed an independent government, republican in form, with +himself as President, and at the time of my arrival in the Islands the +entire edifice of executive and legislative departments had been +accomplished, at least <i>on paper</i>.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2368src" href="#xd20e2368" name="xd20e2368src">2</a> Of course at +that time we were still officially declining to take Filipino +aspirations for independence seriously, and preferred to treat +Aguinaldo’s government as purely a matter of stationery. As a +matter of fact, an exhaustive examination of the official documents of +that period, made with a view of ascertaining just how much of that +Aguinaldo government of 1898 was stationery fiction and how much was +stable fact, has absolutely surprised one man who was out there from +1899 to 1905 (the writer), and I have no doubt will be interesting, as +mere matter of political necrology, to any American who was there +“in the days of the empire” as the +“ninety-niners” called it.</p> +<p>Early in the spring of 1899, Mr. McKinley sent out the Commission of +which President Schurman of Cornell University was Chairman, to try to +stop the war. They bent themselves to the task in a spirit as kindly as +that in which we know Mr. McKinley himself would have acted. They +failed because the war was already on and the Filipinos were bent on +fighting for independence to the bitter end. But they learned a good +deal about the facts of the earlier situation. Speaking of these in +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb70" href="#pb70" name= +"pb70">70</a>]</span>their report to the President<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e2377src" href="#xd20e2377" name="xd20e2377src">3</a> with +especial reference to the period beginning with Aguinaldo’s +landing at Cavite in May, after describing how the Filipino successes +in battle with the Spaniards finally resulted in all of them being +driven into Manila, where they remained hemmed in, they say:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">While the Spanish troops now remained quietly in +Manila, the Filipino forces made themselves <i>masters of the entire +island except that city</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>“For three and one half months,” says General Otis in +describing the facts of this same situation a year later, “the +insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled [meaning while +Admiral Dewey had been blockading the place by water] * * * +and food supplies were exhausted.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2391src" href="#xd20e2391" name="xd20e2391src">4</a> “We +had Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island was held <i>not</i> by +the Spanish but by the Filipinos,” said General Anderson, in the +<i>North American Review</i> for February, 1900. “It is a fact +that they were in possession, they had gotten pretty much the whole +thing except Manila,” said Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee +in 1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2402src" href="#xd20e2402" name= +"xd20e2402src">5</a></p> +<p>General Merritt took Manila August 13th, and sailed away for Paris +August 31st, and only a week after that General Otis wired Washington +(under date of September 7th) from Manila: “Insurgents have +captured all Spanish garrisons in island [of Luzon] and control affairs +outside of Cavite and this city.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2409src" href="#xd20e2409" name="xd20e2409src">6</a></p> +<p>The recruiting by Aguinaldo of an army of 40,000 men with guns +within one hundred days after his little “Return from +Elba”—“15,000 fighting men, 11,000 <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb71" href="#pb71" name="pb71">71</a>]</span>of them +armed with guns,” in fifty days,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2418src" href="#xd20e2418" name="xd20e2418src">7</a> which number +had swelled to nearly 40,000 men with guns in another fifty days (by +August 29th)<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2424src" href="#xd20e2424" +name="xd20e2424src">8</a>—is no more remarkable than his progress +in organizing his government and making its grip on the whole island of +Luzon effective in a short space of time.</p> +<p>As all Americans who know the Filipinos know how fond they are of +what government offices call “paper work,” and how their +<i lang="es">escribientes</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e2435src" href= +"#xd20e2435" name="xd20e2435src">9</a> can work like bees in drafting +documents, it might be easy to ignore Aguinaldo’s various +proclamations, already hereinbefore noticed in Chapter II., as +representing merely “a government on paper,” were there no +other proof. But among the insurgent captured papers we found long +afterward, there is a document containing the minutes of a convention +of the <i lang="es">insurrecto</i> presidentes from all the pueblos of +fifteen different provinces, on August 6, 1898, which throws a flood of +light on the subject now under consideration.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2441src" href="#xd20e2441" name="xd20e2441src">10</a> This +convention was held at Bacoor, then Aguinaldo’s headquarters, a +little town on the bay shore between Manila and Cavite. The minutes of +the convention recite that its members had been previously chosen as +presidentes of their respective pueblos in the manner prescribed by +previous decrees issued by Aguinaldo (already noticed), and that +thereafter they had taken the oath of office before Aguinaldo as +President of the government, etc. They then declare that the Filipino +people whom they speak for are “not ambitious for power, nor +honors, nor riches, aside from the rational aspirations for a free and +independent life,” and “proclaim solemnly, in the face of +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb72" href="#pb72" name= +"pb72">72</a>]</span>the whole world, the Independence of the +Philippines.” They also re-affirm allegiance to Aguinaldo as +President of the government and request him to seek recognition of it +at the hands of the Powers, “because,” says the paper, +“to no one is it permitted to * * * stifle the +legitimate aspirations of a people”—as if Europe cared a +rap what <i>we</i> did to them except in the way of regret that +<i>it</i> did not have a finger in the pie. However, they were not only +apprehensive, on the one hand, lest we might be tempted to take their +country away from Spain for ourselves, but also, on the other hand, +lest we might in the wind-up decide to leave them to Spain at the end +of the war. That this last was not an idle fear is shown by the fact +that during the deliberations of the Paris Peace Commission, Judge Gray +urged, in behalf of his contention against taking the islands at all, +that if Dewey had sunk the Spanish fleet off Cadiz, instead of in +Manila Bay, and the Carlists had incidentally helped us about that +time, we would have been under no resulting obligation “to stay +by them at the conclusion of the war.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2456src" href="#xd20e2456" name="xd20e2456src">11</a> When the +presidentes in convention assembled as aforesaid got through with their +<span class="sc">whereases</span> and <span class= +"sc">resolutions</span> they presented them to His Excellency the +President of the Republic, Aguinaldo, who then issued a proclamation +which recited, among other things: “In these provinces [the +fifteen represented in the convention] complete order and perfect +tranquillity reign, administered by the authorities +elected”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2467src" href="#xd20e2467" +name="xd20e2467src">12</a> according to his previous decrees as +Dictator, which decrees have already been placed before the reader. The +proclamation claims that the new government has 9,000 prisoners of war +and 30,000 combatants. The former claim no one <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb73" href="#pb73" name="pb73">73</a>]</span>having +any acquaintance with those times and conditions will question for a +moment. As to the 30,000 combatants, if he had 11,000 men armed with +guns on July 9th and 40,000 on August 29th, why not 30,000 on August +6th? Of course, men without guns, bolo men, do not count for much in a +serious connection like this now being considered. In November, 1899, +at San José, in Nueva Ecija province, I heard General Lawton +tell Colonel Jack Hayes to disarm and turn loose 175 bolo men the +colonel had just captured and was lining up on the public square as we +rode into the town. But we are considering how much of a government the +Filipinos had in 1898, because the answer is pertinent to what sort of +a government they could run if permitted <i>now</i> or at any time in +the future; and, physical force being the ultimate basis of stability +in all government, when we come to estimate how much of an army they +had when their government was claiming recognition as a legitimate +living thing, we must remember that “It was just a question of +arming them. They could have had the whole population.”<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e2478src" href="#xd20e2478" name= +"xd20e2478src">13</a></p> +<p>Now the great significant fact about this Bacoor convention of +presidentes of August 6th—a week before Manila surrendered to our +forces—is that in it more than half the population of the island +of Luzon was represented. The total population of the Philippines is +about 7,600,000,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2486src" href="#xd20e2486" +name="xd20e2486src">14</a> and, of these, one-half, or +3,800,000<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2492src" href="#xd20e2492" name= +"xd20e2492src">15</a> live on Luzon. The other islands may be said to +dangle from Luzon like the tail of a kite. Taking the tables of the +American census of the Philippines of 1903 (vol. ii., p. 123), as a +basis on which to judge what Aguinaldo’s claims of August 6th +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb74" href="#pb74" name= +"pb74">74</a>]</span>amounted to if true, the population of the +provinces thus duly incorporated into the new government and in working +order on that date, was, in round numbers, about as follows: South of +Manila:—Cavite, 135,000; Batangas, 260,000; Laguna, 150,000; +Tayabas, 150,000; North of Manila:—Bulacan, 225,000; Pampamga, +225,000; Nueva Ecija, 135,000; Tarlac, 135,000; Pangasinan, 400,000; +Union, 140,000; Bataan, 45,000; Zambales, 105,000. This represents a +total of more than 2,000,000 of people.</p> +<p>But Aguinaldo’s claims of August 6th are not the only evidence +as to the political status of the provinces of Luzon in August, 1898. +Toward the end of that month, Maj. J. F. Bell, Chief of General +Merritt’s Bureau of Military Information, made a report on the +situation as it stood August 29th, the report being made after most +careful investigation, and intended as a summary of the then situation +according to the most reliable information obtainable, in order that +General Merritt might know, as far as practicable, what he would be +“up against” in the event of trouble with the +insurgents.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2502src" href="#xd20e2502" name= +"xd20e2502src">16</a></p> +<p>This report not only corroborates Aguinaldo’s claims of August +6th, but it also concedes to the Aguinaldo people eight other important +provinces—four south of the Pasig River with a total population +of about 630,000,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2510src" href="#xd20e2510" +name="xd20e2510src">17</a> the only four of southern Luzon not included +in Aguinaldo’s claim of August 6th, thus conceding him +practically all of Luzon south of the Pasig; and it furthermore +concedes him four great provinces of northern Luzon with a total +population of nearly 600,000.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2513src" href= +"#xd20e2513" name="xd20e2513src">18</a> General Bell states that these +last <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb75" href="#pb75" name= +"pb75">75</a>]</span>are “still in the possession of the +Spanish,” but practically certain to be with the insurgents in +the very near future. “Insurgents have been dispatched to attack +the Spanish in these provinces,” says the Bell report.</p> +<p>In this same report Major Bell said: “There is not a particle +of doubt but what Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any attempt +<i>of any government</i> to reorganize a colonial government +here.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2523src" href="#xd20e2523" +name="xd20e2523src">19</a> When the insurgent government was finally +dislodged from its last capital and Aguinaldo became a fugitive hotly +pursued by our troops, he started for the mountains of northern Luzon, +passing through provinces he had never visited before. The diary of one +of his staff officers, Major Villa, in describing a brief stop they +made in a town <i>en route</i> (Aringay, in Union province) says: +“After the honorable President had urged them [the townspeople] +to be patriotic, we continued the march.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2531src" href="#xd20e2531" name="xd20e2531src">20</a> They +certainly did “continue the march.” The Maccabebe scouts, +of which the writer commanded a company at the time, took the town a +few hours later, Aguinaldo’s rear-guard retiring after a brief +resistance, following which we found, among the dead in the trenches, a +major other than Villa. Certainly, to read this little extract from the +diary of Aguinaldo’s retreat is to feel the pulse of northern +Luzon as to its loyalty to the revolution at that time, and is +corroborative of these claims of Aguinaldo made in August, 1898, +supplemented, as we have seen them, by General Bell’s +appraisal.</p> +<p>As to the political conditions which prevailed in southern Luzon, +particularly in the Camarines, in August and the fall of 1898, +information derived from one who was there then would seem appropriate +here. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb76" href="#pb76" name= +"pb76">76</a>]</span>Major Blanton Winship, Judge Advocate’s +Corps, U. S. A., Major Archibald W. Butt, the late lamented military +aide to President Taft, and the writer, lived together in Manila, in +1900, at the house of a Spanish physician, a Dr. Lopez, who had been a +“prisoner” at Nueva Caceres, a town situated in one of the +provinces of southern Luzon (Camarines) in the fall of 1898. Dr. Lopez +had a large family. They had also been “prisoners” down +there. No evil befell them at the hands of their “captors.” +They had the freedom of the town they were in. They had good reason to +be pretty well scared as to what the insurgents might do to them. But +they were never maltreated. The main impression we got from Dr. Lopez +and his family was that the political grip of the Aguinaldo government +on southern Luzon was complete during the time they were +“prisoners” there. If anybody doubts the absoluteness of +the grip of the Revolutionary government on the situation in the +provinces which were represented at the Bacoor convention of August 6, +1898, above mentioned, when the Filipino Declaration of Independence +was signed and proclaimed, let him ask any American who had a part in +putting down the Philippine insurrection what a presidente, an +<i>insurrecto</i> presidente, in a Filipino town, was in 1899 and 1900. +He was “the whole thing.” Even to-day the presidente of a +pueblo is as absolute boss of his town as Charles F. Murphy is of +Tammany Hall. And a <i>town</i> or <i>pueblo</i> in the Philippines is +more than an area covered by more or less contiguous buildings and +grounds. It is more like a township in Massachusetts. So that when you +account governmentally for the pueblos of a given province, you account +for every square foot of that province and for every man in it. For +several years before our war with Spain, nearly every Filipino of any +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb77" href="#pb77" name= +"pb77">77</a>]</span>education and spirit in the archipelago belonged +to the secret revolutionary society known as the Katipunan. This had +its organization in every town when Dewey sank the Spanish fleet and +landed Aguinaldo at Cavite. The rest may be imagined.</p> +<p>By September, 1898, Aguinaldo was absolute master of the whole of +Luzon. Before the Treaty of Paris was signed (December 10, 1898), in +fact while Judge Gray of the Peace Commission was cabling President +McKinley that not to leave the government of the Philippines to the +people thereof “would be to make a mockery of +instructions,” Aguinaldo had become equally absolute master of +the situation throughout the rest of the archipelago outside of +Manila.</p> +<p>Toward the end of July, 1898, our Manila Consul, Mr. Williams, who +was one of our consular triumvirate of would-be Warwicks, or +“original Aguinaldo men,” of 1898, used to have nice talks +with Aguinaldo about the lion and the lamb lying down together without +the lion eating the lamb, and in one instance, at least, he goes so far +as to represent Aguinaldo as willing to some such +arrangement—<i>e. g.</i>, annexation, or some vague scheme of +dependence. But whenever we hear from Aguinaldo over his own signature, +we hear him saying whatever means in Tagalo “Timeo Danaos et dona +ferentes.” For instance, at page 15, of <i>Senate Document +208</i>, he writes Williams, under date of August 1st, with fine +courtesy:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I congratulate you with all sincerity on the acuteness +and ingenuity which you have displayed in painting in an admirable +manner the benefits which, <i>especially for me and my leaders</i>, and +in general for all my compatriots, would be secured by the union of +these islands with the United States of America. Ah! that picture, so +happy and so finished * * * This is not saying that I am not +of your opinion <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb78" href="#pb78" name= +"pb78">78</a>]</span>* * * You say all this and yet more will +result from annexing ourselves to your people * * * You are +my friend and the friend of the Filipinos and have said it. But why +should we say it? Will my people believe it? * * * I have +done what they desire, establishing a government * * * not +only because it was my duty, but also because had I acted in any other +manner they would fail to recognize me as <i>the interpreter of their +aspirations</i>, and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me by +another <i>more careful of his own honor and dignity</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>Now that we know what was in the Filipino mind when General Merritt +arrived in the Philippines, let us see what was in the American +military mind out there at the same time. Says General Merritt: +“General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his +services as a subordinate leader.” We trust the reason of this at +once suggests itself from what has preceded, including General +Anderson’s dealings with the insurgent chief. The latter wanted +some understanding as to what <i>the intentions of our government +were</i>, and what was to be the programme afterward, should he and his +countrymen assist in the little fighting that now remained necessary to +complete the taking of Manila. <i>Those intentions were precisely what +Merritt was determined to conceal.</i> “As my instructions from +the President fully contemplated the occupation of <i>the Islands</i> +by the American land forces, and stated that ‘the powers of the +military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon +the political condition of the inhabitants,’ I did not consider +it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader +until I should be in possession of the city of Manila.”<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e2588src" href="#xd20e2588" name= +"xd20e2588src">21</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb79" href="#pb79" +name="pb79">79</a>]</span></p> +<p>On one occasion General Merritt passed through the village of Bacoor +where Aguinaldo had his headquarters, but, says Mr. Millet<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e2597src" href="#xd20e2597" name= +"xd20e2597src">22</a> in mentioning this, “They never met.” +After the taking of the city, General Merritt remembered that with some +13,000 Spanish prisoners to guard, and a city of 300,000 people, all +but a sprinkling of whom were in sympathy with the insurgent cause, on +his hands, and an army of at least 14,000 insurgents—probably far +more than that—clamoring without the gates of that city, and only +10,000 men of his own with whom to handle such a situation, frankness +was out of the question, in view of his orders from the +President.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2602src" href="#xd20e2602" name= +"xd20e2602src">23</a> Therefore, on the day after the city surrendered, +General Merritt issued a proclamation, copying<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2608src" href="#xd20e2608" name="xd20e2608src">24</a> +<i>verbatim</i> from Mr. McKinley’s instructions (<i>ante</i>) +such innocuous milk-and-water passages as the one which assured the +people that our government “has not come to wage war upon them +* * * but to protect them in their homes, in their +employments, and in their personal and religious rights; all persons +who, by active aid or honest submission, co-operate with the United +States * * * will receive the reward of its support and +protection.” But he carefully omitted the words quoted above +about the powers of the military occupant being absolute and supreme, +“lest his [Aguinaldo’s] pretensions,” to use General +Merritt’s expression, “should clash with my designs.” +“For these reasons,” says General Merritt (p. 40), +“the preparations for the attack on the city were * * * +conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent +forces.”</p> +<p>Here General Merritt is speaking frankly but not <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb80" href="#pb80" name= +"pb80">80</a>]</span>accurately. He means he made his preparations +without any more reference to the situation of the insurgent forces +than he could help. As a matter of fact, their situation bothered him a +good deal. They were in the way. For instance, there was a whole +brigade of them at one point between our people and Manila. +“This,” says General Merritt (p. 41), “was overcome +by instructions to General Greene to <i>arrange if possible</i> with +the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to +the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control of the +roads in their immediate front. No objection was made,” etc. That +reads very well—that about “arrange if possible,” +“no objection was made,” etc.,—does it not? Nothing +there through which “the lustre and the moral strength” of +the motives that prompted the Spanish war might be “dimmed by +ulterior designs which might tempt us,”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2626src" href="#xd20e2626" name="xd20e2626src">25</a> is there? +It was stated above that General Merritt was speaking frankly in this +report. He was. He probably did not know how General Greene carried out +the order to “arrange if possible with the insurgent +brigadier-commander.” But it so happened that there was a +newspaper correspondent along with General Greene who has since told +us. This gentleman was Mr. Frank D. Millet, from whom we have already +above quoted, the correspondent of the <i>London Times</i> and of +<i>Harper’s Weekly</i>. General Greene had known him years before +in the campaigns of the Turco-Russian war. Mr. Millet had been a war +correspondent in those campaigns also, and General Greene was there +taking observations. So that in the operations against Manila, Mr. +Millet, being an old friend of General Greene’s, known to be a +handy man to have around in a close place, was acting <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb81" href="#pb81" name="pb81">81</a>]</span>as a +civilian volunteer aide to the general.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2641src" href="#xd20e2641" name="xd20e2641src">26</a> Here is Mr. +Millet’s account of what happened, taken from his book, <i>The +Expedition to the Philippines</i>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">On the afternoon of the 28th [of July, 1898], General +Greene received a verbal message from General Merritt suggesting that +he <i>juggle the insurgents out of part of their lines</i>, always on +his own responsibility, and without committing in any way the +commanding general to any recognition of the native leaders or opening +up the prospect of an alliance. This General Greene accomplished very +cleverly.</p> +</div> +<p>Mr. Millet then goes on to tell how General Greene persuaded one of +Aguinaldo’s generals (Noriel) to evacuate certain trenches so he +(Greene) could occupy them, “with a condition attached that +General Greene must give a written receipt for the +entrenchments.” This condition, Mr. Millet says, was imposed by +“the astute leader” (Aguinaldo). General Greene’s +“cleverness” consisted in purposely failing and omitting to +give the receipt, which Mr. Millet says “looked very much like a +bargain concluded over a signature, and was a little more formal than +General Greene thought advisable.” The key to this sorry business +may be found in the first paragraph of General Merritt’s +instructions to all his generals at the time:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">No rupture with insurgents. This is imperative. <i>Can +ask</i> insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for <i>permission</i> to occupy +trenches, but if refused not to use force.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2669src" href="#xd20e2669" name="xd20e2669src">27</a></p> +</div> +<p>“I am quite unable to explain,” says Mr. Millet (p. 61), +“why we did not in the very beginning make them understand that +we were masters of the situation, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb82" +href="#pb82" name="pb82">82</a>]</span>and that they must come strictly +under our authority.” The obvious reason was that a war of +conquest to subjugate a remote people struggling to be free from the +yoke of alien domination was sure to be more or less unpopular with +many of the sovereign voters of a republic, and more or less dangerous +therefore, like all unpopular wars, to the tenure of office of the +party in power. So that in entering upon a war for conquest, a republic +<i>must</i> “play politics,” using the military arm of the +government for the twofold purpose of crushing opposition and proving +that there is none.</p> +<p>The maxim which makes all fair in war often covers a multitude of +sins. But let us turn for a moment from strategy to principle, and see +what two other distinguished American war correspondents were thinking +and saying about the same time. Writing to <i>Harper’s Weekly</i> +from Cavite, under date of July 16th, concerning the work of the +Filipinos during the eight weeks before that, Mr. O. K. Davis said: +“The insurgents have driven them [the Spaniards] back over twenty +miles of country practically impassable for our men. * * * +Aguinaldo has saved our troops a lot of desperately hard campaigning +* * *. The insurgent works extend clear around Manila, and +the Spaniards are completely hemmed in. There is no hope for them but +surrender.” Writing to the same paper under date of August 6th, +Mr. John F. Bass says: “We forget that they drove the Spaniards +from Cavite to their present intrenched position, thus saving us a +long-continued fight through the jungle.” This gentleman did not +tackle the question of inventing a new definition of liberty consistent +with alien domination. He simply says: “Give them their liberty +and guarantee it to them.” In the face of such plucky patriotism +as he had witnessed, political casuistry about <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb83" href="#pb83" name= +"pb83">83</a>]</span>“capacity for self-government” would +have hung its head. Yet Mr. Bass was by no means a novice. He had +served with the British army in Egypt in 1895, through the Armenian +massacres of 1896, and in the Cretan rebellion and Greek War of 1897. +His sentiments were simply precisely what those of the average American +not under military orders would have been at the time. After the fall +of Manila he wrote (August 17th): “I am inclined to think that +the insurgents intend to fight <i>us</i> if we stay and <i>Spain</i> if +we go.”</p> +<p>There were 8500 American troops in the taking of the city of Manila, +on August 13, 1898. The Filipinos were ignored by them, although they +afterwards claimed to have helped. As a matter of fact, the Spanish +officers in command were very anxious to surrender and get back to +Spain. The Filipinos had already made them “long for +peace,” to use a famous expression of General J. F. Bell. The +garrison only put up a very slight resistance, “to save their +face,” as the Chinese say, <i>i. e.</i>, to save themselves from +being court-martialed under some quixotic article of the Spanish army +regulations. The assault was begun about 9.30 <span class= +"sc">A.M.</span>, and early that afternoon the Spanish flag had been +lowered from the flag-staff in the main square and the Stars and +Stripes run up in its stead, amid the convulsive sobs of dark-eyed +señoritas and the muttered curses of melodramatic Spanish +cavaliers. Thanks to the Filipinos’ three and one half +months’ work, the performance only cost us five men killed out of +the 8500. The list of wounded totalled 43. Our antecedent loss in the +trenches prior to the day of the assault had been fourteen killed and +sixty wounded. So the job was completed, so far as the records show, at +a cost of less than a score of American lives.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2702src" href="#xd20e2702" name="xd20e2702src">28</a> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb84" href="#pb84" name= +"pb84">84</a>]</span></p> +<p>As Aguinaldo’s troops surged forward in the wake of the +American advance they were stopped by orders from the American +commander, and prevented from following the retreating Spaniards into +Manila. They were not even allowed what is known to the modern small +boy as “a look-in.” They were not permitted to come into +the city to <i>see</i> the surrender. President McKinley’s +message to Congress of December, 1898, describes “the last scene +of the war” as having been “enacted at Manila its starting +place.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2714src" href="#xd20e2714" +name="xd20e2714src">29</a> It says: “On August 13th, after a +brief assault upon the works by the land forces, in which the squadron +assisted, the capital surrendered unconditionally.” In this +connection, by way of explaining Aguinaldo’s treatment at the +hands of our generals from the beginning, the message says, +“Divided victory was not permissible.” “It was +fitting that whatever was to be done * * * should be +accomplished by the strong arm of the United States alone.” But +what takes much of the virtue out of the “strong arm” +proposition is that Generals Merritt and Anderson were carrying out +President McKinley’s orders all the time they were juggling +Aguinaldo out of his positions before Manila, and giving him evasive +answers, until the city could be taken by the said “strong +arm” <i>alone</i>. For, as the message puts it, in speaking of +the taking of the city, “By this the conquest of the Philippine +Islands * * * was formally sealed.”</p> +<p>When General Merritt left Manila on August 30th, he proceeded to +Paris to appear before the Peace Commission there. His views doubtless +had great weight with them on the momentous questions they had to +decide. But his views were wholly erroneous, and that they were so is +not surprising. As above stated, he did <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb85" href="#pb85" name="pb85">85</a>]</span>not even meet Aguinaldo, +purposely holding himself aloof from him and his leaders. He never did +know how deeply they were incensed at being shut out of Manila when the +city surrendered. In his report prepared aboard the steamship +<i>China</i>, en route for Paris, he says: “Doubtless much +dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents, but +* * * I am of the opinion that the leaders will be <i>able to +prevent</i> serious disturbances,” etc. (p. 40). If General +Merritt had caught the temper of the trenches he would have known +better, but he saw nothing of the fighting prior to the final scene, +nor did he take the field in person on the day of the combined assault +on the city, August 13th, and therefore missed the supreme opportunity +to understand how the Filipinos felt. Says General Anderson in his +report:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I understood from the general commanding that he would +be personally present on the day of battle. * * * On the +morning of the 13th, General Babcock came to my headquarters and +informed me that the major-general commanding would remain on a +despatch boat.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2735src" href="#xd20e2735" +name="xd20e2735src">30</a></p> +</div> +<p>Indeed, so reduced was Manila, by reason of the long siege conducted +by the insurgents, that the assault of August 13th, not only was, but +was expected to be, little more than a sham battle. Says +Lieutenant-Colonel Pope, chief quartermaster, “On the evening of +August 12th an order was sent me to report with two battalions of the +Second Oregon Volunteers, under Colonel Summers the next day on the +<i>Kwong Hoi</i> to the commanding general on the <i>Newport</i>, as an +escort on his entrance into Manila. At the hour named, I reported +etc.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2748src" href="#xd20e2748" name= +"xd20e2748src">31</a> As soon as Spanish “honor” was +satisfied, up <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb86" href="#pb86" name= +"pb86">86</a>]</span>went the white flag and General Merritt was duly +escorted ashore and into the city, where he received the surrender of +the Spanish general.</p> +<p>In the Civil War, General Merritt had received six successive +promotions for gallantry, at Gettysburg, Yellow Tavern, Five Forks, +etc., and had been with Sheridan at Winchester. So the way he +“commanded” the assault on Manila is proof only of the +obligations we then owed the Filipinos. They had left very little to be +done.</p> +<p>In his account of General Merritt’s original personal +disembarkation at Cavite, Mr. Frank Millet acquaints his readers with a +Philippine custom we afterwards grew quite familiar with and found +quite useful, of keeping your shoes dry in landing from a rowboat on a +beach by riding astride the shoulders of some husky native boatman. The +boatmen make it a point of special pride not to let their passengers +get their feet wet. Mr. Millet tells us that a general in uniform looks +neither dignified nor picturesque under such circumstances, and that +therefore he will not elaborate on the picture, but that it is +suggestive “more of the hilarious than of the heroic.” +Presumably when General Merritt went ashore on August 13th, from the +despatch boat from which he had been watching the assault on Manila, to +receive the surrender of the Spanish general, he followed the same +custom of the country he had used on the occasion of his original +disembarkation. So that in the taking of Manila, we were probably +literally, as well as ethically, like General Mahone of Virginia as he +is pictured in a familiar <i>post-bellum</i> negro story, according to +which the general met a negro on a steep part of the road to heaven, +told him that St. Peter would only admit mounted parties, mounted the +negro with the latter’s consent, rode on his <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb87" href="#pb87" name="pb87">87</a>]</span>back the +rest of the toilsome journey to the heavenly gate, dismounted, knocked, +and was cordially welcomed by the saint at the sacred portal thus: +“Why how d’ ye do, General Mahone; jess tie yoh hoss and +come in.” <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb88" href="#pb88" name= +"pb88">88</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2358" href="#xd20e2358src" name="xd20e2358">1</a></span> <i>S. D. +208</i>, 1900, p. 13.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2368" href="#xd20e2368src" name="xd20e2368">2</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 40.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2377" href="#xd20e2377src" name="xd20e2377">3</a></span> +<i>Report First Philippine Commission</i>, vol. i., p. 172.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2391" href="#xd20e2391src" name="xd20e2391">4</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4. Otis report, p. 13.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2402" href="#xd20e2402src" name="xd20e2402">5</a></span> <i>S. D. +331</i>, 1902, p. 2941.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2409" href="#xd20e2409src" name="xd20e2409">6</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +788.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2418" href="#xd20e2418src" name="xd20e2418">7</a></span> May +19th–July 9th; see General Anderson’s report to the +Adjutant-General of the army of July 9, 1898, <i>S. D. 208</i>, p. +6.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2424" href="#xd20e2424src" name="xd20e2424">8</a></span> See +Major J. F. Bell’s report to Merritt of August 29, 1898, <i>S. D. +62</i>, p. 379.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2435" href="#xd20e2435src" name="xd20e2435">9</a></span> +Clerks.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2441" href="#xd20e2441src" name="xd20e2441">10</a></span> See +<i>S. D. 208</i>, pp. 101–2.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2456" href="#xd20e2456src" name="xd20e2456">11</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 34.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2467" href="#xd20e2467src" name="xd20e2467">12</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, p. 99.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2478" href="#xd20e2478src" name="xd20e2478">13</a></span> Admiral +Dewey to Senate Committee, 1902, <i>S. D. 331</i>, 1902, p. 2940.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2486" href="#xd20e2486src" name="xd20e2486">14</a></span> +7,635,426. See <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. ii., p. 15.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2492" href="#xd20e2492src" name="xd20e2492">15</a></span> +3,798,507. See <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. ii., p. 125.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2502" href="#xd20e2502src" name="xd20e2502">16</a></span> See +<i>Senate Document 62</i>, 1898, p. 379.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2510" href="#xd20e2510src" name="xd20e2510">17</a></span> Albay, +Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, and Sorsogon.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2513" href="#xd20e2513src" name="xd20e2513">18</a></span> Ilocos +Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Cagayan.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2523" href="#xd20e2523src" name="xd20e2523">19</a></span> <i>S. +D. 62</i>, p. 380.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2531" href="#xd20e2531src" name="xd20e2531">20</a></span> Diary +of Major Simeon Villa, p. 1898, <i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 3, 56th +Congress, 1st Session, 1902.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2588" href="#xd20e2588src" name="xd20e2588">21</a></span> See +Merritt’s Report for 1898, <i>War Dept. Report</i>, 1898, vol. +i., pt. 2, p. 40.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2597" href="#xd20e2597src" name="xd20e2597">22</a></span> +<i>Expedition to the Philippines</i>, p. 61.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2602" href="#xd20e2602src" name="xd20e2602">23</a></span> +“With 10,000 men, we would have had to guard 13,300 Spanish +prisoners, and to fight 14,000 Filipinos,” says General Anderson, +<i>North American Review</i> for February, 1900.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2608" href="#xd20e2608src" name="xd20e2608">24</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 208</i>, p. 86.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2626" href="#xd20e2626src" name="xd20e2626">25</a></span> Mr. +McKinley’s instructions to the Peace Commissioners, <i>Senate +Document 148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 6.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2641" href="#xd20e2641src" name="xd20e2641">26</a></span> See +General Greene’s Report, <i>W. D. R.</i>, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, +p. 72, where Mr. Millet’s conduct in the assault on the city +receives special mention.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2669" href="#xd20e2669src" name="xd20e2669">27</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 73.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2702" href="#xd20e2702src" name="xd20e2702">28</a></span> See +<i>War Dept. Report</i>, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 58.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2714" href="#xd20e2714src" name="xd20e2714">29</a></span> +<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1898, p. 5.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2735" href="#xd20e2735src" name="xd20e2735">30</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 57.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2748" href="#xd20e2748src" name="xd20e2748">31</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 190.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch5" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter V</h2> +<h2 class="main">Otis and Aguinaldo</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Where people and leaders are agreed,</p> +<p class="line">What can the archon do?</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Athenian Maxims.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Major-general Elwell S. Otis and staff arrived at +Manila August 21, 1898.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2781src" href= +"#xd20e2781" name="xd20e2781src">1</a> He relieved General Merritt and +succeeded to the command of the American troops in the Philippines, +August 29th. Archbishop Chapelle, who was papal delegate to the +Philippines in 1900, once said to the writer at Manila, in that year, +that General Otis was “of about the right mental calibre to +command a one-company post in Arizona.” The impatience manifested +in the remark was due to differences between him and the +commanding-general about the Friar question. The remark itself was of +course intended, and understood, as hyperbole. But the selection of +General Otis to handle the Philippine situation <i>was</i> a serious +mistake. He was past sixty when he took command. He continued in +command from August 29, 1898, to May 5, 1900, a period of some twenty +months. The insurrection was held in abeyance for some five months +after he took hold, the leaders hoping against hope that the Treaty of +Paris would leave their country to them as it did Cuba to the Cubans; +and during all that time General Otis <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb89" href="#pb89" name="pb89">89</a>]</span>was apparently unable to +see that war would be inevitable in the event the decision at Paris was +adverse to Filipino hopes. A member of General Otis’s staff once +told me in speaking of the insurrection period that his chief +pooh-poohed the likelihood of an outbreak right along up to the very +day before the outbreak of February 4, 1899, occurred. <i>Before</i> +the insurrection came he <i>would</i> not see it, and <i>after</i> it +came he—literally—<i>did not</i> see it; that is to say, +during fifteen months of fighting he commanded the Eighth Army Corps +from a desk in Manila and never once took the field. His Civil War +record was all right, but he was now getting well along in years. He +was also a graduate of the Harvard Law School of the Class of 1861, +rather prided himself on being “a pretty fair jack-leg +lawyer,” and had a most absorbing passion for the details of +administrative work. They used to say that the only occasion on which +General Otis ever went out of Manila the whole time he was there was +when he went up the railroad once to Angeles to see that a proper +valuation was put on a then recently deceased Quartermaster’s +Department mule. When he left the Islands he remarked to a newspaper +man that he had had but one “day off” since he had been +there. Unswerving devotion to a desk in time of war, on the part of the +commanding general of the army in the field, seemed to him an +appropriate subject for just pride. This showed his limitations. He was +a man wholly unable to see the essentials of an important situation, or +to take in the whole horizon. He was known to the Eighth Corps, his +command, as a sort of “Fussy Grandpa,” his personality and +general management of things always suggesting the picture of a +painfully near-sighted be-spectacled old gentleman busily nosing over +papers you had submitted, and finding fault to show he knew a thing or +two. However, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb90" href="#pb90" name= +"pb90">90</a>]</span>he had many eminently respectable traits, and did +the best he knew how, though wholly devoid of that noble serenity of +vision which used to enable Mr. Lincoln, amid the darkest and most +tremendous of his problems, to say with a smile to Horace Greeley: +“Don’t shoot the organist, he’s doing the best he +can.”</p> +<p>Before General Otis relieved General Merritt, the latter had written +Aguinaldo politely requesting him to move his troops beyond certain +specified lines about the city,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2809src" +href="#xd20e2809" name="xd20e2809src">2</a> and Aguinaldo had replied +August 27th, agreeing to do so, but asking that the Americans promise +to restore to him the positions thus vacated in the event under the +treaty the United States should leave the Philippines to +Spain.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2815src" href="#xd20e2815" name= +"xd20e2815src">3</a> August 31st, Otis notified Aguinaldo, then still +at Bacoor, his first capital, that General Merritt had been +unexpectedly called away, and that he, Otis, being unacquainted with +the situation must take time before answering the Aguinaldo letter to +Merritt of the 27th. On September 8th, he did answer, in a +preposterously long communication of about 3000 words, which says, +among other things: “I have not been instructed as to what policy +the United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate +holdings here”; and therefore declines to promise anything about +restoring the insurgent positions in the event we should leave the +Islands to Spain under the treaty. Commenting on this in the <i>North +American Review</i> for February, 1900, General Anderson says: “I +believe we came to the parting of the ways when we refused this +request.” General Anderson was right. General Merritt had on +August 21st sent Aguinaldo a memorandum by the hand of Major J. +Franklin Bell which promised: “Care will be taken to leave him +[Aguinaldo] <i>in as good condition <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb91" +href="#pb91" name="pb91">91</a>]</span>as he was found by the forces of +the government.</i>”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2828src" href= +"#xd20e2828" name="xd20e2828src">4</a> In the rôle of political +henchman for President McKinley, which General Otis seems to have +conceived it his duty to play from the very beginning in the +Philippines, it thus appears that he was not troubled about keeping +unsullied the faith and honor of the government as pledged by his +predecessor. His 3000-word letter to Aguinaldo of September 8th ignores +Merritt’s promise as coolly as if it had never been made. His +only concern appears to have been to leave the government free to throw +the Filipinos overboard if it should wish to. He peevishly implies +later on that Aguinaldo’s requests in this regard were merely a +cloak for designs against us (p. 40). But his real reason is given in a +sort of stage “aside”—a letter to the +Adjutant-General of the army dated September 12, 1898, wherein he +explains: “Should I promise them that in case of the return of +the city to Spain, upon United States evacuation, their forces would be +placed by us in positions which they now occupy, I thoroughly believe +that they would evacuate at once. But, of course, under the +international obligations resting upon us * * * no such +promise can be given.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2834src" href= +"#xd20e2834" name="xd20e2834src">5</a> In the sacred name of National +Honor what of the Merritt promise? You only have to turn a few pages in +the <i>War Department Report</i> for 1899 from the Merritt promise to +the Otis repudiation of it. Yes, General Anderson was right. It was +when General Otis practically repudiated in writing the written promise +of his predecessor, General Merritt, that we “came to the parting +of the ways” in our relations with the Filipinos. Let no American +suppose for a moment that the author of this volume is engaged in the +ungracious, and frequently deservedly thankless task of mere +muck-raking. He never met <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb92" href= +"#pb92" name="pb92">92</a>]</span>General Otis but once, and then for a +very brief official interview of an agreeable nature. He is only +attempting to make a small contribution to the righting of a great +wrong unwittingly done by a great, free, and generous people to another +people then struggling to be free—a wrong which he doubts not +will one day be righted, whether he lives to see it so righted or not. +General Otis’s letter to the Adjutant-General of the army of +September 12th, above quoted, shows that he was holding himself in +readiness to carry out in the Philippines any political programme the +Administration might determine upon, which would mean that he would +afterwards come home and tell how entirely righteous that programme had +been. Had the Administration hearkened back to Admiral Dewey’s +suggestion that the Filipinos were far superior to the Cubans, and +decided to set before General Otis in the Philippines the same task it +had set before General Wood in Cuba, we would have heard nothing about +Filipino “incapacity for self-government.” General Otis +would have taken his cue from the President, his commander-in chief, +and said: “I cordially concur in the opinion of Admiral +Dewey.” Then he would have gone to work in a spirit of generous +rivalry to do in the Philippines just what Wood did in Cuba. And the +task would have been easier. Had the Administration taken the view +urged by Judge Gray, as a member of the Paris Peace Commission, that +“if we had captured Cadiz and the Carlists had helped us [we] +would not owe duty to stay by them at the conclusion of the +war,”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2844src" href="#xd20e2844" name= +"xd20e2844src">6</a> and therefore we were not bound to see the +Filipinos through their struggle, General Otis would have adopted that +view with equal loyalty and in the presidential campaign of 1900, he +would have furnished the Administration <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb93" href="#pb93" name="pb93">93</a>]</span>with arguments to justify +that course. This would have been an easy task, also, for two of +Spain’s fleets had been destroyed by us, leaving her but one to +guard her home coast cities, and making the sending of reinforcements +to the besieged and demoralized garrison of Manila impossible. The +native army she relied on throughout the archipelago had gone over +bodily to the patriot cause, and there was no hope of successful +resistance to it. But General Otis did not have the boundless prestige +of Admiral Dewey and so volunteered no advice. As soon as the +Administration chose its course, he set to work to prove the +correctness of it. From him, of course, came all the McKinley +Administration’s original arguments against doing for the +Filipinos as we did in the case of Cuba. He was the only legitimate +source the American people could look to at that time to help them in +their dilemma. They were standing with reluctant feet where democracy +and its antithesis meet, and Otis was their sole guide. But the guide +was of the kind who wait until you point and ask “Is that the +right direction?” and then answer “Yes.” Four days +after General Otis sent his above quoted letter of September 12th, to +Adjutant-General Corbin, Mr. McKinley signed his instructions to the +Paris Peace Commissioners, directing them to insist on the cession of +Luzon at least, the instructions being full of eloquent but specious +argument about the necessity of establishing a guardianship over people +of whom we then knew nothing. From that day forward General Otis bent +himself to the task of showing the righteousness of that course. +“I will let nothing go that will hurt the Administration,” +was his favorite expression to the newspaper correspondents when they +used to complain about his press censorship. Hypocrisy is defined to be +“a false assumption of piety or virtue.” <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb94" href="#pb94" name="pb94">94</a>]</span>The +false assumption of piety or virtue which has handicapped the American +occupation of the Philippines from the beginning, and which will always +handicap it, until we throw off the mask and honestly set to work to +give the Filipinos a square deal on the question of whether they can or +cannot run a decent government of their own if permitted, is traceable +back to the Otis letter to the Adjutant-General of September 12, 1898, +ignoring General Merritt’s promise to leave Aguinaldo “in +as good condition as he was found by the forces of the +government” in case we should, under the terms of the treaty of +peace, leave the Islands to Spain.</p> +<p>General Otis’s letter of September 8th to Aguinaldo is +apparently intended to convince him that he ought to consider +everything the Americans had done up to date as exactly the correct +thing, according to the standards of up-to-date, philanthropic, +liberty-loving nations which pity double-dealing as mediæval; and +that he should cheer up, and feel grateful and happy, instead of +sulking, Achilles-like, in his tents; and furthermore—which was +the crux—that he must move said tents. General Otis does not +forget “that the revolutionary forces under your command have +made many sacrifices in the interest of <i>civil liberty</i> (observe, +he does not call it independence) and for the welfare of your +people”; admits that they have “endured great hardships, +and have rendered aid”; and avers, as a reason for +Aguinaldo’s evacuating that part of the environs of Manila +occupied by his troops: “It [the war with Spain] was undertaken +by the United States for humanity’s sake * * * not for +* * * aggrandizement or for any national profit.” After +stating, as above indicated, that he does not yet know what the policy +of the United States is to be “in regard to its legitimate +holdings here,” General Otis proceeds to declare that in any +event he <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb95" href="#pb95" name= +"pb95">95</a>]</span>will not be a party to any joint occupation of any +part of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila—the territory covered +by the Peace Protocol of August 13th—and that Aguinaldo must +effect the evacuation demanded in the letter of General Merritt +“before Tuesday the 15th” (of September), <i>i.e.</i>, +within a week. Aguinaldo finally withdrew his troops, after much +useless parleying and much waste of ink.</p> +<p>There was some of the parleying and ink, however, that was not +wholly wasted. But to properly appreciate it as illustrative of the +fortitude and tact which the early Filipino leaders seem to have +combined in a remarkable degree, some prefatory data are essential.</p> +<p>Aguinaldo’s capital was then at Bacoor, one of the small coast +villages you pass through in going by land from Manila to Cavite. From +Manila over to Cavite by water is about seven miles, and by land about +three or four times that. The coast line from Manila to Cavite makes a +loop, so that a straight line over the water from Manila to Cavite +subtends a curve, near the Cavite end of which lies Bacoor. Thus, +Bacoor, being at the mercy of the big guns at Cavite, and also easily +accessible by a land force from Manila, to say nothing of Dewey’s +mighty armada riding at anchor in the offing, was a good place to move +away from. There it lay, right in the lion’s jaws, should the +lion happen to get hungry. Aguinaldo had reflected on all this, and had +determined to get himself a capital away from “the city, bay, and +harbor of Manila,” that is to say, to take his head out of the +lion’s jaws. General Otis’s demand of September 8th that he +move his troops out of the suburbs of Manila determined him to move his +capital as well. He moved it to a place called Malolos, in Bulacan +province. Bulacan lies over on the north shore of Manila Bay, opposite +Cavite province <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb96" href="#pb96" name= +"pb96">96</a>]</span>on the south shore. Malolos is situated some +distance inland, out of sight and range of a fleet’s guns, and +about twenty-odd miles by railroad northwest of Manila. Malolos was +also desirable because it was in the heart of an insurgent province +having a population of nearly a quarter of a million people, a province +which, by reason of being on the north side of the bay, was sure to be +in touch, strategically and politically, with all Luzon north of the +Pasig River, just as Cavite province, the birthplace of Aguinaldo, and +also of the revolutionary government, had been with all Luzon south of +the Pasig. Should the worst come to the worst—and as has already +been indicated, the insurgents played a sweepstake game from the +beginning for independence, with only war as the limit—northern +Luzon had more inaccessible mountains from which to conduct such a +struggle for an indefinite period than southern Luzon. But while the +Otis demand of September 8th decided the matter of the change of +capital, Aguinaldo could not afford to tell his troops that he was +moving them from the environs of Manila because made to. He was going +to accept war cheerfully when it should become necessary to fight for +independence, but he still had some hopes of the Paris Peace Conference +deciding to do with the Philippines as with Cuba, and wished to await +patiently the outcome of that conference. Besides, he was getting in +shipments of guns all the time, as fast as the revenues of his +government would permit, and thus his ability to protract an ultimate +war for independence was constantly enlarging by accretion. The Hong +Kong conference of the Filipino revolutionary leaders held in the city +named on May 4, 1898, at which Aguinaldo presided, and which mapped out +a programme covering every possible contingency, has already been +mentioned. Its minutes say: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb97" href= +"#pb97" name="pb97">97</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">If Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental +principles of its Constitution, it is most improbable that an attempt +will be made to colonize the Philippines or annex them.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e2873src" href="#xd20e2873" name= +"xd20e2873src">7</a></p> +</div> +<p>On the other hand, the minutes of this same meeting as we saw +recognized that America might be tempted into entering upon a career of +colonization, once she should get a foothold in the islands. The +programme of Aguinaldo and his people was thus, from the beginning, not +to precipitate hostilities until it should become clear that, in the +matter of land-grabbing, the gleam of hope held out by the American +programme for Cuba was illusive. According to the minutes of the +meeting alluded to, such a contingency would, of course, “drive +them, the Filipinos * * * to a struggle for their +independence, even if they should succumb to the weight of the +yoke,” etc. Such a struggle, as all the world knows, did +ultimately ensue. That part of the parleying following Otis’s +demand of September 8th (that Aguinaldo move his troops) which was +<i>not</i> useless was this: In order to “save their face,” +with the rank and file of their army, the Filipino Commissioners asked +General Otis “if I [Otis,] would express in writing a simple +<i>request</i> to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I +designated—something which he could show to the +troops.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2886src" href="#xd20e2886" +name="xd20e2886src">8</a> So, on September 13th, General Otis wrote +such a “request,” and Aguinaldo moved his troops as +demanded, but no farther than demanded. He wanted to be in the best +position possible in case the United States should finally leave the +Philippines to Spain, and always so insisted. Long afterward General +Otis insinuated in his report that this <span class="corr" id= +"xd20e2892" title="Source: insistance">insistence</span>, which was +uniformly pressed until after the Treaty was signed, was mere dishonest +pretence, to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb98" href="#pb98" name= +"pb98">98</a>]</span>cloak warlike intentions against the United +States. Yet, as we have seen above, one of our Peace Commissioners at +Paris, Judge Gray, just about the same time, was taking that +contingency quite as seriously as did Aguinaldo. And early in May, +1898, our Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long, had cabled Admiral Dewey +“not to have political alliances with the insurgents +* * * that would incur liability to maintain their cause in +the future.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2898src" href= +"#xd20e2898" name="xd20e2898src">9</a> Before moving his troops +pursuant to the Otis demand of September 8th, the Otis +“request” was duly published to the insurgent army, and as +the insurgents withdrew, the American troops presented arms in most +friendly fashion. “They certainly made a brave show,” says +Mr. Millet (<i>Expedition to the Philippines</i>, p. 255), “for +they were neatly uniformed, had excellent rifles, marched well, and +looked very soldierly and intelligent.” “The +withdrawal,” says General Otis (p. 10), “was effected +adroitly, as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering +the American forces.” Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila +at this time, with complete machinery of government in each province +for all matters of justice, taxes, and police, an army of some 30,000 +men at his beck, and his whole people a unit at his back, Aguinaldo +formally inaugurated his permanent government—permanent as +opposed to the previous provisional government—with a +Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet, patterned after our own,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e2906src" href="#xd20e2906" name= +"xd20e2906src">10</a> just as the South American republics had done +before him when <i>they</i> were freed from Spain, at Malolos, the new +capital, on September 15, 1898. <i>The next day, September 16th, at +Washington, President <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb99" href="#pb99" +name="pb99">99</a>]</span>McKinley delivered to his Peace +Commissioners, then getting ready to start for the Paris Peace +Conference, their letter of instructions, directing them to insist on +the cession by Spain to the United States of the island of Luzon +“at least.”</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e2919src" href= +"#xd20e2919" name="xd20e2919src">11</a> In other words, the day after +the little Filipino republic, gay with banners and glad with music, +started forth on its journey, Mr. McKinley signed its death-warrant. +The political student of 1912 may say just here, “Oh, I read all +that in the papers at the time, or at least it was all ventilated in +the Presidential campaign of 1900.” Mr. McKinley’s +instructions to the Paris Peace Commission were not made public until +after the Presidential election of 1900. To be specific, they were +first printed and given out to the public in 1901, in <i>Senate +Document 148</i>, having been extracted from the jealous custody of the +Executive by a Senate resolution. It was not until then that the veil +was lifted. By that time, no American who was not transcendental enough +to have lost his love for the old maxim, “Right or wrong, my +country,” cared to hear the details of the story. The Filipinos +and “our boys” had been diligently engaged in killing each +other for a couple of years, and the American people said, “A +truce to scolding; let us finish this war, now we are in it.”</p> +<p>But to return from the death-warrant of the Philippine republic +signed by Mr. McKinley on September 16th, to its christening, or +inauguration, the day before. Mr. Millet gives an intensely interesting +account of the inaugural ceremonies of September 15th, which as Manila +correspondent of the <i>London Times</i> and <i>Harper’s +Weekly</i> he had the good fortune to witness. Says he:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The date was at last * * * fixed for +September 15th. A few days before Aguinaldo had made a triumphant entry +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb100" href="#pb100" name= +"pb100">100</a>]</span>into Malolos in a carriage drawn by white +horses, and there had been a general celebration of his arrival, with +speeches, a gala dinner, open air concerts, and a military parade. Mr. +Higgins (an Englishman), the manager of the Railway, kindly offered to +take me up to Malolos to witness the ceremony of the inauguration of +the new government. * * * The only other passenger was to be +Aguinaldo’s secretary * * * a small boyish-looking +young man. * * *<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2942src" href= +"#xd20e2942" name="xd20e2942src">12</a></p> +</div> +<p>It seems there had been a strike of the native employees of the +railway up the road.</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Mr. Higgins calmly remarked to the secretary that, in +his opinion, if the affairs of the Filipino government were managed in +the future as they were at present, the proposed republic would be +nothing but a cheap farce. The secretary timidly asked what there was +to complain about.</p> +</div> +<p>Then came a tirade from Higgins, ending with, “I am going to +lay this * * * before Aguinaldo to-day, and I shall expect +you to arrange an interview for my friend and myself.” Then, +turning to the astonished Millet, he said in English: “It does +these chaps good to be talked to straight from the shoulder. Since they +came to Malolos, the earth isn’t big enough to hold +them.”</p> +<p>This scene on the train is, decidedly, as Thomas Carlyle would say, +“of real interest to universal history.” Mr. Millet’s +Government was a lion about to eat a lamb, but the head of his nation, +Mr. McKinley, clothed with absolute authority in the premises for the +nonce, was balking at the diet. Now, Mr. Millet rather admired the +British boldness, just as a Northern man likes to hear a Southerner +talk straight from the shoulder to a “darkey.” As soon as +the era of good feeling was over, our people quit treating the +Filipinos as Perry <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb101" href="#pb101" +name="pb101">101</a>]</span>did the Japanese in 1854, and began calling +them “niggers.” In fact the commanding general found it +necessary a little later to put a stop to this pernicious practice +among the soldiers by issuing a General Order prohibiting it. But Mr. +Millet’s admiration would have been somewhat toned down had he +known what we found out later. The real secret of Higgins’s +personal arrogance was this. The Filipino government needed his +railroad in its business. During the war which followed, the insurgents +long controlled a large part of this railway, from Manila to Dagupan, +which was the only railway in the Philippines. The railway properties +suffered much damage incident to the war, and—just how willingly +is beside the question—the company rendered material aid to the +insurgent cause. So much did they render, that when Higgins had the +assurance later to want our Government to pay the damages his +properties had suffered at the hands of the insurgents, our government +at Manila promptly turned his claim down. Subsequently the London +office of his company actually inveigled the British Foreign Office +into making representation to our State Department about the +matter—obviously a very grave step, in international law. The +claim was promptly turned down by Washington also, and, happily, that +“closed the incident.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2960src" +href="#xd20e2960" name="xd20e2960src">13</a></p> +<p>Having exploded Mr. Millet’s bubble, let us resume the thread +of his story:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We reached the station [at Malolos] in about an hour +and a half. * * * The town numbers perhaps thirty or forty +thousand people. * * * From the first humble <i>nipa</i> +shack to the great square where the convent stands, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb102" href="#pb102" name= +"pb102">102</a>]</span>thousands of insurgent flags fluttered from +every window and every post. * * * Every man had an insurgent +tri-color cockade in his hat.</p> +</div> +<p>Then follows a detailed account of being introduced, after some +ceremony, to Aguinaldo, who is described as “a small individual, +in full evening black suit, and flowing black tie.” Higgins made +his complaint about the strikers, and Aguinaldo said, “I will +attend to this matter of the strikers,” and then changed the +topic, asking if the visitors did not wish to attend the opening of the +Congress—which they did.</p> +<p>From Mr. Millet’s account, it is evident that, like Admiral +Dewey and most of the Americans who first dealt with the Filipinos +except Generals Anderson, MacArthur, and J. F. Bell, he failed to take +the Filipinos as seriously as the facts demanded. At that time the +Japanese had not yet taught the world that national aspirations are not +necessarily to be treated with contumely because a people are small of +stature and not white of skin. Consul Wildman at Hong Kong at first +wrote the State Department quite peevishly that Aguinaldo seemed much +more concerned about the kind of cane he should wear than about the +figure he might make in history. Wildman did not then know, apparently, +that canes, with all Spanish-Filipino colonial officialdom, were badges +of official rank, like shoulder-straps are with us. The reader will +also remember the toothbrush incident hereinbefore reproduced, told by +Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee, in 1902. That incident, +naturally enough, amused the Committee not a little. But we who know +the Filipino know it was merely an awkward and embarrassed answer due +to diffidence, and made on the spur of the moment to cloak some real +reason which if disclosed would not seem so childish. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb103" href="#pb103" name="pb103">103</a>]</span></p> +<p>Misunderstanding is the principal cause of hate in this world. When +you understand people, hatred disappears in a way strikingly analogous +to the disappearance of darkness on the arrival of light. The more you +know of the educated patriotic Filipino, the more certain you become +that the government we destroyed in 1898 would have worked quite as +well as most any of the republics now in operation between the Rio +Grande and Patagonia. The masses of the people down there, the peons, +are probably quite as ignorant and docile as the Filipino <i>tao</i> +(peasant), and I question if the educated men of Latin America, the +class of men who, after all, control in every country, could, after +meeting and knowing the corresponding class in the Philippines, get +their own consent to declare the latter their inferiors either in +intelligence, character, or patriotism.</p> +<p>But to return to the inauguration. Mr. Millet saw the inaugural +ceremonies in the church, and heard Aguinaldo’s address to the +Congress. Of the audience he says “few among them would have +escaped notice in a crowd for they were exceptionally alert, keen, and +intelligent in appearance.” Of this same Congress and government, +Mr. John Barrett, who was American Minister to Siam about that time, +and is now (1912) head of the Bureau of American Republics at +Washington—an institution organized and run for the purpose of +persuading Latin-America that we do <i>not</i> belong to the Imperial +International Society for the Partition of the Earth and that we are +<i>not</i> in the business of gobbling up little countries on pretext +of “policing” them—said in an address before the +Shanghai Chamber of Commerce on January 12, 1899:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">He [Aguinaldo] has organized a government which has +practically been administering the affairs of that great <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb104" href="#pb104" name= +"pb104">104</a>]</span>island [Luzon] since the American occupation of +Manila, which is certainly better than the former administration; he +has a properly constituted Cabinet and Congress, the members of which +compare favorably with Japanese statesmen.</p> +</div> +<p>The present Philippine Assembly had not had its first meeting when I +left the Islands in the spring of 1905. It was organized in 1907. In +the summer of 1911, I had the pleasure of renewing an old and very +cordial acquaintance with Dr. Heiser, Director of Public Health of the +Philippine Islands, who is one of the most considerable men connected +with our government out there, and is also thoroughly in sympathy with +its indefinite continuance in its present form. The Doctor is a +<span class="corr" id="xd20e3003" title= +"Source: broad-guaged">broad-gauged</span> man likely to be worth to +any government, in matters of Public Health, whatever such government +could reasonably afford to pay in the way of salary, and is doubtless +well-paid by the Philippine Insular Government. He can hardly be +blamed, therefore, for being in sympathy with its indefinite +continuance in its present form. Doctor Heiser is a man of too much +genuine dignity to be very much addicted to slang, but when I asked him +about the Philippine Assembly, I think he said it was “a +cracker-jack.” At any rate, I have never heard any legislative +body spoken of in more genuinely complimentary terms than those in +which he described the Philippine Assembly. I learned from him +incidentally that their “capacity for self-government” is +so crude, however, as yet, that the members have not yet learned to +read newspapers while a colleague whose seat is next to theirs is +addressing the house and trying to get the attention of his fellows, +nor do they keep up such a buzz of conversation that the man who has +the floor cannot hear himself <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb105" +href="#pb105" name="pb105">105</a>]</span>talk. They listen to the +programme of the public business.</p> +<p>Some five years ago in an article written for the <i>North American +Review</i> concerning the Philippine problem, the author of the present +volume said, among other things: “During nearly four years of +service on the bench in the Philippines the writer heard as much +genuine, impassioned, and effective eloquence from Filipino lawyers, +saw exhibited in the trial of causes as much industrious preparation, +and zealous, loyal advocacy of the rights of clients, as any ordinary +<i>nisi prius</i> judge at home is likely to meet with in the same +length of time.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3016src" href= +"#xd20e3016" name="xd20e3016src">14</a> Any country that has plenty of +good lawyers and plenty of good soldiers, backed by plenty of good +farmers, is capable of self-government. As President Schurman of +Cornell University, who headed the first Philippine Commission, the one +that went out in 1899, said in closing his Founder’s Day Address +at that institution on January 11, 1902: “Any decent kind of +government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better than the best possible +government of Filipinos by Americans.” The Malolos government +which Mr. Millet saw inaugurated on September 15, 1898, would probably +have filled this bill. Had the Filipino people then possessed the +consciousness of racial and political unity <i>as a</i> people which +was developed by their subsequent long struggle against us for +independence, and which has been steadily developing more and more +under the mild sway of a <i>quasi</i>-freedom whose princely +prodigality in spreading education is marred only by its declared +programme that no living beneficiary thereof may hope to see the +independence of his country, and that the present generation must +resign itself to tariff schedules “fixed” at Washington, +there is no reasonable <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb106" href= +"#pb106" name="pb106">106</a>]</span>doubt that the original Malolos +government of 1898 would have been a very “decent kind of +government.”</p> +<p>All through the last four months of 1898, the two hostile armies +faced each other in a mood which it needed but a spark to ignite, +awaiting the outcome of the peace negotiations arranged for in +September, commenced in October, and concluded in December. While they +are thus engaged about Manila, let us turn to a happier picture, the +situation in the provinces under the Aguinaldo government. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb107" href="#pb107" name="pb107">107</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2781" href="#xd20e2781src" name="xd20e2781">1</a></span> See his +Report, <i>War Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 3.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2809" href="#xd20e2809src" name="xd20e2809">2</a></span> On +August 20th. <i>War Dept. Report</i>,1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 345.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2815" href="#xd20e2815src" name="xd20e2815">3</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 5.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2828" href="#xd20e2828src" name="xd20e2828">4</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. 1., pt. 4, pp. 346–7.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2834" href="#xd20e2834src" name="xd20e2834">5</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i> p. 335.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2844" href="#xd20e2844src" name="xd20e2844">6</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 34.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2873" href="#xd20e2873src" name="xd20e2873">7</a></span> <i>S. D. +208</i>, pt. ii., pp. 7, 8.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2886" href="#xd20e2886src" name="xd20e2886">8</a></span> +Otis’s <i>Report</i>, p. 10.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2898" href="#xd20e2898src" name="xd20e2898">9</a></span> <i>Navy +Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 101.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2906" href="#xd20e2906src" name="xd20e2906">10</a></span> To say +nothing of the “chariot and four, and a band of a hundred pieces, +and everything in the grandest style,” of which Admiral Dewey +told the Senate Committee in 1902 (<i>S. D. 331</i>, 1902, p. +2972).</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2919" href="#xd20e2919src" name="xd20e2919">11</a></span> See p. +7, <i>S. D. 148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2942" href="#xd20e2942src" name="xd20e2942">12</a></span> +<i>Expedition to the Philippines</i>, p. 255.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e2960" href="#xd20e2960src" name="xd20e2960">13</a></span> +“Putting the road and accessories into the same state as they +were on February 4, 1899,” was the language in which Mr. Higgins +formulated his demand in a letter to General Otis on Jan. 25, 1900. See +<i>War Dept. Record</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 516.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3016" href="#xd20e3016src" name="xd20e3016">14</a></span> +<i>North American Review</i>, January 18, 1907, p. 140.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch6" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter VI</h2> +<h2 class="main">The Wilcox-Sargent Trip</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">A smiling, peaceful, and plenteous land</p> +<p class="line">As yet unblighted by the scourge of war;</p> +<p class="line">Where happiness and hospitality walk hand in hand</p> +<p class="line">And new-born Freedom bows to Law.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Anonymous.</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">In the last chapter, we saw Aguinaldo’s republic +formally established at Malolos, September 15th, claiming jurisdiction +over all Luzon. In <a href="#ch4">Chapter IV</a>., entitled +“Merritt and Aguinaldo,” we saw the political condition of +southern Luzon in August, 1898, and the following months, and verified +the correctness of Aguinaldo’s claims as to complete mastery +there then. Let us now examine the state of affairs in northern Luzon +in the fall of 1898.</p> +<p>In <i>Senate Document 196</i>, 56th Congress, 1st Session, dated +February 26, 1900, transmitted by Secretary of the Navy Long, in +response to a Senate resolution, may be found a report of a tour of +observation through the half of Luzon Island which lies north of Manila +and the Pasig River, made between October 8 and November 20, +1898,—note the dates, for the Paris Peace Conference began +October 1st and ended December 10th,—by Paymaster W. B. Wilcox +and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent. This report was submitted by them to +Admiral Dewey under <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb108" href="#pb108" +name="pb108">108</a>]</span>date of November 23, 1898, and by him +forwarded to the Navy Department for its information, with the comment +that it “in my opinion contains the most complete and reliable +information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern +part of Luzon Island.” The Admiral’s endorsement was not +sent to the Senate along with the report. It appears in a book +afterwards published by Paymaster Wilcox in 1901, entitled <i>Through +Luzon on Highways and Byways</i>. The book is merely an elaboration of +the report, and reproduces most of the report, if not all of it, +<i>verbatim</i>. The book of Paymaster Wilcox may be treated as, +practically, official, for historical purposes. The preface recites +that in October, 1898, American control was effective only in Manila +and Cavite, that the insurgents, under Aguinaldo, who had proclaimed +himself President of the whole Archipelago, immediately after +Dewey’s victory, were in supposedly complete possession of every +part of the Island outside of these two cities, that their lines were +so close to the outposts of our army that their people could at times +converse with our soldiers, and that General Otis’s authority did +not extend much beyond a three-mile radius from the centre of Manila, +while Admiral Dewey held and operated the navy-yard at Cavite. +“Even the country between Manila and Cavite was in the hands of +Aguinaldo, so much so that our officers had been refused permission to +land at any intermediate point by water, and were prohibited from +traversing the distance by road.” Wilcox and Sargent procured +leave of absence from Admiral Dewey to make their trip. They went first +to Malolos, but failed to get anything in the way of safe-conduct from +Aguinaldo. He is described, however, as of “great force of +character * * * and he dominates all around him with a +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb109" href="#pb109" name= +"pb109">109</a>]</span>power that seems peculiar to himself.” +Wilcox had seen him before at Cavite. “He adroitly read between +the lines that the Government of the United States did not then, nor +would it at any future time, recognize his authority,” says the +writer.</p> +<p>Our travellers left Manila, October 8, 1898, on the Manila-Dagupan +Railway, for a place called Bayambang, which is the capital of +Pangasinan province, about one hundred miles north of Manila. In +Pangasinan “the people were all very respectful and polite and +offered the hospitality of their homes.” From Bayambang they +struck off from the railroad and proceeded eastward comfortably and +unmolested a day’s journey, to a town in the adjoining province +of Nueva Ecija (Rosales) where they received a cordial reception at the +hands of the Presidente (Mayor)—Aguinaldo’s Presidente of +course, not the Presidente left over from the Spanish régime. +“At this time all the local government of the different towns was +in the hands of Aguinaldo’s adherents,” says the +descriptive itinerary we are following. The tourists were provided at +Rosales by order of Aguinaldo with a military escort, “which was +continued by relays all the way to Aparri” (the northernmost town +of Luzon, at the mouth of the Cagayan River). Paymaster Wilcox says he +carried five hundred Mexican dollars in his saddle-bags, but used only +a trifling portion of this amount, “for in every town my +entertainment was given without pay.” They went from Rosales to +Humingan, in Nueva Ecija. At Humingan they were again entertained by +the Presidente at dinner, with music following, and comfortably housed. +The Presidente made many inquiries about “the War with Spain and +their own future.” Their future, as revealed by the raised +curtain of a year later, was that their country was being overrun by +Lawton’s <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb110" href="#pb110" name= +"pb110">110</a>]</span>Division of the Eighth Army Corps, the author of +this volume having passed through this same town of Humingan in +November, 1899, as an officer of the scouts used to develop fire for +General Lawton’s column. They journeyed eastward through the +province of Nueva Ecija from Humingan to a little village (Puncan) in +the foothills of the mountains they planned to cross. Of this place and +the hospitality there, our traveller remarks: “I shall never +forget the welcome of the local official” the Presidente. Thence +they proceeded a few more stages and parasangs, northward over the +Caranglan pass, into Nueva Vizcaya province, the watershed of north +central Luzon, and thence down the valley of the Cagayan River via +Iligan and Tuguegarao to Aparri, being always hospitably entertained in +every town through which they passed by the Presidente or Mayor of the +town, the local representative of the Philippine republic. In the +<i>New York Independent</i> of September 14, 1899, Cadet Sargent, in an +article about this trip, gives the words of the new Filipino national +Hymn, which he describes as sung with great enthusiasm everywhere he +and Wilcox were entertained in the various towns. I desire to preserve +a sample verse of it here. The music it is set to is much like the +<i>Marseillaise</i>—quite as stirring:</p> +<div lang="es" class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Del sueño de tres siglos</p> +<p class="line">Hermanos Despertad!</p> +<p class="line">Gritando “Fuera España!</p> +<p class="line">Viva La Libertad!”</p> +</div> +<p class="first">which, being interpreted, means:</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">From the sleep of three centuries</p> +<p class="line">Brothers, awake!</p> +<p class="line">Crying “Out with Spain!</p> +<p class="line">Live Liberty!”</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb111" href="#pb111" name= +"pb111">111</a>]</span></p> +<p>Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar trip through +the provinces of southern Luzon about this same time, under similar +friendly auspices, before we turned friendship to hate and fear and +misery, in the name of Benevolent Assimilation, they would, we now +know, have found similar conditions.</p> +<p>Some suspicions were aroused on one or two occasions, but once the +local authorities became convinced that the trip was being made by +consent of “The Illustrious Presidente” +(Aguinaldo—“El Egregio Presidente” is the Spanish of +it) all was sunshine again. The Mayor of each town—the +Presidente—would receive from the escort coming with them from +the last town they had stopped at, a letter from the Mayor, or +Presidente, of said last town; the old escort would return to +<i>their</i> town, and a new one would be provided to give them +safe-conduct to the next town. This was no new-fangled scheme of +Aguinaldo’s. It was an ancient custom of the Spanish Government, +and was an ideal nucleus of administration for the new government. +Curiously enough, the army knew practically nothing of this trip in the +days of the early fighting. All that country was to us a <i>terra +incognita</i>, until overrun by Captain Bacthelor, with a part of the +25th Infantry in the fall of 1899, the following year. So was the rest +of the archipelago a like <i>terra incognita</i>, until likewise slowly +conquered by hard fighting. That is why we so utterly failed to +understand what a wonderfully complete “going concern” +Aguinaldo’s government had become throughout the Philippine +archipelago before the Treaty of Paris was signed. Descending from the +watershed of north central Luzon in the province of Nueva Viscaya +already mentioned, our travellers reached the town of Carig, in the +foothills which fringe that side of the watershed. There they +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb112" href="#pb112" name= +"pb112">112</a>]</span>were met by Simeon Villa, military commander of +Isabela province, the man who was chief of staff to Aguinaldo +afterwards, and was captured by General Funston along with Aguinaldo in +the spring of 1901. Villa’s immediate superior was Colonel +Tirona, at Aparri, the colonel commanding all the insurgent forces of +the Cagayan valley. Villa was accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant +Ventura Guzman. The latter is an old acquaintance of the author of the +present volume, who tried him afterwards, in 1901, for playing a minor +part in the murder of an officer of the Spanish army committed under +Villa’s orders just prior to, or about the time of, the +Wilcox-Sargent visit. He was found guilty, and sentenced, but later +liberated under President Roosevelt’s amnesty of 1902. He +<i>was</i> guilty, but the deceased, so the people in the Cagayan +valley used to say, in being tortured to death, got only the same sort +of medicine he had often administered thereabouts. At any rate, that +was the broad theory of the amnesty in wiping out all these old cases. +Villa was a Tagal and had come up from Manila with <span class="corr" +id="xd20e3122" title="Source: she">the</span> expedition commanded by +Colonel Tirona, which expedition was fitted out with guns furnished +Aguinaldo by Admiral Dewey, or, if not furnished, permitted to be +furnished. But Guzman was a member of one of the wealthiest and most +influential native families of that province (Isabela). General +Otis’s reports are full of the most inexcusable blunders about +how “the Tagals” took possession of the various provinces +and <i>made</i> the people do this or that. Villa’s relations +with Guzman were just about those of a New Yorker or a Bostonian sent +up to Vermont in the days of the American Revolution to help organize +the resistance there, in conjunction with one of the local leaders of +the patriot cause in the Green Mountain State. Both <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb113" href="#pb113" name="pb113">113</a>]</span>were +members of the Katipunan, the Filipino Revolutionary Secret Society, an +organization patterned after Masonry, membership in which was always +treated by the Spaniards as sedition, and usually visited with capital +punishment. Nearly every Filipino of any spirit belonged to it on May +1, 1898, the date of the naval battle of Manila Bay. It is the +all-pervading completeness of this organization at that time—it +could give old Tammany Hall cards and spades—which explains the +astonishing rapidity of Aguinaldo’s political success, +<i>i.e.</i>, the astonishing rapidity with which the Malolos Government +acquired control of Luzon between May and October, 1898. Their +cabalistic watchword was “Paisano” (fellow-countryman), +their battle cry “Independence.” In the fall of 1898, at +the time of this Wilcox-Sargent trip through Luzon, the Filipinos +really “had tasted the sweets of Independence,” to use the +phrase of the people of Iloilo in declining <i>on that ground</i> to +surrender to General Miller in December thereafter and electing the +arbitrament of war. The writer is perhaps as familiar with the history +of that Cagayan valley as almost any other American. It is true there +were cruelties practised by the Filipinos on the Spaniards. But they +were ebullitions of revenge for three centuries of tyranny. They do not +prove unfitness for self-government. I for one prefer to follow the +example set by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902, and draw the veil over +all those matters. With the Spaniards it was a case of <i lang= +"fr">Sauve qui peut</i>. With the Filipinos, it was a case, as old man +Dimas Guzman, father to this Lieutenant Ventura we have just met, used +to put it, of <i lang="es">Me las vais a pagar</i>, which, liberally +interpreted, means, “The bad quarter of an hour has arrived for +the Spaniards. The day of reckoning has come.” I sentenced both +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb114" href="#pb114" name= +"pb114">114</a>]</span>Dimas and Ventura to life imprisonment for being +accessory to the murder of the Spanish officer above named, Lieutenant +Piera. Villa officiated as archfiend of the gruesome occasion. I am +quite sure I would have hung Villa without any compunction at that +time, if I could have gotten hold of him. I tried to get hold of him, +but Governor Taft’s Attorney-General, Mr. Wilfley, wrote me that +Villa was somewhere over on the mainland of Asia on British territory, +and extradition would involve application to the London Foreign Office. +The intimation was that we had trouble enough of our own without +borrowing any from feuds that had existed under our predecessors in +sovereignty. I have understood that Villa is now practising medicine in +Manila. More than one officer of the American army that I know, +afterwards did things to the Filipinos almost as cruel as Villa did to +that unhappy Spanish officer, Lieutenant Piera. On the whole, I think +President Roosevelt acted wisely and humanely in wiping the slate. We +had new problems to deal with, and were not bound to handicap ourselves +with the old ones left over from the Spanish régime.</p> +<p>It appears that Villa became a little suspicious of the travellers. +He detained them at Carig seven days. Finally there came a telegram +from his chief at Aparri, Colonel Tirona, to our two travellers, which +read: “I salute you affectionately, and authorize Villa to +accompany you to Iligan.” At Iligan, the capital of Isabela +province, the travellers were lavishly entertained. They were given a +grand <i>baile</i> (ball) and <i>fiesta</i> (feast), a kind of +dinner-dance, we would call it. To the light Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox +throw on the then universal acknowledgment of the authority of the +Aguinaldo government, and the perfect tranquillity <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb115" href="#pb115" name="pb115">115</a>]</span>and +public order maintained under it, in the Cagayan valley, I may add that +as judge of that district in 1901–2 there came before me a number +of cases in the trial of which the fact would be brought out of this or +that difference among the local authorities having been referred to the +Malolos Government for settlement. <i>And they always waited until they +heard from it.</i> The doubting Thomas will attribute this to the +partiality of the Filipinos to procrastination in general. I know it +was due to the hearty co-operation of the people with, and their +loyalty to, the then existing government, and to their pride in it. Mr. +Sargent tells a characteristic story of Villa, whose vengeful feeling +toward the Spaniards showed on all occasions. The former Spanish +governor of the province was of course a prisoner in Villa’s +custody. Villa had the ex-governor brought in, for the travellers to +see him, and remarked, in his presence to them, “This is the man +who robbed this province of $25,000 during the last year of his +office.” From Iligan our travellers proceeded to Aparri, +cordially received everywhere, and finding the country in fact, as +Aguinaldo always claimed in his proclamations of that period seeking +recognition of his government by the Powers, in a state of profound +peace and tranquillity—free from brigandage and the like. At +Aparri the visitors were cordially welcomed by Colonel Tirona, and much +fêted. While they were there, Tirona transferred his authority to +a civil régime. Says Paymaster Wilcox:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The steamer <i>Saturnus</i>, which had left the harbor +the day before our arrival, brought news from Hong Kong papers that the +Senators from the United States at the Congress at Paris favored the +independence of the islands with an American protectorate. Colonel +Tirona considered the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb116" href= +"#pb116" name="pb116">116</a>]</span>information of sufficient +reliability to justify him in regarding Philippine Independence as +assured, and warfare in the Islands at an end.</p> +</div> +<p>He then goes on to describe the inauguration of civil government in +Cagayan province. I hope all this will not weary the American reader. +It was vividly interesting to me when I read it for the first time +thirteen years afterward, in 1911, because it was such unexpected +information, so surprising. It will be equally interesting to all other +Americans who participated in putting down the subsequent insurrection +and in setting up the Taft civil government in that same valley three +years later. I was in that town, for a similar purpose, with Governor +Taft in 1901, after a bloody war which almost certainly would not have +occurred had the Paris Peace Commission known the conditions then +existing, just like this, all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands. Of +course the Southern Islands were a little slower. But as Luzon goes, so +go the rest. The rest of the archipelago is but the tail to the Luzon +kite. Luzon contains 4,000,000 of the 8,000,000 people out there, and +Manila is to the Filipino people what Paris is to the French and to +France. Luzon is about the size of Ohio, and the other six islands that +really matter,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3169src" href="#xd20e3169" +name="xd20e3169src">1</a> are in size mere little Connecticuts and +Rhode Islands, and in population mere Arizonas or New Mexicos. +Describing the ceremonies of the inauguration of civil government in +Cagayan, the Wilcox-Sargent report to Admiral Dewey says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The Presidentes of all the towns in the province were +present at the ceremony. * * * Colonel Tirona made a short +speech. * * * He then handed the staff of office to +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb117" href="#pb117" name= +"pb117">117</a>]</span>the man who had been elected “Jefe +Provincial” [Governor of the Province]. This officer also made a +speech in which he thanked the military forces * * * and +assured them that the work they had begun would be perpetuated by the +people, where <i>every man, woman, and child stood ready to take up +arms to defend their newly won liberty and to resist with the last drop +of their blood the attempt of any nation whatever to bring them back to +their former state of dependence</i>. He then knelt, placed his hand on +an open Bible, and took the oath of office.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3180src" href="#xd20e3180" name="xd20e3180src">2</a></p> +</div> +<p>Does not such language in an official report made by officers of the +navy to Admiral Dewey in November, 1898, show an undercurrent of deep +feeling at the position the Administration had put Admiral Dewey in +with Aguinaldo, when it decided to take the Philippines, and +accordingly sent out an army whose generals ignored his +protégé?</p> +<p>The speech of the provincial governor was followed, says the +Wilcox-Sargent report (same page) by speeches from “the other +officers who constitute the provincial government, the heads of the +three departments—justice, police, and internal revenue. Every +town in this province has the same organization.” Article III. of +Aguinaldo’s decree of June 18th, previous, providing an organic +law or constitution for his provisional government (see Chapter II., +<i>ante</i>) had provided precisely the organization which Wilcox and +Sargent thus saw working at Aparri and throughout the Cagayan valley in +October, 1898. The importance of all this to the question of how the +Filipinos feel toward us to-day, in this year of grace, 1912, and to +the element of righteousness there is in that feeling, is too obvious +to need comment. Americans interested in business in the Philippines +come back to this country from time <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb118" href="#pb118" name="pb118">118</a>]</span>to time and give out +interviews in the papers declaring that the Filipinos do not want +independence. What they really mean is that it makes no difference +whether they want it or not, they are not going to get it. And it is +precisely these Americans, and their business associates in the United +States, who have gotten through Congress the legislation which enables +them to give the Filipino just half of what he got ten years ago for +his hemp, and other like legislation, and the Filipinos know it. The +gulf in the Philippines between the dominant and the subject race will +continue to widen as the years go by, so long as indirect taxation +without representation continues to be perpetrated at Washington for +the benefit of special interests having a powerful lobby. If the +American people themselves are groaning under this very sort of thing, +and apparently unable to help themselves, what is the <i>a priori</i> +probability as to our voteless and therefore defenceless little brown +brother. Like the sheep before the shearer, he is dumb. But to return +to our travellers and their journey.</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">A Norwegian steamer came into port [meaning the harbor +of Aparri] that afternoon, and this seemed our only hope. She was +chartered by two Chinamen * * *. At first they refused us +permission to embark, and declined to put in at any port on the west +coast. No sooner was this related to Colonel Tirona than he sent notice +that the ship could not clear without taking us and making a landing +where we desired. This argument was convincing.</p> +</div> +<p>Colonel Tirona provided them with a letter addressed to Colonel +Tiño at Vigan, the chief town of the west coast of Luzon and the +capital of the province of Ilocos Sur, which province fronts the China +Sea. Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent proceeded aboard the Norwegian +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb119" href="#pb119" name= +"pb119">119</a>]</span>steamer from Aparri westward, doubling the +northwest corner of Luzon, and steaming thence due south to the nearest +port. Vigan was the Filipino military headquarters of the western half +of northern Luzon, just as Aparri was at the same time of the eastern +half. On the west coast the travellers were treated always courteously, +but with considerable suspicion. The explanation is easy. That region +is in closer touch with Manila, and with what is going on and may be +learned at the capital, than is the Cagayan valley which our tourists +had just left. They bade the commanding officer at Vigan good-bye, +November 13, 1898. Passing south through Namacpacan (which the command +I was with took a year or so later), they came to San Fernando de +Union, some twenty miles farther south along the coast road. Here they +met Colonel Tiño and presented their letter from Tirona. He gave +them a dinner, of course. How a Filipino does love to entertain, and +make you enjoy yourself! Talk about your “true Southern +hospitality”! You get it there. “Speeches were made, and +great things promised by the Philippine republic in the near +future” says Mr. Wilcox. After the dinner and speech-making came +the inevitable dance. After that Colonel Tiño started them off +on their journey southward toward Manila duly provided with carriages. +Passing Aringay on November 18, 1898<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3205src" href="#xd20e3205" name="xd20e3205src">3</a> our +travellers finally reached Dagupan, the northern terminus of the +Manila-Dagupan Railway, and there took a train for Manila, 120 miles +away.</p> +<p>In his report covering the fall of 1898, General Otis <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb120" href="#pb120" name= +"pb120">120</a>]</span>always scoldingly says of the Filipinos that in +all the parleyings of his commissioners with Aguinaldo’s +commissioners before the outbreak, the latter never did know what they +really wanted. The truth was they believed the Americans were going to +do with them exactly as every other white race they knew of had done +with every other brown race they knew of, but they did not tell General +Otis so. Mr. Wilcox, a more friendly witness of that same period states +their position thus at page twenty of the report to Admiral Dewey: +“They desire the protection of the United States at sea, but fear +any interference on land.” “On one point they seemed +united, viz., that whatever our government may have done for them, it +had not gained the right to annex them,” adding, in relation to +the physical preparations to make good this contention, in the event of +war, “The Philippine Government has an organized force in every +province we visited.”</p> +<p>The whole tone of the Wilcox-Sargent report and the subsequent +Wilcox book is an implied reiteration, after intimate, extended, and +friendly contact with the people of all Luzon north of the Pasig River, +of Admiral Dewey’s telegram sent to the Navy Department, June 23, +1898: “The people are far superior in intelligence and capacity +for self-government to the people of Cuba and I am familiar with both +races.” In fact Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent do not raise the +question of “capacity for self-government” at all, any more +than Commodore Perry did when similarly welcomed in 1854 by the +Japanese. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb121" href="#pb121" name= +"pb121">121</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3169" href="#xd20e3169src" name="xd20e3169">1</a></span> The six +main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao is always dealt with in this +book as a separate and distinct problem.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3180" href="#xd20e3180src" name="xd20e3180">2</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 196</i>, 56th Cong., 1st. Sess., p. 14.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3205" href="#xd20e3205src" name="xd20e3205">3</a></span> Here the +author’s commanding officer, Major Batson, was shot a year and a +day later while directing with his usual clear-headed intrepidity the +fire of a part of his battalion to protect the crossing of the rest of +it over the Aringay River, we being at the time in hot pursuit of +Aguinaldo, whose rear-guard made a stand in the trenches on the other +side of the river.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch7" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter VII</h2> +<h2 class="main">The Treaty of Paris</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">No man can serve two masters.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Matthew</span> vi., 24.</p> +<p>Confine the Empire within those limits which nature seems to have +fixed as its natural bulwarks and boundaries.</p> +<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">Augustus Cæsar’s +Will.</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">This is a tale of three cities, Paris, Washington, and +Manila.</p> +<p>Article III. of the Peace Protocol signed at Washington, August 12, +1898, provided:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, +and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace which +shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the +Philippines.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3242src" href="#xd20e3242" +name="xd20e3242src">1</a></p> +</div> +<p>The “Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain” including +the telegraphic correspondence between President McKinley and our Peace +Commissioners pending the negotiations, were sent to the Senate, +January 30, 1899, just one week before the final vote on the treaty, +but the injunction of secrecy was not removed until January 31, +1901—<i>after</i> the presidential election of 1900. They then +were published as <i>Senate Document 148</i>, 56th Congress, 2d +Session. It was not until then <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb122" +href="#pb122" name="pb122">122</a>]</span>that the veil was lifted. The +instructions to the Peace Commissioners were dated September 16, 1898. +The Commissioners were: William R. Day, of Ohio, Republican, just +previously Secretary of State, now (1912) Associate Justice of the +Supreme Court of the United States; Whitelaw Reid, Republican, then +editor of the <i>New York Tribune</i>, now Ambassador to Great Britain, +and three members of the United States Senate, Cushman K. Davis, of +Minnesota, William P. Frye, of Maine, Republicans, and George Gray, of +Delaware, Democrat. Senator Davis died in 1900, and Senator Frye in +1911. Senator Gray has been, since 1899, and is now, United States +Circuit Judge for the 3d Judicial District. Among other things, the +President’s instructions to the Commissioners said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It is my earnest wish that <i>the United States in +making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided +it in facing war</i>. * * * <i>The lustre and the moral +strength</i> attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon +the considerate judgment of the world <i>should not under any illusion +of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us</i> +* * * <i>into an adventurous departure on untried +paths</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>By elaborate rhetorical gradations, the instructions finally get +down to this:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the +commercial opportunity. * * * The United States cannot accept +less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of +Luzon.</p> +</div> +<p>Though already noticed, we venture, in this connection, again to +recall that in the month previous (August, 1898) a gentleman high in +the councils of the Administration<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3284src" +href="#xd20e3284" name="xd20e3284src">2</a> <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb123" href="#pb123" name= +"pb123">123</a>]</span>declared in one of the great reviews of the +period: “We see with sudden clearness that some of the most +revered of our political maxims have outlived their force.” Among +these “revered maxims” thus suddenly fossilized by his +<i lang="la">ipse dixit</i>, Mr. Vanderlip exuberantly includes the +teachings of “Washington’s Farewell Address and the later +crystallization of its main thought by President +Monroe”—the Monroe Doctrine, adding that in lieu of these +“A new mainspring * * * has become the directing force +* * * the mainspring of commercialism.”</p> +<p>As permanent chairman of the Philadelphia convention which +renominated Mr. McKinley for the Presidency thereafter, in 1900, +Senator Lodge, speaking of the issues raised by the Treaty of Paris, +said: “We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested in +the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in Trade +Expansion.”</p> +<p>“Philanthropy and five per cent. go hand in hand,” said +Mr. Vanderlip’s Chief, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage, +about the same time. Such was the temper of the times when the treaty +was made.</p> +<p>The first meeting with the Spanish Commissioners took place at +Paris, October 1st. The opening event of the meeting, the initial move +of the Spaniards, is extremely interesting in the light of subsequent +events, especially in connection with the Iloilo Fiasco, hereinafter +described (<a href="#ch9">Chapter IX</a>.).</p> +<p>“Spanish communication represents,” says Judge +Day’s cablegram to the President,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3307src" href="#xd20e3307" name="xd20e3307src">3</a> “that +<i>status quo</i> has been altered and continues to be altered to the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb124" href="#pb124" name= +"pb124">124</a>]</span>prejudice of Spain by Tagalo rebels, whom it +describes as <i>an auxiliary force</i> to the regular American +troops.”</p> +<p>Even diplomacy, in a conciliatory communication limited to the +obvious, called the Filipinos our allies.</p> +<p>The Spanish initial move was more immediately prompted by the fact +that in point of absolute astronomical time Manila, though captured +when it was morning of August 13th <i>there</i>, was captured when it +was evening of August 12th, at Washington, and the protocol was signed +at Washington in the evening of August 12th. While this point was +material, because we had captured $900,000 in cash in the Spanish +treasury at Manila and much other property, the title to which, under +the laws of war between civilized nations, depended on just <i>what +time</i> it was captured, the matter was finally swallowed up and lost +sight of in the agreement to give Spain a lump $20,000,000 for the +archipelago. But the initial move had other aspects. In the event we +should take the Philippines off her hands, Spain was going to insist +that we should get back from the Filipinos, our “allies,” +and restore to her all the Spaniards they captured after August 12th. +She knew that in all probability if we bought the Islands we would be +buying an insurrection, and she was “taking care of her +own” at our expense.</p> +<p>The next feature of the proceedings entitled to attention in a +bird’s-eye view like this, concerns the question whether we +should take only Luzon, or the whole archipelago. President McKinley +cabled Admiral Dewey on August 13th, the day after the protocol was +signed, asking as to “the desirability of the several +islands,” “coal <i>and other mineral deposits</i>,” +and “in a naval and commercial sense which (of the several +islands) would be most advantageous.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3335src" href="#xd20e3335" name="xd20e3335src">4</a> Admiral +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb125" href="#pb125" name= +"pb125">125</a>]</span>Dewey had replied, of course, that Luzon was +“the most desirable,” but volunteered no advice. He +<i>did</i> state, “No coal of good quality can be procured in the +Philippine Islands,” which is still true. Allusion is made to +this telegram in the proceedings, but no copy of it is there set forth. +On October 4th, our Commissioners wired President McKinley suggesting +that he cable out to the Admiral and ask him “whether it would be +better * * * to retain Luzon * * * or the whole +group.” Mr. McKinley answered that he had asked Admiral Dewey +before General Merritt left Manila to give the latter his views in +writing “on general question of Philippines,” and that +“his report is in your hands in response to both +questions.” But the commission replied that Admiral Dewey had +sent only a copy of a report of General Francis V. Greene’s and +nothing else. There is no record of any further advice or opinion from +Admiral Dewey on the point except that in General Otis’s Report +(p. 67) we get glimpses of a telegram that has never yet, apparently, +been published, sent by Dewey to Washington early in December, 1898, +suggesting that we “interfere as little as possible in the +internal affairs of the Islands.” No; Admiral Dewey must be +acquitted of having ever counselled the McKinley Administration to buy +the Philippines.</p> +<p>On October 7th the Commission telegraphed Washington that General +Merritt attaches much weight to the opinion of the Belgian Consul at +Manila, M. André, and that “Consul says United States must +take all or nothing”; that “if southern islands remained +with Spain they would be in constant revolt, and United States would +have a second Cuba”; that “Spanish government would not +improve,” and “would still protect monks in their +extortion.” <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb126" href="#pb126" +name="pb126">126</a>]</span></p> +<p>To this advice there was absolutely no answer. It <i>was</i> a case +of “all or nothing,” and it had already become a case of +“all” when on September 16th previous Mr. McKinley signed +his original instructions to the Commission stating “The United +States cannot accept less than Luzon.”</p> +<p>The Commission’s telegram of October 7th goes on to quote from +the Belgian Consul’s opinion that “Present rebellion +represents only one half of one per cent. of the inhabitants.” +The Consul was not before them in person. They were quoting from a +memorandum submitted by him to General Merritt at Merritt’s +request, made at Manila and dated August 29th, the day General Merritt +sailed away from Manila bound for Paris via the Suez Canal. He had +brought the memorandum along with him. From the previous chapters the +reader will, of course, understand that Americans and Europeans at +Manila in August, 1898, were paying very little attention to Aguinaldo +and his claims as to the extent of his authority in the provinces. It +is therefore not surprising that M. André’s memorandum of +August 29th should have made the foolish statement, “Present +rebellion represents only one half of one per cent. of +inhabitants.” But it is eternally regrettable that his statement +on this point had any weight with the Commissioners, for it was, or by +that time at least (October 7th) had become, just about 99½ per +cent. wide of the mark. As a matter of fact, by October 7th it would +have been more accurate to have said, in lieu of the above, +“Present rebellion represents practically whole people.” +You see, we started an insurrection in May, in October it had become a +full grown affair, and in December we bought it. The telegram of +October 7th also quoted General Merritt as saying, “Insurgents +would be victorious unless Spaniards did <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb127" href="#pb127" name="pb127">127</a>]</span>better in future than +in past,” and as considering it “feasible for United States +to take Luzon and perhaps some adjacent islands and hold them as +England does her colonies.” These are about the only two sound +suggestions General Merritt made to that Commission. In the next breath +they quote him as saying, “Natives could not resist 5000 +troops.” The fact that they did resist more than 120,000 troops, +that it took more than that, all told, to put down the insurrection, is +sufficient to show how much General Merritt’s advice was worth. +He was right on two points, as indicated. Both Spanish fleets had been +destroyed and Spain had but one left to protect her home coast cities. +The death knell of her once proud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit +as she was, she could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the +Philippines. Besides the Filipinos would have “eaten them +up.” General Merritt’s suggestion to “hold them as +England does her colonies” was also sensible. In fact that was +the only thoroughly honest thing to have done, if we were going to take +them at all. England never acts the hypocrite with her colonies. <i>She +makes them behave.</i> She does not let native people preach sedition +in native newspapers, because of “sentimental bosh” about +freedom of the press, until the whole country becomes a smouldering +hot-bed of sedition. She <i>has</i> blown offending natives from the +cannon’s mouth, when deemed necessary to cure them and their +country of the desire for independence. If we are going to have +colonies at all, we ought to govern them with the upright downright +ruthless honesty of the British. <i>It is more merciful in the long +run.</i> But we ought not to have colonies at all. For if there is one +thing this republic stands for, above all other things, it is the +righteousness of aversion to a foreign yoke. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb128" href="#pb128" name="pb128">128</a>]</span></p> +<p>In their telegram of October 7th,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3369src" href="#xd20e3369" name="xd20e3369src">5</a> the Peace +Commissioners, now squarely confronted with the question of forcible +annexation, begin to let the Administration down easy. They say:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">General Anderson in correspondence with Aguinaldo in +June and July seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and native +authorities, <i>but subsequently changed his tone</i>. Merritt and +Dewey both kept clear of any <i>compromising</i> communications.</p> +</div> +<p>A despatch sent by Judge Day certainly comes from high authority. +The word “compromising” is therefore important. To say that +Admiral Dewey did not treat Aguinaldo as an ally is to raise a mere +technical point. But Aguinaldo never did get anything from him in +writing. What he got consisted more of deeds than words. And actions +speak louder than words. We <i>had</i> an alliance with Aguinaldo, a +most “compromising” alliance and afterwards repudiated it. +Admiral Dewey made it and General Merritt repudiated it. Dewey did, +without the President’s knowledge, exactly what the President and +the American people would have had him do at the time. And Merritt did +exactly what the President ordered him to do. But between the making of +the alliance, and the repudiation of it, the President and the American +people changed their minds. I say the American people, because they +afterwards ratified all that Mr. McKinley did. You see the bitterness +that lies away down in the secret recesses of the hearts of the +Filipino people to-day has its source at this point. They had “a +gentleman’s agreement,” as it were, with us, not in +writing, made at a time when the thought of a colony had never entered +our minds. They fought in a common cause with us <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb129" href="#pb129" name="pb129">129</a>]</span>on +the faith of that agreement—drove the Spaniards into Manila in +numerous victorious engagements involving much loss of life, on their +part, keeping the Dons thereafter bottled up in Manila on the land side +while their “ally” Admiral Dewey was doing the same on the +sea side. The said Dons were living on horses and rats, and famine was +imminent when our troops arrived and began to finish the work of taking +the beleaguered city. And then, having changed our minds and decided to +annex the islands, we repudiated our “gentleman’s +agreement,” on the idea that the end justified the means. And the +end, as it has turned out, did not even justify the means, seeing that +the islands have proved a heavy financial liability instead of a +profitable asset. Judge Day’s telegram to Secretary Hay of +October 12th (p. 27) contains this curious and surprising passage as to +Cuba:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Senator Gray in favor of accepting sovereignty +unconditionally * * * that we may thereby avoid future +complications with Cubans, claiming sovereignty while we are in process +of pacifying island * * * We desire instructions on this +point.</p> +</div> +<p>The future of Cuba, however, trembled in the balance but for a +moment. Before “the shell-burred cables” had had time to +quit vibrating with the question thus propounded, there came back this +splendidly clean-cut answer from the President:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We must carry out the spirit and letter of the +resolution of Congress [declaring war].</p> +</div> +<p>In characterizing Judge Gray’s position, above indicated, as +“surprising,” no reflection upon him is intended. On the +contrary, such a position, assumed by a <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb130" href="#pb130" name="pb130">130</a>]</span>man of such conceded +intellectual probity, is illuminating as to the attitude subsequently +taken concerning the Philippines by the Democratic Senators who voted +for the treaty. This attitude is stated by Senator Lodge, in his +<i>History of the War with Spain</i>, with all the incisive +forcefulness to which the country has so long been accustomed in the +public utterances of that distinguished man, and, seeing that no +promise had been made, as in the case of Cuba, Senator Lodge’s +statement of the position of those who voted for the treaty should +forever set at rest the stale injustice, still occasionally repeated, +that Mr. Bryan, “played politics” in 1898–9 in urging +his friends in the Senate to vote for its ratification. Says Senator +Lodge (<i>History of the War with Spain</i>, p. 231):</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The friends of ratification took the very simple +ground that the treaty committed the United States to no policy, but +left them free to do exactly as seemed best with all the islands; that +the American people could be safely entrusted with this grave +responsibility, and that patriotism and common sense alike demanded the +end of the war and the re-establishment of peace, which could only be +effected by the adoption of the treaty.</p> +</div> +<p>October 14th, Washington wires the commission that Admiral Dewey has +just cabled:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It is important that the disposition of the Philippine +Islands should be decided as soon as possible. * * * General +anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila. +Natives appear unable to govern.</p> +</div> +<p>In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately repeated as true +some wild rumors then currently accepted by the Europeans and Americans +at Manila which of course were impossible of verification. I say +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb131" href="#pb131" name= +"pb131">131</a>]</span>“unfortunately” with some +earnestness, because it does not appear on the face of his message that +they <i>were</i> mere rumors. And, that they were wholly erroneous, in +point of fact, has already been cleared up in previous chapters, +wherein the real state of peace, order and tranquillity which prevailed +throughout Luzon at that time has been, it is believed, put beyond all +doubt. But what manna in the wilderness to the McKinley Administration, +now that it was bent on taking the islands, was that Dewey message of +October 14th, “The natives appear unable to govern”!</p> +<p>On October 17th, Mr. Day wires Mr. Hay that the Peace Commissioners +feel the importance of preserving, so far as possible, the condition of +things existing at the time of signing the protocol, to prevent any +change in the <i>status quo</i>. He says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Might not our government * * * take more +active and positive measures than heretofore for preservation of order +and protection of life and property in Philippine Islands?</p> +</div> +<p>How could we, when Aguinaldo and his people were in the saddle all +over Luzon, had taken the <i>status quo</i> between their teeth and run +away with it, and were prepared to fight if bidden to halt and +dismount; and, which is more, were preserving order perfectly +themselves?</p> +<p>On October 19th, Mr. Hay repeated by wire to Mr. Day a cablegram +from General Otis which said: “Do not anticipate trouble with +insurgents * * * Affairs progressing favorably.”</p> +<p>General Otis was making a desperate effort to humor Mr. +McKinley’s “consent-of-the-governed” theory and +programme. But it was a situation, not a theory, which confronted him. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb132" href="#pb132" name= +"pb132">132</a>]</span></p> +<p>The date of the high-water mark of the Paris peace negotiations is +October 25th. On that day, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning +Philippine Islands are set forth in statements transmitted (by cable +also) herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit +instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in joint +commission almost immediately.</p> +</div> +<p>Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, sent a joint signed statement. They +urged taking over the whole archipelago, saying that, as their +instructions provided for the retention at least of Luzon, “we do +not consider the question of remaining in the Philippine Islands as at +all now properly before us.” They also urged that as Spain +governed and defended the islands from Manila, we became, with the +destruction of her fleet and the surrender of her army, “as +complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with nothing +needed to complete the conquest save to proceed with the <i>ample</i> +forces we had at hand to take <i>unopposed</i> possession.” The +vice of this proposition, from the strategic as well as the ethical +point of view, is of course clear enough <i>now</i>.</p> +<p>Spain’s government was already tottering in the Philippines +when the Spanish-American war broke out. To be “as complete +masters as she had been” was like becoming the recipient of a +quit-claim deed. Also, ours was not a case of taking “unopposed +possession.” An adverse claimant, relying on immemorial +prescription, was in full possession; all the tenants on the land had +attorned to him, and he and they were ready to defend their claim +against all comers with their lives. They reminded one of the recurrent +small farmer whom <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb133" href="#pb133" +name="pb133">133</a>]</span>some great timber or other corporation +seeks to oust, patrolling his land lines rifle in hand, on the lookout +for the corporation’s agent and the sheriff with the +dispossessory warrant.</p> +<p>Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid go on to say:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Military and naval witnesses agree that it would be +practically as easy to hold and defend the whole as a part.</p> +</div> +<p>Hardly any one can fail to read with interest the following accurate +and vivid picture which they give of the physical strategic unity of +the Philippine Islands:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">There is hardly a single island in the group from +which you cannot shoot across to one or more of the +others—scarcely another archipelago in the world in which the +islands are crowded so closely together and so interdependent.</p> +</div> +<p>This explains also why the Filipino people are <i>a people</i>. +Whenever the American people understand that, they will give them their +independence, unless they get an idea that government <i>of</i> their +people <i>by</i> their people <i>for</i> their people would be +distasteful to them.</p> +<p>In the memorandum of their views telegraphed to Washington on +October 25th, Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid also say:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Public opinion in Europe, <i>including that of +Rome</i>, expects us to retain whole of Philippine Islands.</p> +</div> +<p>Archbishop Chapelle was in Paris at the time of these negotiations. +He afterwards told the writer in Manila that he got that $20,000,000 +put in the Treaty of Paris. The Church preferred that our title should +be a title by purchase rather than a title by conquest, and Mr. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb134" href="#pb134" name= +"pb134">134</a>]</span>McKinley was vigorously urging the latter. +Between the legal effects of the two, there is a world of difference. +The Church outgeneralled the President—checkmated him with a +bishop. Look at that part of the treaty which affects church +property:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Article VIII. The * * * cession +* * * cannot in any respect impair the property or rights +* * * of * * * ecclesiastical * * * +bodies.</p> +</div> +<p>The Church of Rome, or at least some of the ecclesiastical bodies +pertaining to it in the Philippines, owned the cream of the +agricultural estates. By the treaty they have not lost a dollar. It +might have been otherwise, had not Mr. McKinley’s original claim +of title by conquest been overcome at Paris.</p> +<p>Judge Day’s memorandum of his own views, telegraphed on +October 25th along with those of his colleagues, stated that he was +unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the entire +Philippine group; that</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>In the spirit of our instructions</i>, and bearing +in mind the often declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom +from designs of conquest with which the war was undertaken, <i>we +should be consistent</i> in demands in making peace * * * +with due regard to our responsibility because of <i>the conduct of our +military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>Again, he says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We cannot leave the insurgents either to form a +government [he of course did not know what a complete government they +had already formed] or to battle against a foe which * * * +might readily overcome them.</p> +</div> +<p>He also was of course unaware how thoroughly anxious the Spaniards +then in the Philippines were to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb135" +href="#pb135" name="pb135">135</a>]</span>get away, and how completely +they were at the mercy of the new Philippine Republic and its forces. +“On all hands” says Judge Day, “it is agreed that the +inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government.” Of +course we knew absolutely nothing worth mentioning about the Filipinos +at that time. Judge Day then proposes, for the reasons indicated, to +accept Luzon and some adjacent islands, as being of “strategic +advantage,” and to leave Spain the rest, with a “treaty +stipulation for non-alienation without the consent of the United +States.” It seems to me that Judge Day’s scheme was the +least desirable of all.</p> +<p>Senator Gray’s memorandum of the same date is a red-hot +argument against taking over any part of the archipelago. He begins +thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The undersigned cannot agree that it is wise to take +Philippine Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse +accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted upon +through our history. * * * It will make necessary +* * * immense sums for fortifications and harbors +* * * Climate and social conditions demoralizing to character +of American youth * * *. On whole, instead of indemnity, +injury * * *. Cannot agree that any obligation incurred to +insurgents * * *. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had +helped us, would not be our duty to stay by them at the conclusion of +war * * *. No place for * * * government of subject +people in American system * * *. Even conceding all benefits +claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon * * * the moral +grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of +the world * * * for doubtful material advantages and +<i>shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully +assumed</i>. * * * Now that we have achieved all and more +than our object, <i>let us simply keep our word</i> * * *. +<i>Above all let us not make a mockery of the</i> [President’s] +<i>instructions</i>, where, after stating that we took <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb136" href="#pb136" name="pb136">136</a>]</span>up +arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity * * * and +that we had no designs of aggrandizement and no ambition for conquest, +the President * * * eloquently says: “It is my earnest +wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high +rule of conduct which guided it in facing war.”</p> +</div> +<p>The next day, October 26th, came this laconic answer:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. +The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must be required.</p> +</div> +<p>Probably the one thing about the Paris Peace negotiations that is +sure to interest the average American most at this late date is the +matter of how we came to pay that twenty millions. It was this way. On +October 27th, the Commission wired Washington:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Last night Spanish ambassador called upon Mr. +Reid.</p> +</div> +<p>It seems they talked long and earnestly far into the night, trying +to find a way which would prevent the conference from resulting in +sudden disruption, and consequent resumption of the war. Mr. Reid made +plain the inflexible determination of the American people not to assume +the Cuban debt. The Ambassador said: “Montero Rios<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e3573src" href="#xd20e3573" name="xd20e3573src">6</a> +<i>could not return to Madrid</i> now if known to have accepted entire +Cuban indebtedness,” and asked delay to see “if some +concessions elsewhere might not be found which would save Spanish +Commissioners from utter repudiation at home.” There is no doubt +that the talk we are now considering was a “heart-to-heart” +affair, probably quite informal. Yet it is one of the most important +talks that have <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb137" href="#pb137" +name="pb137">137</a>]</span>occurred between any two men in this world +in the last fifty years. Mr. Reid finally threw out a hint to the +effect that as the preponderance of American public sentiment seemed +rather inclined to retain the Philippines, “It was +possible,” he said, “but not probable that out of these +conditions the Spanish Commissioners might find something <i>either in +territory or debt</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e3583src" href= +"#xd20e3583" name="xd20e3583src">7</a> which might <i>seem to their +people at least like a concession</i>.!”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3590src" href="#xd20e3590" name="xd20e3590src">8</a></p> +<p>It was the leaven of this hint that leavened the whole loaf. There +was doubtless much informal parleying after that, but finally, the +American Commissioners, having become satisfied that Spanish honor +would not be offended by an offer having the substance, if not the +form, of charity, and being very tired of Spain’s sparring for +wind in the hope of a European coalition against us should war be +resumed, submitted the following proposal:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The Government of the United States is unable to +modify the proposal heretofore made for the cession of the entire +archipelago of the Philippine Islands, but the American Commissioners +are authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession should be agreed +to, the sum of $20,000,000.</p> +</div> +<p>This alluring offer was accompanied with the stern announcement +that</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Upon the acceptance * * * of the proposals +herein made * * * <i>but not otherwise</i>, it will be +possible * * * to proceed to the consideration +* * * of other matters.</p> +</div> +<p>Also, our Commissioners wired Washington: <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb138" href="#pb138" name="pb138">138</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">If the Spanish Commissioners refuse our proposition +* * * nothing remains except to close the negotiations.</p> +</div> +<p>This was very American and very final. Washington answered: +“Your proposed action approved.”</p> +<p>November 29th, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Spanish Commissioners at to-day’s conference +presented a definite and final acceptance of our last proposition.</p> +</div> +<p>And that is how that twenty millions found its way into the +treaty—not forgetting the prayers and other contemporaneous +activities of Archbishop Chapelle.</p> +<p>After the tremendous eight weeks’ tension had relaxed, and +before the final reduction to writing of all the details, we see this +dear little telegram, from Secretary of State Hay, himself a writer of +note, come bravely paddling into port, where it was cordially received +by both sides, taken in out of the wet, and put under the shelter of +the treaty:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Mr. Hay to Mr. Day: In renewing conventional +arrangements do not lose sight of copyright agreement.</p> +</div> +<p>And here is the last act of the drama:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Mr. Day to Mr. Hay, Paris, December 10, 1898: Treaty +signed at 8.50 this evening.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb139" href="#pb139" name= +"pb139">139</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3242" href="#xd20e3242src" name="xd20e3242">1</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 62</i>, pt. 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898–9, +p. 283.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3284" href="#xd20e3284src" name="xd20e3284">2</a></span> Hon. +Frank A. Vanderlip, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, now +(1912) President of the National City Bank, New York, in the <i>Century +Magazine</i>, August, 1898.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3307" href="#xd20e3307src" name="xd20e3307">3</a></span> <i>S. D. +148</i>, p. 15.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3335" href="#xd20e3335src" name="xd20e3335">4</a></span> <i>Navy +Department Report</i> for 1898, Appendix, p. 122.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3369" href="#xd20e3369src" name="xd20e3369">5</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 148</i>, p. 19.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3573" href="#xd20e3573src" name="xd20e3573">6</a></span> Chairman +of the Spanish Commission.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3583" href="#xd20e3583src" name="xd20e3583">7</a></span> Meaning +evidently payment of some of Spain’s debts with money she could +probably get from us for the asking, as a matter of sympathy for the +fellow who is “down and out.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3590" href="#xd20e3590src" name="xd20e3590">8</a></span> Mr. +McKinley had before that sent word significantly that he was not +unmindful of the distressing financial embarrassments of Spain.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch8" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter VIII</h2> +<h2 class="main">The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">Prometheus stole the heavenly fire from the altar of +Jupiter to benefit mankind, and Jupiter thereupon punished both +Prometheus and the rest of mankind by creating and giving to them the +woman Pandora, a supposed blessing but a real curse. Pandora brought +along a box of blessings, and when she opened it, everything flew out +and away but Hope.</p> +<p class="xd20e236"><i>Tales from Æschylus.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">The ever-memorable Benevolent Assimilation +Proclamation, the Pandora box of Philippine woes, was signed December +21, 1898, and its contents were let loose in the Philippines on January +1, 1899.</p> +<p>Let us consider for a moment the total misapprehension of conditions +in the islands under which Mr. McKinley drafted and signed that famous +document—a misapprehension due to General Otis’s curious +blindness to the great vital fact of the situation, viz., that the +Filipinos were bent on independence from the first, and preparing to +fight for it to the last. Take the following Otis utterance, for +example, concerning a date when practically everybody in the Eighth +Army Corps, and every newspaper correspondent in the Philippines, +recognized that war would be certain in the event the Paris Peace +negotiations should result, as common rumor then said they would +result, in our taking over the islands:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory +solution of the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb140" href="#pb140" name= +"pb140">140</a>]</span>from a despatch sent to Washington on December +7th, wherein I stated that conditions were improving, and that there +were signs of revolutionary disintegration.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3659src" href="#xd20e3659" name="xd20e3659src">1</a></p> +</div> +<p>There can be no doubt that, at the date of that despatch, General +Otis had been given to understand that under the Treaty of Paris we +were going to keep the islands <i>if</i> the treaty should be ratified, +and also that the <i>if</i> might give the Administration trouble, +should trouble arise with the Filipinos before the <i>if</i> was +disposed of at home. As heretofore intimated, in addition to his +preference for legal and administrative work to the work of his +profession, in the Philippines General Otis constituted himself from +the beginning a political henchman. Ample evidence will be introduced +later on to show beyond all doubt that all through the early +difficulties, when the American people should have been frankly dealt +with and given the facts, General Otis would, in the exercise of his +military powers as press censor, always say to the war correspondents, +“I will let nothing go that will hurt the +Administration.”</p> +<p>Let us see what the real facts of the Philippine situation were at +the date of the Treaty of Paris, December 10th, or, which is the same +thing, when General Otis sent his despatch of December 7th. When the +Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in possession of Manila +and Cavite, with less than 20,000 men under his command, and Aguinaldo +was in possession of practically all the rest of the archipelago, with +between 35,000 and 40,000 men under his command, armed with guns, and +the whole Filipino population were in sympathy with the army of their +country. We have already seen the conditions in the various provinces +at that time and also the inauguration of the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb141" href="#pb141" name= +"pb141">141</a>]</span>native central government. Let us now examine +the military figures.</p> +<p>Ten thousand American soldiers were on hand when Manila was +captured, August 13th, and 5000 more had arrived under command of +Major-General Elwell S. Otis a week or so after the fall of the +city.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3682src" href="#xd20e3682" name= +"xd20e3682src">2</a> They had 13,000 Spanish soldiers to guard. In +addition to this, by the terms of the capitulation, the city +(population say 300,000), its inhabitants, its churches and educational +establishments, and its private property of all descriptions had been +placed “under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the +American army.”<a class="noteref" id="n169.2src" href="#n169.2" +name="n169.2src">3</a> Some 4500 to 5000 more troops began to swarm out +of San Francisco bound for Manila in the latter part of October, 1898, +the last of them reaching Manila December 11th, the day after the +Treaty of Paris was signed. After that there were no further additions +to General Otis’s command prior to the outbreak of war with the +Filipinos, February 4, 1899.<a class="pseudonoteref" href= +"#n169.2">3</a> Of these (approximately) 20,000 men, only 1500 to 2000 +were regulars, having the Krag-Jorgensen smokeless gun. The rest were +State volunteers, armed with the antiquated Springfield rifles, the +same the 71st New York and the 2d Massachusetts had been permitted to +carry into the Santiago campaign the summer before. Aguinaldo’s +people were equipped entirely with Mausers captured from the Spaniards, +and other rifles, bought in Hong Kong mostly, using smokeless +ammunition. Major (now Major-General) J. F. Bell, who is, in the +judgment of many, one of the best all-round soldiers in the American +army to-day, was in charge of the “Division of Military +Information” at Manila both before and after the taking of the +city. General Bell <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb142" href="#pb142" +name="pb142">142</a>]</span>has done many fine things, in the way of +reckless bravery in battle at the critical moment and of bold +reconnoitring in campaign, and what he fails to find out about an +enemy, or a prospective enemy, is not apt to be ascertainable. In a +report bearing date August 29, 1898,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3697src" href="#xd20e3697" name="xd20e3697src">4</a> prepared in +anticipation of possible trouble with the Filipinos, he estimated the +number of men under arms that Aguinaldo had at between 35,000 and +40,000. This estimate is based by General Bell in his report on the +number of guns out in the hands of the Filipinos, which he figures +thus:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Captured from Spanish militia</td> +<td>12,500</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>From Cavite arsenal</td> +<td>2,500</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>From Jackson & Evans (American merchants trading with Hong +Kong)</td> +<td>2,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>From Spanish (captured in battle)</td> +<td>8,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>In hands of Filipinos previous to May 1, 1898</td> +<td>15,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Total</td> +<td class="sum">40,000</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>From this number General Bell deducts several thousands as having +been recaptured by the Spaniards, or bought in. I at once hear some +former comrade-in-arms of the Philippine insurrection say: “Oh, +no. They couldn’t have had as many as 40,000 guns, or near +that.” I thought the same thing when I first read General +Bell’s report on the matter. But he removes the doubt thus: +“They are being continually sent away to other +provinces.”</p> +<p>We did not understand Aguinaldo’s movements then. All his +troops were not around Manila. From what I learned from General Lawton +and his staff in 1899, my belief is that Aguinaldo had perhaps 30,000 +men with guns around Manila, and out along the railroad, at +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb143" href="#pb143" name= +"pb143">143</a>]</span>the time of the outbreak of February 4th. It is +idle, of course, at this late date, to claim that the Filipinos were +not bent on independence from the first. The matured plans of their +leaders, formulated at Hong Kong May 4, 1898, before they ever started +the insurrection, preserved in the captured minutes of the meeting +already noticed,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3741src" href="#xd20e3741" +name="xd20e3741src">5</a> provide the programme to be adopted in the +event we should be tempted to keep the islands. In that event, they +were prepared against surprise, or any necessity for making new plans, +and were agreed to accept war as inevitable. From the first, they made +ready for it.</p> +<p>Governmentally and strategically, the Philippine Islands, except +Mohammedan Mindanao, which is a separate and distinct problem, may be +described very simply and sufficiently as consisting of the great +island of Luzon, on which Manila is situated, and the Visayan +group.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3749src" href="#xd20e3749" name= +"xd20e3749src">6</a> We are already familiar with the conditions in +Luzon in December, 1898. You hear a great deal about the Philippine +archipelago consisting of a thousand and one islands, but there are +only eight that are, broadly speaking, worth considering here. The +moment a jagged submarine ledge peeps out of the water it becomes an +island. And even before that it may wreck a ship. But we are talking +about islands that need to be charted on the sea of world politics. The +Visayan Islands that really count at all in a great problem such as +that we are now considering, are but six in number: Panay, capital +Iloilo; Cebu, capital Cebu; Bohol, Negros, Samar, and Leyte.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e3753src" href="#xd20e3753" name="xd20e3753src">7</a> +Iloilo is <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb144" href="#pb144" name= +"pb144">144</a>]</span>some three hundred and odd miles south of +Manila, and, besides being the capital of Panay, is the chief port of +the Visayas and the second city of the archipelago, Cebu being the +third. Under the Spaniards, as now under us, a vessel might clear from +either of these places for any part of the world. As we saw in the +chapter preceding this, as early as November 18th, Admiral Dewey had +cabled Washington that the entire island of Panay was in possession of +insurgents, except Iloilo. By the end of December, all the Spanish +garrisons in the Visayan Islands had surrendered to the insurgents. +(<i>Otis’s Report</i>, p. 61.) Iloilo did not surrender to the +insurgents until the day before Christmas. But let us not +anticipate.</p> +<p>December 13th, General Otis received a petition for protection +signed by the business men and firms of Iloilo (p. 54), sent of course +with the approval of the general commanding the imperilled Spanish +garrison. December 14th, he wired Washington for instructions as to +what action he should take on this petition, saying, among other +things, “Spanish authorities are still holding out, but <i>will +receive</i> American troops”; and adding one of his inevitable +notes of optimism as to the tameness of Filipino aspirations (at +Iloilo) for independence: “Insurgents reported favorable to +American annexation.”</p> +<p>General Otis knew the Spanish troops were hard pressed by the +insurgents down at Iloilo, and eagerly awaited a reply. President +McKinley was then away from Washington, on a southern trip, to Atlanta +and Macon, Georgia, and other points, and nobody at home was giving any +thought to the Filipinos, while they were knocking successively at the +gates of the various Visayan capitals, and receiving the surrender of +their Spanish defenders. It was getting toward the yuletide +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb145" href="#pb145" name= +"pb145">145</a>]</span>season. President McKinley was engaged, quite +seasonably, in putting the finishing touches to the great work of his +life, which was welding the North and the South together forever by +wise and kindly manipulation of the countless opportunities to do so +presented by the latest war. It was a season of general peace and +rejoicing in a thrice-blessed land, and nobody in the United States was +looking for trouble with the Filipinos. With our people it was a case +of ignorance being bliss, so far as the Philippine Islands and their +inhabitants were concerned. In his <i>Autobiography of Seventy +Years</i>, Senator Hoar tells of an interview with President McKinley +concerning his (the Senator’s) attitude toward the Treaty of +Paris, early in December, 1898.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3777src" +href="#xd20e3777" name="xd20e3777src">8</a> “He greeted me with +the delightful and affectionate cordiality which I always found in him. +He took me by the hand, and said: ‘How are you feeling this +winter, Mr. Senator?’ I was determined there should be no +misunderstanding. I replied at once: ‘Pretty pugnacious, I +confess, Mr. President.’ The tears came into his eyes and he +said, grasping my hand again: ‘I shall always love you whatever +you do.’”</p> +<p>It behooves this nation, and all nations, to consider those tears. +They explain all the subsequent history of the Philippines to date. Mr. +McKinley had proved himself a gallant soldier in his youth, and he knew +something of the horrors of war. He was also one of the most amiable +gentlemen that ever lived. But it is no disrespect to his memory to say +that while Mr. McKinley was a good man, Senator Hoar was his superior +in moral fibre, and he knew it, and he knew the country knew it. He +knew that Senator Hoar was going to fight the ratification of the +treaty to the last ditch, speaking for the Rights of Man and such old +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb146" href="#pb146" name= +"pb146">146</a>]</span>“worn out formulæ,” and that +his only defence before the bar of history would have to rest on +“Trade Expansion,” alias the “Almighty Dollar.” +Those tears were harbingers of the coming strife in the Philippines. +They were shed for such lives as that strife might cost. They were an +assumption of responsibility for such shedding of blood as the treaty +might entail. The President returned to Washington from his southern +trip on December 21st, and on December 23d (p. 55) cabled General Otis +the following reply to his request of December 14th for +instructions:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Send necessary troops to Iloilo, to <i>preserve the +peace</i> and protect life and property. <i>It is most important that +there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory but +firm.</i></p> +</div> +<p>Senator Hoar had put Mr. McKinley on notice that he was going to +present the ethics of the case in the debate on the treaty. Congress +had gone home for the holidays, and after it re-assembled in January +the treaty would come up. The vote was sure to be close, and a too +vigorous manifestation of belief on the part of the Filipinos that this +nation was <i>not</i> closing the war with Spain animated by “the +same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war” (Mr. +McKinley’s instructions to the Peace Commissioners) might defeat +the ratification of the treaty. Indeed, the final vote of February 6th, +was so close that the Administration had but one vote to spare. The +final vote was fifty-seven to twenty-seven—just one over the +necessary two-thirds. The smoke of a battle to subjugate the Filipinos +might “dim the lustre and the moral strength,” as Mr. +McKinley had expressed it in his instructions to the Peace +Commissioners, of a war to free the Cubans. Therefore there must be no +trouble, at <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb147" href="#pb147" name= +"pb147">147</a>]</span>least until after the ratification of the +treaty. President McKinley had invented in the case of Cuba a very +catchy phrase, “Forcible annexation would be criminal +aggression,” and every time anybody now quoted it on him it +tended to take the wind out of his sails. So benevolently eager was +that truly kind-hearted and Christian gentleman to avoid the appearance +of “criminal aggression” that he evidently got to thinking +about that telegram of December 23d in which he had authorized General +Otis to send troops to the relief of the beleaguered Spanish garrison +at Iloilo, and also about the message from Admiral Dewey received +November 18th previous, to the effect that the entire island of Panay +except Iloilo was then already in the hands of the insurgents. The +result was that he decided not to let his conciliatory proclamation of +December 21st await the slow process of the mails, and therefore, +though it consisted of something like one thousand words, he had it +cabled out to General Otis in full on December 27th. It is now here +reproduced in full because it precipitated the war in the Philippines, +and is the key to all our subsequent dealings with them<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e3800src" href="#xd20e3800" name= +"xd20e3800src">9</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">THE BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION PROCLAMATION</p> +<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Executive Mansion, +Washington</span>, December 21, 1898.</p> +<p>The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the +United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed +by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, +practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb148" href="#pb148" name= +"pb148">148</a>]</span>suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With +the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and +Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th +instant, and as a result of the victories of American arms, <i>the +future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands +are ceded to the United States</i>. In the fulfilment of the <i>rights +of sovereignty</i> thus acquired and the responsible obligations of +government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of +the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately +necessary, and the <i>military government</i> heretofore maintained by +the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila <i>is to be +extended</i> with all possible despatch <i>to the whole of the ceded +territory</i>. In performing this duty the military commander of the +United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the +Philippine Islands that in <i>succeeding to the sovereignty of +Spain</i>, in severing the former political relations, and in +establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States +is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the +people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private +rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the +forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner +that <i>we come</i> not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, +<i>to protect</i> the natives in their homes, in their employments, and +in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by +active aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the Government of +the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will +receive the reward of its support and <i>protection</i>. All others +will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness +if need be, but without severity, so far as possible. Within the +absolute domain of <i>military authority</i>, which necessarily is and +<i>must remain supreme</i> in the ceded territory until the legislation +of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the +territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression +of crime are to be considered as continuing <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb149" href="#pb149" name="pb149">149</a>]</span>in +force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, so far as +practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be +performed by such officers as may accept <i>the supremacy of the United +States</i> by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen, as +far as practicable, from the inhabitants of the islands. While the +control of all the public property and the revenues of the state passes +with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means +of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the +United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or +corporations, is to be respected except for cause duly established. The +taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late +government become payable to the authorities of the United States +unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or +modes of contribution to the expenses of government, whether general or +local. If private property be taken for military use, it shall be paid +for when possible in cash, at a fair valuation, and when payment in +cash is not practicable, receipts are to be given. All ports and places +in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and +naval forces of the United States will be opened to the commerce of all +friendly nations. All goods and wares not prohibited for military +reasons by due announcement of the military authority will be admitted +upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at +the time of their importation. Finally, it should be the earnest wish +and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, +respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by +assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual +rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by +proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of</p> +<p>BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION</p> +<p>substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. +In the fulfilment of this high mission, supporting <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb150" href="#pb150" name="pb150">150</a>]</span>the +temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the +governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of +authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the +bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people +of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">William McKinley.</span></p> +</div> +<p>The words used in the foregoing proclamation which were regarded by +the Filipinos as “fighting words,” <i>i. e.</i>, as making +certain the long anticipated probability of a war for independence, are +those which appear in italics. The rest of the proclamation counted for +nothing with them. They had been used to the hollow rhetoric and +flowery promises of equally eloquent Spanish proclamations all their +lives, they and their fathers before them.</p> +<p>In suing to President McKinley for peace on July 22d, previous, the +Prime Minister of Spain had justified all the atrocities committed and +permitted by his government in Cuba during the thirty years’ +struggle for independence there which preceded the Spanish-American War +by saying that what Spain had done had been prompted only by a +“desire to spare the great island from the dangers of premature +independence.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3880src" href= +"#xd20e3880" name="xd20e3880src">10</a></p> +<p>Clearly, from the Filipino point of view, the United States was now +determined “to spare them from the dangers of premature +independence,” using such force as might be necessary for the +accomplishment of that pious purpose.</p> +<p>The truth is that, Prometheus-like, we stole the sacred fire from +the altar of Freedom whereupon the flames of the Spanish War were +kindled, and gave it to the Filipinos, justifying the means by the end; +and “the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb151" href="#pb151" name= +"pb151">151</a>]</span>links of the lame Lemnian” have been +festering in our flesh ever since. The Benevolent Assimilation +Proclamation was a kind of Pandora Box, supposed to contain all the +blessings of Liberty, but when the lid was taken off, woes innumerable +befell the intended beneficiaries, and left them only the Hope of +Freedom—from us. Verily there is nothing new under the sun. It is +written: “Thou shalt not steal” anything—not even +“sacred fire.” There is no such thing as nimble morality. +The lesson of the old Greek poet fits our case. So also, indeed, do +those of the modern sage, Maeterlinck, for the Filipinos could have +found their own Bluebird for happiness. The record of our experience in +the Philippines is full of reminders, which will multiply as the years +go by, that, after all, every people have an “unalienable +right” to pursue happiness <i>in their own way</i> as opposed to +<i>somebody else’s way</i>. That is the law of God, as God gives +me to see the right. Conceived during the Christmas holiday season and +in the spirit of that blessed season and presented to the Filipino +people on New Year’s Day, received by them practically as a +declaration of war and baptized in the blood of thousands of them in +the battle of February 4th thereafter, the manner of the reception of +this famous document, the initial reversal and subsequent evolution of +its policies, and all the lights and shadows of Benevolent Assimilation +will be traced in the chapters which follow. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb152" href="#pb152" name="pb152">152</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3659" href="#xd20e3659src" name="xd20e3659">1</a></span> +Otis’s <i>Report for 1899</i>, p. 43.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3682" href="#xd20e3682src" name="xd20e3682">2</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 3.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id="n169.2" +href="#n169.2src" name="n169.2">3</a></span> <i>Ib.</i>, pt. 2, p. +75.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3697" href="#xd20e3697src" name="xd20e3697">4</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 62</i>, p. 379.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3741" href="#xd20e3741src" name="xd20e3741">5</a></span> +Published at page 7 of <i>Senate Document 208</i>, pt. 2, 56th +Congress, 1st Session (1900).</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3749" href="#xd20e3749src" name="xd20e3749">6</a></span> Called +in Spanish “Visayas,” or Bisayas. Visayas is an adjective +derived from the name of the Bay of Biscay, “b” and +“v” being interchangeable in Spanish.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3753" href="#xd20e3753src" name="xd20e3753">7</a></span> For a +fuller description of the archipelago, see <a href="#ch12">Chapter +XII</a>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3777" href="#xd20e3777src" name="xd20e3777">8</a></span> Vol. +ii., p. 315.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3800" href="#xd20e3800src" name="xd20e3800">9</a></span> This +proclamation has been printed many times, in various government +publications, <i>e.g.</i>, <i>War Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., +pt. 4, pp. 355–6; <i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Congress, 1st +Session (1900), pp. 82–3, etc.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3880" href="#xd20e3880src" name="xd20e3880">10</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 62</i>, pt. 1, 55th Congress, 3d Session, p. +272.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch9" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter IX</h2> +<h2 class="main">The Iloilo Fiasco</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">The King of France with forty thousand men</p> +<p class="line">Marched up the hill and then marched down again.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Old English Ballad.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">We have already seen how busily Aguinaldo occupied +himself during the protracted peace negotiations at Paris in getting +his government and people ready for the struggle for independence which +he early and shrewdly guessed would be ultimately forthcoming. General +Otis was in no position to preserve the <i>status quo</i>. The +<i>status quo</i> was a worm in hot ashes that would not stay still. +The revolution was a snow-ball that <i>would</i> roll. The day after +Christmas, General Otis at last sent an expedition under General Marcus +P. Miller to the relief of Iloilo, but when it arrived, December 28th, +the Spaniards had already turned the town over to the insurgent +authorities, and sailed away. When General Miller arrived, being under +imperative orders from Washington to be conciliatory, and under no +circumstances to have a clash with the insurgents, the +Administration’s most earnest solicitude being to avoid a clash, +at least until the treaty of peace with Spain should be ratified by the +United States Senate, he courteously <i>asked permission</i> to land, +several times, being refused each time. With a request of this sort +sent ashore January 1, 1899, he transmitted <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb153" href="#pb153" name="pb153">153</a>]</span>a +copy of the proclamation set forth in the preceding chapter. The +insurgent reply defiantly forbade him to land. Therefore he did not +land—because Washington was pulling the strings—until after +the treaty was ratified. “So here we are at Iloilo, an exploded +bluff,” wrote war correspondent J. F. Bass to his paper, +<i>Harper’s Weekly</i>.</p> +<p>By the time the treaty was ratified the battle of Manila of February +4th had occurred, and the pusillanimity of self-doubting diplomacy had +given way to the red honesty of war.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3935src" href="#xd20e3935" name="xd20e3935src">1</a></p> +<p>As was noticed in the chapter preceding this, by the end of +December, 1898, all military stations outside Luzon, with the exception +of Zamboanga, in the extreme south of the great Mohammedan island of +Mindanao near Borneo, had been turned over by the Spaniards to the +insurgents. When General Miller, commanding the expedition to Iloilo, +arrived in the harbor of that city with his teeming troop-ships and +naval escorts on December 28th, an aide of the Filipino commanding +general came aboard the boat he was on and “desired to +know,” says General Miller’s report,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3940src" href="#xd20e3940" name="xd20e3940src">2</a> “if we +had anything against them—were we going to interfere with +them.” General Miller then sent some of his own aides ashore with +a letter to the insurgent authorities, explaining the peaceful nature +of his errand. They at once asked if our people had brought down any +instructions from Aguinaldo. Answering in the negative, General +Miller’s aides handed them his olive-branch letter. They read it +and said they could do nothing without orders from Aguinaldo “in +cases <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb154" href="#pb154" name= +"pb154">154</a>]</span>affecting their Federal Government.” The +grim veteran commanding the American troops smoked on this for a day or +so, and then asked a delegation of insurgents that were visiting his +ship by his invitation—they would not let him land, you +see—whether if he landed they would meet him with armed +resistance. The Malay reverence for the relation of host and guest +resulted in an evasive reply. They could not answer. But after they +went back to the city they did answer. And this is what they wrote:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Upon the return of your commissioners last night, we +* * * discussed the situation and attitude of this region of +Bisayas in regard to its relations and dependence upon the central +government of Luzon (the Aguinaldo government, of course); and +* * * I have the honor to notify you that, in conjunction +with the people, the army, and the committee, we insist upon our +pretension <i>not to consent * * * to any foreign +interference without express orders from the central government of +Luzon * * * with which we are one in ideas, as we have been +until now in sacrifices</i>. * * * If you insist +* * * upon disembarking your forces, this is our final +attitude. <i>May God forgive you, etc.</i>”</p> +<p class="dateline">Iloilo, December 30, 1898.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3958src" href="#xd20e3958" name="xd20e3958src">3</a></p> +</div> +<p>This letter is recited in General Miller’s report to be from +“President Lopez, of the Federal Government of Visayas.” +General Miller then wrote Otis begging permission to attack on the +ground that upon the success of the expedition he was in charge of +“depends the future speedy yielding of insurrectionary movements +in the islands.” War correspondent Bass, who was on the ground at +the time, also wrote his paper: “The effect on the natives will +be incalculable all over the islands.” But General Otis was +trying to help <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb155" href="#pb155" name= +"pb155">155</a>]</span>Mr. McKinley nurse the treaty through the Senate +on the idea that there weren’t going to be any +“insurrectionary movements in the islands,” that all dark +and misguided conspiracies of selfishly ambitious leaders looking to +such impious ends would fade before the sunlight of Benevolent +Assimilation.</p> +<p>Cautioning Otis against any clash at Iloilo, Mr. McKinley wired +January 9th: “Conflict would be most unfortunate, considering the +present. * * * Time given the insurgents cannot injure us, +and must weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent +purpose, etc.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3969src" href= +"#xd20e3969" name="xd20e3969src">4</a></p> +<p>The Iloilo fiasco did indeed furnish to the insurgent cause aid and +comfort at the psychologic moment when it most needed encouragement to +bring things to a head. It presented a spectacle of vacillation and +seeming cowardice which heartened the timid among the insurgents and +started among them a general eagerness for war which had been lacking +before. In one of his bulletins<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3976src" +href="#xd20e3976" name="xd20e3976src">5</a> to Otis, General Miller +tells of two boats’ crews of the 51st Iowa landing on January +5th, and being met by a force of armed natives who “asked them +their business and warned them off,” whereupon they heeded the +warning and returned to their transport. This regiment had then been +cooped up on their transport continuously since leaving San Francisco +November 3d, previous, sixty-three days. They were kept lying off +Iloilo until January 29th, and then brought back to Manila and landed, +after eighty-nine days aboard ship, all idea of taking Iloilo before +the Senate should act having been abandoned.</p> +<p>The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation was received by cable in +cipher, at Manila, December 29th, and as soon as it had been written +out in long hand <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb156" href="#pb156" +name="pb156">156</a>]</span>General Otis hurried a copy down to General +Miller at Iloilo by a ship sailing that day, so that General Miller +might “understand the position and policy of our +government.” But he forgot to tell Miller to conceal the policy +for the present.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3985src" href="#xd20e3985" +name="xd20e3985src">6</a> So the latter, on January 1st, not only sent +a copy of it to the “President of the Federal Government of +Visayas,” Mr. Lopez,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3991src" href= +"#xd20e3991" name="xd20e3991src">7</a> but <i>in the note of +transmittal</i> he “asked,” says his report, “that +they <i>permit</i> the entry of my troops.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4003src" href="#xd20e4003" name="xd20e4003src">8</a> What a fatal +mistake! Here was a proclamation representing all the “majesty, +dominion, and power” of the American Government, signed by the +President of the United States, in terms asserting immediate, absolute, +and supreme authority, and the natives were “asked” if they +would “permit” its enforcement. General Miller’s +report says that he also had the proclamation “translated into +Spanish and distributed to the people.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4008src" href="#xd20e4008" name="xd20e4008src">9</a> “The +people laugh at it,” he says. “The insurgents call us +cowards and are fortifying at the point of the peninsula, and are +mounting old smooth-bore guns left by the Spaniards. They are +intrenching everywhere, are bent on having one fight, and are confident +of victory. <i>The longer we wait before the attack the harder it will +be to put down the insurrection.</i>” This is especially +interesting in the light of President McKinley’s justification of +the wisdom of temporizing—on the idea that delay would weaken the +insurgents and could not hurt us. “<i>Let no one convince +you</i>,” writes Miller to Otis on January 5th, “that +peaceful means can settle the difficulty here.” <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb157" href="#pb157" name="pb157">157</a>]</span></p> +<p>The appeal to Otis to permit commencement of operations was without +avail. Otis was the Manila agent of the Aldrich Old Guard in the +Senate, in charge of the pending treaty. He would simply send the +disgusted Miller messages not to be hasty, assuring him that the firing +of a shot at Iloilo would mean the precipitation of general conflict +about Manila and all over the place, and that this would be “most +disappointing to the President of the United States, who continually +urges extreme caution and no conflict.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4022src" href="#xd20e4022" name="xd20e4022src">10</a></p> +<p>The Administration was counting senatorial noses at the time, and +that its anxiety was justified is apparent from the fact already noted, +that on the final vote whereby the treaty was ratified it had but one +vote to spare. So General Miller sat sunning himself on the deck of his +transport, and watching the insurgents working like ants at their +fortifications, and vainly wishing his 2500 men could get ashore at +least long enough to stretch themselves a bit. John F. Bass, +correspondent for <i>Harper’s Weekly</i>, left Iloilo, returned +to Manila, and wrote his paper on January 23d: “I returned to +Manila well knowing that there was nothing more to be done in Iloilo +until the Senate voted on the Treaty of Peace.”</p> +<p>On the eighth day after General Miller had asked permission of the +Iloilo village Hampdens to enforce the orders of the President of the +United States, the “Federal Government of the Visayas,” +through its President, Señor Lopez, finally deigned to notice +Mr. McKinley’s proclamation. It said under date of January +9th:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">General: We have the high honor of having received +your message, dated January 1st, of this year, enclosing <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb158" href="#pb158" name= +"pb158">158</a>]</span>letter of President McKinley. You say in one +clause of your message: “As indicated in the President’s +cablegram, under these conditions the inhabitants of the island of +Panay ought to obey the political authority of the United States, and +they will incur a grave responsibility if, after deliberating, they +decide to resist said authority.” So the council of state of this +region of Visayas are, at this present moment, between the authority of +the United States, that you try to impose on us, and the authority of +the central government of Malolos.</p> +</div> +<p>Then follows this remarkable statement of the case for the +Filipinos:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The supposed authority of the United States began with +the Treaty of Paris, on the 10th of December, 1898. <i>The authority of +the Central Government of Malolos is founded in the sacred and natural +bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, (and) +sacrifices.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e4047src" href="#xd20e4047" +name="xd20e4047src">11</a></p> +</div> +<p>General Otis was fond of throwing cold water on any particularly +eloquent Filipino <i>insurrecto</i> document he had occasion to put in +his reports by saying that Mabini was “the brains of” the +Malolos Government—meaning the only brains it had<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e4057src" href="#xd20e4057" name= +"xd20e4057src">12</a>—and that he probably wrote such document, +whatever it might be. But here is a piece of real eloquence, +originating away down in the Visayan Islands, as far away from Malolos +as Colonel Stark and his “Green Mountain Boys” were from +Washington and Hamilton in 1776 and after. What then is the explanation +of composition so forceful in its <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb159" +href="#pb159" name="pb159">159</a>]</span>impassioned simplicity, and +in the light of subsequent events, so pathetic? There is but one +explanation. It came from the heart. It was the cry of the Soul of +Humanity seeking its natural affiliations. It was the language of what +Aguinaldo’s early state papers always used to call the +“legitimate aspirations of” his people—legitimate +aspirations which we later strangled. The reason of the writer’s +earnestness is that a few months later he helped do some of the +strangling. Thirteen years afterwards, a thorough acquaintance with the +Filipino side of the matter, derived from an examination of the +information which has been gradually accumulated and published by our +government during that time, causes him to say, “Father forgive +me, for I knew not what I did.” The 35,000 volunteers of 1899 +knew nothing about the Filipinos or their side of the case. We were +like the deputy sheriff who goes out with a warrant duly issued to +arrest a man charged with unlawful breach of the peace. It is not his +business to inquire whether the man is guilty or not. If the man +resists arrest, he takes the consequences.</p> +<p>On the second day after the above defiance of the President of the +United States was served up to General Miller, that gallant officer +having dutifully swallowed it, sent an officer ashore on a diplomatic +mission. The name and rank of this military ambassador were Acting +Assistant Surgeon Henry DuR. Phelan, who clearly appears to have been a +man of keen insight and considerable ability. His written report to +General Miller of what transpired is a document of permanent interest +and importance to the annals of men’s struggles for free +institutions.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4064src" href="#xd20e4064" +name="xd20e4064src">13</a> It states that at the meeting the spokesman +of the Filipinos, Attorney Raimundo Melliza, began by saying that +“all the Americans <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb160" href= +"#pb160" name="pb160">160</a>]</span>owned was Manila.” That was +unquestionably true, so our ambassador, it seems, did not gainsay it. +Dr. Phelan suggested that the Americans had sacrificed lives and money +in destroying the power of Spain. The spokesman, Attorney Melliza, +replied that “<i>they also</i> had made great sacrifice in lives, +<i>and that they had a right to their country</i> which they had fought +for, and that we are here now to take from them what they had won by +fighting; <i>that they had been our allies, and we had used them as +such</i>.” Dr. Phelan’s report goes on to say: “I +replied that military occupation was a necessity for a time, +* * * and that as soon as order was assured it would be +withdrawn * * *. <i>They smiled at this.</i>” Well they +might. Fourteen years have elapsed since then, and the law-making power +of the United States has never yet declared whether the American +occupation of the Philippine Islands is to be temporary, like our +occupation of Cuba was, or permanent, like the British occupation of +Egypt is. True, Dr. Phelan said “military” occupation, but +the smile was provoked by the suggestion of <i>temporariness</i>. After +the committee smiled, they remarked:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We have fought for independence and feel that we have +the power of governing and need no assistance. <i>We are showing it +now. You might inquire of the foreigners if it is not so.</i></p> +</div> +<p>Dr. Phelan’s report proceeds:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">They stated that their orders were not to allow us to +disembark, and that they were powerless to allow us to come in without +express orders from their government.</p> +</div> +<p>In regard to the Treaty of Paris, the spokesman, Lawyer Melliza, +said: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb161" href="#pb161" name= +"pb161">161</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">International law forbids a nation to make a contract +in regard to taking the liberties of its colonies.</p> +</div> +<p>Lawyer Melliza was wrong. If he had said “the law of +righteousness,” instead of “international law,” his +proposition, thus amended, would have been incontrovertible. On +September 19, 1911, one of the great newspapers of this country, the +<i>Denver Post</i>, sent out to the members of the Congress of the +United States, and to “The Fourth Estate” also, the +newspaper editors, a circular letter proposing that we sell the +Philippine Islands to Japan. A member of the United States Senate sent +this answer:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I do not favor your proposition. Selling the Islands +means selling the inhabitants. The question of traffic in human beings, +whether by wholesale or retail, was forever settled by the Civil +War.</p> +</div> +<p>About the same time a leading daily paper of Georgia had an +editorial on the <i>Denver Post’s</i> proposition, the most +conspicuous feature of which was that <i>Japan was too poor to pay us +well</i>, should we contemplate selling the Filipinos to her, so it was +no use to discuss the matter at length.</p> +<p>No; Lawyer Melliza’s proposition has no standing in +international law <i>yet</i>. But it has with what Mr. Lincoln’s +First Inaugural called “the better angels of our nature,” +if we stop to reflect.</p> +<p>Another interesting feature of the Phelan report to General Miller +is the following:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I asked Lawyer Melliza if Aguinaldo said we could +occupy the city would they agree to it. He replied most emphatically +that they would.</p> +</div> +<p>At that time, in January, 1899, while the debate on the treaty was +in progress in the United States Senate, <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb162" href="#pb162" name="pb162">162</a>]</span>there was hardly a +province in that archipelago where you would not have encountered the +same inflexible adherence to the Aguinaldo government.</p> +<p>Dr. Phelan’s report closes thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">At the conclusion of the meeting it was said that as +this question <i>involved the integrity of the entire republic</i>, it +could not be further discussed here, but must be referred to the +Malolos Government.</p> +</div> +<p>There is one other statement made by the spokesman of the Filipinos, +at their meeting with Dr. Phelan, which arrested and gripped my +attention. That it may interest the reader as it did me, it will need +but a word or so as preface. In the fall of that same year, 1899, when +my regiment, the 29th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, reached the Islands, +it was supposed that the insurrection had about played out, +<i>i.e.</i>, that it had been “beaten to a frazzle,” +because the Filipinos no longer offered to do battle in force in the +open. Yet all that fall, and all through 1900 and after, a most +obstinate guerrilla warfare was kept up. Anywhere in the archipelago +you were liable to be fired on from ambush. At first we could not +understand this. Later we found out it was the result of an order of +Aguinaldo’s, faithfully carried out, not to assemble in large +commands, but to conduct a systematic guerrilla warfare indefinitely. +We learned this by capturing a copy of the order, which was quite +elaborate. Dr. Phelan’s report says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I told him [Melliza] that the city was in our power, +and that we could destroy it at any time * * *. Lawyer +Melliza replied that he cared nothing about the city; that we could +destroy it if we wished * * *. “<i>We will withdraw to +the mountains and repeat the North American Indian warfare. You must +not forget that.</i>”</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb163" href="#pb163" name= +"pb163">163</a>]</span></p> +<p>Later, they did.</p> +<p>On January 15th, General Otis wrote General Miller<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e4165src" href="#xd20e4165" name="xd20e4165src">14</a> again +cautioning him against any clash at Iloilo, and saying of conditions at +Manila and Malolos: “The revolutionary government is <i>very +anxious</i> for peaceful relations.”</p> +<p>Three days later Senator Bacon saw the situation with clearer vision +from the other side of the world than General Otis could see it under +his nose, and said on the floor of the Senate on January 18th +concerning the conditions at Manila and Malolos:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">While there is no declaration of war, while there is +no avowal of hostile intent, with two such armies fronting each other +with such divers intents and resolves, it will take but a spark to +ignite the magazines which is to explode.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4178src" href="#xd20e4178" name="xd20e4178src">15</a></p> +</div> +<p>The spark was ignited on February 4, 1899, by a sentinel of the +Nebraska regiment firing on some Filipino soldiers who disregarded his +challenge to halt, and killing one of them. War once on, General Miller +was directed on February 10th, after he had lain in Iloilo harbor for +forty-four days, to take the city. So at last he gave written notice to +the insurgents in Iloilo demanding the surrender of the city and +garrison “before sunset Saturday, the 11th instant” and +requesting them to give warning to all non-combatants.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e4186src" href="#xd20e4186" name= +"xd20e4186src">16</a> Thereupon the insurgents set fire to the city and +departed. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb164" href="#pb164" name= +"pb164">164</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3935" href="#xd20e3935src" name="xd20e3935">1</a></span> The +“self-doubting” lay in the doubt of the Administration as +to whether its programme of conquest would or would not be ratified by +the Senate. The “pusillanimity” lay, wholly unbeknown to +Washington of course, in the estimate of us it produced among the +Filipinos.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3940" href="#xd20e3940src" name="xd20e3940">2</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 62.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3958" href="#xd20e3958src" name="xd20e3958">3</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 64.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3969" href="#xd20e3969src" name="xd20e3969">4</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 79.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3976" href="#xd20e3976src" name="xd20e3976">5</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 67.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3985" href="#xd20e3985src" name="xd20e3985">6</a></span> “I +sent you the President’s proclamation, not for publication, but +for your information,” wrote Otis to Miller after the latter had +let the cat out of the bag. <i>Senate Document 208</i>, p. 58.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e3991" href="#xd20e3991src" name="xd20e3991">7</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 54.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4003" href="#xd20e4003src" name="xd20e4003">8</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 66.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4008" href="#xd20e4008src" name="xd20e4008">9</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4022" href="#xd20e4022src" name="xd20e4022">10</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 59.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4047" href="#xd20e4047src" name="xd20e4047">11</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900), pp. +54–5.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4057" href="#xd20e4057src" name="xd20e4057">12</a></span> Colonel +Enoch H. Crowder, General Otis’s Judge Advocate, was “the +brains of” the Otis government. But the difference between +General Otis and Aguinaldo was that Aguinaldo always had the good sense +to follow Mabini’s advice, while Otis did not always follow +Crowder’s.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4064" href="#xd20e4064src" name="xd20e4064">13</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 208</i>, p. 56.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4165" href="#xd20e4165src" name="xd20e4165">14</a></span> <i>S. +D. 208</i>, p. 58.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4178" href="#xd20e4178src" name="xd20e4178">15</a></span> See +<i>Congressional Record</i>, January 18, 1899, p. 734.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4186" href="#xd20e4186src" name="xd20e4186">16</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 208</i>, p. 59.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch10" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter X</h2> +<h2 class="main">Otis and Aguinaldo (<i>Continued</i>)</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">A word spoken in due season, how good is it!</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Proverbs</span> xv., 23.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">In the last chapter we saw the début of the +Benevolent Assimilation programme at Iloilo. We are now to observe it +at Manila. General Otis says in his report for 1899<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e4212src" href="#xd20e4212" name="xd20e4212src">1</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">After fully considering the President’s +proclamation and the temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily +discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the United +States Government toward them, I concluded that there were certain +words and expressions therein, such as “sovereignty,” +“right of cession,” and those which directed immediate +occupation, etc., * * * which might be advantageously used by +the Tagalo war party to incite widespread hostilities among the +natives. * * * It was my opinion, therefore, that I would be +justified in so amending the paper that the beneficent object of the +United States Government would be clearly brought within the +comprehension of the people.</p> +</div> +<p>Accordingly, he published a proclamation as indicated, on January +4th, at Manila. In a less formal communication concerning this +proclamation, viz., a letter <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb165" href= +"#pb165" name="pb165">165</a>]</span>to General Miller at Iloilo, +General Otis comes to the point more quickly thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">After some deliberation we put out one of our own +which it was believed would suit the temper of the people.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e4228src" href="#xd20e4228" name= +"xd20e4228src">2</a></p> +</div> +<p>The only thing in the Otis proclamation specifically directed toward +soothing “the temper of the people” was a hint that the +United States would, under the government it was going to impose, +“appoint the representative men now forming the controlling +element of the Filipinos to civil positions of responsibility and +trust” (p. 69). And this, far from soothing Filipino temper, was +interpreted as an offer of a bribe if they would desert the cause of +their country. The <i>bona fides</i> of the offer they did not doubt +for a moment. In fact it caught a number of the more timid prominent +men, especially the elderly ones of the ultraconservative element +preferring submission to strife. But the younger and bolder spirits +were faithful, many of them unto death, and all of them unto many +battles and much “hiking.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4238src" href="#xd20e4238" name="xd20e4238src">3</a></p> +<p>General Otis’s report goes on to tell how, about the middle of +January, after he had published his sugar-coated edition of the +presidential proclamation at Manila, it then at last occurred to him +that General Miller might have published the original text of it in +full at Iloilo, and, “fearing that,” says he, “I +again despatched Lieut. Col. Potter to Iloilo”—evidently +post-haste. But it appears that when the breathless Potter arrived, the +lid was already off. The horse had left <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb166" href="#pb166" name="pb166">166</a>]</span>the stable and the +door was open, as we saw in the preceding chapter. However, as the Otis +report indicates in this connection (p. 67), copies of the original +McKinley proclamation, as published in full at Iloilo by General +Miller, were of course promptly forwarded by the insurgents at Iloilo +to the insurgent government at Malolos. So all that General Otis got +for his pains was detection in the attempt to conceal the <i>crucial +words</i> asserting American sovereignty in plain English. He tells us +himself that as soon as the Malolos people discovered the trick, +“it [the proclamation] became”—in the light of the +Otis doctoring—“the object of venomous attack.” His +report was of course written long after all these matters occurred, but +its language shows a total failure on the part of its author, even +then, to understand the cause of the bitterness he denominates +“venom.” This bitterness grew naturally out of what seemed +to the Filipinos an evident purpose of the United States to take and +keep the Islands and an accompanying unwillingness to acknowledge that +purpose, as shown by the conspicuous discrepancies between the original +text of the proclamation as published at Iloilo by General Miller, on +January 1st, and the modified version of it given out by General Otis +at Manila on January 4th. “The ablest of the insurgent +newspapers,” says he (p. 69), “which was now issued at +Malolos and edited by the uncompromising Luna * * * attacked +the policy * * * as declared in the proclamation, and its +assumption of sovereignty * * * with all the vigor of which +he was capable.” The nature of Editor Luna’s philippics is +not described by General Otis in detail, the only specific notion we +get of them being from General Otis’s echo of their tone, which, +he tells us, was to the effect that “everything tended simply to +a change of masters.” But in another part of the Otis +<i>Report</i> (p. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb167" href="#pb167" +name="pb167">167</a>]</span>163) we find an epistle written about that +time by one partisan of the revolution to another, whose key-note, +given in the following extracts, was doubtless in harmony with the Luna +editorials:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We shall not have them (Filipinos enough to conduct a +decent government) in 10, 20, or a 100 years, because the Yankees will +never acknowledge the aptitude of an “inferior” race to +govern the country. Do not dream that when American sovereignty is +implanted in the country the American office-holders will give up. +Never! If * * * it depends upon them to say whether the +Filipinos have sufficient men for the government of the country +* * * they will never say it.”</p> +</div> +<p>Is not the American who pretends that he would have done anything +but just what the Filipinos did, had he been in their place, +<i>i.e.</i>, fought to the last ditch for the independence of his +country, the rankest sort of a hypocrite? General Otis was a soldier, +and his views may have been honestly colored by his environment. But +how at this late date can any fair-minded man read the above extracts +illustrative of the temper in which the Filipinos went to war with us +without acknowledging the righteousness of the motives which impelled +them?</p> +<p>Aguinaldo promptly met General Otis’s proclamation of January +4th by a counter-proclamation put out the very next day, in which he +indignantly protested against the United States assuming +<i>sovereignty</i> over the Islands. “Even the women,” says +General Otis (p. 70), “in a document numerously signed by them, +gave me to understand that after the men were all killed off they were +prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence +of their country.” General Otis actually intended this last as a +sly touch <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb168" href="#pb168" name= +"pb168">168</a>]</span>of humor. But when we recollect Mr. +Millet’s description (<a href="#ch4">Chapter IV</a>. <i>ante</i>) +of the women coming to the trenches and cooking rice for the men while +the Filipinos were slowly drawing their cordon ever closer about the +doomed Spanish garrison of Manila in July and August previous, fighting +their way over the ground between them and the besieged main body of +their ancient enemies inch by inch, while Admiral Dewey blockaded them +by sea, General Otis’s sly touch of humor loses some of its +slyness. “The insurgent army also,” he says (p. 70), +“was especially affected * * * and only awaited an +opportunity to demonstrate its invincibility in war with the United +States troops * * * whom it had commenced to insult and +charge with cowardice.”</p> +<p>The benighted condition of the insurgents in this regard was +directly traceable to the Iloilo fiasco. It was that, principally, +which made the insurgents so foolishly over-confident and the +subsequent slaughter of them so tremendous. Further on in his report +General Otis says, with perceptible petulance, in summing up his case +against the Filipinos:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The pretext that the United States was about to +substitute itself for Spain * * * was resorted to and had its +effect on the ignorant masses.</p> +</div> +<p>Speaking of his own modified version of the Benevolent Assimilation +Proclamation, General Otis says (p. 76):</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">No sooner was it published than it brought out a +virtual declaration of war from, in this instance at least, the +wretchedly advised President Aguinaldo, who, on January 5th, issued the +following</p> +</div> +<p>—giving the reply proclamation in full. No man can read the +Otis report itself without feeling that if he, the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb169" href="#pb169" name= +"pb169">169</a>]</span>reader, had been playing Aguinaldo’s hand +he would have played it exactly as Aguinaldo did. To General Otis the +government at Malolos—“their Malolos arrangement,” he +used to call it—seemed quite an impudent little +<i>opera-bouffe</i> affair, “a tin-horn government,” as +Senator Spooner suggested in the same debate on the treaty, in which he +called his rugged and fiery friend from South Carolina, Senator +Tillman, “the Senator from Aguinaldo,” and immediately +thereafter, with that engaging frankness that always so endeared him to +his colleagues on both sides of the Chamber, removed the sting from the +jest by admitting that neither he (Spooner), nor Tillman, nor anybody +else in the United States, knew anything about Aguinaldo or his +government. But in the calmer retrospect of many years after, we have +seen, through the official documents which have become available in the +interval, that said government was in complete and effective control of +practically the whole archipelago, and had the moral support of the +whole population at a time when our troops controlled absolutely +nothing but the two towns of Manila and Cavite. Therefore, when we read +in the Aguinaldo proclamation such phrases as, “In view of this, +I summoned a council of my generals and asked the advice of my cabinet, +and in conformity with the opinion of both bodies I” did so and +so; “My government cannot remain indifferent to” this or +that act of the Americans assuming sovereignty over the islands; +“Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities +if” etc.; they do not sound to us so irritatingly bombastic as +they did to General Otis, distributed under his nose as the +proclamation containing them at once was, by thousands, throughout a +city of which he was nominally in possession, but nine-tenths of whose +300,000 <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb170" href="#pb170" name= +"pb170">170</a>]</span>inhabitants he was obliged to believe in +sympathy with the insurgents.</p> +<p>“My government,” says the Aguinaldo proclamation, +“rules the whole of Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and a part of +Mindanao.” Except as to Mindanao, which cut absolutely no figure +in the insurrection until well toward the end of the guerrilla part of +it, we have already examined this claim and found by careful analysis +that it was absolutely true by the end of December, 1898.</p> +<p>After a rapid review of how he had been aided and encouraged in +starting the revolution against the Spaniards by Admiral Dewey, and +then given the cold shoulder by the army when it came, +Aguinaldo’s manifesto says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It was also taken for granted that the American forces +would necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed +to encourage, and which had saved them much blood and great hardships; +and, above all, we entertained absolute confidence in the history and +traditions of a people which fought for its independence and for the +abolition of slavery, and which <i>posed as the champion and liberator +of oppressed peoples</i>. <i>We felt ourselves under the safeguard of a +free people.</i></p> +</div> +<p>That this statement also was authorized by the facts is evident from +the minutes of the Hong Kong meeting of May 4th, already noticed, +presided over by Aguinaldo, and called to formulate the programme for +the insurrection he was about to sail for the Philippines to +inaugurate, in which, after much discussion among the revolutionary +leaders it was agreed that while they must be prepared for all possible +contingencies, yet,</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">if Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental +principles of its constitution, it is most improbable that an +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb171" href="#pb171" name= +"pb171">171</a>]</span>attempt will be made to colonize the Filipinos +or annex them.<a class="noteref" id="n199.1src" href="#n199.1" name= +"n199.1src">4</a></p> +</div> +<p>In short, the Aguinaldo proclamation of January 5th suggests with a +briefness which Filipino familiarity with the great mass of facts +already laid before the reader in the preceding chapters made +appropriate, all the causes for which the Malolos Government was ready, +if need be, to declare war, and winds up by boldly serving General Otis +with notice that if the Americans try to take Iloilo and the Visayan +Islands “my government is disposed to open +hostilities.”</p> +<p>On January 9th President McKinley cabled out to General Otis asking +if it would help matters to send a commission out to explain to the +Filipinos our benevolent intentions. This idea thus suggested +materialized, a few weeks later, in the Schurman Commission, of which +more anon. The next day, January 10th, General Otis answered endorsing +the sending of “commissioners of tact and discretion,” and +adding:<a class="pseudonoteref" href="#n199.1">4</a></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Great difficulty is that leaders cannot control +ignorant classes.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4332src" href="#xd20e4332" +name="xd20e4332src">5</a></p> +</div> +<p>As a matter of fact the leaders were leading. They were not +<i>arguing</i> with the tide. They were merely <i>riding the crest</i> +of it. Actually, General Otis would have stopped “The Six Hundred +Marseillaise Who Knew How to Die”—the ones whose march to +Paris, according to Thomas Carlyle, inspired the composition of the +French national air, “The Marseillaise”—and tried to +parley with the head of the column on the idea of getting them to +abandon their enterprise and disperse to their several homes. He also +says, in the cablegram under consideration: <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb172" href="#pb172" name="pb172">172</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">If peace kept for several days more immediate danger +will have passed.</p> +</div> +<p>In other words, he was holding off the calf as best he could pending +the ratification of the treaty. From the text itself, however, of +General Otis’s report, it is clear enough, that even he was +getting anxious to give the Filipinos a drubbing as soon as the treaty +should be safely passed. Referring to a message from the President +enjoining avoidance of a clash with the Filipinos he says (p. 80):</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The injunction of his Excellency the President of the +United States to exert ourselves to preserve the peace had an excellent +effect upon the command. Officers and men * * * <i>were</i> +restless under the restraints * * * imposed, and +* * * eager to avenge the insults received. <i>Now</i> they +submit very quietly to the taunts and aggressive demonstrations of the +insurgent army who continue to throng the streets of the business +portion of the city.</p> +</div> +<p>See the lamb kick the lion viciously in the face, and observe the +lion as he first lifts his eyes heavenward and says meekly: “Thy +will be done. This is Benevolent Assimilation”; and then turns +them Senate-ward and murmurs: “I cannot stand this much longer, +kind sirs. Say when!” The way war correspondent John F. Bass puts +the situation about this time in a letter to his paper, +<i>Harper’s Weekly</i>, was this:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Jimmie Green<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4370src" href= +"#xd20e4370" name="xd20e4370src">6</a> bites his lip, hangs on to +himself, and finds comfort in the idea that his time will come.</p> +</div> +<p>After Aguinaldo’s ultimatum of January 5th about fighting if +we took Iloilo, General Otis refrained from taking Iloilo, and +continued to communicate with the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb173" +href="#pb173" name="pb173">173</a>]</span>insurgent chieftain, +appointing commissioners to meet commissioners appointed by him. These +held divers and sundry sessions, whose only result was to kill time, or +at least to mark time, while the Administration was getting the treaty +through the Senate. The object of these meetings is thus set forth in +the military order of January 9, 1899, appointing the Otis portion of +the Joint High Parleying Board:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">To meet a commission of like number appointed by +General Aguinaldo, and to confer with regard to the situation of +affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, +purposes, aim, and desires of the Filipino people and the people of the +United States, that peace and harmonious relations between these +respective peoples may be continued.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4381src" href="#xd20e4381" name="xd20e4381src">7</a></p> +</div> +<p>The minutes of the first meeting of this board, prepared by the +Spanish-speaking clerk or recorder, recite the above declared purpose +<i>verbatim</i>, in all its verbosity, and then go on to say that our +side asked</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">That the commissioners appointed by General Aguinaldo +give their opinion as to what <i>were</i> the purposes, aspirations, +aims, and desires of the people of the archipelago.</p> +</div> +<p>The next paragraph is almost Pickwickian in its unconscious +terseness:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">To this request the commissioners appointed by General +Aguinaldo made response that in their opinion the aspirations, +purposes, and desires of the Philippine people might be summed up in +<i>two words</i> “Absolute Independence.”</p> +</div> +<p>Of course even General Otis does not reproduce this laconic answer +as part of his petulant summing up of how little the Filipinos knew, +before the outbreak of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb174" href= +"#pb174" name="pb174">174</a>]</span>February 4th, as to what they +really wanted. He merely alludes to it as being of record elsewhere. It +is one o£ the various pieces of jetsam and flotsam that have +floated from the sea of those great events to the shores of government +publications since. The minutes of these meetings may be found among +the hearings before the Senate Committee of 1902.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4415src" href="#xd20e4415" name="xd20e4415src">8</a></p> +<p>General Otis’s report complains that Aguinaldo’s +commissioners did not know what they wanted, “could not give any +satisfactory explanation” of the “measure of +protection” they wanted, they having declared that they would +greatly prefer the United States to establish a protectorate over them +to keep them from being annexed by some other power. But he fails to +state, which is a fact shown by the minutes of the meeting of January +14 (p. 2721), that the Filipino commissioners did say that this was a +question which would only be reached between their government and ours +when the latter should agree to officially recognize the former. To +quote their exact language, which is rather clumsily translated, they +said: “The aspiration of the Filipino people is the independence +with the restrictions resulting from the conditions which its +government may agree with the American, <i>when the latter agree to +officially recognize the former</i>.”</p> +<p>It is perfectly clear from the voluminous minutes of the proceedings +that the Filipinos were only seeking <i>some declaration of the purpose +of our government</i> which would satisfy their people that the +programme was something more than a mere change of masters. “They +begged,” says General Otis (p. 82), “for <i>some tangible +concession</i> from the United States Government—one <i>which +they could present to the people</i> and which might serve to allay +excitement.” General Otis of course <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb175" href="#pb175" name="pb175">175</a>]</span>had no authority to +bind the government and so could make no promise. But the day this +Otis-Aguinaldo parleying board had its second meeting, January 11th, +and probably with no more knowledge of its existence than the reader +has of what is going on in the Fiji Islands at the moment he reads +these lines, Senator Bacon introduced in the United States Senate some +resolutions which were precisely the medicine the case required and +precisely the thing the Filipinos were pleading for. These resolutions +concluded thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition +or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over +said islands except for the pacification thereof, and assert their +determination when an independent government shall have been duly +erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to said +government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights +secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the +government and control of the islands to their people.</p> +</div> +<p>They were a twin brother to the Teller Cuban resolution which was +incorporated into the resolution declaring war against Spain, being +<i>verbatim</i> the same, except with the necessary changes of name, of +“islands” for “island,” etc.</p> +<p>On January 18th, while the futile parleying board aforesaid was +still futilely parleying at Manila, Senator Bacon made an argument in +the Senate in support of his resolution, whose far-sighted +statesmanship, considered in relation to the analogies of its historic +setting, most strikingly reminds us of Burke’s great speech on +conciliation with America delivered under similar circumstances nearly +a century and a quarter earlier. After alluding to the naturalness of +the apprehension of the Filipinos “that it is the purpose of the +United <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb176" href="#pb176" name= +"pb176">176</a>]</span>States Government to maintain permanent dominion +over them,”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4454src" href="#xd20e4454" +name="xd20e4454src">9</a> Senator Bacon urged:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The fundamental requirement in these resolutions is +that the Government of the United States will not undertake to exercise +<i>permanent dominion</i> over the Philippine Islands. The resolutions +are intentionally made broad, so that <i>those who agree on that +fundamental proposition may stand upon them</i> even though they may +differ materially as to a great many other things relative to the +future course of the government in connection with the Philippine +Islands.</p> +</div> +<p>Senator Bacon then quoted the following from some remarks Senator +Foraker had previously made in the course of the great debate on the +treaty:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I do not understand anybody to be proposing to take +the Philippine Islands with the idea and view of permanently holding +them. * * * The President of the United States does not, I +know, and no Senator in this chamber has made any such statement;</p> +</div> +<p>and added:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">If the views expressed by the learned Senator from +Ohio in his speech * * * are those upon which we are to act, +there is very little difference between us; and there will be no future +contention between us * * * if we can have an authoritative +expression from <span class="sc">The Law-Making Power</span> of the +United States in a joint resolution that such is the purpose of the +future.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4483src" href="#xd20e4483" name= +"xd20e4483src">10</a></p> +</div> +<p>Says the Holy Scripture: “A word spoken in season, how good is +it!” Had the Bacon resolutions passed the United States Senate in +January, 1899, we never would have had any war with the +Filipinos.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4490src" href="#xd20e4490" name= +"xd20e4490src">11</a> They <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb177" href= +"#pb177" name="pb177">177</a>]</span>would have presented at the +psychologic moment the very thing the best and bravest of the Filipino +leaders were then pleading with General Otis for, something +“tangible,” something “which they could present to +their people and which would allay excitement,” by allaying the +universal fear that we were going to do with them exactly as all other +white men they had ever heard of had done with all other brown men they +had ever heard of under like circumstances, viz., keep them under +permanent dominion with a view of profit.</p> +<p>In his letter accepting the nomination for the Presidency in 1900, +Mr. McKinley sought to show the Filipinos to have been the aggressors +in the war by a reference to the fact that the outbreak occurred +<i>while the Bacon resolution was under discussion</i> in the Senate. +This hardly came with good grace from an Administration whose friends +in the Senate had all along opposed not only the Bacon resolution but +also all other resolutions frankly declaratory of the purpose of our +government. The supreme need of the hour then was, and the supreme need +of every hour of every day we have been in the Philippines since has +been, “an authoritative expression from the law-making power of +the United States”—not mere surmises of a President, +confessedly devoid of binding force, but an <i>authoritative expression +from the law-making power</i>, declaratory of the purpose of our +government with regard to the Philippine Islands. Secretary of War Taft +visited Manila in 1907 to be present at the opening of the Philippine +Assembly. In view of the universal longing which he knew existed for +some definite authoritative declaration as to whether our government +intends to keep the Islands permanently or not, he said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I cannot speak with authority * * *. The +policy to be pursued with respect to them is, therefore, ultimately for +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb178" href="#pb178" name= +"pb178">178</a>]</span>Congress to determine. * * * I have no +authority to speak for Congress in respect to the ultimate disposition +of the Islands.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4511src" href="#xd20e4511" +name="xd20e4511src">12</a></p> +</div> +<p>This bitter disappointment of the public expectation and hope of +something definite, certainly did not lessen the belief of the +Filipinos that we have no notion of ever giving them their +independence. Had the Senate known what the Filipino commissioners were +so earnestly asking of the Otis commissioners in January, 1899, the +Bacon resolution would probably have passed. In fact it is demonstrable +almost mathematically that, had the Administration’s friends in +the Senate allowed that resolution to come to a vote before the +outbreak of February 4th, instead of filibustering against it until +after that event, it would have passed. As stated in the foot-note, the +roll-call on the final vote on it, which was not taken until February +14th, showed a tie—29 to 29, the Vice-President of the United +States casting the deciding vote which defeated it. Much dealing with +real life and real death has blunted my artistic sensibilities to +thrills from the mere pantomime of the stage. But as here was a vote +where, had a single Senator who voted No voted Aye, some 300,000,000 of +dollars, over a thousand lives of American soldiers killed in battle, +some 16,000 lives of Filipino soldiers killed in battle, and possibly +100,000 Filipino lives snuffed out through famine, pestilence, and +other ills consequent on the war, would have been saved, I can not +refrain from reproducing the vote—perhaps the most uniquely +momentous single roll-call in the parliamentary history of +Christendom<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4519src" href="#xd20e4519" name= +"xd20e4519src">13</a>: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb179" href= +"#pb179" name="pb179">179</a>]</span></p> +<p><i>Ayes</i></p> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td> +<ul> +<li>Bacon</li> +<li>Bate</li> +<li>Berry</li> +<li>Caffery</li> +<li>Chilton</li> +<li>Clay</li> +<li>Cockrell</li> +<li>Faulkner</li> +<li>Gorman</li> +<li>Gray</li> +<li>Hale</li> +<li>Harris</li> +<li>Heitfield</li> +<li>Hoar</li> +<li>Jones of Arkansas</li> +</ul> +</td> +<td> +<ul> +<li>Jones of Nevada</li> +<li>Lindsay</li> +<li>McLaurin</li> +<li>Martin</li> +<li>Money</li> +<li>Murphy</li> +<li>Perkins</li> +<li>Pettigrew</li> +<li>Pettus</li> +<li>Quay</li> +<li>Rawlins</li> +<li>Smith</li> +<li>Tillman</li> +<li>Turner</li> +</ul> +</td> +</tr> +</table> +<p><i>Nays</i></p> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td> +<ul> +<li>Allison</li> +<li>Burrows</li> +<li>Carter</li> +<li>Chandler</li> +<li>Deboe</li> +<li>Fairbanks</li> +<li>Frye</li> +<li>Gear</li> +<li>Hanna</li> +<li>Hawley</li> +<li>Kyle</li> +<li>Lodge</li> +<li>McBride</li> +<li>McEnery</li> +<li>McMillan</li> +</ul> +</td> +<td> +<ul> +<li>Mantle</li> +<li>Morgan</li> +<li>Nelson</li> +<li>Penrose</li> +<li>Platt of Connecticut</li> +<li>Platt of New York</li> +<li>Pritchard</li> +<li>Ross</li> +<li>Shoup</li> +<li>Simon</li> +<li>Stewart</li> +<li>Teller</li> +<li>Warren</li> +<li>Wolcott</li> +</ul> +</td> +</tr> +</table> +<p>In January, 1899, the out-and-out land-grabbers had not yet made +bold to show their hand, the friends of the treaty confining themselves +to the alleged shame of doing as we had done with Cuba, on account of +the supposed semi-barbarous condition of “the various tribes out +there,” leaving the possibility of profit to quietly suggest +<i>itself</i> amid the noisy exhortations of altruism. It was not until +after the milk of human kindness had been spilled in war that Senator +Lodge said at the Philadelphia National Republican Convention of +1900:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested +in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in Trade +Expansion.</p> +</div> +<p>Speaking (p. 82) of the meetings of what for lack of a better term I +have above called the Otis-Aguinaldo Joint High Parleying Board, +General Otis says in his report: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb180" +href="#pb180" name="pb180">180</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Finally, the conferences became the object of +insurgent suspicion, * * * and * * * amusement.</p> +</div> +<p>The Filipino newspapers called attention to the fact that large +reinforcements of American troops were on the way to Manila, and very +plausibly inferred that the parleying was for delay only. By January +26th the politeness of both the American and the Filipino commissioners +had been worn to a frazzle, and they adjourned, each recognizing that +the differences between them could ultimately be settled only on the +field of battle, in the event of the ratification of the treaty.</p> +<p>January 27th, General Otis cabled to Washington a letter from +Aguinaldo, of which he says in his report: “I was surprised +* * * because of the boldness with which he therein indicated +his purpose to continue his assumptions and establish their correctness +by the arbitrament of war” (p. 84). General Otis was +“surprised” to the last. Aguinaldo’s letter is not at +all surprising, though extremely interesting. It sends General Otis a +proclamation issued January 21st, announcing the publication of a +constitution modelled substantially after that of the United States, +even beginning with the familiar words about “securing the +blessings of liberty, promoting the general welfare,” etc., and +concludes with an expression of confident hope that the United States +will recognize his government, and a bold implication of determination +to fight if it does not. On the evening of February 4th an insurgent +soldier approaching an American picket failed to halt or answer when +challenged, and was shot and killed. Nearly six months of nervous +tension thereupon pressed for liberation in a general engagement which +continued throughout the night and until toward sundown of the next +day, thus finally unleashing the dogs of war. In <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb181" href="#pb181" name="pb181">181</a>]</span>the +<i>Washington Post</i> of February 6, 1899, Senator Bacon is quoted as +saying:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I will cheerfully vote all the money that may be +necessary to carry on the war in the Philippines, but I still maintain +that we could have avoided a conflict with those people had the Senate +adopted my resolution, or a similar resolution <i>announcing our honest +intentions with regard to the Philippines</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>Said the <i>New York Criterion</i> of February 11, 1899:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Whether we like it or not, we must go on slaughtering +the natives in the English fashion, and taking what muddy glory lies in +this wholesale killing until they have learned to respect our arms. +<i>The more difficult task of getting them to respect our intentions +will follow.</i></p> +</div> +<p>The <i>Washington Post</i> of February 6, 1899, may not have quoted +Senator Bacon with exactitude. But what the Senator <i>did</i> say on +the floor of the Senate <i>is</i> important, historically. Under date +of February 22, 1912, Senator Bacon writes me, in answer to an +inquiry:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I enclose a speech made by me upon the subject in the +Senate February 27, 1899, and upon pages 6, 7, and 8 of which you will +find a statement of my position, and the reasons given by me therefor. +Of course you cannot go at length into that question in your narration +of the events of that day, but my position was that, while I did not +approve of the war, and did not approve of the enslavement of the +Filipinos, and while if I had my way I would immediately set them free, +at the same time, as war was then flagrant, and there were then some +twenty odd thousand American troops in the Philippine Islands, we must +either support them or leave them to defeat and death. I do not know +how far you can use anything then said by me, but if you make allusion +to the fact that I was willing to supply money <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb182" href="#pb182" name="pb182">182</a>]</span>and +troops to carry on the war in the Philippines, I would be glad for it +to be accompanied by a very brief statement of the ground upon which I +based such action.</p> +</div> +<p>The above makes it unnecessary to quote at length from the speech +referred to, which may be found at pp. 2456 <i>et seq</i> of the +<i>Congressional Record</i> for February 27, 1899. However, there is +one passage in the speech to which I especially say Amen, and invite +all whose creed of patriotism is not too sublimated for such a common +feeling to join me in so doing. Senator Bacon will now state the +creed:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The oft-repeated expression “our country, right +or wrong” has a vital principle in it, and upon that principle I +stand.</p> +</div> +<p>The Senator immediately follows his creed with these +commentaries:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">In this annexation of the Philippine Islands through +the ratification of the treaty, and in waging war to subjugate the +Filipinos, I think the country, acting through constitutional +authorities, is wrong. But it is not for me to say because the country +has been committed to a policy that I do not favor and have opposed, in +consequence of which there is war, that I will not support the +government.</p> +</div> +<p>Under the civilizing influence of Krag-Jorgensen rifles and the +moral uplift of high explosive projectiles, what our soldiers used to +call, with questionable piety, “the fear of God,” was +finally put into the hearts of the Filipinos, after much carnage by +wholesale in battle formation and later by retail in a species of +guerrilla warfare as irritating as it was obstinate. But they have +never yet learned to respect our intentions, because under the guidance +of three successive Presidents we <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb183" +href="#pb183" name="pb183">183</a>]</span>have studiously refrained +from any authoritative declaration as to what those intentions are. We +are loth to hark back to the only right course, a course similar to our +action in Cuba, because of the expense we have been to in the +Philippines. But we also know that the islands are and are likely to +continue, a costly burden, a nuisance, and a distinct strategic +disadvantage in the event of war; and that Mr. Cleveland was right when +he said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The government of remote and alien people should have +no permanent place in the purposes of our national life.</p> +</div> +<p>The mistaken policy which involved us in a war to subjugate the +Filipinos, following our war to free the Cubans, will never stand +atoned for before the bar of history, nor can the Filipinos ever in +reason be expected to respect our intentions, until the law-making +power of the government shall have authoritatively declared what those +intentions are—<i>i. e.</i>, what we intend ultimately to do with +the islands. Senator Bacon’s resolutions of 1899 were, are, and +always will be the last word on the first act needed to rectify the +original Philippine blunder, “announcing” as they would, to +use the language attributed to their distinguished author by the +<i>Washington Post</i> of February 6, 1899, above-quoted, “our +honest intentions with regard to the Philippines.” So eager is +the exploiter to exploit the islands, and so apprehensive is the +Filipino that the exploiter will have more influence at Washington than +himself and therefore be able ultimately to bring about a practical +industrial slavery, that common honesty demands such a declaration. To +doctor present Filipino discontent with Benevolent Uncertainty is a +mere makeshift. The remedy the situation needs is simple, but as yet +untried—Frankness. The chief of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb184" href="#pb184" name="pb184">184</a>]</span>causes of the present +discontent among the Filipinos with American rule is precisely the same +old serpent that precipitated the war thirteen years ago, to wit, lack +of a frank and honest declaration of our purpose. The trouble then lay, +and still lies, and, in the absence of some such declaration as that +proposed by the Bacon resolution, will always lie in what seemed then, +and still seems, to the Filipinos “an evident purpose to keep the +islands and an accompanying unwillingness to acknowledge that +purpose.” Some may object that one Congress cannot bind another. +The same argument would have killed the Teller amendment to the +declaration of war with Spain avowing our purpose as to Cuba. Such an +argument assumes that this nation has no sense of honor, and that it +should cling for a while longer to the stale Micawberism that the +Islands may yet pay, before it decides whether it will do right or not, +and signalizes such decision by formal announcement through Congress. +To men capable of such an assumption as the one just indicated, this +book is not addressed. Three successive Presidents, Messrs. McKinley, +Roosevelt, and Taft, have with earnest asseveration of benevolent +intention tried without success all these years to win the affections +of the Filipino people, and to make them feel that “our flag had +not lost its gift of benediction in its world-wide journey to their +shores,” as Mr. McKinley used to say. But the corner-stone of the +policy was laid before we knew anything about how the land lay, and on +the assumption, made practically without any knowledge whatever on the +subject, that the Filipino people were incapable of self-government. +The corner-stone of our Philippine policy has been from the beginning +precisely that urged by Spain for not freeing Cuba, viz., “to +spare the people from the dangers of premature independence.” +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb185" href="#pb185" name= +"pb185">185</a>]</span>The three Presidents named above have always +been willing to imply independence, but never to promise it. And the +unwillingness to declare a purpose ultimately to give the Filipinos +their independence has always been due to the desire to catch the vote +of those who are determined they shall never have it. In this +inexorable and unchangeable political necessity lies the essential +contemptibleness of republican imperialism, and the secret of why the +Filipinos, notwithstanding our good intentions, do not like us, and +never will under the present policy. How can you blame them?</p> +<p>Yet the more you know of the Filipinos, the better you like them. +Self-sacrificing, brave, and faithful unto death in war, they are +gentle, generous, and tractable in peace. Moreover, respect for +constituted authority, as such, is innate in practically every +Filipino, which I am not sure can be predicated concerning each and +every citizen of my beloved native land. And we can win the grateful +and lasting affection of the whole seven or eight millions of them any +day we wish to. How? Have done with vague, vote-catching Presidential +<i>obiter</i>, and through your Congress declare your purpose! +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb186" href="#pb186" name= +"pb186">186</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4212" href="#xd20e4212src" name="xd20e4212">1</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 66.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4228" href="#xd20e4228src" name="xd20e4228">2</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 58, letter +to General Miller.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4238" href="#xd20e4238src" name="xd20e4238">3</a></span> A +campaign synonym for forced marching. It has no known etymology, but to +the initiated it suggests torrential downpouring of rain and bedraggled +mud-spattered columns of troops.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id="n199.1" +href="#n199.1src" name="n199.1">4</a></span> <i>Senate Document +208</i>, pt. 2, p. 7.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4332" href="#xd20e4332src" name="xd20e4332">5</a></span> <i>Otis +Report</i>, p. 80.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4370" href="#xd20e4370src" name="xd20e4370">6</a></span> The +American “Tommy Atkins.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4381" href="#xd20e4381src" name="xd20e4381">7</a></span> <i>Otis +Report</i>, 1899 <i>War Dept. Rpt.</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. +81.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4415" href="#xd20e4415src" name="xd20e4415">8</a></span> See +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 2709 <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4454" href="#xd20e4454src" name="xd20e4454">9</a></span> +<i>Congressional Record</i>, January 11, 1899, p. 735.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4483" href="#xd20e4483src" name="xd20e4483">10</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, January 18, 1899, p. 733.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4490" href="#xd20e4490src" name="xd20e4490">11</a></span> The +vote on the Bacon resolution was a tie, 29 to 29, and the +Vice-President of the United States then cast the deciding vote against +it. <i>Cong. Rec.</i>, Feby. 14, 1899, p. 1845.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4511" href="#xd20e4511src" name="xd20e4511">12</a></span> See +<i>Present-Day Problems</i>, by Wm. H. Taft, p. 9; Dodd, Mead, & +Co., N. Y., 1908.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4519" href="#xd20e4519src" name="xd20e4519">13</a></span> +<i>Congressional Record</i>, February 14, 1899, p. 1846 (55th Cong., 3d +Sess.).</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch11" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XI</h2> +<h2 class="main">Otis and the War</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Am I the boss, or am I a tool,</p> +<p class="line">Am I Governor-General or a hobo—hobo;</p> +<p class="line">Now I’d like to know who’s the boss of the +show,</p> +<p class="line">Is it me, or Emilio Aguinaldo?</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Army Song of the Philippines under +Otis.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">“The thing is on,” said General Hughes, +Provost Marshal of Manila, to General Otis, at Malacañan palace, +on the night of February 4, 1899, about half past eight o’clock, +as soon as the firing started.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4783src" +href="#xd20e4783" name="xd20e4783src">1</a> He was talking about +something which every American in Manila except General Otis had for +months frankly recognized as inevitable—the war.</p> +<p>On the day of the outbreak of February 4th, General Otis had under +his command 838 officers and 20,032 enlisted men, say in round numbers +a total of 21,000. Of these some 15,500 were State volunteers mostly +from the Western States, and the rest were regulars. All the volunteers +and 1650 of the regulars were, or were about to become, entitled to +their discharge, and their right was perfected by the exchange of +ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain on April 11, 1899. The +total force which he was thus entitled to command for any considerable +period consisted of less than 4000. Of the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb187" href="#pb187" name= +"pb187">187</a>]</span>21,000 men on hand as aforesaid, on February +4th, deducting those at Cavite and Iloilo, the sick and wounded, those +serving in civil departments, and in the staff organizations, the +effective fighting force was 14,000, and of these 3000 constituted the +Provost Guard in the great and hostile city of Manila.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e4793src" href="#xd20e4793" name="xd20e4793src">2</a> +Thus there were only 11,000 men, including those entitled to discharge, +available to engage the insurgent army, “which,” says +Secretary of War Root, “was two or three times that number, well +armed and equipped, and included many of the native troops formerly +comprised in the Spanish army.”</p> +<p>Such was the predicament into which General Otis’s supremely +zealous efforts to help the Administration get the treaty through the +Senate by withholding from the American people the knowledge of facts +which might have put them on notice that they were paying $20,000,000 +for a $200,000,000 insurrection, had brought us. This is not a tale of +woe. It is a tale of the disgust—good-humored, because +stoical—which finally found expression at the time in the army +song that heads this chapter, disgust at unnecessary sacrifice of +American life which could so easily have been prevented had General +Otis only revealed the real situation in time to have had plenty of +troops on hand. It is a requiem over those brave men of the Eighth Army +Corps from Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the Western States that bore +the brunt of the early fighting, whose lives were needlessly sacrificed +in 1899 as the result of an unpreparedness for war due to anxiety not +to embarrass Mr. McKinley in his efforts to get the treaty through the +Senate, an unpreparedness which remained long unremedied thereafter in +order to conceal from the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb188" href= +"#pb188" name="pb188">188</a>]</span>people of the United States the +unanimity of the desire of the Filipinos for Independence.</p> +<p>It is quite true that none of our people then in the Islands +realized this unanimity in all its pathos at the outset, but it soon +became clear to everybody except the commanding general. It naturally +dawned on him last of all, because he did not visit the most reliable +sources of information, to wit, the battlefields during the fighting, +and therefore did not see how tenaciously the Filipinos fought for the +independence of their country. Moreover, General Otis tried to think +till the last along lines in harmony with the original theory of +Benevolent Assimilation. Hence Mr. Root’s nonsense of 1899 and +1900 about “the patient and unconsenting millions” +dominated by “the Tagalo tribe,” which nonsense was +immensely serviceable in a campaign for the presidency wherein +antidotes for sympathy with a people struggling to be free were of +supreme practical political value. General Otis actually had Mr. +McKinley believing as late as December, 1899, at least, that the +opposition to a change of masters in lieu of Freedom was confined to a +little coterie of self-seeking politicians who were in the business for +what they could get out of it, and that the great majority would prefer +him, Otis, to Aguinaldo, as governor-general. It <i>is</i> difficult on +first blush to accept this statement as dispassionately correct, but +there is no escape from the record. Mr. McKinley said in his annual +message to Congress in December, 1899, in reviewing the direction he +gave to the Paris peace negotiations which ended in the purchase of the +islands, and the war with the Filipinos which had followed, and had +then been raging since February 4th previous, “I had every reason +to believe, and <i>still believe</i> that the transfer of sovereignty +was in accordance with the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb189" href= +"#pb189" name="pb189">189</a>]</span>wishes and aspirations of the +great mass of the Filipino people.”</p> +<p>Yet every American soldier who served in the Philippines at the time +knows that Aguinaldo held the whole people in the hollow of his hand, +because he was their recognized leader, the incarnation of their +aspirations.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4817src" href="#xd20e4817" +name="xd20e4817src">3</a></p> +<p>During the presidential campaign of 1900, while the war with the +Filipinos was still raging, partisan rancour bitterly called in +question the sincerity of President McKinley’s statement in his +annual message to Congress of December, 1899, that he then still +believed “the transfer of sovereignty was in accord with the +wishes and aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino people,” +on the ground that he must by the time he made that statement have +understood how grossly—however honestly—General Otis had +misled him as to the unanimity and tenacity of the Filipino purpose. +But it is only necessary to read Admiral Dewey’s testimony before +the Senate Committee of 1902 to understand Mr. McKinley’s +allusion in this same message to Congress of 1899 to “the +sinister ambition of a few leaders,” and this, once understood, +explains the other statement of the message. Admiral Dewey came home in +the fall of 1899 and undoubtedly filled Mr. McKinley with the estimate +of Aguinaldo which makes such painful reading in the Admiral’s +testimony of 1902 before the Senate Committee, where he abused +Aguinaldo like a pick-pocket, so to speak, saying his original motive +was principally loot.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4825src" href= +"#xd20e4825" name="xd20e4825src">4</a> In the fall of 1899 Aguinaldo +had issued a proclamation claiming that Admiral Dewey originally +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb190" href="#pb190" name= +"pb190">190</a>]</span>promised him independence, and Admiral Dewey had +bitterly denounced this as a falsehood, so that the Admiral always +cherished a very real resentment against the insurgent chief +thereafter. His estimate of the Filipino leader as being in the +insurrection merely for what he could get out of it was wholly +erroneous, and has long since been exploded, all our generals of the +early fighting and all Americans who have known him since being +unanimous that Aguinaldo was and is a sincere patriot; but it +undoubtedly explains Mr. McKinley’s still clinging, in 1899, to +the notion derived from General Otis that the insurrection did not have +the moral and material backing of the whole Filipino people. The +Filipino leaders were familiar with the spirit of our institutions. The +men who controlled their counsels were high-minded, educated, patriotic +men. “For myself and the officers and men under my +command,” wrote General Merritt to Aguinaldo in August, 1898, +just after the fall of Manila, “I can say that we have conceived +a high respect for the abilities and qualities of the Filipinos, and if +called upon by the Government to express an opinion, it will be to that +effect.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4834src" href="#xd20e4834" +name="xd20e4834src">5</a></p> +<p>The leaders believed that the American people did not fully +understand the identity of the Philippine situation with that in Cuba, +and that if they had, the treaty would not have been ratified. They +also knew the supreme futility of trying to get the facts before the +American people by peaceful means. And it was really with the abandon +of genuine patriotism that they plunged their country into war. We did +not know it then, but we do know it now. It would be simply +wooden-headed to affirm that they ever expected to succeed in a war +with us. Of course some of the <i lang="fr">jeunesse dorée</i>, +as General Bell calls them in one of <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb191" href="#pb191" name="pb191">191</a>]</span>his early +reports,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4846src" href="#xd20e4846" name= +"xd20e4846src">6</a> grew very aggressive and insulting toward the +last. But the thinking men went into the war for independence in a +spirit of “decent respect to the opinions of mankind,” to +correct the impression General Otis had communicated to Mr. McKinley, +and through him to our people, in the hope that the more lives they +sacrificed in such a war (they risked—and many of them +lost—their own also), the nearer they would come to refuting the +idea that they did not know what they wanted. It was the only way they +had to appeal to Cæsar, <i>i.e.</i>, to the great heart of the +American people. As the war grew more and more unpopular in the United +States, the impression was more and more nursed here at home that the +people did not really want independence, but were being coerced; and +that they were like dumb driven cattle. The striking similarity of +these suggestions to those by which tyranny has always met the +struggles of men to be free, did not seem to occur to the American +public. They were accepted as authoritative, being convenient also as +an antidote to sympathy. General Otis had suppressed such words as +“sovereignty,” “protection,” and the like from +his original sugar-coated edition of the Benevolent Assimilation +Proclamation, offering an elaborate cock-and-bull explanation of why he +did so. The Filipino answer to this took the form of a very clever +newspaper cartoon, representing an American in a carromata—a kind +of two-wheeled buggy—with a Filipino between the shafts pulling +it; which cartoon of course, never reached the United States. The +Filipinos had never heard the story on General Mahone about “tie +yoh hoss an’ come in,”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4854src" +href="#xd20e4854" name="xd20e4854src">7</a> but they had heard of the +jinrickshaws of Japan, and they had read in Holy <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb192" href="#pb192" name="pb192">192</a>]</span>Writ +and elsewhere of conquered people becoming hewers of wood and drawers +of water to invading conquerors. And they are <i>not</i> without a +sense of humor. It is a common mistake with many Americans—for +quite a few among us suffer intellectually from +over-sophistication—to suppose we monopolize all the sense of +humor there is, and that that alone is proof of a due sense of +proportion. At any rate, the Filipinos, with all due respect to General +Otis’s good intentions, understood that “sovereignty” +and “protection” meant alien domination, so there was +nothing in the Otis notion that for them those words had a +“<i>peculiar</i> meaning which might be advantageously used by +the Tagalo war party to incite,” etc.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4871src" href="#xd20e4871" name="xd20e4871src">8</a></p> +<p>Having now gotten into a war on the theory that only a small +fraction of the Filipino people were opposed to a new and unknown yoke +in lieu of the old one, General Otis still continued to try to square +his theory with the facts. For many months he sat at his desk in Manila +cheerily waging war with an inadequate force, and retaining in the +service and on the firing line after their terms of enlistment expired, +under pretence that they consented to it willingly, a lot of fellows +from Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the Western States, who had +volunteered for the war with Spain, with intent to kill Spaniards in +order to free Cubans, and not with intent to kill Filipinos for also +wanting to be free. Seeing nothing of the fighting himself, he of +course failed to get a correct estimate of the tenacity of the Filipino +purpose. No purpose is here entertained to suggest that any of those +early volunteers went around preaching mutiny, or feeling mutinous. +They did not originally like the Filipinos especially; furthermore, +they liked the Philippines less than they did the Filipinos, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb193" href="#pb193" name= +"pb193">193</a>]</span>and they had a vague notion that some one had +blundered. But it was not theirs to ask the reason why. Besides, the +orders from Washington being not to clash with the Filipinos at least +until the treaty was ratified, the Filipino soldiers and subaltern +officers had been calling them cowards for some time with impunity. So +that as soon as the treaty was safely “put over,” they were +very glad to let off steam by killing a few hundred of them. But their +hearts were not in the fight, in the sense of clear and profound +conviction of the righteousness of the war. However, war is war, and +they were soldiers, and “orders is orders,” as Tommy Atkins +says. So let us turn to an honester, if grimmer, side of the +picture.</p> +<p>The first battle of the war began about 8:30 o’clock on the +night of February 4th, and lasted all through that night and until +about 5 o’clock in the afternoon of the next day. Our casualties +numbered about 250 killed and wounded. The insurgent loss was estimated +at 3000. “Those of the insurgents will never be known,” +says General Otis.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4883src" href= +"#xd20e4883" name="xd20e4883src">9</a> “We buried 700 of +them.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4888src" href="#xd20e4888" +name="xd20e4888src">10</a> There was fighting pretty much all around +Manila, for the insurgents had the city almost hemmed in. An arc of a +circle, broken in places possibly, but several miles long, drawn about +the city, would probably suggest the general idea of the enemy’s +lines. They had been allowed to dig trenches without interference while +the debate in the Senate on the treaty was in progress, pursuant to the +temporary “peace-at-any-price” programme. The arc was +broken into smithereens by 5 <span class="sc">P.M.</span> of February +5th. When the morning of February 6th came Col. James F. Smith, +commanding the First Californias, was <i lang="la">non est +inventus</i>, and so was a large part of his regiment. “No one +seemed to know definitely his location,” says the Otis +<i>Report</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4903src" href="#xd20e4903" +name="xd20e4903src">11</a> As a matter of fact <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb194" href="#pb194" name="pb194">194</a>]</span>he +had taken two battalions of his regiment and waded clean through the +enemy’s lines, and had to be sent for to come back to form again +with the line of battle needed to protect the city. So the Californias +probably carried off the pick of the laurels of the first day’s +fighting. General Anderson, commanding the First Division of the Eighth +Corps, threw them some very handsome well earned bouquets in his +report, stating also that their colonel had shown “the very best +qualities of a volunteer officer”—why he limited it to +“volunteer” does not appear, but is inferable from the +well-known disposition of all regulars to consider all volunteers +“rookies”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4910src" href= +"#xd20e4910" name="xd20e4910src">12</a>—and recommended that he +be made a brigadier general, which shortly afterward was done.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e4913src" href="#xd20e4913" name= +"xd20e4913src">13</a></p> +<p>It would be invidious to follow the various phases of the subsequent +early fighting, and single out one or more States<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4920src" href="#xd20e4920" name="xd20e4920src">14</a> and tell of +the hard earned and well deserved honors they won, because space +forbids a proper tribute to the heroism of all of them. As for the +regulars,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4923src" href="#xd20e4923" name= +"xd20e4923src">15</a> they were the same they were at Santiago de Cuba, +the same they always are anywhere you put them. When a newspaper man +would come around a regular regiment during the fighting before +Santiago he would be told that they had no news to give him, “We +ain’t heroes, we’re regulars,” they would say. After +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb195" href="#pb195" name= +"pb195">195</a>]</span>the outbreak of February 4th, all our people did +well, acted nobly, “Angels could no more.” Neither could +devils, as shown by the losses inflicted on the enemy.</p> +<p>There was more fighting outside Manila during the next two or three +days, and when that was done the somewhat shattered insurgent legions +had recoiled to the distantly visible foot-hills, convinced that their +notion they could take Manila was very foolish and very rash.</p> +<p>At the town of Caloocan, some three or four miles out to the north +of Manila, were located the shops and round houses of the Manila and +Dagupan Railway, which runs from Manila in a northwesterly direction +about 120 miles to Dagupan, and was then the only railroad in the +archipelago. It was fed by a vast rich farming country, the great plain +of central Luzon. Naturally, the central plain which fed the railroad +that traversed it and kept its teeming myriads of small farmers in +touch with the great outside world was to be sooner or later, the +theatre of war. To seize transportation is instinctively the first +tactical move of a military man. Lieutenant-General Luna, +commander-in-chief, next to Aguinaldo, of the revolutionary forces, the +man whom later Aguinaldo had shot, was just then at Caloocan with 4000 +men. So it fell to General MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of +the Eighth Corps, to move on Caloocan, which he did on February +10th.</p> +<p>John F. Bass, correspondent for <i>Harper’s Weekly</i>, +writing from Manila a short time after this, describes this movement. +It was our first move away from the city of Manila. With a few masterly +strokes of the pen, which I regret there is not space to reproduce here +in full, Mr. Bass gives a vivid picture of the various engagements, and +of “a background of burning villages, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb196" href="#pb196" name= +"pb196">196</a>]</span>smoke, fire, shot, and shell, the ceaseless +tramp of tired and often bleeding feet,” etc. +“Heroism,” he says, “became a matter of course and +death an incident.” Finally his story pauses for a moment thus: +“The natural comment is that all this is merely war—the +<i>business</i> of the soldier. True, nor do I think Jimmie Green [Mr. +Bass’s name for our “Tommy Atkins”] is troubled with +heroics. He accepts the situation without excitement or hysterics. +<i>He has little feeling in this matter for his heart is not in this +fight.</i>” Here brother Bass’s moralizing ceases abruptly, +and the contagious excitement of the hour catches him, just as it +always does the average man under such circumstances:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">From La Loma church you may get the full view of our +long line crossing the open field, evenly, steadily, irresistibly, like +an inrolling wave on the beach * * *. Watch the regiments go +forward, and form under fire, and move on and on, and you will exclaim: +“Magnificent,” and you will gulp a little and feel proud +<i>without exactly knowing why</i>. Then gradually the <i>power</i> of +that line will force itself upon you, and you will feel that you must +follow, that wherever that line goes you must go also. By and by you +will be sorry, but for the present the might of an American regiment +has got possession of you.</p> +</div> +<p>Anybody who has ever been with an American regiment in action knows +exactly how the man who wrote that felt. The American who has never had +the experience Mr. Bass describes above has missed one way of realizing +the majesty of the power of the republic whereof he is privileged to be +a citizen. For if there is one national trait which more than any other +explains the greatness of our country, it is the instinct for +organization, the fondness for self-multiplication to the +<i>n</i><sup>th</sup> power by intelligent co-operation with +one’s fellows to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb197" href= +"#pb197" name="pb197">197</a>]</span>a common end. Especially is the +experience in question inspiring where the example of the field +officers is particularly appropriate to the occasion. Take for instance +the following, concerning the conduct of Major J. Franklin Bell in this +advance on Caloocan, from the report of Major Kobbe, Commanding the +Artillery:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">As the right cleared the head of the ravine, I could +see Maj. J. F. Bell * * * leading a company of Montana troops +in front of the right * * * advancing, firing, toward +intrenchments * * *. He was on a black horse to the last +* * * leading and cheering the men. His work was most gallant +and * * * especially cheering to me.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4967src" href="#xd20e4967" name="xd20e4967src">16</a></p> +</div> +<p>No mere scribe can magnify General Bell’s matchless efficiency +in action, but it is certainly inspiring to contemplate. There are no +“fuss and feathers” about him. Yet his power, proven on +many a field in the Philippines, to kindle martial ardor by example, +suggests the ubiquitous “Helmet of Navarre” of Lord +Macaulay’s poem.</p> +<p>A little later correspondent Bass develops what he meant by +“by and by you will be sorry.” You see it is not +comfortable business, this of hustling about among the dead and dying. +In the excitement, you are so liable to step on the face of some poor +devil you knew well, maybe a once warm friend. In this connection Mr. +Bass says: “There is this difference between the manner in which +American and Filipino soldiers die. The American falls in a heap and +dies hard; the Filipino stretches himself out, and when dead is always +found in some easy attitude, generally with his head on his arms. They +die the way a wild animal dies—in just such a position as one +finds a deer or an antelope which one has shot in the woods.” +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb198" href="#pb198" name= +"pb198">198</a>]</span></p> +<p>So far as the writer is advised and believes, nobody who knows John +F. Bass ever suspected him of being a quitter. He must have been +reading the <i>London Standard</i>, which said about that time: +“It <i>is</i> a little startling to find the liberators of Cuba +engaged in suppressing a youthful republic which claims the sacred +right of self-government.” Bass had written his newspaper in +August previous, after observing how pluckily the Filipinos had fought +and licked the Spaniards: “Give them their independence and +guarantee it to them.” The overwhelming sentiment of the Eighth +Army Corps when we took the Philippines was against taking them; and +those who had kept informed knew that the Senate had ratified the +treaty by a majority only one more than enough to squeeze it through, +the vote having been 57 to 27, at least 56 being thus indispensable to +make the necessary constitutional two-thirds of the 84 votes cast; and +that Wall Street and the White Man’s Burden or land-grabbing +contingent—“Philanthropy and Five per cent,” as +Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage put it at the time—were +responsible for these shambles Mr. Bass describes.</p> +<p>At this juncture some soft-headed gentleman asks: “What is +this man who writes this book driving at? Is he trying to show that the +American soldiers in the Philippines in February, 1899, all wanted to +quit as soon as the war broke out?” Not at all. In the first +place it hardly lay in American soldier nature to want to quit when +Aguinaldo was telling us “if you don’t take your flag down +and out of these islands at once and promptly get out yourselves along +with it, I will proceed to kick <i>you</i> out and throw <i>it</i> +out.” And in the next place, in the war with the Filipinos, as in +all other wars, fuel was added to the flame as soon as the war broke +out. Among the Americans, charges soon came into general <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb199" href="#pb199" name= +"pb199">199</a>]</span>circulation and acceptance that the Filipinos +had planned (but been frustrated in) a plot looking to a general +massacre of all foreigners in Manila. This alleged plot was supposed to +have been scheduled to be carried out on a certain night shortly after +February 15, 1899. Among the Filipinos, on the other hand, +counter-charges soon followed, and met with general credence, that the +Americans made a practise of killing prisoners taken in battle, +including the wounded. Neither charge was ever proven, but both served +the purpose, at the psychologic moment, of possessing each side with +the desire to kill, which is the business of war. Let us glance briefly +at these recriminations.</p> +<p>Between pages 1916 and 1917 of <i>Senate Document 331</i>, part +2<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5000src" href="#xd20e5000" name= +"xd20e5000src">17</a> may be found a photo-lithograph of the celebrated +alleged order of the Filipino Revolutionary Government of February 15, +1899, to massacre all foreign residents of Manila. In his report for +1899<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5003src" href="#xd20e5003" name= +"xd20e5003src">18</a> General Otis himself describes this order as one +“which for barbarous intent is unequalled in these modern times +in civilized warfare,” and speaks of it as “issued by the +Malolos Government through the responsible officer who had raised and +organized the hostile inhabitants within the city.” After +Aguinaldo was captured in 1901, according to an account given by +General MacArthur to the Senate Committee in 1902, of a conversation +with the insurgent leader, the latter was shown a copy of this document +purporting to have been signed by General Luna, one of his generals. He +disclaimed having in any way sanctioned it, in fact disclaimed any +prior knowledge of it whatsoever,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5008src" +href="#xd20e5008" name="xd20e5008src">19</a> a disclaimer which General +MacArthur appears to have <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb200" href= +"#pb200" name="pb200">200</a>]</span>accepted as true, frankly and +entirely. At page 1890 of the same volume, Captain J. R. M. Taylor, +14th U. S. Infantry, a gallant soldier and an accomplished scholar, who +was in charge in 1901 of the captured insurgent records at Manila, +states that he was “informed” that the document was +originally “signed by Sandico, then Secretary of the +Interior” of the revolutionary government. Captain Taylor made an +attempt to run the matter down, but obtained no evidence convincing to +him. A like investigation by General MacArthur in 1901 had a like +result.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5016src" href="#xd20e5016" name= +"xd20e5016src">20</a></p> +<p>On the other hand, Major Wm. H. Bishop, of the 20th Kansas, was +credited in a soldier’s letter written home, which first came to +light in this country, with killing unarmed prisoners during the +advance on Caloocan. The charges originated with a private of that +regiment. Major Bishop denied the charges.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5026src" href="#xd20e5026" name="xd20e5026src">21</a> An +investigation followed, in the course of which somebody made an +innuendo, or charge—it is not important which—that other +officers used their influence to prevent a full ventilation of the +matter, specifically, General Funston, then Colonel of the 20th Kansas, +and Major Metcalf, of the same regiment. These last two also made a +most vigorous general denial, and nothing whatever was established +against them. The whole matter was finally disposed of by being +forwarded to the War Department at Washington by General Otis on July +13, 1899, some six months after the occurrences alleged, with the +remark that he (General Otis) “doubted the wisdom of a +court-martial” of the soldier who had made the charge against +Major Bishop, “as it would give the insurgent authorities a +knowledge of what was taking place, and they would assert positively +that our troops practised inhumanities, whether the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb201" href="#pb201" name= +"pb201">201</a>]</span>charges could be proven or not” and that +they would use the incident “as an excuse to defend their own +barbarities.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5033src" href= +"#xd20e5033" name="xd20e5033src">22</a> The last endorsement on the +papers preceding General Otis’s final endorsement was one by +Colonel Crowder, now (1912) Judge Advocate General of the United States +Army, in which he said: “I am not convinced from a careful +reading of this report, that Private Brenner has made a false charge +against Captain Bishop”; adding that “considerations of +public policy, sufficiently grave to silence every other demand, +require that no further action be taken in this case.”<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e5038src" href="#xd20e5038" name= +"xd20e5038src">23</a> The “considerations of public policy” +were of course those indicated in General Otis’s final +endorsement on the papers, already quoted. They were compellingly +controlling, in my judgment, independently of the merits. Washing +one’s soiled linen in public is never advisable, and placing a +weapon in your enemy’s hand in time of war is at least equally +unwise. Some shreds of this once much mooted matter doubtless still +linger in the public memory. It has been thus briefly ventilated here +solely to trace the genesis of the bitterness of that war, and of +numerous later barbarities avenged in kind. The bitterness thus early +begun grew as the war went on, until every time a hapless Filipino +peasant soldier speaking only two or three words of Spanish would +falsely explain, when captured, that he was a non-combatant, an +<i>amigo</i> (friend), it usually at once filled the captor with vivid +recollections of slain comrades, and of rumored or sometimes proven +mutilation of their bodies after death, and these reflections would at +once fill him with a yearning desire to blow the top of the +<i>amigo’s</i> head off, whether he yielded to the desire or not. +Of no instance where he did so yield am I aware. But I do know that the +invariable statement of all <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb202" href= +"#pb202" name="pb202">202</a>]</span>Filipinos unarmed and un-uniformed +when captured, to the effect that they were <i>amigos</i>, became to +the American soldier not remotely dissimilar to the waving of a red rag +at a bull. Of course this was also due, largely, to the guerrilla +practice of hiding guns when hard-pressed and actually plunging at once +into some make-believe agricultural pursuit. As for Major Bishop, it is +inconceivable to me that he gave any order to kill unarmed prisoners. +Even admitting for the sake of the argument that he is a fiend, he is +not a fool. As a matter of fact, he was a brave soldier, as all the +reports show, and is a reputable lawyer, having many warm friends whose +opinion of any man would command respect anywhere. The truth of the +whole matter probably is that just before going into battle, when our +troops were in an ugly temper by reason of the rumors of barbarities +alleged to have been perpetrated by the enemy, or contemplated by him, +the word was passed along the line to “Take no more prisoners +than we have to,” and that that thought originated with some +irresponsible private soldier of the line inflamed by stories of +mutilation of our dead or of maltreatment of our wounded. Such a +“word,” so passed from man to man, can, in the heat of +conflict, very soon evolve into something having for practical purposes +all the force and effect of an order.</p> +<p>Through the foregoing, and like causes, including the “water +cure,” later invented to persuade <i>amigos</i> to discover the +whereabouts of hidden insurgent guns or give information as to the +movements of the enemy,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5060src" href= +"#xd20e5060" name="xd20e5060src">24</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb203" href="#pb203" name="pb203">203</a>]</span>our war with the +Filipinos became, before it was over, a rather “dark and +bloody” affair, accentuated as it was, from time to time, by +occasional Filipino success in surprising detachments from ambush, or +by taking them unawares and off their guard in their quarters, and +eliminating them, the most notable instance of the first being the +crumpling of a large command of the 15th Infantry by General Juan +Cailles, in southern Luzon, and the most indelibly remembered and +important example of the second being the massacre of the 9th Infantry +people at Balangiga, in Samar, in the fall of 1901. Certainly more than +one American in that long-drawn-out war did things unworthy of any +civilized man, things he would have believed it impossible, before he +went out there, ever to come to. Personally, I have heard, so far as I +now recollect, of comparatively few barbarities perpetrated by +Filipinos on captured American soldiers. Barbarities on their side +seemed to have been reserved for those of their own race whom they +found disloyal to the cause of their country. Personally I have never +seen the water-cure administered. But I once went on a confidential +mission by direction of General MacArthur, in the course of which I +reported first, on arriving in the neighborhood of the contemplated +destination, to a general officer of the regular army who is still such +to-day.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5065src" href="#xd20e5065" name= +"xd20e5065src">25</a> That night the general was good enough to extend +the usual courtesy of a cot to sleep on, in the headquarters building. +Toward dusk I went to dine with a certain lieutenant, also of the +regular army.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5068src" href="#xd20e5068" +name="xd20e5068src">26</a> As we approached <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb204" href="#pb204" name="pb204">204</a>]</span>the +lieutenant’s quarters a sergeant came up with a prisoner, and +asked instructions as to what to do with him. The lieutenant said: +“Take him out and find out what he knows. <i>Do you +understand</i>, Sergeant?” The sergeant saluted, answered in the +affirmative, and moved away with his prisoner. We went in to the +lieutenant’s quarters, and while at dinner heard groans outside. +I said “What is that, Jones?”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5077src" href="#xd20e5077" name="xd20e5077src">27</a> Jones said: +“That’s the water-cure he’s giving that <i lang= +"es">hombre</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5083src" href="#xd20e5083" +name="xd20e5083src">28</a> Want to see it?” I replied that I +certainly did not. Returning that night to the general’s +headquarters, after breakfast the next morning I met my friend Jones +coming out of the general’s office. I said: “What’s +the matter, what are you doing here,” he having mentioned the +evening before an expedition planned for the morrow. He said: +“Well, I’ve just had a talk with the general to see if I +could get my resignation from the army accepted?” +“Why?” said I. “Well,” was the reply, +“that ——” (designating the prisoner of the +night before by a double barrelled epithet) “died on me last +night.” Just how the matter was hushed up I have never known, but +Jones was never punished. More than one general officer of the United +States Army in the Philippines during our war with the Filipinos at +least winked at the water-cure as a means of getting information, and +quite a number of subalterns made a custom of applying it for that +purpose. It was practically the only way you could get them to betray +their countrymen. Did I report the incident to General MacArthur? +Certainly not. It was the business of the general commanding the +district. The water-cure, though very painful, was seldom fatal, and +when not fatal was almost never <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb205" +href="#pb205" name="pb205">205</a>]</span>permanently damaging, and it +was about the only way to shake the loyalty of the average Filipino and +make him give information as to hidden insurgent guns, guerrilla bands, +etc. It was a part of Benevolent Assimilation.</p> +<p>Let us now return to the early battlefields about Manila which we +left, initially, to analyze the extreme bitterness of the feeling +between the combatants that very early began to develop.</p> +<p>We left war correspondent John F. Bass among the dead and dying on +one of these fields, supposedly musing on the White Man’s Burden, +or Land-Grabbing, or Trust-for-Civilization theory, or whatever it was +that moved the fifty-seven senators whose votes had ratified the treaty +by a majority of just one more than the constitutionally necessary +two-thirds.</p> +<p>The reason the writer lays so much stress on Mr. Bass’s +letters to <i>Harper’s Weekly</i> on the early fighting in the +Philippines, is because his remarks come direct from the battlefield, +and are, as it were, <i>res gestæ</i>. They were made <i>dum +fervet opus</i>, to use a law Latin phrase which in plain English means +“while the iron is hot.” They reflect more or less +accurately the feelings of the men whose deeds he was recording. He, +and O. K. Davis, now Washington correspondent of the <i>New York +Times</i>, and John T. McCutcheon, of Chicago, the now famous +cartoonist (who was with Dewey in the battle of Manila Bay), and Robert +Collins, now London correspondent of the Associated Press, and +“Dick” Little of the <i>Chicago Tribune</i>,—a little +man about six feet three,—and lots of other good men and true, +were all through that fighting, and we will later come to an issue of +personal veracity between them and General Otis which culminated in the +retirement from office of Secretary of War Alger, and ought to have +resulted in <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb206" href="#pb206" name= +"pb206">206</a>]</span>the recall of General Otis, but did not, because +to have acknowledged what a blunderer General Otis had been and to have +relieved him from command, as he should have been relieved, would have +been to “swap horses crossing a stream,” as Mr. Lincoln +used to put it in declining to change generals during a given campaign. +The object here is to bring out the truth of history as to how the men +who bore the brunt of the early fighting felt about it. Testimony as to +what the officers and men of the army said would be of no value, +because a complaining soldier’s complaints are too often only a +proof of “cold feet.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5112src" +href="#xd20e5112" name="xd20e5112src">29</a></p> +<p>These newspaper men, not under military orders, were daily risking +their lives voluntarily, just to keep the American public informed, and +the American public were kept in darkness and only vouchsafed bulletins +giving them the progressive lists of their dead and wounded, and this +last only on demand made upon Secretary Alger by the people of +Minnesota, the Dakotas, etc., through their senators. The War +Department did not want the people to know, did not want to admit +itself, how plucky, vigorous, and patriotic the resistance was. The +period of the fighting done by the State Volunteers from February until +fall, when public opinion finally forced the Administration to send +General Otis an adequate force, is slurred by Secretary of War Root in +his report for 1899. I do not mean that it was slurred intentionally. +But the Philippines were a long way off, and Mr. Root and Mr. McKinley +naturally relied for their information on their commanding general on +the spot. There were gallant deeds done in the Philippines by those +Western fellows of the State regiments which volunteered for the war +with Spain, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb207" href="#pb207" name= +"pb207">207</a>]</span>that would have made the little fighting around +Santiago look like—well, to borrow from “Chimmie” +Fadden’s fertile vocabulary, “like 30 cents.” But +General Otis was not in a position to get the thrill of such things +from his office window, so very few of them were given much prominence +by him in his despatches to the Adjutant-General of the army. This was +wise enough from a political standpoint, seeing that a presidential +campaign was to ensue in 1900 predicated on the proposition that +American sovereignty was “in accord with the wishes and +aspirations of the great mass of the Filipinos,” to use the words +of the President’s message to Congress of December, 1899.</p> +<p>Caloocan was taken by General MacArthur on February 10th. The +natural line of advance thereafter was of course up the railroad, +because the insurgents held it, and needed it as much as we would. +Throughout February there were engagements too numerous to mention. The +navy also entertained the enemy whenever he came too near the shores of +Manila Bay. One incident in particular is worthy of note, and worthy of +the best traditions of the navy. I refer to the conduct of Assistant +Engineer Emory Winship off Malabon, March 4, 1899. Malabon is five +miles north of Manila, on the bay, not far from Caloocan. On the day +named, a landing party of 125 men from the U. S. S. <i>Bennington</i> +went ashore near Malabon to make photographs, in aid of navy gunnery, +of certain entrenchments and buildings that had been struck by shells +from the <i>Monadnock</i>. They foolishly failed to throw out scouts +ahead of their column, and were suddenly greeted with a withering fire +from a whole regiment of insurgents who had seen them first and lain in +wait for them. They retired with considerably more haste than they had +gone forth. The insurgents advanced, firing, at <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb208" href="#pb208" name= +"pb208">208</a>]</span>double quick, toward the comparative handful of +Americans, and would undoubtedly have killed the last man jack of them, +but Engineer Winship, who had been left in charge of the tug that +brought the landing party shoreward, to keep up steam, saw the +situation and promptly met it. He unlimbered a 37<i>mm.</i> Hotchkiss +revolving machine gun which stood in the bow of the tug, and opened up +with accurate aim on the advancing regiment of Filipinos. Naturally he +at once became a more important target than the retreating body. +Nevertheless, he kept pumping lead into that long howling murderous +advancing brown line until, when within two hundred yards of where the +tug lay, the line recoiled and retreated, and the landing party got +safely back to the ship. It was, literally, a case of saving the lives +of more than a hundred men, by fearless promptness and dogged tenacity +in the intelligent and skilful performance of duty. The awnings of the +tug were torn in shreds by the enemy’s rain of bullets, and her +woodwork was much peppered. Winship was hit five times, and still +carries the bullets in his body, having been retired on account of +disability resulting therefrom, after being promoted in recognition of +his work.</p> +<p>Soon after March 25th, General MacArthur, commanding the Second +Division of the Eighth Army Corps, advanced from Caloocan up the +railroad to Malolos, the insurgent capital, some twenty miles away. +Malolos was taken March 31st. Our February killed were six officers and +seventy-one enlisted men, total seventy-seven, and a total of 378 +wounded. By the end of March the list swelled to twelve officers and +127 enlisted men killed, total 139, and a total of 881 wounded, making +our total casualties, as reported April 1st, 1020. Also 15% of the +command, or about <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb209" href="#pb209" +name="pb209">209</a>]</span>2500, were on sick report on that date from +heat prostrations and the like.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5136src" +href="#xd20e5136" name="xd20e5136src">30</a> For these and other +reasons, farther advance up the railroad was halted for a while.</p> +<p>Meantime, General Lawton, with his staff, consisting of Colonel +Edwards, Major Starr, and Captains King and Sewall, “the big +four” they were called, had come out from New York City by way of +the Suez Canal, bringing most welcome reinforcements, the 4th and 17th +Infantry. These people arrived between the 10th and the 22d of March. +What happened soon after, as a result of their arrival, must now become +for a brief moment, a part of the panorama, the lay of the land General +Lawton first swept over being first indicated.</p> +<p>Luzon is practically bisected, east and west, by the Pasig River and +a lake out of which it flows almost due west into Manila Bay, Manila +being at the mouth of the river. Under the Spaniards, all Luzon north +of the Pasig had been one military district and all Luzon south of the +Pasig another. The Eighth Army Corps always spoke of northern Luzon as +“the north line,” and of southern Luzon as “the south +line.” The lake above mentioned is called the Laguna de Bay. It +is nearly as big as Manila Bay, which last is called twenty odd miles +wide by thirty long. On the map, the Laguna de Bay roughly resembles a +half-moon, the man in which looks north, the western horn being near +Manila, and the eastern near the Pacific coast of Luzon. General Otis +had learned that at a place called Santa Cruz, toward the eastern end +of the Laguna de Bay, there were a lot of steam launches and a Spanish +gun-boat, which, if captured, would prove invaluable for river fighting +and transportation of supplies along the <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb210" href="#pb210" name="pb210">210</a>]</span>Rio Grande de +Pampanga and the other streams that watered the great central plain +through which the railroad ran and which would have to be occupied +later. So as soon as possible after General Lawton arrived and the +necessary men could be spared, he was sent with 1500 troops to seize +and bring back the boats in question. Of course the country he should +overrun would have to be overrun again, because there were not troops +enough to spare to garrison and hold it. But for the present, the +launches would help. This expedition was successful, leaving the head +of the lake nearest Manila on April 9th, and returning April 17th. It +met with some good hard fighting on the way, sweeping everything before +it of course, inflicting considerable loss, and suffering some. General +Lawton’s report mentions, among other officers whose conspicuous +gallantry and efficiency in action attracted his attention, Colonel +Clarence R. Edwards, now Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the +War Department, of whose conduct in the capture of Santa Cruz on the +morning of April 10th, he says: “No line of battle could have +been more courageously or intelligently led.”<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e5148src" href="#xd20e5148" name="xd20e5148src">31</a> The +resistance was pretty real to Colonel Edwards then, <i>i.e.</i>, the +Benevolent Assimilation was quite strenuous, and it continued to be so +until his great commander was shot through the breast in the forefront +of battle in the hour of victory in December thereafter, and the +colonel came home with the general’s body. Since then the colonel +has soldiered no more, but has remained on duty at Washington, the +birthplace of the original theory that the Filipinos welcomed our rule, +charged with the duty of yearning <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb211" +href="#pb211" name="pb211">211</a>]</span>over the erring Filipino who +thinks he can govern himself but is mistaken, and also with the still +more difficult task of trying to live up to the original theory as far +as circumstances will permit. As a matter of fact, the Filipinos would +probably have gotten along much better than the Cubans if we had let +General Lawton do there what he and General Wood were set to work doing +in Cuba shortly after Santiago fell. Public opinion is a very dangerous +thing to trifle with, and when, in September, 1899, there was a story +going the rounds of the American newspapers that Lawton, the hero of El +Caney, the man who had reflected more glory on American arms in +striking the shackles of Spain from Cuba than any other one soldier in +the army, had called the war in the Philippines “this accursed +war,” the War Department got busy over the cable to General Otis +and obtained from him a denial that General Lawton had made such a +remark. But the public knew its Lawton and what he had done in Cuba, +and had a suspicion there might be some truth in the rumor. So the War +Department cabled out saying “Newspapers say Lawton’s +denial insufficient,” and then repeating the words attributed to +him. So General Otis sent another denial that filled the bill.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e5158src" href="#xd20e5158" name= +"xd20e5158src">32</a> Of course General Lawton made no such remark. He +was too good a soldier. It would have demoralized his whole command. +But I served under him in both hemispheres, and I will always believe +that he had a certain amount of regret at having to fight the Filipinos +to keep them from having independence, when they were a so much +likelier lot, take it all in all, than the Cubans we saw about +Santiago. Moreover, I believe that had it not been then too late to ask +him, he would <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb212" href="#pb212" name= +"pb212">212</a>]</span>have subscribed to the opinion Admiral Dewey had +cabled home the previous summer: “These people are far superior +in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the +natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.”</p> +<p>After the expedition down the lake, General Lawton went on +“The North Line.” So let us now turn thither also. For +wherever Lawton was, there was fighting.</p> +<p>In the latter half of April, General MacArthur advanced north along +the railroad, and took Calumpit, where the railroad crosses the Rio +Grande, on April 28th. This was the place where under cover of +“the accurate concentrated fire of the guns of the Utah Light +Artillery commanded by Major Young”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5174src" href="#xd20e5174" name="xd20e5174src">33</a> a few +Kansas men with ropes tied to their bodies swam the river in the face +of a heavy fire from the enemy, fastened the ropes to some boats on the +enemy’s side, and were pulled back in the boats, by their +comrades, to the side they had come from; the Kansans then crossing the +river under the lead of the gallant Funston, and driving the enemy from +his trenches. The desperate bravery of the performance, like so many +other things General Funston did in the Philippines, was so superb that +one forgets how contrary it was to all known rules of the game of war. +If it was Providence that saved Funston and his Kansans from +annihilation, certainly Providence was ably assisted on that occasion +by Major Young and his Utah Battery.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5180src" href="#xd20e5180" name="xd20e5180src">34</a></p> +<p>Shortly after this General MacArthur entered San <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb213" href="#pb213" name= +"pb213">213</a>]</span>Fernando, the second insurgent capital, which is +forty miles or so up the railroad from Manila.</p> +<p>During the month of May General Lawton kept the insurgents busy to +the east of the railroad, between it and the Pacific coast range, +taking San Isidro, whither the third insurgent capital was moved after +Malolos fell, on May 17th. Here he made his headquarters for a time, as +did General MacArthur at San Fernando.</p> +<p>It had been supposed that practically the whole body of the +insurgent army was concentrated in the country to the north of Manila, +but this proved a mistake. They now began to threaten Manila from the +country south of the Pasig. Says General Otis:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The enemy had become again boldly demonstrative at the +South and it became necessary to throw him back once more.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e5197src" href="#xd20e5197" name= +"xd20e5197src">35</a></p> +</div> +<p>General Lawton was directed to concentrate his troops in the country +about San Isidro, turn them over to the command of some one else, and +come to Manila to organize for a campaign on the south line. The +<i>details</i> of this expedition belong to a military history, which +this is not. The expedition left its initial point of concentration +near Manila on June 9th. Its great event was the battle of Zapote River +on June 13th. Along this river in 1896 the insurgents had gained a +great victory over the Spaniards. They had trenches on the farther side +of the river which they deemed impregnable. General Lawton attacked +them in these intrenchments June 13th. At three o’clock that +afternoon he wired General Otis at Manila giving him an idea of the +battle and stating that the enemy was fighting in strong force and with +determination. At 3:30 o’clock he wired: <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb214" href="#pb214" name="pb214">214</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We are having a beautiful battle. Hurry up ammunition; +we will need it;</p> +</div> +<p>and at 4 o’clock:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We have the bridge. It has cost us dearly. Battle not +yet over. It is a battle however.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5218src" +href="#xd20e5218" name="xd20e5218src">36</a></p> +</div> +<p>It was in this battle of Zapote River that Lieutenant William L. +Kenly, of the regular artillery, did what was perhaps the finest single +bit of soldier work of the whole war,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5225src" href="#xd20e5225" name="xd20e5225src">37</a> in +recognition of which his conduct in the battle was characterized as +“magnificent” by so thorough a soldier as General Lawton, +who recommended him to be brevetted for distinguished gallantry in the +presence of the enemy, with this remark:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">As General Ovenshine says, speaking of Lieutenant +Kenly and his battery, “This is probably <i>the first time in +history</i> that a battery has been advanced and <i>fought without +cover within thirty yards of</i> strongly manned +trenches.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5237src" href="#xd20e5237" +name="xd20e5237src">38</a></p> +</div> +<p>For what he did on that occasion, Kenly ought to have had a medal of +honor, which, except life insurance and a good education, is the finest +legacy any government can enable a soldier to bequeath to his children. +If the war had been backed by the sentiment of the whole country, as +the Spanish War was, he would have gotten it. As it was, the only thing +he ever got for it, so far as the writer is advised, was to have his +name spelt wrong in an account of the incident in the only book +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb215" href="#pb215" name= +"pb215">215</a>]</span>wherein there has yet been attempted a record of +the many deeds of splendid daring that marked the only war into which +this nation ever blundered.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5247src" href= +"#xd20e5247" name="xd20e5247src">39</a></p> +<p>While there were divers and sundry movements of our troops hither +and thither, and much sacrifice of life, after General Lawton’s +Zapote River campaign in June, no substantial progress was made in +conquering and occupying the Islands until the fall following the +Zapote River campaign above mentioned, when the twenty-five regiments +of volunteers were organized and sent out. All that was done until +then, after the capture of San Fernando, may be summed up broadly, by +saying that we protected Manila and held the railroad, as far as we had +fought our way up it. It is true that the city of Iloilo had been +occupied on February 11th, the city of Cebu shortly afterward, the +island of Negros, an oasis of comparative quiet in a great desert of +hostility, a little later; also that a small Spanish garrison at the +little port of Jolo in the Mohammedan country near Borneo had also been +relieved by a small American force on the 19th of May. But these +irresolute movements accomplished nothing except to deprive our force +at the front of about 4000 men and to awaken the Visayan Islands to +active and thorough organization against us.</p> +<p>Preparatory to an understanding of the fall campaign, in which +patchwork and piecemeal warfare was superseded by the real thing, it +will now be necessary to consider the political—or let us call +it, the politico-military—aspect of the first half year of the +war.</p> +<p>General Otis’s folly had led him to advise Washington as early +as November, 1898, that he could get along with <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb216" href="#pb216" name= +"pb216">216</a>]</span>25,000 troops,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5261src" href="#xd20e5261" name="xd20e5261src">40</a> and the +Otis under-estimate of the resistance we would meet if we took the +Islands had undoubtedly influenced Mr. McKinley in deciding to take +them. Twenty-five thousand troops was only 5000 more than General Otis +had with him at the time he made the recommendation, and signified that +he was not expecting trouble. The Treaty of Paris was signed on +December 10, 1898, and on December 16th, President McKinley’s +Secretary of War informed Congress that 25,000 troops would be enough +for the Philippines.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5266src" href= +"#xd20e5266" name="xd20e5266src">41</a> When the treaty was ratified +February 6, 1899, the war in the Philippines had already broken out. On +March 2, 1899, two days before the 55th Congress expired, in fact on +the very day that Congress appropriated the $20,000,000 to pay Spain +for the Islands, an act was passed authorizing the President to enlist +35,000 volunteers to put down the insurrection in the Islands. The term +of enlistment of these volunteers was to expire June 30, 1901. As the +New Thought people would say “Hold the Thought!” June 30, +1901, is the end of our government’s fiscal year. That date, the +date of expiration of the enlistment of the volunteer army raised under +the act of March 2, 1899, is a convenient key to the whole history of +the American occupation of the Philippines since the outbreak of our +war with the Filipinos, February 4, 1899, including the titanic efforts +of the McKinley Administration in the latter half of 1899 and the first +half of 1900 to retrieve the Otis blunders; the premature resumption by +Judge Taft, during and in aid of Mr. McKinley’s campaign for the +Presidency in 1900, of the original McKinley Benevolent Assimilation +programme, on the theory, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb217" href= +"#pb217" name="pb217">217</a>]</span>already wholly exploded by a long +and bitter war, that the great majority of the people welcomed American +rule and had only been coerced into opposing us; and the premature +setting up of the Civil Government on July 4, 1901. No candid mind +seeking only the truth of history can fail to see that when President +McKinley sent the Taft Commission to the Philippines in the spring of +1900, part of their problem was to facilitate Mr. McKinley in avoiding +later on any further call for volunteers to take the place of those +whose terms would expire June 30, 1901. The amount of force that has +been needed to saddle our government firmly on the Filipino people is +the only honest test by which to examine the claim that it is unto them +as Castoria unto children. In February, 1899, the dogs of war being +already let loose, President McKinley had resumed his now wholly +impossible Benevolent Assimilation programme, by sending out the +Schurman Commission, which was the prototype of the Taft Commission, to +yearningly explain our intentions to the insurgents, and to make clear +to them how unqualifiedly benevolent those intentions were. The scheme +was like trying to put salt on a bird’s tail after you have +flushed him. This commission was headed by President Schurman, of +Cornell University. It arrived in March, armed with instructions as +benevolent in their rhetoric as any the Filipinos had ever read in the +days of our predecessors in sovereignty, the Spaniards. And the +commission were of course duly astounded that their publication had no +effect. The Filipinos in Manila tore them down as soon as they were put +up. The instructions clothed the commission with authority to yield +every point in issue except the only one in dispute—Independence. +On this alone they were firm. But so were the people who had already +submitted the issue to the arbitrament <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb218" href="#pb218" name="pb218">218</a>]</span>of war. Of course the +Schurman Commission, therefore, accomplished nothing. It held frequent +communication with the enemy in the field and came near an open rupture +with General Otis, who was nominally a member of it. But even that +unwise man knew war when he saw it, and knew the futility of trying to +mix peace with war. War being hell, the sooner ’tis over the +better for all concerned. After Professor Schurman had been quite +optimistically explaining our intentions for about three months, under +the tragically mistaken notion Mr. McKinley had originally derived from +General Otis that the insurrection had been brought about by “the +sinister ambition of a few leaders,”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5276src" href="#xd20e5276" name="xd20e5276src">42</a> General +Otis wired Washington, on June 4th, “Negotiations and conferences +with insurgent leaders cost soldiers’ lives and prolong our +difficulties,”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5279src" href= +"#xd20e5279" name="xd20e5279src">43</a> adding with regard to the +Schurman Commission: “Ostensibly it will be supported +* * * here, and to the outside world gentle peace shall +prevail,” but intimating that he would be very much gratified if +the Department would allow him to handle the enemy, and stop Dr. +Schurman from having their leaders come in under flags of truce to +parley. After that Dr. Schurman’s activities seem to have been +confined to the less mischievous business of gathering statistics. His +mistake was simply the one he had brought with him, derived from +President McKinley. He came back home, however, thoroughly satisfied +that the Filipinos did of a verity want the independence they were +fighting for, and quite as sure that republics should not have colonies +as General Anderson’s experience had previously made him. It has +long been known throughout the length and breadth <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb219" href="#pb219" name="pb219">219</a>]</span>of +the United States that Dr. Schurman is in favor of Philippine +independence.</p> +<p>On June 26th, just thirteen days after the Zapote River fight had +stopped the insurgents on the south line from threatening almost the +very gates of the city of Manila itself, General Otis had another +attack of optimism. On that date he wired Washington: “Insurgent +cause may collapse at any time.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5289src" href="#xd20e5289" name="xd20e5289src">44</a> Finally, +the war correspondents at Manila, wearied with the military press +censorship whereby General Otis had so long kept the situation from the +people at home, with his eternal “situation-well-in-hand” +telegrams, got together, inspired no doubt by the example of the +Roosevelt round robin that had rescued the Fifth Army Corps from Cuba +after the fighting down there, and prepared a round robin of their +own—a protest against further misrepresentation of the facts. +This they of course knew General Otis would not let them cable home. +However, they asked his permission to do so, the committee appointed to +beard the lion in his den being O. K. Davis, John T. McCutcheon, Robert +Collins, and John F. Bass. General Otis threatened to “put them +off the island.” This did not bother them in the least. General +Otis told the War Department afterwards that he did not punish them +because they were “courting martyrdom,” or words to that +effect. As a matter of fact, they were merely determined that the +American people should know the facts. That of “putting them off +the island” was just a fussy phrase of “Mother” Otis, +long familiar to them. They were under his jurisdiction. But they were +Americans, and reputable gentlemen, and he knew he was responsible for +their right treatment. After General Otis had duly put the expected +veto on the proposed <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb220" href="#pb220" +name="pb220">220</a>]</span>cablegram of protest, the newspaper men +sent their protest over to Hong Kong by mail, and had it cabled to the +United States from there. It was published in the newspapers of this +country July 17, 1899. A copy of it may be found in any public library +which keeps the bound copies of the great magazines, in the <i>Review +of Reviews</i> for August, 1899, pp. 137–8. It read as +follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The undersigned, being all staff correspondents of +American newspapers stationed in Manila, unite in the following +statement:</p> +<p>We believe that, owing to official despatches from Manila made +public in Washington, the people of the United States have not received +a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines, but that +those despatches have presented an ultra-optimistic view that is not +shared by the general officers in the field.</p> +<p>We believe the despatches incorrectly represent the existing +conditions among the Filipinos in respect to internal dissension and +demoralization resulting from the American campaign and to the brigand +character of their army.</p> +<p>We believe the despatches err in the declaration that “the +situation is well in hand,” and in the assumption that the +insurrection can be speedily ended without a greatly increased +force.</p> +<p>We think the tenacity of the Filipino purpose has been +under-estimated, and that the statements are unfounded that volunteers +are willing to engage in further service.</p> +<p>The censorship has compelled us to participate in this +misrepresentation by excising or altering uncontroverted statements of +facts on the plea that “they would alarm the people at +home,” or “have the people of the United States by the +ears.”</p> +</div> +<p>The men of the pen had been so long under military rule and had seen +so much of courts-martial that their <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb221" href="#pb221" name="pb221">221</a>]</span>document savored of +military jurisprudence. After making the above charges, it set forth +what it called “specifications.” These were:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Prohibition of hospital reports; suppression of full +reports of field operations in the event of failure; numbers of heat +prostrations in the field; systematic minimization of naval operations; +and suppression of complete reports of the situation.</p> +</div> +<p>The paper was signed by John T. McCutcheon and Harry Armstrong, +representing the Chicago <i>Record</i>; O. K. Davis and P. G. +MacDonnell, representing the New York <i>Sun</i>; Robert M. Collins, +John P. Dunning, and L. Jones, representing the Associated Press; John +F. Bass and William Dinwiddie, representing the New York <i>Herald</i>; +E. D. Skeene, representing the Scripps-McRae Association; and Richard +Little, representing the Chicago <i>Tribune</i>. Mr. Collins, the +Associated Press representative, wrote his people an account of this +whole episode, which was also given wide publicity. After describing +the committee’s interview with the General down to a certain +point, he says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">But when General Otis came down to the frank admission +that it was his purpose to keep the knowledge of conditions here from +the public at home, and when the censor had repeatedly told us, in +ruling out plain statements of undisputed facts, “My instructions +are to let nothing go that can hurt the Administration,” we +concluded that protest was justifiable.</p> +</div> +<p>Collins had written what he considered a conservative review of the +situation in June, saying reinforcements were needed. Of the +suppression of this he says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The censor’s comment (I made a note of it) was: +“Of course we all know that we are in a terrible mess out here, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb222" href="#pb222" name= +"pb222">222</a>]</span>but we don’t want the people to get +excited about it. If you fellows will only keep quiet now we will pull +through <i>in time</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5348src" href= +"#xd20e5348" name="xd20e5348src">45</a> without any fuss at +home!”</p> +</div> +<p>Mr. Collins’s letter proceeds: “When I went to see him +[Otis] he repeated the same old story about the insurrection going to +pieces.”</p> +<p>As to the charge of suppressing the real condition of our sick in +the hospitals, Mr. Collins says that General Otis remarked that the +“hospitals were full of perfectly well men who were shirking and +should be turned out.” On June 2, 1899, according to General +Otis’s report (p. 121), sixty per cent. of one of the State +volunteer regiments were in hospital sick or wounded and there were in +its ranks an average of but eight men to a company fit for duty. The +report of the regimental surgeon stating this was forwarded by General +Otis to Washington with the comment that there were few cases of +serious illness; that the then “present station of these +troops”—the place where the fighting was hottest, San +Fernando—“is considered by the Filipinos as a health +resort,” and that “when orders to take passage to the +United States are issued, both the Montana and South Dakota troops will +recover <i>with astonishing rapidity</i>.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5359src" href="#xd20e5359" name="xd20e5359src">46</a></p> +<p>This round robin of course produced a profound sensation in the +United States. It was just what the American public had long suspected +was the case. Shortly afterward Secretary of War Alger resigned. Coming +as it did on the heels of the scandal about “embalmed beef” +having been furnished to the army <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb223" +href="#pb223" name="pb223">223</a>]</span>in Cuba, it made him too much +of a load for the Administration to carry. He was succeeded by Mr. +Root, an eminent member of the New York Bar, whose masterful mind soon +saw the essentials of the situation and proceeded to get a volunteer +army recruited, equipped, and sent to the Philippines without further +unnecessary delay. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb224" href="#pb224" +name="pb224">224</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4783" href="#xd20e4783src" name="xd20e4783">1</a></span> See +General Hughes’s testimony before Senate Committee, 1902, +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, p. 508.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4793" href="#xd20e4793src" name="xd20e4793">2</a></span> See +<i>Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President for 1899</i>, +pp. 7 <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4817" href="#xd20e4817src" name="xd20e4817">3</a></span> This is +no mere attempt at rhetorical decoration. Said General MacArthur to the +Senate Committee in 1902 concerning Aguinaldo: “He was the +incarnation of the feelings of the Filipinos.” <i>Senate Document +331</i>, 1902, p. 1926.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4825" href="#xd20e4825src" name="xd20e4825">4</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, pp. 2927 <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4834" href="#xd20e4834src" name="xd20e4834">5</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 23.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4846" href="#xd20e4846src" name="xd20e4846">6</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 62</i>, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898–9, p. +383.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4854" href="#xd20e4854src" name="xd20e4854">7</a></span> See end +of <a href="#ch4">Chapter IV</a>. <i>ante.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4871" href="#xd20e4871src" name="xd20e4871">8</a></span> <i>Otis +Report for 1899</i>, p. 66.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4883" href="#xd20e4883src" name="xd20e4883">9</a></span> +<i>Report</i>, p. 99.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4888" href="#xd20e4888src" name="xd20e4888">10</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 100.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4903" href="#xd20e4903src" name="xd20e4903">11</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 150.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4910" href="#xd20e4910src" name="xd20e4910">12</a></span> Raw +recruits.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4913" href="#xd20e4913src" name="xd20e4913">13</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 375.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4920" href="#xd20e4920src" name="xd20e4920">14</a></span> There +were thirteen States represented by at least one organization. These +were the First Californias, Second Oregons, First Colorados, First +Nebraskas, Tenth Pennsylvanias, Major Young’s Utah Battery, the +First Idahos, Thirteenth Minnesotas, the North Dakota Artillery, the +Twentieth Kansas, and the Tennessees, Montanas, and Wyomings.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4923" href="#xd20e4923src" name="xd20e4923">15</a></span> The +regular regiments represented were the 14th, 8th, and 23d Infantry and +4th Cavalry. There were also some batteries of the Third Regular +Artillery, and a number of Engineers, Hospital Corps, and Signal Corps +people.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e4967" href="#xd20e4967src" name="xd20e4967">16</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 440.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5000" href="#xd20e5000src" name="xd20e5000">17</a></span> +Hearings on affairs in Philippine Islands, 1902.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5003" href="#xd20e5003src" name="xd20e5003">18</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 109.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5008" href="#xd20e5008src" name="xd20e5008">19</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, p. 1890.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5016" href="#xd20e5016src" name="xd20e5016">20</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pp. 1890 <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5026" href="#xd20e5026src" name="xd20e5026">21</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, p. 1436.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5033" href="#xd20e5033src" name="xd20e5033">22</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, p. 1448.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5038" href="#xd20e5038src" name="xd20e5038">23</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, pt. 2, p. 1447.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5060" href="#xd20e5060src" name="xd20e5060">24</a></span> The +“water cure” (a cure for reticence) consisted in placing a +bamboo reed in the victim’s mouth and pouring water down his +throat thus painfully distending his stomach and crowding all his +viscera. Allowed to void this after a time, he would, under threat of +repetition, give the desired information.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5065" href="#xd20e5065src" name="xd20e5065">25</a></span> Since +the above was written, the officer in question has joined the Great +Majority. It was that fearless, faithful, and kindly man, General Fred. +D. Grant, who died in April, 1912.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5068" href="#xd20e5068src" name="xd20e5068">26</a></span> The +lieutenant is no longer in the army, but he resigned voluntarily long +after the incident related in the text, and for reasons wholly foreign +to said incident.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5077" href="#xd20e5077src" name="xd20e5077">27</a></span> Of +course my host’s name was not Jones, but Jones will do.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5083" href="#xd20e5083src" name="xd20e5083">28</a></span> Spanish +for man.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5112" href="#xd20e5112src" name="xd20e5112">29</a></span> A +Philippine campaign expression for losing one’s nerve and wanting +to quit.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5136" href="#xd20e5136src" name="xd20e5136">30</a></span> +Otis’s <i>Report</i>, p. 133.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5148" href="#xd20e5148src" name="xd20e5148">31</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 35. In this handsome +commendation General Lawton also included Maj. Charles G. Starr, one of +the best all-round soldiers I ever knew.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5158" href="#xd20e5158src" name="xd20e5158">32</a></span> See +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., pp. +1068 <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5174" href="#xd20e5174src" name="xd20e5174">33</a></span> +Otis’s <i>Report</i>, p. 115.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5180" href="#xd20e5180src" name="xd20e5180">34</a></span> An +interesting account of this experience is given by General Funston +himself in the October, 1911, number of <i>Scribner’s +Magazine</i>, in an article entitled “From Malolos to San +Fernando.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5197" href="#xd20e5197src" name="xd20e5197">35</a></span> +Otis’s <i>Report</i>, p. 136.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5218" href="#xd20e5218src" name="xd20e5218">36</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 138.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5225" href="#xd20e5225src" name="xd20e5225">37</a></span> Except, +of course, the capture of Aguinaldo by General Funston nearly two years +later.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5237" href="#xd20e5237src" name="xd20e5237">38</a></span> See +General Lawton’s Report on the Zapote River fight, <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 282.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5247" href="#xd20e5247src" name="xd20e5247">39</a></span> See +Harper’s <i>History of the War in the Philippines</i>, p. 214, +where the name of the gentleman is spelled “Kanly.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5261" href="#xd20e5261src" name="xd20e5261">40</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, Otis Despatches +of November 27th, vol. ii., p. 846.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5266" href="#xd20e5266src" name="xd20e5266">41</a></span> +<i>House Document 85</i>, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5276" href="#xd20e5276src" name="xd20e5276">42</a></span> The +words quoted are from President McKinley’s message to Congress of +December, 1899.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5279" href="#xd20e5279src" name="xd20e5279">43</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1002.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5289" href="#xd20e5289src" name="xd20e5289">44</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1020.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5348" href="#xd20e5348src" name="xd20e5348">45</a></span> +Meaning, of course, in time not to embarrass President McKinley’s +prospective candidacy for re-election in 1900, in a campaign in which +all knew the acquisition of the Philippines was sure to be the +paramount issue.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5359" href="#xd20e5359src" name="xd20e5359">46</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., part 4, p. 122.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch12" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XII</h2> +<h2 class="main">Otis and the War (<i>Continued</i>)</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">And now, a man of head being at the centre of it, the +whole matter gets vital.—Carlyle’s <i>French +Revolution</i>.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">There can surely be little doubt in any quarter that +Mr. Root is, in intellectual endowment and equipment at least, one of +the greatest, if he is not <i>the</i> greatest, of living American +statesmen. Mankind will always yield due acclaim to men who, in great +emergencies, see the essentials of a given situation, and at once +proceed to get the thing done that ought to be done. Whether the war in +the Philippines was regrettable or not, it had become, by midsummer of +1899, supremely important, from any rational and patriotic standpoint, +to end it as soon as possible.</p> +<p>Mr. Root had not been in office as Secretary of War very long before +fleets of troop-ships, carrying some twenty-five well-equipped +volunteer regiments,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5391src" href= +"#xd20e5391" name="xd20e5391src">1</a> were <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb225" href="#pb225" name= +"pb225">225</a>]</span>swarming out of New York harbor bound for Manila +by way of the Suez Canal, and out of the Golden Gate for the same +destination <i>via</i> Honolulu. Nor was there any confusion as in the +Cuban helter-skelter. Everything went as if by clockwork. Moreover, +along with the new and ample force, went a clear, masterly, +comprehensive plan of campaign, prepared, not by General Otis at +Manila, but in the War Department at Washington, by officers already +familiar with the islands.</p> +<p>It was the purpose of this government at last to demonstrate +conclusively to the Filipino people that the representative of the +United States at Manila was “the boss of the show,” and +that Aguinaldo was <i>not</i>—a demonstration then sorely needed +by the exigencies of American prestige. The purpose can readily be +appreciated, but to understand the plan of campaign, and the method of +its execution, somewhat of the geography of Luzon must now be +considered. Before we approach the shores of Luzon and the city of +Manila, however, let us consider from a distance, in a bird’s-eye +view, as it were, the relation of Luzon to the rest of the archipelago, +so as to know, in a comprehensive way, what we are “going out for +to see.” We may as well pause at this point, long enough to learn +all we will ever need to know, for the purposes of the scope of this +narrative, concerning the general geography of the Philippine +archipelago, and the governmental problems it presents. (<i>See folding +map at end of volume.</i>)</p> +<p>It is a common saying that Paris is France. In the same sense Manila +<i>is</i> the Philippines. In fact, the latter expression is more +accurate than the former, for Manila, besides being the capital city of +the country, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb226" href="#pb226" name= +"pb226">226</a>]</span><i>and</i> its chief port, is a city of over +200,000 people, while no one of the two or three cities next to it in +rank in population had more than 20,000.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5418src" href="#xd20e5418" name="xd20e5418src">2</a> By parity of +reasoning it may be said that Luzon <i>was</i> the Philippines, so far +as the problem which confronted us when we went there was concerned, +relatively both to the original conception in 1898 of the struggle for +independence, its birth in 1899, its life, and its slow, lingering +obstinate death in 1900–1902, in which last year the insurrection +was finally correctly stated to be practically ended. To know just how +and why this was true, is necessary to a clear understanding of that +struggle, including not only its genesis and its exodus, but also its +gospels, its acts, its revelations, and the multitudinous subsequent +commentaries thereon.</p> +<p>The total land area of the Philippine archipelago, according to the +American Census of 1903, is 115,000 square miles.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5432src" href="#xd20e5432" name="xd20e5432src">3</a> The area of +Luzon, the principal island, on which Manila is situated, is 41,000 +square miles, and that of Mindanao, the only other large island, is +36,000.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5438src" href="#xd20e5438" name= +"xd20e5438src">4</a> Between these two large islands, Luzon on the +north, and Mindanao on the south, there are a number of smaller ones, +but acquaintance with only six of these is essential to a clear +understanding of the American occupation. Many Americans, too busy to +have paid <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb227" href="#pb227" name= +"pb227">227</a>]</span>much attention to the Philippine Islands, which +are, and must ever remain, a thing wholly apart from American life, +have a vague notion that there are several thousand of them. This is +true, in a way. American energy has made, for the first time in their +history, an actual count of them, “including everything which at +high tide appeared as a separate island.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5445src" href="#xd20e5445" name="xd20e5445src">5</a> The work was +done for our Census of 1903 by Mr. George R. Putnam, now head of the +Lighthouse Board of the United States. Mr. Putnam, counted 3141 of +them.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5450src" href="#xd20e5450" name= +"xd20e5450src">6</a> Of these, of course, many—many hundred +perhaps—are merely rocks fit only for a resting place for birds. +2775, have an area of less than a square mile each, 262 have an area of +between 1 and 10 square miles, 73 between 10 and 100 square miles, and +20 between 100 and 1000 square miles. This accounts for, and may +dismiss at once from consideration 3130—all but 11. Most of these +3130 that are large enough to demand even so much as a single word here +are poorly adapted to human habitation, being in most instances, +without good harbors or other landing places, and usually covered +either with dense jungle or inhospitable mountains, or both. Their +total area is only about 8500 square miles, of the 115,500 square miles +of land in the archipelago. None of them have ever had any political +significance, either in Spain’s time, or our own, and therefore, +the whole 3130 may at once be eliminated from consideration, leaving 11 +only requiring any special notice at all—the 11 largest islands. +Of these, Luzon and Mindanao have already been mentioned. The remaining +9, with their respective areas and populations, are: <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb228" href="#pb228" name="pb228">228</a>]</span></p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Island</i></td> +<td><i>Area<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5465src" href="#xd20e5465" name= +"xd20e5465src">7</a> in Square Miles</i></td> +<td><i>Population</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5474src" href= +"#xd20e5474" name="xd20e5474src">8</a></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Panay</td> +<td>4,611</td> +<td>743,646</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Negros</td> +<td>4,881</td> +<td>560,776</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cebu</td> +<td>1,762</td> +<td>592,247</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bohol</td> +<td>1,411</td> +<td>243,148</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Samar</td> +<td>5,031</td> +<td>222,690</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Leyte</td> +<td>2,722<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5520src" href="#xd20e5520" name= +"xd20e5520src">9</a></td> +<td>357,641</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Mindoro</td> +<td>3,851</td> +<td>28,361</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Masbate</td> +<td>1,236</td> +<td>29,451</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Paragua</td> +<td>4,027<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5544src" href="#xd20e5544" name= +"xd20e5544src">10</a></td> +<td>10,918</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Total</td> +<td class="sum">29,532</td> +<td class="sum">2,788,878</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>The political or governmental problem being now reduced from 3141 +islands to eleven, the last three of the nine contained in the above +table may also be eliminated as follows: (<i><a href="#map">See map at +end of volume</a>.</i>)</p> +<p>Paragua, the long narrow island seen at the extreme lower left of +any map of the archipelago, extending northeast southwest at an angle +of about 45°, is practically worthless, being fit for nothing much +except a penal colony, for which purpose it is in fact now used.</p> +<p>Masbate—easily located on the map at a glance, because the +twelfth parallel of north latitude intersects the 124th meridian of +longitude east of Greenwich in its southeast corner—though noted +for cattle and other quadrupeds, is not essential to a clear +understanding of the human problem in its broader governmental +aspects.</p> +<div class="figure xd20e5571width" id="p228"><img src="images/p228.jpg" +alt= +"Bird’s-eye view of the Philippine Archipelago, showing the preponderating importance of Luzon." +width="539" height="720"> +<p class="figureHead">Bird’s-eye view of the Philippine +Archipelago, showing the preponderating importance of Luzon.</p> +<p class="first">For greater details, see <a href="#map">folding +map</a> at end of volume.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb229" href="#pb229" name= +"pb229">229</a>]</span></p> +<p>Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk of Luzon, +pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, is thick +with densely wooded mountains and jungle over a large part of its area, +has a reputation of being very unhealthy (malarious), is also very +sparsely settled, and does not now, nor has it ever, cut any figure +politically, as a disturbing factor.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5583src" href="#xd20e5583" name="xd20e5583src">11</a></p> +<p>Eliminating Paragua, Masbate, and Mindoro as not essential to a +<span class="corr" id="xd20e5588" title= +"Source: substanially">substantially</span> correct general idea of the +strategic and governmental problems presented by the Philippine +Islands, we have left, besides Luzon and Mindanao, nothing but the +half-dozen islands which appear in large type in the above table: +Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Leyte, with a total area of 20,500 +square miles. Add these to Luzon’s 41,000 square miles and +Mindanao’s 36,000, and you have the Philippine archipelago as we +are to consider it in this book, that is to say, two big islands with a +half dozen little ones in between, the eight having a total area of +97,500 square miles, of which the two big islands represent nearly +four-fifths.</p> +<p>While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near Borneo, with its +36,000 square miles<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5593src" href= +"#xd20e5593" name="xd20e5593src">12</a> of area, requires that the +Philippine archipelago be described as stretching over more than 1000 +miles from north to south, still, inasmuch as Mindanao only contains +about 500,000 people all told,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5599src" +href="#xd20e5599" name="xd20e5599src">13</a> half of them +semi-civilized,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5605src" href="#xd20e5605" +name="xd20e5605src">14</a> the governmental problem it presents has +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb230" href="#pb230" name= +"pb230">230</a>]</span>no more to do with the main problem of whether, +if ever, we are to grant independence to the 7,000,000 Christians of +the other islands, than the questions that have to be passed on by our +Commissioner of Indian Affairs have to do with the tariff.</p> +<p>Mindanao’s 36,000 square miles constitute nearly a third of +the total area of the Philippine archipelago, and more than that +fraction of the 97,500 square miles of territory to a consideration of +which our attention is reduced by the process of elimination above +indicated. Turning over Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan, +semi-civilized Moros would indeed be “like granting +self-government to an Apache reservation under some local chief,” +as Mr. Roosevelt, in the campaign of 1900, ignorantly declared it would +be to grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e5612src" href="#xd20e5612" name="xd20e5612src">15</a> +Furthermore, the Moros, so far as they can think, would prefer to owe +allegiance to, and be entitled to recognition as subjects of, some +great nation.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5618src" href="#xd20e5618" +name="xd20e5618src">16</a> Again, because, the Filipinos have no moral +right to control the Moros, and could not if they would, the latter +being fierce fighters and bitterly opposed to the thought of possible +ultimate domination by the Filipinos, the most uncompromising advocate +of the consent-of-the-governed principle has <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb231" href="#pb231" name="pb231">231</a>]</span>not +a leg to stand on with regard to Mohammedan Mindanao. Hence I affirm +that as to it, we have a distinct and separate problem, which cannot be +solved in the lifetime of anybody now living. But it is a problem which +need not in the least delay the advent of independence for the other +fourteen-fifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e5623src" href="#xd20e5623" name= +"xd20e5623src">17</a>—all Christians living on islands north of +Mindanao. It is true that there are some Christian Filipinos on +Mindanao, but in policing the Moros, our government would of course +protect them from the Moros. If they did not like our government, they +could move to such parts of the island as we might permit to be +incorporated in an ultimate Philippine republic. Inasmuch as the +300,000 or so Moros of the Mohammedan island of Mindanao and the +adjacent islets called Jolo (the “Sulu Archipelago,” so +called, “reigned over” by the Sultan of comic opera fame) +originally presented, as they will always present, a distinct and +separate problem, and never did have anything more to do with the +Philippine insurrection against us than their cousins and +co-religionists over in nearby Borneo, the task which confronted Mr. +Root in the fall of 1899, to wit, the suppression of the Philippine +insurrection, meant, practically, the subjugation of one big island, +Luzon, containing half the population and one-third the total area of +the archipelago, and six neighboring smaller ones, the Visayan +Islands.</p> +<p>And now let us concentrate our attention upon Luzon as Mr. Root no +doubt did, with infinite pains, in the fall of 1899. Of the 7,600,000 +people of the Philippines<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5628src" href= +"#xd20e5628" name="xd20e5628src">18</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb232" href="#pb232" name="pb232">232</a>]</span>almost exactly +one-half, <i>i.e.</i>, 3,800,000,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5639src" +href="#xd20e5639" name="xd20e5639src">19</a> live on Luzon, and these +are practically all civilized.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5645src" +href="#xd20e5645" name="xd20e5645src">20</a> It so happens that the +State of our Union which is nearer the size of Luzon than any other is +the one which furnished the first American Civil Governor for the +Philippine Islands, Governor Taft. President Taft’s native State +of Ohio is 41,061 square miles in area, and Luzon is 40,969.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e5652src" href="#xd20e5652" name= +"xd20e5652src">21</a> Roughly speaking, Luzon may also be said to be +about the size of Cuba,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5657src" href= +"#xd20e5657" name="xd20e5657src">22</a> though it is about twice as +thickly populated as the latter, Cuba, having something over 2,000,000 +people to Luzon’s nearly 4,000,000.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5660src" href="#xd20e5660" name="xd20e5660src">23</a></p> +<div class="figure xd20e5663width" id="p232"><img src="images/p232.jpg" +alt="Outline sketch of the theatre of operations in Luzon, 1899." +width="440" height="720"> +<p class="figureHead">Outline sketch of the theatre of operations in +Luzon, 1899.</p> +</div> +<p>By all Americans in the Philippines since our occupation, the island +of Luzon is always contemplated as consisting of two parts, to wit, +northern Luzon, or that part north of Manila, and southern Luzon, the +part south of Manila. The great central plain of Luzon, lying just +north of Manila, is nearly as large as the republic of Salvador, or the +State of New Jersey, <i>i.e.</i>, in the neighborhood of 7000 square +miles area<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5672src" href="#xd20e5672" name= +"xd20e5672src">24</a>—and, like Salvador, it contains a +population of something over 1,000,000 inhabitants. The area and +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb233" href="#pb233" name= +"pb233">233</a>]</span>population of the five provinces of this plain +are, according to the <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, as follows:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5693src" href="#xd20e5693" +name="xd20e5693src">25</a> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5702src" href= +"#xd20e5702" name="xd20e5702src">26</a></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pangasinan</td> +<td>1,193</td> +<td>397,902</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pampanga</td> +<td>868</td> +<td>223,754</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bulacan</td> +<td>1,173</td> +<td>223,742</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tarlac</td> +<td>1,205</td> +<td>135,107</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Nueva Ecija</td> +<td>1,950</td> +<td>134,147</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td class="sum">6,389</td> +<td class="sum">1,114,652</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>Roughly speaking, the central plain comprising the above five +provinces is bounded as follows: On the north by mountains and Lingayen +Gulf, on the east by a coast range of mountains separating it from the +Pacific Ocean, on the west by a similar range separating it from the +China Sea, and on the south by Manila Bay and mountains. The Rio Grande +de Pampanga flows obliquely across it in a southwesterly direction into +Manila Bay, and near its western edge runs the railroad from Manila to +Dagupan on Lingayen gulf. Dagupan is 120 miles from Manila. This plain, +held by a well-equipped insurgent army backed by the moral support of +the whole population, became the theatre of war as soon as the +volunteers of 1899 began to arrive at Manila, the insurgent capital +being then at Tarlac, a place about two-thirds of the way up the +railroad from Manila to Dagupan.</p> +<p>Of course the first essential thing to do was to break <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb234" href="#pb234" name="pb234">234</a>]</span>the +backbone of the insurgent army, and scatter it, and the next thing to +do was to capture Aguinaldo, the head and front of the whole business, +the incarnation of the aspirations of the Filipino people. The +operations to this end commenced in October, and involved three +movements of three separate forces:</p> +<p>(1) A column under General Lawton, proceeding up the Rio Grande and +along the northeastern borders of the plain, and bending around +westward along its northern boundary toward the gulf of Lingayen, +garrisoning the towns en route, and occupying the mountain passes on +the northeast which give exit over the divide into the great valleys +beyond.</p> +<p>(2) An expedition under General Wheaton, some 2500 in all, +proceeding by transports to the gulf of Lingayen, the chief port of +which, Dagupan, was the northern terminus of the railroad; the +objective being to land on the shore of that gulf at the northwest +corner of the plain, occupy the great coast road which runs from that +point to the northern extremity of the island, and also to proceed +eastward and effect a junction with the Lawton column.</p> +<p>(3) A third column under General MacArthur, proceeding up the +railroad to the capture of Tarlac, the third insurgent capital, and +thence still up the railroad to its end at Dagupan, driving the +enemy’s forces before it toward the line held by the first two +columns.</p> +<p>On October 12th, General Lawton moved up the Rio Grande from a place +called Aryat, a few miles up stream from where the railroad crosses the +river at Calumpit, driving the insurgents before him to the northward +and westward. His command was made up mainly from the 3d Cavalry and +the 22d Infantry, together with several hundred scouts, American and +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb235" href="#pb235" name= +"pb235">235</a>]</span>Maccabebee. On the 20th San Isidro was again +captured. That was the place Lawton had evacuated in May previous. +Arriving in the Islands with Colonel E. E. Hardin’s regiment, the +29th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, on November 3, 1899, the writer was +immediately detailed to the Maccabebee scouts, to take the place of +Lieutenant Boutelle, of the regular artillery, a young West Pointer +from Oregon, who had been killed a day or two previous, and reported to +Major C. G. Starr, General Lawton’s Adjutant-General in the field +(whom he had known at Santiago de Cuba the previous year) at San Isidro +on or about November 8th. Major Starr said: “We took this town +last spring,” stating how much our loss had been in so doing, +“but, partly as a result of the Schurman Commission parleying +with the insurgents General Otis had us fall back. We have just had to +take it again.” General Lawton garrisoned San Isidro this time +once for all, and pressed on north, capturing the successive towns en +route. Meantime, General Young’s cavalry, and the Maccabebee +scouts under Major Batson, a lieutenant of the regular army, and a +medal-of-honor graduate of the Santiago campaign, were operating to the +west of the general line of advance, striking insurgent detachments +wherever found and driving them toward the line of the railroad. By +November 13th, Lawton’s advance had turned to the westward, +according to the concerted plan of campaign above described, +garrisoning, as fast as they were taken, such of the towns of the +country over which he swept as there were troops to spare for. We knew +that Aguinaldo had been at Tarlac when the advance began, and every +officer and enlisted man of the command was on the <i>qui vive</i> to +catch him. By November 18th, General Lawton’s forces held a line +of posts extending up the eastern <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb236" +href="#pb236" name="pb236">236</a>]</span>side of the plain, and +curving around across the northern end to within a few miles of the +gulf of Lingayen.</p> +<p>On November 6th, General Wheaton set sail from Manila for Lingayen +Gulf, with 2500 men of the 13th Regular and 33d Volunteer Infantry, and +a platoon of the 6th Artillery, convoyed by the ships of the navy, and +next day the expedition was successfully landed at San Fabian, +“with effective assistance from the naval convoy against spirited +resistance,” says Secretary of War Root, in his annual report for +1899. The navy’s assistance on that occasion was indeed +“effective,” but such passing mention hardly covers the +case. In the first place, they selected the landing point, their +patrols being already familiar with the coasts. As soon as the +transports were sighted, about eleven o’clock on the morning of +November 7th, Commander Knox, the senior officer present, who commanded +the <i>Princeton</i>, and Commander Moore, of the <i>Helena</i>, went +out to meet and confer with General Wheaton. This done, the landing was +effected under protection of the navy’s guns. Besides the naval +vessels above named, there were also present the <i>Bennington</i> +under Commander Arnold, the <i>Manila</i> under Lieutenant-Commander +Nazro, and two captured Spanish gun-boats small enough to get close in +shore, the <i>Callao</i>, and the <i>Samar</i>. The troops were +disembarked in two columns of small boats towed by launches. +Lieutenant-Commander Tappan in charge of the <i>Callao</i>, and Ensign +Mustin, commanding the <i>Samar</i>, were especially commended in the +despatches of Admiral Watson, commander-in-chief of the Asiatic +squadron. Both bombarded the insurgent trenches at close range during +the landing, and Mustin actually steamed in between the insurgents and +the head of the column of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb237" href= +"#pb237" name="pb237">237</a>]</span>troop-boats, so as to intercept +and receive the brunt of their fire himself, and, selecting a point +about seventy-five yards from the enemy’s trenches whence he +could effectually pepper them, ran his ship aground so she would stick, +and commenced rapid firing at point blank range, driving the enemy from +his trenches, and enabling Colonel Hare of the 33d, and those who +followed, to land without being subjected to further fire while on the +water.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5802src" href="#xd20e5802" name= +"xd20e5802src">27</a></p> +<p>On the 11th of November, Colonel Hare with the 33d Volunteer +Infantry and one Gatling gun under Captain Charles R. Howland of the +28th Volunteer Infantry, a lieutenant of the regular army, and a member +of General Wheaton’s staff, proceeded southeastward to San +Jacinto, and attacked and routed some 1200 to 1600 intrenched +insurgents, Major John A. Logan being among our killed. The enemy left +eighty-one dead in the trenches, and suffered a total loss estimated at +three hundred. While space does not permit dwelling on the details of +engagements, it may be remarked here, once for all, that the 33d +Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Luther R. Hare commanding, made more +reputation than any other of the twenty-five regiments of the volunteer +army of 1899, except, possibly, Colonel J. Franklin Bell’s +regiment, the 36th. This is no reflection on the rest. These two were +lucky enough to have more opportunities. In meeting his opportunities, +however, Colonel Hare, like Colonel Bell, proved himself a superb +soldier; <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb238" href="#pb238" name= +"pb238">238</a>]</span>his field-officers, especially Major +March,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5812src" href="#xd20e5812" name= +"xd20e5812src">28</a> were particularly indefatigable; and his men were +mostly Texans, accustomed to handling a rifle with effect. Space also +forbids following Captain Howland and his Gatling gun into the +engagement of November 11th, but from the uniformity with which General +Wheaton’s official reports commend his young aide’s bravery +and efficiency on numerous occasions in 1899–1900, it may be +safely assumed that those qualities were behind that Gatling gun at San +Jacinto. There was a vicious rumor started after the San Jacinto fight +and given wide circulation in the United States, that Major Logan was +shot in the back by his own men. I saw a major surgeon a few days later +who had been an eye-witness to his death. He said an insurgent +sharpshooter shot Major Logan from a tree, and that the said +sharpshooter was promptly thereafter dropped from his perch full of 33d +Infantry bullets. Says General Wheaton’s despatch of November +12th: “Major Logan fell while gallantly leading his +battalion.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5815src" href="#xd20e5815" +name="xd20e5815src">29</a></p> +<p>On November 5th, General MacArthur, with a strong column, composed +mainly of the 9th, 17th, and 36th Regiments of Infantry, two troops of +the 4th Cavalry, two platoons of the 1st Artillery, and a detachment of +scouts, advanced up the railroad from Angeles, in execution of his part +of the programme.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5826src" href="#xd20e5826" +name="xd20e5826src">30</a> Angeles is some distance up the railroad +from Calumpit, where the railroad crosses the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb239" href="#pb239" name="pb239">239</a>]</span>Rio +Grande.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5831src" href="#xd20e5831" name= +"xd20e5831src">31</a> General MacArthur’s column encountered and +overwhelmed the enemy at every point, entering Tarlac on November 12th, +and effecting a junction with General Wheaton at Dagupan, the northern +terminus of the Manila-Dagupan Railroad, 120 miles from Manila, on +November 20th.</p> +<p>After General Lawton had finished his part of the round-up, he had a +final conference with General Young on November 18th at Pozorubio, +which is near the northeastern border of the plain, bade him good-bye, +and soon afterward went south to dispose of a body of insurgents who +were giving trouble near Manila. It was in this last expedition that he +lost his life at San Mateo about twelve miles out of Manila on December +19, 1899.</p> +<p>The first of the two purposes of the great Wheaton-Lawton-MacArthur +northern advance, viz., the dispersion of the insurgent army of +northern Luzon had been duly accomplished. The other purpose had failed +of realization. Aguinaldo had not been captured. He escaped through our +lines.</p> +<p>Such is in brief the story of the destruction of the Aguinaldo +government in 1899 by General Otis, or rather by Mr. Root. But the +trouble about it was that it would not stay destroyed. It “played +possum” for a while, the honorable President retiring to +permanent headquarters in the mountains “with his government +concealed about his person,” as Senator Lodge put it later in a +summary of the case for the Administration, before the Senate, in the +spring of 1900. If the distinguished and accomplished senator from +Massachusetts, in adding at that time to the gaiety of nations, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb240" href="#pb240" name= +"pb240">240</a>]</span>had had access to a certain diary kept by one of +Aguinaldo’s personal staff throughout that period, subsequently +submitted, in 1902, to the Senate Committee of that year, he could have +swelled the innocuous merriment with such cheery entries as “Here +we tightened our belts and went to bed on the ground”—the +time alluded to being midnight after a hard day’s march without +food, the place, some chilly mountain top up which the “Honorable +Presidente” and party had that day been guided by the +ever-present and ever-willing <i>paisano</i> (fellow countryman) of the +immediate neighborhood—whatever the neighborhood—to +facilitate them in eluding General Young’s hard riding cavalry +and scouts. The writer has no quarrel with Senator Lodge’s +witticism above quoted, having derived on reading it, in full measure, +the suggestive amusement it was intended to afford. It is true that +about all then left of the “Honorable Presidente’s” +government, for the nonce, was in fact concealed about his person. It +was of a nature easily portable. It needed neither bull trains, pack +ponies, nor coolies to carry it. It consisted solely of the loyal +support of the whole people, who looked to him as the incarnation of +their aspirations. Said General MacArthur to the Senate Committee in +1902 concerning Aguinaldo: “He was the incarnation of the +feelings of the Filipinos.” “Senator Culberson: ‘And +represented the Filipino people?’ General MacArthur: ‘I +think so; yes’.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5845src" href= +"#xd20e5845" name="xd20e5845src">32</a> We of the 8th Army Corps did +not know what a complete structure the Philippine republic of +1898–9 was until, having shot it to pieces, we had abundant +leisure to examine the ruins. To admit, in the same breath, +participation in that war and profound regret that it ever had +occurred, is not an incriminating <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb241" +href="#pb241" name="pb241">241</a>]</span>admission. In this case as in +any other where you have done another a wrong, by thrashing him or +otherwise, under a mistake of fact, the first step toward righting the +wrong is to frankly acknowledge it. As soon as Aguinaldo’s flight +and wanderings terminated in the finding of permanent headquarters, he +began sending messages to his various generals all over Luzon and the +other islands, and wherever those orders were not intercepted they were +delivered and loyally obeyed. This kept up until General Funston +captured him in 1901. One traitor among all those teeming millions +might have betrayed his whereabouts, but none appeared. The obstinate +character and long continuance of the warfare in northern Luzon after +the great round-up which terminated with the final junction of the +Lawton, Wheaton, and MacArthur columns near Dagupan, as elsewhere later +throughout the archipelago, was at first very surprising to our +generals. It had been supposed that to disperse the insurgent army +would end the insurrection. As events turned out, it only made the +resistance more effective. So long as the insurgents kept together in +large bodies they could not hide. And as they were poor marksmen, while +the men behind our guns, like most other young Americans, knew +something about shooting, the ratio of their casualties to ours was +about 16 to 1.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5852src" href="#xd20e5852" +name="xd20e5852src">33</a> When General MacArthur began his advance on +Tarlac, General Lawton his great march up the valley of the Rio Grande, +and General Wheaton his closing in from Dagupan, Aguinaldo with his +cabinet, generals, and headquarters troops abandoned Tarlac, their +capital, and went up the railroad to Bayambang. Here they held a +council of war, which General MacArthur <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb242" href="#pb242" name="pb242">242</a>]</span>describes in his +report for 1900 (from information obtained later on) as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">At a council of war held at Bayambang, Pangasinan, +about November 12, 1899, which was attended by General Aguinaldo and +many of the Filipino military leaders, a resolution was adopted to the +effect that the insurgent forces were incapable of further resistance +in the field, and as a consequence it was decided to disband the army, +the generals and the men to return to their own provinces, with a view +to organizing the people for general resistance by means of guerrilla +warfare.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5861src" href="#xd20e5861" name= +"xd20e5861src">34</a></p> +</div> +<p>This had been the plan from the beginning, the council of war simply +determining that the time to put the plan into effect had arrived. +Accordingly, the uniformed insurgent battalions and regiments broke up +into small bands which maintained a most persistent guerrilla warfare +for years thereafter. During those years they seldom wore uniforms, +disappearing and hiding their guns when hotly pursued, and reappearing +as non-combatant peasants interrupted in agricultural pursuits, with +invariable protestations of friendship. Hence all such came to be known +as <i>amigos</i> (friends), and the word <i>amigo</i>, or friend, +became a bitter by-word, meaning to all American soldiers throughout +the archipelago an enemy falsely claiming to be a friend. <i>And every +Filipino was an “amigo.”</i></p> +<p>Still, the volunteers had arrived in time to enable Mr. Root to make +a very nice showing to Congress, and through it to the people, in his +annual report to the President for 1899, dated November 29th. This +report is full of cheerful chirps from General Otis to the effect that +the resistance was practically ended, and the substance of the +information it conveyed duly <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb243" href= +"#pb243" name="pb243">243</a>]</span>found its way into the +President’s message of December of that year and through it to +the general public. One of the Otis despatches said: “Claim to +government by insurgents can be made no longer.”<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e5881src" href="#xd20e5881" name= +"xd20e5881src">35</a> This message went on to state that nothing was +now left but “banditti,” and that the people are all +friendly to our troops. Thus misled, Mr. Root repeated to the President +and through him to Congress and the country the following nonsense:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It is gratifying to know that as our troops got away +from the immediate vicinity of Manila they found the natives of the +country exceedingly friendly * * *. This was doubtless due in +some measure to the fact that the Pampangos, who inhabit the provinces +of Pampanga and Tarlac, and the Pangasinanes, who inhabit Pangasinan, +as well as the other more northerly tribes, are unfriendly to the +Tagalogs, and had simply submitted to the military domination of that +tribe, from which they were glad to be relieved.</p> +</div> +<p>In characterizing this as nonsense no disrespect is intended to Mr. +Root. He did not know any better. He was relying on General Otis. But +it is sorely difficult to convey in written words what utter nonsense +those expressions about “the Pampangos” and “the +Pangasinanes” are to any one who was in that northern advance in +the fall of 1899. Imagine a British cabinet minister making a report to +Parliament in 1776 couched in the following words, to wit:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The Massachusetts-ites, who inhabit Massachusetts, and +the Virginia-ites who inhabit Virginia, as well as most of the other +inhabitants are unfriendly to the New York-ites, and have simply +submitted to the military domination of the last named,</p> +</div> +<p>and you have a faint idea of the accuracy of Mr. Root’s +report. It is quite true that the Tagalos were <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb244" href="#pb244" name="pb244">244</a>]</span>the +prime movers in the insurrection against us, as they had been in all +previous insurrections against Spain. But the “Tagalo +tribe” was no more alone among the Filipino people in their +wishes and views than the “unterrified” Tammany tribe who +inhabit the wilds of Manhattan Island, at the mouth of the Hudson +River, are alone in their views among our people.</p> +<p>On page 70 of this report, Secretary Root reproduces a telegram from +General Otis dated November 18, 1899, stating that on the road from San +Nicolas to San Manuel, a day or so previous, General Lawton was +“cordially received by the inhabitants.” He announces in +the same telegram the drowning of Captain Luna, a volunteer officer +from New Mexico, who was one of General Lawton’s aides, and had +been a captain in Colonel Roosevelt’s regiment of Rough Riders +before Santiago. The writer happens to have been on that ride with +General Lawton from San Nicolas to San Manuel, and was within a dozen +feet of Captain Luna when the angry current of the Agno River caught +him and his pony in its grip and swept both out of sight forever, along +with divers troopers of the 4th Cavalry, horses and riders writhing to +their death in one awful, tangled, struggling mass. He can never forget +the magnificent dash back into the wide, ugly, swollen stream made by +Captain Edward L. King of General Lawton’s staff, as he spurred +his horse in, followed by several troopers who had responded to his +call for mounted volunteers to accompany him in an effort to save the +lives of the men who went down. Their generous work proved futile. But +it was inspired partly by common dread of what they knew would happen +to any half-drowned soldier who might be washed ashore far away from +the column and captured. If an army was ever “in enemy’s +country” <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb245" href="#pb245" name= +"pb245">245</a>]</span>it was then and there. When we reached San +Manuel that night, Captains King and Sewall, the two surviving personal +aides of General Lawton’s staff, and the writer, stopped, along +with the general, in a little <i>nipa</i> shack on the roadside. +General Lawton, was in an upper room busy with couriers and the like, +but downstairs King, Sewall, and myself set to work to +<i>buscar</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5910src" href="#xd20e5910" +name="xd20e5910src">36</a> something to eat. I got hold of an +<i>hombre</i> (literally, a man; colloquially a native peasant man), +who went to work with apparent alacrity, and managed to provide three +ravenously hungry young men with a good meal of chicken, eggs, and +rice. After supper, being new in the country, the writer remarked to +the general on the alacrity of the <i>hombre</i>. I had brought out +from the United States the notions there current about the nature of +the resistance. General Lawton said, with a humorous twinkle in those +fine eyes of his: “Humph! If you expected to be killed the next +minute if you didn’t find a chicken, <i>you’d</i> probably +find one too.” It is true that in the course of the campaign +General Young sent a telegram to General Otis at Manila characterizing +his reception at the hands of the natives as friendly. This was +prompted by our column being met as it would come into a town by the +town band. It did not take long to see through this, and other like +hypocrisy entirely justifiable in war, though such tactics deceived us +for a little while at first into thinking the people were genuine +<i>amigos</i> (friends). General Otis, not being near the scene, +remained under our original brief illusion. Let us return, however, +from Mr. Root’s “patient and unconsenting millions +dominated by the Tagalo tribe,” of <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb246" href="#pb246" name="pb246">246</a>]</span>1899, to the facts, +and follow the course of events succeeding Lawton’s junction with +Wheaton and MacArthur and his farewell to Young.</p> +<p>General Young, with his cavalry, and the Maccabebee scouts, +continued in pursuit of Aguinaldo through the passes of the mountains, +the latter having managed to run the gauntlet of our lines successfully +by a very close shave. How narrowly he escaped is illustrated by the +fact that after a fight we had at the Aringay River on November 19th, +in which Major Batson was wounded while gallantly directing the +crossing of the river, we remained that night in the town of Aringay, +and at the very time we were “hustling for chow” in +Aringay, Aguinaldo was in the village of Naguilian an hour or so +distant, as was authoritatively ascertained long afterward from a +captured diary of one of his staff officers.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5930src" href="#xd20e5930" name="xd20e5930src">37</a></p> +<p>General Young proceeded up the coast road, in hot haste, taking one +town, San Fernando de Union, after a brief engagement led by the +general in person—imagine a brigadier-general leading a charge at +the head of thirty-seven men!—but Aguinaldo had turned off to the +right and taken to the mountains. General Lawton wired General Otis +about that time, in effect, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb247" href= +"#pb247" name="pb247">247</a>]</span>in announcing Aguinaldo’s +escape through our lines and his own tireless brigade-commander’s +bold dash in pursuit of him with an inadequate force of cavalry +hampered by lack of horseshoes and nails for the same, “If Young +does not catch Aguinaldo, he will at least make him very +unhappy.” The Young column garrisoned the towns along the route +over which it went, occupying all the western part of Northern Luzon, +hereafter described, and also later on rescued Lieutenant Gilmore of +the navy, Mr. Albert Sonnichsen, previously an enlisted man and since a +writer of some note, and other American prisoners who had been in the +hands of the insurgents for many months. General Young finally made his +headquarters at Vigan, in the province of Ilocos Sur, a fine town in a +fine country. The Ilocanos are called “the Yankees of the +Philippines,” on account of their energy and industry. Vigan is +on the China sea coast of Luzon (the west coast), about one hundred +miles up the old Spanish coast road, or “King’s +Highway” (Camino Real), from Lingayen Gulf (where the +hundred-and-twenty mile railroad from Manila to Dagupan ends) and about +eighty miles from the extreme northern end of the island of +Luzon.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5949src" href="#xd20e5949" name= +"xd20e5949src">38</a></p> +<p>As subsequent policies and their effect on one’s attitude +toward a great historic panorama do not interfere in the least with a +proper appreciation of the bravery and efficiency of the army of +one’s country, it is with much regret that this narrative cannot +properly chronicle in detail what the War Department reports record of +the stirring deeds of General Young, and the officers and men of his +command, Colonels Hare and Howze, Captains Chase and Dodd, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb248" href="#pb248" name="pb248">248</a>]</span>and +the rest,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5956src" href="#xd20e5956" name= +"xd20e5956src">39</a> performed during the long course of the work now +under consideration. One incident, however, is appropriate in this +connection, not only to a collection of <i>genre</i> pictures of the +war itself, but also to a place among the lights and shadows of the +general picture of the American occupation. On December 2, 1899, Major +March of the 33d Infantry had his famous fight at Tila pass, in which +young Gregorio del Pilar, one of the ablest and bravest of the +insurgent generals, was killed. The locality mentioned is a wild pass +in the mountains of the west coast of Luzon, that overlook the China +Sea, some 4500 feet above sea level. It was strongly fortified, and was +believed by the insurgents to be impregnable. The trail winds up the +mountains in a sharp zigzag, and was commanded by stone barricades +loop-holed for infantry fire. The advance of our people was checked at +first by a heavy fire from these barricades. The approach being +precipitous, it looked for a while as if the position would indeed be +impregnable, and the idea of taking it by a frontal attack was +abandoned. But a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb249" href="#pb249" +name="pb249">249</a>]</span>hill to the left front of the barricade was +seized by some of our sharpshooters—those Texans of the 33d were +indeed <i>sharpshooters</i>—and after that, under cover of their +fire, our troops managed to get in a fire simultaneously both on the +flank and rear of the occupants of the barricades, climbing the +precipitous slope up the mountain side by means of twigs and the like, +and finally killing some fifty-two of the enemy, General Pilar among +the number. After the fight was over, Lieutenant Quinlan, heretofore +mentioned, moved by certain indignities in the nature of looting +perpetrated upon the remains of General Pilar, buried them with such +military honors as could be hastily provided, after first taking from a +pocket of the dead general’s uniform a souvenir in the shape of +an unfinished poem written in Spanish by him the night before, +addressed to his sweetheart; and, the burial finished, the American +officer placed on the rude headstone left to mark the spot this +generous inscription:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">General Gregorio Pilar, killed at the battle of Tila +Pass, December 2d, 1899, commanding Aguinaldo’s rear-guard. <i>An +officer and a gentleman.</i> (Signed) D. P. Quinlan, 2d Lieutenant, +11th Cavalry.</p> +</div> +<p>The brief incident over, Quinlan hurried on, rejoined the column, +and resumed the work of Benevolent Assimilation and the war against +Home Rule with all the dauntless ardor of his impetuous Irish nature. +Whatever the ultimate analysis of the ethics of this +scene—Quinlan at the grave of Pilar—clearly the Second +Lieutenant Quinlan of 1899 would hardly have agreed with the +vice-presidential candidate of 1900, Colonel Roosevelt, that granting +self-government to the Filipinos would be like granting self-government +to an Apache reservation under some local chief.</p> +<p>The territory occupied and finally “pacified” by +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb250" href="#pb250" name= +"pb250">250</a>]</span>General Young, with the effective assistance of +the officers heretofore mentioned, and many other good men and true, +was ultimately organized into a military district, which was called the +First District of the Department of Northern Luzon. As territory was +fought over, occupied, and finally reduced to submission, that +territory would be organized into a military district by the commanding +general or colonel of the invading column, under the direction of the +division commander. The military “Division of the +Philippines,” which was succeeded by the Civil Government of the +Philippines under Governor Taft in 1901, of course covered all the +territory ceded by the Treaty of Paris. It was divided into four +“Departments,” the Department of Northern Luzon, the +Department of Southern Luzon, the Department of the Visayas,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e5984src" href="#xd20e5984" name= +"xd20e5984src">40</a> and the Department of Mindanao and Jolo. General +Young commanded the First District of the Department of Northern +Luzon—which included the three west coast provinces north of +Lingayen Gulf, and the three adjacent mountain provinces—from the +time he led his brigade into that region in pursuit of Aguinaldo until +shortly before Governor Taft’s inauguration in the summer of +1901. Many were the combats, great and small, of General Young’s +brigade, in compassing the task of crushing the resistance in that part +of Luzon into which he led the first American troops in the winter of +1899–1900. The resistance was obstinate, desperate, and long +drawn out, but when he finally reported the territory under his command +“pacified,” it <i>was</i> pacified. A soldier’s task +had been performed in a soldierly manner. The work had been done +thoroughly. General <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb251" href="#pb251" +name="pb251">251</a>]</span>Young gave the Ilocano country a lesson it +never forgot, before politics had time to interfere. We have never had +any trouble in that region from that day to this.</p> +<p>Before the army of occupation had had time to do in southern Luzon +what General Young did in northern Luzon and thereby secure like +permanent results in that region, a “peace-at-any-price” +policy was inaugurated to meet the exigencies of Mr. McKinley’s +campaign for the Presidency in 1900. Our last martyred President clung +all through that campaign to his original assumption that Benevolent +Assimilation would work, and that the single burning need of the hour +was to make clear to the Filipinos what our intentions were—as if +powder and lead did not spell denial of independence plain enough, as +if that were not the sole issue, and as if that issue had not been +submitted, with deadly finality, to the stern arbitrament of war. +However, neither Lord Roberts in India, nor Lord Kitchener in Egypt +ever more effectively convinced the people of those countries that his +flag must be respected as an emblem of sovereignty, than General Young +did the Ilocanos. Take the month of April, 1900 for instance. Several +days after the expiration of said month (on May 5th) General Otis was +relieved and went home. During the month of April, General Young killed +five hundred insurgents in his district.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5994src" href="#xd20e5994" name="xd20e5994src">41</a> But this +did not prevent General Otis, arriving as he did in the United States +in the month of June, when the national political conventions meet, +from “repeating <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb252" href= +"#pb252" name="pb252">252</a>]</span>the same old story about the +insurrection going to pieces”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6002src" +href="#xd20e6002" name="xd20e6002src">42</a>—<i>only</i>, not +“going” now, but “gone.” Nor did it, and like +sputterings of insurrection all over the place, prevent Judge +Taft—the “Mark Tapley of this Philippine business” as +he humorously told the Senate Committee of 1902 he had been +called—from cabling home, during the presidential campaign of +1900, a series of superlatively optimistic bulletins,<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e6008src" href="#xd20e6008" name="xd20e6008src">43</a> based on +the testimony of Filipinos who had abandoned the cause of their country +as soon as patriotism meant personal peril, all such testimony being +eagerly accepted, as testimony of the kind one wants and needs badly +usually is, in total disregard of information directly to the contrary +furnished by General MacArthur and other distinguished soldiers who had +been then on the ground for two years.</p> +<p>The area and population of the territory occupied by General Young, +the “First District of the Department of Northern Luzon,” +was, according to the Census of 1903, as follows:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6022src" href= +"#xd20e6022" name="xd20e6022src">44</a></td> +<td><i>Population</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e6030src" href= +"#xd20e6030" name="xd20e6030src">45</a></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ilocos Norte</td> +<td>1,330</td> +<td>178,995</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ilocos Sur</td> +<td>471</td> +<td>187,411</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Union</td> +<td>634</td> +<td>137,839</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Abra</td> +<td>1,171</td> +<td>51,860</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Lepanto-Bontoc<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6067src" href= +"#xd20e6067" name="xd20e6067src">46</a></td> +<td>2,005</td> +<td>72,750</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Benguet</td> +<td>822</td> +<td>22,745</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td class="sum">6,433</td> +<td class="sum">651,600</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb253" href="#pb253" name= +"pb253">253</a>]</span></p> +<p>As this narrative purposes so to present the geography of the +Philippine Islands as to facilitate an easy remembrance of <i>the +essentials only</i> of the governmental problem there presented, we +will hereafter speak of the First District as containing, roughly, 6500 +square miles, and 650,000 people. Whenever, if ever, a Philippine +republic is set up, these six provinces are very likely, for +geographical and other reasons, to become one of the original states +comprising that republic, just as the states of Mexico are made up of +groups of provinces.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6095src" href= +"#xd20e6095" name="xd20e6095src">47</a></p> +<p>The rest of the story of the northern campaign of 1899–1900 +immediately following Aguinaldo’s escape into the mountains +through General Young’s and General Lawton’s lines, being a +necessary part of the American occupation of the Philippines, may also +serve as a text for further acquainting the reader with the geography +of Luzon. War is the best possible teacher of geography, and it may be +well to communicate in broken doses, as we received them, the lessons +on the subject which the 8th Army Corps learned in 1899 and the +subsequent years so thoroughly that we could all pronounce with +astonishing glibness, the most unpronounceable names imaginable.</p> +<p>When the great Wheaton-Lawton-MacArthur “Round-up” +reached the mountains on the northeast of the great central plain, in +the latter part of November 1899, Captain Joseph B. Batchelor, with one +battalion of the 24th (negro) Infantry, and some scouts under +Lieutenant Castner, a very intrepid and tireless officer, boldly cut +loose from the column of which he was <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb254" href="#pb254" name="pb254">254</a>]</span>a part, and, pressing +on over the Caranglan pass, overran the province of Nueva Vizcaya, +which is part of the watershed of north central Luzon, proceeding from +Bayombong, the capital of Nueva Vizcaya, down the valley of the Magat +River, by the same route Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent of the navy had +made their pleasant junket in the fall of 1898 as described in <a href= +"#ch6">Chapter VI</a> (<i>ante</i>). Following this route Captain +Batchelor finally came into Isabela province, where the Magat empties +into the Cagayan River, reaching Iligan, the capital of Isabela, ninety +miles northeast of Bayombong, about December 8th. From Iligan Batchelor +went on, promptly overcoming all resistance offered, down the great +Cagayan valley, some 110 miles due north, to the sea at Aparri, the +northernmost town of Luzon and of the archipelago, where he met two +vessels of our navy, the <i>Newark</i> and the <i>Helena</i>, under +Captain McCalla, and found, to his inexpressible (but partially and +rather fervently expressed) chagrin, that the insurgents who had fled +before him, and also the garrison at Aparri, had already surrendered to +the navy. The territory thus covered by Batchelor’s bold, +brilliant, and memorable march over two hundred miles of hostile +country from the mountains of central Luzon down the Cagayan valley to +the northern end of the island, at Aparri,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6118src" href="#xd20e6118" name="xd20e6118src">48</a> consisted +of the three provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The area +and population of these three, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb255" +href="#pb255" name="pb255">255</a>]</span>according to the census +tables of 1903, are as follows:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6135src" href= +"#xd20e6135" name="xd20e6135src">49</a></td> +<td><i>Population</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e6143src" href= +"#xd20e6143" name="xd20e6143src">50</a></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cagayan</td> +<td>5,052</td> +<td>156,239</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Isabela</td> +<td>5,018</td> +<td>76,431</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Nueva Vizcaya</td> +<td>1,950</td> +<td>62,541</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Total</td> +<td class="sum">12,020</td> +<td class="sum">295,211</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>The troops of Captain Batchelor’s command were later on +relieved by the 16th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Hood, under whom +the above group of three provinces finally became the “Second +District of the Department of Northern Luzon.” As part of the +plan to provide the reader with a fair general idea of Luzon +conveniently portable in memory, he is requested to note, at this +point, that hereinafter the Cagayan valley, with its three +provinces,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6180src" href="#xd20e6180" name= +"xd20e6180src">51</a> will be alluded to as a district containing +12,000 square miles and 300,000 people. As was remarked concerning the +original military district commanded by General Young, to wit, the +First District, so of Colonel Hood’s district, the +Second—that is to say, as the Ilocano country may some day become +the state of Ilocos, so, for like geographical and other governmental +reasons, the three provinces of the Cagayan valley may some day become +the state of Cagayan in the possible Philippine republic of the future. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb256" href="#pb256" name= +"pb256">256</a>]</span></p> +<p>Having now followed the “far-flung battle line” of the +volunteers of ’99 and their comrades in arms, the regulars, from +Manila northward across the rice paddies of central Luzon and over the +mountains to the northern extremity of the island, let us return to the +central plain, for reasons which will be stated in so doing. Between +the China Sea and the coast range which forms the western boundary of +the central plain of Luzon, there is a long strip of territory—a +west wing of the plain, as it were—about 125 miles long, with an +average width of not more than twenty miles, stretching from Manila Bay +to Lingayen Gulf. This is divided, for governmental purposes into two +provinces, Bataan on the south, whose southern extremity lay on Admiral +Dewey’s port side as he entered Manila Bay the night before the +naval battle of May 1, 1898, and Zambales on the north. The area and +population of this territory are as follows:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bataan</td> +<td>537</td> +<td>46,787</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Zambales</td> +<td>2,125</td> +<td>104,549</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td>2,662</td> +<td>151,336</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>Also, between the Pacific Ocean and the coast range which forms the +eastern boundary of the plain is a longer, narrower, and very sparsely +populated strip, or east wing, divided also into two provinces, +Principe on the north and Infanta on the south, each supposed to +contain about fifteen thousand people. Principe and Infanta are wholly +unimportant, except that, to avoid confusion, we must account for all +the provinces visible on the maps of Luzon. These two provinces +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb257" href="#pb257" name= +"pb257">257</a>]</span>never gave any trouble and no one ever bothered +about them.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6229src" href="#xd20e6229" name= +"xd20e6229src">52</a> In the mountains of Zambales and Bataan, however, +as in most of the other provinces of the archipelago, the struggle was +long kept up, just as the Boers kept up their war for independence +against Great Britain about the same time, by guerrilla warfare.</p> +<p>The central plain with five provinces has already been fully +described. If to this plain you add its two wings, above mentioned, you +have the nine provinces of central Luzon you see on the map. And if to +them you add the six provinces of the Ilocos country and the three of +the Cagayan valley, you have clearly before you the political make-up +of northern Luzon—eighteen provinces in all. When central Luzon +was arranged by districts under the military occupation, it was divided +into three parts, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth districts of the +Department of Northern Luzon, the Third District being under General +Jacob H. Smith of Samar fame,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6234src" href= +"#xd20e6234" name="xd20e6234src">53</a> the Fourth under General +Funston, and the Fifth under General Grant. The Sixth and last district +of northern Luzon was made up of the city of Manila and adjacent +territory. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb258" href="#pb258" name= +"pb258">258</a>]</span></p> +<p>General Smith’s district, the Third, comprised the provinces +of</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Zambales</td> +<td>2,125</td> +<td>104,549</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pangasinan</td> +<td>1,193</td> +<td>397,902</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tarlac</td> +<td>1,205</td> +<td>135,107</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td class="sum">4,523</td> +<td class="sum">637,558</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>Pangasinan with its near 400,000 people is the largest, in point of +population, of the twenty-five provinces of Luzon, and the third +largest of the archipelago.</p> +<p>General Funston’s district, the Fourth, comprised the +provinces of</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Nueva Ecija</td> +<td>2,169</td> +<td>134,147</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Principe<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6311src" href="#xd20e6311" +name="xd20e6311src">54</a></td> +<td>331</td> +<td>15,853</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td class="sum">2,500</td> +<td class="sum">150,000</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>General Grant’s district, the Fifth, comprised the provinces +of</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bataan</td> +<td>537</td> +<td>46,787</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pampanga</td> +<td>868</td> +<td>223,754</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bulacan</td> +<td>1,173</td> +<td>223,742</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td class="sum">2,578</td> +<td class="sum">494,283</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td>2,500</td> +<td>150,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Totals, 4th and 5th Districts:</td> +<td class="sum">5,078</td> +<td class="sum">644,283</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb259" href="#pb259" name= +"pb259">259</a>]</span></p> +<p>It will be seen from the foregoing that the Third District was +nearly equal in area to the Fourth and Fifth added together, and that +the same was true as to its population figure.</p> +<p>Just as the six provinces of the Ilocano country, first occupied by +General Young and organized as “The First District of the +Department of Northern Luzon,” should some day evolve into a +State of Ilocos, and the three provinces of the Cagayan valley, +occupied by Colonel Hood as the Second District, into an ultimate State +of Cagayan, so the provinces of General Smith’s old district, the +Third, should finally become a State of Pangasinan.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e6390src" href="#xd20e6390" name="xd20e6390src">55</a> This +Third District may be conveniently recollected as accounting for, +roughly speaking, 4500 square miles of territory and 625,000 people. +The total combined area of General Funston’s old district, the +Fourth,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6393src" href="#xd20e6393" name= +"xd20e6393src">56</a> and the adjacent one, the Fifth, General +Grant’s district, is—roughly—5000 square miles, and +its total population 650,000. No reason is apparent why these two +districts, the Fourth and Fifth, should not ultimately evolve into a +State of Pampanga. The five original military districts,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e6396src" href="#xd20e6396" name= +"xd20e6396src">57</a> which in 1900 constituted all of the Department +of Northern Luzon except the city of Manila and vicinity, might make +four ultimate states, with names, areas, and populations as follows: +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb260" href="#pb260" name= +"pb260">260</a>]</span></p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>State</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ilocos</td> +<td>6,500</td> +<td>650,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cagayan</td> +<td>12,000</td> +<td>300,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pangasinan</td> +<td>4,500</td> +<td>625,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pampanga</td> +<td>5,000</td> +<td>650,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td>28,000</td> +<td>2,225,000</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>It may surprise the reader after all the blood and thunder to which +his attention has hereinabove been subjected, apropos of northern Luzon +and the winter of 1899–1900, to know that the insurgents were +still bearding the lion in his den, <i>i. e.</i>, General Otis in +Manila, by operating in very considerable force in the village-dotted +country within cannon-shot of the road from Manila to Cavite in +January, 1900. Nevertheless such was the case.</p> +<p>On the 4th of January, 1900, General J. C. Bates was assigned to the +command of the First Division of the Eighth Army Corps, General +Lawton’s old division, and an active campaign was commenced in +southern Luzon. The plan adopted was that General Wheaton with a strong +force should engage and hold the enemy in the neighborhood of Cavite, +while General Schwan, starting at the western horn of the half moon to +which the great lake called Laguna de Bay has already been likened, +should move rapidly down the west shore of the lake, and around its +south shore to Santa Cruz near its eastern end, or horn, garrisoning +the towns en route, as taken, instead of leaving them to be re-occupied +by the insurgents. Santa Cruz is the same place where General Lawton +had “touched second base,” as it were, with a flying column +in April, 1899.</p> +<p>This plan was duly carried out. The Schwan column started from San +Pedro Macati, the initial rendezvous, <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb261" href="#pb261" name="pb261">261</a>]</span>a few miles out of +Manila, on January 4, 1900, now garrisoning the towns en route, instead +of leaving them to be fought over and captured again as heretofore. The +first stiff fight we had in that campaign was at Biñan, on +January 6, 1900, one of the places General Lawton’s expedition +had taken when he fought his way over the same country the year before. +O. K. Davis and John T. McCutcheon, who were in that fight and +campaign—in fact one of them had the ice-cold nerve to photograph +the Biñan fight while it was going on, as I learned when we all +went down to the creek near the town, after we took it, to freshen +up—can testify that we did not then hear any nonsense about a +“Tagal” insurrection, such as Secretary of War Root’s +<i>Report for 1899</i>, published shortly before, is full of, and that +on the contrary the whole country was as much a unit against us and as +loyal to the Aguinaldo government as northern Luzon had been. And +inasmuch as I am doing some “testifying” along here myself, +and assuming to brush aside without the slightest hesitation, as wholly +erroneous, information conveyed to the American public at the time in +the state papers of President McKinley and Secretary of War Root, it is +only due the reader, whose attention is being seriously asked, that +“the witness” should “qualify” as to the +opportunities he may have had, if any, to know whereof he speaks, +concerning the character of the opposition. To that end, the following +document, which General Schwan was kind enough to send me afterwards, +is submitted as sent:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">EXTRACT COPY.</p> +<p>Headquarters Detachment Macabebe Scouts.<br> +The Adjutant General, Schwan’s Expeditionary Brigade:</p> +<p>Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the +operations of the Detachment of Macabebe Scouts, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb262" href="#pb262" name= +"pb262">262</a>]</span>under my command, while forming a part of your +Brigade.</p> +<p>The Detachment, consisting of five (5) officers and one hundred and +forty (140) men, was divided into two companies, commanded by 1st Lt. +J. Lee Hall, 33rd Inf., and 1st Lt. Blount, 29th Inf., left San Pedro +Macati the afternoon of Jan. 4th, 1900 * * *.</p> +<hr class="tb"> +<p>I wish to invite your attention, especially, to the good work done +in the fight at Biñan by Lieut. Blount, 29th Inf., who led the +line by at least twenty-five yards * * *.</p> +<p>Very Respectfully,<br> +<span class="sc">Wm. C. Geiger</span>, 1st Lt. 14th Inf., +Com’d’g Det.</p> +<p>I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of extracts from the +report of the operations of the Detachment of Macabebe Scouts forming +part of an Expeditionary Brigade under my command, in the months of +January and February, 1900.</p> +<p><span class="sc">Theo. Schwan</span>,<br> +Brig. General, U. S. Vols.<br> +Aug. 16, 1900.</p> +</div> +<p>The activities of Generals Bates and Wheaton, and the Schwan +Expedition of January-February, 1900, extended the American occupation, +so far as there were troops enough immediately available to go around, +over the lake-shore portions and the principal towns of the two great +provinces of southern Luzon bordering on the Laguna de Bay, viz., +Cavite and Laguna; and over parts of the two adjacent provinces of +Batangas and Tayabas.</p> +<p>Batangas bounds Cavite on the south, and is itself bounded on the +south by the sea, where a fairly good port offered a fine gateway for +smuggling arms into the interior from abroad. Tayabas province adjoins +Laguna on the southeast. Cavite province has always been, since the +opening of the Suez Canal, about 1869, <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb263" href="#pb263" name="pb263">263</a>]</span>and the agitations +for political reform in Spain which culminated in the Spanish republic +of 1873, quickened the thought of Spain’s East Indies, the home +of insurrection, the breeding place of political agitation. Aguinaldo +himself was born within its limits in 1869. Laguna province comprehends +most of the country lying between the southern and eastern lake-shore +of the Laguna de Bay and the mountains which skirt that body of water +in the blue distance, all parts of it being thus in easy and safe touch +by water transportation by night with Cavite, the home and headquarters +of insurgency.</p> +<p>Just as northern Luzon had been gradually organized into military +districts as conquered, so was southern Luzon. The territory, over-run, +as above described, by Generals Bates, Wheaton, and Schwan, was divided +into two districts.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6514src" href= +"#xd20e6514" name="xd20e6514src">58</a> Colonel Hare commanded the +First District, Cavite province and vicinity. General Hall commanded +the Second District, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas. The area and +population of these four provinces, according to the Census of 1903, +were as follows:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cavite</td> +<td>619</td> +<td>134,779</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Batangas</td> +<td>1,201</td> +<td>257,715</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Laguna</td> +<td>629</td> +<td>148,606</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tayabas</td> +<td>5,993</td> +<td>153,065</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td class="sum">8,442</td> +<td class="sum">694,165</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>For convenience of subsequent allusion, this group of provinces may +be treated as representing roughly 8500 square miles of territory and +700,000 people. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb264" href="#pb264" +name="pb264">264</a>]</span>These four provinces group themselves +together naturally from a military standpoint. As physical force is the +final basis of all government, these four provinces constitute a +logical administrative governmental unit, as shown by the action of our +military authorities in their extension of the American occupation. It +would seem therefore that if there should ever be a Philippine +republic, they would probably constitute one of its states—the +State, let us say, of Cavite.</p> +<p>The rest of southern Luzon below that part above described consists +of a peninsula which, owing to its odd formation, is easy to remember. +The mainland of Luzon, that is to-say, that part of the island which +our narrative has already covered, remotely suggests, in shape, the +State of Illinois. At least it resembles Illinois more than it does any +other State of our Union, in that its length runs north and south, and +its average length and width are nearer that of Illinois than any +other. At the southeast corner of this mainland, the observer of the +map will see, jutting off to the southeast from the mainland, the +peninsula in question. It is about a hundred and fifty miles long, with +an average width of possibly thirty miles—a minimum width of, +say, ten miles, and a maximum of fifty,—and is separated from +Samar by the narrow, swift, and treacherous San Bernardino Strait, +which connects the Pacific Ocean with the China Sea. This peninsula is +frequently called “the Hemp Peninsula.” The importance of +controlling the hemp ports prompted General Otis to send General Bates +with an expedition to those ports on February 15, 1900.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e6575src" href="#xd20e6575" name= +"xd20e6575src">59</a> This expedition did little more than occupy those +ports. The great interior continued under insurgent control some time +afterward. The report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Root, for 1900, goes +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb265" href="#pb265" name= +"pb265">265</a>]</span>on to describe an engagement, or two, sustained +by the Bates Expedition shortly after it landed, and concludes, with a +complacency almost Otis-like, by stating that shortly thereafter +“the normal conditions of industry and trade relations with +Manila were resumed by the inhabitants.” Of course Mr. Root +believed this, and so did Mr. McKinley. More the pity, as we shall +later see. General Otis was now getting anxious to go home, and +hastened to “occupy” and organize the rest of the +archipelago, on paper, at least, the hemp peninsula becoming, on March +20, 1900, the Third District of the Department of Southern Luzon, +Brigadier-General James M. Bell commanding. The provinces comprised in +this district, with their areas and populations as given by the Census +of 1903, were as follows:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Camarines<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6599src" href="#xd20e6599" +name="xd20e6599src">60</a></td> +<td>3,279</td> +<td>239,405</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Albay</td> +<td>1,783</td> +<td>240,326</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Sorsogon</td> +<td>755</td> +<td>120,495</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td class="sum">5,817</td> +<td class="sum">600,226</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>For convenience of subsequent allusion, these three provinces of the +hemp peninsula which constituted the Third Military District of the +Military Department of Southern Luzon in 1900, may be regarded as +comprising, roughly, 6000 square miles of territory and 600,000 people. +If the Philippine republic of the future which is the dream of the +Filipino people, prove other than an idle dream, the hemp peninsula +will probably some day constitute a state of that republic, an +appropriate <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb266" href="#pb266" name= +"pb266">266</a>]</span>and probable name for which would be the State +of Camarines.</p> +<p>The Fourth District of southern Luzon—there were but +four—was occupied by the 29th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, commanded +by Colonel E. E. Hardin, one of the best executive officers General +Otis had in his whole command. The Fourth District comprised a lot of +islands unnecessary to be considered at length in this bird’s-eye +view of the panorama, but necessary to be mentioned in outlining the +military occupation. The 29th, like the other twenty-four volunteer +regiments, settled down with equanimity to the business of policing a +hostile country, sang with zest, like the rest of the twenty-five +volunteer regiments, that old familiar song, “Damn, Damn, Damn +the Filipino,” etc., and waited with the uniquely admirable +stoicism of the American soldier for the season of their home-going to +roll round, which, under the Act of Congress,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6637src" href="#xd20e6637" name="xd20e6637src">61</a> would be +the spring of the following year.</p> +<p>In volume i., part 5, <i>War Department Report</i>, 1899, at pages 5 +<i>et seq.</i>, may be found a journal illustrating the nature of the +“police” work done by the volunteers of 1899, in 1900, and +at pages 5 <i>et seq.</i> of the same report for 1900 (volume i., part +4) may be found a similar diary carried up to June 30, 1901. Throughout +the period covered by those reports, scarcely a day passed without what +the military folk coolly call “contacts” with the +enemy.</p> +<p>The Visayan Islands were in course of time duly organized, as Luzon +had previously been, departmentally and by military districts. The +Visayan Islands became the Department of Visayas, divided into +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb267" href="#pb267" name= +"pb267">267</a>]</span>districts commanded either by regimental +commanders having a regiment or more with them, or by general officers. +For a long time no attempt to make military occupation effective in +these various islands, save in the coast towns, was attempted. However, +the indicated disposition of troops completed, technically at least, +the American occupation of the Visayan Islands.</p> +<p>Pursuant to the plan followed, as we have hitherto followed the army +in our narrative, first throughout northern Luzon and later through +southern Luzon, some data are now in order concerning the Visayan +Islands.</p> +<p>As already made clear, there are but six of the Visayan Islands with +which any one interested in the Philippines merely as a student of +world politics or of history need bother. The area and population of +these are as follows:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6660src" href= +"#xd20e6660" name="xd20e6660src">62</a></p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Island</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Panay</td> +<td>4,611</td> +<td>743,646</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Negros</td> +<td>4,881</td> +<td>460,776</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cebu</td> +<td>1,762</td> +<td>592,247</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Leyte</td> +<td>2,722</td> +<td>356,641</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Samar</td> +<td>5,031</td> +<td>222,090</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bohol</td> +<td>1,441</td> +<td>243,148</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>Whenever, if ever, an independent republic is established in the +Philippines, the six islands above mentioned could and should +constitute self-governing commonwealths similar to the several States +of the American Union. The rest of the islands lying between Luzon and +Mindanao could easily be disposed of governmentally by being attached +to the <span class="corr" id="xd20e6730" title= +"Source: jursidiction">jurisdiction</span> of one of the said six +islands. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb268" href="#pb268" name= +"pb268">268</a>]</span></p> +<p>Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo were organized as the +Department of Mindanao and Jolo, under General Kobbe, with the 31st +Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Pettit’s regiment, the 40th Volunteer +Infantry, Colonel Godwin’s regiment, and the 23rd Regular +Infantry. Thus the archipelago was completely accounted for, for the +time being, just as all the territory of the United States was long +accounted for by our military authorities at home, with the Department +of the East, headquarters Governor’s Island, New York; the +Department of the Lakes, headquarters Chicago; the Department of the +Gulf, headquarters Atlanta, etc. In this state of the case, General +Otis re-embraced his early pet delusion—if it was a delusion, +which charity and the probabilities suggest it should be +called—about the insurrection having gone to pieces; and decided +to come home. Possibly, also, he was homesick. General Otis was a very +positive character, a strong man. But even strong men get homesick +after long exile. When you hear the call of the homeland after long +residence “east of Suez,” you must answer the call, duty +not forbidding. General Otis had stood by his ink wells and the +Administration with unswerving devotion for twenty months, and was +entitled to come back home and tell the public all about the fighting +in the Philippines, and how entirely over it was, and how wholly right +Mr. McKinley was in his theory that the visible opposition to our rule +and the seeming desire to be free and independent did not represent the +wishes of the Filipino people at all, but only the “sinister +ambitions of a few unscrupulous Tagalo leaders.” Accordingly on +May 5, 1900, he was relieved at his own request, and departed for the +United States. He was succeeded in command by a very different type of +man, Major-General Arthur <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb269" href= +"#pb269" name="pb269">269</a>]</span>MacArthur, upon whom now devolved +the problem of holding down the situation and of actually getting it +stably “well in hand” by June 30, 1901, the date of +expiration of the term of enlistment of the twenty-five volunteer +regiments organized under the Act of March 2, 1899. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb270" href="#pb270" name="pb270">270</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5391" href="#xd20e5391src" name="xd20e5391">1</a></span> Strictly +speaking, only twenty-three regiments were sent out from the United +States. Under the Act of March 2, 1899, providing the volunteer army of +35,000 men for the Philippines, twenty-four regiments of infantry and +one of cavalry were organized. The infantry regiments were numbered +Twenty-six to Forty-nine, both inclusive, the numbering taking up where +the numbering of the regular infantry regiments then ended, with the +Twenty-fifth. The cavalry regiment was called the Eleventh Cavalry, the +regular cavalry regimental enumeration ending at that time with the +Tenth. The Eleventh Cavalry and the Thirty-sixth Infantry were +organized, officered, and largely recruited from men of the State +Volunteers sent out in ’98, who, in consideration of liberal +inducements offered by the Government, consented to remain.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5418" href="#xd20e5418src" name="xd20e5418">2</a></span> The +population of the city of Manila according to the <i>Philippine Census +of 1903</i>, vol. ii., p. 16; was 219,928. The three next largest towns +are: Laoag, in the province of Ilocos Norte, about 270 miles north of +Manila, near the northwest corner of Luzon, population 19,699; Iloilo, +capital of the island of Panay and chief city and port of the Visayan +Islands, some 300 miles south of Manila, population 19,054; and Cebu, +capital and chief port of the island of Cebu, a day’s voyage from +Iloilo, population 18,330. See <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. +ii., p. 38.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5432" href="#xd20e5432src" name="xd20e5432">3</a></span> 115,026 +is the exact figure. See <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 57.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5438" href="#xd20e5438src" name="xd20e5438">4</a></span> The +exact figure for Luzon is 40,969, and that for Mindanao, 36,292. +<i>Ib.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5445" href="#xd20e5445src" name="xd20e5445">5</a></span> +<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 56.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5450" href="#xd20e5450src" name="xd20e5450">6</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5465" href="#xd20e5465src" name="xd20e5465">7</a></span> Table of +Areas, <i>Census</i>, 1903, vol. i., p. 263.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5474" href="#xd20e5474src" name="xd20e5474">8</a></span> Table of +Populations, <i>ib.</i>, vol. ii., p. 126.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5520" href="#xd20e5520src" name="xd20e5520">9</a></span> Total of +these six in large type 20,418 square miles, say roughly 20,500.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5544" href="#xd20e5544src" name="xd20e5544">10</a></span> Total +of these last three in smaller type 9114 square miles.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5583" href="#xd20e5583src" name="xd20e5583">11</a></span> There +is a large sugar estate on Mindoro, supposed to contain over 60,000 +acres or, say, ninety odd square miles, which in 1911 figured in a +congressional investigation of certain charges against Professor +Worcester, a member of the Philippine Commission, but this is wholly +separate from the original problem of public order.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5593" href="#xd20e5593src" name="xd20e5593">12</a></span> The +exact figure is 36,292. <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 263.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5599" href="#xd20e5599src" name="xd20e5599">13</a></span> +499,634, <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 126.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5605" href="#xd20e5605src" name="xd20e5605">14</a></span> The +semi-civilized Moros of Mindanao live mostly in the interior, and have +a crude form of Mohammedanism. The civilized Christian Filipinos of +Mindanao live mostly on the littoral.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5612" href="#xd20e5612src" name="xd20e5612">15</a></span> This +was said in no mere speech. Speeches are often misquoted. It was a +letter signed by the foremost man of this age, Mr. Roosevelt, written +September 15, 1900, accepting the nomination for the Vice-Presidency. +(See <i>Proceedings of the Republican National Committee</i>, 1900, p. +86.) Yet it represented then one of the many current misapprehensions +about the Filipinos which moved this great nation to destroy a young +republic set up in a spirit of intelligent and generous emulation of +our own.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5618" href="#xd20e5618src" name="xd20e5618">16</a></span> One of +the sultans, or head-men, was believed in 1899, to have tried on his +return from a pilgrimage to Mecca made before we took the Philippines, +by some dickering at Singapore or near there in the Straits +Settlements, to sell out for a consideration to Great Britain, so as to +be under the protection and in the pay of British North Borneo.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5623" href="#xd20e5623src" name="xd20e5623">17</a></span> The +fraction used is based on 500,000 (the population of Mindanao), being +that fraction of 7,500,000 (which last is, roughly speaking, the total +population of the archipelago). The census figures being 499,634 and +7,635,426 respectively, as heretofore stated.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5628" href="#xd20e5628src" name="xd20e5628">18</a></span> +7,635,426. <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 15.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5639" href="#xd20e5639src" name="xd20e5639">19</a></span> +3,798,507. <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 125.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5645" href="#xd20e5645src" name="xd20e5645">20</a></span> 223,506 +is the total of the uncivilized tribes still extant in Luzon, +<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 125, but they live in the +mountains and you might live in the Philippines a long lifetime without +ever seeing a sample of them, unless you happen to be an energetic +ethnologist fond of mountain climbing.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5652" href="#xd20e5652src" name="xd20e5652">21</a></span> +<i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. i., p. 57.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5657" href="#xd20e5657src" name="xd20e5657">22</a></span> The +area of Cuba is about 44,000 square miles.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5660" href="#xd20e5660src" name="xd20e5660">23</a></span> Except +Ohio, the States of Pennsylvania and Tennessee are nearer the size of +Luzon than any others of the Union, the former containing about 45,000 +square miles and the latter about 42,000.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5672" href="#xd20e5672src" name="xd20e5672">24</a></span> This +comparison does not pretend to be mathematically exact. New +Jersey’s area is nearer 8000 than 7000 square miles. For further +illustration by comparison, it may be noted in this connection that the +area of Massachusetts is over 8000 square miles (8315) and that of +Vermont between 9000 and 10,000 (9565). As Costa Rica has only 368,780 +inhabitants (<i>Statesman’s Year Book</i>), the province of +Pangasinan alone contains more people than the republic of Costa Rica. +The average of intelligence and industry of the masses in both is +doubtless about the same, with the probabilities in favor of +Pangasinan.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5693" href="#xd20e5693src" name="xd20e5693">25</a></span> Table +of Areas, <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5702" href="#xd20e5702src" name="xd20e5702">26</a></span> Table +of Populations, <i>ib.</i>, vol. ii., p. 123.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5802" href="#xd20e5802src" name="xd20e5802">27</a></span> In +alluding, in complimentary terms, to this officer’s gallant +conduct on that occasion, Harper’s <i>History of the War in the +Philippines</i> spells the name “Hustin,” as it had +previously misspelled the name of the star actor among the younger +officers who participated in the Zapote River fight +“Kanly.” “Such is fame.” The gentleman’s +right name is Mustin. He is now a lieutenant-commander, well known in +the navy to-day, as the inventor of the “Mustin +gun-sight.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5812" href="#xd20e5812src" name="xd20e5812">28</a></span> There +is a notable unanimity, among the men in the army of about Major +March’s age and rank, in the opinion that he is a man of very +extraordinary ability. This unanimity is so generous and genuine that I +deem it a duty as well as a pleasure to emphasize it here.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5815" href="#xd20e5815src" name="xd20e5815">29</a></span> See +Otis’s <i>Report</i> covering September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900, +<i>War Dept. Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 261.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5826" href="#xd20e5826src" name="xd20e5826">30</a></span> The +12th, part of the 25th, and the 32d Infantry being used to guard the +railroad and for other purposes.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5831" href="#xd20e5831src" name="xd20e5831">31</a></span> +Calumpit will be remembered as the place where in the previous spring +Colonel Funston and his Kansans performed the daring and successful +manœuvre of crossing the Bagbag River under fire.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5845" href="#xd20e5845src" name="xd20e5845">32</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 2 (1902), p. 1926.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5852" href="#xd20e5852src" name="xd20e5852">33</a></span> This +ratio is no jest. It is a statistical fact, figured out from one of the +War Department Reports.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5861" href="#xd20e5861src" name="xd20e5861">34</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 59.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5881" href="#xd20e5881src" name="xd20e5881">35</a></span> +<i>Report of Secretary of War</i>, 1899, p. 12.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5910" href="#xd20e5910src" name="xd20e5910">36</a></span> +Campaign Spanish for “look for.” Generals Lawton and Young +had cut loose from their base of supplies and their command was +trusting for subsistence to living upon the country.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5930" href="#xd20e5930src" name="xd20e5930">37</a></span> See +translation of diary of Major Simeon Villa, <i>Senate Document 331</i>, +pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902), p. 1988. It was in this Aringay +fight that one of the narrowest escapes from death in battle ever +officially authenticated occurred. Lieutenant Dennis P. Quinlan, now a +captain of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, was struck just over the heart by an +insurgent bullet (probably more or less spent) while crossing the river +in the face of a hot fire, the bullet being deflected by a plug of +tobacco carried in the breast pocket of the regulation campaign blue +shirt he was wearing, which pocket, any one acquainted with that shirt +will remember, is at the left breast just over the heart (<i>War +Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 6, <span class="corr" id= +"xd20e5938" title="Source: pt.">pp.</span> 166, 279). He was knocked +over, but soon recovered and went on. The flesh of the left breast over +the heart was bruised black and blue. He was recommended for a medal of +honor on account of the incident (<i>War Department Report</i>, 1900, +vol. i., pt. 7, p. 136).</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5949" href="#xd20e5949src" name="xd20e5949">38</a></span> If +these figures are not exact, they are approximately correct. We always +called it three hundred miles from Manila to the northern end of Luzon +via Vigan and the lighthouse at Cape Bojeador.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5956" href="#xd20e5956src" name="xd20e5956">39</a></span> For +instance, there was what used to be known to the 8th Corps as +“Col. Jim Parker’s night attack at Vigan,” which +occurred early in December, 1899, soon after that place was occupied, +the insurgents coming into the town in large numbers, at night under +command of General Tiñio, through a tunnel so it was said, and +being driven out only after desperate close quarters’ fighting +from about two o’clock in the morning until after broad daylight, +leaving the streets and plaza of Vigan much cumbered with their dead. +Again, later on, there was the sudden order, swiftly executed, in +obedience to which Lieutenant Grayson V. Heidt with a part of a troop +of the 3d Cavalry, rode from Laoag to Batac to the rescue of a besieged +garrison at the latter place, arriving in time to prevent a small +Custer massacre, the garrison having gotten short of ammunition, and +having just managed to telegraph for reinforcements a few moments +before the enemy cut the telegraph wire. Then, there was Lieutenant +Hannay, of the 22d Infantry, who being at the front, received an order +from General Lawton to come back to build a bridge. The order made him +sick, the surgeon reported him sick, the messenger returned with that +message, and then Hannay promptly got well, and stayed at the front. +And so on, <i lang="la">ad infinitum</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5984" href="#xd20e5984src" name="xd20e5984">40</a></span> The +Visayan Islands—the half-dozen islands between Luzon and Mindanao +already mentioned, as the only ones worth mentioning for our purposes, +together with the various smaller islands, islets, and rocks +“visible at high water.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e5994" href="#xd20e5994src" name="xd20e5994">41</a></span> +“During April, in the First District, comprising the provinces of +Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Union, Abra, Lepanto, Benguet, and Bontoc, +Brigadier General S. B. M. Young, commanding, the insurgents manifested +considerable activity and endeavored to take the offensive against the +scattered detachments in the district. The insurgents were in every +instance defeated, and lost more than 500 men killed.” <i>War +Dept. Report</i> 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 196.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6002" href="#xd20e6002src" name="xd20e6002">42</a></span> The +language quoted is that employed by Robert Collins, Associated Press +Correspondent, in connection with the Round Robin incident of nine +months previous, described in the concluding part of the chapter +preceding this.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6008" href="#xd20e6008src" name="xd20e6008">43</a></span> +Hereinafter more fully set forth.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6022" href="#xd20e6022src" name="xd20e6022">44</a></span> For the +Table of Areas, see <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6030" href="#xd20e6030src" name="xd20e6030">45</a></span> For the +Table of Populations, see <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. +123.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6067" href="#xd20e6067src" name="xd20e6067">46</a></span> Under +the Spaniards, these were two provinces. They were combined by us.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6095" href="#xd20e6095src" name="xd20e6095">47</a></span> A +province in Latin countries corresponds more nearly to what we call a +county than to anything else familiar to our system of political +divisions.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6118" href="#xd20e6118src" name="xd20e6118">48</a></span> For the +details of this march, see <i>War Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., +pt. 4, p. 309. Captain Batchelor had neither orders nor permission to +do what he did. When he cut loose from the command he belonged to, he +took very long chances on finding subsistence for his men in the +unknown country he had set out to conquer, to say nothing of the highly +probable chances of annihilation of his whole command. When an officer +commanding troops does this in time of war, he does so at his peril, +and signal success is his only salvation.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6135" href="#xd20e6135src" name="xd20e6135">49</a></span> Area +tables, <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6143" href="#xd20e6143src" name="xd20e6143">50</a></span> +Population tables, <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 123.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6180" href="#xd20e6180src" name="xd20e6180">51</a></span> Though +Nueva Vizcaya is not <i>in</i> the Cagayan valley, but on a plateau of +the great divide, still, its streams all flow into the Cagayan valley, +and that term will be used in this book, as it is colloquially in the +Philippines, to include not only the Cagayan valley proper, but also +the adjoining tributary province of Nueva Vizcaya.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6229" href="#xd20e6229src" name="xd20e6229">52</a></span> The +only thing of interest to the American people that ever happened over +there was the capture of Lieutenant Gilmore of the Navy, and his men, +at Baler, on the Pacific coast, in Principe, a capture which, it will +be recollected, was followed by long captivity, and ultimately +terminated in rescue. The interested student will see these two +provinces on the American maps of the islands, but they were each +attached by the Taft government for administration purposes to another +province, and do not appear in the American census list of provinces. +Therefore, they cut no figure in the census totals, either of area or +population.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6234" href="#xd20e6234src" name="xd20e6234">53</a></span> The +officer on whom public attention in the United States was later +focussed by an alleged order, charged to have been issued by him in a +campaign in Samar to “kill everything over ten years old.” +This alleged order was called by the American newspapers of the period +“Jake Smith’s Kill and Burn Order.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6311" href="#xd20e6311src" name="xd20e6311">54</a></span> The +figures as to Principe are mere arbitrary guesses, the exact figures +used being fixed on merely to get convenient round numbers, there being +no statistics as to Principe.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6390" href="#xd20e6390src" name="xd20e6390">55</a></span> Of +course the Filipinos should be consulted as to what provinces should +constitute each state, but I am simply sketching a tentative +governmental scheme based upon the way our army perfected its original +grip on public order and the general administrative situation.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6393" href="#xd20e6393src" name="xd20e6393">56</a></span> All +along here we, of course, deal in round numbers only.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6396" href="#xd20e6396src" name="xd20e6396">57</a></span> See +<i>War Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., part 5, pp. 45 <i>et +seq.</i> The city of Manila and vicinity constituted the Sixth District +of the Department of Northern Luzon.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6514" href="#xd20e6514src" name="xd20e6514">58</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., part 5, pp. 47–8.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6575" href="#xd20e6575src" name="xd20e6575">59</a></span> <i>War +Dept. Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., part 1, p. 9.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6599" href="#xd20e6599src" name="xd20e6599">60</a></span> The +Spanish word <i>camarin</i> means a warehouse. The province of +Camarines was originally two provinces, and is still referred to as +two, though governmentally but one.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6637" href="#xd20e6637src" name="xd20e6637">61</a></span> Of +March 2, 1899. Under it the term of enlistment of the volunteers was to +expire June 30, 1901.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6660" href="#xd20e6660src" name="xd20e6660">62</a></span> Table +of Areas, <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. i., p. 263. Table of +Population, <i>ib.</i>, vol. ii., pp. 123 <i>et seq.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch13" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XIII</h2> +<h2 class="main">MacArthur and the War</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Damn, damn, damn the Filipino,</p> +<p class="line">Pock-marked khakiac ladrone;<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6750src" href="#xd20e6750" name="xd20e6750src">1</a></p> +<p class="line">Underneath the starry flag</p> +<p class="line">Civilize him with a Krag,</p> +<p class="line">And return us to our own beloved home.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Army Song of the Philippines under +MacArthur.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e6762src" href="#xd20e6762" +name="xd20e6762src">2</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Some one has said, “Let me write the songs of a +people and I care not who makes their laws.” Give me the campaign +songs of a war, and I will so write the history of that war that he who +runs may read, and, reading, <i>know</i> the truth. The volunteers of +1899 had, most of them, been in the Spanish War of ’98. That +struggle had been so brief that, to borrow a phrase of the principal +beneficiary of it, Colonel Roosevelt, there had not been “war +enough to go ’round.” The Philippine insurrection had +already broken out when the Spanish War volunteers returned from Cuba +in the first half of 1899. Few of them knew exactly where the +Philippines were on the map. They simply knew that we had bought the +islands, that disturbances of public order were in progress there, and +that the Government desired to suppress them. The President had called +for volunteers. That was enough. When they reached the islands, instead +of finding a lot of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb271" href="#pb271" +name="pb271">271</a>]</span>outlaws, brigands, etc., such as that +pestiferous, ill-conditioned outfit of horse-thieves and cane-field +burning patriots we volunteers of ’98 had to comb out of the +eastern end of Cuba under General Wood in the winter of 1898–9, +they found Manila, on their arrival, practically almost a besieged +city. They knew that the erroneous impression they had brought with +them was the result of misrepresentation. Who was responsible for that +misrepresentation they did not attempt to analyze. They simply set to +work with American energy to put down the insurrection. Nobody +questioned the unanimity of the opposition. There it was, a +<i>fact</i>—denied at home, but a fact. In the course of the +fight against the organized insurgent army they lost a great many of +their comrades, and in that way the unanimity of the resistance was +quite forcibly impressed upon them. By kindred psychologic processes +equally free from mystery, their determination to overcome the +resistance early became very set—a state of mind which boded no +good to the Filipinos. The army song given at the beginning of <a href= +"#ch11">Chapter XI</a> (<i>ante</i>), in which General Otis is made to +sing, after the fashion of some of the characters in <i>Pinafore</i>, +that pensive query to himself</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Am I the boss, or am I a tool?</p> +</div> +<p class="first">the first stanza of which closes</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Now I’d like to know who’s the boss of the +show,</p> +<p class="line">Is it me or Emilio Aguinaldo?</p> +</div> +<p class="first">was a point of departure, in the matter of +information, which served to acquaint them with all that had gone +before. They resented the loss of prestige to American arms and desired +to restore that prestige. While engaged in so doing, they became aware, +during the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb272" href="#pb272" name= +"pb272">272</a>]</span>Presidential year 1900, that the campaign of +that year in the United States was based largely upon the pretence that +the majority of the Filipinos welcomed our rule. Naturally, their +experience led them to a very general and very cordial detestation of +this pretence. For one thing, it was an unfair belittling of the actual +military service they were rendering. People hate a lie whether they +are able to trace its devious windings to its source or sources, or to +analyze all its causes, or calculate all its possible effects, or not. +The real rock-bottom falsehood, not as fully understood then as it +became later, consisted in the impression sought to be produced at +home, in order to get votes, that the great body of the Filipino people +were not really in sympathy with their country’s struggle for +freedom, and would be really glad tamely to accept the alien domination +so benevolently offered by a superior people, but were being coerced +into fighting through intimidation by a few selfish leaders acting for +their own selfish ends. While our fighting generals in the +field,—General MacArthur, for instance, whose interview with a +newspaper man just after the fall of Malolos, in March, 1899, +subsequently verified by him before the Senate Committee of 1902, has +already been noticed—at first believed that it was only a faction +that we had to contend with, they soon discovered that the whole people +were loyal to Aguinaldo and the cause he represented. But, while the +point as to how unanimous the resistance was remained a disputed matter +for some little time among those of our people who did not have to +“go up against it,” the most curious fact of that whole +historic situation, to my mind, is the absolute identity of the +disputed suggestion with that which had previously been used in like +cases in all ages by the powerful against people struggling to be free, +and the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb273" href="#pb273" name= +"pb273">273</a>]</span>cotemporaneous absence of any notation of the +coincidence by any conspicuous spectator of the drama, to say nothing +of us smaller fry who bore the brunt of the war or any portion of +it.</p> +<p>Those men of ’99 in the Philippines realized in 1900, vaguely +it may be, but actually, that they were waging a war of conquest after +the manner of the British as sung by Kipling, but under the +hypocritical pretence that they were doing missionary work to improve +the Filipino. They did not know whether the Filipinos could or could +not run a decent government if permitted. It was too early to form any +judgment. And even then there was no unanimous feeling that they could +not. Brigadier-General Charles King, the famous novelist, who was in +the fighting out there during the first half of 1899, was quoted in the +<i>Catholic Citizen</i>, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in June, 1899, as +having said in an interview given at Milwaukee:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">There is no reason in the world why the people should +not have the self-government which they so passionately desire, so far +as their ability to carry it on goes.</p> +</div> +<p>The real reason why the war was being waged was stated with the +honesty which heated public discussion always brings forth, by Hon. +Charles Denby, a member of the Schurman Commission of 1899, in an +article which appeared in the <i>Forum</i> for February, 1899, entitled +“Why the Treaty Should be Ratified:”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6814src" href="#xd20e6814" name="xd20e6814src">3</a></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The cold, hard, practical question alone remains: +“Will the possession of the islands benefit us as a +nation?” If it will not, set them free to-morrow.</p> +</div> +<p>But in the same magazine, the <i>Forum</i>, for June, 1900, in other +words to the very same audience, in an article <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb274" href="#pb274" name= +"pb274">274</a>]</span>whose title is a protest, “Do we Owe the +Filipinos Independence?” we find this same distinguished diplomat +sagaciously deferring to that not inconsiderable element of the +American public which is opposed to wars for conquest, with the rank +hypocrisy which must ever characterize a republic warring for gain +against the ideals that made it great, thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">A little time ought to be conceded to the +Administration to ascertain what the wish of the people [meaning the +people of the Philippine Islands] really is;<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6834src" href="#xd20e6834" name="xd20e6834src">4</a></p> +</div> +<p>adding some of the stale but ever-welcome salve originally invented +by General Otis for use by Mr. McKinley on the public conscience of +America, about the war having been “fomented by professional +politicians,” and not having the moral support of the whole +people. “A majority of the Filipinos are friendly to us,” +he says. Even as early as January 4, 1900, in the New York +<i>Independent</i>, we find Mr. Denby abandoning all his previous +honesty of 1899 about “the cold, hard, practical question,” +and rubbing his hands with invisible soap to the tune of the following +hypocrisy:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Let us find out how many of the people want +independence, and how many are willing to remain loyal to our +government. It is believed a large majority [etc.].<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e6849src" href="#xd20e6849" name="xd20e6849src">5</a></p> +</div> +<p>The same article even assumed an air of injured innocence and urged +that as soon as the insurgent army laid down its arms<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e6854src" href="#xd20e6854" name="xd20e6854src">6</a> +“the intentions of our government <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb275" href="#pb275" name="pb275">275</a>]</span>will be made known by +Congress.” That was just thirteen years ago, and “the +intentions of our government” have never yet been “made +known by Congress,” despite the fact that the omission has all +these years been like a buzzing insect, lighting intermittently on the +sores of race prejudice and political difference in the Philippines, to +say nothing of the circumstance that such omission leaves everybody +guessing, including ourselves. The omission has been due to the fact +that both the McKinley Administration which committed the original +blunder of taking the islands, and the succeeding Administrations which +have been the legatees of that blunder, have always needed in their +Philippine business the support both of those whose votes are caught by +the Denby honesty of 1899 and those whose votes are caught by the Denby +hypocrisy of 1900.</p> +<p>War is a great silencer of hypocrisy. In the presence of real sorrow +and genuine anger, it slinks away and is seen no more until more piping +times. The lists of casualties had been duly bulletined to the United +States from time to time between February, 1899, and June, 1900, so +that by the date last named it had become “good politics” +to throw off the mask. Hence, at the Republican National Convention +held in Philadelphia June 19–21, 1900, we find that astute +past-master of the science of government by parties, Senator Lodge, +boldly throwing off the mask thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested +in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in trade +expansion.</p> +</div> +<p>Now the words of a United States Senator are much listened to by an +army in the field. When a war breaks out, it is usually your Senator +who gets your commission <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb276" href= +"#pb276" name="pb276">276</a>]</span>for you originally, and has you +promoted and made captain, colonel, or general, as the case may be, if +you do anything to deserve it, or lifted from the ranks to a +commission, if you do anything to deserve it, or sees that something +fitting is done if you die in any specially decent way. An army in the +field thinks a United States Senator is about one of the biggest +institutions going—which, seriously, is not far from the truth, +with all due respect to the blasé pessimists of the press +gallery. Consider then how wholly uninspiring, as a sentiment to die by +and kill by, the above senatorial utterance was to the men in the field +in the Philippines, who did not even then believe the islands would +pay. The “cold, hard, practical” fact was, if the Senator +was to be believed, that we were fighting for what is generically +called “Wall Street;” that it was primarily a Wall Street +war: an expedition fitted out to kill enough Filipinos to make the +survivors good future customers—“Ultimate +Consumers”—and only incidentally a war to make people +follow your way of being happy in lieu of their own. Yet we had most of +us, but shortly previously to that, gone trooping headlong to Cuba, in +the wake of the most inspiring single personality of this +age—Senator Lodge’s friend, Colonel Roosevelt—some of +our American thoraxes inflated with sentiments thus nobly expressed by +the same distinguished Senator in his speech on the resolution which +declared war against Spain:</p> +<p>“We are there” (meaning in the then Cuban situation), +Senator Lodge had said in the Senate, in the matchless outburst of +eloquence with which he set the keynote to the war with +Spain—</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We are there because we represent the spirit of +liberty and the new time. * * * We have grasped no +man’s territory, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb277" href= +"#pb277" name="pb277">277</a>]</span>we have taken no man’s +property, we have invaded no man’s rights. <i>We do not ask their +lands.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e6878src" href="#xd20e6878" name= +"xd20e6878src">7</a></p> +</div> +<p>What difference, however, did it make to men under military orders, +and that far away from home, where American public opinion could not +and never can affect any given situation in time to help it, whether +they were serving God or the devil? Everything disappeared but the +primal fighting instinct. So the slaughter proceeded right merrily, at +a ratio of about sixteen to one, and many a Filipino died with the word +“Independence” on his lips,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6885src" href="#xd20e6885" name="xd20e6885src">8</a> while many +an obscure American life went out, fighting under the Denby-Lodge +dollar-mark flag of pseudo-trade expansion. Can you imagine a more +thankless job? Do you wonder at the song that heads the chapter? Still, +war is war, once you are in it. All through 1900 the volunteers of 1899 +kept on, cheerfully doing their country’s work, not in the least +hampered by whys or wherefores, so far as the quality of their work +went. They knew that the Filipinos were not heathen, and they were not +perfectly clear that they themselves were doing the Lord’s work, +unless “putting the fear of God into the heart of the <i lang= +"es">insurrecto</i>”—one of their campaign +expressions—was the Lord’s work. However, if any of them +gave any special thought to the ethics of the situation, this did not +in the least affect their efficiency in action, nor their determination +to lick the Filipino into submission. When the brief organized +resistance of the insurgent armies in the field (February to November, +1899) underwent its transition to the far more formidable guerrilla +tactics, they realized that they were “up <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb278" href="#pb278" name= +"pb278">278</a>]</span>against” a long and tedious task, in which +would be no special glamour, as there had been in Cuba, because the war +was not much more popular at home than it was with them. The rank net +hypocrisy of the whole situation, as they viewed it, is expressed in +the song which heads this chapter. It is an answer to the Taft nonsense +of 1900 about “the people long for peace and are willing to +accept government under United States.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6896src" href="#xd20e6896" name="xd20e6896src">9</a> That is why +the Caribao Society do not sing it to Mr. Taft when he attends their +annual banquet, notwithstanding that it is the star song of their +repertoire.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6902src" href="#xd20e6902" name= +"xd20e6902src">10</a> This statement of Judge Taft’s, as well as +other like statements of his which followed it during the presidential +campaign of 1900, would have been perfectly harmless in home politics. +It was made in the same spirit of optimism in which a Taft man will +tell you to-day, “The people are willing to see the Taft +Administration endorsed.” But at that time in the Philippines +there was no possible way to prove or disprove the statement to the +satisfaction of anybody at home—or elsewhere, for that matter. +And, under the circumstances, it was at once a libel on Filipino +patriotism and an ungracious belittling of the work of the American +army. It was a libel on Filipino patriotism because it denied the loyal +(even if ill-advised) unanimity of the Filipino people in their +struggle for independence, and was a statement made recklessly, without +knowledge, in aid of a presidential candidate in the United States. +That it was highly inaccurate was well known to some <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb279" href="#pb279" name= +"pb279">279</a>]</span>70,000 American soldiers then in the field, who +were daily getting <i>insurrecto</i> lead pumped into them, and also +well known to their gallant commander, General MacArthur, who told +Judge Taft just that thing. That it was an ungracious belittling of the +work of the army is certainly obvious enough, and it was so considered +by the army, and its commanding general aforesaid, who practically told +Judge Taft just that thing. But Mr. Root, then Secretary of War, was as +much interested in Mr. McKinley’s re-election as Judge Taft was. +So he spread the Taft cablegrams broadcast throughout the United States +during the presidential campaign, and pigeonholed the MacArthur +messages and reports on the situation in the dusty and innocuous +desuetude of the War Department archives. Four years later at the +Republican National Convention of 1904, Mr. Root told the naked truth, +thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">When the last national convention met, over 70,000 +soldiers from more than 500 stations held a still vigorous enemy in +check.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6914src" href="#xd20e6914" name= +"xd20e6914src">11</a></p> +</div> +<p>The foregoing is all a record made and unalterable. It is a fair +sample of the initial stages of one more of the experiments in +colonization by a republic which are scattered through history and +teach but one lesson. All the gentlemen concerned were personally men +of high type. But look at the net result of their work. The impression +it produced in the United States, at a tremendously critical period in +the country’s history, when the men at the helm of state were +bending every energy to railroad the republic into a career of overseas +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb280" href="#pb280" name= +"pb280">280</a>]</span>conquest, and using the army for that purpose, +can be called by a short and ugly word. The splendor of Mr. +Root’s intellect is positively alluring, but he is a dangerous +man to republican institutions. Mr. Taft’s part in that +conspiracy for the suppression of the facts of the Philippine situation +in 1900 was really due to kindliness of heart, regret at the war, and +earnest hope that it would soon end. Mr. Denby’s part was that of +the out-and-out imperialist who has frank doubts in his own mind as to +whether it is axiomatic, after all, that the form of government +bequeathed us by our fathers is the best form of government yet +devised. But the conspiracy was really a sin against the progress of +the world, because it deceived the American people as to the +genuineness and unanimity of the desire of the Filipino people to +imitate the example set by us in 1776, which has since served as a +beacon-light of hope to so many people in so many lands in their +several struggles to be free.</p> +<p>By the spring of 1900, when General MacArthur relieved General Otis, +the volunteers of 1899 had gotten thoroughly warmed up to the work of +showing the Filipinos who was in fact “the boss of the +show,” and by June, 1900, when Judge Taft arrived, they had +gotten still warmer<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6925src" href= +"#xd20e6925" name="xd20e6925src">12</a>; and in General Otis’s +successor they had a commander who understood his men thoroughly, and +was determined to carry out honestly, with firmness, and without +playing, as his predecessor had done, the rôle of political +henchman, the purpose for which the army he commanded had been sent to +the Islands to accomplish. In this state of the case, the Taft +Commission came out.</p> +<p>This would seem rather an odd point at which to <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb281" href="#pb281" name= +"pb281">281</a>]</span>terminate a chapter on “MacArthur and the +War,” seeing that General MacArthur continued to command the +American forces in the Philippines and to direct their strenuous field +operations until July, 1901, more than a year later, when he was +relieved by General Chaffee, on whom thereafter devolved the subsequent +conduct of the war. But we must follow the inexorable thread of +chronological order, and so yield the centre of the stage from June, +1900, on, to Mr. Taft, else the resultant net confusion of ideas about +the American occupation of the Philippines might remain as great as +that which this narrative is an attempt in some degree to correct.</p> +<p>All through the official correspondence of 1899 and 1900 between the +Adjutant-General of the Army, General Corbin, and General Otis at +Manila, one sees Mr. McKinley’s sensitiveness to public opinion. +“In view of the impatience of the people” you will do thus +and so, is a typical sample of this feature of that +correspondence.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6934src" href="#xd20e6934" +name="xd20e6934src">13</a> Troubled, possibly, with misgivings, as to +whether, after all, in view of the vigorous and undeniably obstinate +struggle for independence the Filipinos were putting up, it would not +have been wiser to have done with them as we had done in the case of +Cuba, and troubled, beyond the peradventure of a doubt, about the +effect of the possible Philippine situation on the fortunes of his +party and himself in the approaching campaign for the presidency, Mr. +McKinley sent Mr. Taft out, in the spring preceding the election of +1900, to help General MacArthur run the war. We must now, therefore, +turn our attention to Mr. Taft, not forgetting General MacArthur in so +doing. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb282" href="#pb282" name= +"pb282">282</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6750" href="#xd20e6750src" name="xd20e6750">1</a></span> +Copper-colored thief.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6762" href="#xd20e6762src" name="xd20e6762">2</a></span> Sung to +the tune of “Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are +marching.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6814" href="#xd20e6814src" name="xd20e6814">3</a></span> See +<i>Forum</i>, vol. xxvi., p. 647.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6834" href="#xd20e6834src" name="xd20e6834">4</a></span> See +<i>Forum</i>, vol. xxix., p. 403.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6849" href="#xd20e6849src" name="xd20e6849">5</a></span> These +quotations are not taken from a scrap-book. Many readers forget that +the bound volumes of all the great magazines are permanently available +in the great libraries of the country.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6854" href="#xd20e6854src" name="xd20e6854">6</a></span> +Hostilities had not yet broken out when the article now being +considered appeared on January 4th, and did not break out until thirty +days later, to wit, on February 4th.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6878" href="#xd20e6878src" name="xd20e6878">7</a></span> +<i>Congressional Record</i>, April 13, 1898, p. 3701.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6885" href="#xd20e6885src" name="xd20e6885">8</a></span> In the +early days of the fighting they used to hurrah a good deal, and shout +“<span lang="es">Viva la Independencia</span>” (Live +Independence).</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6896" href="#xd20e6896src" name="xd20e6896">9</a></span> See +Judge Taft’s cablegram to Secretary of War Root of August 21, +1900, <i>War Department Report</i>, vol. i., pt. 1, p. 80.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6902" href="#xd20e6902src" name="xd20e6902">10</a></span> The +Caribao Society is an organization composed mainly of officers of the +regular army, but to which any one who served as an officer, volunteer +or regular, in the Philippine Insurrection, is eligible. Their +principal function, like that of the famous Gridiron Club, is to give +an annual dinner.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6914" href="#xd20e6914src" name="xd20e6914">11</a></span> +<i>Addresses at Republican National Convention</i> (1904), p. 62, +published by Isaac H. Blanchard & Co., New York, 1904. The +Republican National Convention of 1900 met June 19th, just sixteen days +after the Taft Commission arrived at Manila.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6925" href="#xd20e6925src" name="xd20e6925">12</a></span> General +MacArthur relieved General Otis May 5, 1900, and the Taft Commission +arrived at Manila June 3d thereafter.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6934" href="#xd20e6934src" name="xd20e6934">13</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1051.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch14" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XIV</h2> +<h2 class="main">The Taft Commission</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">The papers ’id it ’andsome,</p> +<p class="line">But you bet the army knows.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236">Kipling, <i>Ballad of the Boer War</i>.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">The essentials of the situation which confronted the +Taft Commission on its arrival in the islands in June, 1900, and the +mental attitude in which they approached that situation, may now be +briefly summarized, with entire confidence that such summary will +commend itself as fairly accurate to the impartial judgment both of the +historian of the future and of any candid contemporary mind.</p> +<p>It is not necessary to “vex the dull ear” of a mighty +people much engrossed with their own affairs, by repetition of any +further details concerning the original <i>de facto</i> alliance +between Admiral Dewey and Aguinaldo. Suffice it to remind a people +whose saving grace is a love of fair play, that, after the battle of +Manila Bay, when Admiral Dewey brought Aguinaldo down from Hong Kong to +Cavite, both the Admiral and his Filipino allies were keenly cognizant +of the national purpose set forth in the declaration of war against +Spain, and that the Filipinos could not have been expected to make any +substantial distinction between the casual remarks of a victorious +admiral on the quarter-deck of his flagship in May, remarks concurrent +and consistent <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb283" href="#pb283" name= +"pb283">283</a>]</span>with actual treatment of the Filipinos as +allies, and the imperious commands of a general ashore in December +thereafter, acting under specific orders pursuant to the Treaty of +Paris. The one great fact of the situation, “as huge as high +Olympus,” they <i>did</i> grasp, <i>viz.</i>, that both were +representatives of America on the ground at the time of their +respective utterances, and that one in December in effect repudiated +without a word of explanation what the other had done from May to +August. They had helped us to take the city of Manila in August, and, +to use the current phrase of the passing hour, coined in this period of +awakening of the national conscience to a proper attitude toward +double-dealing in general, they felt that they had been “given +the double cross.” In other words they believed that the American +Government had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian. And +that was the cause of the war.</p> +<p>We have seen in the chapters on “The Benevolent Assimilation +Proclamation” and “The Iloilo Fiasco” that, in the +Philippines at any rate, no matter how mellifluously pacific it may +have sounded at home—no matter how soothing to the troubled +doubts of the national conscience—the Benevolent Assimilation +Proclamation of December 21, 1898, was recognized both by the Eighth +Army Corps and by Aguinaldo’s people as a call to arms—a +signal to the former to get ready for the work of “civilizing +with a Krag”; a signal to the latter to gird up their loins for +the fight to the death for government of their people, by their people, +for their people; and that the yearning benevolence of said +proclamation was calculated strikingly to remind the Filipinos of +Spain’s previous traditional yearnings for the welfare of Cuba, +indignantly cut short by us—yearnings “to spare the great +island from the danger of premature <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb284" href="#pb284" name= +"pb284">284</a>]</span>independence”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6975src" href="#xd20e6975" name="xd20e6975src">1</a> which that +decadent monarchy could not even help repeating in the swan-song +wherein she sued to President McKinley for peace. We did not realize +the absoluteness of the analogy then. It is all clear enough now. We +can now understand how and why Mr. McKinley’s programme of +Annexation and Benevolent Assimilation of 1898–9, blindly earnest +as was his belief that it would make the Filipino people at once +cheerfully forego the “legitimate aspirations” to which we +ourselves had originally given a momentum so generous that nothing but +bullets could then possibly have stopped it, was in fact received by +them in a manner compared with which Canada’s response in 1911 to +Speaker Champ Clark’s equally benevolent suggestion of United +States willingness to accord to Canada <i>also</i>, gradual Benevolent +Assimilation and Ultimate Annexation, was one great sisterly sob of +sheer joy as at the finding of a long lost brother. From the arrival of +the American troops on June 30, 1898, until the outbreak of February 4, +1899, there had been two armies camped not far from each other, one +born of the idea of independence and bent upon it, the other at first +groping in the dark without instructions, and finally instructed to +deny independence. There was never any faltering or evasion on the part +of Aguinaldo and his people. They knew what they wanted and said so on +all occasions. At all times and in all places they made it clear, by +proclamation, by letter, by conversation, and otherwise, that +independence was the one thing to which, whether they were fit for it +or not, they had pledged “their lives, their fortunes, and their +sacred honor.” <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb285" href="#pb285" +name="pb285">285</a>]</span></p> +<p>We have seen how easily the war itself could have been averted by +the Bacon Resolution of January, 1899, or some similar resolution +frankly declaring the purpose of our government; how here was Senator +Bacon at this end of the line pleading with his colleagues to be frank, +and to make a declaration in keeping with “the high +purpose” for which we had gone to war with Spain, instead of +holding on to the Philippines on the idea that they might prove a +second Klondike, while justifying such retention by arbitrarily +assuming, without any knowledge whatever on the subject, that the +Filipinos were incapable of self-government; how, there, at the other +end of the line, at Manila, Aguinaldo’s Commissioners, familiar +with our Constitution and the history and traditions of our government, +were making, substantially, though in more diplomatic language, +precisely the same plea, and imploring General Otis’s +Commissioners to give them some assurance which would quiet the +apprehensions of their people, and calm the fear that the original +assurance, “We are going to lick the Spaniards and set you +free,” was now about to be ignored because the islands might be +profitable to the United States.</p> +<p>We have seen the war itself, as far as it had progressed by June, +1900, one of the bitterest wars in history, punctuated by frequent +barbarities avenged in kind, and how, if the Taft Commission had not +come out with McKinley spectacles on, they would have seen the picture +of a bleeding, prostrate, and deeply hostile people, still bent on +fighting to the last ditch, not only animated by a feeling against +annexation by us similar to that the Canadians would have to-day if we +should also try the Benevolent Assimilation game on them—first +with proclamations breathing benevolence and then with cannon belching +grape-shot—but further <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb286" href= +"#pb286" name="pb286">286</a>]</span>animated by the instinctive as +well as inherited knowledge common to all colored peoples, whether red, +yellow brown, or black, that wheresoever white men and colored live in +the same country together, <i>there the white man will rule</i>. +Understand, this was before Judge Taft had had a chance to assure them, +with the kindly Taft smile and the hearty Taft hand-shake, that their +benevolent new masters were going to reverse the verdict of the ages, +and treat them with a fraternal love wholly free from race prejudice. +If Judge Taft could only have arrived in January, 1899, and told them +that the Bacon Resolution really represented the spirit of the attitude +of the American people toward them, then the finely commanding bearing +of Mr. Taft, and the noble genuineness of his desire to see peace on +earth and goodwill toward men, might even have prevented the war. But +this is merely what <i>might</i> have been. What actually <i>was</i>, +when he <i>did</i> arrive, in June, 1900, was that the milk of human +kindness had long since been spilled, and his task was to gather it up +and put it back in the pail. When I, a Southern man who have taken part +in the only two wars this nation has had in my lifetime, reflect that +in this year of grace, 1912, Mr. Underwood’s otherwise matchless +availability as the candidate of his party for President is questioned +on the idea that it might be a tactical blunder, because of “the +late war,” which broke out before either Mr. Underwood or myself +were born, I cannot share the Taft optimism as to the rapidity with +which the scars of “the late war” in the Philippines will +heal, and as to the affectionate gratitude toward the United States +with which the McKinley-Taft programme of Benevolent Assimilation will +presently be regarded by the people of the Philippine Islands.</p> +<p>We have seen the futile efforts of the Schurman <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb287" href="#pb287" name= +"pb287">287</a>]</span>Commission of 1899, sent out that spring, in +deference to American public opinion, with definite instructions to try +and patch up a peace, by talking to the leading spirits of a war for +independence, <i>now in full swing</i>, about the desirability of +benevolent leading-strings. “They [meaning the Schurman +Commission] had come,” says Mr. McKinley, in his annual message +to Congress of December 5, 1899,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7010src" +href="#xd20e7010" name="xd20e7010src">2</a> “with the hope of +co-operating with Admiral Dewey and General Otis in establishing peace +and order.” They came, they saw, they went, recognizing the +futility of the errand on which they had been sent. And now came the +Taft Commission a year later, on precisely the same errand, after the +Filipinos had sunk all their original petty differences and jealousies +in a very reasonable instinctive common fear of economic exploitation, +and a very unreasonable but, to them, very real common fear of race +elimination, amounting to terror, and been welded into absolute +oneness—if that were somewhat lacking before—in the fierce +crucible of sixteen months of bloody fighting against a foreign foe for +the independence of their common country. President McKinley’s +message to Congress of December, 1899, is full of the old insufferable +drivel, so grossly, though unwittingly, ungenerous to our army then in +the field in the Philippines, about the triviality of the resistance we +were “up against.” The message in one place blandly speaks +of “the peaceable and loyal majority who ask nothing better than +to accept our authority,” in another of “the sinister +ambitions of a few selfish Filipinos.” Thus was outlined, in the +message announcing the purpose to send out the Taft Commission, the +view that no real fundamental resistance existed in the islands. Basing +contemplated action on this sort of stuff, the presidential +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb288" href="#pb288" name= +"pb288">288</a>]</span>message outlines the presidential purpose as +follows—this in December, 1899, mind you:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">There is no reason why steps should not be taken from +time to time to inaugurate governments <i>essentially popular in their +form</i> as fast as territory is held and controlled by our troops.</p> +</div> +<p>Then follows the genesis of the idea which resulted in the Taft +Commission:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">To this end I am considering the advisability of the +return [to the islands] of the commission [the Schurman Commission] or +such of the members thereof as can be secured.</p> +</div> +<p>In Cuba, General Wood began the work of reconstruction at Havana +with a central government and the best men he could get hold of, and +acted through them, letting his plans and purposes percolate +<i>downward</i> to the masses of the people. Not so in the Philippines. +Reconstruction there was to begin by establishing municipal +governments, to be later followed by provincial governments, and +finally by a central one; in other words, by placing the waters of +self-government at the bottom of the social fabric among the most +ignorant people, and letting them percolate <i>up</i>, according to +some mysterious law of gravitation apparently deemed applicable to +political physics. Of course, these poor people simply always took +their cue from their leaders, knowing nothing themselves that could +affect the success of this project except that we were their enemies +and that they might get knocked in the head if they did not play the +game. “I have believed,” says Mr. McKinley, in his message +to Congress of December, 1899, “that reconstruction should not +begin by the establishment of one central civil government for all the +islands, with its seat at Manila, but rather <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb289" href="#pb289" name="pb289">289</a>]</span>that +the work should be commenced by <i>building up from the +bottom</i>.” Whereat, the young giant America bowed, in puzzled +hope, and worldly-wise old Europe smiled, in silent but amused +contempt.</p> +<p>If at the time he formulated this scheme for their government Mr. +McKinley had known anything about the Philippines, or the Filipinos, he +would have known that what he so suavely called “building from +the bottom” was like trying to make water run up hill, +<i>i.e.</i>, like starting out to have ideas percolate upward, so that +through “the masses” the more intelligent people might be +redeemed. The “nigger in the woodpile” lay in the words +“essentially popular in form.” Of course no government by +us “essentially popular” was possible at the time. But a +government “popular in form” would sound well to the +American people, and, if they could be kept quiet until after the +presidential election of 1900, maybe the supposed misunderstanding on +the part of the Filipinos of the benevolence of our intentions might be +corrected by kindness. Accordingly, the following spring, +cotemporaneously with General Otis’s final departure from Manila +to the United States, in which free country he might say the war was +over as much as he pleased without being molested with round-robins by +Bob Collins, O. K. Davis, John McCutcheon, and the rest of those banes +of his insular career, who so pestiferously insisted that the American +public ought to know the facts, the Taft Commission was sent out, to +“aid” General MacArthur, as the Schurman Commission had +“aided” General Otis.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7050src" +href="#xd20e7050" name="xd20e7050src">3</a></p> +<p>It would seem fairly beyond any reasonable doubt <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb290" href="#pb290" name="pb290">290</a>]</span>that +the official information the Taft Commission were given by President +McKinley concerning the state of public order they would find in the +islands on arrival was in keeping with the information solemnly +imparted to Congress by him in December thereafter, which was as +follows: “By the spring of this year (1900) the effective +opposition of <i>the dissatisfied Tagals</i>”—always the +same minimization of the task of the army as a sop to the American +conscience—“was virtually ended.” Then follows a +glowing picture of how the Filipinos are going to love us after we +rescue them from the hated Tagal, but with this circumspect +reservation: “He would be rash who, with the teachings of +contemporary history, would fix a limit” as to how long it will +take to produce such a state of affairs. Looking at that mighty +panorama of events from the dispassionate standpoint now possible, it +seems to me that Mr. McKinley’s whole Philippine policy of +1899–1900 was animated by the belief that the more the Philippine +situation should resemble the really identical Cuban one in the +estimation of the American people, the more likely his Philippine +policy was to be repudiated at the polls in the fall of 1900. The Taft +Commission left Washington for Manila in the spring of 1900, after +their final conference with the President who had appointed them and +was a candidate for re-election in the coming fall, as completely +committed as circumstances can commit any man or set of men to the +programme of occupation which was to follow the subjugation of the +inhabitants, and to the proposition of present incapacity for +self-government, its corner-stone; to say nothing of the embarrassment +felt at Washington by reason of having stumbled into a bloody war with +people whom we honestly wanted to help, had never seen, and had nothing +but the kindliest feelings for. While the serene <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb291" href="#pb291" name="pb291">291</a>]</span>and +capacious intellect of William H. Taft was still pursuing the even +tenor of its way in the halls of justice (as United States Circuit +Judge for the 8th Circuit), the Philippine programme was formulated at +Washington. Judge Taft went to Manila to make the best of a situation +which he had not created, to write the lines of the <i>Deus ex +machina</i> for a Tragedy of Errors up to that point composed wholly by +others. It has been frequently stated and generally believed that when +Mr. McKinley sent for him and proposed the Philippine mission, Judge +Taft replied, substantially: “Mr. President, I am not the man for +the place. <i>I don’t want the Philippines</i>.” To which +Mr. McKinley is supposed to have replied: “You <i>are</i> the man +for the place, Judge. I had rather <i>have</i> a man out there who +doesn’t want them.” The point of the original story lay in +what Mr. McKinley said. The point of the repetition of it here lies in +what Mr. Taft said, the inference therefrom being that he did not think +the true interests of his country “wanted” them, and that +had he been called into President McKinley’s council sooner he +would have so advised; an inference warranted by his subsequent +admission that “we blundered into colonization.”<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e7078src" href="#xd20e7078" name= +"xd20e7078src">4</a></p> +<p>It is utterly fatal to clear thinking on this great subject, which +concerns the liberties of a whole people, to treat Judge Taft’s +reports as Commissioner to, and later Governor of, the Philippines as +in the nature of a judicial decision on the capacity of the Filipinos +for self-government. When he consented to go out there, he went, not to +review the findings of the Paris Peace Commission, but at the urgent +solicitation of an Administration <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb292" +href="#pb292" name="pb292">292</a>]</span>whose fortunes were +irrevocably committed to those findings, including the express finding +that they were unfit for self-government, and the implied one that we +must remain to improve the condition of the inhabitants. He was thus +not a judge come out to decide on the fitness of the people for +self-government, but an advocate to make the best possible case for +their unfitness, and its corollary, the necessity to remain +indefinitely, just as England has remained in Egypt. The war itself +convinced the whole army of the United States that Aguinaldo would have +been the “Boss of the Show” had Dewey sailed away from +Manila after sinking the Spanish fleet. The war satisfied us all that +Aguinaldo would have been a small edition of Porfirio Diaz, and that +the Filipino republic-that-might-have-been would have been, very +decidedly, “a going concern,” although Aguinaldo probably +would have been able to say with a degree of accuracy, as Diaz might +have said in Mexico for so many years, “The Republic? <i>I</i> am +the Republic.” The war demonstrated to the army, to a Q. E. D., +that the Filipinos are “capable of self-government,” unless +the kind which happens to suit the genius of the American people is the +only kind of government on earth that is respectable, and the one +panacea for all the ills of government among men without regard to +their temperament or historical antecedents. The educated patriotic +Filipinos can control the masses of the people in their several +districts as completely as a captain ever controlled a +company.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7091src" href="#xd20e7091" name= +"xd20e7091src">5</a> While the municipal officials of the McKinley-Taft +municipal kindergarten were stumbling along with the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb293" href="#pb293" name= +"pb293">293</a>]</span>strange new town government system imported from +America, and atoning to their benignant masters for mistakes by writing +them letters about how benignant they—the teachers—were, +they—the pupils,—according to the contemporaneous +description by the commanding general of the United States forces in +the islands, were running a superbly efficient municipal system +throughout the whole archipelago, “simultaneously and in the same +sphere as the American governments, and in many instances through the +same personnel,”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7099src" href= +"#xd20e7099" name="xd20e7099src">6</a> in aid of the insurrection. +General MacArthur humorously adds that the town officials “acted +openly in behalf of the Americans and secretly in behalf of the +insurgents, and, <i>with considerable apparent solicitude for the +interest of both</i>.” In short, the war at once demonstrated +their “capacity for self-government” and made granting it +to them for the time being unthinkable. For the war was fought not on +the issue of the <i>capacity</i>, but on the issue of the +<i>granting</i>. The Treaty of Paris settled the “capacity” +part. The army in 1898, 1899, and 1900 can hardly be said to have had +any much more decided opinion on the <i>capacity</i> branch of the +subject, than Perry did about the Japanese in 1854. The Paris Peace +Commission having solemnly decided the “capacity part” +adversely to the Filipinos and the war having followed, thereafter Mr. +Taft went out to make out the best case possible in support of the +action of the Peace Commission and, <i lang="la">ex vi termini</i>, in +support of everything made necessary by the fact of the purchase. +Unless some one goes out to present to the American people the other +side of the case, they will never arrive at a just verdict.</p> +<p>Committed, <i>a priori</i>, to the task of squaring the McKinley +Administration with its course as to Cuba, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb294" href="#pb294" name="pb294">294</a>]</span>the +only course possible for the Taft Commission was to set up a benevolent +government based upon the incompetency of the governed, which, being a +standing affront to the intelligence of the people, earns their hatred, +however it may crave their love. By the very bitterness of the +opposition it permits yet disregards, it binds itself ever more +irrevocably to remain a benevolent engenderer of malevolence. +Government and governed thus get wider apart as the years go by, and, +the <i lang="fr">raison d’être</i> of the former being the +mental deficiencies of the latter, it must, in self-defence, assert +those deficiencies the more offensively, the more vehemently they are +denied. What hope therefore can there be that the light that shone upon +Saul on the road to Damascus will ever break upon the President? What +hope that he will ever re-attune his ears to the voice of the +Declaration of Independence, calling down from where the Signers (we +hope without untoward exception) have gone, crying: “William, +William, why persecutest thou me? it is hard for thee to kick against +the right of a people to pursue happiness in <i>their own +way</i>”? The difference between the President and the writer is +that both went out to scoff and the latter remained—much +longer—to pray.</p> +<p>The Taft Commission arrived at Manila on June 3, 1900, loaded to the +guards with kindly belief in the stale falsehood wherewith General +Otis, ably assisted by his press censor, had been systematically +soothing Mr. McKinley’s and the general American conscience +during the whole twenty months he had commanded the Eighth Army +Corps,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7135src" href="#xd20e7135" name= +"xd20e7135src">7</a> viz., that the insurrection was due solely to +“the sinister ambitions of a few selfish leaders,” and did +<i>not</i> represent the wishes of the whole people. It is true that +the insurrection originally started under <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb295" href="#pb295" name="pb295">295</a>]</span>Admiral Dewey’s +auspices and under the initial protection of his puissant guns was +headed by a group of men most of whom, including Aguinaldo, were +Tagalos. But all Filipinos look alike, the whole seven or eight +millions of them. They differ from one another not one whit more than +one Japanese differs from another. And they all feel alike on most +things,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7143src" href="#xd20e7143" name= +"xd20e7143src">8</a> because they all have the same customs, tastes, +and habits of thought. Said Governor Taft to the Senate Committee in +1902:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">While it is true that there are a number of Christian +“tribes,” so-called,—I do not know the number, +possibly eight or ten, or twelve,—that speak different languages, +there is a homogeneity in the people in appearance, in habits, and in +many avenues of thought. To begin with, <i>they are +Catholics</i>.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7152src" href= +"#xd20e7152" name="xd20e7152src">9</a></p> +</div> +<p>Certainly this should forever crucify the stale slander, still +ignorantly repeated in the United States at intervals, which seeks to +make the American people think the great body of the Filipino people +are still in a tribal state, ethnologically.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7161src" href="#xd20e7161" name="xd20e7161src">10</a> A Tagalo +leader is about as much a “tribal” leader as is a Tammany +“brave” of Irish antecedents. In fact there is much in +common between the two. Both are clannish. Both have a genius for +organization that is simply superb. Both are irrepressible about Home +Rule. Countless generations ago the Filipinos were lifted by the +Spanish priests out of the tribal state, and the educated people all +speak Spanish. But the original tribal dialects, which the Spanish +priests patiently mastered and finally reduced for them to a written +language, still survive in <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb296" href= +"#pb296" name="pb296">296</a>]</span>the several localities of their +origin. So that every Filipino of a well-to-do family is brought up +speaking two languages, Spanish, and the local dialect of his native +place, which is the only language known to the poorer natives of the +same neighborhood. Surely even the valor of ignorance can see that we +are presumptuously seeking to reverse the order of God and nature in +assuming that an alien race can lead a people out of the wilderness +better than could a government by the leading men of their own race to +whom the less favored look with an ardent pride that would be a +guarantee of loyal and inspiring co-operation. You can beat a balking +horse to death but you <i>cannot</i> make him wag his tail, or +otherwise indicate contentment or a disposition to cordial co-operation +which will make for progress. Mr. Bryan has visited the Philippines, +and his evidence is simply cumulative of mine, as mine, based on six +years’ acquaintance with the Filipinos, is simply cumulative of +Admiral Dewey’s testimony of 1898, so often cited hereinbefore, +and of the opinion of Hon. George Curry, a Republican member of +Congress from New Mexico who served eight years in the Philippines, and +believes they can safely be given their independence by 1921. Mr. Bryan +says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">So far as their own internal affairs are concerned, +they do not need to be subject to any alien government.</p> +</div> +<p>He further says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">There is a wide difference, it is true, between the +general intelligence of the educated Filipino and the laborer on the +street and in the field, but this is not a barrier to self-government. +Intelligence controls in every government, except where it is +suppressed by military force. Nine tenths of the Japanese have no part +in the law-making. In Mexico, the gap between the educated classes and +the peons is fully as <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb297" href= +"#pb297" name="pb297">297</a>]</span>great as, if not greater than, the +gap between the extremes of Filipino society. Those who question the +capacity of the Filipinos for self-government forget that <i>patriotism +raises up persons fitted for the work that needs to be +done</i>.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7183src" href="#xd20e7183" +name="xd20e7183src">11</a></p> +</div> +<p>It is because I believe that in the Philippines we are doing +ourselves an injustice and keeping back the progress of the world by +depreciating and scoffing at the value of patriotism as a factor in +self-government and in the maintenance of free institutions, that I +have written this book. There is no more patriotic people in the world +than the Filipino people. I base this opinion upon an intimate +knowledge of them, and in the light of considerable observation +throughout most of Europe, and in Asia from the Golden Horn to the +mouth of the Yang-tse. Woe to the nonsense, sometimes ignorant, +sometimes vicious, wherewith we are regaled from time to time by +Americans who go to Manila, smoke a cigar or two in some American club +there, and then come back home and depreciate the Filipino people +without at least correcting Col. Roosevelt’s wholly uninformed +and cruel random assertions of 1900 about the Filipinos being a +“jumble of savage tribes,” and about Aguinaldo being +“the Osceola of the Filipinos,” or their “Sitting +Bull!” It is wonderfully inspiring to turn from such stale +slander to Mr. Bryan’s above statement of the case for our +Oriental subjects, a statement framed in his own infinitely sympathetic +and inimitable way, which says for me just what I had long wanted to +express, but could not, so well. And in the midst of the recurring +slander that the Filipino people are “a heterogeneous lot,” +it is refreshing to find in a preface to the American Census of the +Philippines of 1903, by the Director thereof, a passage where, in +comparing the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb298" href="#pb298" name= +"pb298">298</a>]</span>tables of that census with those of the Twelfth +Census of the United States, he says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“Those of the Philippine Census are somewhat +simpler, the differences being due mainly to <i>the more homogeneous +character of the population of the Philippine +Islands</i>.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7199src" href= +"#xd20e7199" name="xd20e7199src">12</a></p> +</div> +<p>When we consider the above in the light of the past and present +operation of our own immigration laws, it is not flattering, but it may +and should tend to awaken some realization of the manifold nature and +blinding effects of current misapprehensions in the United States +concerning the inhabitants of the Philippines. One Filipino does not +differ from another any more than one American does from another +American—in fact they differ less, considering immigration. The +Filipino people are not rendered a heterogeneous lot by having three +different languages, Ilocano, Tagalo, and Visayan,<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e7206src" href="#xd20e7206" name="xd20e7206src">13</a> which +are respectively the languages spoken in the northern, the central, and +the southern part of their country, any more than the people of +Switzerland are rendered heterogeneous by the circumstance that in +northern Switzerland you find German spoken for the most part, while +farther south you find French, and near the southernmost extremities +some Italian. At this late date no credible person acquainted with the +facts will be so poor in spirit as to deny that the motives of the men +who originally started the insurrection were patriotic. Nor will any +one who served under General Otis’s command in the Philippines +deny that that eminent desk soldier continued to cling to his early +theory that it was a purely Tagalo insurrection long after the deadly +unanimity of the opposition had seeped, with <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb299" href="#pb299" name= +"pb299">299</a>]</span>all-pervading thoroughness, into the general +mind of the army of occupation. The white flag or rag of truce, +<i>alias</i> treachery, used to be hoisted to put us off our guard in +pretence of welcome to our columns approaching their towns and barrios. +Such use of such a flag, followed by treachery, the ultimate weapon of +the weak, had been in turn followed, with relentless impartiality in +countless instances, by due unloosening of the vials of American wrath, +until every <i>nipa</i> shack<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7217src" href= +"#xd20e7217" name="xd20e7217src">14</a> in the Philippine Islands that +remained unburned had had its lesson, written in the blood of its +occupants or their kin, to the tune of the Krag-Jorgensen or the +Gatling. Yet General Otis’s reports are always bland, and always +convey the idea of an insurrection exclusively Tagalo.</p> +<p>In the summer of 1900, the newly arrived civilians, the Taft +Commission, had no special interest in the soldiers who, for better, +for worse, were “doing their country’s work,” as +Kipling calls his own country’s countless wars against its +refractory subjects in the far East; and no especial sympathy with that +work. Two years later we find President Roosevelt, in connection with +the general amnesty of July 4, 1902, congratulating his “bowld +lads,” as Mr. Dooley would call them—meaning General +Chaffee and the Eighth Army Corps—on a total of “two +thousand combats, great and small” up to that time, but you never +find in any of Governor Taft’s Philippine state papers any more +affirmative recognition of continued resistance to American rule than +some mild allusion to “small but hard knocks” being +administered here and there by the army. From the beginning there was a +systematic belittling, on the part of the Taft Commission, of the work +of the army, incidentally to belittling the reality and unanimity +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb300" href="#pb300" name= +"pb300">300</a>]</span>of the opposition which was daily calling it +forth.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7227src" href="#xd20e7227" name= +"xd20e7227src">15</a> This was not vicious. It was essentially +benevolent. It was part of the initial fermentation of their +preconceived theory. But the trouble about their theory was that it was +only a theory. It would not square with the facts. They were trying to +square the subjugation of the Philippines with the freeing of Cuba, a +task quite as soluble as the squaring of a circle. They hoped, with all +the kindly benevolence of Mr. McKinley himself, that the opposition to +our rule was not as great as some people seemed to think. They had come +out to the islands earnestly wishing to find conditions not as bad as +they had been asserted to be. And the wish became father to the thought +and the thought soon found expression in words—cablegrams to the +United States presenting an optimistic view as to the prospects of +necessity for further shedding of blood in the interest of Benevolent +Assimilation, alias Trade Expansion. Some flippant person will say, +“That is a polite way of charging insincerity.” This book +is not addressed to flippant persons. It is a serious attempt to deal +with a problem involving the liberties of a whole people, and will be, +as far as the writer can make it, straightforward, dignified, and +candid. Judge Taft’s fearful mistake of 1900–1901 in the +matter of his premature planting of the civil government—a +mistake because based on the idea that “the great majority of the +people” welcomed American rule, and a fearful mistake because +fraught <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb301" href="#pb301" name= +"pb301">301</a>]</span>with so much subsequent sacrifice of life due to +too early withdrawal of the police protection of the army—was not +the first instance in American history where an ordinarily level-headed +public man has, with egregious folly, mistaken the mood and temper of a +whole people. The key to his mistake lay in the fact that, coming into +a strange country in the midst of a war, he ignored the advice of the +commanding general of the army of his country concerning the military +situation, and took the advice of a few native Tories, or Copperheads, +of wealth, who had never really been in sympathy with the insurrection +and who, flocking about him as soon as he arrived, told him what he so +longed to be told, viz., that the war did not represent the wishes of +the people but was kept up by “a conspiracy of +assassination” of all who did not contribute to it either in +service or money. He thereupon decided that the men who told him this +really represented the voice of the people, and that the men in the +field who had then been keeping up the struggle for independence for +sixteen months, in season and out of season, were simply “a Mafia +on a very large scale.” Consequently the Taft Commission had been +in the islands less than three months when Secretary of War Root at +Washington was giving the widest possible publicity to cablegrams from +them, such as that dated August 21, 1900, mentioned in the preceding +chapter, conveying the glad tidings that “large number of people +long for peace and are willing to accept government under United +States”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7235src" href="#xd20e7235" +name="xd20e7235src">16</a>; and by November next thereafter, the +“large number” had grown to “a great majority,” +and the “willing” to “entirely willing.” The +November statement was: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb302" href= +"#pb302" name="pb302">302</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>A great majority</i> of the people long for peace +and are <i>entirely</i> willing to accept the establishment of a +government under the supremacy of the United States.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e7250src" href="#xd20e7250" name="xd20e7250src">17</a></p> +</div> +<p>Yet, as we saw in the preceding chapter, the real situation in the +Philippines at this very time was described four years later at the +Republican National Convention of 1904 by Mr. Root thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">When the last national convention met, over 70,000 +American soldiers from more than 500 stations held a still vigorous +enemy in check.</p> +</div> +<p>Between the date of their arrival in the Islands on June 3d, and the +date of this August 21st telegram, the Taft Commission did little +junketing, but remained in Manila imbibing the welcome views of the +“Tories” or “Copperheads,” and seeking very +little information from the army. But it so happens that the +Adjutant-General at Manila used to keep a record of the daily +engagements during that period, which record was later published in the +annual <i>War Department Report</i>,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7268src" href="#xd20e7268" name="xd20e7268src">18</a> and it +shows a total of about five hundred killings (of Filipinos) between +June 3d, and August 21st, to say nothing of probably many times that +number hit but not killed, and therefore able to get away. (You could +not include any Filipino in your returns of your killings except dead +you had actually counted.) It also happens that on June 4th, the day +after Judge Taft’s arrival, General MacArthur, in response to an +order from Washington sent some time previous at the instance of +Congress, had all the Filipino casualties our military records showed +up to that time (<i>i. e.</i>, during the sixteen months from the day +of the outbreak, February 4, 1899, to June 3, 1900), tabulated and +totalled, and the total Filipino <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb303" +href="#pb303" name="pb303">303</a>]</span>killed accordingly reported +by cablegram to the War Department on June 4, 1900, was +10,780.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7278src" href="#xd20e7278" name= +"xd20e7278src">19</a></p> +<p>Ten thousand in sixteen months is 625 per month. So that by the time +Judge Taft arrived, the Filipinos had been sufficiently beaten into +submission to decrease the death-rate due to the Independence Bug from +something over six hundred per month to about two hundred per month. +Judge Taft called this enthusiasm. I call it exhaustion. Whereupon, +exclaims a Boston Anti-Imperialist, “Why don’t you issue +Mr. Taft a certificate as a member of the Ananias Club at once, and be +done with it?” My answer is that I do not believe the Taft +Commission in 1900 either knew these figures or wanted to know them. +They came out preaching a Gospel of Hope to the exclusion of all else, +a species of mental healing. They said, soothingly to Dame Filipina, +“Be not afraid; you are well; you are well”—of the +desire for independence she had conceived, when what that lady needed +was the surgical operation indispensable for the removal of a +still-born child.</p> +<p>The will of the American people is ascertainable, and quadrennially +announced, through certain prescribed methods. And (nearly) everybody +takes the result good-humoredly, God bless our country, whatever the +result. But just how Mr. Taft and his colleagues could assume to speak +for the “great majority” of the Filipino people at the +tremendous juncture in their destinies now under consideration during +the Presidential election of 1900, does not clearly appear, except that +in their first report they say:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Many witnesses were examined as to the form of +government best adapted to these islands and <i>satisfactory to the +people</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7293src" href="#xd20e7293" name= +"xd20e7293src">20</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb304" href="#pb304" name= +"pb304">304</a>]</span></p> +<p>a statement which obviously takes for granted the only point +involved in the war, viz., whether <i>any kind</i> of alien government +would be “satisfactory to the people.” And in their various +other communications to Washington they describe themselves, with no +small degree of benevolent satisfaction, as enthusiastically received +by natives not under arms at the moment of such reception. As a matter +of fact, a carpet-bag governor of Georgia might just as well have +reported to Andrew Johnson an enthusiastic reception at the hands of +the people whose homes had lately been put to the torch, and their kith +and kin to the sword, while the whole fair face of nature from Atlanta +to the sea lay bruised and bleeding under the iron heel of +Sherman’s army. Let no advocate of Indefinite Tutelage whet his +scalping-knife for me because of the use of that word +“carpet-bag.” It was as free from ill-will as the explosion +incident to flash-light photography. We are trying to develop a picture +of those times. Two at least of the Commission, Messrs. Taft and +Wright, were the kind of men who in all the personal relations of life, +meet the ultimate test of human confidence and friendship—you +would make either, if he would consent to act, executor of your will, +or testamentary guardian of your child. But they came out with the +preconceived notion that kindness would win the people over, whereas +what those people wanted was not foreign kindness but home rule, not +silken political swaddling clothes, but freedom. And as the acquisition +of the Philippines has placed us under the necessity of getting up a +new definition of freedom, one consistent with tariff taxation without +representation—through legislation by a Congress on the other +side of the world in which “our new possessions” have no +vote—it should be added that one of the things Freedom meant with +us before 1898, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb305" href="#pb305" +name="pb305">305</a>]</span>was freedom to frame the laws—tariff +and other—which largely determine the selling price of crops and +the purchase price of the necessities of life, freedom to see the +intelligent and educated men of your own race in charge of your common +destiny, freedom to have a flag as an emblem of your common interests, +in a word, just Freedom. And that was what the war was about. They +wanted to be free and independent. Whether they were fit for such +freedom is wholly foreign to the reality and unanimity of their desire +for it. General Otis used to be very fond of taking the wind out of the +sails of their commissioners and other officials before the outbreak by +saying that their people had not the slightest notion of what the word +independence meant. It is true that they knew nothing about it by +experience, but equally true that whatever it was, they wanted it. Of +the ten thousand men we had already killed when Judge Taft arrived, +there can be no question, as already heretofore suggested, that many of +them may have been hit just as they were hurrahing for independence, in +other words, died with the word “Independence” on their +lips. When men have been thus fighting against overwhelming odds for +some sixteen months for government <i>of their</i> people <i>by</i> +their people <i>for</i> their people—however inarticulate the +emotions of the rank and file on going into battle—it is idle to +claim that they do not know what they want, whether the great majority +of the rank and file can read and write or not. But pursuant to the +idea that kindness would cure the desire for independence, Judge Taft +ignored, in the outset, all advice from the military department, +because that was not the kindness department, accepting as truly +representative of the temper of the whole people the views of a few +ultra-conservatives of large means who had always been part and parcel +of the Spanish Administration. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb306" +href="#pb306" name="pb306">306</a>]</span></p> +<p>On the other hand, General MacArthur and the whole Eighth Army Corps +had seen a great insurrection drag on from month to month and from one +year to another, under General Otis, when short shrift would have been +made of it in the outset, and far less life sacrificed, if Mr. McKinley +had not needed, in aid of his Philippine policy, the support of both of +those who believed it was right <i>and</i> of those who believed it +would pay. The one central thought which had seemed to animate General +Otis from the beginning, a thought which we have already traced through +all its humiliating manifestations, was that he must neither do or +permit anything that might hurt the Administration. When the +“impatience of the people” at home, which figures so +prominently in the correspondence already cited between the Adjutant +General of the army, General Corbin, and General Otis at Manila, had +begun to cast its shadows on the presidential year, 1900, the master +mind of Mr. Root had interrupted the fatal Otis treatment of the +insurrection, indicated by General Otis’s long failure to call +for volunteers, his stupid stream of “situation well in +hand” and “insurrection about to collapse” telegrams, +and his utterly unpardonable persistence in calling it a purely +“Tagalo insurrection,” by sending him a competent force, +and a plan of campaign, and directing him to carry out the plan. +General Otis did this, because he was told to, and then began again to +sing the same old song. MacArthur, Wheaton, Lawton, Bates, Young, +Funston, and the rest of the fighting generals, had submitted to all +the Otis follies without a murmur, because insubordination degrades an +army into a rabble. But they<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7322src" href= +"#xd20e7322" name="xd20e7322src">21</a> believed the army <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb307" href="#pb307" name="pb307">307</a>]</span>was +there to put down that insurrection, not to have a symposium with its +leaders on the rights of man. They had taken up “The White +Man’s Burden,” after the manner of Lords Kitchener and +Roberts, and they had no qualms. Above all, they wanted <i>peace</i>, +no matter how much fighting it took to get it. Mindful of the attempts +of the Schurman Commission of the year before to mix peace with war, +and of the immense encouragement thus given the insurgents, they had +not looked forward with enthusiasm to the coming of the Taft +Commission, and to the highly probable renewal of negotiations with the +insurgent leaders in the field, pursuant to a presidential policy of +patching up a peace at any price, suggested by the exigencies of +political expediency, to give the government a semblance of having more +or less of the consent of the governed. That the anticipations of the +military authorities in this regard did not receive a pleasant +disappointment, has already been suggested by the nature of the views +adopted by the commission soon after its arrival.</p> +<p>The military view of the situation, as it stood when Judge Taft and +his colleagues arrived at Manila in June, 1900, is set forth in the +annual report of the commanding general, General MacArthur, rendered +shortly thereafter; rendered, not in aid of any political candidate at +home, nor of a sudden, but at the usual and customary annual season for +the making of such reports; and rendered by a soldier of no mean +experience and ability, who was a man of great kindliness of heart as +well, to the war department of his government, to acquaint it with the +facts of a military situation he had been dealing with for two years +prior to the arrival of the Taft Commission. General MacArthur’s +views, as expressed in his report, must now be contrasted with the Taft +view, not to show that MacArthur is a bigger <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb308" href="#pb308" name="pb308">308</a>]</span>man +than Taft, nor for any other idle or petty purpose, but because, if, in +1900, General MacArthur was right, and Judge Taft was wrong, about the +unanimity of the whole Filipino people against us, then the institution +of the Civil Government of the Philippines on July 4, 1901, was +premature; and, therefore, by reason of the withdrawal of the strong +arm of the military at a critical period of public order, it was not +calculated to give adequate protection to the lives and property of +those who were willing to abandon the struggle for independence and +submit to our rule. And if, as we shall see later, it did in fact +grossly fail to afford such adequate protection for life and property, +it was derelict in the most sacred duty enjoined upon it by Mr. +McKinley’s instructions to the Taft Commission. But first let me +introduce you to General MacArthur.</p> +<p>General MacArthur is not only a soldier of a high order of ability, +but a statesman as well. Moreover, he was a thoroughgoing +“expansionist.” He believed in keeping the Philippines +permanently, just as England does her colonies. But he was perfectly +honest about it. He recognized the fact that they were against our +rule. But he did not attach any more weight to that circumstance than +Lord Kitchener would have done. Also, he had come out to the islands +with the first expedition, in 1898, had been in the field continuously +for fifteen months prior to assuming supreme military command, and knew +the Filipinos thoroughly. As soon as he took command, on May 5, 1900, +of the 70,000 troops then in the Islands, he set himself with patience +and firmness to the great task of ending the insurrection, which at +that time promised to continue indefinitely, the far more formidable +guerrilla warfare that had followed the brief period of serried +resistance having now settled down to a chronic stage, aided and +abetted <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb309" href="#pb309" name= +"pb309">309</a>]</span>by the whole population. I have said General +MacArthur was a “thoroughgoing” expansionist. This needs a +slight qualification. At first he appears to have had a few qualms. +Shortly after the outbreak of the war with the Filipinos, when he took +the first insurgent capital Malolos, in March, 1899, he had said at +Malolos, as we have seen, to a newspaper man who accompanied the +expedition:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">When I first started in against these rebels, I +believed that Aguinaldo’s troops represented only a faction. I +did not believe that the whole population of Luzon was opposed to us; +but I have been <i>reluctantly</i> compelled to believe that the +Filipinos are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he +represents.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7344src" href="#xd20e7344" name= +"xd20e7344src">22</a></p> +</div> +<p>General MacArthur’s reports concerning the war in the +Philippines during the period of his command are succinct and luminous. +He makes it perfectly clear that the original resistance offered by the +insurgent armies in the field after the arrival of the overwhelmingly +ample reinforcements sent out from this country in the fall of 1899, +was little more than a mere flash in the pan, compared with the +well-planned scheme of resistance which followed the dispersion of +those armies to the several provinces which had furnished them to the +cause, and Aguinaldo’s simultaneous flight into the mountains +“with his government concealed about his person,” as +Senator Lodge exultantly described that incident in his speech of +April, 1900, in defence of the Administration’s Philippine +policy. Speaking of this period, General MacArthur says: <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb310" href="#pb310" name="pb310">310</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It has since been ascertained that the expediency of +adopting guerrilla warfare from the inception of hostilities was +seriously discussed by the native leaders, and advocated with much +emphasis as the system best adapted to the peculiar conditions of the +struggle. It was finally determined, however, that a concentrated field +army, conducting regular operations, would, in the event of success, +attract the favorable attention of the world, and be accepted as a +practical demonstration of capacity for organization and +self-government. The disbandment of the field army, therefore, having +been a subject of contemplation from the start, the actual event, in +pursuance of the deliberate action of the council of war in Bayambang +about November 12, 1899 (already hereinbefore noticed), <i>was not +regarded by Filipinos in the light of a calamity, but simply as a +transition from one form of action to another</i>; a change which by +many was regarded as a positive advantage, and was relied upon to +accomplish more effectively the end in view. The Filipino idea behind +the dissolution of their field army was not at the time of the +occurrence well understood in the American camp. As a consequence, +misleading conclusions were reached to the effect that the insurrection +itself had been destroyed, and that it only remained to sweep up the +fag ends of the rebel army by a system of police administration not +likely to be either onerous or dangerous.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7359src" href="#xd20e7359" name="xd20e7359src">23</a></p> +</div> +<p>In his report covering the period from May 5th, to October 1, 1900, +General MacArthur says of the policy of resistance above outlined:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The country affords great advantages for the practical +development of such a policy. The practice of discarding the uniform +enables the insurgents to appear and disappear almost at their +convenience. At one time they are in the ranks as soldiers, and +immediately thereafter are within the American lines in the attitude of +peaceful natives, absorbed in <i>a dense mass of sympathetic +people</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7372src" href="#xd20e7372" name= +"xd20e7372src">24</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb311" href="#pb311" name= +"pb311">311</a>]</span></p> +<p>In this same connection the report includes a copy of the original +order of the insurgent government which was the corner stone of the +guerrilla policy, and states that “systemized regulations” +for its effective prosecution throughout the archipelago had been +compiled and published by the Filipino junta, or revolutionary +committee at Madrid, and distributed among the insurgent forces. The +report also appends a copy of the “Army Regulations” under +which the insurgent forces were to conduct the guerrilla warfare. It +also describes in detail the system of warfare prescribed under these +regulations, and states that as a result of the measures which he, +General MacArthur, took to combat that warfare “the 53 stations +of American troops occupied in the archipelago on November 1, 1899, had +on September 1, 1900, expanded to 413,” and that during this +period, the casualties to our troops were 268 killed, 750 wounded, 55 +captured, and to the insurgents, so far as our records showed, 3227 +killed, 694 wounded, and 2864 captured. Says he:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The extensive distribution of troops has strained the +soldiers of the army to the full limit of endurance. Each little +command has had to provide its own service of security and information +by never ceasing patrols, explorations, escorts, outposts, and regular +guards. An idea seems to have been established in the public mind [he +meant the public mind at home, of course] that the field work of the +army is in the nature of police, in regulating a few bands of +guerrillas, and involving none of the vicissitudes of war. [Here he is +meeting the Otis theory, then being industriously circulated in the +United States.] <i>Such a narrow statement of the case is unfair to the +service.</i> In all things requiring endurance, fortitude, and patient +diligence, the guerrilla period has been pre-eminent. It is difficult +for the non-professional observer [he means Judge Taft] to understand +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb312" href="#pb312" name= +"pb312">312</a>]</span>that apparently desultory work, such as has +prevailed in the Philippines during the past ten months,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e7388src" href="#xd20e7388" name= +"xd20e7388src">25</a> has demanded <i>more of discipline and as much of +valor</i> as was required during the period of regular operations +against the concentrated field forces of the insurrection. It is, +therefore, a great privilege to speak warmly in respect of the +importance of the service rendered day by day, with unremitting +vigilance, by the splendid men who,” etc.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7394src" href="#xd20e7394" name="xd20e7394src">26</a></p> +</div> +<p>It was not until July 4, 1902, that President Roosevelt officially +declared, by his amnesty proclamation of that date that the +insurrection in the Philippines was at last ended. It was by no means +beaten to a frazzle, as we shall later see. But of course, knowing the +impatience of a large portion of the American people with a situation +about which there was a wide-spread notion that much remained +undisclosed, Mr. Roosevelt would have issued such a proclamation +earlier, had the facts seemed to him to so authorize. General +MacArthur’s relentless “never ceasing patrols, +explorations,” etc., continued straight on through the +presidential campaign of 1900 side by side in point of time with the +roseate Taft cablegrams of the same period, and long +thereafter—how long will be later indicated. Says General +MacArthur, in his report for 1901:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It had been suggested that some of the Filipino +leaders were willing to submit the issue to the judgment of the +American people, which was soon to be expressed at the polls, and to +abide by the result of the presidential election of November, +1900.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7404src" href="#xd20e7404" name= +"xd20e7404src">27</a> But subsequent events demonstrated <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb313" href="#pb313" name="pb313">313</a>]</span>that +the hope of ending the war without further effusion of blood was not +well founded, and that as a matter of fact the Filipinos were +<i>organizing for further desperate resistance</i> by means of a +general banding of the people in support of the guerrillas in the +field.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7418src" href="#xd20e7418" name= +"xd20e7418src">28</a></p> +</div> +<p>General MacArthur then goes on to tell how, as part of this +programme, the insurgent authorities,</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">announced a primal and inflexible principle, to the +effect that every native, without any exception, residing within the +limits of the archipelago, owed active allegiance to the insurgent +cause. This jurisdiction was enjoined under severe penalties, which +were systematically enforced.</p> +</div> +<p>This is what Judge Taft afterwards described as “a conspiracy +of murder, a Mafia on a very large scale”,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7432src" href="#xd20e7432" name="xd20e7432src">29</a> the +characterization being made in support of his theory that “the +great majority of the people” with whom we were then at war would +welcome our rule if allowed to follow their real preferences, and that +they were being cruelly coerced to fight for the independence of their +country. General MacArthur’s view, however, did not support this +theory. His report deals with this branch of the subject thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The cohesion of Filipino society in behalf of +insurgent interests is most emphatically illustrated by the fact that +assassination, which was extensively employed, was generally accepted +as a legitimate expression of insurgent governmental authority. <i>The +individuals marked for death would not appeal to American protection, +although condemned exclusively on account of supposed +pro-Americanism.</i></p> +</div> +<p>Later on, when we came to understand the Filipinos better, this +summary method of dealing with the faint-hearted <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb314" href="#pb314" name="pb314">314</a>]</span>lost +much of its initial horrifying force, and the failure of such to appeal +to us for protection lost much of its strangeness. In the first place, +nobody loves a traitor. Even those to whom he claims to have betrayed +his countrymen do not trust him implicitly. Again, Latin countries +never assume that before a man is punished for alleged crime he has +been confronted with the witnesses against him. Such testimony is, +under their jurisprudence, frequently received in his absence. The +legal department of General MacArthur’s office once got hold of a +captured insurgent paper subscribed with the autograph of Juan Cailles, +one of their best generals. It directed that a named Filipino residing +in a certain town garrisoned by American troops be executed—we of +course, would call it “assassinated”—at a certain +hour on a certain day in a public street of the town, and that the +soldier or soldiers performing the “execution” should +declare to the bystanders, if any, in so doing, that it was done +because the man was a traitor, a friend of the Americans. We kept this +paper, intending to hang Juan whenever he should be captured. He held +out a long time, and finally surrendered unconditionally—but he +proved such an elegant fellow, game as a pebble, courteous as +Chesterfield, and immensely popular with his people, that it was +decided he could be of more service as a live governor of a province +than he could as a dead general,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7448src" +href="#xd20e7448" name="xd20e7448src">30</a> so he was appointed a +provincial governor by Governor Taft, and made a splendid official.</p> +<p>Another reason why Filipinos suspected, during the insurrection, by +the more obstinate and stout-hearted <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb315" href="#pb315" name="pb315">315</a>]</span>of their compatriots +who held out longer in the struggle for independence, of weakening +toward the cause of their country, in other words, suspected of what +might be called “Copperhead” or “Tory” +tendencies, would not appeal to us for protection, is strikingly +presented in General MacArthur’s report for 1901. He says they +naturally had “grave doubt as to the wisdom” of siding with +us, “as the United States had made no formal announcement of an +inflexible purpose to hold the archipelago and afford protection to +pro-Americans.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7458src" href= +"#xd20e7458" name="xd20e7458src">31</a></p> +<p>The one great thing that has crippled progress in the Philippines +from the beginning of the American occupation down to date is the +uncertainty as to what our policy for the future is to be, the lack of +some, “formal announcement of an inflexible purpose.” And +of course I mean, as General MacArthur meant, by +“<i>formal</i>” announcement, an authoritative declaration +by <i>the law-making power</i> of the government. If Congress should +formally declare that it is the purpose of this government to hold the +Philippines permanently, American and other capital would at once go +there in abundance and the place would “blossom like a +rose.” If, on the other hand, Congress should formally declare +that it is the purpose of this government to give the Filipinos their +independence as soon as a stable native government can be set up, thus +holding out to the present generation the prospect of living to see the +independence of their country, the place would also quickly blossom as +aforesaid, through the generous ardor of native love of country. In +either event, everybody out there would know where he is +“at.” At present all is uncertainty, both with the resident +members of the dominant alien race, and with those over whom we are +ruling. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb316" href="#pb316" name= +"pb316">316</a>]</span></p> +<p>It took over 120,000 American troops, first and last, to put down +the struggle of the Filipinos for independence.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7474src" href="#xd20e7474" name="xd20e7474src">32</a> The war +began February 4, 1899, and the last public official announcement that +it was ended was on July 4, 1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7477src" +href="#xd20e7477" name="xd20e7477src">33</a> Of course this does not +imply that every province was at all times during that period a theatre +of actual war. Putting down the insurrection was something like putting +out a fire in a field of dry grass. At first the trouble was general. +Gradually it diminished toward the end. But for a while, no sooner was +it quenched in one province than it would break out in another. How the +Filipinos were able to prolong the struggle as long as they did against +such apparently overwhelming odds is most interestingly explained by +General MacArthur in his report for 1900. After describing the method +he followed of establishing native municipal governments in territory +as conquered, he says, with a patient stateliness that is almost +humorous:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The institution of municipal government under American +auspices, of course, carried the idea of exclusive fidelity to the +sovereign power of the United States. All the necessary moral +obligations to that end were readily assumed by municipal bodies, and +all outward forms of loyalty and decorum carefully preserved. But +precisely at this point the psychologic conditions referred to above +[meaning the unity against us],<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7483src" +href="#xd20e7483" name="xd20e7483src">34</a> began to work with great +energy, in assistance of insurgent field operations. For this purpose +most of the towns secretly organized complete insurgent municipal +governments, to proceed <i>simultaneously and in the same sphere as the +American governments and</i> in many instances <i>through the same +personnel</i>—that is to say, the <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb317" href="#pb317" name="pb317">317</a>]</span>presidentes and town +officials acted openly in behalf of the Americans and secretly in +behalf of the insurgents, and, paradoxical as it may seem, with +considerable apparent solicitude for the interests of both. In all +matters touching the peace of the town, the regulation of markets, the +primitive work possible on roads, streets, and bridges, and the +institution of schools, their open activity was commendable; at the +same time they were exacting and collecting contributions and supplies +and recruiting men for the Filipino forces, and sending all obtainable +military information to the Filipino leaders. Wherever, throughout the +archipelago, there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact +beyond dispute, that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance +thereof. In other words, the towns, regardless of the fact of American +occupation and town organization, are the actual bases for all +insurgent military activities; and not only so in the sense of +furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of guerrillas, but +as affording secure places of refuge. Indeed, it is now the most +important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely pressed and +seek safety in the nearest <i>barrio</i>; a manœuvre quickly +accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people and the ease +with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance of a +peaceful native.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7501src" href="#xd20e7501" +name="xd20e7501src">35</a></p> +</div> +<p>To contrast a cold, hard military fact involving the lives of +American soldiers with a lot of political nonsense intended for +consumption in the United States during a presidential election, the +next paragraph is particularly interesting in the light of the +cotemporaneous Taft view:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7509src" href= +"#xd20e7509" name="xd20e7509src">36</a></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>The success of this unique system of war depends +upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. +That <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb318" href="#pb318" name= +"pb318">318</a>]</span>such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of +discussion.</i> Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this +end, but fear as the only motive is hardly sufficient to account for +the <i>united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of +people</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7522src" href="#xd20e7522" name= +"xd20e7522src">37</a> One traitor in each town would effectually +destroy such a complex organization.</p> +</div> +<p>Then follows this bit of grim humor:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>It is more probable that the adhesive principle +comes from ethnological homogeneity which induces men to respond for a +time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership</i>—</p> +</div> +<p>in other words, to stick to <i>their own kith and kin</i>. He had in +a previous paragraph used that very expression thus: “The people +seem to be actuated by the idea that in politics or war men are never +nearer right then when going with their own kith and kin.”</p> +<p>In all the foregoing, General MacArthur was not simply trying to +score a point against Judge Taft, though his resentment of the effort +of the Taft Commission of 1900 to mix politics with war in the +presidential year was quite as decided, and quite as well known in the +islands at the time, as was General Otis’s similar attitude +toward the Schurman Commission of the previous year.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e7544src" href="#xd20e7544" name="xd20e7544src">38</a> He is +simply laying before the War <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb319" href= +"#pb319" name="pb319">319</a>]</span>Department, as a soldier, the +familiar facts of a situation which he had been dealing with for two +years past, as well known to the 70,000 officers and men under his +command as to himself. And as the details into which he goes are simply +prefatory to an account of the remedy he applied to the situation, that +remedy must now claim our attention. The remedy General MacArthur +finally applied was a proclamation, explaining to the Filipino +people—“to all classes throughout the archipelago,” +it read, and especially to the leaders in the field, many of whose +captured comrades-in-arms he had now become thoroughly acquainted +with—the severities sanctioned by the laws of civilized nations +under such circumstances, and the reasons therefor; and, further, +serving them with notice that thenceforward he proposed to enforce +those laws with full rigor.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7554src" href= +"#xd20e7554" name="xd20e7554src">39</a></p> +<p>The eminent lawyers of the Taft Commission were too busy about that +time acquainting themselves with the situation through natives not in +arms, to attach much importance to General MacArthur’s +proclamation, but the Eighth Army Corps always believed that that +proclamation, and the army’s work under it, was the main factor +in making the civil government at all possible by the date it was set +up, July 4, 1901. The issuance of this document was not only a wise +military move, but a subtle stroke of statesmanship as well. It assumed +that the Filipino people were a <i>civilized people</i>, an assumption +never indulged by Spain during the whole of her rule, but always freely +admitted by General MacArthur in all his dealings with their leading +men to be a fact. It therefore appealed to their <i lang="fr">amour +propre</i>, and to the <i lang="fr">noblesse oblige</i> of many of the +most obstinate and trusted fighting leaders. The writer was, at the +date of the proclamation under consideration, on duty <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb320" href="#pb320" name="pb320">320</a>]</span>at +General MacArthur’s headquarters, as assistant to Colonel +Crowder, his judge advocate, now Judge Advocate General of the United +States Army, and prepared the first rough, tentative suggestions for +the final draft of it, accompanying such suggestions with a memorandum +showing the course taken by Wellington in France in 1815, and by +Bismarck’s generals at the close of the Franco-Prussian War, as +well as that followed under General Order No. 100, 1863, for the +government of the armies of the United States in the field. Having then +entertained the opinion that that proclamation, though drastic, was +wise and right under the facts of the situation which confronted us, +and having nowise changed that opinion since, it may be well for the +writer of this book to explain his reasons for that opinion. This must +be done wholly without reference to “the authorities,” for +neither at the bar of public opinion, nor at the bar of final judgment, +do “the authorities” count for much. In so doing, however, +we must start with the <i>assumption</i> that it was a case of American +military occupation of hostile territory, notwithstanding that Judge +Taft began soon after his arrival in the islands in the June previous +to the December now referred to, to cable home impressions which, if +correct, amounted to a denial that the great body of the people were +hostile. Military occupation is a fact which admits of no debate, and +the necessity of making your country’s flag respected is always +fully and keenly recognized as the one supreme consideration by every +good American except one who, obsessed with the idea that kindness will +cure the desire of a people for independence, proceeds to act on that +idea in the midst of a war for independence.</p> +<p>Under the laws of war the commanding general of the occupying force +owes protection, both of life and property, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb321" href="#pb321" name="pb321">321</a>]</span>to +all persons residing within the territory occupied. The object of +General MacArthur’s proclamation was to put a stop to such +“executions,” or assassinations, as that perpetrated by +Juan Cailles, mentioned above, and to separate the insurgents in the +field from their main reliance, the towns. The latter end of a bloody +war is no time for a discussion of the causes of the war between victor +and vanquished. Nor is it any time to believe the representative of the +enemy who tells you that most of him is really in sympathy with you and +merely coerced. Your duty is to stop the war. You and your enemy having +had a difference, and having referred it to the arbitrament of war, +which is, unfortunately, at present the only human jurisdiction having +power to enforce decisions concerning such differences, if you win, and +your enemy refuses to abide the decision, he is simply, as it were in +contempt of court, and, in the scheme of things, as at present ordered, +deserves punishment as an enemy to the general peace. To state the +ethics of the matter juridically, “there should be an end of +litigation”—somewhere.</p> +<p>I do not believe in the doctrine that might makes right, and I +cherish the high hope that this human family of ours will survive to +see war superseded, as the ultimate arbiter, by something more like +heaven and less like hell. But in the Philippines in 1900 it was a +situation, not a theory, that confronted us, and, as far as my +consciously fallible thinking apparatus lights the way which then lay +before us, that way led to a shrine whereon was written “A life +for a life.” This is no mere academic discussion. With me it is a +tremendously practical one. In the gravest possible acceptation of the +term it is <span class="sc">awe</span>-fully so. If I am wrong, every +execution I approved by memorandum review furnished <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb322" href="#pb322" name= +"pb322">322</a>]</span>Colonel Crowder and General MacArthur, of +military commission findings out there was wrong, and so were a number +of the executions I ordered as a judge appointed by Governor Taft under +a government which, though nominally a civil government, was no more +“civil” in so far as that term implies absence of necessity +for the presence of military force, than other governments immediately +following conquest usually are. The propriety of the imposition of +capital punishment by the constituted authorities of a nation as part +of a set policy to make its sovereignty respected, is wholly +independent of whether you call your colonial government a civil or a +military one. So that in justifying General MacArthur I am also +justifying Governor Taft, and as it was on the recommendation of the +former that the latter appointed me to the Bench, we are certainly all +three in the same boat in the matter of the capital punishments under +consideration. And while the company you were in on earth in a given +transaction, however distinguished that company, is not going to help +you with the Recording Angel,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7588src" href= +"#xd20e7588" name="xd20e7588src">40</a> still, it is some comfort to +know that wiser and abler men than yourself approved a course of +imposing capital punishments to which you were a party, such +punishments having been inflicted as part of a policy whose subsequent +evolution revealed it to you as fundamentally wrong. And this +reflection is quite relevant in the present connection to the question +whether the government of Benevolent <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb323" href="#pb323" name="pb323">323</a>]</span>Assimilation we have +maintained over the Filipinos for the last fourteen years is one which +was originally imposed by force against their will, or whether it was +ever welcomed by them or any considerable fraction of them.</p> +<p>That the MacArthur proclamation of December 20, 1900, concerning the +laws of war, was at the time a military necessity, is as perfectly +clear to me now as it was then. And yet it may well give the thoughtful +and patriotic American pause. It is sometimes difficult to understand +why men are so often entirely willing to go on fighting and dying in a +cause they must know to be hopeless. The famous passage of Edmund +Burke’s speech on “Conciliation with America,”</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, so long +as foreign troops remained on my native soil, I never would lay down my +arms, no, never, never, never!</p> +</div> +<p>sounds well to us, but from the standpoint of a conqueror, there is +a good deal of wind-jamming to it, after all. It was the language of a +man who knew nothing of the horrors of war by actual experience, or of +what hell it slowly becomes to everybody concerned after most of the +high officials of the vanquished government have been captured and are +sleeping on dry, warm beds, eating good wholesome food, and smoking +good cigars, in comfortable custody, while the vanquished army, no +longer strong enough to come out in the open and fight, is relegated to +ambuscades and other tactics equally akin to the methods of the +assassin. The law of nations in this regard is an expression of the +views of successive generations of civilized and enlightened men of all +nations <i>whose profession</i> was war—men familiar with the +horrors inevitably incident to it and anxious to mitigate them as far +as possible. That law represents <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb324" +href="#pb324" name="pb324">324</a>]</span>the common consensus of +Christendom resulting from that experience. It recognizes that after +resistance becomes utterly hopeless, it becomes a crime against society +and the general peace, and this is wholly independent of the merits or +demerits of the questions involved in the war. In other words, the +greatest good of the greatest number cries aloud that the war must +stop. The cold, hard fact is that the great majority of the men who +hold out longest are, usually, either single men having no one +dependent on them, or nothing to lose, or both, or else they are men +more or less indifferent to the ties of family affection, and callous +to the suffering fruitlessly entailed upon innocent noncombatants by +the various and sundry horrors of war, such as decimation of the plough +animals of the country due to their running at large without caretakers +or forage; resultant untilled fields and scant food; pestilence and +famine consequent upon insufficient nourishment; arson, robbery, rape, +and murder inevitably committed in such times by sorry scamps and +ruffians claiming to be patriots but yielding no allegiance to any +responsible head; and so on, <i>ad infinitum</i>.</p> +<p>General MacArthur’s proclamation of December 20, 1900, served +notice on the leaders of a hopeless cause that assassinations, such as +that ordered by Juan Cailles, above mentioned, must stop; that the +universal practice of the townfolk, of sending money, supplies, and +information concerning our movements to the enemy in the field, must +stop; that participating in hostilities intermittently, in citizen +garb, followed by return to home and avocation when too hard pressed, +must stop; in short that <i>the war must stop</i>. Yet the proclamation +explained in so firm and kindly a way why the penalties it promised +were only reasonable under the circumstances, that “as an +educational document <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb325" href="#pb325" +name="pb325">325</a>]</span>the effect was immediate and +far-reaching,”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7616src" href= +"#xd20e7616" name="xd20e7616src">41</a> to quote from an opinion +expressed by its author in the body of it, an opinion entirely +consistent with modesty and fully justified by the facts. General +MacArthur also goes on to say of his unrelenting and rigid enforcement +of the terms of this proclamation that the results “preclude all +possibility of doubt * * * that the effective pacification of +the archipelago <i>commenced</i> December 20, 1900”—its +date. It is a part of the history of those times, familiar to all who +are familiar with them, that the Taft Civil Commission thought its +assurances of the benevolent intentions of our government were what +made the civil government possible by midsummer, 1901. But whatever the +Filipinos may think of us at present, now that they understand us +better, certainly in 1900–01, in view of the events of the +preceding two or three years, which formed the basis of the only +acquaintance they then had with us, and in view of the fact that their +experience for the preceding two or three hundred years had made force +the only effective governmental argument with them, and governmental +promises a mere mockery, and in view of the fact that the +“never-ceasing patrols, explorations, escorts, outposts,” +etc., of General MacArthur’s 70,000 men were relentlessly kept up +during the six months immediately following the proclamation and in aid +of it, it at once becomes obvious how infinitesimal a fraction of the +final partial pacification which made the civil government possible, +the Taft assurances to the Filipinos as to our intentions must have +been. These matters are of prime importance to any honest effort toward +a clear understanding of present conditions, because far and away the +greatest wrong which we, in our genuinely benevolent misinformation, +have done the Filipinos, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb326" href= +"#pb326" name="pb326">326</a>]</span>not even excepting the tariff +legislation perpetrated upon them by Congress, lies in the insufferably +hypocritical pretence that they ever consented to our rule, or that +they consent to it now—a pretence conceived in 1898 by Trade +Expansion, to beguile a nation the breath of whose own life is +political liberty based on consent of the governed, into a career of +conquest, but not even countenanced since by those who believe the +Government should go into the politico-missionary business, after the +manner of Spain in the sixteenth century.</p> +<p>Having now exhaustively examined the differences of opinion between +Judge Taft and General MacArthur, when the former set to work, in the +summer of 1900, to get a civil government started by the date of +expiration of the term of enlistment of the volunteer army (June 30, +1901), let us follow the facts of the situation up to the date last +named, or, which is practically the same thing, up to the inauguration +of Judge Taft as Civil Governor of the islands on July 4, 1901, +pausing, in passing, for such reflections as may force themselves upon +us as pertinent to the Philippine problem of to-day.</p> +<p>On September 19, 1900, General MacArthur wired Secretary of War +Root—General Corbin, the Adjutant-General of the Army, to be +exact, but it is the same thing—describing what he calls +“considerable activity” throughout Luzon, ominously stating +that General Young (up in the Ilocano country, into which we followed +him and his cavalry in <a href="#ch12">Chapter XII</a>, <i>ante</i>) +“has called so emphatically for more force,” that he, +MacArthur, feels grave concern; adding that Luzon north of the Pasig is +“very much disturbed,” and that south of the Pasig the same +conditions prevail.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7634src" href= +"#xd20e7634" name="xd20e7634src">42</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb327" href="#pb327" name="pb327">327</a>]</span></p> +<p>October 26th, General MacArthur cables outlining a plan for a great +campaign on comprehensive lines, stating that “Full development +of this scheme requires about four months and all troops now in the +islands,” and deprecating any move on Mr. Root’s part to +reduce his force of 70,000 men by starting any of the volunteers +homeward before it should be absolutely necessary.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e7642src" href="#xd20e7642" name="xd20e7642src">43</a> October +28th, General MacArthur wires, “Shall push everything with great +vigor,” adding “Expect to have everything in full operation +November 15th.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7647src" href= +"#xd20e7647" name="xd20e7647src">44</a> November 5th, as if to reassure +General MacArthur that he and the General understand each other and +that the Taft cotemporaneous nonsense is not going to be allowed to +interfere with more serious business, Secretary Root, through the +Adjutant-General, sends this cable message:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Secretary of War directs no instructions from here be +allowed interfere or impede progress your military operations which he +expects you force to successful conclusion.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7655src" href="#xd20e7655" name="xd20e7655src">45</a></p> +</div> +<p>So that while the American people were being pacified with the Taft +cablegrams to Secretary Root that the Filipino people wanted peace, +General MacArthur, under Mr. Root’s direction, was simultaneously +proceeding to <i>make</i> them want it with the customary argument used +to settle irreconcilable differences between nations—powder and +lead. Mr. Root was all the time in constant communication with both, +but he gave out only the Taft optimism to the public, and withheld the +actual facts within his knowledge. December 25th, General MacArthur +wires Secretary Root, “Expectations based on result of election +have not been realized.” “Progress,” he says, is +“very slow.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7665src" href= +"#xd20e7665" name="xd20e7665src">46</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb328" href="#pb328" name="pb328">328</a>]</span></p> +<p>And now I come to one of the most important things that all my +researches into the official records of our government concerning the +Philippine Islands have developed. On December 28, 1900, General +MacArthur reports by cable the contents of some important insurgent +papers captured in Cavite Province about that time. The Filipinos have +a great way of reducing to writing, or making minutes of, whatever +occurs at any important conference. This habit they did not abandon in +the field. The papers in question belonged to General Trias, the +Lieutenant-General commanding all the insurgent armies in the field, +and, next to Aguinaldo, the highest official connected with the +revolutionary government. One of these papers, according to General +MacArthur’s despatch of December 28th, purported to be the +minutes of a certain meeting had October 11th previous, between General +Trias and the Japanese Consul at Manila. As to whether or not the paper +was really authentic, General MacArthur says: “I accept it as +such without hesitation.” Communicating the contents of the paper +he says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Consul advised that Trias visit Japan. Filipinos +represented that concessions which they might be forced to make to +Washington would be more agreeable if made to Japan, <i>which as a +nation of kindred blood would not be likely to assert superiority</i>. +Consul said Japan desired coaling station, freedom to trade and build +railways.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7679src" href="#xd20e7679" name= +"xd20e7679src">47</a></p> +</div> +<p>I consider these negotiations of the Japanese Government with the +Philippine insurgents important to be related here because they have +never been generally known, for the good reason, of course, that the +President of the United States cannot take the public into his +confidence about such grave and delicate matters when <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb329" href="#pb329" name="pb329">329</a>]</span>they +occur. The incident is not “ancient history” relatively to +present-day problems, for the following reasons:</p> +<p>(1) Because it is credibly reported and currently believed in the +United States that in Japan, during the cruise of our battleship fleet +around the world in 1907, one of the reception committee of Japanese +officers who welcomed our officers was recognized by one of the latter +as having been, not a great while before that, a servant aboard an +American battleship.</p> +<p>(2) Because of the following incident, related to me, in 1911, +without the slightest injunction of secrecy, by the Director of Public +Health of the Philippine Islands, then on a visit to the United States. +Shortly before the Director’s said visit home, while he was out +in one of the provinces, there was brought to his attention a Filipino +with a broken arm. There was a Japanese doctor in the town, at least a +Japanese who had a sign out as a doctor. The Director carried the +sufferer to the “doctor,” not being a surgeon himself. The +“doctor” turned out to be a civil engineer, who had been +making maps and plans of fortifications. The plans were found in his +possession.</p> +<p>(3) Because from one of the islands through which the northern line +of the Treaty of Paris runs, situated only a pleasant morning’s +journey in a launch due north of Aparri, the northernmost town of +Luzon, you can see, on a clear day, with a good field-glass, the +southern end of Formosa, some 60 or 70 miles away. <i>Japan can land an +army on American soil at Aparri any time she wants to, +overnight</i>—an army several times that of the total American +force now in the Philippines,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7699src" href= +"#xd20e7699" name="xd20e7699src">48</a> or likely ever to be there. +From Aparri it is 70 miles up the river to Tueguegarao, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb330" href="#pb330" name="pb330">330</a>]</span>40 +more to Iligan, and 90 more, all fairly good marching, to Bayombong, in +Nueva Viscaya (total distance, Aparri to Bayombong, 200 miles) the +province which lies in the heart of the watershed of Central Luzon. I +know what I am talking about, because that region was the first +judicial district I presided over, and many a hard journey I have had +over it, circuit riding, on a scrubby pony. Part of it I have been +through in the company of President Taft. It thus appears that from +Aparri to Bayombong there would be but a week or ten days of unresisted +marching to reach the watershed region, Nueva Viscaya. The Japanese +soldier’s ration is mainly rice, so that he can carry more +days’ travel rations than almost any other soldier in the world. +Never fear about their making the journey inside of a week or ten days, +once they start. To descend from the watershed aforesaid, over the +Caranglan Pass, and down the valley of the Rio Grande de Pampanga to +Manila, another three or four days would be all that would be needed. +It would be a Japanese picnic. Fortifying Corregidor Island, at the +entrance to Manila Bay, which is about all the serious scheme of +defence against a foreign foe we have out there, is quite like the +reliance of the Spaniards on Morro Castle, at the mouth of the harbor +of Santiago de Cuba, against our landing at Guantanamo. Our garrison in +the Philippines, all told, is but a handful. Aparri is an absolutely +unfortified seaport, at which the Japanese could land an army overnight +from the southern end of Formosa. There are no military fortifications +whatsoever to stay the advance of an invading army from Aparri down the +Cagayan Valley, and thence over the watershed of Nueva Viscaya +Province, through the Caranglan Pass, and down the valley of the +Pampanga River to Manila. So that to-day Japan can take Manila inside +of two <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb331" href="#pb331" name= +"pb331">331</a>]</span>weeks any time she wants to. That is why I +object to the President’s “jollying” the situation +along as best he can, without taking the American people into his +confidence. Any army officer at our War College will inform any member +of the House or Senate on inquiry, that Japan can take the Philippines +any time she wants to. President Taft and the Mikado may keep on +exchanging the most cordial cablegrams imaginable, but the map-making +goes on just the same. And, earnest and sincere as both the President +and the Emperor undoubtedly are in their desire to preserve the general +peace, who is going to restrain Hobson and Hearst, and several of +Japan’s public men equally distinguished and equally +inflammatory? Heads of nations cannot restrain gusts of popular +passion. The Pacific Coast is not so friendly to Japan as the rest of +our country, and as between Japan and the Pacific Coast, we are pretty +apt to stand by the latter without inquiring with meticulous nicety +into any differences that may arise.</p> +<p>The reason I said in the chapter before this one that Mr. Root is a +dangerous man to Republican institutions was because he is of the type +who are constantly finding situations which they consider it best for +the people not to know about. After the McKinley election of 1900 was +safely “put over,” Mr. Root, as Secretary of War, let Judge +Taft go ahead and ride his dove-of-peace hobby-horse in the +Philippines, duly repeating to the American people all the cheery Taft +cluckings to said horse, at a time when the real situation is indicated +by such grim correspondence as the following cablegram dated January +29, 1901:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Wood, Havana: Secretary of War is desirous to know if +you can give your consent to the immediate withdrawal <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb332" href="#pb332" name= +"pb332">332</a>]</span>Tenth Infantry from Cuba. <i>Imperative that we +have immediate use of every available company we can lay our hands on +for service in the Philippines.</i> (Signed) Corbin.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e7716src" href="#xd20e7716" name="xd20e7716src">49</a></p> +</div> +<p>But let us turn from this sorry spectacle of Mr. Root pulling the +wool over the eyes of his countrymen to make them believe the Filipinos +were not quite so unconsenting as they seemed to be, and again look at +the sheer splendor of American military ability to get anything done +the Government wants done. I refer to the capture of Aguinaldo.</p> +<p>One of the most eminent lawyers in this country once said to me, +“I would not let that man Funston enter my house.” I tried +to enlighten him, but as I happened to be a guest in his house at the +time, which entitled him to exemption from light if he +insisted—which he did—General Funston and he have continued +to miss what might have been a real pleasure to them both. The +following is, as briefly as I can dispose of it, the story of the +capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901.</p> +<p>Ever since Aguinaldo had escaped through our lines in November, +1899, his capture had been the one great consummation most devoutly +wished. It has already been shown how busy with the war the army was +all the time Judge Taft was gayly jogging away astride of his peace +hobby about the insurrection being really quite regretted and over. +However, in the favorite remark with which he used to wave the +insurrection into thin air, to the effect that it was now merely +“a Mafia on a large scale,” there was one element of truth. +The general feeling of the people, both educated and uneducated, was +such as to countenance the attitude of the leaders that pro-American +tendencies were <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb333" href="#pb333" +name="pb333">333</a>]</span>treason. Any leader who surrendered of +course was thereafter an object of at least some suspicion to his +fellow-countrymen, however assiduous his subsequent double-dealing. As +long as Aguinaldo remained out, this state of affairs was sure to +continue indefinitely, possibly for years to come. If captured, +<i>he</i> would probably himself give up the struggle, and use his +influence with the rest to do likewise. Therefore, in the spring of +1901, each and every one of General MacArthur’s 70,000 men was, +and had been since 1899, on the <i>qui vive</i> to make his own +personal fortunes secure for life, and gain lasting military +distinction, by taking any sort of chances to capture Aguinaldo. On +February 8, 1901, an officer of General Funston’s district, the +Fourth, in central Luzon, intercepted a messenger bearing despatches +from Aguinaldo to one of his generals of that region, directing the +general (Lacuna) to send some reinforcements to him, Aguinaldo. General +Funston’s headquarters were then at San Fernando, in the province +of Pampanga—organized as a “civil” government +province by act of the Taft Commission just five days later.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e7735src" href="#xd20e7735" name= +"xd20e7735src">50</a> Through these despatches and their bearer, +General Funston ascertained the hiding-place of the insurgent chieftain +to be at a place called Palanan, in the mountains of Isabela Province, +in northeastern Luzon, near the Pacific Coast. Early in the war we had +availed ourselves of a certain tribe, or clan, known as the Maccabebes, +who look nowise different from all other Filipinos, but who had, under +the Spanish government, by reason of long-standing feuds with their +more rebellious neighbors, come to be absolutely loyal to the Spanish +authorities. When we came they had transferred that loyalty to us, and +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb334" href="#pb334" name= +"pb334">334</a>]</span>had now become a recognized and valuable part of +our military force. So it occurred to General Funston; “Why not +personate the reinforcements called for, the American officers to +command the expedition assuming the rôle of captured American +prisoners?” The plan was submitted to General MacArthur and +adopted. A picked company of Maccabebes was selected, consisting of +about eighty men, and General Funston decided to go himself, taking +with him on the perilous expedition four young officers of proven +mettle: Captain Harry W. Newton, 34th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, now a +captain of the Coast Artillery; Captain R. T. Hazzard, 11th Volunteer +Cavalry; Lieutenant O. P. M. Hazzard, his brother, of the same +regiment, the latter now an officer of the regular army, and Lieutenant +Mitchell, “my efficient aid.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7744src" href="#xd20e7744" name="xd20e7744src">51</a> March 6, +1901, the U.S.S. <i>Vicksburg</i> slipped <span class="corr" id= +"xd20e7753" title="Source: quitely">quietly</span> out of Manila Bay, +bearing the participants in the desperate enterprise—as desperate +an undertaking as the heart and brain of a soldier ever carried to a +successful conclusion. General Thomas H. Barry wrote Secretary of War +Root, after they left, telling of their departure, and stating that he +did not much expect ever to see them again. The chances were ten to one +that the eighty men would meet five or ten times their number, and, as +they were to masquerade as troops of the enemy, they could not +complain, under the recognized laws of war as to spies, at being +summarily shot if captured alive. And the whole Filipino people were a +secret service ready to warn Aguinaldo, should the carefully concocted +ruse be discovered anywhere along the journey. They went down to the +southern end of Luzon, and through the San Bernardino Straits into the +Pacific Ocean, and thence up the east coast of Luzon to <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb335" href="#pb335" name= +"pb335">335</a>]</span>Casiguran Bay, about 100 miles south of Palanan, +landing at Casiguran Bay, March 14th. The “little Macks,” +as General Funston calls the Maccabebes, were made to discard their +dapper American uniforms after they got aboard the ship, and don +instead a lot of nondescript clothing gathered by the military +authorities at Manila before the <i>Vicksburg</i> sailed, so as to +resemble the average insurgent command. Not a man of them had been told +of the nature of the expedition before sailing. This was not for fear +of treachery, but lest some one of the faithful “Macks” +should get his tongue loosed by hospitality before departing. Also, +their Krag-Jorgensen regulation rifles were taken from them, and a +miscellaneous assortment of old Springfields, Mausers, etc., given them +instead, to complete the deception. An ex-insurgent officer, well known +to Aguinaldo, but now in General Funston’s employ, was to play +the rôle of commanding officer of the +“reinforcements.” To read General Funston’s account +of this expedition is a more convincing rebuttal of the contemporaneous +Taft denials of Filipino hostility and of the unanimity of the feeling +of the people against us, than a thousand quotations from official +documents could ever be. It was necessary to land more than 100 miles +south of Aguinaldo’s hiding-place, lest the smoke of the +approaching vessel should be sighted from a distance, and some peasant +or lookout give the alarm. Accordingly, they landed at Casiguran Bay by +night, with the ship’s lights screened, the <i>Vicksburg</i> at +once departing out of sight of land, and agreeing to meet them off +Palanan, their destination, on March 25th, eleven days later. From the +beginning they vigilantly and consummately played the rôle +planned, the “Macks” having been drilled on the way up, +each and all, in the story they were to tell at the first village +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb336" href="#pb336" name= +"pb336">336</a>]</span>near Casiguran Bay, and everywhere thereafter, +to the effect that they had come across country, and en route had met +ten American soldiers out map-making, and had killed two, wounded +three, and captured five. They were to point to General Funston and the +four other Americans in corroboration of their story. Speaking of +himself and his four fellow “prisoners,” General Funston +says, “We were a pretty scrubby looking lot of privates.” +The villagers received the patriot forces, thus flushed with triumph, +in an appropriate manner, and supplied them with rations and guides for +the rest of their 100-mile journey to the headquarters of the +“dictator.” General Funston is even at pains to say for the +village officials that they were very humane and courteous to himself +and the other four American “prisoners.” They reached +Palanan Bay, eight miles from Palanan, on March 22d. Here Hilario Tal +Placido, the ex-insurgent officer whose rôle in the present +thrilling drama was that of “commanding officer” of the +expedition, sent a note to Aguinaldo, stating that he had halted his +command for a rest at the beach preparatory to marching inland and +reporting to the Honorable Presidente, that they were very much +exhausted, and much in need of food, and please to send him some. Of +course that was the natural card to play to put Aguinaldo off his +guard. The food came, and the bearers returned and casually reported to +the Honorable Presidente that his honorable reinforcements would soon +be along, much to the honorable joy—to make the thing a little +Japanesque—of the president of the honorable republic. This +incident has been since made the occasion of some criticism—that +it was contrary to decency to accept Aguinaldo’s food and then +attack him afterwards. General Funston very properly replies in effect +that the case would have been <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb337" +href="#pb337" name="pb337">337</a>]</span>very different had he thrown +himself on Aguinaldo’s mercy, taken his food, and used treachery +afterwards, but that his conduct was entirely correct, under the code +of war, for the reason that should he and his command be captured while +personating enemy’s forces, Aguinaldo would have had a perfect +right, under the rules of the game, to shoot them all as spies. He adds +rather savagely, concerning “certain ladylike persons in the +United States” who have censured his course in the matter, that +he “would be <i>very much interested in seeing</i> the results of +a surgical operation performed on the skull of a man who cannot readily +see the radical difference between the two propositions,” and +that he doubts if a good quality of calf brains would be revealed by +the operation.</p> +<p>At all events, the expedition was very much refreshed by the food +and highly delighted at the proof, contained in the sending of it, that +Aguinaldo did not suspect a ruse. But now came one of the many +emergencies which had to be met by quick wit in the course of that +memorable adventure. Aguinaldo sent word to leave the +“prisoners” under a guard in one of the huts by the +sea-shore, where there was one of the Aguinaldo retainers in charge, an +old Tagalo. After a hurried, whispered conversation, +“prisoner” Funston instructed “Commanding +Officer” Placido to go ahead with his main column and then a +little later send back a forged written order purporting to be from +Aguinaldo, for the “prisoners” to come on also. This was +shown to the old Tagalo, thus disarming suspicion on his part. But now +came the “closest shave” they had. The column met a +detachment from Aguinaldo’s headquarters sent down with +instructions to relieve the necessarily worn-out guard of the newly +arrived “re-inforcements” that were supposed to be guarding +the five prisoners at the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb338" href= +"#pb338" name="pb338">338</a>]</span>beach, and let said guard come on +up to headquarters with the rest of the “re-inforcements,” +the idea being to still leave the prisoners at the beach so they would +not learn definitely as to the Aguinaldo whereabouts. Detaining the +officer commanding this detachment for a moment or so on some pretext, +the “Commanding Officer” of the +“re-inforcements” whispered to a Maccabebe corporal to run +back and tell General Funston and the rest of the +“prisoners” to jump in the bushes and hide. This they did, +lying within thirty feet of the detachment, as it passed them en route +for the beach. Of course a fight would have meant considerable firing, +and the quarry might hear it, take fright, and escape. Finally they +reached Palanan, the “prisoners” quite far in the rear. +Placido got safely into Aguinaldo’s presence, followed at a short +distance by the main body of his Maccabebes. Aguinaldo’s +life-guard of some fifty men, neatly uniformed, presented arms as +Placido entered the insurgent headquarters building, and thereafter +waited at attention outside. Then the worthy Placido entertained the +honorable Presidente with a few cock-and-bull stories about the march +across country, etc., made obediently to the President’s order, +keeping a weather eye out of the window all the time. As soon as the +Maccabebes had come up and formed facing the Aguinaldo life-guard, +Placido went to the window and ordered them to open fire. This they +did, killing two of the insurgents and wounding their commanding +officer. The rest fled, panic-stricken, by reason of the surprise. Then +Placido, a very stout individual, grabbed Aguinaldo, who only weighs +about 115 pounds, threw him down, and <i>sat on him</i>, until General +Funston, the Hazzards, Mitchell, and Newton arrived. The orders were +iron-clad that under no circumstances, if it could be avoided, was +Aguinaldo to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb339" href="#pb339" name= +"pb339">339</a>]</span>be killed. His signature to proclamations +telling the people to quit the war was going to be needed too much. The +party rested two days and then set out for the coast again, on March +25th, the day the <i>Vicksburg</i> had agreed to meet them. “At +noon” says General Funston, “we again saw the Pacific, and +far out on it a wisp of smoke—the <i>Vicksburg</i> coming +in!” In due course they reached Manila Bay. The old palace of the +Spanish captains-general, then occupied by our commanding general, is +up the Pasig River, accessible from the bay by launch. By that method +General Funston took his precious prisoner to the palace without the +knowledge of a soul in the great city of Manila. He arrived before +General MacArthur had gotten up. In a few minutes the General came out. +“Where is Aguinaldo?” said he, dryly. He supposed General +Funston simply had some details to tell, like the commanding officers +of hundreds of other expeditions that had gone out before that on false +scents in search of the illustrious but elusive Presidente. +“Right here in this house,” said General Funston. General +MacArthur could hardly believe his ears. A few days later, General +Funston walked into General MacArthur’s office. The latter said; +“Well, Funston, they do not seem to have thought much in +Washington of your performance. I am afraid you have got into +trouble.” “At the same time he handed me,” says +General Funston in the <i>Scribner Magazine</i> article above +mentioned, “a cablegram announcing my appointment as a +brigadier-general in the regular army.”</p> +<p>In his annual report for 1901,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7793src" +href="#xd20e7793" name="xd20e7793src">52</a> General MacArthur +describes the capture of Aguinaldo as “the most momentous single +event of the year,” stating also that “Aguinaldo was the +incarnation of the insurrection.” <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb340" href="#pb340" name="pb340">340</a>]</span>This last statement +explains why he was so anxious to capture him <i>alive</i>. If dead, he +would be sure to get <i>re-incarnated</i> in the person of some able +assistant of his entourage, thus insuring undisturbed continuance of +the war. He was most graciously treated by General MacArthur during his +stay as that distinguished soldier’s “guest” at the +<span class="corr" id="xd20e7808" title= +"Source: Malacanan">Malacañan</span> palace, from March 28th +until April 20th. The word “guest” is placed in quotations +because the host thought so much of him that he considered him worth +many hundred times his weight in gold, and had him watched <i>night and +day by a commissioned officer</i>. Everything that had been done by the +Americans since November, 1899, was explained to him, and he was made +to see that our purposes with regard to his people were not only +benevolent but also inflexible; in other words that there was no +altering our determination to make his people happy whether they were +willing or not. Seeing this, Aguinaldo bowed to the inevitable. The +programme explained to Aguinaldo is wittily described by a very bright +Englishwoman as a plan “to have lots of American school teachers +at once set to work to teach the Filipino English and at the same time +keep plenty of American soldiers around to knock him on the head should +he get a notion that he is ready for self-government before the +Americans think he is”—a quaint scheme, she adds, +“and one characteristic of the dauntlessness of American +energy.” To be brief, on April 19th, Aguinaldo took the oath of +allegiance to the American Government, which all agree he has +faithfully observed ever since, and issued a proclamation recommending +abandonment of further resistance. This proclamation was at once +published by General MacArthur and signalized by the immediate +liberation of one thousand prisoners of war, on their likewise +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb341" href="#pb341" name= +"pb341">341</a>]</span>taking the oath of allegiance. In his +proclamation Aguinaldo said, among other things:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The time has come, however, when they [the Filipino +people] find their advance along this path [the path of their +aspirations] impeded by an irresistible force. * * * Enough +of blood, enough of tears and desolation.</p> +</div> +<p>He concludes by announcing his final unconditional submission to +American sovereignty and advises others to do likewise.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e7823src" href="#xd20e7823" name= +"xd20e7823src">53</a></p> +<p>Soon after this General Tiño surrendered in General +Young’s district, and in another part of northern Luzon, General +Mascardo, commanding the insurgent forces in the provinces of Bataan +and Zambales, heretofore described as “the west wing of the great +central plain,” also surrendered. In the latter part of June, +General Cailles, with whom we have already had occasion to become +acquainted, in connection with Judge Taft’s “Mafia on a +large scale,” also surrendered in Laguna Province. After that, +there was never any more trouble in northern Luzon. But during the +spring of 1901, the Commission had been very busy organizing the +provinces of southern Luzon under civil government, thus cutting short +the process of licking it into submission and substituting a process of +loving it into that state through good salaries and otherwise—a +policy which postponed the final permanent pacification of that +ill-fated region for several years, as hereinafter more fully set +forth.</p> +<p>The unconditional absoluteness with which Judge Taft acted from the +beginning on the assumption that the Filipinos would make a distinction +between civil and military rule, and that their objection to us was +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb342" href="#pb342" name= +"pb342">342</a>]</span>because we had first sent soldiers to rule them +and not civilians, and that these objections would vanish before the +benignant sunlight of a government by civilians, is one of the great +tragedies of all history, considering the countless lives it eventually +cost. As a matter of fact, the Filipino objection had little or no +relation to the kind of clothes we wore, whether they were white duck +or khaki. Their objection was to <i>us, i.e.</i>, to an alien yoke. +However, to heal the bleeding wounds of war, the Filipinos were +benevolently told to forget it, and a civil government was set up on +July 4, 1901, pursuant to the amiable delusion indicated. That it has +never yet proved a panacea, and why, will be developed in the next and +subsequent chapters, but only in-so-far as such development throws +light on the present situation—which it is the whole object of +this book to do.</p> +<p>And now a few words by way of concluding the present chapter, as +preliminary to the inauguration of a civil government, cannot be +misconstrued, though they come from one who held office under it. I +have certainly made clear that Judge Taft and his colleagues were as +honest in their delusion about how popular they were with the Filipinos +as many other public men who have been known to have hobbies, and my +remarks must be understood as based on the comprehensive +bird’s-eye view which we have had of the whole situation from the +outbreak of the war with Spain in 1898 to the end of June, 1901, as a +summation of that situation. It is quite true that all contemporary +history is as much affected by its environment as the writer of it is +by his own limitations. But it certainly seems clear now that, in +regard to the Philippine problem presented in 1898 by the decision to +keep the islands, the American people were played upon by the +politicians <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb343" href="#pb343" name= +"pb343">343</a>]</span>for the next few years thereafter, sometimes on +the idea that the Filipino people were <i>not</i> a people but only a +jumble of semi-civilized tribes incapable of any intelligent notion of +what independence meant, and sometimes on the idea that while there was +no denying that they <i>were</i> indeed a civilized, homogeneous, +Christian people, yet the great majority of them did not want +independence, and would prefer to be under a strong alien government. +But the key-note to the McKinley policy from the beginning, his answer +to the eager question of his own people, was that there was no real +absence of the consent of the governed. In Senator Lodge’s +history of the war with Spain, written in 1899, there is a description +of the long struggle for independence in Cuba, whose existence Spain +denied year after year until we decided that patience had ceased to be +a virtue, which description is so strikingly applicable to the +situation in the Philippines during the first years of American rule +that I cannot refrain from quoting it here:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">And we were to go on pretending that the war was not +there, and that we had answered the unsettled question, when we really +had simply turned our heads aside and refused to look. And then when +the troublesome matter had been so nicely laid to sleep, the result +followed which is usual <i>when Congressmen and Presidents and nations +are trying to make shams pass for realities</i>.”<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e7855src" href="#xd20e7855" name= +"xd20e7855src">54</a></p> +</div> +<p>By the same high token the Philippine question will always remain +“the unsettled question” until it is settled right. In +other words, the American occupation of the Philippines, having been +originally predicated on the idea that the Filipino people did not +really want independence, a fiction which political expediency +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb344" href="#pb344" name= +"pb344">344</a>]</span>incident to government by parties inexorably +compelled it to try to live up to thereafter, took the form, in 1901, +of a civil government founded upon a benevolent lie, which expressed a +hope, not a fact, a hopeless hope that can never be a fact. And that is +what has been the matter with it ever since.</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">The papers ’id it ’andsome,</p> +<p class="line">But you bet the army knows.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb345" href="#pb345" name= +"pb345">345</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e6975" href="#xd20e6975src" name="xd20e6975">1</a></span> Letter +of July 22, 1898, by Duc d’Almodovar del Rio, Prime Minister of +Spain, to President McKinley, suing for peace. <i>Senate Document +62</i>, pt. 1, 55th Congress, 3d Session, pp. 272–3.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7010" href="#xd20e7010src" name="xd20e7010">2</a></span> See +<i>Congressional Record</i> of that date, p. 33.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7050" href="#xd20e7050src" name="xd20e7050">3</a></span> General +Otis’s appreciation of such “aid” was thus expressed +in his cablegram to Washington of June 4, 1899: “Negotiations and +conferences with insurgents cost soldiers’ lives and prolong our +difficulties.” <i>Correspondence Relating to the War with +Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. 1002.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7078" href="#xd20e7078src" name="xd20e7078">4</a></span> Address +by Secretary of War Taft before the National Geographic Society at +Washington, published in the official organ of that Society, +<i>National Geographic Magazine</i> for August, 1905.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7091" href="#xd20e7091src" name="xd20e7091">5</a></span> Says +General Chaffee in his annual report for 1902: “The intelligent +element controlled the ignorant masses as perfectly as ever a captain +controlled the men of his company.” <i>War Department Report</i>, +1902, vol. ix., p. 191.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7099" href="#xd20e7099src" name="xd20e7099">6</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 61.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7135" href="#xd20e7135src" name="xd20e7135">7</a></span> August +29, 1898, to May 5, 1900.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7143" href="#xd20e7143src" name="xd20e7143">8</a></span> +Especially independence.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7152" href="#xd20e7152src" name="xd20e7152">9</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i> (1902), pt. 1, page 50<span class="corr" id= +"xd20e7156" title="Not in source">.</span></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7161" href="#xd20e7161src" name="xd20e7161">10</a></span> A +slander ignorantly repeated by the adverse report of the minority of +the Insular Affairs Committee of the House, on the Jones Bill, +introduced in March, 1912, proposing ultimate independence in 1921.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7183" href="#xd20e7183src" name="xd20e7183">11</a></span> See +<i>The Commoner</i>, April 27, 1906.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7199" href="#xd20e7199src" name="xd20e7199">12</a></span> +<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 9.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7206" href="#xd20e7206src" name="xd20e7206">13</a></span> These +are the three main lines of cleavage, linguistically speaking. Nearly +all the minor dialects are kin to some one of the principal three.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7217" href="#xd20e7217src" name="xd20e7217">14</a></span> +Peasant’s hut, usually of bamboo, thatched with stout straw +(<i>nipa</i>). It is the log cabin of the Philippines.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7227" href="#xd20e7227src" name="xd20e7227">15</a></span> By way +of protest against this kind of belittling of the army’s work, +General MacArthur says in his annual report (<i>War Dept. Rept.</i>, +1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60), “Such a narrow statement of the +case is unfair to the service,” adding a handsome tribute, which +might have come very graciously from the Commission had it felt so +disposed, to “the endurance, fortitude, and valor” of his +70,000 men during the precise period while the Commission was filling +the American papers with politically opportune nonsense about +“Peace, peace,” when there was no peace.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7235" href="#xd20e7235src" name="xd20e7235">16</a></span> See +Report of Secretary of War Root for 1900. <i>War Department Report</i>, +1900, vol. i., pt. 1, p. 80.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7250" href="#xd20e7250src" name="xd20e7250">17</a></span> See +<i>Report of Taft Philippine Commission of 1900</i>, p. 17.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7268" href="#xd20e7268src" name="xd20e7268">18</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 34–42.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7278" href="#xd20e7278src" name="xd20e7278">19</a></span> <i>S. +D. 435</i>, 56th Cong. 1st Sess.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7293" href="#xd20e7293src" name="xd20e7293">20</a></span> +<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, November, 1900, p. 15.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7322" href="#xd20e7322src" name="xd20e7322">21</a></span> General +Lawton was killed in battle in the hour of victory at a point only +about twelve miles out of Manila, in the winter preceding the spring of +1900 in which the Taft Commission left the United States for +Manila.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7344" href="#xd20e7344src" name="xd20e7344">22</a></span> This +interview was indorsed as substantially correct by General MacArthur +before the Senate Committee of 1902, Senator Culberson first reading it +to him and then asking him if it quoted him correctly. See hearing on +Philippine affairs, 1902, <i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 2, p. +1942.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7359" href="#xd20e7359src" name="xd20e7359">23</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 88.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7372" href="#xd20e7372src" name="xd20e7372">24</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7388" href="#xd20e7388src" name="xd20e7388">25</a></span> +November, 1899, to September, 1900, both inclusive.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7394" href="#xd20e7394src" name="xd20e7394">26</a></span> <i>W. +D. R.</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7404" href="#xd20e7404src" name="xd20e7404">27</a></span> Judge +Taft had cabled Secretary of War Root on August 21, 1900, after his +arrival in June: “Defining of political issues in United States +reported here in full, gave hope to insurgent officers still in arms, +* * * and <i>stayed surrenders</i> to await result of +election.” See <i>War Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. +4, p. 80.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7418" href="#xd20e7418src" name="xd20e7418">28</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 89.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7432" href="#xd20e7432src" name="xd20e7432">29</a></span> See +<i>Report of Taft Commission to Secretary of War</i>, dated November +30, 1900.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7448" href="#xd20e7448src" name="xd20e7448">30</a></span> A +sample of one of these death sentences that Cailles and all the rest of +the insurgent generals were accustomed to issue against their +“Copperheads” may be seen in General MacArthur’s +report for 1900. <i>War Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. +63.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7458" href="#xd20e7458src" name="xd20e7458">31</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 90.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7474" href="#xd20e7474src" name="xd20e7474">32</a></span> See +Report of Secretary Root for 1902, p. 13.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7477" href="#xd20e7477src" name="xd20e7477">33</a></span> Just +how correct this was will be examined later.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7483" href="#xd20e7483src" name="xd20e7483">34</a></span> +“The people seem to be actuated by the idea that men are never +nearer right than when going with their own kith and kin.” <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 61.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7501" href="#xd20e7501src" name="xd20e7501">35</a></span> General +MacArthur’s Annual Report dated October 1, 1900. <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 61–2.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7509" href="#xd20e7509src" name="xd20e7509">36</a></span> General +MacArthur’s report which we are now quoting from, dated October +1, 1900, was forwarded by the ordinary course of mail, and even if it +arrived before the day of the November election, the Secretary of War +certainly did not at once place it before the public.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7522" href="#xd20e7522src" name="xd20e7522">37</a></span> Compare +this MacArthur, October 1, 1900, statement with the Taft statements of +the same situation between June and November, 1900, as expressed for +instance in his November, 1900, report to the Secretary of War thus: +“<i>A great majority of the people long for peace and are +entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the +supremacy of the United States.</i> They are, however, restrained by +fear. * * * Without this, armed resistance to the United +States authority would have long ago ceased. It is a Mafia on a very +large scale.” Report, Taft Commission, November 30, 1900, p. 17. +This was before Judge Taft met Juan Cailles above mentioned and liked +him well enough to make him governor of a province, in spite of his +being an “assassin,” in other words a Filipino general who +had a few weak-kneed fellows shot for being too friendly with the +Americans.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7544" href="#xd20e7544src" name="xd20e7544">38</a></span> +<a href="#ch9">Chapter XI</a>., <i>ante</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7554" href="#xd20e7554src" name="xd20e7554">39</a></span> See +<i>War Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 65–6.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7588" href="#xd20e7588src" name="xd20e7588">40</a></span> As for +my share as a soldier in that Philippine Insurrection, admitting, as I +now do, that it was a tragedy of errors, the President of the United +States would indeed be a very impotent Chief Executive if it were every +American’s duty to deliberate as a judge on the Bench before he +decided to answer a president’s call for volunteers in an +emergency. I am not yet so highly educated as to find no inward +response to the sentiment, “Right or wrong, my country.” If +this sentiment is not right, no republic can long survive, for the +ultimate safety of republics must lie in volunteer soldiery.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7616" href="#xd20e7616src" name="xd20e7616">41</a></span> Page +93.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7634" href="#xd20e7634src" name="xd20e7634">42</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1211.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7642" href="#xd20e7642src" name="xd20e7642">43</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1222.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7647" href="#xd20e7647src" name="xd20e7647">44</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i>, vol. ii., p. 1223.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7655" href="#xd20e7655src" name="xd20e7655">45</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 1226.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7665" href="#xd20e7665src" name="xd20e7665">46</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 1237.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7679" href="#xd20e7679src" name="xd20e7679">47</a></span> See +<i>Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1239.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7699" href="#xd20e7699src" name="xd20e7699">48</a></span> Ten or +twelve thousand.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7716" href="#xd20e7716src" name="xd20e7716">49</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1249.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7735" href="#xd20e7735src" name="xd20e7735">50</a></span> See +<i>Public Laws, U. S. Philippine Commission Division of Insular +Affairs, War Department</i>, Washington, 1901, p. 181.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7744" href="#xd20e7744src" name="xd20e7744">51</a></span> See +General Funston’s article on “The Capture of +Aguinaldo,” which appeared in <i>Scribner’s Magazine</i> +for November, 1911.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7793" href="#xd20e7793src" name="xd20e7793">52</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i. pt.<a id="xd20e7797" name= +"xd20e7797"></a> 4, p. 99.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7823" href="#xd20e7823src" name="xd20e7823">53</a></span> For a +copy of this proclamation see <i>War Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. +i., pt. 4, p. 100.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7855" href="#xd20e7855src" name="xd20e7855">54</a></span> <i>The +War with Spain</i>, by H. C. Lodge, p. 20<span class="corr" id= +"xd20e7859" title="Not in source">.</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch15" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XV</h2> +<h2 class="main">Governor Taft—1901–2</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">For they have healed the hurt of the daughter of my +people slightly, saying—Peace, peace; when there is no peace. +Jeremiah viii., 11.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">On February 22, 1898, the American Consul at Manila, +Mr. Williams, after he had been at that post for about a month, wrote +the State Department, describing the Spanish methods of keeping from +the world the outward and visible manifestations of the desire of the +Filipino people to be free from their yoke thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Peace was proclaimed and, since my coming, festivities +therefor were held; but there is no peace, and has been none for two +years.</p> +</div> +<p>He adds:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War +exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, etc.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e7893src" href="#xd20e7893" name="xd20e7893src">1</a></p> +</div> +<p>As will hereinafter appear, this is not far from a correct +description of the conditions which prevailed successively in various +provinces of the Philippines in gradually lessening degree for the six +years next ensuing after the report of the Taft Commission of November +30, 1900, wherein they said: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb346" href= +"#pb346" name="pb346">346</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">A great majority of the people long for peace and are +entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the +supremacy of the United States.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7905src" +href="#xd20e7905" name="xd20e7905src">2</a></p> +</div> +<p>We have seen how from the date of the outbreak, February 4, 1899, to +the date of his final departure from the islands for the United States +on May 5, 1900, General Otis had diligently supplied the eager ear of +Mr. McKinley with his “situation well in hand” and +“insurrection about to collapse” telegrams, Secretary of +War Alger having meantime been forced out of the cabinet—in part, +at least—by a public opinion which indignantly believed that the +real situation was being withheld. We have seen how, from soon after +the arrival of the Taft Commission at Manila on June 3, 1900, until +after the November elections of that year, the same eager presidential +ear aforesaid was supplied with like material through the presumably +innocent but opportunely deluded optimism of the Commission, as +manifested in the above sample message; how the actual military +situation as described by General MacArthur, the military commander at +the time, was one of “desperate resistance by means of a general +banding of the people in support of the guerrillas in the +field,”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7913src" href="#xd20e7913" +name="xd20e7913src">3</a> he having wired the War Department on January +4, 1901, “Troops throughout the archipelago more active than at +any time since November, 1899”;<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7919src" href="#xd20e7919" name="xd20e7919src">4</a> and how this +had been followed on July 4, 1901, by a civil government, the +inauguration of which could by no possibility be construed as affirming +to the people of the United States anything other than the existence of +a state of peace. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb347" href="#pb347" +name="pb347">347</a>]</span></p> +<p>We are to trace in this and subsequent chapters how, a short time +after the civil government was instituted, the insurrection got its +second wind; how a year later came another public declaration of peace, +on July 4, 1902; and how this was followed by a long series of public +disorders, combated by prosecutions for sedition and brigandage, until +toward the end of 1906. The drama is quite an allegory—Uncle Sam +wrestling with his guardian angel Consent-of-the-governed. He finally +gets both the angel’s shoulders on the mat, however, and so the +two have lived at loggerheads in the Philippines ever since.</p> +<p>As soon as we had once blundered into the colonial business, the +rock-bottom frankness with which we so dearly love to deal with one +another, let carping Europe deny it as she will, was superseded by a +systematic effort on the part of the statesmen responsible for the +blunder to conceal it. It soon became clear to those on the inside that +the sovereign American people had “bought a gold brick,” +that is to say, had made a grievous mistake and had <i>done wrong</i>. +But as it is not expedient for courtiers to tell the sovereign he has +done wrong, because “The king can do no wrong,” thereafter +all the courtiers,—<i>i. e.</i> persons desiring to control the +“sovereign” while seeming to obey him—instead of +risking loss of the “royal” favor by boldly telling the +people they had done wrong and ought to mend the error of their ways, +began to fill their ears and salve their conscience with mediæval +doctrines about salvation of the heathen through governmental missions +maintained by the joint agencies of Cross and Sword. For the foregoing +and cognate reasons, Senator Lodge’s description of Spain’s +last thirty years in Cuba fits our first six or seven in the +Philippines, beginning in 1899 with the original Otis press censorship +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb348" href="#pb348" name= +"pb348">348</a>]</span>policy of “not letting anything go that +will hurt the Administration,” and coming on down to a +certificate made in 1907 by the Philippine Commission for consumption +in the United States, to the effect that a state of general and +complete peace had prevailed throughout the islands for a stated period +preceding the certificate, when, as a matter of fact, during the period +covered by the certificate, an executive proclamation formally +declaring a state of insurrection had issued, and the Supreme Court of +the islands had upheld certain drastic executive action as legal +<i>because</i> of the state of insurrection recognized by the +proclamation.</p> +<p>The Taft civil government of the Philippines set up in 1901 was an +attempt to answer the question which, during the crucial period of our +country’s history following the Spanish War, rang so persistently +through the public utterances of both Grover Cleveland and Benjamin +Harrison: “Mr. President, how are you going to square the +subjugation of the Philippines with the freeing of Cuba?” Mr. +McKinley’s answer had been, in effect: “Never mind about +that, Grover; you and Benjamin are back numbers. I will show you +‘the latest thing’ in the consent-of-the-governed line, a +government <i>not</i> ‘essentially popular,’ it is true, +nor indeed at all ‘popular,’ in fact very unpopular, but +‘essentially popular <i>in form</i>.’ You lads are not +experts on the political trapeze.” Accordingly, as Senator Lodge +said concerning the dreary years of continuous public disorders in Cuba +under Spain, which we finally put a stop to in 1898:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We were to go on pretending that the war was not +there, etc.</p> +</div> +<p>Lack of frankness is usually due to weakness of one sort or another. +The weakness of the Spanish colonial <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb349" href="#pb349" name="pb349">349</a>]</span>system lay in the +impotent poverty of the home government and the graft tendencies of the +colonial officials. The weakness of the American colonial system has +always lain in the fundamental unfitness of republican governmental +machinery for boldly advocating and honestly enforcing doctrines which +deny frankly and as a matter of course that governments derive their +just powers from the consent of the governed. There are so many people +in a republic like ours who will always stand by this last proposition +as righteous, and as being the chief bulwark of their own liberties, +and so many who will always regard denial of that proposition as an +insidious practice calculated ultimately to react on their own +institutions, that no colonial government of conquered subject +provinces eager for independence can ever have the sympathy and backing +of all our people. Thus it is that to get home support for the policy, +the supreme need of the colonial government is constant apology for its +own existence, and constant effort to show that the subject people do +not really want freedom to pursue happiness in their own way as badly +as their orators say they do; that the oratory is mere “hot +air”; and that the people really like alien domination better +than they seem to.</p> +<p>Always in a mental attitude of self-defence against home criticism, +in its official reports there is ever present with the Philippine +insular government the tendency and temptation not to volunteer to the +American people evidence within its possession calculated to awaken +discussion as to the wisdom of its continuance. It thus usurps a +legitimate function never intended to be delegated to the Executive, +but reserved to the people. It thus makes itself the judge of how much +the people at home shall know. The law of self-preservation prompts it +not to take the American <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb350" href= +"#pb350" name="pb350">350</a>]</span>people into its confidence, at +least not that portion of them who are opposed on principle to holding +remote colonies impossible to defend in the event of war without a +large standing army maintained for the purpose. There is always the +apprehension that the value of apparently unfavorable evidence will not +be wisely weighed by the people at home, because of unfamiliarity with +insular conditions. This is by no means altogether vicious. It is a +perfectly natural attitude and a good deal can be said in favor of it. +But the real vice of it lies in the fact that your colonial government +thus becomes not unlike the president of a certain naval board before +which a case involving the commission of an officer of the navy was +once tried. They had no competent official stenographer to take down +all that transpired. The Navy Department was asked for one, but they +referred it to the board. The president of the board knew very well +that “the defence” wanted to show bias on his part. He +exuded conscious rectitude and plainly resented any suggestion of bias. +So a stenographer was refused and the case proceeded, the proceedings +being recorded in long hand by a regular permanent employee of the +board. Under such circumstances, there is so much which transpires that +is absolutely irrelevant and immaterial, that the proceedings would be +interminable if every little thing were recorded. Consequently, much +that <i>was</i> material, including casual remarks of the president of +the board clearly indicative of bias sufficient to disqualify any judge +or juror on earth, failed of entry in the record. However, enough was +gotten into the record to satisfy the President of the United States +that the president of the board was not only not impartial, but very +much prejudiced, and he reversed the action of the board. The case of +that board is very much like the case of the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb351" href="#pb351" name= +"pb351">351</a>]</span>Philippine Government. The case of the latter +is, as it were, a case involving a question as to how long a +guardianship ought to continue, and they simply fail and omit to have +recorded in a form where it may be available to the reviewing +authority, the American people, much that is material (on the idea of +saving the reviewing authority labor and trouble), which they think the +record ought not to be cumbered with, or the reviewing authority +bothered with. This practice is due to a confident belief that the +American people, being so far away, and being necessarily so wholly +unacquainted with all the ins and outs of the situation in the +Philippines, are not fitted to pass intelligently on the questions +which continually confront the colonial government. This is not a +mental attitude of insult to the intelligence of the people of the +United States. It is simply a belief that they, the colonial officials, +know much better than the American people can ever know, what is +wisest, in each case, to be done in the premises. And there is much to +be said in favor of this view, so far as details go. The fundamental +error of it, however, lies in the assumption that the American people +are forever committed to permanent retention of the Philippines, <i>i. +e.</i>, permanent so far as any living human being is +concerned—an assumption wholly unauthorized by any declaration of +the law-making power of this government, and countenanced only by the +oft-expressed hope of President Taft that that will be the policy some +day declared, if any definite policy is ever declared. Thus it is that +throughout the last twelve years those particular facts and events +which (to me) seem most vitally relevant to the fundamental question in +the case, viz., whether or not we should continue to persist in the +original blunder of inaugurating and maintaining a—to all intents +and purposes—<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb352" href="#pb352" +name="pb352">352</a>]</span>permanent over-seas colonial government, +have been withheld from the knowledge of the American public. The +present policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention is a +mere makeshift to avoid a frank avowal of intention to retain the +islands for all future time with which anybody living has any practical +concern. Until it is substituted by a definite declaration by Congress +similar to the one we made in the case of Cuba, and the present +American Governor-General and his associates are substituted by men +sent out to report back how soon they think the Filipinos may safely be +trusted to attend to their own domestic concerns, all crucial facts and +situations that might jeopardize the continuance of the present +American régime in the Philippines will continue, as heretofore, +to remain unmentioned in the official reports of the American +authorities now out there. Until that is done, you will never hear the +Filipino side of the case from anybody whose opinion you are willing to +make the basis of governmental action. These remarks will, obviously +from the nature of the case, be quite as true long after President +Taft, the reader, and I are dead as they are now.</p> +<p>Mr. Taft would be very glad to have Congress declare frankly that it +is the purpose of this Government to hold the Philippines permanently, +<i>i. e.</i>, permanently so far as the word means continuance of the +“uplift” treatment long after everybody now on the earth is +beneath it. But because public opinion in the United States is so much +divided as to the wisdom of a policy of frankly avowed intention +permanently to retain the islands, he prefers to leave the whole matter +open and undetermined, so as to get the support both of those who think +a definite programme of permanent retention righteous and those who +think such a programme vicious. He wishes to please both sides of a +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb353" href="#pb353" name= +"pb353">353</a>]</span>moral issue, on the idea that, as the present +policy is in his individual judgment best for all concerned, the end +justifies the means. Yet, as the issue <i>is</i> a moral one, which +concerns the cause of representative government throughout the world, +and a strategic one which concerns the national defence, it should, in +my judgment, no longer be dodged, but squarely met. You constantly hear +President Taft talking quite out loud here at home, in his public +utterances, about the great politico-missionary work we are doing in +the Philippines by furnishing them with the most approved up-to-date +methods for the pursuit of happiness, the avoidance of graft in +government, the elimination of crimes of violence, in short the ideal +way to minimize the ills that human governments are heir to, while +every day and every dollar spent out there by Americans induced by him +to go there, are time and money tensely arrayed against the ultimate +independence he purports to favor. Give the Americans out there a +square deal. Let them know whether we are going to keep the islands or +whether we are not. Honesty is a far better policy than the present +policy. The Americans in the islands, Mr. Taft’s agents in the +Philippines, talk no uncandid and misleading stuff about the +Philippines being exclusively for the Filipinos. And they do +considerable talking. They need looking after, if the present pious +fiction is to be kept up at this end of the line. Nobody in the +Philippines to-day, among the Americans, considers talk about +independence as anything other than political buncombe very hampering +to their work. Listen to this high official of the insular government, +who writes in the <i>North American Review</i> for February, 1912:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The somewhat blatant note with which we at the +beginning proclaimed our altruistic purposes in the Philippines +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb354" href="#pb354" name= +"pb354">354</a>]</span>has <i>died away into a whisper</i>. <i>To say +much about it is to incur a charge of hypocrisy.</i><a class="noteref" +id="xd20e7994src" href="#xd20e7994" name="xd20e7994src">5</a></p> +</div> +<p>The most important problem which confronted Mr. McKinley when he +sent Judge Taft to the Philippines was how to so handle the supreme +question of public order as to avoid any necessity of having to ask +Congress later for more volunteers to replace those whose terms of +enlistment would expire June 30, 1901. We have already reviewed the +strenuous efforts of General MacArthur during the twelve months +immediately following the arrival of the Taft Commission in June, 1900, +to get rid of the shadow of this necessity by the date named, the +regular army having been reorganized meantime and considerably +increased by the Act of February 2, 1901. On March 22, 1901, while the +Taft Commission was going around the islands with their Federal party +folk, holding out the prospect of office to those who would quit +insurging and come in and be good, General MacArthur reported progress +to Secretary of War Root by cable as follows: “Hope report +cessation of hostilities before June 30.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8002src" href="#xd20e8002" name="xd20e8002src">6</a> His idea was +to get a good military grip on the situation, if possible, by that +time, and, as a corollary, of course, that the grip thus obtained +should be diligently retained for a long time, not loosened, so that +the disturbed conditions incident to many years of war might have a few +years, at least, in which to settle. In his annual report dated July 4, +1901, the date of the inauguration of Judge Taft as “Civil +Governor,” he says, in regard to the imperative necessity for +continuing the military grip by keeping on hand sufficient forces: +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb355" href="#pb355" name= +"pb355">355</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Anything in the immediate future calculated to impede +the activity or reduce the efficiency of these instruments will not +only be a menace to the present, but <i>put in jeopardy the entire +future of American possibilities</i> in the archipelago.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e8014src" href="#xd20e8014" name= +"xd20e8014src">7</a></p> +</div> +<p>General MacArthur believed in keeping the islands permanently. His +views were frankly imperialistic. He had no salve to offer to the +conscience of pious thrift at home anxious to believe that the +Filipinos were not bitterly opposed to our rule, and very much in favor +of what was supposed to be a glittering opening for Trade Expansion. He +was thoroughly imbued with the British colonial idea known as The White +Man’s Burden. On the other hand, Governor Taft firmly believed +that kindness would cure the desire of the people for independence. The +difference between these two gentlemen was fully ventilated afterward +before the Senate Committee of 1902. A statement of General +MacArthur’s embodying the crux of this difference was read to +Governor Taft by Senator Carmack, and the Governor’s reply +was:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We did not then agree with that statement, and we do +not now agree with it.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8024src" href= +"#xd20e8024" name="xd20e8024src">8</a></p> +</div> +<p>A little later, in the same connection, he said to the same Senate +Committee, with the cheery tolerance of conflicting views which comes +only from entire confidence in the soundness of one’s own:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I have been called the Mark Tapley of this Philippine +business.</p> +</div> +<p>There is no doubt about the fact that President Taft is an optimist. +But while optimism is a very blessed <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb356" href="#pb356" name="pb356">356</a>]</span>thing in a sick-room +or a financial panic, it is a very poor substitute for powder and lead +in putting down an insurrection, or in weaning people from a desire for +independence accentuated by a long war waged for that purpose, +especially when your kindness must be accompanied by assurances to the +objects of it that on account of a lack of sufficient intelligence they +are not fit for the thing they want. It was upon a programme of this +sort that Governor Taft entered upon the task of reconciling the +Filipinos to American rule more than ten years ago. The impossibility +of the task is of course obvious enough from the mere statement of it. +The subsequent bitterness between him and the military authorities was +quite carefully and very properly kept from the American public because +it might get back to the Filipino public. The military folk knew that +to go around the country setting up provincial and municipal +governments, carrying a liberal pay-roll, with diligent contemporaneous +circulation of the knowledge that anybody who would quit fighting would +stand a good chance to get an office, would seem to many of the +Filipinos a confession of weakness and fear, sure to cause trouble +later. Many of them—of course it would be inappropriate to +mention names—simply did not believe that Mr. Taft was honest in +his absurd notion. They simply damned “politics” for +meddling with war, and let it go at that. But the real epic pathos of +the whole thing was that Mr. Taft was actually sincere. He believed +that the majority of the Philippine people were for him and his +policies. As late as 1905, he seems to have clung to this idea, +according to various accounts by Senators Newlands, Dubois, and others, +in magazine articles written after their return from a trip to the +Philippines in that year in company with Mr. Taft, then Secretary of +War. In fact so impressed were <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb357" +href="#pb357" name="pb357">357</a>]</span>they with the general +discontent out there, and yet so considerate of their good friend Mr. +Taft’s feelings in the matter and his confidence that the +Filipinos loved benevolent alien domination, that one of them simply +contented himself with the remark:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">When we left the islands I do not believe there was a +single member of our party who was not sorry we own them, except +Secretary Taft himself.</p> +</div> +<p>Indeed it is not until 1907 that, we find Mr. Taft’s paternal +solicitude for his step-daughter, Miss Filipina, finally reconciling +itself to the idea that while this generation seems to want Home Rule +as irreconcilably as Ireland herself and “wont be happy +’til it gets it,” yet inasmuch as Home Rule is not, in his +judgment, good for every people, this generation is therefore a wicked +and perverse generation, and hence the Filipinos must simply resign +themselves to the idea of being happy in some other generation. This +attitude was freely stated before the Millers’ convention at St. +Louis, May 30, 1907, the speech being reported in the <i>St. Louis +Globe-Democrat</i> the next day. Said Mr. Taft on that occasion, after +admitting that the Islands had been a tremendous financial drain on +us:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">If, then, we have not had material recompense, have we +had it in the continuing gratitude of the people whom we have +aided?</p> +</div> +<p>Answering this, in effect, though not in so many words, “Alas, +no,” he adds, with a sigh which is audible between the lines:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">He who would measure his altruism by the thankfulness +of those whom he aids, will not persist in good works.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb358" href="#pb358" name= +"pb358">358</a>]</span></p> +<p>Thus we see the Mark Tapley optimism of 1902 become in 1907 a +species of solicitude which Dickens describes in <i>Bleak House</i> as +“Telescopic Philanthropy,” in the chapter by that title in +which he introduces the famous Mrs. Jellyby, mother of a large and +interesting family, “a lady of very remarkable strength of +character, who devotes herself entirely to the public,” who +“has devoted herself to an extensive variety of public subjects, +at various times, and is at present devoted to the subject of Africa, +with a general view to the cultivation of the coffee +berry—<i>and</i> the natives,”—to the woeful neglect +of her own domestic concerns and her large and expensive family of +children. Since 1907, Mr. Taft has frankly abandoned his early delusion +about the consent-of-the-governed, and boldly takes the position, up to +that time more or less evaded, that the consent of the governed is not +at all essential to just government.</p> +<p>The apotheosis of Uncle Sam as Mrs. Jellyby is to be found in one of +Mr. Taft’s speeches wherein he declared that the present +Philippine policy was “a plan for the spread of Christian +civilization in the Orient.”</p> +<p>Thus has it been that, under the reactionary influence of a colonial +policy, this republic has followed its frank abandonment of the idea +that all just government must derive its origin in the consent of the +governed by a further abandonment of the idea that Church and State +should be kept separate. I do not wish to make President Taft +ridiculous, and could not if I would. Nor do I seek to belittle him in +the eyes of his people,—for we <i>are</i> “his +people,” for the time being. No one can belittle him. He is too +big a man to be belittled by anybody. Besides, he is, in many respects +beyond all question, a truly great man. But he is not the only great +man in history who has made egregious blunders. And there is no +question that we are running there on <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb359" href="#pb359" name="pb359">359</a>]</span>the confines of Asia, +in the Philippines, a superfluous governmental kindergarten whose +sessions should be concluded, not suddenly, but without unnecessary +delay. The two principal reasons for retaining the Filipinos as +subjects, or “wards,” or by whatever euphemism any one may +prefer to designate the relation, are, first, that a Filipino +government would not properly protect life and property, and second, +that although they complain much at taxation without representation +through tariff and other legislation placed or kept on the statute +books of Congress through the influence and for the benefit of special +interests in the United States, yet that such taxation without +representation is not so grievous as to justify them in feeling as we +did in 1776. Whether these reasons for retaining the Filipinos as +subjects indefinitely are justified by the facts, must depend upon the +facts. If they are not, the question will then arise, “Would a +Filipino government be any worse for the Filipinos than the one we are +keeping saddled on them over their protest?”</p> +<p>In his letter of instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Taft +Commission, Mr. McKinley first quoted the noble concluding language +with which the articles of capitulation of the city of Manila gave an +immediate and supremely comforting sense of security to a city of some +three hundred thousand people who had then been continuously in terror +of their lives for three and one half months, thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">This city, its inhabitants, * * * and its +private property of all description * * * are placed under +the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army;</p> +</div> +<p>and then added:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the +Government of the United States to give protection for property +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb360" href="#pb360" name= +"pb360">360</a>]</span>and life * * * to all the people of +the Philippine Islands. * * * I charge this commission to +labor for the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the +honor and conscience of their country.</p> +</div> +<p>How the premature setting up of the civil government of the +Philippines in 1901 under pressure of political expediency, and the +consequent withdrawal of the police protection of the army, was +followed by a long series of disorders combated by prosecutions for +sedition and brigandage, toward the end of which the writer broke down +and left the Islands exclaiming inwardly, “I do not know the +method of drawing an indictment against a whole people,” will now +be traced, not so much to show that the Philippine insular government +has failed properly and competently to meet the most sacred obligations +that can rest upon any government, but to show the inherent unfitness +of a government based on the consent of the governed to run any other +kind of a government.</p> +<p>There were five officers of the Philippine volunteer army of +1899–1901 appointed to the bench by Governor Taft in 1901. Their +names and the method of their transition from the military to the civil +<i>régime</i> are indicated by the following communication, a +copy of which was furnished to each, as indicated in the endorsement +which follows the signature of Judge Taft:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE COMMISSION</p> +<p><span class="sc">President’s Office, Manila</span>, June 17, +1901.</p> +<p>Major-General <span class="sc">Arthur MacArthur</span>, U. S. +A.,</p> +<p>Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, Manila.</p> +<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Sir:</span></p> +<p>I am directed by the commission to inform you that it has made the +following appointments under the recent Judicial Act passed June 11, +1901: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb361" href="#pb361" name= +"pb361">361</a>]</span></p> +<p>You will observe that among our appointees are five army officers: +Brigadier General James F. Smith, Lieutenant James H. Blount, Jr., 29th +Infantry, Captain Adam C. Carson, 28th Infantry; Captain Warren H. +Ickis, 36th Infantry; and Lieutenant George P. Whitsett, 32d +Infantry.</p> +<p>It is suggested that it would be well for these officers to resign +their positions in the United States military service to the end that +they may accept the civil positions, take the oath of office, and +immediately begin their new duties.</p> +<p>I have the honor to be, very respectfully,</p> +<p class="signed">Your obedient servant,</p> +<p class="signed">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">Wm. H. +Taft</span>,</p> +<p class="signed">President.</p> +</div> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Official extract copy respectfully furnished +Lieutenant James H. Blount, Jr., 29th Infantry, U. S. Vols., Manila, P. +I. Your resignation, if offered in compliance with above letter, will +be accepted upon the date preferred.</p> +<p>By command of Major-General MacArthur:</p> +<p class="signed">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">E. H. +Crowder</span></p> +<p>Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge Advocate, U. S. A. Secretary.</p> +<p class="dateline">Military Secretary’s Office,<br> +June 18, 1901.</p> +</div> +<p>General Smith had come out as colonel of the 1st Californias, and +had won his stars on the field of battle, as has already been described +in an earlier chapter. He went from the army to the Supreme +Bench—at Manila. The archipelago had been divided by the Taft +Commission into fifteen judicial districts, containing three or four +provinces each,—each district court to be a <i>nisi prius</i> or +trial court. Judge Carson (Va.) went to the Hemp Peninsula District in +the extreme south of Luzon, already described, and four years later to +the Supreme Bench, where he still is. Judge Ickis (Ia.) went to +Mindanao, and later died of the cholera down there. Judge Whitsett +(Mo.) went to Jolo (the little group of islets near British North +Borneo), but his wife died soon afterward, and he resigned and came +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb362" href="#pb362" name= +"pb362">362</a>]</span>home. The writer (Ga.) went to northern Luzon, +to the First District hereinafter noticed.</p> +<p>Just here it may be remarked that the reader will need no long +complicated description of the details of the organization of the new +government, interspersed with unpronounceable names, if he will simply +assume the view-point Governor Taft had in the beginning. Governor Taft +simply analogized his situation to that of a governor of a State or +Territory at home. His fifty provinces were to him fifty counties, +twenty-five of them in the main island of Luzon, which, as heretofore +stated, is about the size of Ohio or Cuba (forty odd thousand square +miles), and contains half the population and over one-third the total +land area of the archipelago. However, each of his provincial governors +was liberally paid, and the authority of a governor of a province was, +on a small scale, more like that of one of our own state chief +executives than like the authority and functions of the chairman of the +Board of County Commissioners of a county with us. For instance, the +governorship of Cebu, with its 2000 square miles of territory and +650,000 inhabitants, was quite as big a job as the governorship of New +Mexico, or some other one of our newer States.</p> +<p>So that the task on which Governor Taft entered July 4, 1901, was +the governing of a potential ultimate federal union in miniature, +containing nearly eight millions of people. One slight mistake I think +he made was in providing that the governors of the provinces should be +ex-officio sheriffs of the Courts of First Instance (of the fifteen +several judicial districts aforesaid). This was to enable the Judges of +First Instance to keep a weather eye on the provincial governors, the +judiciary at first being largely American, and it being the programme +to have native governors, some of them <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb363" href="#pb363" name="pb363">363</a>]</span>recently surrendered +insurgent generals, as rapidly as practicable and advisable. The scheme +was good business, but not tactful. It subtracted some wind from the +gubernatorial sails to be a sheriff, a provincial governor under the +Spanish <i>régime</i> having been quite a vice-regal potentate. +But the judges were as careful to treat their native governors with the +consideration the authority vested in them called for as Governor Taft +himself would have been. So no substantial harm was done, and the real +power in the provinces of questionable loyalty remained where it +belonged, in American hands.</p> +<p>Just after Governor Taft’s inauguration, the four newly +appointed district judges just out of the army called on the governor. +Judge Carson was the spokesman, though without pre-arrangement. He +said: “Governor, we have called to pay our respects and say +goodbye before going to the provinces. We have been acting under +military orders so long, that while we are not here to get orders, we +would like to have any parting suggestions that may occur to +you.” Governor Taft said: “Well, Gentlemen, all I can think +of is to remind you that if what we have all heard is true the Spanish +courts usually operated to the delay of justice, rather than to the +dispensing of it. So just go ahead to your respective districts, and +get to work, remembering that you are Americans.” So we did. Of +course none of us loaned ourselves for a moment to the amiable Taft +fiction that “the great majority of the people are entirely +willing to government under the supremacy of the United States.” +We had all had a share in the subjugation of the Islands as far as it +had progressed at that time, and had seen the Filipinos +fight—unskilfully and ineffectively, it is true (because they +none of them understood the use of two sights on a rifle, and +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb364" href="#pb364" name= +"pb364">364</a>]</span>simply could not hit us much), but pluckily +enough. We knew the Filipinos well, and our attitude was simply that of +“Pharaoh and the Sergeant,” in Kipling’s ballad of +the conquest of Egypt. However, we knew nothing of the Egyptians, +except what we had learned in the Bible, gave no thought to whether our +occupation was to be “temporary” like the British +occupation of Egypt since 1882, or temporary like the American +occupation of Cuba in 1898. That was a matter for the people of the +United States to determine later. But somebody had to govern the +Islands, and there we were, and there were the Islands. In the scheme +of things some one had to do that part of the world’s work, and, +as the salaries were liberal, we went to the work, not concerning +ourselves with amiable fictions of any kind. I think our attitude was +really one of more intimately sympathetic understanding of the +Filipinos than that of Governor Taft himself, because we had all known +them longer, and all spoke their language, <i>i. e.</i>, the language +of the educated and representative men (Spanish), and knew their ways, +their foibles, and their many indisputably noble traits. But we did not +start out to play the part of political wet-nurses. Our attitude was, +if Mr. Filipino does not behave, we will make him.</p> +<p>Judge Carson and myself had one peculiar qualification for fidelity +to the Taft policies for which we were entitled to no credit. We +instinctively resented any suggestion comparing the Filipinos to +negroes. We had many warm friends among the Filipinos, had shared their +generous hospitality often, and in turn had extended them ours. Any +such suggestion as that indicated implied that we had been doing +something equivalent to eating, drinking, dancing, and chumming with +negroes. And we resented such suggestions with <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb365" href="#pb365" name="pb365">365</a>]</span>an +anger quite as cordial and intense as the canons of good taste and +loyal friendship demanded. I really believe that the southern men in +the Philippines have always gotten along better with the Filipinos than +any other Americans out there, and for the reasons just suggested. Not +only is the universal American willingness to treat the educated +Asiatic as a human being endowed with certain unalienable rights going +to redeem him from the down-trodden condition into which British and +other European contempt for him has kept him, but the American from the +South out there is a guarantee that he shall never be treated as if he +were an African. The African is æons of time behind the Asiatic +in development; the latter is æons ahead of us in the mere +duration of his civilization. The Filipino has many of the virtues both +of the European and the Asiatic. Christianity has made him the superior +in many respects, of his neighbor and racial cousin, the Japanese. And +Spanish civilization has produced among them many educated gentlemen +whom it is an honor to call friend.</p> +<p>The five lawyers, who on ceasing to be volunteer officers became +judges, had other incentives also to make the Taft Government a +success. The possession of power is always pleasant. We knew the +military folk were going to stand by and watch the civil government, +and prophesy failure. This of course put us on our metal to impress +upon the dictatorial gentry of the military profession, with didactic +firmness, the fundamental importance to all American ideals that the +military should be subordinate to the civil authority.</p> +<p>The First Judicial District to which the writer was first assigned +comprised four provinces, Ilocos Norte, in the Ilocano country, the +province situated at the extreme northwestern corner of Luzon, in the +military <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb366" href="#pb366" name= +"pb366">366</a>]</span>district the conquest of which by General Young +has already been fully described; and the three provinces of the +Cagayan valley,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8194src" href="#xd20e8194" +name="xd20e8194src">9</a> overrun by Captain Batchelor on his +remarkable march from the mountains to the sea in November, 1899, also +already described. Here I remained for a year, and then came home on +leave, desperately ill; being given, on returning to the Islands after +my recovery, an assignment in one of the southern islands, hereinafter +dealt with.</p> +<p>We volunteers were all commissioned as judges as of the 15th of +June, though none of us I believe were mustered out until June 30th. +The day after I was notified of my appointment as judge, as above set +forth, desiring to enter upon my judicial emoluments, which were +several times those I was receiving as a soldier, I removed the +shoulder-straps and collar ornaments from my white duck suit, and went +over and took the oath of office before the Chief Justice of the +Islands. We had not yet been mustered out of the army, but as above +stated, Governor Taft had suggested to General MacArthur that we resign +without waiting for the day of muster out, so we could get to work that +much sooner, and General MacArthur had notified us that if we cared to +resign at once as suggested, he would cable our resignations to +Washington. Immediately after qualifying before the Chief Justice, I +left his office and on emerging from the court-house hailed a <i lang= +"es">carromata</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8203src" href= +"#xd20e8203" name="xd20e8203src">10</a> but the driver said No, he +would not carry me. I suggested in a very rudimental way, in rather +rudimental Spanish suited to him, that he was a common carrier, and as +such under a duty to transport me. He said his horse was tired. His +horse did not look tired. He would not have thus casually toyed with +veracity <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb367" href="#pb367" name= +"pb367">367</a>]</span>if I had had my shoulder-straps on. An <i lang= +"es">autoridad</i> (a representative of constituted authority) is to +the masses of the Filipino people something which instinctively +challenges their respect and obedience, more especially where the +“authority” is firm and just. Respect for authority is +their most conspicuous civic trait, and it is on this element in the +lower ninety, on the intelligence and capacity to guide them of the +upper ten, and on the ardent patriotism of both, that I predicate my +difference with President Taft as to the capacity of the Filipino +people for self-government. However, as I was to all appearances not an +“authority,” this ignorant man treated me as merely one of +the Americans who, having invaded his country, apparently were not sure +whether they were afraid of his people or not. Again I tried diplomacy, +offering him an exorbitant fare. “Nothing doing.” It was +about siesta time, and he would not budge. Here then was the civil +government proposition in a nutshell, to take the ignorant people and +teach them their rights under theoretically free institutions, instead +of letting their own people do it <i>in their own way</i>; to reason +directly with such people as this <i lang="es">cochero</i> (hackman), +to begin at the bottom of the social scale right on the jump, the idea +being to fit them, the sacred (?) majority, to know their rights and +“knowing dare maintain” them against the educated minority, +as if the latter did not have a greater natural interest in their +welfare than any stranger could possibly have. That I indulged all +these reflections at the time I of course do not mean to say. The +significance of the incident has of course deepened in the light of the +subsequent years. At any rate, I did not succeed in budging that +<i lang="es">cochero</i>. I walked home, forego the difference between +the military and the judicial salary for the two weeks remaining before +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb368" href="#pb368" name= +"pb368">368</a>]</span>muster-out day, put my shoulder-straps back on, +and kept them on until June 30, 1901.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8223src" href="#xd20e8223" name="xd20e8223src">11</a></p> +<p>When I first landed on the China seacoast of the district I was to +preside over, I was met by quite a reception committee of the leading +men, who conducted me with great courtesy to the provincial capital. A +little later the justices of the peace paid their respects. One of them +came thirty miles to do so. The court-room was very long, and when I +first spied this last man, he was at the other end of the room bowing +very low. He would bow, then advance a few steps, then bow again, then +resume the forward march toward me. I reminded myself of some ancient +king, so profound were his obeisances. At first I thought to myself, +“He bows too low, he must have been up to some devilment +lately!” Experience showed me later that it was simply one of the +ever-present manifestations of the respect of the Filipino for +constituted authority. They positively love to show their respect for +authority, just as a good soldier loves to show his respect for an +officer. Here some American remarks: “Ah, but that is not good +proof of capacity for self-government. They would not ‘cuss +out’ the party in power enough.” I answer: Who made you the +judge to say that our particular form of government and our particular +way of doing things is better for each and every other people under the +sun than any they can devise for themselves? But there was of course +another possible reason for the profundity of the obeisances of my +judicial subordinate above mentioned. When I reached that province +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb369" href="#pb369" name= +"pb369">369</a>]</span>of Ilocos Norte in July, 1901, the people were +in a state of submission that was simply abject. They had at first +worked the <i lang="es">amigo</i> business on General Young, and +treachery of that kind had been so inexorably followed by dire +punishment, that every home in the country had its lesson. Yet that was +the only way. The poor devils did not seem to know when they were +licked. This is not maudlin sentiment. It is a protest against the +cotemporary libel on Filipino patriotism about “the great +majority” being “entirely willing” to accept our +rule, and the cotemporary belittling of the work the army had to do to +make them accept it.</p> +<p>I remained in charge of the First Judicial District for more than a +year, and during that period tried few or no crimes of a political +character, that is to say, indictments for sedition or the +like—attempts to subvert the government. The district comprised a +total population of about a half million people, more than one-eighth +of the population of Luzon, and a total area of over 13,000 square +miles, nearly one-third of all Luzon. But remember, this was in +northern Luzon, where the work of pacification was lucidly completed by +the army before the “peace-at-any-price” policy began. We +will see what happened in my friend Judge Carson’s district, and +in the rest of southern Luzon later. The principal broad general fact I +now recall, in connection with the administration of justice in the +First Judicial District during the year or more I had it, is that the +main volume of business on the court calendars was crimes of violence +of a strictly non-political character due to lack of efficient police +protection in the several communities, consequent on withdrawal of +military garrisons. The country was in an unsettled state. The +aftermath of war, lawless violence, was virulently <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb370" href="#pb370" name= +"pb370">370</a>]</span>present, and the presence of troops scattered +through a province, under such circumstances, is a wonderful moral +force to restrain lawlessness. However high the purpose, however kindly +the motive, the setting up of a civil government in the Philippines at +the time it was set up, when the country was far from ready for it, was +a terrible mistake. Of course no one man in a given province or +judicial district had a bird’s-eye view of the whole situation +and the whole panorama at the time, such as we can get at this +distance, in retrospect. Of course it did not lie in human nature for +the men responsible for the mistake to see it at first, and, the die +once cast, they had to keep on, with intermittent resort to military +help, the extent of which help was always minimized thereafter. To show +how little the general state of the archipelago was understood by +American provincial officials busy in a given part of it, and getting +little or no news of the outside world, I remained in the First +Judicial District from July, 1901, to August, 1902, and heard nothing +of the great insurrection in southern Luzon, in Batangas, and the +adjacent provinces, which raged during the winter of 1901–02, +except a vague rumor that there was trouble down there. The Filipinos +did, however. Of course for Mr. Root to be able to furnish in December, +1901, a report, as Secretary of War, to the President, for consumption +by Congress and the people of this country, to the effect that his +volunteer army had been mustered out on schedule time, June 30, 1901, +and a “civil” government set up and in due operation, was a +nice showing, calculated to sooth latent public discontent with wading +through slaughter to over-seas dominion. Reports thereafter of +disturbances could always be waived aside as merely local in character, +and not <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb371" href="#pb371" name= +"pb371">371</a>]</span>serious. If it were stoutly asserted that +everything was quiet all over the archipelago except in certain parts +of certain localities, naming them, that sounded well, and as the +public at home simply skipped the unpronounceable names, not caring +much whether they represented molecules or hemispheres, all went well. +For instance, most of the provinces of the archipelago were organized +under “civil” government prior to the inauguration of +Governor Taft, which occurred, July 4, 1901, and on July 17th, +thereafter, Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol were restored to military +control.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8239src" href="#xd20e8239" name= +"xd20e8239src">12</a> I suppose the fact that Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol +had been so restored was duly announced at the time in the Associated +Press despatches from Manila. But what light did it throw on the +situation? Who knew whether any one of these names represented a +mountain lair, a country village, a remote islet, or a large and +populous province? As a matter of fact, each was a province, and the +total population of the three provinces was 1,180,655,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e8242src" href="#xd20e8242" name= +"xd20e8242src">13</a> and their total area 4651 square miles.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e8248src" href="#xd20e8248" name= +"xd20e8248src">14</a> The eminent gentlemen charged with the government +of the Islands, once they committed themselves to their +“civil” government, persisted always in treating the +insurrection, as General Hancock’s campaign speeches used to +treat the tariff—as “a local issue.” The true +analogy, that of a house on fire, with the fire partly but not wholly +under control, and momentarily subject to gusts of wind, never seems to +have occurred to them. Here were provinces aggregating nearly twelve +hundred <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb372" href="#pb372" name= +"pb372">372</a>]</span>thousand people, officially admitted to be still +in insurrection within less than two weeks after the announcement of +the inauguration of a civil government, which included them, with its +implied assertion of a state of peace as to them.</p> +<p>If to the three provinces above named you add the province of Samar, +later of dark and bloody fame, you have a fourth province as to which +not only had there been no “civil” government organized on +paper, but no claim yet made by any one that we had ever conquered it. +We had been so busy in Luzon and elsewhere that we had not yet had time +to bother very much with Samar. The area of Samar is 5276 square miles, +and its population 266,237. (See the census tables already cited.) In +their report dated October 15, 1901,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8258src" href="#xd20e8258" name="xd20e8258src">15</a> you find +the Commission admitting that “the insurrection still continues +in Batangas, Samar, Cebu” and “parts of” Laguna and +Tayabas provinces. Now the euphemistic limitation implied in the words +“parts of” is quite negligible, for any serious purpose, +since our troops kept the insurgents rather constantly on the move, and +the population in all the “parts of” any province that was +still holding out backed up the combatants morally and materially, with +information as to our movements, supplies, etc., whenever the insurgent +detachments, in the course of their peregrinations, happened to pass +through those “parts.” So, to make a recapitulation +presenting the political situation admitted by the Commission to exist +a little over three months after the inauguration of civil government, +we have the insurrection still in progress as follows: <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb373" href="#pb373" name="pb373">373</a>]</span></p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Province</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Batangas</td> +<td>1,201</td> +<td>257,715</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cebu</td> +<td>1,939</td> +<td>653,727</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bohol</td> +<td>1,511</td> +<td>269,223</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Laguna</td> +<td>629</td> +<td>148,606</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tayabas</td> +<td>5,993</td> +<td>153,065</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Samar</td> +<td>5,276</td> +<td>266,237</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Total</td> +<td class="sum">16,549</td> +<td class="sum">1,748,573</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>According to his own official statements, it thus appears that on +October 15th, after Governor Taft set up his “civil” +government on the Fourth of July, throughout one-fifth of the territory +and among one-fourth of the population insurrection was rampant. The +total area of the archipelago, if Mohammedan Mindanao be excepted (for +the reason that the Moros never had anything to do with the Filipinos +and their insurrection against us), is about 80,000 square miles, +having a total population of 7,000,000. So that, to restate the case, +one-fifth of the house was still on fire, and one-fourth of the inmates +were trying their best to keep the fire from being put out.</p> +<p>Just here I owe it to President Taft, under whose administration as +governor I served as a judge, as well as to myself, to explain why I +have so frequently put the word “civil” in quotations in +referring to the civil government of the Philippines. Broadly speaking, +if “civil” does not imply consent of the governed, it at +least distinctly negatives the idea of a bleeding, prostrate, and +deeply hostile people. And, in that the civil government of the +Philippines founded in 1901 did so negative the actual conditions it +was a kindly humbug. When you go around the country sending people to +the penitentiary by scores for political crimes, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb374" href="#pb374" name="pb374">374</a>]</span>and +then get criticised afterwards for “subserviency” to the +government you are thus serving, you get a trifle sensitive about such +criticism. Now the core of the charges made in this country against the +Philippine judiciary in the early days was that they were parties to a +humbug, pliable servants of a government which was trying to produce at +home an incorrect impression of substantial <i>absence of +unwillingness</i> on the part of the governed. I am very sure that the +five ex-officers of the volunteer army above named, who went from the +army to the bench, never did, by act or word, lend themselves to the +idea that there was any “consent” on the part of the +governed. Those of us who had been in Cuba with General Wood had but a +little while previously observed there a <i>civil régime</i> +under a <i>military</i> name. We were now, in the Philippines, serving +a <i>military régime</i> under a <i>civil</i> name. We had all +of us doubtless—if there was an exception it is +immaterial—served on military commissions. We therefore felt, +without immodesty, that we could deal out to insurrectos and their +political cousins, the brigands, more even-handed justice, as a +<i>military commission of one</i>, than a board of several officers, +booted, spurred, and travel-stained from some recent man-hunt. Turning, +however, from the more inconspicuous objects of Professor +Willis’s attacks,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8354src" href= +"#xd20e8354" name="xd20e8354src">16</a> the American trial judges in +the Philippines in the pioneer days, to the now wide-looming historic +personage who was his real objective, I was asked at a public meeting +in Boston, rather significantly, by one of the most eminent lawyers in +this country, Mr. Moorfield Storey, formerly president of the American +Bar Association, whether or not there had <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb375" href="#pb375" name="pb375">375</a>]</span>been attempts in the +Philippines, while I was there, to make the judiciary subservient to +the executive. My answer was, “No, the lawyers who have been in +charge of the Philippine Government have never been guilty of any +unprofessional conduct.” But the distinguished Boston barrister +above referred to has a nephew who is now and has been since 1909, +Governor of the Philippines—and who, before he went out there was +a representative of Big Business in Boston—Governor Forbes, and I +have no idea that any judge who during that time has rendered any +decision of importance he did not like has been promoted to the Supreme +Bench of the Islands, though I know that under Governor Taft, Judge +Carson unhesitatingly declared a certain act of the Commission null and +void as being in conflict with an Act of Congress, and before the +time-servers had gotten through wondering at his rashness, Mr. Taft had +him put on the Supreme Bench of the Philippines<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8365src" href="#xd20e8365" name="xd20e8365src">17</a> because he +liked that kind of a judge.</p> +<p>Having sown the wind by setting up his civil government too soon, +let us now observe the whirlwind Governor Taft reaped within six months +thereafter. Of course the civil and military folk were at +daggers’ points. That goes without saying. But their differences +were decorously suppressed so that the Filipinos did not get hold of +them. To that end, the situation was also diligently concealed in the +United States. In his proclamation of July 4, 1902, you find President +Roosevelt publicly smoothing the ruffled feathers of that rugged hero +of many battles in two hemispheres, General Chaffee, and also +commending Governor Taft, and telling them how harmoniously they had +gotten along together to the credit of their common country. But in +1901, shortly after General Chaffee <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb376" href="#pb376" name="pb376">376</a>]</span>had relieved General +MacArthur, you find the following cablegram:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first dateline"><span class="sc">Executive Mansion, +Washington</span>,<br> +October 8, 1901.</p> +<p><span class="sc">Chaffee, Manila</span>: I am deeply chagrined, to +use the mildest possible term, over the trouble between yourself and +Taft. I wish you to see him personally, and spare no effort to secure +prompt and friendly agreement in regard to the differences between you. +Have cabled him also. It is most unfortunate to have any action which +produces friction and which may have a serious effect both in the +Philippines <i>and here at home</i>. I trust implicitly that you and +Taft will come to agreement.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Theodore Roosevelt</span>.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e8390src" href="#xd20e8390" name= +"xd20e8390src">18</a></p> +</div> +<p>The most important words of the above telegram are “and here +at home.” The “serious effect here at home” so +earnestly deprecated was that the real issue between General Chaffee +and Governor Taft might be ventilated by some Congressional Committee, +and thus bring out the prematurity with which, to meet political +exigencies, the civil government had been set up. The issue was that +General Chaffee was recognizing the hostility of the people, and +deprecating the withdrawal of the police protection of the army from +districts in which there were many people who, though tired of keeping +up the struggle, and willing to quit, were being harried by the +die-in-the-last-ditch contingent. This would mean, ultimately, an +examination, such as has already been made in this volume, of the +evidence on which Governor Taft based his half-baked opinion of 1900 +that “the great majority” were “entirely +willing” to American sovereignty. It would also show up Mr. +Root’s nonsense about “the patient and unconsenting +millions,” so shamelessly flouted in the presidential +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb377" href="#pb377" name= +"pb377">377</a>]</span>campaign of 1900, and his pious Philippics +against delivering said millions “into the hands of the assassin, +Aguinaldo,”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8399src" href="#xd20e8399" +name="xd20e8399src">19</a> and would reveal the truth confessed by +Secretary Root in a speech made to the cadets at West Point in July, +1902, after the trouble had blown over, in which, apropos of the valor +and services of the army, he referred proudly to its having then just +completed the suppression of “an insurrection of 7,000,000 +people.”</p> +<p>On September 28, 1901, just prior to President Roosevelt’s +above cablegram pouring oil on the troubled politico-military insular +waters, a company of General Chaffee’s command, Company C, of the +9th Infantry, had been taken off their guard and massacred at a place +called Balangiga, in the island of Samar.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8404src" href="#xd20e8404" name="xd20e8404src">20</a> This had +made General Chaffee somewhat angry, and explains the subsequent dark +and bloody drama of which General “Jake” Smith was the +central figure, whereby Samar was made “a howling +wilderness.” But Governor Taft was filled with much more +solicitude about the success of his civil government than he was about +the obscure lives lost at Balangiga. Apropos of the Balangiga affair he +was wearing the patience of the doughty Chaffee with remarks like this: +“The people are friendly to the civil government,” and +suavely speaking of “the evidence which accumulates on every hand +of the desire of the people at large for peace and protection by the +civil government.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8413src" href= +"#xd20e8413" name="xd20e8413src">21</a> The same Taft <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb378" href="#pb378" name= +"pb378">378</a>]</span>report goes on to deprecate “rigor in the +treatment” of the situation and the “consequent revulsion +in those feelings of friendship toward the Americans which have been +growing stronger each day with the spread and development of the civil +government.”</p> +<p>General “Jake” Smith was sent to Samar shortly after the +Balangiga massacre, and did indeed make the place a howling wilderness, +with his famous “kill-and-burn” orders, instructions to +“kill everything over ten years old” and so forth, and the +army was in sympathy generally with most of what he did,—except, +of course, the unspeakable “10 year old” part—piously +exclaiming, as fallible human nature often will in such circumstances, +“Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord.” Now the civil +government could have put a stop to all this if it had wanted to. It +had the backing of President Roosevelt. But it quietly accepted the +benefit of such “fear of God”—to use the army’s +rather sacrilegious expression about that Samar campaign—as the +military arm put into the heart of the Filipino, and went on the even +tenor of its way, still maintaining that the Filipinos must like us +because the civil government was so benevolent,—as if the +Filipinos drew any nice distinctions between Governor Taft and General +Chaffee, or supposed the two did not represent one and the same +government, the government of the United States. There was much +investigation about that awful Samar campaign afterward. General Smith +was court-martialed and partly whitewashed, at least not dismissed. At +General Smith’s court-martial, there was some dispute about the +alleged orders to “kill and burn,” to “kill +everything over ten years old,” etc. But the nature of the +campaign may be inferred from General Smith’s famous circular No. +6, which, issued on Christmas eve, 1901, advised his command, in +effect, that he <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb379" href="#pb379" +name="pb379">379</a>]</span>did not take much stock in the civil +commission’s confidence that the people really wanted peace; that +he was “thoroughly convinced” that the wealthy people in +the towns of his district were aiding the insurgents while pretending +to be friendly and that he proposed to</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">adopt a policy that will create <i>in all the minds of +all the people a burning desire for the war to cease</i>; a desire or +longing <i>so intense, so personal, and so real</i> that it will +<i>impel</i> them to devote themselves in real earnest to bringing +about a <i>real state</i> of peace.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8440src" +href="#xd20e8440" name="xd20e8440src">22</a></p> +</div> +<p>During all his trial troubles, General Smith “took what was +coming to him” without a murmur, and General Chaffee stuck to him +as far as he could without assuming the primary responsibility for the +fearful orders above alluded to. If, when General Smith went to Samar, +his superior officer, General Chaffee, was in just the direly vengeful +frame of mind he, General Smith, afterwards displayed, and prompted him +to do, substantially, what he afterward did, which is by no means +unlikely, General Smith never whimpered or put the blame on his chief. +But a fearful lesson was given the Filipinos, and the civil government +profited by it. General Chaffee was never really pressed on whether he +did or did not prompt General Smith to do what he did; Governor Taft +was never even criticised for not protesting; but with a flourish of +presidential trumpets, General Smith was finally made “the +goat,” by being summarily placed on the retired list, and that +closed the bloody Samar episode of 1901–02. I wonder General +Smith has not gone and wept on General Miles’s shoulder and like +him become a member of the Anti-Imperialist League of Boston. Some of +the best fighting men in <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb380" href= +"#pb380" name="pb380">380</a>]</span>the army say that as a soldier in +battle General Smith is superb. At any rate he may find spiritual +consolation in the following passage of the Scriptures which fits and +describes his case:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">But the goat, on which the lot fell to be the +scapegoat, shall be presented alive before the Lord, to make an +atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat into the +wilderness.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8452src" href="#xd20e8452" name= +"xd20e8452src">23</a></p> +</div> +<p>In his Report for 1901 Governor Taft says that the four principal +provinces, including Batangas, which gave trouble shortly after the +civil government was set up in that year, and had to be returned to +military control, were organized under civil rule “on the +recommendation” of the then commanding general +(MacArthur)<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8460src" href="#xd20e8460" name= +"xd20e8460src">24</a>: It certainly seems unlikely that the haste to +change from military rule to civil rule came on the motion of the +military. If the Commission ever got, <i>in writing</i>, from General +MacArthur, a “recommendation” that any provinces be placed +under civil rule while still in insurrection, the text of the writing +will show a mere soldiery acquiescence in the will of Mr. McKinley, the +commander-in-chief. Parol contemporaneous evidence will show that +General MacArthur told them, substantially, that they were +“riding for a fall.” In fact, whenever an insurrection +would break out in a province after Governor Taft’s inauguration +as governor, the whole attitude of the army in the Philippines, from +the commanding general down, was “I told you so.” They did +not say this where Governor Taft could hear it, but it was common +knowledge that they were much addicted to damning +“politics” as the cause of all the trouble. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb381" href="#pb381" name="pb381">381</a>]</span></p> +<p>Governor Taft’s statement in his report for 1901, that the +four principal provinces, above named, Batangas and the rest, were +organized under civil rule “on the recommendation of General +MacArthur,” is fully explained in his testimony before the Senate +Committee of 1902. From the various passages hereinbefore quoted from +President McKinley’s state papers concerning the Philippines, +especially his messages to Congress, the political pressure Mr. +McKinley was under from the beginning to make a show of +“civil” government, thus emphasizing the alleged absence of +any real substantial opposition to our rule by a seeming absence of +necessity for the use of force, so as to palliate American repugnance +to forcing a government upon an unwilling people, has been made clear. +There were to be no “dark days of reconstruction.” The +Civil War in the United States from 1861 to 1865 was a love feast +compared with our war in the Philippines. Yet the work of +reconstruction in the Philippines was to be predicated on the theory of +consent, so persistently urged by President McKinley before the +American people from the beginning, viz., that the insurrection +represented only a small faction of the people. We have seen how +General MacArthur also had originally, in 1898, entertained this +notion, and how by the time he took Malolos in March, 1899, he had +gotten over this notion, and had—regretfully—recognized +that “the whole people are loyal to Aguinaldo and the cause he +represents.” And now came Governor Taft, after fifteen months +more of continuous fighting, to tell General MacArthur, on behalf of +Mr. McKinley, that he, MacArthur, did not know what he was talking +about, and that “the great majority” were for American +rule. The representative men of my own State of Georgia welcomed the +return of the State to military control in 1870. Most of them +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb382" href="#pb382" name= +"pb382">382</a>]</span>had been officers of the Confederate army. The +Federal commander simply told them that if <i>they</i> could not +restrain the lawless element of their own people, <i>he would</i>. By +premature setting up of the Philippine civil government, the lawless +element was allowed full swing. General MacArthur had been in the Civil +War. He knew something about reconstruction. But here were the Taft +Commission, with instructions from Mr. McKinley to the effect that +civil government, government “essentially <i>popular</i> in +form,” was to be set up as fast as territory was conquered. It +didn’t make any difference about the government being +“essentially popular” just so it was “essentially +popular <i>in form</i>.” To the Senate Committee of 1902, +Governor Taft said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">General MacArthur and the Commission did differ as to +where the power lay with respect to the organization of civil +governments, as to <i>who should say what civil governments should be +organized</i>, the Commission contending that, under the instructions, +it was left to them, and General MacArthur thinking that everything was +subject to military control ultimately, in view of the fact that the +islands were <i>in a state of war</i>.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8495src" href="#xd20e8495" name="xd20e8495src">25</a></p> +</div> +<p>Governor Taft then added that he and General MacArthur reached a +<i>modus vivendi</i>. When a good soldier once finds out just what his +commander-in-chief wants done, he will endeavor, in loyal good faith, +to carry out the spirit of instructions, no matter how unwise they may +seem to him. As soon as General MacArthur saw what President McKinley +wanted done, he proceeded to co-operate loyally with Governor Taft to +carry out the plan. He well knew the country was not ready for civil +government, but if Mr. McKinley was bent on crowding civil government +forward as fast <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb383" href="#pb383" +name="pb383">383</a>]</span>as territory was conquered, he would make +his recommendations on that basis. In the matter of the utter folly of +the prematurity with which the civil government was set up in the +Philippines in 1901, and the terrible consequences to the hapless +Filipinos, hereinafter described, which followed, by reason of the +premature withdrawal of the police protection of the army and the sense +of security its several garrisons radiated, from a country just +recovering from some six years of war, General MacArthur’s +exemption from responsibility is shown by his reports for 1900 and +1901.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8507src" href="#xd20e8507" name= +"xd20e8507src">26</a> The former has already been fully examined, and +the original sharp differences between him and Governor Taft made +clear. In the latter report dated July 4, 1901, the date of the Taft +inauguration as Governor, and also, if I mistake not, the day of +General MacArthur’s final departure for the United States, the +latter washes his hands of the kindly McKinley-Taft nonsense, born of +political expediency, about there having never been any real +fundamental or unanimous resistance, in no uncertain terms thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Anything in the immediate future calculated to impede +the activity or reduce the efficiency of these instruments [our +military forces,] will not only be a menace to the present, but <i>put +in jeopardy the entire future of American possibilities in the +archipelago</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8526src" href="#xd20e8526" +name="xd20e8526src">27</a></p> +</div> +<p>No, President Taft can never make General MacArthur “the +goat” for what General Bell had to do in Batangas Province in +1901–02 to make our “willing” subjects behave. Nor +can the ultimate responsibility before the bar of history for the awful +fact that, according <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb384" href="#pb384" +name="pb384">384</a>]</span>to the United States Coast and Geodetic +Survey Atlas of the Philippines of 1899, the population of Batangas +Province was 312,192, and according to the American Census of the +Philippines of 1903 it was 257,715,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8535src" +href="#xd20e8535" name="xd20e8535src">28</a> rest entirely on military +shoulders. An attempt to place the responsibility for the prematurity +of the civil government on General MacArthur was made by Honorable +Henry C. Ide, who was of the Taft Commission of 1900, and later +Governor General of the Islands, and is now Minister to Spain, in the +<i>North American Review</i> for December, 1907. But Mr. Taft, a man of +nobler mould, has at least maintained a decorous silence on the subject +except when interrogated by Congress, and when so interrogated, his +testimony, above quoted, if analyzed, places the responsibility where +it honestly belongs. In 1900 the Taft Commission were not taking much +military advice.</p> +<p>Batangas province was first taken under the wing of the +peace-at-any-price policy by the Act of the Taft Commission of May 2, +1901, entitled “An Act Extending the Provisions of ‘the +Provincial Government Act’<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8546src" +href="#xd20e8546" name="xd20e8546src">29</a> to the Province of +Batangas.” By the Act of the Commission of July 17, 1901, the +provinces of Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol, were restored to military +control. When the civil authorities turned those provinces back to +military control, they well knew the frame of mind the military were +in, and there is no escape from the proposition that they, in effect, +said to the military: “Take them and chasten them; go as far as +you like. After you are done with them, it will be time enough to +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb385" href="#pb385" name= +"pb385">385</a>]</span>pet them again. But for the present we mean +business.” General Bell was scathingly criticised on the floor of +the United States Senate for what he did in Batangas in 1901–02, +but by the time he took hold there it had become a case of “spare +the rod and spoil the child.” The substitution by the Commission +of kindness, and a disposition to forget what the Filipinos could not +forget, for firmness and the policy of making them submit unreservedly +to the inevitable,—viz., abandonment of their dream of +independence—had created among them a well-nigh ineradicable +impression that, for some reason or other, whether due to disapproval +in the United States of the so-called “imperial” policy or +what not, we were afraid of them. General Bell’s task in +Batangas, therefore, was to eradicate this impression all over the +archipelago by making an example of the Batangas people.</p> +<p>In General Chaffee’s report for 1902,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8553src" href="#xd20e8553" name="xd20e8553src">30</a> he prefaces +his account of General Bell’s operations in Batangas as +follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The long-continued resistance in the province of +Batangas and in certain parts of the bordering provinces of Tayabas, +Laguna, and Cavite, had made it apparent to me and to others that the +insurrectionary force keeping up the struggle there could exist and +maintain itself only through the connivance and knowledge of +practically all the inhabitants; that it received the active support of +many who professed friendship for United States authority, etc.</p> +</div> +<p>This last was a thrust at Governor Taft’s new-found Filipino +friends and advisers, in whose lack of sympathy with the cause of their +country the Governor so profoundly believed, but in whose continuing +co-operation <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb386" href="#pb386" name= +"pb386">386</a>]</span>in the killing of his soldiers General Chaffee +believed still more profoundly.</p> +<p>General Bell’s famous operations on a large scale in Batangas +began January 1, 1902. The great mistake of the Civil Commission, to +which they adhered so long, was in supposing that when the respectable +military element of the insurgents was pursued to capture or surrender, +these last <i>could</i> and <i>would</i> thereafter control the +situation. As a matter of fact, whether they could or not, they did +not.</p> +<p>In his celebrated circular order dated Batangas, December 9, 1901, +General Bell announced:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first salute">To all Station Commanders:</p> +<p>A general conviction, which the brigade commander shares, appears to +exist, that the insurrection in this brigade continues because the +greater part of the people, especially the wealthy ones, <i>pretend</i> +to desire, but do not in reality <i>want</i> peace; that when all +<i>really want</i> peace, we can have it promptly. Under such +circumstances, it is clearly indicated that a policy should be adopted +that will, as soon as possible, make the people <i>want peace</i> and +<i>want it badly</i>.</p> +<p>The only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real sentiments +of either individuals or town councils should be such acts publicly +performed as must <i>inevitably commit them irrevocably</i> to the side +of Americans by arousing the animosity of the insurgent element. +* * * No person should be given credit for loyalty simply +because he takes the oath of allegiance, or secretly conveys to +Americans worthless information and idle rumors which result in +nothing. Those who <i>publicly</i> guide our troops to the camps of the +enemy, who <i>publicly</i> identify insurgents, who <i>accompany troops +in operations</i> against the enemy, who denounce and assist in +arresting the secret enemies of the Government, who <i>publicly</i> +obtain and bring <i>reliable</i> and <i>valuable</i> information to +commanding officers, those in fact who <i>publicly</i> array themselves +against the insurgents, and for Americans, should be <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb387" href="#pb387" name= +"pb387">387</a>]</span>trusted and given credit for loyalty, <i>but no +others</i>. No person should be given credit for loyalty solely on +account of having done nothing for or against us so far as known. +Neutrality should not be tolerated. Every inhabitant of this brigade +should be either active friend or be classed as enemy.</p> +</div> +<p>In his Circular Order No. 5, dated Batangas, December 13, +1901,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8631src" href="#xd20e8631" name= +"xd20e8631src">31</a> General Bell announced that General Orders No. +100, Adjutant General’s Office, 1863, approved and published by +order of President Lincoln, for the government of the armies of the +United States in the field, would thereafter be regarded as the guide +of his subordinates in the conduct of the war. This order is familiar +to all who have ever made any study of military law. Ordinarily, of +course, a captured enemy is entitled to “the honors of +war,” <i>i. e.</i>, he must be held, housed, and fed, unless +exchanged, until the close of the war. But where an enemy places +himself by his conduct without the pale of the laws of war, <i>i. +e.</i>, where he does not “play the game according to the +rules,” he may be killed on sight, like other outlaws.</p> +<p>Under General Orders No. 100, 1863, men and squads of men who, +without commission, without being part or portion of the regularly +organized hostile army, fight occasionally only, and with intermittent +returns to their homes and avocations, and frequent assumption of the +semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character +and appearance of soldiers; armed prowlers seeking to cut telegraph +wires, destroy bridges and the like, etc., are not entitled to the +protection of the laws of war and may be shot on sight. In other words, +the game being one of life and death, you must take even chances with +your opponent. General Bell’s defenders on the floor of the +Senate simply relied <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb388" href="#pb388" +name="pb388">388</a>]</span>on General Orders No. 100. However, there +is nothing about reconcentration in that order. We learned that from +the Spaniards. In fact we never did succeed in bringing to terms the +far Eastern colonies we bought from Spain, until we adopted her methods +with regard to them. Another of the expedients adopted by General Bell +in Batangas seems harsh, but it was used by Wellington in the latter +end of the Napoleonic wars, and by the Germans in the latter end of the +Franco-Prussian War. It was to promise the inhabitants of a given +territory that whenever a telegraph wire or pole was cut the country +within a stated radius thereof, including all human habitations, would +be devastated. It is in General Bell’s Circular Order No. 7 of +December 15, 1901,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8648src" href= +"#xd20e8648" name="xd20e8648src">32</a> that we find the genesis of the +idea of basing tactics used by Weyler in Cuba on Mr. Lincoln’s +General Order 100. He there says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Though Section 17, General Orders 100, authorizes the +starving of unarmed hostile belligerents as well as armed ones, +provided it leads to a speedier subjection of the enemy, it is +considered neither justifiable nor desirable to permit any person to +starve <i>who has come into towns under our control seeking +protection</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>This order goes on to direct that all food supplies encountered be +brought to the towns. Of course this does not mean supplies captured +from the enemy’s forces, which may lawfully be destroyed at once. +To those not familiar with reconcentration tactics it should be +explained that reconcentration means this: You notify, by proclamation +and otherwise, all persons within a given area, that on and after a +certain day they must all leave their homes and come within a certain +prescribed zone or radius of which a named <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb389" href="#pb389" name="pb389">389</a>]</span>town +is usually the centre, there to remain until further orders, and that +all persons found outside that zone after the date named will be +treated as public enemies. General Bell’s order of December 20th, +provided that rice found in the possession of families outside the +protected zone should, if practicable, be moved with them to the town +which was the centre of the zone, that that found apparently +<i>cached</i> for enemy’s use should be confiscated, and also +destroyed if necessary.</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Whenever it is found absolutely impossible to +transport it [any food supply] to a point within the protected zone, it +will be burned or otherwise destroyed. <i>These rules will apply to all +food products</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>No person within the reconcentration zones was permitted to go +outside thereof—cross the dead line—without a written pass. +The Circular Order of December 23d, apparently solicitous lest +subordinate commanders might become infected with the Taft belief in +Filipino affection, directs that after January 1, 1902, all the +municipal officials, members of the police force, etc., “who have +not <i>fully complied</i> with their duty by <i>actively</i> aiding the +Americans and rendering them <i>valuable</i> service,” shall be +<i>summarily thrown into prison</i>.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8689src" href="#xd20e8689" name="xd20e8689src">33</a> Circular +Order No. 19, issued on Christmas Eve, 1901, provided that,</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">in order to make the existing state o£ war and +martial law <i>so inconvenient and unprofitable to the people that they +will earnestly desire and work for</i> the re-establishment of peace +and <i>civil government</i>,</p> +</div> +<p>subordinate commanders might, under certain prescribed restrictions, +put everybody they chose to work on the roads.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8707src" href="#xd20e8707" name="xd20e8707src">34</a> This was an +ingenious blow at the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb390" href= +"#pb390" name="pb390">390</a>]</span>wealthy and soft-handed, intended +to superinduce submission by humbling their pride. Note also the seeds +of affection thus sown for the civil government under the +reconstruction period which was to follow. In one of Dickens novels +there occurs a law firm by the name of Spenlow and Jorkins. Mr. Spenlow +was quite fond of considering himself, and of being considered by +others, as tender-hearted. Mr. Jorkins did not mind. When the widow and +the orphan would plead with Mr. Spenlow to stay the foreclosure of a +mortgage, that benevolent soul would tell them, with a pained +expression of infinite sympathy, that he would do all he could for +them, but that they would have to see Mr. Jorkins, “who is a very +exacting man,” he would say. In the dual American +politico-military régime in the Philippines of 1901–02, +Governor Taft was the Mr. Spenlow, General Chaffee the Mr. Jorkins. But +the former always seemed to harbor the amiable delusion that the +Filipinos did not at all consider <i>the firm</i> as the movants in +each proceeding against them, and that on the contrary they were sure +to make a favorable contrast in their hearts between the kindness of +Mr. Spenlow and the harshness of Mr. Jorkins. He seemed blind to the +fact that the Filipinos, in considering what was done by <i>any</i> of +us, spelled <i>us</i>—U. S.</p> +<p>General Bell’s Circular Order No. 22, also a Christmas Eve +product, re-iterates the usual purpose to make the people yearn for +civil government, and the usual warning that none of them really and +truly want the blessings of American domination and Benevolent +Assimilation as they truly should, and adds:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">To combat such a population, it is necessary to make +the state of war as insupportable as possible; and there is no more +efficacious way of accomplishing this than by <i>keeping <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb391" href="#pb391" name="pb391">391</a>]</span>the +minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that +living under such conditions will soon become unbearable</i>. Little +should be said. The less said the better. Let acts, not words, convey +intentions.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8733src" href="#xd20e8733" name= +"xd20e8733src">35</a></p> +</div> +<p>Under date of December 26, 1901, General Bell reports:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2500 men, +who will be used in columns of fifty each. I expect to accompany the +command. * * * I take so large a command for the purpose of +thoroughly searching <i>each ravine, valley, and mountain peak</i> for +insurgents and for food, expecting to <i>destroy everything I find +outside of town</i>. <i>All able-bodied men will be killed or +captured.</i></p> +</div> +<p>Such was the central idea animating the Bell Brigade that overran +Batangas in 1902. The American soldier in officially sanctioned wrath +is a thing so ugly and dangerous that it would take a Kipling to +describe him. I have seen him in that mood, but to describe it is +beyond me. Side by side with innumerable ambuscades incident to the +nature of the field service as it then was, in which little affairs the +soldier above mentioned had lost many a “bunkie,” there had +gone on for some time, under the McKinley-Taft peace-at-any-price +policy, whose keynote was that no American should have a job a Filipino +could fill, much appointing to municipal and other offices of +Filipinos, many of whom had at once set to work to make their new +offices useful to the cause of their country by systematic aid to the +ambuscade business. With this and the Balangiga massacre ever in mind, +the men of General Bell’s brigade began their work in Batangas in +a mood which quite made for fidelity in performance of orders to +“make living unbearable” for the Filipino “by acts, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb392" href="#pb392" name= +"pb392">392</a>]</span>not words.” Also, the American soldier can +sing, sometimes very badly, but often rather irrepressibly, until +stopped by his officer. Also, whether justly or unjustly is beside the +question, he considers a politician who pets the enemy in the midst of +a war a hypocrite. So General Bell’s 2500 men began that Batangas +campaign on New Year’s Day, 1902, giving preference, out of their +repertoire, to a campaign song whose ominous chorus ran:</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">“He may be a brother of William H. Taft</p> +<p class="line">But he ain’t no friend of mine,”</p> +</div> +<p class="first">and between songs they would say purringly to one +another, “Remember Balangiga.” <i>And their commanding +officer was the very incarnation of this feeling.</i> So listen to the +stride of his seven-league boots and the ring of his iron heel:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I expect to first clean out the wide Looboo Peninsula. +I shall then move command to the vicinity of Lake Taal, and sweep the +country westward to the ocean and south of Cavite, returning through +Lipa. I shall <i>scour and clean up</i> the Lipa mountains. Swinging +northward, the country in the vicinity of [here follows a long list of +towns] will be <i>scoured</i>, ending at [a named mountain], which will +then be <i>thoroughly searched and devastated</i>. Swinging back to the +right, the same treatment will be given all the country of which [two +named mountains] are the main peaks.</p> +</div> +<p>And so on <i lang="la">ad libitum</i>. General Bell’s course +in Batangas was commended in the annual report of his immediate +superior, a very humane, as well as gallant, soldier, General Wheaton, +as “a model in suppressing insurrections under like +circumstances.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8784src" href= +"#xd20e8784" name="xd20e8784src">36</a> The Batangas programme was +approved by General Chaffee, the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb393" +href="#pb393" name="pb393">393</a>]</span>commanding general. In 1902 +the United States Senate rang with indiscriminate denunciation of the +Batangas severities and the Samar “kill and burn” orders. I +tried in 1903, without success, to satisfy my distinguished and beloved +fellow-townsman, Senator Bacon, that at the time it was adopted it had +become a military necessity, which it had. The fact was that the +McKinley-Taft policy of conciliation, intended to gild the rivets of +alien domination and cure the desire for independence by coddling, had +loaned aid and comfort to the enemy, by creating, among a people used +theretofore solely to force as a governmental agency for making +sovereignty respected, the pathetic notion that we were afraid of them, +and might be weakening in respect to our declared programme of denying +them independence. The Bell opinion of the Commission’s +confidence in Filipino gladness at its advent among them is +sufficiently apparent in his orders to his troops. On May 23, 1902, +Senator Bacon read in the Senate a letter from an officer of the army, +a West Point graduate and a personal friend of the Senator’s, +whose name he withheld, but for whose veracity he vouched, which letter +alluded to “a reconcentrado, pen with a dead line outside, beyond +which everything living is shot”; spoke of “this +corpse-carcass stench wafted in” (to where the letter-writer sat +writing) as making it “slightly unpleasant here,” and made +your flesh crawl thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">At nightfall clouds of vampire bats softly swirl out +on their orgies over the dead.</p> +</div> +<p>This does not sound to me like Batangas and Bell. It sounds like +Smith and Samar. There were about 100,000 people, all told, gathered in +the reconcentrado <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb394" href="#pb394" +name="pb394">394</a>]</span>camps in Batangas under General +Bell,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8799src" href="#xd20e8799" name= +"xd20e8799src">37</a> and they were handled as efficiently as General +Funston handled matters after the San Francisco fire. There was no +starvation in those camps. All the reconcentrados had to do was not to +cross the dead line of the reconcentration zone, and to draw their +rations, which were provided as religiously as any ordinary American +who is not a fiend and has plenty of rice on hand for the purpose will +give it to the hungry. The reconcentrado camps and the people in them +were daily looked after by medical officers of the American army. +General Bell’s active campaigning began in Batangas January 1, +1902, Malvar surrendered April 16 thereafter, and Batangas was +thoroughly purged of insurrectos and the like by July. During this +period the total of <span class="corr" id="xd20e8805" title= +"Source: insurgent">insurgents</span> killed was only 163, and wounded +209; and 3626 insurgents surrendered.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8808src" href="#xd20e8808" name="xd20e8808src">38</a></p> +<p>The truth is General Bell’s “bark” was much worse +than his “bite.” The inestimable value of what he did in +Batangas in 1901–02 lay in convincing the Filipinos once and for +all that we were not as impotent as the civil-government coddling had +led them quite naturally, but very foolishly, to think we were. +Reference was made above to the fact that the population of Batangas in +1899 was 312,192, and in 1903, 257,715. Those figures were inserted at +the outset to make General Bell’s “bark” sound +louder, but now that we are considering his +“bite”—how many lives his Batangas lesson to the +Filipino people cost—another bit of testimony is tremendously +relevant. On December 18, 1901, the Provincial Secretary of Batangas +Province reported to Governor Taft that the mortality in Batangas +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb395" href="#pb395" name= +"pb395">395</a>]</span>due to war, pestilence, and famine “has +reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants +which in former years the province had.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8817src" href="#xd20e8817" name="xd20e8817src">39</a> Considering +that General Bell’s 1901–’02 campaign in that +ill-fated province cost outright but 163 killed,—how many of the +209 wounded recovered does not appear; they may have all +recovered—the Bell programme in Batangas was indeed a very tender +model, from the humanitarian stand-point, of civilizing with a Krag, a +model of “suppressing insurrection under like +circumstances.” But it was never again followed. It had made too +much noise at home. Senator Bacon’s “corpse-carcass +stench” from supposed reconcentrado pens and his “clouds of +vampire bats softly swirling on their orgies over the dead,” so +vividly reminded our people of why they had driven Spain out of Cuba, +that the Administration became apprehensive. Until the noise about the +Batangas business, our people had been led by Governor Taft and +President Roosevelt to believe that the Filipinos were most sobbingly +in love with “a benign civil government” and had forgotten +all about independence. It was obvious that a repetition of such a +campaign in any other province might create in the public mind at home +a disgust with the whole Philippine policy which would be heard at the +polls in the next presidential election. So the Batangas affair made it +certain that the army was not going to be ordered out again in the +Philippines before said next presidential election, at least; whatever +castigation might be deemed advisable thereafter.</p> +<p>It was intimated above that Senator Bacon’s army +friend’s “clouds of vampire bats softly swirling” +over the corpses of reconcentrados, were doing said swirling <i>not</i> +over Batangas at all, but over Samar. Any man familiar with the lay of +the land in the two provinces <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb396" +href="#pb396" name="pb396">396</a>]</span>can see from the letter that +it was written from Samar. Moreover, Colonel Wagner afterwards +testified before the Senate Committee of 1902<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8830src" href="#xd20e8830" name="xd20e8830src">40</a> that if +there had been any great mortality in the reconcentration camps in +Batangas, he would have known of it. He inspected practically all those +Batangas camps. Nobody who was in the islands at the time doubts but +what such conditions may have obtained in some places under General +Smith in Samar, or believes for a moment that any such conditions would +have been tolerated under General Bell. General Bell has that aversion +to either causing or witnessing needless suffering, which you almost +invariably find in men who are both constitutionally brave and +temperamentally generous and considerate of others. But the moral +sought to be pointed here is not that the Bell reconcentration in +Batangas was as merciful as the Smith performances in Samar were +hellish, but that, in all matters concerning the Philippines, the army, +as in the case of Senator Bacon’s friend, is gagged by operation +of law, and its enforced silence is peculiarly an asset in the hands of +the party in power seeking to continue in power, in a distant colonial +enterprise. Senator Bacon withheld his friend’s name, because for +an army officer to tell the truth about the Philippines would be likely +to get him into trouble with the President of the United States. The +President, be it remembered, is also the leader of the political party +to which he belongs. That is why the country has never been able to get +any light from those who know the most about the Philippines and the +wisdom or unwisdom of keeping them, viz., the army. In 1898 this +republic was beguiled into abandonment of the faiths of the founders +and started after a gold brick, thinking it was a Klondyke. Then and +ever since, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb397" href="#pb397" name= +"pb397">397</a>]</span>the most important and material witnesses +concerning the wisdom or unwisdom of keeping the brick, viz., the +army,—which best of all knows the rank folly of it—have +been gagged by operation of law. All republics that have heretofore +become monarchies, have become so through manipulation of the army by +men in power seeking to continue in power. We should either resign our +expensive kingship over the Philippines or get a king for the whole +business, and be done with it. We have some ready-made coronet initials +in T. R.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8837src" href="#xd20e8837" name= +"xd20e8837src">41</a></p> +<p>“On June 23, 1902,” says General Chaffee, in his report +for that year,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8845src" href="#xd20e8845" +name="xd20e8845src">42</a> “by Act No. 421 of the Philippine +Commission, so much of Act No. 173, of July 17, 1901, as transferred +the province of Batangas to military control was revoked. Civil +government was re-established in the province at 12 o’clock noon, +July 4, 1902.” The rest of the 1,748,573 people herein above +mentioned as constituting the population of Batangas, Cebu, Bohol, +Laguna, Tayabas, and Samar, were also in turn made to “want peace +and want it badly,” and on July 4, 1902, President Roosevelt +issued his proclamation declaring that a state of general and complete +peace existed. This is the famous proclamation in which he +congratulated General Chaffee and the officers and men of his command +on “a total of more than 2000 combats, great and small,” +most of them subsequent to the Taft roseate cablegrams of 1900, and the +still more roseate reports of 1901 from the same source. The +proclamation appeared in the Philippines as General Orders No. 66, +Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, dated July 4, +1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8850src" href="#xd20e8850" name= +"xd20e8850src">43</a> It directed, in the body of it, that it be +“read aloud at parade in every military post.” It thanked +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb398" href="#pb398" name= +"pb398">398</a>]</span>the officers and enlisted men of the army in the +Philippines, in the name of the President of the United States, for the +courage and fortitude, the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with +which they had been fighting up to that time, alluded to the impliedly +lamb-like or turn-the-other-cheek way in which they had been behaving +(no special reference is made either to Batangas, Samar, or the +water-cure), and closes with a bully Rooseveltian war-whoop about the +“more than 2000 combats, great and small,” above mentioned. +It also referred to how, “<i>with admirable good temper</i> and +loyalty to American ideals its (the army’s) commanding generals +have joined with the civilian agents of the government” in the +work of superinducing allegiance to American sovereignty. This document +is one of the most remarkable state papers of that most remarkable of +men, ex-President Roosevelt, in its evidences of ability to mould +powerful discordant elements to his will. It put everybody in a good +humor. And yet, read at every military post, it served notice on the +military that if they knew which side their bread was buttered on, they +had better forget everything they knew tending to show the prematurity +of the setting-up of the civil government, sheath all tomahawks and +scalping knives they might have whetted and waiting for Governor +Taft’s exit from office, abstain from chatty letters to United +States Senators telling tales out of school, such as the one Senator +Bacon had read on the floor of the Senate (already noticed), and +dutifully <i>perceive</i>, in the future, that the war was ended, as +officially announced in the proclamation itself.</p> +<p>The report of the Philippine Commission for 1902, declares that the +insurrection “as an organized attempt to subvert the authority of +the United States” is over (p. 3). They then proceed, with +evident sincerity, to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb399" href= +"#pb399" name="pb399">399</a>]</span>describe the popularity of +themselves and their policies with the same curious blindness you +sometimes find in your Congressional district, in the type of man who +thinks he could be elected to Congress “in a walk” if he +should only announce his candidacy, when as a matter of fact, the great +majority of the people of his district are, for some notorious reason +connected with his past history among them,—say his war +record—very much prejudiced against him. They repeat one of their +favorite sentiments about the whole country—always except +“as hereinafter excepted”—being now engaged in +<i>enjoying</i> civil government. But they casually admit also that +“much remains to be done” in suppressing lawlessness and +disturbances, so as to perfect and accentuate said +“enjoyment.”</p> +<p>Let us see just what the state of the country was in this regard +according to their own showing. They say:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The six years of war to which these islands have been +subjected have naturally created a class of restless men utterly +lacking in habits of industry, taught to live and prey upon the country +for their support by the confiscation of food supplies as a war +measure, and regarding the duties of a laborer as dull and impossible +for one who has tasted the excitement of a guerrilla life. Even to the +man anxious to return to agricultural pursuits, the conditions existing +present no temptation. By the war and by the rinderpest, chiefly the +latter, the carabaos, or water-buffaloes, <i>have been reduced to ten +per cent. of their former number</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>Think of the condition of a country, <i>any</i> country, but +especially one whose wealth is almost wholly agricultural, which has +just had nine tenths of its plow animals absolutely swept off the face +of the earth by war and its immediate consequences. The report +proceeds: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb400" href="#pb400" name= +"pb400">400</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The chief food of the common people of these islands +is rice, and the carabao is the indispensable instrument of the people +in the cultivation of rice,</p> +</div> +<p>adding also that the carabao is the chief means of transportation of +the tobacco, hemp, and other crops to market, and that the few +remaining carabaos, the ordinary price of which in normal Spanish times +had been $10 was now $100. Then, after completing a faithful picture of +supremely thorough desolation such as the Islands had never seen since +they first rose out of the sea, certainly not during the sleepy, +easy-going Spanish rule, they say: “The Filipino people of <i>the +better</i> class have received the passage of the Philippine Act with +great satisfaction”—meaning the Act of Congress of July 1, +1902, the Philippine Government Act. <i lang="de">Gott im Himmel!</i> +What did the people care about paper constitutions concerning +benevolent assimilation? What they were interested in was food and +safety, not politics; food, raiment, shelter, and efficient police +protection from the brigandage which immediately follows in the wake of +all war, not details as to what we were going to do with the bleeding +and prostrate body politic. But the Commission had started out to +govern the Filipino people on a definite theory,—apparently on +the idea that if Americans wore white duck and no brass buttons, in +lieu of khaki and brass buttons, the Filipinos would at once forget the +war and be happy with an exceeding great happiness. Now the real +situation was this. The Islands had not yet been thoroughly beaten into +submission. Northern Luzon had been conquered. The lake region of +Southern Luzon had been conquered. The most important of the Visayan +Islands had been conquered. But the extreme southern portion of Luzon, +the enormously rich hemp peninsula already described <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb401" href="#pb401" name="pb401">401</a>]</span>in a +former chapter, and the adjoining hemp island of Samar, were still +seething with sedition which later broke out. All through the winter of +1900–01 General MacArthur had tried to get Mr. Root to let him +close the hemp ports. But some powerful influence at Washington had +prevented the grant of this permission. On January 9, 1901, General +MacArthur had wired Mr. Root:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Hemp in southern Luzon in same relation to present +struggle as cotton during rebellion.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8902src" href="#xd20e8902" name="xd20e8902src">44</a></p> +</div> +<p>Nothing doing. General MacArthur must worry along with the +“blockade-runners” as best he could, no matter how much +hemp money might be poured into the insurgent coffers. So that in the +latter part of 1902, although the more respectable of the insurgent +leaders had then surrendered, even in the hemp country, the flames of +public disorder, which had flickered for a spell after the Batangas +lesson, broke out anew in the province of Albay, and in parts of +Sorsogon, the two provinces of the hemp peninsula having the best +sea-ports. The man at the head of this Albay insurrection was a sorry +scamp of some shrewdness by the name of Simeon Ola, with whom I +afterwards had an interesting and in some respects most amusing +acquaintance. But that is another story. I have simply brought the +whole archipelago abreast of the close of 1902, relatively to public +order. In this way only may the insurrections in Albay and elsewhere in +1902–03, described in the chapter which follows, be understood in +their relation to a comprehensive view of the American occupation from +the beginning, and not be regarded as “a local issue” like +General Hancock’s tariff, having <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb402" href="#pb402" name="pb402">402</a>]</span>no general political +significance. In this way only may those insurrections be understood in +their true relation to the history of public order in the Islands. The +Commission always represented all disturbances after 1902 as matters of +mere banditti, such as have been chronic for generations in Calabria or +the Transcaucasus, wholly distinct from, instead of being an inevitable +political sequel of, the years of continuous warfare which had +preceded. Their benevolent obsession was that the desire of the +Philippine people for independence was wholly and happily eradicated. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb403" href="#pb403" name= +"pb403">403</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7893" href="#xd20e7893src" name="xd20e7893">1</a></span> Mr. +Williams to Mr. Cridler, <i>Senate Document 62</i> (1898), p. 319.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7905" href="#xd20e7905src" name="xd20e7905">2</a></span> See +<i>First Report of Taft Philippine Commission to the Secretary of +War</i>, p. 17.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7913" href="#xd20e7913src" name="xd20e7913">3</a></span> General +MacArthur’s report for 1901, <i>War Department Report</i>, 1901, +vol. i., pt. 4, p. 90.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7919" href="#xd20e7919src" name="xd20e7919">4</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1241.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e7994" href="#xd20e7994src" name="xd20e7994">5</a></span> J. R. +Arnold, of the Philippine Civil Service Board, in <i>North American +Review</i>, for February, 1912.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8002" href="#xd20e8002src" name="xd20e8002">6</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1261.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8014" href="#xd20e8014src" name="xd20e8014">7</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 98.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8024" href="#xd20e8024src" name="xd20e8024">8</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 1, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902, p. +136.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8194" href="#xd20e8194src" name="xd20e8194">9</a></span> Cagayan, +Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8203" href="#xd20e8203src" name="xd20e8203">10</a></span> A kind +of two-wheeled buggy, the principal public vehicle of Manila.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8223" href="#xd20e8223src" name="xd20e8223">11</a></span> As it +turned out, I lost nothing in the end, because my resignation of my +military commission was not acted on at Washington, and I only ceased +to be an officer of the army by operation of law at the end of the +fiscal year, June 30, 1901, as had been provided by the Act of Congress +of March 2, 1899, organizing the twenty-five regiments for Philippine +service.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8239" href="#xd20e8239src" name="xd20e8239">12</a></span> See the +Act of the U. S. Philippine Commission of July 17, 1901, entitled, +“An act restoring the provinces of Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol, to +the executive control of the military governor,” in Public Laws, +U. S. Philippine Commission, Division of Insular Affairs, War +Department.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8242" href="#xd20e8242src" name="xd20e8242">13</a></span> See +<i>American Census of the Philippines</i>, vol. ii., p. 123.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8248" href="#xd20e8248src" name="xd20e8248">14</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8258" href="#xd20e8258src" name="xd20e8258">15</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 7.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8354" href="#xd20e8354src" name="xd20e8354">16</a></span> See +pages 102 <i>et seq.</i> of <i>Our Philippine Problem</i> by H. Parker +Willis, Professor of Economics and Politics in Washington and Lee +University. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1905.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8365" href="#xd20e8365src" name="xd20e8365">17</a></span> Where +he still is.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8390" href="#xd20e8390src" name="xd20e8390">18</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1297.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8399" href="#xd20e8399src" name="xd20e8399">19</a></span> The +words quoted were used by Mr. Root in a speech delivered at Youngstown, +Ohio, October 25, 1900.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8404" href="#xd20e8404src" name="xd20e8404">20</a></span> +Sixty-six men and three officers were surprised at breakfast and cut +off from their guns by several hundred <i>bolo</i> men who had come +into town as unarmed natives under pretence of attending a church +fiesta. Forty-five men and officers were killed after a desperate +resistance. Twenty-four only were able to escape. <i>War Department +Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 8.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8413" href="#xd20e8413src" name="xd20e8413">21</a></span> +Governor Taft’s Report for 1901, <i>War Department Report</i>, +1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 8.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8440" href="#xd20e8440src" name="xd20e8440">22</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 208.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8452" href="#xd20e8452src" name="xd20e8452">23</a></span> +Leviticus xvi., 10.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8460" href="#xd20e8460src" name="xd20e8460">24</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 12.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8495" href="#xd20e8495src" name="xd20e8495">25</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 1, p. 86, 57th Congress, 1st Session +(1902).</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8507" href="#xd20e8507src" name="xd20e8507">26</a></span> <i>War +Department Report for 1900</i>, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 59 <i>et seq.</i> +<i>Ibid.</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 88 <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8526" href="#xd20e8526src" name="xd20e8526">27</a></span> +<i>Report for 1901</i>, p. 98.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8535" href="#xd20e8535src" name="xd20e8535">28</a></span> See +<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii, p. 123.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8546" href="#xd20e8546src" name="xd20e8546">29</a></span> The +Provincial Government Act was an act passed February 6, 1901, outlining +the general scheme of government for the several provinces, and +indicating the various tempting official positions attaching +thereto.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8553" href="#xd20e8553src" name="xd20e8553">30</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 191.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8631" href="#xd20e8631src" name="xd20e8631">31</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, p. 1612 <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8648" href="#xd20e8648src" name="xd20e8648">32</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 1614.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8689" href="#xd20e8689src" name="xd20e8689">33</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, 1902, p. 1622.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8707" href="#xd20e8707src" name="xd20e8707">34</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 1623.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8733" href="#xd20e8733src" name="xd20e8733">35</a></span> <i>S. +D. 331</i>, 1902, p. 1628.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8784" href="#xd20e8784src" name="xd20e8784">36</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 221.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8799" href="#xd20e8799src" name="xd20e8799">37</a></span> Colonel +Wagner’s testimony before Senate Committee of 1902. <i>Senate +Document 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2873.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8808" href="#xd20e8808src" name="xd20e8808">38</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 284.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8817" href="#xd20e8817src" name="xd20e8817">39</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 887.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8830" href="#xd20e8830src" name="xd20e8830">40</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2878.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8837" href="#xd20e8837src" name="xd20e8837">41</a></span> +Theodore <i>Rex</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8845" href="#xd20e8845src" name="xd20e8845">42</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 192.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8850" href="#xd20e8850src" name="xd20e8850">43</a></span> +<i>Correspondence relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., pp. +1352–3.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8902" href="#xd20e8902src" name="xd20e8902">44</a></span> +<i>Military Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1244.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch16" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XVI</h2> +<h2 class="main">Governor Taft, 1903</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Me miserable! Which way shall I fly?</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Paradise Lost.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Throughout the last year of Governor Taft’s +administration in the Philippines, 1903, both he, and the peaceably +inclined Filipinos in the disturbed districts, were between the devil +and the deep sea. The military handling of the Batangas and Samar +disorders of 1901–2 had precipitated in the United States Senate +a storm of criticism, at the hands of Senator Bacon and others, which +had reminded a public, already satiated with slaughtering a weaker +Christian people they had never seen in the interest of supposed trade +expansion, of “the days when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily +against Verres, and when, before a senate which still retained some +show of freedom, Tacitus thundered against the oppressor of +Africa.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8926src" href="#xd20e8926" +name="xd20e8926src">1</a> He did not want to order out the military +again if he could help it, and this relegated him to his native +municipal police and constabulary, experimental outfits of doubtful +loyalty,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8932src" href="#xd20e8932" name= +"xd20e8932src">2</a> and, at best, wholly inadequate, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb404" href="#pb404" name="pb404">404</a>]</span>as +it afterwards turned out,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8946src" href= +"#xd20e8946" name="xd20e8946src">3</a> for the maintenance of public +order and for affording to the peaceably inclined people that sort of +security for life and property, and that protection against +semi-political as well as unmitigated brigandage, which would comport +with the dignity of this nation. The better class of Filipinos, though +not so enamored of American rule as Governor Taft fondly believed, had +by 1903 about resigned themselves to the inevitable, and would have +liked to see brigandage masquerading under the name of patriotism +stopped by that sort of adequate police protection which was so +obviously necessary in the disturbed and unsettled conditions naturally +consequent upon many years of war, and which they of course realized +could only be afforded by the strong arm of the American army. But they +knew that if the army were ordered out, the burden of proof as to their +own loyalty would at once be shifted to them, by the strenuous agents +of that strenuous institution. The result was a sort of reign of terror +for nearly a year, in 1902–3, in the richest province of the +whole archipelago, the hemp-producing province of Albay, at the +southern end of Luzon, and also in portions of the province of Misamis. +These conditions had begun in those provinces in 1902, and, not being +promptly checked, because the army was held in leash and the +constabulary were crude and inadequate, by 1903 brigandage therein was +thriving like a garden of weeds. Super-solicitude concerning the +possible effect of adequately vigorous governmental action in the +Philippines on the fortunes of the Administration in charge of the +Federal Government at <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb405" href= +"#pb405" name="pb405">405</a>]</span>Washington, an attitude not +surprising in the colonial agents of that Administration, but which, as +we have seen, had been from the beginning, as it must ever be, the +curse of our colonial system, had rendered American sovereignty in the +disturbed districts as humiliatingly impotent as senile decadence ever +rendered Spain.</p> +<p>The average American citizen will admit that the average American +statesman, even if he be not far-sighted, looks at least a year ahead, +in matters where both his personal fortunes and those of the political +party to which he belongs are intimately related to what he may be +doing at the time. If in 1903 Governor Taft’s administration of +affairs in the Philippines was wholly uninfluenced by any possible +effect it might have on President Roosevelt’s chances for +becoming an elected President in 1904, then he was a false friend and a +very poor party man as well. Assuming that he was neither, let us +examine his course regarding the disturbances of public order in the +Philippines in that year, as related to the first and most sacred duty +of every government, adequate protection for life and property.</p> +<p>In President McKinley’s original instructions of April 7, +1900, to the Taft Commission, after quoting the final paragraph of the +articles of capitulation of the city of Manila:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">This city, its inhabitants * * * and its +private property of all descriptions * * * are hereby placed +under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American +army;</p> +</div> +<p>the President had added:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the +Government of the United States to give <i>protection for property and +life</i> * * * <i>to all the people of the Philippine +Islands</i>. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb406" href="#pb406" name= +"pb406">406</a>]</span></p> +<p>* * * <i>I charge this Commission to labor for the full +performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience +of their country.</i></p> +</div> +<p>We will probably never again have a better man at the head of the +Philippine Government than William H. Taft. We have no higher type of +citizen in the republic to-day than the man now<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8978src" href="#xd20e8978" name="xd20e8978src">4</a> at the head +of it. In the <i>Outlook</i> of September 21, 1901, there appeared an +article on the Philippines written in the summer previous by +Vice-President Roosevelt, entitled “The First Civil +Governor,” which began as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">A year ago a man of wide acquaintance both with +American public life and American public men<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8987src" href="#xd20e8987" name="xd20e8987src">5</a> remarked +that the first Governor of the Philippines ought to combine the +qualities which would make a first-class President of the United States +with the qualities which would make a first-class Chief Justice of the +United States, and that the only man he knew who possessed all these +qualities was Judge William H. Taft, of Ohio. The statement was +entirely correct.</p> +</div> +<p>The writer subscribed then, and still subscribes, to the foregoing +estimate of Mr. Taft, whether Colonel Roosevelt still does or not. +Though I dissent most vigorously from more than one of President +Taft’s policies, and though this book is one long dissent from +his chief pet policy, still it is to me an especial pleasure to do him +honor where I may, not merely because he has greatly honored me in the +past, but because my judgment approves the above estimate. Though as a +party leader he is a very poor general, as Chief Magistrate of the +nation he has certainly deserved and commanded the cordial esteem of +the whole country, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb407" href="#pb407" +name="pb407">407</a>]</span>and the respectful regard of all mankind. +With this admission freely made, if after reading what follows in this +and the next chapter, and weighing the same in the light of all that +has preceded, the reader does not decide that the writer, far from +being animated by any intelligent high purpose, is merely a foolish +person of the sounding-brass-and-tinkling-cymbal variety full of sound +and fury signifying nothing, then he can reach but one other +conclusion, viz., that colonization by a republic like ours, such as +that we blundered into by purchasing the Philippines, is a case of a +house divided against itself, a case of the soul of a nation at war +with the better angels of its nature, a case where considerations of +what may be demanded by home considerations of political expediency +will always operate to the detriment of the Filipino people, and be the +controlling factor in our government of them. And if I show that in the +Philippines in 1903 Governor Taft failed properly to protect the lives +and property of peaceably inclined people, as so sacredly enjoined in +the language above quoted from President McKinley’s original +instructions to him, lest “the full performance of this +obligation” might prejudice the presidential prospects of his +friend, Mr. Roosevelt, and the success of the party to which they +belonged, then I will have shown that for this republic to be in the +colonizing business is an absolutely evil thing, and that any man who +proposes any honorable way out of the conceded blunder of 1898, is +entitled to a hearing at the hands of the American people, because it +“concerns the honor and conscience of their country.”</p> +<p>Having tried most of the cases which arose out of the public +disorders in the Philippines in 1903, and knowing from what I thus +learned, together with what I subsequently learned <i>which Mr. Taft +knew then</i>, that the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb408" href= +"#pb408" name="pb408">408</a>]</span>most serious of those disorders +were very inadequately handled by native police, and constabulary, with +much wholly unnecessary incidental sacrifice of life, in order to +preserve the appearance of “civil” government and convey +the impression of the state of peace the name implied, at a time when a +reign of terror due to brigandage prevailed throughout wide and +populous regions in whose soil lay the riches of agricultural plenty, +while the United States Army looked on with a silent disgust which +understood the reason, and a becoming subordination which regretfully +bowed to that reason as one which must ever be the curse of +colonization by a republic like ours, I know whereof I shall speak, and +will therefore speak neither lightly nor unadvisedly, but soberly, +charitably, and in the fear of God.</p> +<p>The insurrection in the Philippines against American authority which +began with the outbreak of February 4, 1899, and whose last dying +embers were not finally stamped out until 1906, systematic denials by +optimist officialdom to the contrary notwithstanding, had three +distinct stages:</p> +<p>(1) The original fighting in company, battalion, and regimental +formation, with the ordinary wide-flung battle line; this having +terminated pursuant to a preconcerted plan early in November, 1899.</p> +<p>(2) A period of guerrilla warfare maintained by the educated, +patriotic, fighting generals, in a gradually decreasing number of +provinces, until the summer of 1902.</p> +<p>(3) The final long drawn-out sputterings, which began to get serious +in the fall of 1902, in provinces prematurely taken under the civil +government, and stripped of adequate military protection before things +had been given time to settle down in them to normal.</p> +<p>These last are the “gardens of weeds”—brigandage +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb409" href="#pb409" name= +"pb409">409</a>]</span>weeds—above mentioned. While the +horticultural metaphor will help some, to really understand the case +nothing so fits it as the more common illustration applied to grave +public disorders having a common cause which likens such matters to a +conflagration. The third and last stage through which the Philippine +insurrection degenerated to final extinction is adequately and +accurately described in the following extract from one of the military +reports of 1902:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The surrender or capture of the respectable military +element left the control of affairs and the remainder of the arms in +the hands of a lot of persons, most of them ignorant, some criminal, +and nearly all pertaining to a restless, irresponsible, unscrupulous +class of people, whose principal ambition seems to be to live without +work, and who have found it possible to so do under the guise of +patriotism.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9018src" href="#xd20e9018" name= +"xd20e9018src">6</a></p> +</div> +<p>Such was the problem which confronted Governor Taft in 1903 as to +public order and protection of the peaceably inclined people, in the +two main provinces hereinafter dealt with.</p> +<p>It is a great pity that in 1903 President Roosevelt could not have +called in Secretary of War Root and sent for Senator Bacon, and those +of the latter’s colleagues whose philippics in the Senate of the +year previous against Generals Jake Smith and J. Franklin Bell had +reminded an aroused nation of the days of Cicero and Verres, Tacitus +and Africa, etc., and had a frank talk with them somewhat after this +fashion:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Gentlemen, Governor Taft has a hard job out there in +the Philippines. There is a big insurrection going on in the province +of Albay, which is the very richest province in the whole archipelago, +a province as big as the State of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb410" +href="#pb410" name="pb410">410</a>]</span>Delaware,<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e9032src" href="#xd20e9032" name="xd20e9032src">7</a> having a +population of about a quarter of a million people, and he has, for +police purposes, a crude outfit of native constabulary, officered +mostly by ex-enlisted men of the mustered-out American volunteer +regiments. The personnel of the officers may be weeded out later and +made a fine body of men, but just at present there are a good many +rather tough citizens among them. Moreover, as soon as the constabulary +was gotten together they were at once set to work chasing little +remnants of the insurgent army all over the archipelago. So as yet they +are as undisciplined an outfit as you can well imagine, and have never +had any opportunity to act together in any considerable command. +Moreover, hardly any Filipinos have yet had a chance to learn much +about how to shoot a rifle. Also, they know practically nothing about +the interior economy of large commands, such as handling and +distributing rations systematically for troops and for prisoners, or +doing the same as to clothing, and nothing at all about medical care of +the wounded, or the sick, or prisoners. So you can see that to handle +this insurrection with such an outfit as this is sure to mean trouble +of one sort or another. Wholly unauthorized overtures through officious +natives, to the insurgent brigand chiefs, may, possibly, be made, +promising them immunity, when they ought to be made an example of; and +that will embarrass us in punishing them when we do finally get them, +and be an encouragement to other cut-throats to do likewise in the +future. Worst of all, you can see that if some five hundred or a +thousand of these brigands, or insurgents, or whatever they are, +suddenly surrender, the ordinary police accommodations for housing and +feeding prisoners will be wholly inadequate; yet we will have to detain +them all until our courts can sift them and see which are the mere dumb +driven cattle and which are the mischievous fellows. Therefore, in case +of such a surrender, the nature of this constabulary force, as I have +already described it to you, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb411" href= +"#pb411" name="pb411">411</a>]</span>makes it plain that its inadequacy +to meet the serious conditions we are now confronted with may result in +our having on our hands a series of little Andersonville prisons that +will smell to heaven. The majority of the people of the province are +really sick of the war. Their best men have all surrendered and come +in. But there is an ignorant creature calling himself a general, by the +name of Ola, who seems to have a great deal of influence with the +lawless element that do not want to work. Ola has gathered together +nearly a thousand malcontents, who obey him implicitly. He is +terrorizing Albay province and the regions adjacent thereto, and as the +constabulary are not adequate to patrol the whole province, the people +do not know whether self-interest demands that they should side with +Ola or with us. Clearly, therefore, this is a case for vigorous +measures, if we all have a common concern for the national honor, for +the maintenance of law and order in a territory we are supposed to be +governing, and for the proper protection of life and property there. +General Bell or somebody else ought to be sent there to comb that +province just as Bell did Batangas. But we don’t want any howl +about it.</p> +</div> +<p>At this point of the supposed colloquy,—I say +“colloquy,” though tradition has it that most of President +Roosevelt’s “colloquys” with Senators were what Henry +E. Davis, the Sidney Smith of Washington, calls “unilateral +conversation”—one can imagine the senatorial Ciceros +exchanging glances expressive of the unspoken thought: “The man +certainly has his nerve with him. Does he think the Senate is an annex +of the White House?” Then we can imagine President Roosevelt +bending strenuously to his task with infinite tactfulness thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I put Jake Smith out of business, as you gentlemen all +know, for his inhuman methods of avenging the Balangiga <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb412" href="#pb412" name= +"pb412">412</a>]</span>massacre in Samar, and I am just as much opposed +to cruelty as any of you Senators can be. But Bell in Batangas is an +altogether different case from Smith in Samar. All this about the odor +of decomposing bodies wafted from reconcentration camps, and +“clouds of vampire bats swirling out on their orgies over the +dead,” that Senator Bacon’s army friend, whoever he may be, +wrote the Senator, relates to Samar, and never did have any application +to Bell’s methods in Batangas. Bell did a clean job in a minimum +of time and with a minimum sacrifice of life, and, while he did have +those reconcentration camps in Batangas, he saw to it religiously that +nobody starved, and that all those people received daily medical +treatment.</p> +</div> +<p>For the correctness of the picture of conditions presented in the +above hypothetical talk, I of course intend to be understood as +vouching. If such a talk could have been had in 1903 by President +Roosevelt with Senator Bacon and those of his colleagues who shared his +views, the Albay situation might have been handled creditably. But the +Administration was in no position to be frank with the Opposition. No +Administration has ever yet during the last fourteen years been in a +position to be frank with the Senate and the country concerning the +situation at any given time in the Philippines, because at any given +time there was always so much that it could not afford to re-open and +explain. Mr. Root, for instance, might have been questioned too closely +as to why, when Secretary of War, he had gone around the country in the +fall of 1900 speaking for Mr. McKinley, and talking about “<i>the +patient and unconsenting millions” so anxious to be rid of +“Aguinaldo and his band of assassins</i>,” when at that +very time his (Mr. Root’s) generals in the Philippines were +engaged in activities, the magnitude of which may be inferred from a +telegram sent from Washington to General <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb413" href="#pb413" name="pb413">413</a>]</span>Wood at Havana, +asking if he could possibly spare the 10th Infantry, and adding:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>Imperative that we have immediate use of every +available company that we can lay our hands on for service in the +Philippines</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9058src" href="#xd20e9058" +name="xd20e9058src">8</a></p> +</div> +<p>although at West Point in 1902 he told the cadets how nobly the army +had labored in putting down “an insurrection of 7,000,000 +people.” No, the Administration in 1903 simply could not afford +to be frank concerning the situation in the Philippines. I need not +recapitulate here any more of the long train of reasons why, because +they have all been fully explained in the preceding chapters. Of course +President Roosevelt had no such guilty knowledge of the facts as Mr. +Root. He was not in constant daily contact with army officers at the +War Department, familiar with the actual situation in the Philippines, +as Mr. Root was. He was simply “sticking to Taft.” +Somewhere along about the time the military folk in the Philippines +were scoffing at the unnecessary sacrifice of life incident to the lack +of a strong government, President Roosevelt had written his warm +personal friend, Hon. George Curry, now a member of Congress from New +Mexico, who had been a captain in his regiment before Santiago, was +then an official of the civil government of the Philippines, and later +Governor of New Mexico, by appointment of Mr. Roosevelt: “Stick +to Taft, George” or words to that effect. Mr. Roosevelt’s +attitude was simply that of an intensely loyal friend of Mr. Taft who +simply assumed that the Philippine Government was not going to tolerate +impotence in the matter of protecting life and property. But everybody +at both ends of the line was too deep in the mire of all the long and +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb414" href="#pb414" name= +"pb414">414</a>]</span>systematic withholding of facts from the +American public which had been occurring ever since 1898, and which it +has been the aim of the preceding chapters to illuminate by the light +since <span class="corr" id="xd20e9067" title= +"Source: become">becoming</span> available in the published official +records of the Government. Hence, in the hypothetical conference above +supposed, President Roosevelt was in no position to take any high +ground. He would have had to admit that the civil government of 1901 +was set up too soon in order to stand by half-baked notions dished out +in 1900 by the Taft Commission in aid of his own and Mr. +McKinley’s campaign for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, +respectively. In other words the truth about the Philippines from the +beginning might, and probably would, have seriously jeopardized the +Roosevelt presidential chances in 1904. So Governor Taft was left to +his own resources in struggling with the problem of law and order in +the Islands, intimately understanding the obvious bearing, just +suggested, of what he might do out there, on the election of 1904. What +then did Governor Taft do to meet the situation in 1903? Chronological +order, as well as other considerations making for clearness, would +suggest that I begin by telling what he did not do.</p> +<p>In May, 1903, I was sent to the province of Surigao to try some +cases arising out of what has ever since been known in that +out-of-the-way region as “the affair of March 23d” (1903). +In his annual report for 1903, pages 29 and 30, in describing the +Surigao affair, Governor Taft correctly states that a band of outlaws +came into the town of Surigao on the day above named, killed Captain +Clark, the officer in charge of the constabulary, took the +constabulary’s guns, while they were all away at their mid-day +meal, scattered about the town, and departed. But Mr. Taft’s +report <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb415" href="#pb415" name= +"pb415">415</a>]</span>disposes of the whole incident in a most casual +way. As a matter of fact the gist of it was that a heroic little band +of Americans under Mr. Luther S. Kelly, the provincial treasurer, an +old Indian scout of the Yellowstone country, hastily gathered the seven +American women then in the town, one of them in a delicate condition, +into the stone government house, and stood off those semi-civilized +sensual brigands until reinforcements arrived. Governor Taft’s +failure adequately to present the gravity of the episode in his account +of it does not argue well for the subsequent solicitude he might feel +about other American women in other remote provinces which he was +anxious to keep on his “pacified list,” to say nothing of +politically negligible native life therein.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9074src" href="#xd20e9074" name="xd20e9074src">9</a> Nor does +this report include any of the material facts showing the +ineffectiveness of the rank and file of the constabulary to cope with +the situation, or the general feeling of insecurity I found in the +province as to how far the whole population might be in sympathy with +the brigands. As a matter of fact, after that Surigao affair, Governor +Taft had to turn the army loose in the province to go and get back and +restore to his constabulary the seventy-five to one hundred +stand-of-arms the brigands had so rudely and impolitely taken away from +them, and I held court there for a month trying the people who were +captured and brought in, with Colonel Meyer, of the 11th Infantry, one +of the most thorough and able soldiers of the United States Army, and +seven hundred soldiers of his regiment acting as deputy sheriffs, and +yet all the time the province was under “civil” government, +nominally. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb416" href="#pb416" name= +"pb416">416</a>]</span>Colonel Meyer got the men who killed Clark, and, +upon due and ample proof, I hung them, but Surigao was never taken for +a day from the list of provinces enjoying “the peace and +protection of a benign civil government.” <i>The writ of habeas +corpus was never suspended for a moment.</i></p> +<p>In the report above quoted from, Governor Taft remarks that if the +prompt steps he did take (he had already described the prompt sending +of the military to the scene) had not been taken, “the trouble +might have spread.” But the Surigao affair seemed to teach the +civil government nothing in the matter of subsequent protection of +life, nor did it lessen their persistence in relying on their +constabulary for due extension of such protection in time of need.</p> +<p>By June, 1903, another scheme was invented for avoiding calling on +the military. When you are in a foreign country building a new +government on the ruins of an old one, you naturally find out as much +as you can about how the old one met its problems. The Spaniards had +had the same problem in their day about not ordering out the military, +because they did not have any military to order out. They were too poor +to garrison the various provinces. They had long followed the plan, +from time to time, of reconcentrating in the main towns of disturbed +districts all the country population they could get to come in, and +then acting on the assumption that all who did not come in were public +enemies. This meant that when the country people came in, they simply +looked out for themselves, while away from their homes, and farms, as +best they could. Of course nobody at all looked after the farms, and +nobody provided medical attention for the reconcentrados, or sanitary +attention for the reconcentration camps. This general plan was formally +sanctioned by <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb417" href="#pb417" name= +"pb417">417</a>]</span>the Commission, in so far as the following law +sanctioned it. The law was enacted, June 1, 1903. It is section 6, of +Act 781, which was an act dealing with all the constabulary problems, +of which this was one. It read:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">In provinces which are <i>infested to such an extent +with ladrones or outlaws that the lives and property of residents in +the outlying barrios<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9094src" href= +"#xd20e9094" name="xd20e9094src">10</a> are rendered wholly insecure by +continued predatory raids</i>—</p> +</div> +<p>think of permitting a country to get into any such condition when +you have an abundance of American troops on hand available to prevent +it—</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones +or outlaws their sources of food supply, <i>and it is not possible with +the available police forces constantly to provide protection to such +barrios</i>—</p> +</div> +<p>there being all the time “available police forces,” in +the shape of regular troops, amply able to handle these unsettled +conditions, which were the inevitable aftermath of lawlessness +consequent on five or six years of guerrilla warfare—</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">it shall be within the power of the Governor-General, +upon resolution of the Philippine Commission, to authorize the +provincial governor to order that the residents of such outlying +barrios be temporarily brought—</p> +</div> +<p>observe the length of time this may last is not limited— +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb418" href="#pb418" name= +"pb418">418</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">within stated proximity to the <i>poblacion</i>, or +larger barrios, of the municipality, there to remain until the +necessity for such order ceases to exist.</p> +</div> +<p>To house and ration the reconcentrados, the following provision is +made by the statute we are considering:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">During such <i>temporary</i> residence, it shall be +the duty of the provincial board, out of provincial funds, to furnish +such sustenance and shelter as may be needed to prevent suffering among +the residents of the barrios thus withdrawn.</p> +</div> +<p>The act also provides that during the course of the reconcentration, +where the province does not happen to have the necessary ready cash, it +may apply to the Commission, in distant Manila, for an appropriation to +meet the emergency. What is to be done with those who starve during the +temporary deficit, it does not say. If you must have reconcentration, +to leave it to such agencies as the above, with the native police and +constabulary as understudies, in lieu of availing yourself of the +superb equipment of the American army, with all its facilities for +handling great masses of people, as they did, for instance, after the +San Francisco fire, is like preferring the Mulligan Guards to the +Cold-stream Guards. Furthermore, there is no escape from the logic of +the fact that reconcentration is essentially a war measure. The +difference between what is lawful in war and what is lawful in peace is +not a technical one. In war the innocent must often suffer with the +guilty. In peace the theory at least is that only the guilty suffer. +Hence it is that our Constitution is so jealous that in time of peace +no man’s life, liberty, or property, shall be taken from him +without “due process of law,” a provision which becomes +inoperative in war times, being superseded by martial law. I know that +the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb419" href="#pb419" name= +"pb419">419</a>]</span>early question, “Does the Constitution +follow the flag?” was answered by the Supreme Court of the United +States in the negative as to the Philippines. But the Act of Congress +of July 1, 1902, under which we were governing the Philippines in 1903, +and still govern them, known as the Philippine Government Act, extended +to the Islands all the provisions of the Bill of Rights of our +Constitution except the right of jury trial and the individual right to +go armed—“bear arms.” It specifically said in section +5:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">No law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall +deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of +law.</p> +</div> +<p>It hardly needs argument to show that to bundle the rural population +of a whole district out of house and home, and make them come to town +to live indefinitely on such public charity as may drain through the +itching fingers of impecunious town officials, abandoning meantime +their growing crops, and the household effects they cannot bring with +them, is depriving people of their property, and restraining them of +their liberty, without due process of law. In fact, in 1905, in the +case of Barcelon <i>vs.</i> Baker, vol. v., <i>Philippine Report</i>, +page 116, during an insurrection in Batangas, to control which, the +presidential election of 1904 being then safely over, the writ of +habeas corpus had been suspended and martial law declared, the Supreme +Court of the Philippines held that detention of people as +reconcentrados under such circumstances “for the purpose of +protecting them” was not an illegal restraint of their liberty, +<i>because the ordinary law had been suspended</i>. This decision held +it to be both the prerogative and the duty of the Governor-General to +suspend <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb420" href="#pb420" name= +"pb420">420</a>]</span>the writ of habeas corpus when the public safety +so required.</p> +<p>I refuse to believe for a moment that President Taft, the former +wise and just judge, in whom is now vested by law the mighty power of +filling vacancies on the highest court in this great country of ours, +will seriously contend that that reconcentration law is not in direct +violation of the above quoted section of the Act of Congress of July 1, +1902, for the government of the Philippines, and therefore null and +void. The truth is, it was a piece of careless legislation, dealing +with conditions that were essentially war conditions, under a +government which was forever vowing that peace conditions existed, and +determined not to admit the contrary. The civil government was like +Lot’s wife. It could not look back.</p> +<p>The Act of Congress of 1902 had made the usual provision permitting +the governor to declare martial law in a given locality in his +discretion. But the reconcentration law passed by the Philippine +Commission was a way of avoiding the exercise of that authority, so as +to keep up the appearance of peace in the provinces to which it might +be applied, regardless of how many lives it might cost. In its last +analysis the reconcentration law was at once an admission of a duty to +order out the military and a declaration of intention to neglect that +duty. I suppose the eminent gentlemen who enacted it justified it on +the idea of teaching the natives how to maintain order themselves by +letting them stew in the dregs of their own insurrection. Yet no one +can read the Commission’s own description of the widespread +lawlessness which so long ran riot after the guerrilla warfare +degenerated into brigandage, without seeing, from their own showing, +how obvious was their duty to have waited, originally, until law and +order <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb421" href="#pb421" name= +"pb421">421</a>]</span>were restored, by not interfering with the war +itself until it was over, and by keeping the country properly +garrisoned for a decorous and sufficient period after it <i>was</i> +over, until something like real peace conditions should exist, on which +to begin the work of post-bellum reconstruction. After all, it all gets +us back to the original pernicious programme outlined in President +McKinley’s annual message to Congress of December, 1899, wherein +was announced the intention to send out the Taft Commission, which +message also announced, in effect, that it was Mr. McKinley’s +purpose to begin the work of reconstruction as fast as the patient and +unconsenting millions “loyal to our rule” should be rescued +from the clutch of the hated Tagals.</p> +<p>Recurring again to the reconcentration law itself, the moral quality +of executive action putting it in operation was not unlike that which +would attach should the Governor of Massachusetts, in lieu of ordering +the state troops to the scene of great strike riots in half a dozen +towns around Boston, issue a proclamation something like this:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The situation has grown so serious that your local +police force, as you see, is wholly inadequate to cope with the +situation. You will all, therefore, thrust your tooth-brushes, +night-gowns, and a change of clothing, into the family grip, and +assemble on the Boston Common and in the public gardens, there to +remain until the necessity for this order ceases to exist, and we will +there take the best care of you we can, as was done in the case of the +San Francisco fire. As governor I am unwilling to order out the +military.</p> +</div> +<p>If any lawyer on the Commission gave any thought at the time to the +validity of the reconcentration law, in its relation to the “due +process of law” clause of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb422" href="#pb422" name="pb422">422</a>]</span>Philippine Government +Act, which none of them probably did, he must simply have justified the +means by the benevolence of the end, on the idea that he knew so much +better than Congress possibly could, the needs of the local situation. +But if you read this law in the light of a knowledge of its practical +operation, there is more suggestion between its lines of Senator +Bacon’s friend’s “corpse-carcass stench” and +“clouds of vampire bats softly swirling out on their orgies over +the dead” than there is of benevolence. It really was +unsportsmanlike for the Commission to have entrusted reconcentration to +the native police and constabulary the native governors had, and it was +wholly indefensible for them to take the liberty of violating an act of +Congress in order to live up to their pet fiction about the war being +“entirely over.”</p> +<p>After the term of court at Surigao in the month of May, 1903, I was +sent to Misamis province, where I remained until September, handling an +insurrection down there. This province also was nominally in a state of +peace, <i>i.e.</i>, there was no formal recognition of the existence of +the insurrection by suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Curiously +enough, as I wrote Governor Taft afterwards, the Misamis crowd of +disturbers of the peace were genuine <i>insurrectos</i>. Their movement +was not so formidable as the Ola insurrection in Albay I dealt with +later, but they were by no means unmitigated cut-throats. I have often +wondered how they managed to be so respectable at that late date. They +did not steal, as did most of the outlaws of 1903. Their avowed purpose +was to subvert the existing government. The use of this word +“insurrection” in connection with these various +disturbances recalls a pertinent incident. In 1904 there was a vacancy +on the Supreme Bench of the Islands. Some of my friends, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb423" href="#pb423" name= +"pb423">423</a>]</span>members of the bar of my district, got up a +petition to the then Governor-General setting forth in most partial +terms my alleged qualifications for the place. Now in the Philippines, +in the candor of informal social intercourse, all of us always called a +spade a spade, <i>i.e.</i>, we called an insurrection an insurrection, +instead of referring to the disturbance in the guarded and euphemistic +terms which you find in all the official reports intended for home +consumption. So in their petition, these gentlemen recited, among my +other supposed qualifications, that I had held court in three different +provinces “during insurrections in the same.”</p> +<p>The Albay insurrection was the worst one I had to deal with during +Governor Taft’s administration as Governor of the Philippines. +This was the insurrection headed by Simeon Ola. The first appearance of +this man Ola in the official reports of the Philippine Government in +connection with the Albay disturbances of 1902–3 is in the report +of the colonel commanding the constabulary for the district which +included Albay, Col. H. H. Bandholtz, dated June 30, 1903.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e9195src" href="#xd20e9195" name= +"xd20e9195src">11</a> This report contains a sort of diary of events +for the year preceding the date of it. An entry for October 28, 1902, +begins:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Early this month <i>negotiations</i> were opened with +Simeon Ola, chief of the ladrones in this province, with a view of +inducing him to surrender.</p> +</div> +<p>Think of this great government <i>negotiating</i> with the leader of +a band of thieves who were openly and flagrantly defying its authority! +The entry proceeds:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">After many promises and conferences extending over a +period of forty days, during which hostilities were suspended, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb424" href="#pb424" name= +"pb424">424</a>]</span>Ola <i>broke off negotiations</i> and withdrew +his entire force and <i>a large number of additional recruits that he +had secured during the armistice</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>Before Ola finally surrendered he is supposed to have had a total +command ranging at various times from a thousand to 1500 men. And I +think Colonel Bandholtz must have had in the field opposed to him, +first and last, at least an equal number of native forces. Ola also +makes an official reappearance in the report of the Governor of Albay +Province for 1904.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9226src" href= +"#xd20e9226" name="xd20e9226src">12</a> It there appears that +reconcentration was begun in Albay as part of the campaign against Ola +and his forces, in March, 1903, and continued until the end of October +of that year. Says this report of the Governor of Albay concerning +reconcentration:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Naturally, the effect of this <i>unusual volume of +persons</i> in a limited area was disease and suffering for want of +food and ordinary living accommodations.</p> +</div> +<p>The Governor does not say how large the “unusual volume of +persons” was that was herded into the reconcentration zones, nor +does he furnish any mortality statistics. <i>Nobody kept any.</i> How +much there was of the awful mortality and “clouds of vampire bats +softly swirling out on their orgies over the dead,” that Senator +Bacon’s army friend correspondent encountered in Samar does not +affirmatively appear. The number of people affected by reconcentration +in Albay and an adjacent province that caught the contagion of unrest +and had to be given similar treatment, was about 300,000.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e9243src" href="#xd20e9243" name= +"xd20e9243src">13</a></p> +<p>In his report for 1903, in describing the Ola insurrection +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb425" href="#pb425" name= +"pb425">425</a>]</span>of 1902–3, Governor Taft says: “A +reign of terror was inaugurated throughout the province.” He then +goes on to state that to meet it he applied the reconcentration +tactics. In the same report he describes what is to my mind the most +humiliating incident connected with the whole history of the American +Government in the Philippines, viz., Vice-Governor Wright’s visit +to Albay in 1903, apparently in pursuance of the peace-at-any-price +policy that the Manila Government was bent on. Governor Taft says of +the civil government’s dealings with His Excellency, the +Honorable Simeon Ola, the chief of the brigands, that General Wright +and Dr. Pardo de Tavera, a Filipino member of the Commission, went down +to Albay and “talked to the people,” the idea apparently +being that those poor unarmed or ill-armed creatures should go after +the brigands. This was to avoid ordering out the military, and +summarily putting a stop to the reign of terror as became the dignity +of this nation. I think these talks had something to do with the origin +of the charge afterwards made that immunity was promised Ola and the +men who finally did surrender with him. Of course General Wright made +no such promises. But the idea got out in the province that the word +was, “Get the guns,” the inference being that if Ola and +his people would come in and surrender their guns they would be lightly +dealt with. In his book <i>Our Philippine Problem</i>, Professor +Willis, at page 140, gives what purports to be an agreement signed by +Colonel Bandholtz, dated September 22, 1903, whereby Bandholtz promises +Ola immunity, and also promises a number of other things which are on +their face rankly preposterous. Ola was much on the witness stand +before me during that term of court, and, everything “came out in +the wash.” He was represented by <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb426" href="#pb426" name="pb426">426</a>]</span>competent, +intelligent, and fearless Filipino counsel, and they did not suggest +the existence of any such document. No proof of any offer of immunity +was adduced before me. I think Ola simply finally decided to throw +himself on the mercy of the government, on the idea that there would be +more joy over the one sinner that repenteth than over the ninety and +nine that are already saved. He was probably as much afraid that +Governor Taft <i>would</i> order out the military as the wretched +<i>pacificos</i> were that he would not. He immediately turned +state’s evidence against all the men under him of whose +individual actings and doings he had any knowledge, the prosecuting +attorney making, with my full approval, a promise to ask executive +clemency as a reward. This was in keeping with the practice in like +cases customary in all jurisdictions throughout the English-speaking +world.</p> +<p>The magnitude of the Ola insurrection may be somewhat appreciated +from the financial loss it occasioned. Says Governor Taft, in his +report for 1903:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The Governor [of Albay] estimates that hemp production +and sale have been interfered with to the extent of some ten to twelve +millions of dollars Mexican [which is equivalent to five or six million +dollars American money<span class="corr" id="xd20e9268" title= +"Not in source">]</span>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9271src" href= +"#xd20e9271" name="xd20e9271src">14</a></p> +</div> +<p>As the population of the province was about 250,000,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e9278src" href="#xd20e9278" name= +"xd20e9278src">15</a> a loss of $5,000,000 meant a loss of $20 per +capita for the six months or so of reconcentration during which the +farms were neglected. This would be equivalent to a loss of +$1,800,000,000, in the same length of time to a country having a +population of 90,000,000, which is the total population figure for the +United States according to the Census of 1910. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb427" href="#pb427" name="pb427">427</a>]</span></p> +<p>It was in the latter part of October, 1903, I believe, that Ola +finally surrendered with some five hundred or six hundred men. I was +sent to Albay about the middle of November, to assist the regular judge +of the district, Hon. Adam C. Carson, now one of the justices of the +Supreme Court of the Philippines, in disposing of the case arising out +of the Ola performances. Conditions at the time were also very much +perturbed in various neighboring and other provinces, and the courts +and constabulary were kept very busy.</p> +<p>An incident recurs to memory just here which illustrates the state +of public order. But before relating it a decent respect to the +opinions of the reader requires me to state my own attitude toward that +whole situation at the time. I am perfectly clear in my own mind that +as society stands at present, capital punishment is a necessary part of +any sensible scheme for its protection. I have no compunction about +hanging any man for the lawless taking of the life of another. We owe +it to the community as a measure of protection to your life and mine +and all others. So far as public order was concerned in the country now +under consideration in 1903, the “civil” government was +simply a well-meaning sham, a military government with a civil name to +it. When the constabulary would get in the various brigands, +cut-throats, etc., who might be terrorizing a given district, some of +them masquerading as patriots, others not even doing that, the courts +would try them. None of the judges cared anything about any particular +brigand in any given case except to find out how many, if any, murders, +rapes, arsons, etc., he had committed during the particular reign of +terror of which he had been a part. Wherever specific murders were +proven, the punishment would always be “a life for a life.” +And you have no idea how absolutely wanton some of <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb428" href="#pb428" name="pb428">428</a>]</span>the +murders were, and how cruelly some of the young women, daughters of the +farmers, were maltreated after they were carried off to the mountains. +I would hate to try to guess how much more of this sort of thing would +have had to occur in Albay in 1903 than did occur, to have moved +Governor Taft to deprive Albay of “the protection of a benign +civil government”—one of the pet expressions of +contemporaneous official literature—and say the word to the army +to take hold of the situation and give the people decent protection. +But to come to the incident above broached. Shortly after I reached +Albay, and set to work to hold Part II. of the district court, while my +colleague, Judge Carson, held Part I. we had a call from a third judge, +Judge Linebarger, of Chicago, who was on his way to some other +perturbed region. I think that by that time, late in November, 1903, +Governor Taft must have known he was soon to leave the Islands to +become Secretary of War, and therefore was anxious to be able to make +the best showing possible, in his farewell annual report as Governor, +as to the “tranquillity” conditions. At any rate Judge +Linebarger came to see us, for a few hours, his ship having touched en +route at the port near the provincial capital of Albay. Judge Carson +had had a gallows erected near the public square of the town, for the +execution of some brigand he had convicted, whether it was for +maltreating some poor farmer’s daughter until she died, or +burying an American alive, or what, I do not now recollect. But in +going around the town some one suggested, as we passed this gallows, +that we go up on it to get the view. So we went—the three of us. +Then each looked at the other and all thought of the work ahead. Then +Judge Carson smiled and dispelled the momentary sombreness by repeating +with grim humor, an old Latin quotation <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb429" href="#pb429" name="pb429">429</a>]</span>he happened to +remember from his college days at the University of Virginia: <i lang= +"la">Hæc olim meminisse juvabit</i> (“It will be pleasant +to remember these things hereafter”).</p> +<p>The Ola insurrection had continued from October, 1902, to October, +1903, without suspension of civil government. During that period the +jail had been filled far beyond its reasonable capacity most of the +time. It sometimes had contained many hundreds. As to the sanitary +conditions, in passing the jail building one day in company with one of +the provincial officials, he remarked to me, nonchalantly: +“It’s equivalent to a death sentence to put a man in that +jail.” I afterwards found out that this was no joke. During most +of my visit to the province I was too busy holding court and separating +the sheep from the goats, to think much of anything else. But toward +the close of the term, after Christmas, after Governor Taft had left +the Islands and gone home to be Secretary of War, an incident happened +that produced a profound impression on me, suggested a new view-point, +and started troubled doubts as to whether the whole Benevolent +Assimilation business was not a mistake born of a union of avarice and +piety in which avarice predominated—doubts which certain events +of the following year, hereinafter related, converted in conviction +that any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos would be +better for all concerned than any government we could give them, +hampered as we always will be by the ever-present necessity to argue +that government against the consent of the governed is not altogether +wrong, and that taxation without representation may be a blessing in +disguise. The Yule-tide incident above alluded to was this. Most of the +docket having been disposed of, and there being a lull between +Christmas and New Year’s <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb430" +href="#pb430" name="pb430">430</a>]</span>day which afforded time for +matters more or less perfunctory in their nature, the prosecuting +attorney brought in rough drafts of two proposed orders for the court +to sign. One was headed with a list of fifty-seven names, the other +with a list of sixty-three names. Both orders recited that “the +foregoing” persons had died in the jail—all but one between +May 20 and Dec. 3. 1903 (roughly six and one-half months) as will +appear from an examination of the dates of death—and concluded by +directing that the indictments be quashed. The writer was only holding +an extraordinary term of court there in Albay, and was about to leave +the province to take charge of another district to which Governor Taft +had assigned him before leaving the Islands. The newly appointed +regular judge of the district, Judge Trent, now of the Philippine +Supreme Court, was scheduled soon to arrive. Therefore the writer did +not sign the proposed orders but kept them as legal curios. A correct +translation of one of them appears below, followed by the list of names +which headed the other (identical) order:</p> +<p>THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, EIGHTH JUDICIAL +DISTRICT</p> +<p>In the Court of First Instance of Albay</p> +<p>The United States against</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cornelio Rigorosa</td> +<td>died December</td> +<td>3, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Fabian Basques</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>25, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Julian Nacion</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>14, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Francisco Rigorosa</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>18, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Anacleto Solano</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>25, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Valentin Cesillano</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>6, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Felix Sasutona</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>26, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Marcelo de los Santos</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>3, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Marcelo Patingo</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>15, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Julian Raynante</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>7, 1903<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb431" href="#pb431" name= +"pb431">431</a>]</span></td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Dionisio Carifiaga</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>4, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Felipe Navor</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>17, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Luis Nicol</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>23, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Balbino Nicol</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>23, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Damiano Nicol</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>23, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Leoncio Salbaburo</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>20, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Catalino Sideria</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>25, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Marcelo Ariola</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>26, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Francisco Cao</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>26, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Martin Olaguer</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>13, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Juan Neric</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>16, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Eufemio Bere</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>21, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Julian Sotero</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>30, 1902</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Juan Payadan</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>10, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Benedicto Milla</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>30, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Placido Porlage</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>13, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Gaudencio Oguita</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>11, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Alberto Cabrera</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>8, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Julian Payadan</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>4, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Eusebio Payadan</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>10, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Leonardo Rebusi</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>2, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Julian Riobaldis</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>2, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Victor Riobaldis</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>23, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Mauricio Balbin</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>27, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tomas Rigador</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>23, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Miguel de los Santos</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>28, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Eustaquio Mapula</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>18, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Eugenio Lomibao</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>1, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Francisco Luna</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>7, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Gregorio Sierte</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>31, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Teodoro Patingo</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>21, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Teodorico Tua</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>23, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ceferino Octia</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>10, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Graciona Pamplona</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>12, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Felipe Bonifacio</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>26, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Baltazer Bundi</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>12, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Julian Locot</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>13, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Francisco de Punta</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>20, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pedro Madrid</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>24, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Felipe Pusiquit</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>17, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Rufo Mansalan</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>14, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ignacio Titano</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>20, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Alfonso Locot</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>29, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Gil Locot</td> +<td>died May</td> +<td>23, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Regino Bitarra</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>7, 1903<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb432" href="#pb432" name= +"pb432">432</a>]</span></td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bonifacio Bo</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>2, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Francisco de Belen</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>29, 1903</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">DECREE</p> +<p>The defendants above named, charged with divers crimes, having died +in the provincial jail by reason of various ailments, upon various +dates, according to official report of the jailer, it is</p> +<p><span class="sc">ORDERED BY THIS COURT</span>, That the cases +pending against the said deceased persons be, and the same are hereby, +quashed, the costs to be charged against the government.</p> +<hr class="tb"> +<p class="signed">Judge of the Twelfth District acting in the +Eighth.</p> +<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Albay</span>, December 28, +1903.</p> +</div> +<p>The foregoing order contains fifty-seven names. As already +indicated, the second order was like the first. It contained the names +of sixty-three other deceased prisoners, as follows, to wit:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Anacleto Avila</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>2, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Gregorio Saquedo</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>21, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Francisco Almonte</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>11, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Faustino Sallao</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>9, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Leocadio Pena</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>16, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Juan Ranuco</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>16, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Esteban de Lima</td> +<td>died February</td> +<td>4, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Estanislao Jacoba</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>7, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Macario Ordiales</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>19, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Laureano Ordiales</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>27, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Reimundo Narito</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>4, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Antonio Polvorido</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>12, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Norverto Melgar</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>14, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bartolome Rico</td> +<td>died November</td> +<td>8, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Simon Ordiales</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>13, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Candido Rosari</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>29, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Saturnino Vuelvo</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>18, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Vicente Belsaida</td> +<td>died May</td> +<td>26, 1903<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb433" href="#pb433" name= +"pb433">433</a>]</span></td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Felix Canaria</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>12, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pedro Cuya</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>26, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Evaristo Dias</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>24, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Felix Padre</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>8, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Alberto Mantes</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>7, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Joaquin Maamot</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>5, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Santiago Cacero</td> +<td>died May</td> +<td>28, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Hilario Zalazar</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>26, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tomas Odsinada</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>1, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Julian Oco</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>4, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Julian Lontac</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>27, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ambrosio Rabosa</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>19, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Mariano Garcia</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>12, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ramon Madrigalejo</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>19, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Albino Oyardo</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>1, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Felipe Rotarla</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>29, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Urbano Saralde</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>5, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Gil Mediavillo</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>13, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Egidio Mediavillo</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>16, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Mauricio Losano</td> +<td>died October</td> +<td>5, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bernabe Carenan</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>27, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pedro Sagaysay</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>29, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Laureano Ibo</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>5, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Vicente Sanosing</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>17, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Francisco Morante</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>10, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Anatollo Sadullo</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>16, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Lucio Rebeza</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>27, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Eugenio Sanbuena</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>13, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Nicolas Oberos</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>26, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Eusebio Rambillo</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>13, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tomas Rempillo</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>19, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Daniel Patasin</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>19, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ignacio Bundi</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>7, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Juan Locot</td> +<td>died May</td> +<td>23, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Zacarias David Padilla</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>7, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Juan Almazar</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>12, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Rufino Quipi</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>13, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Antonio Brio</td> +<td>died June</td> +<td>13, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Timoteo Enciso</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>12, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Hilario Palaad</td> +<td>died August</td> +<td>28, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ventura Prades</td> +<td>died May</td> +<td>24, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Alejandro Alevanto</td> +<td>died May</td> +<td>22, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Rufino Pelicia</td> +<td>died May</td> +<td>20, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Alejo Bruqueza</td> +<td>died July</td> +<td>19, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Prudencio Estrada</td> +<td>died September</td> +<td>15, 1903</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb434" href="#pb434" name= +"pb434">434</a>]</span></p> +<p>These lists were printed in an article by the author which appeared +in the <i>North American Review</i> for January 18, 1907, which article +was reprinted by Hon. James L. Slayden, of Texas, in the +<i>Congressional Record</i> for February 12, 1907. There can be little +doubt that President Taft saw the article, and that if it had contained +any inaccuracies they would long since have been noticed. So that in +the Albay jail in 1903 we had a sort of Andersonville prison, or Black +Hole of Calcutta, on a small scale.</p> +<p>If the military authorities had had charge of the Albay insurrection +and of the prisoners in the Albay jail in 1903, it is safe to say that +the great majority of those who died would have lived. But to have +ordered out the troops would have been to abandon the official fiction +that there was peace.</p> +<p>Of Ola’s five or six hundred men, Judge Carson and I, assisted +by the chief prosecuting attorney of the government, Hon. James Ross, +turned several hundred loose. Another large batch were disposed of +under a vagrancy law, which allowed us to put them to work on the roads +of the provinces for not exceeding two years, usually six to twelve +months. Most of the remainder, a few score, we tried under the sedition +law, and sent to Bilibid, the central penitentary at Manila, for terms +commensurate with their individual conduct and deeds. The more serious +cases were sent up for longer terms under the brigandage law. We +indulged in no more maudlin sentiment about those precious scamps who +had been degrading Filipino patriotism by occasionally invoking its +name in the course of a long season of preying upon their respectable +fellow-countrymen than Aguinaldo or Juan Cailles would have indulged. I +am quite sure that either Aguinaldo or Juan Cailles would have made +much shorter shrift of the whole bunch <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb435" href="#pb435" name="pb435">435</a>]</span>than Judge Carson and +I did. It was only the men shown to have committed crimes usually +punished capitally in this country that we sentenced to death—a +dozen or more, all told. Ola was the star witness for the state. He +held back nothing that would aid the prosecuting attorney to convict +the men who had followed him for a year. He was given a sentence of +thirty years (by Judge Carson), as a sort of expression of opinion of +the most Christian attitude possible concerning his real deserts, but +his services as state’s evidence entitled him to immunity, and +for that very good and sufficient reason Judge Carson, Prosecuting +Attorney Ross, and myself so recommended to the Governor.</p> +<p>Ola could read and write after a fashion, though he was quite an +ignorant man. But to show what his control must have been over the rank +and file of his men, let one incident suffice. On the boat going up to +Manila from Albay, after the term of court was over, Ola was aboard, en +route for the penitentiary. But, as he was a prospective recipient of +executive clemency, though the guards kept an eye on him, he was +allowed the freedom of the ship. One night on the voyage up, the +weather being extremely warm, I left my stateroom sometime after +midnight, carrying blanket and pillow, and went back to the storm +steering-gear at the stern of the ship, to spend the rest of the night +more comfortably. Waking sometime afterward for some unassignable +cause, I realized that the crown of another head was tangent to the +crown of my own, and occupying part of my pillow. It was Ola, the chief +of the brigands. I raised up, shook the intruder, and said: +“Hello, Ola, what are you doing here?” He wakened slowly. +He had no idea of any first-class passenger being back there, and had +taken it for granted that I was one of the ship’s crew, when he +decided to share my pillow. As <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb436" +href="#pb436" name="pb436">436</a>]</span>soon as he realized who I +was, he sprang to his feet with profound and effusive apologies, and +paced the deck until morning, perhaps thinking over the possible effect +of the incident on my recommendation concerning himself.</p> +<p>After I had recovered the use of all my pillow I went back to sleep +for a spell. About dawn I was wakened by some of the guards chattering. +But I heard Ola, who had apparently been keeping watch over my august +slumbers in the meantime, say in an imperious tone to the guards, +<i>his keepers</i>, “Hush, the judge is sleeping.” They +looked at the brigand chief, and cowed, obeyed.</p> +<p>Ola was pardoned. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb437" href="#pb437" +name="pb437">437</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8926" href="#xd20e8926src" name="xd20e8926">1</a></span> +Macaulay’s <i>Trial of Hastings</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8932" href="#xd20e8932src" name="xd20e8932">2</a></span> Says +Gen. Henry T. Allen, commanding the Philippines constabulary, in his +report for 1903 (<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1903, pt. +3, p. 49), “For some time to come the number of troops (meaning +American) to be kept here should be <i>a direct function of the number +of guns put into the hands of natives</i>.” He adds, “It is +unwise to ignore the great moral effect of a strong armed force +<i>above suspicion</i>.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8946" href="#xd20e8946src" name="xd20e8946">3</a></span> The +constabulary force was about 5000. When disturbances in one province +would become formidable, constabulary from provinces would be hurried +thither, thus denuding the latter provinces of proper police +protection.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8978" href="#xd20e8978src" name="xd20e8978">4</a></span> +1912.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e8987" href="#xd20e8987src" name="xd20e8987">5</a></span> The +reference is supposed to be to Mr. McKinley.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9018" href="#xd20e9018src" name="xd20e9018">6</a></span> <i>War +Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 264.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9032" href="#xd20e9032src" name="xd20e9032">7</a></span> Delaware +has 2050 square miles, Albay 1783.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9058" href="#xd20e9058src" name="xd20e9058">8</a></span> +<i>Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. +1249.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9074" href="#xd20e9074src" name="xd20e9074">9</a></span> +President Roosevelt cabled Kelly, whom he had known in the West many +years before, congratulating him on the results of his cool and +determined fearlessness and presence of mind on that occasion, but +elaboration on the Surigao affair was not part of the insular +programme, which was one of irrepressible optimism as to the state of +public order.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9094" href="#xd20e9094src" name="xd20e9094">10</a></span> Every +province in the Philippines is divided into so many pueblos. Pueblo, in +Spanish, means <i>town</i>. But the Spanish pueblo is more like a +township. It does not mean a continuous stretch of residences and other +buildings, but a given municipal area. Each pueblo is likewise +subdivided into <i>barrios</i>, dotted usually with hamlets, and groups +of houses.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9195" href="#xd20e9195src" name="xd20e9195">11</a></span> +<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1903, pt. 3, p. 92.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9226" href="#xd20e9226src" name="xd20e9226">12</a></span> +<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1903, pt. 1, p. 366.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9243" href="#xd20e9243src" name="xd20e9243">13</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 170</i>, 58th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 16.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9271" href="#xd20e9271src" name="xd20e9271">14</a></span> +<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1903, pt. 1, p. 32.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e9278" href="#xd20e9278src" name="xd20e9278">15</a></span> 240, +326, <i>Philippine Census</i>, 1903, vol. ii., p. 123.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch17" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XVII</h2> +<h2 class="main">Governor Taft, 1903 (<i>Continued</i>)</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">The Philippines for the Filipinos.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Speech of Governor +Taft.</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Just before Governor Taft left the Islands in 1903, he +made a speech which made him immensely popular with the Filipinos and +immensely unpopular with the Americans. The key-note of the speech was +“The Philippines for the Filipinos.” The Filipinos +interpreted it to mean for them that ultimate independence was not so +far in the dim distance of what is to happen after all the living are +dead as to be a purely academic matter. And there was absolutely +nothing in the speech to negative that idea, although he must have +known how the great majority of the Filipinos would interpret the +speech. On the other hand, the Americans in the Islands, popularity +with whom was then and there a negligible factor, interpreted the +speech, not inaccurately, to mean for them: “If you white men out +here, not connected with the Government, you Americans, British, +Germans and Spaniards, and the rest of you, do not like the way I am +running this country, why, the boats have not quit running between here +and your respective homes.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10230src" +href="#xd20e10230" name="xd20e10230src">1</a> Then he came back +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb438" href="#pb438" name= +"pb438">438</a>]</span>to the United States and has ever since been +urging American capital to go to the Philippines, all the time opposing +any declaration by the law-making power of the Government which will +let the American who goes out there know “where he is at,” +<i>i.e.</i>, whether we are or are not going to keep the Islands +permanently, and how to formulate his earthly plans accordingly, though +the educated Filipinos are concurrently permitted to clamor against +American “exploitation,” American rule, and Americans +generally, and to keep alive among the masses of their people what they +call “the spirit of liberty,” and what the insular +government calls the spirit of “irreconcilableness.” +Clearly, a policy which makes for race friction and race hatred is +essentially soft-headed, not soft-hearted, and ought not to be +permitted to continue. Yet it has been true for twelve years, as one of +President Taft’s admiring friends proudly boasted concerning him +some time since:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">One man virtually holds in his keeping the American +conscience with the regard to the Philippines.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10249src" href="#xd20e10249" name="xd20e10249src">2</a></p> +</div> +<p>This is true, and it is not as it should be. We should either stop +the clamor, or stop the American capital and energy from going to the +Islands. After an American goes out to the Islands, invests his money +there, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb439" href="#pb439" name= +"pb439">439</a>]</span>and casts his fortunes there, unless he is a +renegade, he sticks to his own people out there. Then the Taft policy +steps in and bullyrags him into what he calls “knuckling to the +Filipinos,” every time he shows any contumacious dissent from the +Taft decision reversing the verdict of all racial history—which +has been up to date, that wheresoever white men dwell in any +considerable numbers in the same country with Asiatics or Africans, the +white man will rule. Yet the American in the Philippines, once he is +beguiled into going there, must bow to the Taft policies. He has taken +his family to the Islands, and all his worldly interests are there. Yet +he is living under a despotism, a benevolent despotism, it is true, so +long as the non-office-holding American does not openly oppose the +government’s policies, but one which, however benevolent, is, so +far as regards any brooking of opposition from any one outside the +government hierarchy, as absolute as any of the other despotic +governments of Asia. Though the Governor of the Philippines does not +wear as much gilt braid as some of his fellow potentates on the +mainland of Asia, still, in all executive matters he wields a power +quite as immediate and substantial, in its operation on his subjects, +as any of his royal colleagues. It never for a moment occurs either to +the American Government official in the Philippines, or to the American +citizen engaged in private business there who is in entire accord with +the policies of the insular government and on terms of friendship with +the officials, that the government under which he is living is any more +of a despotism than the Government of the United States. The shoe never +pinches the American citizen engaged in private business until he +begins, for one reason or another, to be “at outs” with the +insular government, and to have “opinions” <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb440" href="#pb440" name= +"pb440">440</a>]</span>which—American-like—he at once wants +to express. If he permits himself to get thoroughly out of accord with +the powers that be, the sooner he gets out of the Islands the better +for him. This is the most notorious single fact in the present +situation. There is no public opinion to help such a person, in any +case where he differs with any specific act or policy of the insular +government. The American colony is comparatively small, say between ten +and twenty thousand all told, outside the army (which consists of ten +or twelve thousand individuals living wholly apart from the rest of the +community). The doctor who is known to have the patronage of high +government officials is sure of professional success, and his wife is +sure to receive the social recognition her husband’s position in +the community naturally commands; and this permits her to make +auspicious entrance into the game of playing at precedence with her +next neighbor called “society,” so dear to the hearts of +many otherwise sensible and estimable women—to say nothing of +carpet knights, callow youths, cads, and aging gourmands. Also if the +doctor and his lady have adult children, their opportunities to marry +well are multiplied by the sunlight from the seats of the mighty. Thus +the doctor and his wife are a standing lesson to the man “with +convictions” that yearn for utterance, but who is also blessed +with a discreet helpmate, more concerned in the general welfare and +happiness of all the family than in seeing her husband’s name in +the paper. What is true of the doctor is also true of the lawyer known +to be <i>persona grata</i> to the government. Again, the newspaper man +in favor with the government is sure to get his share of the government +advertising, according to a very liberal construction, and that insures +his being able to command reportorial and editorial talent such +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb441" href="#pb441" name= +"pb441">441</a>]</span>as will sell his paper, and the consequent +circulation is sure to get him the advertising patronage of the +mercantile community, thus placing success for him on a solid, +comfortable basis. Also, a contrary course will, slowly, maybe, but +surely, freeze out any rash competitor. Consequently, the American in +the Philippines is deprived of one of his most precious home pleasures, +viz., letting off steam, in some opposition paper, about the real or +imagined shortcomings of the men in charge of the government. For the +reasonable expectancy of life of an opposition paper in Manila is +pathetically brief. The hapless editor on the prosperous paper, +whatever his talents, who happens to become afflicted with +“views” which he airs in his editorial columns, is soon +upbraided by his friends at his club as “getting cranky,” +and is told by the orthodox old-timers among them, “John, +you’ve been out here too long. You better go home.” If he +does not change his tone, the receipts of the advertising department of +his paper soon fall off, and his friend, the more tactful proprietor, +who “knows how to get along with people,” is not long in +agreeing with the rest of his friends that he has “been out here +too long.” Again the successful merchant has too many interests +at stake in which he needs the cordial friendship of the government to +be able to afford to antagonize it. And so on, through every walk of +life, the influence of the government permeates every nook and corner +of the situation.</p> +<p>The average public man in the United States would not feel +“nat’ral” unless intermittently bedewed with steam +from the exhaust valve of the soul of some “outraged +citizen,” through the medium of the public press. But in the +Philippines a public man occupying a conspicuous position with the +government may be very <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb442" href= +"#pb442" name="pb442">442</a>]</span>generally detested and actually +not know it.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10270src" href="#xd20e10270" +name="xd20e10270src">3</a> The American in the Philippines, with all +his home connections severed, might as well send his family to the +poor-house at once as to come out in a paper with an interview or +speech,—even supposing any paper would publish it—which, +copied by the papers back in the United States, would embarrass the +National Administration’s Philippine policy in any way. The same +applies to talking too freely for the newspapers when home on a +visit.</p> +<p>I think the foregoing makes sufficiently obvious the inherent +impossibility of the American people ever knowing anything about +current governmental mistakes in the Philippines, of which there must +be some, in time for their judgment to have anything to do with shaping +the course of the government out there for which they are responsible. +And therefore it shows the inherent unfitness of their governmental +machinery to govern the Filipinos so long as they do not change the +home form of government to meet the needs of the colonial situation, by +providing a method of invoking the public judgment on a single issue, +as in the case of monarchical ministries, instead of lumping issues as +we now do. It is certainly a shame that the fate and future of the +Philippines are to-day dependent upon issues as wholly foreign to +anything Philippine as is the price of cheese in Kamchatka or the price +of wool in the United States. Whether the Filipinos are fit for +self-government or not, under our present form of government we are +certainly wholly unfit to govern them. In our government of the +Filipinos, the nature of the case eliminates our most valuable +governmental asset, to wit, that saving grace of public opinion which +stops <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb443" href="#pb443" name= +"pb443">443</a>]</span>public men, none of whom are infallible, before +they can accomplish irreparable mischief, through uncorrected faith in +plans of questionable wisdom and righteousness to which their minds are +made up.</p> +<p>To show how absolute was the executive and legislative power over +8,000,000 of people entrusted by the sole authority of President +McKinley to Governor Taft—without consulting Congress, though +afterwards the authority so conferred was ratified by Congress and +descended from Governor Taft to his successor—an incident related +to me in the freedom of social intercourse, and not in the least in +confidence, by my late beloved friend Arthur W. Fergusson, long +Executive Secretary to Governor Taft, will suffice. In 1901 the +Commission had passed a law providing for the constitution of the +Philippine judiciary,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10279src" href= +"#xd20e10279" name="xd20e10279src">4</a> according to which law an +American, in order to be eligible to appointment as a Judge of First +Instance (the ordinary trial court, or <i lang="la">nisi prius</i> +court, of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence) must be more than thirty years +old, and must have practised law in the United States for a period of +five years before appointed. In 1903 President Roosevelt wanted to make +Hon. Beekman Winthrop (then under thirty years of age) now (1912), +Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a Judge of First Instance. Governor +Taft called Fergusson in and said: “Fergy, make me out a +commission for Beekman Winthrop as a Judge of First Instance.” +Fergusson said: “You can’t do it, Governor. It’s +against the law. He’s not old enough.” Winthrop was a +graduate of the Harvard Law School. Governor Taft said humorously, +“I can’t eh? I’ll show you. Send me a +stenographer.” A law was dictated<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10285src" href="#xd20e10285" name="xd20e10285src">5</a> striking +out thirty <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb444" href="#pb444" name= +"pb444">444</a>]</span>years and inserting twenty-five, and adding +after the words “must have practised law for a period of five +years” the words “or be a graduate of a reputable law +school.” Fergusson was then called in, and told to go down the +hall, see the other commissioners,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10290src" +href="#xd20e10290" name="xd20e10290src">6</a> and get them together, +which he did, and the law was passed in a few minutes. Then Fergusson +was sent for, and the Governor said, handing him the new +“law”; “Now make out that commission.” Even if +Fergusson colored the incident up a bit, in the exercise of his +inimitable artistic capacity to make <i>anything</i> interesting, his +story was certainly substantially correct relatively to the +absoluteness of the authority of the Governor, as will appear by +reference to the two laws cited.</p> +<p>It is only fair to say that Winthrop made a very good judge. There +used to be current in the Philippines a story that Governor Taft had +said, in more or less humorous vein: “Gentlemen, I’m +somewhat of an expert on judges. What you need in a judge +is”—counting with the index finger of one hand on the +fingers of the other—“firstly, integrity; secondly, +courage; thirdly, common sense; and fourthly, he <i>must</i> know a +<i>little</i> law.” Winthrop’s integrity, courage, and +common sense were beyond all question. It could hardly have been +otherwise. He came of a long line of sturdy and distinguished men, the +first of whom had come over in the <i>Mayflower</i> days to the +Massachusetts coast. And, he <i>did</i> know a <i>little</i> law. But +the manner of his appointment is none the less illustrative of how much +quicker, Governor Taft could make and publish a law than any of his +fellow despots<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10315src" href="#xd20e10315" +name="xd20e10315src">7</a> over on the mainland of Asia, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb445" href="#pb445" name= +"pb445">445</a>]</span>considering how slow-moving all <i>their</i> +various grand viziers were, compared with Fergy, and his corps of +stenographers.</p> +<p>Having now given, I hope, a more or less sympathetic insight into +what absolute rulers our governors in the Philippines have been, in the +very nature of the case, from the beginning, let us observe the change +of tone of the government, after the reign of the first ended, and the +reign of the second began. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb446" href= +"#pb446" name="pb446">446</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10230" href="#xd20e10230src" name="xd20e10230">1</a></span> The +speech referred to in the text was made at Manila in December, 1903, +but the same “Philippines for the Filipinos” policy had +already been proclaimed much earlier. The <i>Manila American</i> of +February 28, 1903, reprints from the <i>Iloilo Times</i> of February +21, 1903, an account of Governor Taft’s celebrated Iloilo speech +of February 19, 1903, which was received with such profound chagrin by +the American business community in the Islands. There had been much bad +blood between the American colony at and about Iloilo and the native +Americano-phobes. The following is from the Iloilo paper’s +account of Governor Taft’s speech: “The Governor then gave +some advice to foreigners and Americans, remarking that if they found +fault with the way the government was being run here, they could leave +the islands; that the government was being run for the +Filipinos.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10249" href="#xd20e10249src" name="xd20e10249">2</a></span> James +LeRoy in <i>The World’s Work</i> for December, 1903.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10270" href="#xd20e10270src" name="xd20e10270">3</a></span> A +familiar instance of this will occur to any one acquainted with the +situation in the Islands for any considerable part of the last ten +years.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10279" href="#xd20e10279src" name="xd20e10279">4</a></span> Act +No. 136, U. S. Philippine Commission, passed June 11, 1901.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10285" href="#xd20e10285src" name="xd20e10285">5</a></span> Act +1024, Philippine Commission, passed Oct. 10, 1903.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10290" href="#xd20e10290src" name="xd20e10290">6</a></span> There +were five members of the original Taft Commission, including President +Taft.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10315" href="#xd20e10315src" name="xd20e10315">7</a></span> I +neither forget nor gainsay the generally benevolent character of his +despotism; and having been a beneficiary of it myself I am therefore +disposed to see much of wisdom in the way it was exercised.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch18" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XVIII</h2> +<h2 class="main">Governor Wright—1904</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">The blame of those ye better</p> +<p class="line">The hate of those ye guard.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Kipling’s</span> +<i>White Man’s Burden</i>.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Governor Taft left the Philippines on or about +December 23, 1903, to become Secretary of War in President +Roosevelt’s Cabinet, and shortly afterward Vice-Governor Luke E. +Wright succeeded to the governorship. After the accession of Governor +Wright, there was no more hammering it into the American business men +having money invested in the Islands that the Filipino was their +“little brown brother,” for whom no sacrifice, however +sublime, would be more than was expected. Governor Wright was quite +unpopular with the Filipinos and immensely popular with the Americans +and Europeans, because, soon after he came into power, he “let +the cat out of the bag,” by letting the Filipinos know plainly +that they might just as well shut up talking about independence for the +present, so far as he was advised and believed; in other words, that +Governor Taft’s “Philippines for the Filipinos” need +not cause any specially billowy sighs of joy just yet, because it had +no reference to any Filipinos now able to sigh, but only to unborn +Filipinos who might sigh in some remote future generation; and that the +slogan which had caused them all to want <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb447" href="#pb447" name="pb447">447</a>]</span>to sob simultaneously +for joy on the broad chest of Governor Taft was merely a case of an +amiable unwillingness to tell them an unpleasant truth, viz., that in +his opinion they were wholly unfit for self-government—all of +which, in effect, meant that Governor Taft had been merely +“Keeping the word of promise to the ear and breaking it to the +hope.”</p> +<p>The Wright plain talk made the Filipinos one and all feel: +“Alackaday! Our true friend has departed.” But as Secretary +of War Taft, after four years more of trying to please both sides, at +home, at last frankly told the Filipinos when he went out to attend the +opening of the first Philippine legislature, in 1907, practically just +what Governor Wright had begun to tell them from the moment his +predecessor had exchanged the parting tear with them on the water-front +at Manila in 1903, the net result of the Wright policy of +uncompromising honesty on the <i>present</i> political situation, may +easily be guessed.</p> +<p>Governor Wright’s method of repudiating the Taft straddle took +for <i>its</i> key-note, in lieu of “The Philippines for the +Filipinos,” the slogan “An Equal Chance for All.” +What Governor Wright meant was merely that there would be no more +browbeating of Americans to make them love their little brown brother +as much as Governor Taft was supposed to love him, but that everybody +would be treated absolutely alike and nobody coddled. However, the +Filipinos of course knew that they could not compete with American +wealth and energy, and so did the Americans in the islands. So what the +Wright slogan, unquestionably fair as was its intent, inexorably meant +to everybody concerned except the dignified, straightforward and candid +propounder of it, was, in effect, the British “White Man’s +Burden” or Trust-for-Civilization theory, a theory whereunder the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb448" href="#pb448" name= +"pb448">448</a>]</span>white man who wants some one else’s land +goes and takes it on the idea that he can put it to better use than the +owner. Thus early did the original “jollying” Mr. Taft had +given them become transparent to his little brown brother. Thus early +did it become clear to the Filipinos that behind the mask of executive +protestations that they shall some day have independence when fit for +it, lurks a set determination industriously to earn for an +indeterminate number of generations yet to come</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">The blame of those ye better</p> +<p class="line">The hate of those ye guard.</p> +</div> +<p class="first">This book has been written, up to this point, in vain, +if the preceding chapters have not made clear how much political +expediency, looking to the welfare of a party in power naturally +seeking to continue in power, necessarily dominates Philippine affairs +under American rule. We have observed under the microscope of history, +made available by the official documents now accessible, the long +battle between the political expediency germ and the independence bug +which began in General Anderson’s dealings with Aguinaldo and +continued through General Merritt’s and General Otis’s +<i>régimes</i>. We have seen General MacArthur’s attempt +at a wise surgical operation to excise the independence bug from the +Philippine body politic—so that the expediency germ might die a +natural death from having nothing to feed on. We have seen that +operation interfered with by the Taft Commission during the +presidential campaign of 1900, because the men in control of the +republic could not ignore considerations of political expediency; and +we saw the consequent premature setting up of the civil government in +1901, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb449" href="#pb449" name= +"pb449">449</a>]</span>with all its dire consequences in the then as +yet unconquered parts of the archipelago, southern Luzon, and some of +the Visayan Islands. We have observed the effective though heroic local +treatment administered to the Philippine body politic by General Bell +in Batangas in 1901–2, with a view of killing off the +independence bug there. We have seen the fierce struggle between some +of the bug’s belated spawn and the expediency germ’s now +more emboldened forces in Albay in the off year, 1903. We are now to +take our fifth year’s course in the colonial department of +politico-entomological research, the presidential year 1904.</p> +<p>It was the way the Samar insurrection of 1904–5-6 was handled +which finally convinced me that the Filipinos would not kill any more +of each other in a hundred years than we have killed, or permitted to +be killed, of them, in the fell process of Benevolent Assimilation.</p> +<p>American imperialism is not honest, like the British variety. +American imperialism knows that Avarice was its father, and Piety its +mother, and that it takes after its father more than it does after its +mother. British imperialism frankly aims mostly to make <i>the +survivors</i> of its policies happy, not the people it immediately +operates on. American imperialism pretends to be ministering to the +happiness of the living, and, though it realizes that it is not a +success in that line, it resents identification with its British +cousin, by sanctimonious reference to the alleged net good it is doing. +Yet in its moments of frankness it says, with an air of infinite +patience under base ingratitude, “Well, they will be happy in +some other generation,” and that therefore the number of people +we <i>have</i> had or <i>may</i> have, to kill, or permit to be killed, +in the process of Benevolent Assimilation, is wholly negligible. This +is simply the old, old argument that the end justifies <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb450" href="#pb450" name="pb450">450</a>]</span>the +means, the argument that has wrought more misery in the world than any +other since time began.</p> +<p>When Judge Taft, General Wright, and their colleagues of the Taft +Commission, came out to the Philippines in 1900, they came full of the +McKinley convictions about a people whom neither they or Mr. McKinley +had ever seen, bound hand and foot by political necessity to square the +freeing of Cuba with the subjugation of the Philippines. A perfectly +natural evolution of this attitude resulted in the position they at +once took on arriving in the Islands, viz., that to do for the +Filipinos what we have done for the Cubans would mean a bloody welter +of anarchy and chaos. And the presidential contest of 1900 was fought +and won largely on that issue. After 1900, for all the gentlemen above +referred to, the proposition was always <i lang="la">res +adjudicata</i>. All protests by Filipinos to the contrary caused only +resentment, and welded the authorities more and more hermetically to +the correctness of the original proposition. Loyalty to the original +ill-considered decision became impregnated, in their case, with a +fervor not entirely unlike religious fanaticism, and belief in it +became a matter of principle, justifying all they had done, and guiding +all they might thereafter do. So that when General Wright “came +to the throne” in our colonial empire, as Governor, and legatee +of the McKinley-Taft Benevolent Assimilation policies, his attitude in +all he did was thoroughly honest, and also thoroughly British. He +honestly believed in the “bloody welter of anarchy and +chaos” proposition, and was prepared, in any emergency that might +arise, to follow his convictions in that regard whithersoever they +might lead, without variableness or shadow of turning. Take him all in +all, Governor Wright was about the best man occupying exalted +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb451" href="#pb451" name= +"pb451">451</a>]</span>station I ever knew personally, President Taft +himself not excepted; although I still adhere to Colonel +Roosevelt’s opinion of 1901 concerning Mr. Taft, quoted in the +chapter preceding this, from the <i>Outlook</i> of September 21, 1901, +notwithstanding that in the contest for the Republican nomination for +the presidency in 1912, the Colonel “recalled” that +opinion. Seriously, a man may “combine the qualities which would +make a first class President of the United States with the qualities +which would make a first class Chief Justice of the United +States” and still cut a sorry figure trying to fit a square peg +into a round hole, or a scheme of government, the breath of whose life +is public opinion, into the running of a remote colonial government, +the breath of whose life is exemption from being interfered with by +public opinion.</p> +<p>After the Albay insurrection of 1903 had been cleaned up, I took +charge of the Twelfth Judicial District, having been appointed thereto +by Governor Taft just before he left the islands to become Secretary of +War. In those trying pioneer days they always seemed to give me the +insurrections to sift out, but it was purely fortuitous. Whenever you +ceased to be busy, prompt arrangements were made for you to get busy +again. Judge Ide, the Minister of Justice, wasted no government +money.</p> +<p>The Twelfth District consisted of the two island provinces of Samar +and Leyte, two of the six Visayan Islands heretofore noticed as the +only ones worth considering in a general view of the archipelago such +as the student of world politics wants or needs. Leyte had a population +of 388,922,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10402src" href="#xd20e10402" +name="xd20e10402src">1</a> and an area of 3008 square miles.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e10407src" href="#xd20e10407" name= +"xd20e10407src">2</a> Samar’s population was 266,237, and its +area, 5276 square miles, makes it the third largest island of the +Philippine Archipelago. So that as Judge <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb452" href="#pb452" name="pb452">452</a>]</span>of the Twelfth +District, consisting of two provinces, the Governor of each of which +was <i>ex-officio</i> sheriff of the court for his province, I was, in +a sense, a sort of shepherd of a political flock of some 650,000 +people, whom I always thought of as a whole as “my” +people.</p> +<p>Samar and Leyte are separated, where nearest together, by a most +picturesque winding strait bordered with densely wooded hills. San +Juanico Strait is much narrower than the inland sea of Japan at its +narrowest point, and almost as beautiful. In fact, at its narrowest +point it seems little more than a stone’s throw in width. It is +as pretty as the prettiest part of the Golden Horn. Leyte had been put +under the Civil Government in 1901, and this premature interference +with the military authorities in the midst of their efforts to pacify +the island had had the usual result of postponing pacification, by +filling local politicians, wholly unable to comprehend a government +which <i>entreated</i> or <i>reasoned</i> with people to do things, +with the notion that we were resorting to diplomacy in lieu of force +because of fear of them. Leyte and Samar were strategically one for the +insurgents, just as the provinces of the Lake district of Luzon, +described in an earlier chapter, were, because they could flee by night +from one province to another in small boats without detection, when +hard pressed by the <i>Americano</i>. The main insurgent general in +Samar, Lucban, had surrendered to General Grant in 1902, but the +cheaper fellows stayed out much longer, preying upon those who +preferred daily toil to cattle-stealing and throat-cutting as a means +of livelihood, and continuing the political unrest intermittently in +gradually diminishing degree, through 1903. By the spring of 1904, +however, there still remained in Samar riffraff enough, the +<i>jetsam</i> and <i>flotsam</i> of the insurrection—professional +outlaws—to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb453" href="#pb453" +name="pb453">453</a>]</span>get up some trouble, so that, as brigand +chiefs, they might resume the rôles of Robin Hood, Jesse James, +<i>et al.</i> During the first half of that year the opportunity these +worthies had been waiting for, while resting on their oars, developed. +The crop of municipal officials resulting from the original McKinley +plan of beginning the work of reconstruction <i>during</i>, instead of +<i>after</i>, the war, and among the potential village Hampdens, +instead of among the Cromwells, had resulted in some very rascally +municipal officials who oppressed the poor, getting the hemp of the +small farmer, when they would bring it to town, at their own +prices—hemp being to Samar what cotton is to the South. From the +lowland and upland farmers the ever-widening discontent spread to the +hills, where dwelt a type of people constituting only a small fraction +of the total population of the Islands—“half savage and +half child”—but loving their hills, and wholly indisposed, +of their own initiative, to start trouble, unless manipulated. +Obviously, then, “the public mind” of Samar—those who +know Samar will smile with me at the phrase, but it will do, for lack +of a better—was likely soon to be in a generally inflammable +condition. By July, 1904, the Robin Hoods, Jesse Jameses, <i>et +al.</i>, touched the match to the material and a political +conflagration started, apparently as unguided—save by the winds +of impulse—and certainly as persistent, as a forest fire. Every +native of the Philippine Islands, whether he be of the 7,000,000 +Christians or of the 500,000 non-Christian tribes, is born with a +highly developed social instinct either to command or to obey. The +latter tendency is quite as common in the Philippines as the former is +in the United States. Hence the Samar disturbances of 1904–5-6, +though made up at the outset of raids and depredations by various +roving bands of outlaws <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb454" href= +"#pb454" name="pb454">454</a>]</span>yielding allegiance only to their +immediate chief, soon took on a very formidable military and political +aspect.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10452src" href="#xd20e10452" name= +"xd20e10452src">3</a> The roving bands would ask the peaceably inclined +people our flag was supposed to be protecting, “Are you for us or +for the Americans?” promptly chopping their heads off if they +showed any lack of zeal in denouncing American municipal institutions +and things American in general. Pursuant to Mr. McKinley’s +original scheme—concocted for a people he had never seen, under +pressure of political necessity—to rig up in short order a +government “essentially popular in form,” a lot of most +pitiable municipal governments had been let loose on the people, a part +of our series of kindergarten lessons. The plan was as wise as it will +be for the Japanese—some one please hold Captain Hobson while I +finish the analogy—when they conquer the United States, to go to +the Bowery and the Ghetto for mayors of all our cities. Thus by our +pluperfect benevolence, we had contrived in Samar by 1904 to rouse the +highland folk, or hill people, whom the Spaniards had always let alone, +against the pacific agricultural lowland people and the dwellers in the +coast villages. The latter, or such of them as did not join the hill +folk for protection, we permitted to be mercilessly butchered by +wholesale, from August to November, 1904, as hereinafter more fully set +forth, because ordering out the army to protect them might have been +construed at home to mean disturbances <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb455" href="#pb455" name="pb455">455</a>]</span>more serious and +widespread than actually existed, and might therefore affect the +presidential election in the United States by renewing the notion that +the Administration had never been frank with the American people +concerning conditions in the Philippines.</p> +<p>The annual report of the Philippine Commission for 1904 is dated +November 1st, which was just a week before the presidential election +day of that year. Their annual report for 1905 is dated November 1, +1905. In their report for 1904, the Commission deal with the general +state of public order in the same roseate manner which, as we have +seen, had made its first appearance during the political exigencies of +1900 in the language about “the great majority of the +people” being “entirely willing” to benevolent alien +domination in lieu of independence. When Rip Van Winkle was trying to +quit drinking, he used to say after each drink: “Oh, we’ll +just let that pass.” In their report for 1904, the Commission +swallow the conditions in Samar with equal nonchalance. After stating +that some (impliedly negligible) disturbances had occurred in Samar +“two months since,” they add that “the constabulary +of the province took the field” against the bands of Pulajans, or +outlaws, and that “as a result, they were soon broken up, and are +being pursued and killed or captured” (p. 3). In their report +dated November 1, 1905, by way of preface to an account of the +extensive military operations inaugurated in Samar shortly after the +presidential election of 1904, which operations had not only been in +progress for nearly a year on the date of the 1905 report, but +continued for more than a year thereafter, the Commission explain their +1904 nonchalance about Samar thus: “It was then believed that the +constabulary <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb456" href="#pb456" name= +"pb456">456</a>]</span>forces had succeeded in checking the further +progress of the outbreak” (p. 47).</p> +<p>Let us examine the facts on which they based this statement, since +it meant that they believed that a duly reported epidemic of massacres +of peaceably inclined people, over whom the American flag was floating +as a symbol of protection to life and property, had stood effectually +checked by November 1, 1904, the date of their report. And first, of +the massacres themselves, their nature and extent.</p> +<p>The Samar massacres of 1904 began with what we all called down there +“the outbreak of July 10th.” In August, 1904, I went to +Samar to handle the cases arising out of the disturbances there, +assisted by the (native) Governor of the province, who, under the law +already alluded to, was <i>ex-officio</i> sheriff of the court, and an +army of deputy sheriffs, as it were, the constabulary, numbering +several hundred. The outbreak of July 10th was always known afterwards +as “the Tauiran affair.” This Tauiran affair was a raid by +an outlaw band on the <i>barrio</i> of Tauiran, one of the hamlets of +the municipal jurisdiction of the township called Gandara, in the +valley of the Gandara River, in north central Samar, wherein one +hundred houses, the whole settlement, were burned, and twenty-one +people killed. The term of court lasted from early in August until +early in November. The day after the Tauiran affair, over on the other +fork of the Gandara River, occurred what was called “the +Cantaguic affair.” Cantaguic was a hamlet or <i>barrio</i> about +the size of Tauiran. The brigands killed the lieutenant of police of +Cantaguic and some others, but they did not kill everybody in the +place. Instead, after killing a few people, they went to the +<i>tribunal</i> (town hall), seized the local <i>teniente</i>, or +municipal representative of American <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb457" href="#pb457" name="pb457">457</a>]</span>authority, tied the +American flag they found at the <i>tribunal</i> about the head of the +<i>teniente</i>, turban fashion, poured kerosene oil on it, and took +the <i>teniente</i> down stairs and out into the public square, where +they lighted and burned the flag on his head, the chief of the band, +one Juliano Caducoy by name, remarking to the onlookers that the act +was intended as a lesson to those serving that flag. They then cut off +the lips of the <i>teniente</i> so he could not eat (he of course died +a little later), burned the <i>barrio</i> and carried off fifty of the +inhabitants. Caducoy was captured some time afterward, and I sentenced +him to be hanged. There was practically no dispute about the facts. +After the Cantaguic affair, during the term of court mentioned, the +provincial doctor, Dr. Cullen, an American who had been a captain +doctor of volunteers, had occasion to run up to Manila. The doctor was +a most accomplished gentleman, but he had a fondness for the grewsome +in description equal to Edgar Allan Poe himself. After he came back he +told me about having told the Governor-General of the Cantaguic affair, +and repeated with an evident pleased consciousness of his ability to +make his hearer’s blood curdle, how the Governor had said to him +slowly, “Doctor, that—is—<i>aw</i>ful!”</p> +<p>Blood seemed to whet the appetite for slaughter. The records of the +August–November, 1904 term of the court of first instance of +Samar show all the various <i>barrios</i> of the Gandara Valley in +flames on successive days, after the affairs of July 10th and 11th. I +do not speak from memory, but from documents contained in a large +bundle of papers kept ever since, in memory of that incarnadined epoch. +You find one <i>barrio</i> burned one day and another another day, +until all the people of the Gandara Valley were made homeless. One of +the constabulary officers, Lieutenant Bowers, a very <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb458" href="#pb458" name= +"pb458">458</a>]</span>gallant fellow, testified before me that from +July 10th to the date of his testimony, which was on or about September +28th, some 50,000 people had been made homeless in Samar by the +operations of the outlaws. I deem Lieutenant Bowers’s estimate +quite reasonable. His figures include only one-fifth of the population +of an island which was in the throes of an all-pervading brigand +uprising. The conservative nature of Lieutenant Bowers’s estimate +concerning the mischief that had already been wrought by the end of +September, 1904, and was then gathering destructive potentiality like a +forest or prairie fire, may be inferred from the contents of a +memorandum appearing below, furnished me by a Spanish officer of the +constabulary, a Lieutenant Calderon, who had been an officer of the +Rural Guard in the Spanish days. It contains a list of fifty-three +towns, villages, and hamlets (a <i>barrio</i> may be quite a village, +sometimes even quite a town, though usually it is a hamlet) burned up +to the date the memorandum was furnished me.</p> +<p>In order to a clear understanding of these Samar massacres and +town-burnings of 1904, as well as for general geographical purposes, a +few preliminary words of explanation will be appropriate just here. A +province in the Philippines has heretofore been likened to a county +with us. But in the largest provinces, the <i>subdivisions</i> of +provinces called <i>municipalities</i> are more like counties; and each +municipality is in turn subdivided into sections called <i>barrios</i>. +A municipality (Spanish, <i>pueblo</i>) in the Philippines is not +primarily a city or town, as we understand it, <i>i.e.</i>, a more or +less continuous settlement of houses and lots more or less adjacent, +but a specific area of territory, a township, as it were. This area or +territory may be 5 × 10 square miles, or 10 × 20, or more, +or less. For example, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb459" href= +"#pb459" name="pb459">459</a>]</span>Samar’s area is 5276 square +miles. Yet it contained in 1904, and probably still contains, only +twenty-five townships or municipalities all told, each municipality +being subdivided in turn into <i>barrios</i>. Municipalities in the +Philippines vary in size as much as counties do with us, and their +total area accounts for and represents the total area of the province, +just as the total area of the counties of a State represents with us +the total area of the State. The seat of government of the municipality +<i>always</i> bears the same name as the municipality itself, just as +the county seat of a county usually, or frequently, bears the same name +as the county, with us. Take for instance, the name of the first +municipality or township in the list which appears below, Gandara. The +municipality of Gandara might be described by analogy as the +“county” of Gandara, the list of <i>barrios</i> burned as a +list of towns and villages of the “county” of Gandara.</p> +<p>The municipality of Gandara included a watershed in north central +Samar from which the Gandara River flowed in a southwesterly direction +to the sea. Within this watershed, parallel 12½ north of the +equator intersects the 125th meridian of longitude east of Greenwich. +Northern Samar is a very rich hemp country, Catarman hemp being usually +quoted higher than any hemp listed on the London market. If you stand +at the highest point of the Gandara watershed you can see four streams +flowing off north, northwest, northeast, and southwest to the sea. +There are some half dozen streams having their source there. Brigands +making their headquarters there could always, when hard pressed, get +away in canoes toward the sea in almost any direction they wished. The +following is Lieutenant Calderon’s list: <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb460" href="#pb460" name="pb460">460</a>]</span></p> +<p lang="es">RELACION POR MUNICIPIOS DE LOS BARRIOS QUEMADOS.</p> +<p>(List by Municipalities of the <i>Barrios</i> Burned.)</p> +<p>MUNICIPALITY OF GANDARA</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tauiran</td> +<td>July 10</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cantaguic</td> +<td>July 12</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cauilan</td> +<td>July 13</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Erenas</td> +<td>July 16</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Blanca Aurora</td> +<td>July 19</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bulao<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10592src" href="#xd20e10592" name= +"xd20e10592src">4</a></td> +<td>July 21</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pizarro</td> +<td>August 8</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cagibabago</td> +<td>August 8</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Nueva</td> +<td>August 10</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Hernandez</td> +<td>August 10</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>San Miguel</td> +<td>August 10</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Buao</td> +<td>August 15</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>El Cano</td> +<td>August 17</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>San Enrique</td> +<td>August 20</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>San Luis</td> +<td>August 25</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN</p> +<p>(Calderon’s List of <i>Barrios</i> Burned, +<i>continued</i>)</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Malino</td> +<td>July 31</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Silanga</td> +<td>August 9</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ginga</td> +<td>August 13</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>San Fernando</td> +<td>August 15</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Maragadin</td> +<td>August 20</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Talinga</td> +<td>August 21</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Santa Cruz</td> +<td>August 22</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Dap-dap</td> +<td>August 29</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Palencia</td> +<td>August 31</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Albalate</td> +<td>(date not given)</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Villa Hermosa</td> +<td>(date not given)</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb461" href="#pb461" name= +"pb461">461</a>]</span></p> +<p>The above list of villages burned in the township of Catbalogan +shows how bold the Pulajans had then grown. By that time they were +committing depredations, robbery, murder, and town-burning, in all the +various villages within the municipal jurisdiction of the township of +Catbalogan, coming often within a few miles of the town proper of +Catbalogan itself, the seat of the provincial government. In the attack +on Silanga, which occurred August 9th, a number of people were killed. +Silanga was but little more than an hour’s walk from the +court-house at Catbalogan. The Governor at once wired Manila as +follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first dateline"><span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar</span>, +Aug. 9, 1904.</p> +<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Executive Secretary</span>, +Manila:</p> +<p>The peaceably inclined people of the <i>barrios</i> near here are +collecting here in large numbers, terrorized by Pulajans who are boldly +roaming the country, burning <i>barrios</i> within seven or eight miles +from Catbalogan. They kill men, women, and children without +distinction. These Pulajans have fled from Gandara where they are being +actively pursued by constabulary. All forces that could be spared have +gone out. We have about thirty available fighting men here. <i>Pulajans +liable at any time to enter Catbalogan.</i> We are in danger of some +occurrence quite as serious as the Surigao affair.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e10745src" href="#xd20e10745" name="xd20e10745src">5</a> There +are buildings here which I must protect at all hazards—Treasury, +Provincial Jail with ninety-five prisoners, and commissary and ordnance +stores of constabulary. We need at once at least <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb462" href="#pb462" name= +"pb462">462</a>]</span>three hundred men, scouts if possible, to handle +situation, between here and Gandara. Pulajans undoubtedly have friends +in Catbalogan. I suspect certain of the municipal authorities here. I +estimate number of Pulajans now operating at about five hundred.</p> +<p class="signed">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">Feito</span>, +Governor.</p> +</div> +<p>On September 2d, the Provincial Governor of Samar sent to Manila the +following telegram:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first dateline"><span class="sc">Catbalogan</span>, Sept. 2, +1904.</p> +<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Carpenter</span>, Actg. Ex. Secy., +Palace, Manila:</p> +<p>Seven-thirty this evening simultaneous reports from north and south +sides of town Pulajans approaching. They have not entered yet and may +not, but have gathered Americans with wives and children in my house. +Arms supplied. Treasury twenty-five thousand Conant.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e10772src" href="#xd20e10772" name="xd20e10772src">6</a> One +hundred forty prisoners in jail. Only forty-seven constabulary here. If +Pulajans enter much needless sacrifice life pacific citizens here. Feel +sure Pulajans have friends in Catbalogan. Request company either scouts +or soldiers from Calbayog stationed here, preferably former. Their +presence guarantee stability.</p> +<p class="signed">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">Feito</span>, +Governor.</p> +</div> +<p>Of course Governor Feito did not call for the regular army of the +United States. His job, poor devil, was to demonstrate as best he could +that the military were not needed. He would at once have been suspected +of trying to scuttle the ship of “benign civil government” +if he had admitted that the regular army was needed. But to return to +Calderon’s list: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb463" href= +"#pb463" name="pb463">463</a>]</span></p> +<p>MUNICIPALITY OF CALBAYOG<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10789src" href= +"#xd20e10789" name="xd20e10789src">7</a></p> +<p>(Calderon’s List of <i>Barrios</i> Burned, +<i>continued</i>)</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ylo</td> +<td>August 17</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Napuro</td> +<td>August 17</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Balud</td> +<td>August 17</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>MUNICIPALITY OF WRIGHT</p> +<p>(Calderon’s List of <i>Barrios</i> Burned, +<i>continued</i>)</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Guinica-an</td> +<td>July 25</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Calapi</td> +<td>July 28</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bonga</td> +<td>August 4</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tutubigan</td> +<td>August 19</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Motiong</td> +<td>September 1</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Lau-an</td> +<td>October 10</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Sao Jose</td> +<td>(date not given)</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>A sample of the distressing communications I was getting as these +massacres progressed is the notification of the Motiong affair of +September 1st set forth below, which I give as a type of the methodical +stoicism of those bloody times. Motiong was seven miles down the coast +road from Catbalogan:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">In the district of Motiong, municipality of Wright, +province of Samar, Philippine Islands, September 1, 1904.</p> +<p>In the presence of the undersigned Peregrin Albano, member of the +village council, there being also present the president of the +Municipal Board of Health, Mr. Tomas San Pablo, and the principal men +of the place, there has this day occurred the burial of the corpses, +victims of the Pulajans, in the cemetery of this place, to wit: The +officer of volunteers, Rafael Rosales, and the following <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb464" href="#pb464" name= +"pb464">464</a>]</span>volunteers, viz., Gualberto Gabane, Juan Pacle, +Dionisio Daisno, Pedro Damtanan, Carmelo Lagbo; also the two women, +Eustaquia Sapiten and Apolinaria N., also one unknown Pulajan. This in +fulfilment of the official letter of instructions No. 136, from the +office of the presidente of the town of Wright dated to-day. Said +burial ceremonies were conducted by the Reverend Father Marcos Gomez, +and were attended by the whole volunteer force of this place because of +the death of their officer Rosales.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Tomas San Pablo</span>,<br> +President of the Board of Health.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Peregrin Albano</span>,<br> +Councillor.</p> +<p>(<i>Illegible</i>)——<span class="sc">Moro</span>, +Captain of Volunteers.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10893src" href= +"#xd20e10893" name="xd20e10893src">8</a></p> +</div> +<p>Fancy having documents like the foregoing handed you with +ever-increasing regularity as you sauntered, morning after morning, +from your bath to your coffee and rolls, preparatory to the daily +sifting of incidents such as that which included the burning of the +American flag on the head of the municipal representative of American +authority already mentioned, and other like acts of poor misguided +peasants stirred up by trifling <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb465" +href="#pb465" name="pb465">465</a>]</span>scamps representing the dregs +of insurrection. Motiong was not only within seven miles of the +court-house at Catbalogan, but it was so near to Camp Bumpus, over in +Leyte, where the 18th Infantry lay, that an order to them to move in +the morning would have made life and property in all that +brigand-harried region safe that night and continuously thereafter.</p> +<p>General Wm. H. Carter, Major-General U. S. A., well known to the +American public as the able officer who, in 1911, commanded the United +States forces mobilized on the Mexican border during the Mexican +revolution of that year, that ousted President Diaz and seated +President Madero, was in command at the time—the fall of +1904—of the military district of the Philippines which included +Samar and Leyte. A word of request to him would have made life +definitely safe in all the coast towns and their vicinity within two or +three days after receipt of such a request.</p> +<p>Besides Gandara, Catbalogan, Calbayog, and Wright, Lieutenant +Calderon’s list included the trio of ill-fated municipalities set +forth below, concluding with the illustrious name of Taft:</p> +<p>MUNICIPALITY OF CATUBIG</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td><i>Poblacion</i></td> +<td>September 5</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Tagabiran</td> +<td>August 11</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>San Vicente</td> +<td>August —</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>Catubig was toward the north end of Samar. On the day of the burning +and sacking of the <i>poblacion</i> of Catubig, September 5th, which +was done by a force of several hundred Pulajans, the scouts and +constabulary, so it was afterward reported, killed a hundred of the +Catubig Pulajans in an engagement. If this report were correct, as is +likely, it was the biggest single killing of natives since the early +days of the insurrection.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10937src" href= +"#xd20e10937" name="xd20e10937src">9</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb466" href="#pb466" name="pb466">466</a>]</span>But it did not in the +least check the Pulajan insurrection, which simply swerved its fury +from the Catubig region toward the coast (the Pacific coast), +descending upon the towns, villages, and hamlets of the townships of +Borongan and Taft, thus:</p> +<p>MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN</p> +<p>(Calderon’s List of <i>Barrios</i> Burned, +<i>continued</i>)</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Sepa</td> +<td>Sept. 23</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Lucsohong</td> +<td>Sept. 23</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Maybocog</td> +<td>Sept. 23</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Maydolong</td> +<td>Sept. 23</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Soribao</td> +<td>Sept. 23</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bugas</td> +<td>Oct. 10</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Punta Maria</td> +<td>Oct. 10</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Canjauay</td> +<td>Oct. 11</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>MUNICIPALITY OF TAFT</p> +<p>(Calderon’s List <i>continued</i>)</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Del Remedio</td> +<td>Sept. 22</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>San Julian</td> +<td>Sept. 22</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Nena</td> +<td>Sept. 22</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Libas</td> +<td>Sept. 22</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pagbabangnan</td> +<td>Sept. 22</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>San Vicente</td> +<td>Sept. 21</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Jinolaso</td> +<td>Oct. 3</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>Of the twenty-five pueblos or townships of Samar, the Calderon list +only pretended to throw light on events in nine of them, those being +the only ones from which definite news had then reached headquarters. +But as a reign of terror prevailed all over Samar at the time, the rest +may be imagined, though it can never be ascertained. Of these nine, the +last two were:</p> +<p>MUNICIPALITY OF LLORENTE</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pagbabalancayan</td> +<td>Sept. 23</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb467" href="#pb467" name= +"pb467">467</a>]</span></p> +<p>MUNICIPALITY OF ORAS</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Concepcion</td> +<td>Sept. 23</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Jipapad</td> +<td>—</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>Now it feels just as uncomfortable to be boloed in Pagbabalancayan +as it would in a place with a more pronounceable name, and the same is +true of the comparatively mellifluous Jipapad. True, some of these +places were mere hamlets of twenty to forty houses, but you may be sure +there were five or six people, on an average, to each house. On the +other hand, glance back again at the list of towns of the township of +Taft that were sacked and burned, and consider that San Julian was +about the size of the provincial capital, Catbalogan, and that +Catbalogan, the town proper, contained a population of four thousand, +though looked at from the amphitheatre of hills which surround it, +Catbalogan does not look like such a very large group of houses. +Filipino houses are usually full of people. It is easier to live that +way than to build more houses.</p> +<p>After the Pulajan descent on Llorente, the people of Llorente all +went off to the hills <i>to the Pulajans</i> for safety. They were not +allowed to have firearms. This was forbidden by law, except on +condition of making formal application for permission, getting it +finally approved, and giving a bond, conditions which, in practical +operation, made the prohibition all but absolute. The law was general +for the whole archipelago. The theory of the law was that the +inhabitants were under “the peace and protection of a benign +civil government.” The real reason of the law was that if the +people were allowed to bear arms it was very uncertain which side they +would use them on, our side or the other. But, by 1904, the lowland and +coast people of Samar would have been glad enough to have stuck to +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb468" href="#pb468" name= +"pb468">468</a>]</span>us and gone out after the mountain robber bands +had we armed them. Left unprotected, a feeling seemed to spread in many +places that about the only thing to do to be safe was to depart from +under the “protection” of the American flag and take to the +hills and join, or seem to join, the uprising.</p> +<p>Toward the last of September, the provincial treasurer of Samar, an +American, a Mr. Whittier, visited the east coast of Samar, including +Taft. On October 5th, he stated before me as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">All the presidentes that I have talked with, and this +man Hill,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11082src" href="#xd20e11082" name= +"xd20e11082src">10</a> said that they wanted some protection for their +towns. Except at Borongan there are no guns in the hands of the +municipal police.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11085src" href= +"#xd20e11085" name="xd20e11085src">11</a> This band near Taft was said +to have nineteen guns, and they felt they could not <i>defend their +towns with spears</i> against these guns. There were reported to be +between 200 and 600 in operation on the coast at that time, and they +felt that they could not defend their towns with the means at hand. I +found at Taft that they had taken all the records of the municipality, +and the money, and taken it over to an island away from the main coast, +in order to protect their money and their records, and I understand the +same thing was done at Llorente. At Oras they had practically decided +to take the same step if it became necessary. All of the commercial +houses on the east coast and a large number of people congregated at +Borongan, which was safe on account of the protection of the +constabulary; and the constabulary there were doing very good work, +<i>doing everything they could with their small force</i>, and they +(the presidentes) felt that if they had guns in the hands of the +municipal police or if they had the constabulary <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb469" href="#pb469" name="pb469">469</a>]</span>to +guard their towns, they could go out after these people themselves.</p> +</div> +<p>The importance of all this testimony, relatively to its forever +sickening any one acquainted with it with colonization by a republic, +is that a transcript of Mr. Whittier’s statement of October 5th +was placed in the hands of the Governor-General a few days later by Mr. +Harvey, the Assistant Attorney-General, and yet this situation +continued until shortly after the presidential election. Several years +afterwards, in the <i>North American Review</i>, Judge Ide, who was +Vice-Governor in 1904, after admitting that he was in constant +consultation with the Governor-General all through that period (by way +of showing his opportunities for knowing whereof he spoke), denied that +the failure to order out the military to protect the people from +massacre had any relation whatever to the presidential election then +going on in the United States.</p> +<p>Mr. Whittier also stated before me that the total population of the +municipality of Taft was 18,000, and that twenty-five men armed with +guns in each of the four principal villages thereof that were burned +would have prevented the destruction of those villages. So we did not +protect the people, and we would not let them protect themselves. I do +not select the pueblo of Taft on account of its distinguished name. +“What’s in a name?” The fate of Taft and its +inhabitants was simply typical of the fate which descended upon scores +of other places in “dark and bloody” Samar between the +outbreak of July 10, 1904, and the presidential election of November +8th, of that year, and between those two dates the shadow of such a +fate was over all the towns of the island on which it did not in fact +descend. Mr. Whittier stated to me informally that at <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb470" href="#pb470" name="pb470">470</a>]</span>the +time he was speaking of in the above formal statement, there were +pending and had been pending for a long time (he seemed to think they +must have been pigeon-holed) applications for permission to bear arms +from fifteen different pueblos. After Mr. Whittier had finished his +statement the Presidente of Taft made a like statement on the same day, +October 5th. My retained copy shows that this official bore the +ponderous name of Angel Custodio Crisologo. He declared a willingness +to lead his people against the Pulajans if given guns, though the +fervent soul <i>did</i> qualify this martial remark by adding, +“If I am well enough,” explaining that the presidential +body was subject to rheumatism. Mr. Crisologo stated among other things +that there had been eight hundred houses burned in the jurisdiction of +Taft before he left the east coast for Catbalogan—about a week +before. Like Mr. Whittier’s, a copy of Mr. Crisologo’s +statement was delivered a few days later to the Governor-General in +person by the Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Harvey, who had been +present when it was made and taken down.</p> +<p>This Mr. Harvey need not be, to the western hemisphere reader, a +mere nebulous antipodal entity, as the Hon. Angel Custodio Crisologo +might. He is a very live American, a very high-toned gentleman, and an +excellent lawyer, and was at last accounts still with the insular +government of the Philippine Islands, though in a higher capacity +(Solicitor General) than he was at the date of the events herein +narrated. There was very little congenial society in Catbalogan when +Mr. Harvey came there to help dispose of the criminal docket, and his +advent was to me a very welcome oasis in a desert of “the +solitude of my own originality”—or lack of originality. On +September 19th I had wired <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb471" href= +"#pb471" name="pb471">471</a>]</span>Vice-Governor Ide that there were +172 prisoners in the jail awaiting trial and “many more +coming.” Of course no justice of the peace would be trusted to +pass on whether an alleged outlaw should or should not be held for +trial. If he were secretly in sympathy with the discomfiture American +authority in Samar was having, he might let the man go, no matter what +the proof. Also he might seek to clear himself of all suspicion in each +case by committing men against whom there was no proof, thus +unnecessarily crowding an already fast filling provincial jail of +limited dimensions, wherein beriberi<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11116src" href="#xd20e11116" name="xd20e11116src">12</a> was +already making its dread appearance.</p> +<p>So the writ of habeas corpus remained unsuspended, thus making it +possible to so state in later official certificates covering that +period. But habeas corpus cut no more figure in the situation than it +did at the battle of Gettysburg, or at the crossing of the Red Sea by +the chosen people, or at the sinking of the <i>Titanic</i>. The +constabulary would worry along with such force as they had in the +island of Samar, only a few hundred, certainly nearer five hundred than +one thousand. And, whenever they had a battle with the outlaws, if they +themselves were not annihilated, which happened more than once, they +would bring back prisoners in droves and put them in the jail, and I +was expected to sift out how much proof they had, or claimed to have, +of overt acts by persons not actually captured in action. Of course a +race then began, a race against death, to see whether death or I would +get to John Doe or Richard Roe first. And though I held court every day +except Sunday from <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb472" href="#pb472" +name="pb472">472</a>]</span>August to November 8th, sometimes getting +in sixteen hours per day by supplementing a day’s work with a +night session, death would often beat me to some one man on the jail +list whom I happened to have picked out to get to the next day. Men so +picked out were men as to whom something I might have heard held out +the hope of being able to dispose of their cases quickly by letting +them loose,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11126src" href="#xd20e11126" +name="xd20e11126src">13</a> thus getting that much farther from the +danger limit of crowding in the jail. Some of these would be specially +picked out because reported sick. I kept track of the sick by visiting +them myself when practicable, and talking to them. Of course many of +them were brigands—-Pulajans—but some of them were the +saddest looking, most abject little brigands that anybody ever saw. Of +course you might catch some nasty disease from them, but nobody, +somehow, ever seemed to have any apprehension on that score in the +Philippines. This does not argue bravery at all. It is merely the +listless stoicism that lurks in the climate. I recollect going to walk +one afternoon, after adjourning court at 5 o’clock, saying to the +prosecuting attorney before adjourning, “We will take up the case +of Capence Coral in the morning; there does not seem, from what I can +understand, to be enough proof to convict him of anything.” Of +course when you were dealing with hundreds of people, you did not have +any nerve-racking hysterics about any one man. Leaving the court-house +I passed by the hospital, where Capence had been transferred, pending +the arrival of witnesses against him and the rest of the crowd captured +with him. I asked the hospital steward <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb473" href="#pb473" name="pb473">473</a>]</span>how Capence was. The +answer was he had died at 4:45—some twenty minutes before. Death +had beat me to Capence. When I meet Capence he will know I did the best +I could. I was under a great strain, a sort of writ of habeas corpus +incarnate, the only thing remotely suggesting relief from +unwarranted<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11131src" href="#xd20e11131" +name="xd20e11131src">14</a> detention on the whole horizon of the +situation. I was trying to do the best I could by the Constitution, in +so far as the spirit of it had reached the Philippines. I broke down +totally under the strain about November 8th, came home in the spring of +the following year and remained an invalid for several years +thereafter; and as a noted corporation lawyer once said after recovery +from a similar illness, “I haven’t had much +<i>constitution</i> since, but have been living mostly under the +by-laws.”</p> +<p>American office-holding in the Philippines is not so popular with +the Filipinos as to have moved them to any outburst of gratitude in the +shape of an effort to create a pension system for Americans who lose +their health in the government service out there. When they leave the +Islands they become as one dead so far as the Philippine insular +government is concerned. And <i>the men whose health is more or less +permanently impaired by disability incurred in line of duty in the +Philippines are not and will never be numerous or powerful enough back +home to create any sentiment in favor of a pension system for former +Philippine employees</i>, since the Philippine business is not a +subject of much popular enthusiasm at best. So if I had not had private +resources, the results of the Samar insurrection of 1904 would have +left me also in the pitiable plight in which I have beheld so many of +my repatriated former comrades <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb474" +href="#pb474" name="pb474">474</a>]</span>of the Philippine service in +the last seven years, to whom the heart of the more fortunate +ex-Filipino indeed goes out in sympathy. But to return to the race to +beat death to prisoners in that grim and memorable fall of 1904.</p> +<p>In September the crowded condition of the jail had begun to tell on +the inmates. The constabulary force at Catbalogan was quite inadequate +for the varied emergencies of the situation, there being, besides the +town itself to protect, the provincial treasury to guard, the +governor’s office, the court-house, and the jail. Consequently +the jail guard was too small. The jail buildings were in an enclosure a +little larger than a baseball diamond, surrounded by high stone walls. +But it was not safe to let the inmates sleep out in the enclosure at +night. They had to be kept at night in the buildings. Any American who +has visited the central penitentiary at Manila called Bilibid has seen +a place almost as clean as a battleship. This is American work. But the +Filipinos are not trained in sanitary matters, and all they know about +handling large crowds of prisoners they learned from the Spaniards. The +Governor was a native half-caste, a very excellent man, but free from +that horror, which I think is an almost universal American trait, of +seeing unnecessary and preventable sacrifice of human life, no matter +whose the life. I inspected the jail as often as was practicable, and +managed to keep down the death-rate below what it might have been, the +prisoners being allowed to go out in the open court during the day. +They also had such medical attention as was available. However, during +the last five or six weeks of that term of court I would be pretty sure +to find on my desk every two or three days, on opening court in the +morning, a notice like this: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb475" href= +"#pb475" name="pb475">475</a>]</span></p> +<div lang="es" class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"></p> +<p class="addressline">Carcel Provincial de Samar, I. F.<br> +Oficina del Alcaide</p> +<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar, I. +F.</span>,<br> +22 de Septiembre de 1904.</p> +<p class="addressline"></p> +<p>Hon. Sr. Juez de I<sup>a</sup> Instancia de esta provincia,<br> +<span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar, I. F.</span></p> +<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Señor</span>:</p> +<p>Tengo el honor de poner en conocimiento de ese juzgado, que anoche +entre 12 y 1 de ella, fallecio el procesado, Ramon Boroce, a +consecuencia de la enfermedad de beriberi, que venia padeciendo.</p> +<p>Lo que tengo el honor de communicar a ese Juzgado para su superior +conocimiento.</p> +<p class="signed">De U. muy respetuosamente,<br> +<span class="sc">Gonzalo Lucero</span>,</p> +<p class="signed">Alcaide de la Carcel Provincial.</p> +</div> +<p>which being interpreted means:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first addressline">Provincial Jail of Samar, P. I.</p> +<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar, P. +I.</span>,<br> +September 22, 1904.</p> +<p class="addressline">His honor, the Judge of First Instance of this +province,<br> +<span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.</span></p> +<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Sir</span>:</p> +<p>I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of the court that last +night between 12 and 1 o’clock, the accused person Ramon Boroce +died in consequence of the disease of beriberi from which he has been +suffering; which fact I have the honor to communicate to the court for +its superior knowledge.</p> +<p class="signed">Very respectfully,<br> +<span class="sc">Gonzalo Lucero</span>,</p> +<p class="signed">Warden of the Provincial Jail.</p> +</div> +<p>Now a jail death-rate of only ten or twelve a month was not at all a +bad record for an insurrection in a Philippine province. It would be +rank demagoguery <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb476" href="#pb476" +name="pb476">476</a>]</span>at this late date to be a party to +anybody’s getting excited about it. I was rather proud of it by +comparison with the jail death-rate of the Albay insurrection of the +year before, where 120 men had died in the jail in about six months. +But it began to get on one’s nerves to have to expect a +<i>billet-doux</i> like the above on your desk at the opening of court +each day, when the accused person had had no commitment trial and may +have been wholly innocent. It all came back to the difference between +war and peace, viz., that in war it is to be expected that many +innocent persons will suffer, but that in peace only the guilty should +suffer. Moreover, in war that admits it <i>is</i> war, your agents, +your army, are better able to handle crowds of prisoners than native +police and constabulary, and the percentage of innocent who suffer with +the guilty in such war will be far less; whereas the contrary is true +of war—waged by constabulary checked by courts—which +pretends that a state of peace exists, <i>i.e.</i>, which pretends +there is no need for declaring martial law and calling on your +army.</p> +<p>It was this Samar insurrection which convinced me that waging war +with courts and constabulary in lieu of the recognized method was, in +its net results, the cruelest kind of war, and that the civil +government of the Philippines was a failure, in so far as regarded Mr. +McKinley’s original injunction to the Taft Commission; where, +after alluding to the articles of capitulation of the city of Manila to +our forces, which concluded with the words:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">This city, its inhabitants * * * and its +private property of all descriptions * * * are placed under +the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army,</p> +</div> +<p>he added: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb477" href="#pb477" name= +"pb477">477</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the +Government of the United States to give protection for property and +life * * * to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I +charge this commission to labor for the full performance of this +obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of their +country.</p> +</div> +<p>Commenting on this in his inaugural address as Governor of the +Philippines, Governor Taft had said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">May we not be recreant to the charge, which he truly +says, concerns the honor and conscience of our country.</p> +</div> +<p>No matter who was to blame, here we were in Samar, with the 14th +Infantry three hours away in one direction at Calbayog, doing nothing, +and the 18th Infantry five hours away in another direction, at +Tacloban, doing nothing, and a reign of terror going on in Samar, with +the peaceably inclined people of the lowlands and coast towns appealing +to us for protection and not getting it, sometimes crouching in abject +terror without knowing which way to fly, sometimes taking to the hills +and joining the outlaws as a measure of self-preservation. ’Twas +pitiful, wondrous pitiful! I then and there decided that we ought to +get out of the Philippines as soon as any decent sort of a native +government could be set up, and that our republic was not adapted to +colonization. In his <i>North American Review</i> article above cited, +in denying that the unwillingness of the Manila government to order out +the army in Samar in the fall of 1904 had anything to do with the +possible effect so doing might have had on the presidential election, +then in progress in the United States, Governor Ide rebuked me with +patronizing self-righteousness thus: “Was Judge Blount opposed to +kindness?” He means in giving the Filipinos, under such +circumstances, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb478" href="#pb478" name= +"pb478">478</a>]</span>the “protection of civil +government,” instead of ordering out the army. No, but I was +opposed to using a saw, in lieu of a lancet, in excising the ulcers of +that body politic at that time. In protesting that there was +“nothing sinister” about the failure to use the troops, +Judge Ide cunningly wonders whether my attitude was subsequently +assumed after I left the Islands because of “proclivities as a +Democrat,” or whether it was merely due to “predilections +in favor of military rule.” Read Mr. McKinley’s +instructions to the Taft Commission, above quoted, that to protect life +and property concerned the honor and conscience of their country, and +consider if the Ide suggestion does not seem to hide its head and slink +away in shame before the strong clear light of what was then a plain +duty. As a matter of fact Judge Charles S. Lobinger, who is still with +the Philippine judiciary, visited me en route to another point, during +that Samar term of court, and he will recall, should he ever chance +upon this book and this chapter, with what vehemence I said to him at +the time, in effect, “Judge, we belong in the Western Hemisphere. +We have no business out here permanently.” If proclivities and +predilections in favor of affording decent protection to the lives and +property of defenceless people by properly garrisoning their towns +constitutes lack of kindness, then the Ide rebuke was well taken.</p> +<p>These details are not related with Pickwickian gravity in order to +acquaint the reader with <i>my</i> utterances as being important <i>per +se</i>. But it <i>is</i> important to make clear to the reader, and he +is entitled, in all frankness, to have it made clear by one who has now +so long detained his attention on this great subject, to know just when +“the light from heaven on the road to Damascus” broke upon +this witness, and how and why he <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb479" +href="#pb479" name="pb479">479</a>]</span>came to be in favor of +Philippine independence, because the reasons which convinced him may +seem good in the sight of the reader also. If the man who reads this +book shall see that the man who wrote it was, in Samar in 1904, neither +a Republican nor a Democrat, but simply an American in a far distant +land, jealous of the honor of his country’s flag in its capacity +as a symbol of protection to those over whom it floated, then the work +will not have been written in vain.</p> +<p>The presidentes or mayors of the various pueblos were in session at +Catbalogan in semi-annual convention during the first few days of +October, 1904, when the Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Harvey, visited +Catbalogan. Mr. Harvey and the writer had taken a number of long walks +together in the suburbs of Catbalogan, though Major Dade, commanding +the Samar constabulary, an officer of the regular army, had warned us +it was not safe outside of town. We had talked over the situation +fully. Besides all its other aspects, there were a number of American +women in Catbalogan, an American lawyer’s wife, the wife of the +superintendent of schools, her sister, and others. It was not at all +likely that the Pulajans would enter Catbalogan, but there was always +the <i>possibility</i>, not to be wholly ignored, that some such +episode as that of March 23d, of the preceding year, at Surigao, +already described, might be repeated. As hereinbefore noted, on August +9th, the Pulajans had done some killing and burning at Silanga, less +than ten miles north of Catbalogan and likewise at Motiong, less than +ten miles south of Catbalogan, on September 1st, and on the evening of +September 2d, about 7:30, there had been a false alarm caused by some +native of Catbalogan running down the main street yelling, +“Pulajans! Pulajans!” All of which did not tend to make you +feel <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb480" href="#pb480" name= +"pb480">480</a>]</span>that your American women were quite as entirely +safe from harm as they ought to be.</p> +<p>In the course of one of our walks Mr. Harvey and I had stopped on +the mountain side overlooking Catbalogan, to catch our breath and take +in the view of the town below and the sea beyond. I said to him, +because I knew his mind also was on the one great need of the hour: +“Yes sir, if President Roosevelt were here, and could see this +situation as we do, he would order out the army and protect these +defenceless people, no matter which way the chips might fly.” Mr. +Harvey agreed with me. He promised to go back to Manila and tell the +authorities there so. After we came back to town, we were advised that +the convention of presidentes desired to have Mr. Harvey favor them +with an address. He said, “What shall I tell them?” I said, +“Tell them that if they will do their duty by the American +Government, the American Government will do its duty by them.” He +spoke Spanish fluently, made a good speech, and told them in effect +just that thing. Then he went back to Manila, and shortly afterward +wrote me the two letters which follow:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first addressline"><span class="sc">Department of Justice, +Philippine Islands,<br> +Office of the Assistant Attorney-General<br> +for the Constabulary</span>,</p> +<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Manila, P. I.</span>, October 15, +1904.</p> +<p><span class="sc">My dear Judge</span>: We arrived in Manila on +Tuesday morning, the 11th instant, and I prepared my report and +submitted it to the attorney-general on the 12th, in the meantime +making a transcript of your summary and delivering a copy of same with +other information to the attorney-general along with my report. After +dictating the report and before delivering it I had a conversation with +General Allen on the situation in Samar and told him what my +recommendations would be. He agreed that rewards <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb481" href="#pb481" name= +"pb481">481</a>]</span>should be offered for the capture of Pablo +Bulan, Antonio Anogar, and Pedro de la Cruz, but took issue on the +other recommendations, and to my mind he takes a very extreme view; but +I thought at the time and still think that he wanted to tone me down in +my feelings in the matter. I think the real cause for his opposition is +the effect that he fears an aggressive attitude might have on the +presidential election. In other words, whatever they do aggressively +might be misconstrued and made use of as political capital.</p> +<p>At Governor Wright’s request I got the report from the +attorney-general before it was sent up and went over to the +<span class="corr" id="xd20e11303" title= +"Source: Malacanan">Malacañan</span>, and the governor read the +report and read most of the data that I submitted with the report, +including your summary, and while he did not say much what he did say +convinced me that there would be something doing if it were not on the +eve of election, and in my opinion there will be things doing in Samar +within thirty days.</p> +<p>I inclose herewith a copy of your summary, and also a copy of my +report to the attorney-general. On the 18th instant I received your +telegram to hold the completion of your summary until receipt of a +letter mailed by you that day. I telegraphed you in reply that my +report and your summary were placed in the hands of the +attorney-general on the 12th instant. If there is any additional data +in your letter mailed on the 13th I will submit it to the proper +authorities.</p> +<p>For the lack of time, I will close, and write more next time.</p> +<p class="signed">Very truly yours,<br> +(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">Geo. R. Harvey</span>,<br> +Assistant Attorney-General.</p> +</div> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"></p> +<p class="addressline"><span class="sc">Department of Justice, +Philippine Islands,<br> +Office of the Assistant Attorney-General,<br> +for the Constabulary</span>,</p> +<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Manila, P. I.</span>, October 19, +1904.</p> +<p><span class="sc">My dear Judge Blount</span>: Since mailing my +letter to you of last Saturday I have found the copies of your summary +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb482" href="#pb482" name= +"pb482">482</a>]</span>on the situation in Samar and inclose two +herewith, in accordance with my promise.</p> +<p>This week we have received some good news from Samar with reference +to important captures and killings of Pulajans. I am not in touch with +what is going on with reference to Samar, and can give you no +information along that line. As I remember, the governor told me the +other day when I was talking with him that one more company of scouts +will be sent down right away.</p> +<p>I sincerely hope the situation is improving, and that you are +getting along rapidly in disposing of the large docket before you. If +there is not a very great improvement in the situation by the 9th of +November, I think there will be a considerable movement of troops in +Samar within thirty days. For the good of the government, I hope the +situation will improve materially before that time. I would like to see +them put the troops there right now. I am of the opinion that it would +not affect the election a half-dozen votes, and it might save two or +three or a half-dozen massacres and the destruction of much +property.</p> +<p>With best wishes for your success in your work, and with regards to +Mr. Block, I am,</p> +<p class="signed">Very truly yours,</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Geo. R. Harvey</span>,</p> +<p class="signed">Assistant Attorney-General, Philippines +Constabulary.<br> +To Hon. <span class="sc">James H. Blount</span>,<br> +Judge of First Instance, Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.</p> +</div> +<p>These two letters may be found at p. 2532, <i>Congressional +Record</i>, February 25, 1908, where they were the subject of remark in +the House of Representatives by Hon. Thomas W. Hardwick of Georgia, +apropos of Governor Ide’s <i>North American Review</i> article of +December, 1907.</p> +<p>A few weeks after the presidential election I saw Mr. Harvey in +Manila. We naturally talked about Samar and his two letters to me. The +troops had then been <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb483" href="#pb483" +name="pb483">483</a>]</span>ordered out. He referred to his conference +with the Governor-General and stated, “Yes, he told me that was +the reason,” meaning that the reason for not ordering out the +troops was the one assigned in his (Harvey’s) letter to me, viz., +“Whatever we do aggressively might be misconstrued and made use +of as political capital.”</p> +<p>On October 18, 1904, there was received at Manila the following +cablegram concerning the presidential campaign in the United +States:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">New York, 16th. Judge Parker, in addressing campaign +clubs at Esopus the past week returned to the subject of the +Philippines in the evident hope of making it a paramount issue of the +campaign. He repeated his former declaration that the retention of the +Philippines and the carrying out of the policy of the Republican +Administration have cost six hundred and fifty millions of dollars and +two hundred thousand lives. Secretary of War Taft, in addressing a mass +meeting held in Baltimore, Saturday night, ridiculed Judge +Parker’s statement and characterized his figures as alarmist.</p> +</div> +<p>Of course Judge Parker’s figures were rather high—of +which more anon. He was not going to miss anything in the way of a +chance of “getting a rise” out of the Administration, by +understatement. But some statement from the Philippines at once became +a supremely important desideratum, to counterbalance Judge +Parker’s over-statement, some optimism to meet the Parker +pessimism. Encouraged by the public interest aroused by the figures +furnished him, and the consequent apparent uneasiness it created in +“the enemy’s camp,” Judge Parker soon had the whole +Philippine group of islands going to “the demnition +bow-wows.” On October 20th, Secretary of War <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb484" href="#pb484" name="pb484">484</a>]</span>Taft +cabled Governor Wright, then Governor-General of the Islands, a long +telegram, quoting Judge Parker as having used, among other language +descriptive of the beatitudes we had conferred on our little brown +brother, the following: “The towns in many places in ruins, whole +districts in the hands of ladrones.”<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11389src" href="#xd20e11389" name="xd20e11389src">15</a></p> +<p>At that time the whole archipelago was absolutely quiet for the +nonce, except Samar. Samar was the only island where Judge +Parker’s statement was true, and as to Samar, it was absolutely +true. On October 23d Governor Wright wired Secretary of War Taft as +follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">There is nothing warranting the statement that towns +are in ruins. It is not true that there are whole districts in the +hands of ladrones. Life and property are as safe here as in the United +States.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11400src" href="#xd20e11400" name= +"xd20e11400src">16</a></p> +</div> +<p>This was followed by a perfectly true and correct picture of the +peace and quiet which then prevailed for the time being everywhere +throughout the archipelago, except in Samar, which dark and bloody isle +was specifically excepted. Then followed a statement as to Samar, full +of allusions as elaborately optimistic as any of the Taft cablegrams of +1900, to impliedly inconsiderable “prowling bands” of +outlaws in Samar. Of course nobody at home knew the answer to this, so +it silenced the Parker batteries, and the Samar massacres proceeded +unchecked. Meanwhile the 14th Infantry at Calbayog, Samar, and the 18th +Infantry, at Tacloban, Leyte, smiled with astute, if contemptuous, +tolerance, at the self-inflicted impotence of a republic trying to make +conquered subjects behave without colliding too violently with home +sentiment <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb485" href="#pb485" name= +"pb485">485</a>]</span>against <i>having</i> conquered subjects; sang +their favorite barrack room song,</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">He may be a brother of Wm. H. Taft,</p> +<p class="line">But he ain’t no friend of mine;</p> +</div> +<p class="first">and continued to enjoy enforced leisure. They +<i>did</i> chafe under the restraint, but it at least relieved them +from the not altogether inspiring task of chasing Pulajans through +jungles and along the slippery mire of precipitous mountain trails, and +at the same time permitted the secondest second lieutenant among them +to swear fierce <i>blasé</i> oaths, not wholly unjustified, +about how much better he could run the Islands than they were being +run.</p> +<p>On October 26th, I wired Governor Wright at Manila as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Since my letter of October 6th, situation appears +worse. Additional depredations both on east and west coast. Smith-Bell +closing out.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11429src" href="#xd20e11429" +name="xd20e11429src">17</a> Reliable American residing in Wright says +that during week ending last Sunday thirteen families living along +river Nacbac, <i>barrio</i> of Tutubigan, said pueblo, kidnapped by +brigands and carried off to hills. This means some sixty people having +farms along river, rice ready to be harvested. Seven of the eleven +<i>barrios</i> of Wright have been burned.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Blount.</span></p> +</div> +<p>When I sent that telegram of October 26th, the situation in the +pueblo of Wright was typical of the reign of terror throughout the +island. Wright could have been reached by the 18th Infantry (then over +at Tacloban, in Leyte), and garrisoned on eight hours’ notice. +But I had little hope that the telegram would <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb486" href="#pb486" name="pb486">486</a>]</span>stir +the 18th. The best man I had ever personally known well in high station +was at the head of the government of the Islands, and as he was my +friend, I sat down to think the situation out, determined, with the +prejudice which is the privilege of friendship, to analyze his apparent +apathy, and to conjecture <i>how many times</i> thirteen families +“having farms along river, rice ready to be harvested” +would have to be carried off to the hills by the brigands in order to +move the 18th Infantry before the presidential election. Then I +wondered just how many seconds it would have taken a British +governor-general, backed by unanimous home sentiment concerning the +wisdom of having colonies, to have acted, had a great British colonial +mercantile house like Smith, Bell & Co. appealed to him for +protection of its interests. And that brought me, there on “the +tie-ribs of earth,” as Kipling would phrase it, to the +fundamentals of the problem. The British imperial idea of which Kipling +is the voice and Benjamin Kidd the accompanist is based, superficially, +upon a supposed necessity for the control of the tropics by +non-tropical peoples, though fundamentally, it is an assertion of the +right of any people to assume control of the land and destinies of +another when they feel sure they can govern that other better than that +other can govern itself. Is this proposition tenable, and if so, within +what limits? Is it tenable to the point of total elimination of the +people sought to be improved? If not, then how far? How far is +incidental sacrifice of human life negligible in the working out of the +broader problem of “the greatest good of the greatest +number?” In his article in the <i>North American Review</i> for +December, 1907, Governor Ide makes exhaustive answer to “the +doctors who for some months past, in the columns of the <i>North +American <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb487" href="#pb487" name= +"pb487">487</a>]</span>Review</i> and elsewhere, have published +prescriptions for curing the ills of the Filipino people,” +including Senator Francis G. Newlands, Hon. William J. Bryan, and the +writer. In the course of disposing of the quack last mentioned, +Governor Ide gets on rather a high horse, asking, with much dignified +indignation, “How many people in the United States would have +known or cared whether the army was or was not ordered out in Samar in +1904?” I concede that the solicitude was a super-solicitude, as +do the Harvey letters, but like them, I must recognize its reality. +However, when Governor Ide reaches this rhapsody of conscious virtue: +“It is inconceivable that the Commission could have been animated +by the base and ignoble partisan prejudices thus charged against +them,” capping his climax by triumphantly pointing out that +“Governor-General Wright was a life-long Democrat,” he doth +protest too much. For the angelic pinions he thus attaches to himself +are at once rudely snapped by the reflection that a very short while +after his article came out in the <i>North American Review</i> Governor +Wright became Secretary of War in President Roosevelt’s Cabinet, +and a little later took the stump for Taft and Sherman, in 1908. +Governor Wright did not stoop to deny or extenuate his share in the +matter, and I honor him for it.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11461src" +href="#xd20e11461" name="xd20e11461src">18</a> But to stick to your own +crowd and then deny afterwards that you did so—that is another +story. However, let us brush aside such petty attempts to cloud the +real issue, which is: How many people <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb488" href="#pb488" name="pb488">488</a>]</span>would Governor Wright +and Vice-Governor Ide have permitted to be massacred by the Pulajans in +Samar in 1904 before they would have ordered out the military prior to +the <span class="corr" id="xd20e11474" title= +"Source: presidental">presidential</span> election? Let us consider the +case, not with a view of clouding the issue, but of clearing it. The +truth is, Governor Wright was very gravely concerned about the Samar +situation from August to November, 1904. Of course it is due to him to +make perfectly clear that he did not realize the gravity of that +situation as vividly as those of us who were on the ground in Samar, +four or five hundred miles away. But the information hereinbefore +reviewed, conveyed to him by the Provincial Governor, by Mr. Harvey, +the Assistant Attorney General sent to Samar for the express purpose of +getting the Manila government in possession of the exact situation, and +by myself, was certainly sufficient to make him “chargeable with +notice” of all that happened thereafter, certainly chargeable +with knowledge of all that had happened theretofore. Of course there +was General Allen, the commander-in-chief of the constabulary, at +Manila, presumably speaking well of his command—the right arm of +the civil government—presumably giving industrious and tactful +aid and comfort to the idea that the authorities could afford to worry +along with the constabulary alone until after the presidential +election. But that could not discount the actual facts reported from +the afflicted province by the officials on the ground. General Allen, +it should be noted, remained in Manila all this time. So that any +Otis-like “situation-well-in-hand” bouquets he may have +thrown at his subordinates in Samar, and the situation there generally, +were mere political hothouse products, surer to be recognized as such +by the shrewd kindliness of the truly considerable man at the head of +the government than by most <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb489" href= +"#pb489" name="pb489">489</a>]</span>any one else he could hand them +out to. That man knew, to all intents and purposes, in the great and +noble heart of him, what was really going on in Samar. He knew that +massacres had been occurring, and that they were likely to keep on +occurring. In other words, he knew that <i>preventable</i> sacrifice of +life of defenceless people was going on, and that he could put a stop +to it any time he saw fit. The question he had to wrestle with was, +should he stop it, knowing the “Hell fer Sartin” the +Democratic orators in the United States would at once luridly describe +as “broke loose” in the Philippines? I insist that there is +no use for any holier-than-thou gentleman to become suffused with any +glow of indignant conscious rectitude based on the premises we are +considering. Better to look a little deeper, on the idea that you are +observing your republic <i lang="la">in flagrante colonizatione</i>, +with as good a man as you ever have had, or ever will have, among you, +as the principal actor. Governor Wright’s course was entirely +right, <i>if the Philippine policy was right</i>. If his course was not +right, it was not right because the Philippine policy is fundamentally +wrong. Governor Wright of course believed that the Philippine policy +was right. I myself did not come finally to believe it was wrong until +it was revealed in all its rawness by the period now under discussion. +Of course the Governor did not vividly realize that the American women +in Catbalogan were not entirely safe. If he had, he would have rushed +the troops there, politics or no politics. But native life was +politically negligible. What difference would a few score, or even a +few hundred, natives of Samar make, compared with that pandemonium of +anarchy and bloodshed all over the archipelago which Messrs. Taft, +Wright, and Ide had long been insisting would follow Philippine +independence? Was the whole <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb490" href= +"#pb490" name="pb490">490</a>]</span>future of 8,000,000 of people to +be jeopardized to save a few people in Samar? That was the moral +question before the insular government, in its last analysis. And the +government faced the proposition squarely, and answered it +“No.”</p> +<p>I will go farther than this. If I had believed, with Messrs. Taft, +Wright, and Ide, that Philippine independence meant anarchy in the +Islands, and the orthodox “bloody welter of chaos,” I too +might have hesitated to order out the troops on the eve of the +election, and my hesitation, like theirs, might have continued until +the election was safely over. So might yours, reader. Don’t be so +certain you would not. Practically absolute power, sure of its own +benevolence, has temptations to withhold its confidence from the people +that you wot not of. Don’t condemn Governor Wright. Condemn the +policy, and change your republic back to the course set by its +founders. Give the Philippine people the independence they of right +ought to have, instead of secretly hoping to unload them on somebody +else, through the medium of your next great war.</p> +<p>The question of whether the troops should have been ordered out or +not at the time above dealt with is by no means without two sides. On +the “bloody welter” side, you have the well-known opinions +of Messrs. Taft, Wright, and Ide. On the other side you have before +you—for the moment—only my little opinion. So instead of +having in Governor Wright a Bluebeard, you simply have a man of great +personal probity and unflinching moral courage, following his +convictions to their ultimate logical conclusion without shadow of +turning, in the act of colonization. In other words, Mr. American, you +see yourself, as others see you. So face the music and look at +yourself. In your colony business, you are a house divided against +itself, which <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb491" href="#pb491" name= +"pb491">491</a>]</span>cannot stand. On the other hand, I knew the +Filipino people far more intimately than either Mr. Taft, Governor +Wright, or Judge Ide. I spoke their language—which they did not. +I had met them both in peace and in war—which they had not. I had +held court for months at a time in various provinces of the archipelago +from extreme northern Luzon to Mindanao—which they had not. I had +met the Filipinos in their homes for years on terms of free and +informal intercourse impracticable for any governor-general. It was +therefore perfectly natural that I should know them better than any of +these eminent gentlemen. I was not prepared to be in a hurry about +recommending myself out of office by assenting that our guardianship +over the Filipinos should at once be terminated, but I knew there was +nothing to the “bloody welter” proposition. The home life +of the Filipino is too altogether a model of freedom from discord, +pervaded as it is by parental, filial, and fraternal love, and their +patriotism is too universal and genuine, to give the “bloody +welter” bugaboo any standing in court.</p> +<p>But whosoever questions for one moment Governor Wright’s high +personal character, simply does not know the man. To do so, moreover, +would fatally cloud the issue I have sought to make clear between his +view of the duty of our government and my own. In his moods that +reminded one of Lincoln, Governor Wright used to say: +“Don’t shoot the organist, he’s doing the best he +can.” It is true that his answer to Judge Parker was not a full +and frank statement of the case. But did it lie in American human +nature, when your antagonist was recklessly over-stating the case in +the heat of debate on the eve of a presidential election, to take him +into your confidence and tell him all you knew, in simple trusting +faith that he would thereafter <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb492" +href="#pb492" name="pb492">492</a>]</span>quit exaggerating? To permit +the dispute to boil down to the real issue, viz., how many lives it was +permissible to abandon on the “greatest good to the greatest +number” theory, would obviously jeopardize the existence of a +government which the Governor of the Philippines naturally believed to +be better for all concerned than any other. And there is your +cul-de-sac. <i>Hinc illæ lachrymæ.</i></p> +<p>We can point with pride to many things we have done in the +Philippines, the public improvements,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11506src" href="#xd20e11506" name="xd20e11506src">19</a> the +school system, the better sanitation, and a long list of other benefits +conferred. But in the greatest thing we have done for them, we have +builded wiser than we knew. “God moves in a mysterious way His +wonders to perform.” In fourteen years we have welded the +Filipinos into one homogeneous political unit. In a most charming book, +entitled <i>An Englishwoman in the Philippines</i>,<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e11512src" href="#xd20e11512" name="xd20e11512src">20</a> we +can see our attempts to fit government by two political parties into +over-seas colonization caricatured without sting until we really remind +ourselves of a hippopotamus caressing a squirrel. In one passage the +British sister describes our programme as one “to educate the +Filipino for all he is worth, so that he may, in the course of time, be +fit to govern himself <i>according to American methods</i>; but at the +same time they have plenty of soldiers to knock him on the head if he +shows signs of wanting his liberty before the Americans think he is fit +for it”—“A quaint scheme,” she naïvely +adds, “and one full of the go-ahead originality of +America.”</p> +<p>The more we teach the Filipinos, the more intimately <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb493" href="#pb493" name="pb493">493</a>]</span>they +will become acquainted, <i>in their own way</i>, with the history of +the relations between our country and theirs from the beginning, +including the taxation without representation, through Congressional +legislation (hereinafter noticed) placed or kept on our statute-books +by the hemp trust and other special interests in the United States. And +they will learn all these things in the midst of a “growing gulf +between the two peoples.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11526src" +href="#xd20e11526" name="xd20e11526src">21</a></p> +<p>In fourteen years we have made these unwilling subjects, whom we +neither want nor need any more than they want or need us, a unit; a +unit for Home Rule in preference to alien domination, it is true; but, +nevertheless, a patriotic unit—one people—a potential body +politic which can take a modest, but self-respecting place in the +concert of free nations, with only a little more additional help from +us.</p> +<p>In the handling of an insurrection in any given province with courts +and constabulary during the first four or five years after the Taft +government of the Philippines was founded, the function of a +representative of the office of the Attorney-General, coming from +Manila to help the local prosecuting attorney handle a large docket and +a crowded jail, was by no means remotely analogous to that of a grand +jury. He originated prosecutions, found “No Bill,” etc. +When Mr. Harvey came to Samar, he came direct to the court room, and I +suspended the trial of the pending case, and, after greeting him, began +an informal talk which was akin to the nature of a charge to a grand +jury, putting him in possession of the general aspects of the uprising. +He was a very just and kindly man, and entered into the spirit of the +task. I elaborated on the class of cases <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb494" href="#pb494" name="pb494">494</a>]</span>where the defendant +claimed, as most of them did, “Yes, I joined the band of +brigands, but I was made to do so.” It was also indictable to +furnish supplies to the public enemy. This presented the class of cases +where the brigands would swoop down on a town and demand rice, and not +getting it, would sometimes kill the persons refusing it, and so +intimidate the rest into finding rice for them. Also there was the +class of cases where a man would claim to have been one of the +inhabitants of an unprotected town who had gone off to the hills in a +body, <i>for safety</i>, to propitiate the mountain people by becoming +part of them. This sort of thing at one time threatened to become +epidemic with all the coast towns. It did not, however. A <i>modus +vivendi</i> of some sort, sometimes express, sometimes merely tacit, +would be arranged between the coast people and the hill people. These +<i>modus vivendi</i> arrangements enabled the coast people to obtain a +certain degree of safety, in lieu of that we should have secured them +but did not, by making the hill folk believe that the coast men were +against us and for them. At one time the prosecuting attorney got hold +of evidence sufficient to authorize the issuance of a warrant for the +Presidente of Balangiga, the man supposed to have engineered the +massacre of the 9th Infantry in September 1901. I authorized the +issuance of the warrant for his arrest. But the native governor of the +province, and also Major Dade, the American regular officer commanding +the constabulary, satisfied me that we did not have force sufficient to +protect Balangiga from the Pulajans, if we arrested the presidente, +who, being <i>persona grata</i> to the Pulajans, was able to keep them +from descending on his town. To arrest him would therefore mean, in +their opinion, that the people of Balangiga would take to the hills for +protection, and join the hill folk, or Pulajans, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb495" href="#pb495" name="pb495">495</a>]</span>and +if a town as large as Balangiga set any such example all the coast +towns might follow it. So the supposed perpetrator of the 9th Infantry +massacre was allowed to remain unmolested. The American court was +impotent to enforce its processes.</p> +<p>In my mass of Philippine papers there is one containing a copy of my +remarks to the Assistant Attorney-General on his arrival at Catbalogan, +above referred to as <span class="corr" id="xd20e11552" title= +"Source: analagous">analogous</span> to a charge to a grand jury at +home. It is dated Catbalogan, Samar, September 28, 1904, and is headed: +“Remarks by the court upon the occasion of the arrival of +Assistant Attorney-General Harvey, with regard to the recent +disturbances in Samar, and the cases for brigandage and sedition +growing out of the same.” Certain parts of this +<i>contemporary</i> document will doubtless give the reader a more +vivid apprehension of the then situation than he can get from mere +subsequent description. Of course the visiting representative of the +Attorney-General’s office was familiar in a general way with the +manner of the handling of the Albay insurrection in the previous year, +described in the chapter preceding this. In discussing the Samar +situation the “remarks” of the court contain, among other +things, this passage:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">In the cases growing out of the Albay disturbances +there were a great many people who strayed out to the mountains just +like cattle. They did not know why or whither they went. As to those +persons, Judge Carson, Mr. Ross, and myself were unanimous in the +opinion that some of them could be indicted under the vagrancy law. +There were others of a greater degree of guilt, but who did not appear +to have been what you might call ordinary thieves, and we were all +agreed to indict those under the sedition law, the limit of which is +ten years and ten thousand dollars. Thus you do not force upon a Judge +of First Instance the responsibility <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb496" href="#pb496" name="pb496">496</a>]</span>of sentencing a man +to twenty years of his life for a connection with bandits which may be +but little more than technical. Besides those two classes, there were +in Albay of course the bandits proper, to whom the <i>bandolerismo</i> +[brigandage] law was specially intended to apply. There cannot be any +doubt about the fact that this <i>bandolerismo</i> law is one of the +most stringent statutes that ever was on the statute-books of any +country. It is very far from the purpose of this court to attempt to +say what would be the wisest legislation, or to say that this is not +the very best legislation, under the circumstances. <i>How we +administer the several laws alluded to governing public order, will +settle whether or not substantial justice is done.</i></p> +</div> +<p>The men in the United States who in those days were slinging mud at +the Philippine trial judges as being “subservient,” wholly +missed the core of the whole matter. In the provinces where so many +heavy sentences were imposed, the real situation was that a state of +war existed, and the judges believed, and I think correctly, that they +were practically a military commission of one, and much more able to +give a prisoner a square deal, tempering justice with mercy, than +officers briefly gathered from the scenes of the fighting to act as a +military commission. We tried those men with as little prejudice as if +they had just come from the moon. Moreover, from the italicized +concluding words of the above excerpt from my talk to the Assistant +Attorney-General, it will be seen that the court had practically +unlimited discretion in the matter of punishment, and was, in fact, +about the only <i>court of criminal equity</i> in the annals of +Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.</p> +<p>In the last analysis, the righteousness or unrighteousness of a +civil government in a country not yet entirely subjugated, depends on +whether more innocent <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb497" href= +"#pb497" name="pb497">497</a>]</span>people suffer through completing +the work of subjugation with constabulary whose “prisoners of +war” are tried, to see what they may have done, if anything, by +one-man courts, or whether more innocent people suffer through +completing the work of subjugation as any other great power on earth +but ourselves would have completed it, with an army, trying the +prisoners by military commission. Unless you yourself were a traitor to +your country, you considered as criminal attempts to subvert your +government by cut-throats that no one of the respectable Filipinos, +from Aguinaldo and Juan Cailles down, would have hesitated to have shot +summarily. But you sought to make the punishment in each case fit the +crime, by ascertaining as dispassionately as if the defendant were +fresh from the moon, just what each accused man had himself done. +Either Aguinaldo, or an American military commission would have had +such people shot in bunches, as not entitled to be treated as prisoners +of war. The trouble with the civil government did not lie in its +judiciary, but in its constabulary. It was the physical handling of the +crowds of prisoners by the constabulary, and their failure, because not +numerous enough, to protect peaceably inclined people, which made it a +fact that turning the situation over to the military would have meant +less sacrifice of the innocent along with the guilty. It is much more +merciful to kill a few hundred people, as a lesson to the rest, and let +the rest go, with the clear understanding that if they insurrect again +you will promptly kill a few hundred more, than to permit a reign of +terror from one month to another and from one year to another, with all +the untilled fields, famine, pestilence, and other disease this +involves, merely in order to be able to invoke the blessing of the +Doctor Lyman Abbots of the world on a supposedly benign +“civil” government. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb498" +href="#pb498" name="pb498">498</a>]</span></p> +<p>In all my sentences, and in all his indictments, Mr. Harvey and the +writer sailed close to the wind, by holding only those responsible who +had taken active parts in the sacking and burning of villages and the +massacre of their inhabitants. I knew that sooner or later some +officious prosecuting attorney of less noble mould than Harvey would +ask me to convict some poor creature of brigandage for giving a little +rice to the brigands, and my mind was made up to refuse to do so, and +in so refusing to commit heresy once and for all by expressing my +sentiments, in the decision, concerning the failure to give adequate +protection to defenceless people, along the lines indicated in this +chapter. No such case was in fact presented. I broke down under the +strain of graver cases early in November and left Samar forever, bound +for Manila.</p> +<p>Before I left, the whole island was seething with sedition. I was +told by a credible American that the chief deputy sheriff of the court, +an ex-insurgent officer, one of the “peace-at-any-price” +policy appointees, had remarked among some of his own people where he +did not expect the remark to be repeated: “I see no use +persecuting our brethren in the hills.” The municipal officials +of the provincial capital, Catbalogan, were suspected by the native +provincial governor, and the latter in turn was suspected by the Manila +government. In fact the whole political atmosphere of the island had +become full of rumor and suspicion as to who was <i>for</i> the +government, and who was <i>against</i> the government. I left Samar, +November 8th, which was the day of the presidential election of 1904, +determined to try no more insurrections. By that time nearly everybody +in the island was more or less guilty of sedition, and I did not know +the method of drawing an indictment against a whole people. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb499" href="#pb499" name= +"pb499">499</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10402" href="#xd20e10402src" name="xd20e10402">1</a></span> +<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 123.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10407" href="#xd20e10407src" name="xd20e10407">2</a></span> +<i>Ib.</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10452" href="#xd20e10452src" name="xd20e10452">3</a></span> Says +Brigadier-General Wm. H. Carter, in his annual report for 1905 covering +the Samar outbreak of 1904–5: “Whatever may have been the +original cause of the outbreak, it was soon lost sight of when success +had drawn a large proportion of the people away from their homes and +fields. Except in the largest towns it became simply a question of +joining the pulajans or being harried by them. <i>In the absence of +proper protection</i> thousands joined in the movement.” See +<i>War Department Report</i>, 1905, vol. iii., p. 286.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10592" href="#xd20e10592src" name="xd20e10592">4</a></span> Bulao +was situated on a high bluff on the left bank of a river called the +Bangahon. The Pulajans entered before daybreak, on July 21st. There was +a stiff fight at Bulao, also, between our native troops and the enemy +on August 21st, but Calderon seems to have left it out of his list. See +Gen. Wm. H. Carter’s Report for 1905, <i>War Department +Report</i>, 1905, vol. iii., p. 290. Capt. Cary Crockett, a descendant +of David Crockett, commanded the constabulary, and though badly wounded +himself, as were also half his command, he defeated a force of Pulajans +greatly outnumbering his, killing forty-one of them. <i>Report U. S. +Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 3, p. 90, Report of Col. Wallace +C. Taylor. I think he was awarded a medal of honor for his work. He +certainly earned it.</p> +<p class="footnote">“Pulajan” means “red +breeches,” the uniform of the mountain clans, worn whenever they +set out to give trouble.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10745" href="#xd20e10745src" name="xd20e10745">5</a></span> Of +March 23d of the previous year, already described in a previous +chapter, where Luther S. Kelly—“Yellowstone” +Kelly—saved the American women by gathering them and a few men in +the Government House and bluffing the brigands off.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10772" href="#xd20e10772src" name="xd20e10772">6</a></span> The +“Conant” peso, named for the noted fiscal expert, Mr. +Conant. It was worth fifty cents American money.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10789" href="#xd20e10789src" name="xd20e10789">7</a></span> The +Fourteenth U. S. Infantry was stationed in garrison just outside the +town proper of Calbayog, which was three hours by steam launch from the +provincial capital, Catbalogan. But the depredations might have been +carried to just outside the line of the military reservation, and the +military folk would not have dared to make a move save on request first +made by the Civil Government at Manila. In other words the above three +villages were burned under their noses.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10893" href="#xd20e10893src" name="xd20e10893">8</a></span> One +seems to get the stoicism better in the original, somehow, so I give +the body of the original Spanish, as it came to me:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p lang="es" class="footnote first">En el distrito de Motiong, +municipio de Wright, provincia de Samar, Islas Filipinas, a primero de +septiembre de mil novecientos quatro. Ante mi Peregrin Albano, consejal +del mismo, y presente el Presidente de Sanidad Municipal, D. Tomas San +Pablo y principales del mismo se procedio al enterramiento de los +cadaveres victimas de los Pulajans en el sementerio de esta localidad +el oficial de voluntarios, Rafael Rosales y otros voluntarios, +Gualberto Gabane, Juan Pacle, Dionisio Daisno, Pedro Damtanan, Carmelo +Lagbo, y particulares Eustaquia Sapiten y Apolinaria N: con otro tanto +Pulajan desconocido; en conformidad de la carta oficial de la +presidencia municipal de Wright de fecha de hoy registrada con el +numero 136.</p> +<p lang="es" class="footnote">Del citado enteramiento ha sido asistido +por el Reverendo Padre Marcos Gomez y acompanado por toda la fuerza +voluntaria del mismo por la muerte del oficial Rosales.</p> +</div> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e10937" href="#xd20e10937src" name="xd20e10937">9</a></span> See +<i>War Department Report</i>, 1905, vol. iii., p. 290.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11082" href="#xd20e11082src" name="xd20e11082">10</a></span> Hill +was Whittier’s deputy at Llorente.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11085" href="#xd20e11085src" name="xd20e11085">11</a></span> Even +if the municipal police had been like Cæsar’s wife, they +were like chaff before the wind in a Pulajan foray, though they were +somewhat better if well led by some prominent and forceful man of the +community in an expedition <i>after</i> Pulajans.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11116" href="#xd20e11116src" name="xd20e11116">12</a></span> A +disease of a dropsical variety, usually attacking the legs first, which +easily becomes epidemic. It had been the cause of many of the 120 +deaths in the Albay jail during the Ola insurrection. Ideal conditions +for it are a steady diet of poor rice and lack of exercise.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11126" href="#xd20e11126src" name="xd20e11126">13</a></span> It +was not well to be too hasty. You might have the head of the whole +uprising in custody, or one of his most important lieutenants, and find +it out by the merest accident in the course of hearing a case against +some apparently abject “private of the rear rank.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11131" href="#xd20e11131src" name="xd20e11131">14</a></span> By +unwarranted I mean without warrant. Nobody bothered much with warrants. +The times were too strenuous.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11389" href="#xd20e11389src" name="xd20e11389">15</a></span> See +<i>New York Tribune</i>, Oct. 25, 1904.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11400" href="#xd20e11400src" name="xd20e11400">16</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11429" href="#xd20e11429src" name="xd20e11429">17</a></span> +Smith, Bell & Co. are an old British mercantile house, well known +in Manila and Hong Kong.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11461" href="#xd20e11461src" name="xd20e11461">18</a></span> +<i>The North American Review</i> article by the writer, to which Judge +Ide was replying, appeared in the issue of that magazine for January +18, 1907, and could hardly have escaped the attention of anybody +concerned, having been given wide circulation; (1) by Mr. Andrew +Carnegie through pamphlet reprints; (2) by Hon. Wm. J. Bryan, in his +paper, the <i>Commoner</i>; (3) by Hon. James L. Slayden, M. C. of +Texas, through reprinting in the <i>Congressional Record</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11506" href="#xd20e11506src" name="xd20e11506">19</a></span> Such +as the breakwater at Manila, the road-building in various provinces, +etc.—all, however, be it remembered, being paid for by the +Filipino people, out of the insular revenues and assets.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11512" href="#xd20e11512src" name="xd20e11512">20</a></span> By +Mrs. Campbell Dauncey.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11526" href="#xd20e11526src" name="xd20e11526">21</a></span> +Words used by Governor-General James F. Smith, in an address at the +Quill Club, Manila, January 25, 1909.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch19" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XIX</h2> +<h2 class="main">Governor Wright—1905</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">My heart is heavy with the fate of that unhappy +people.</p> +<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">Speech of Hon. A. O. Bacon in U. +S. Senate.</span><a class="noteref" id="xd20e11604src" href= +"#xd20e11604" name="xd20e11604src">1</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Because the especially cordial relations which existed +to the last between Governor Wright and myself<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11608src" href="#xd20e11608" name="xd20e11608src">2</a> are +familiar to a number of very dear mutual friends, I deem it due both to +them and to myself, in view of the contents of the preceding chapter, +to state <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb500" href="#pb500" name= +"pb500">500</a>]</span>that I see no reason why, in writing a history +of the American Occupation of the Philippines, I should omit or slur +the facts which convinced me that that occupation ought to terminate as +soon as practicable, and that any decent kind of a government of +Filipinos by Filipinos would be better for all concerned than the +McKinley-Taft programme of Benevolent Assimilation whereof Governor +Wright was the legatee. By the thousand and one uncandid threads of +that programme, slowly woven from 1898 to 1904, as indicated in the +first sixteen chapters of this book, Governor Wright had found himself +as hopelessly bound to concealment from the American people of the real +situation in Samar in the fall of 1904, as a Gulliver in Lilliput.</p> +<p>When I finally left Samar and came to Manila, in November, 1904, I +was not prepared to figure out how or how soon, the blunder we made by +the purchase of the Philippine archipelago could be corrected. But my +mental attitude toward the whole Philippine problem had undergone a +complete change. In 1901 Governor Wright, then Vice-Governor, had +written me: “You younger men out here, who have cast your +fortunes with this country, are to be, in all likelihood, in the +natural course of events, its future rulers.” Up to 1903 I had +clung to that idea with the devotion of what was really high and +earnest purpose, untroubled with misgivings of any kind. In November, +1903, in Albay, Judge Carson and myself had talked over the long +struggle of the civil government to walk without leaning on the +military, and, with the readiness of one vested with authority to +believe such authority wisely vested, and the readiness of a civilian +lawyer to jealously guard the American home idea that the military +should be subordinate to the civil authority, I had cordially agreed +with a sentiment one day expressed by Judge <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb501" href="#pb501" name= +"pb501">501</a>]</span>Carson concerning Governor Taft about “the +splendid moral fibre of the man,” meaning in keeping the military +from prancing out of the traces. After Governor Taft left the Islands +to be Secretary of War (December 23, 1903), and while I was still in +Albay, I had learned of the 120 men who had died in the Albay jail +while awaiting trial, and thereafter something of the magnitude of the +Ola insurrection there, and that had given me pause as to the practical +benevolence of the operation of “a benign civil +government.” Then the Samar massacres of 1904, and the gory +panorama I had there witnessed, had finally convinced me that a +republic like ours is wholly unfitted to govern people against their +consent. But I did not tell anybody in Manila all these things. I +simply pondered them. Grover Cleveland was the only man in the world I +would have liked to talk to just then freely and fully. And he was not +about. “My heart was heavy with the fate of that unhappy +people” as Senator Bacon had said in the Senate in 1902, after +visiting the Islands in 1901. I did not condemn Governor Wright. I +quite realized that I was “up against” about the largest +ethical problem of world politics, one on which the nations are much +divided, and that I was not infallible. I did not say to the Governor: +“Governor, let’s resign and go home and tell our people +that this whole business is a mistake.” Nor did I ever lose faith +in Governor Wright personally. If I had, I might just as well have +said: “After this, the deluge.” I would simply have lost +faith in human nature. I had not then, nor have I since, known a man of +higher personal character. I had simply lost faith in Benevolent +Assimilation, and begun to take the Filipino people seriously as a +potential nation, probably better able to handle their own domestic +problems than we will ever be able to handle them for them. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb502" href="#pb502" name= +"pb502">502</a>]</span></p> +<p>The day after I resigned, Mr. Justice Carson, of the Supreme Court, +and Mr. Wilfley, the Attorney-General, came to call on me. My friends +knew I was very much troubled over the Samar business. I was doing some +grumbling, but without specifying, because to specify would mean that +we all of us ought to give up the life careers we had planned for +ourselves in the Islands. I knew the old familiar answer a grumbler was +sure to get in the Philippines, viz., “Old man, you’ve been +out here too long. You better go home.” But I did a little more +grumbling to my friends Judge Carson and Mr. Wilfley, during the course +of their visit. They could both pretty well guess what was the matter. +But Judge Carson and I had come out in 1899, and had served through the +war together. He knew all about the Albay business, and somewhat of the +Samar business. Wilfley had not come out until the civil government was +founded in 1901. Mr. Wilfley said cheerily: “Oh, Blount, you are +too conscientious.” I shall never forget what happened then. +Judge Carson said, with a ring of something like anger in his tone: +“No, Wilfley, I’ll be d—d if he is.” Is it any +wonder that ever since I have worn that man, as Hamlet would say, +“in my heart’s core”? Here was as brave and true an +Irishman as ever gained distinction on battlefield or bench. <i>And he +understood.</i> <i>He</i> did not say—which was the implication +of Wilfley’s tone—“Old man, you’ve been out +here too long, and illness has made you peevish.” He knew what +was the matter. He knew that as trial judges he and I had not been +small editions of Lord Jeffries, as some of our American critics had +implied, <span class="sc">BUT HE ALSO KNEW THAT THERE WAS NO METHOD OF +DRAWING AN INDICTMENT AGAINST A WHOLE PEOPLE</span>.</p> +<p>Possibly the intensity of my feelings on this great <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb503" href="#pb503" name= +"pb503">503</a>]</span>subject, then and ever since, hampers the power +of clear expression. Therefore, a word more in attempt at elucidation. +In 1898, Judge Carson and I, with many thousands of other young +Americans, had trooped down to Cuba, in the wake of the impetuous +Roosevelt, to free the inhabitants of that ill-fated island from +Spanish rule, drive the Spaniards from the Western Hemisphere, and put +a stop to Spain’s pious efforts “to spare the great island +from the dangers of premature independence,” as she always +expressed her attitude toward Cuba. We had many of us been fired by the +catchy Roosevelt utterance which did so much to bring on the Spanish +War, viz., “The steps of the White House are <i>slippery with the +blood of the Cuban reconcentrados</i>.” Then in 1899, we had gone +to the Philippines, and had ever since been engaged there in +“sparing the Islands from the danger of premature +independence,” and the Samar massacres of 1904 were, to me, the +apotheosis of the work. So that after November 8, 1904, I felt +“The steps of the White House are <i>slippery with the blood of +the people of my district</i>.” It had all been done under the +pious pretence that the Filipinos welcomed our rule—a pretence +which had taken the form for six years of systematic asseveration that +they did so welcome it. Yet it was not <i>true</i> that they, or any +appreciable fraction of them, had ever welcomed our rule. <i>And it +never will be true.</i> Surely no man can see in this book any scolding +or unkindness. It is an attempt merely to bring home to my countrymen a +<i>strategic</i> fact, a fact which it is folly to ignore. But to +return to the thread of our story.</p> +<p>Four days after the presidential election of 1904, to wit, on +November 12th, Governor Wright left Manila and went to Samar, including +in his itinerary various <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb504" href= +"#pb504" name="pb504">504</a>]</span>others of the southern +islands.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11682src" href="#xd20e11682" name= +"xd20e11682src">3</a> Soon after their return, the seven hundred native +troops in Samar were increased to nearly two thousand, and sixteen +companies of regulars (say one hundred men to a company) were also +thrown into Samar. It took until the end of 1906 to end the trouble. +You cannot find in the reports of the civil authorities anything +explaining their three or four weeks’ stay in the Visayan Islands +in November–December, 1904, that is not absolutely in accord with +the original Taft obsession of 1900 about the popularity of the +proposed alien “civil” government with its subjects. +Governor Wright’s description of the trip says: “The warm +hospitality of the Filipino people made this trip of inspection a most +agreeable one.” As a matter of fact, on such occasions, the more +disaffected a leader of the people was, the more he would seek, by +“warm hospitality,” “warm” oratory telling the +visiting mighty what the visiting mighty longed to hear, parades, +<i>fiestas</i>, etc., to divert suspicion of sedition from himself. The +poor creatures had met General Young’s cavalry column in northern +Luzon in 1899 with their town bands, doing the only thing they knew of +to do to “temper the wind to the shorn +lamb”—<i>i.e.</i>, to temper it to their several +communities—many of them doubtless expecting to be put to the +sword by General Young’s troopers, as the Cossacks did the +Persians during the brief and sensational sojourn of that brilliant +young administrator, Hon. W. Morgan Shuster, in Persia in +1911–12. I have no doubt that high on the list of those extending +some of the “warm hospitality” above mentioned appeared the +name of Don Jaime de Veyra. Yet in the summer of 1904 Don Jaime had +gotten out of a sick bed to attend a convention <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb505" href="#pb505" name= +"pb505">505</a>]</span>called to send delegates to the Democratic +National Convention in the United States that year,<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e11697src" href="#xd20e11697" name="xd20e11697src">4</a> and +also, in that same year, had run for Governor of Leyte on a platform +the principal plank of which was <i>Carthago est +delenda</i>—“Carthago” being <i>us</i>, the American +<i>régime</i>. De Veyra was defeated that time, but ran again +the next time and was elected. While the writer is not one of those who +seek to show their “breadth of view” by gossiping with +outsiders regarding what is peculiarly our own affair, still, the +British view-point of the situation in the Visayan Islands, as conveyed +by an Englishwoman whose husband was engaged in mercantile business +there in 1904–5, and who therefore was certainly in a position to +know the opinion of the little circle of British people at Cebu and +Iloilo, may not be superfluous here. This lady, living then at Iloilo, +wrote a series of letters to friends back home in England which she +afterwards published in book form.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11709src" +href="#xd20e11709" name="xd20e11709src">5</a> In a letter dated Iloilo, +January 22, 1905 (page 86), she says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The Americans give out and write in their papers that +the Philippine Islands are completely pacified, and that the Filipinos +love Americans and their rule. This, doubtless with good motives, is +complete and utter humbug, for the country is honeycombed with +insurrection and plots; the fighting has never ceased; and the natives +loathe the Americans and their theories, saying so openly in their +native press and showing their dislike in every possible fashion. Their +one idea is to be rid of the U. S. A. * * * and to be free of +a burden of taxation which is heavier than any the Spaniards laid on +them.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb506" href="#pb506" name= +"pb506">506</a>]</span></p> +<p>Also an Englishman who was in Samar in 1904–5, a Mr. Hyatt, +who, with his brother, served with the American troops there in the +bloody Pulajan uprising, afterwards wrote a book called the <i>Little +Brown Brother</i>, wherein he fully corroborates Mrs. Dauncey’s +appreciation of the situation during that period.</p> +<p>In its blindness to the unanimity of Visayan discontent, as +manifested in its report now under consideration, the civil government +of the Philippines was not trying wilfully to deceive anybody. It was +deceiving itself. It was obeying the law of its life, its existence +having been originally predicated on the consent of a great free people +to keep in subjection a weaker people eager to be also free, such +consent having been obtained through diligent nursing of the original +idea that the subject people were not in fact so eager, but were, on +the contrary, in a mental attitude of tearful welcome toward the +proffered protection of a strong power. In his report for 1905<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e11727src" href="#xd20e11727" name= +"xd20e11727src">6</a> General William H. Carter, commanding the +Department of the Philippines which included Samar and the rest of the +Visayan Islands, gives the key to the Commission’s twenty-six-day +stay in his district in the following part of said report:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Within a few days after the rendition of the annual +report for last year<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11735src" href= +"#xd20e11735" name="xd20e11735src">7</a> a serious outbreak occurred in +the Gandara valley, Samar. <i>This was followed by disorders in all the +other large islands of the department</i>, Negros, Panay, Cebu, and +Leyte.</p> +</div> +<p>Nowhere in the civil government reports do you find the slightest +recognition that these disorders had <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb507" href="#pb507" name="pb507">507</a>]</span>any relation to each +other, or to the fundamental problem of public order, or any political +significance whatsoever, each being treated as a purely local issue, +the idea that the circumstance of Samar’s having been thrown into +pandemonium by the successes of the enemies of the American Government +might have encouraged its enemies in the neighboring islands, never +seeming to occur to the authors of the said reports. General +Carter’s report goes on to state that within five months after +the Samar outbreak of July, 1904, seven hundred native troops had been +put in the field in that turbulent island. In December, 1904, troops +began to be poured into Samar, so that it was not long before the seven +hundred native troops had become seventeen hundred or eighteen hundred, +and, says General Carter, “in order to free them from garrison +work in the towns, sixteen companies of the 12th and 14th Infantry were +distributed about the disaffected coasts to enable the people who so +desired to <i>come from their hiding places</i>”—whither +they had gone because the American flag afforded them no +protection—“and undertake the rebuilding of their burned +homes.” General Carter avoids touching on the civil +government’s (to him well-known) obsession about its popularity, +a state of mind which could see no “political” significance +in outbreaks of any kind. But he does use this very straightforward +language about Samar:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Whatever may have been the original cause of the +outbreak, it was soon lost sight of when success had drawn a large +proportion of the people away from their homes and fields. +* * * <i>Except in the largest towns it became simply a +question of joining the Pulajans or being harried by them.</i> In the +absence of proper protection thousands joined in the movement.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb508" href="#pb508" name= +"pb508">508</a>]</span></p> +<p>Early in 1905, Hon. George Curry, of New Mexico, who was an officer +of Colonel Roosevelt’s regiment in Cuba, and had gone out to the +Philippines with a volunteer regiment in 1899, remaining with the civil +Government after 1901, was made Governor of Samar. Governor Curry has +since been Governor of the Territory of New Mexico, and is now (1912) a +member of Congress from the recently admitted State of New Mexico. +Governor Curry has told me since he was elected to Congress that it +took him all of 1905 and most of 1906, aided by several thousand +troops, native and regular, to put down that Samar outbreak. Yet a +certificate signed March 28, 1907, by the Governor-General and his +associates of the Philippine Commission states that “a condition +of general and complete peace” had continued in the Islands for +two years previous to the date of the certificate.<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e11760src" href="#xd20e11760" name="xd20e11760src">8</a> We +will come to this certificate in its chronological order later. How +many and what sort of uprisings were blanketed in that +“forget-it” certificate of 1907 is material to the question +whether or not the National Administration has ever been or is now +frank with the country about the universality of the desire of the +Philippine people for independence and local self-government, and +pertinent to the insistently recurring query: “Why should we make +of the Philippines an American Ireland?” But inasmuch as, in +addition to the Samar uprising which raged all through 1905, another +insurrection occurred in that year, which was duly +“forgotten” by said certificate, this last movement must +now claim our attention.</p> +<p>The provinces which were the theatre of the outbreak last above +mentioned were all near Manila. They were: Cavite, a province of +135,000 people almost at <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb509" href= +"#pb509" name="pb509">509</a>]</span>the gates of Manila; Batangas, a +province of 257,000 inhabitants adjoining Cavite; and Laguna, a +province of 150,000 people adjoining both. Some five hundred brigands +headed by cut-throats claiming to be patriots were terrorizing whole +districts. Far be it from me to lend any countenance to the idea that +the leaders of this movement, Sakay, Felizardo, Montalon, and the rest +of their gang, were entitled to any respect. But they certainly had a +hold on the whole population akin to that of Robin Hood, Little John, +and Friar Tuck. In refusing in 1907 to commute Sakay’s death +sentence after he was captured, tried, and convicted, Governor-General +James P. Smith gives some gruesome details concerning the performance +of that worthy, and his followers, yet in dealing with the nature and +extent of the trouble they gave the Manila government he says they +“assumed the convenient cloak of patriotism, and under the titles +of ‘Defenders of the Country’ and ‘Protectors of the +People’ proceeded to inaugurate a reign of terror, devastation, +and ruin in three of the most beautiful provinces in the +archipelago.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11769src" href= +"#xd20e11769" name="xd20e11769src">9</a></p> +<p>It has already been made clear that, during the time of the +insurrection against both the Spaniards and Americans, the +<i>insurrecto</i> forces were maintained by voluntary contributions of +the people. Major D. C. Shanks, Fourth U. S. Regular Infantry, who was +Governor of Cavite Province in 1905, after calling attention to this +fact, adds<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11780src" href="#xd20e11780" +name="xd20e11780src">10</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">When the insurrection was over a number of these +leaders remained out and refused to surrender. Included among them were +Felizardo and Montalon. The system <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb510" +href="#pb510" name="pb510">510</a>]</span>of voluntary contributions, +carried on during the <i>insurrecto</i> period, was continued after +establishment of civil government.</p> +</div> +<p>Again Governor Shanks says, with more of frankness than diplomacy, +considering that he was a provincial governor under the civil +government:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The establishment of civil government of this province +was premature and ill-advised. Records show the capture or surrender +since establishment of civil government of <i>nearly 600 hostile +firearms</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>One of the causes contributory to the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna +insurrection is stated in the report of the Governor-General for 1905 +thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">In the autumn of 1904 it became necessary to withdraw +a number of the constabulary from these provinces to assist in +suppressing disorder which had broken out in the province of +Samar.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11808src" href="#xd20e11808" name= +"xd20e11808src">11</a></p> +</div> +<p>Another of the contributory causes is thus stated:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">There was at the time [the fall of 1904] also +considerable activity among the small group of irreconcilables in +Manila, who began agitating for immediate independence, doubtless +because of the supposed effect it would have on the presidential +election in the United States, in which the Philippines was a large +topic of discussion. Evidently this was regarded as a favorable time +for a demonstration by Felizardo, Montalon, De Vega, Oruga, Sakay +[etc]. <i>All these men had been officers of the Filipino army during +the insurrection.</i></p> +</div> +<p>Consider the benevolent casuistry necessary to include these +fellows, and the tremendous following <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb511" href="#pb511" name="pb511">511</a>]</span>they could get up, +and did get up, in Cavite, “the home of insurrection,” and +the adjacent provinces, in a certificate to “a condition of +general and complete peace” alleged in the certificate to have +prevailed for two years prior to March 28, 1907. To make a long story +short, on January 31, 1905, a state of insurrection was declared to +exist, the writ of habeas corpus was suspended in Cavite and Batangas, +the regular army of the United States was ordered out, and +reconcentration tactics resorted to, as provided by Section 6 of Act +781 of the Commission. This is the act already examined at length, +intended to meet cases of impotency on the part of the insular +government to protect life and property in any other way. Political +timidity is conspicuously absent from the resolution of the Philippine +Commission of January 31, 1905, formally recognizing a break in the +peerless continuity of the “general and complete peace.” It +is virilely frank, the presidential election being then safely +over.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11825src" href="#xd20e11825" name= +"xd20e11825src">12</a> It concludes by authorizing the Governor-General +to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law, +“the public safety requiring it.” Then follows a +proclamation of the same date and tenor, by the Governor-General.</p> +<p>It appears from the case cited in the foot-note that in the spring +of 1905, one, Felix Barcelon, filed in the proper court a petition for +the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was one of the +reconcentrados corralled and “detained and restrained of his +liberty at the town of Batangas, in the province of Batangas,” by +one of Colonel Baker’s constabulary minions down there. The writ +was denied by the lower court. In one part of the opinion of the +Supreme Court in the case it is stated (p. 116) that the petitioner +“has been detained <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb512" href= +"#pb512" name="pb512">512</a>]</span>for a long time * * * +not for the commission of any crime and by due process of law, but +apparently for the purpose of protecting him.” The opinion of the +court, delivered by Mr. Justice Johnson, very properly held that the +detention was lawful <i>under the war power</i>, basing its decision on +the authority conferred on the Governor-General of the Philippines by +the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5 of which expressly +authorizes the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus “when in +cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may +require it.” A long legal battle was fought, the court holding +that the Executive Department of the Government is the one in which is +vested the exclusive right to say when “a state of rebellion, +insurrection, or invasion” exists, and that when it so formally +declares, <i>that settles the fact that it does exist</i>. At page 98 +of the volume above cited<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11844src" href= +"#xd20e11844" name="xd20e11844src">13</a> the court held, as to the +above mentioned resolution of the Philippine Commission and the above +mentioned executive order declaring a state of insurrection in Cavite +and Batangas:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The conclusion set forth in the said resolution and +the said executive order, as to the fact that there existed in the +provinces of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against the +constituted authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the +discretion of the legislative and executive branches of the Government, +after an investigation of the facts.</p> +</div> +<p>Yet two years later the same “constituted authorities” +certified to the President of the United States, in effect, as we shall +see, that no open insurrection against the constituted authorities had +occurred during the preceding two years. They do not in their +certificate ignore Cavite and Batangas. They mention <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb513" href="#pb513" name="pb513">513</a>]</span>them +by name, with a lot of whereases, explaining that after all they really +believe that the majority of the people in the provinces aforesaid were +not in sympathy with the uprising. However, after they get through with +their whereases they face the music squarely, and certify to “the +condition of general and complete peace.” Of the “nigger in +the woodpile” more anon.</p> +<p>Governor Wright was not a party to the certificate of 1907. He left +the Islands on leave November 4, 1905. A speech made by him prior to +his departure, as published in a Manila paper, indicates an expectation +to return. He never did. In 1906 he was demoted to be Ambassador to +Japan, a place of far less dignity, and far less salary, which he +resigned after a year or so. Vice-Governor Ide acted as +Governor-General until April 2, 1906, on which date he was formally +inaugurated as Governor-General.</p> +<p>Just why Governor Wright did not go back to the Philippines as +Governor, after his visit to the United States in 1905–6, does +not appear. It would seem almost certain that if Secretary of War Taft +had wanted President Roosevelt to send him back, he would have gone. +Mr. Taft never did frankly tell the Filipinos until 1907 that they +might just as well shut up talking about any independence that anybody +living might hope to see. Governor Wright began to talk that way soon +after Mr. Taft left the Islands. Possibly Governor Wright undeceived +them too soon, and thereby made the Philippines more of a troublesome +issue in the presidential campaign of 1904. President Roosevelt +recognized the sterling worth of the man, by inviting him to succeed +Mr. Taft as Secretary of War in 1908. But President Taft did not invite +him to continue in that capacity after March 4, 1909. Gossip has it +that when the incoming President Taft’s <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb514" href="#pb514" name= +"pb514">514</a>]</span>letter to the outgoing President +Roosevelt’s last Secretary of War, Governor Wright, was handed to +the addressee, and its conventional “hope to be able to avail +myself of your services later in some other capacity” was read by +him, the outgoing official quietly remarked: “Well, that is a +little more round-about than the one Jimmie Garfield<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e11864src" href="#xd20e11864" name="xd20e11864src">14</a> got, +but it’s a dismissal just the same.”</p> +<p>I have always thought that the reason Governor Wright did not go +back to the Philippines as Governor after 1905 was that he did not +continue to “jolly” the Filipinos, and abstain from +ruthlessly crushing their hopes of seeing independence during their +lifetime, as Mr. Taft did continuously during his stay out there. The +inevitable tendency of the Wright frank talk was from the beginning to +discredit the Taft pleasing and evasive nothings. Also, it was +followed, as we have seen, by quite a crop of serious disturbances of +public order, and somebody had to be “the goat.” +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb515" href="#pb515" name= +"pb515">515</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11604" href="#xd20e11604src" name="xd20e11604">1</a></span> +Delivered in 1902, after the Senator visited the Islands in 1901.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11608" href="#xd20e11608src" name="xd20e11608">2</a></span> The +following is a copy of the letter accepting my resignation:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="footnote first dateline">Office of the Civil Governor of the +Philippine Islands,<br> +January 25, 1905.</p> +<p class="footnote salute"><span class="sc">My dear Judge +Blount</span>:</p> +<p class="footnote">I have to acknowledge the receipt of your +communication of yesterday in which you tender your resignation as +Judge of First Instance at large. I regret extremely that your +ill-health has made this course imperative. Under all the +circumstances, however, I am satisfied that you have acted wisely, as I +have feared for some time that you would be unable to perform the +duties pertaining to your office because of your physical condition. I, +therefore, though with much regret accept your resignation.</p> +<p class="footnote">At the same time I beg to express my appreciation +of the faithful and efficient services you have rendered in the past. I +hope very much that a rest and change of climate may have the effect of +restoring you again to vigorous health, and I assure you that you carry +with you my best wishes for your future prosperity and happiness.</p> +<p class="footnote">Sincerely yours,<br> +<span class="sc">Luke E. Wright</span>,<br> +<i>Civil Governor</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote">To the Honorable <span class="sc">James H. +Blount</span>, Judge of First Instance at large, Manila, P. I.</p> +</div> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11682" href="#xd20e11682src" name="xd20e11682">3</a></span> See +annual report of the Governor-General for 1905, in <i>Report of the +Philippine Commission for 1905</i>, pt. 1, p. 85.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11697" href="#xd20e11697src" name="xd20e11697">4</a></span> Which +delegates were denied admission to the Convention on the ground that no +American living in the Philippines could be in sympathy with the +Democratic programme as to them.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11709" href="#xd20e11709src" name="xd20e11709">5</a></span> <i>An +Englishwoman in the Philippines</i>, by Mrs. Campbell Dauncey.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11727" href="#xd20e11727src" name="xd20e11727">6</a></span> +<i>War Department Report</i>, 1905, vol. iii., p. 285.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11735" href="#xd20e11735src" name="xd20e11735">7</a></span> Army +reports are usually made right after the expiration of the American +governmental fiscal year, June 30th.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11760" href="#xd20e11760src" name="xd20e11760">8</a></span> +<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 47.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11769" href="#xd20e11769src" name="xd20e11769">9</a></span> See +<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 38. He +means Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11780" href="#xd20e11780src" name="xd20e11780">10</a></span> +<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 1, p. 212.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11808" href="#xd20e11808src" name="xd20e11808">11</a></span> +<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 1, p. 52.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11825" href="#xd20e11825src" name="xd20e11825">12</a></span> For +a copy of it, see the case of Barcelon <i>vs.</i> Baker, <i>Philippine +Supreme Court Reports</i>, vol. v., p. 89.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11844" href="#xd20e11844src" name="xd20e11844">13</a></span> +Volume v., <i>Philippine Reports</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11864" href="#xd20e11864src" name="xd20e11864">14</a></span> Mr. +Garfield was President Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch20" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XX</h2> +<h2 class="main">Governor Ide—1906</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">The Tariff is a local issue.</p> +<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">General W. S. Hancock.</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">After Governor Wright left the Islands finally on +November 4, 1905, Vice-Governor Henry C. Ide acted as Governor-General +until April 2, 1906, when he was duly inaugurated as such. He resigned +and left the Islands finally in September thereafter.</p> +<p>All through 1905, Governor Curry, as Governor of Samar, which is the +third largest island of the archipelago, wrestled with the Pulajan +uprising there, aided, as has been stated in the previous chapter, by +the native troops, scouts, and constabulary, and also by the regular +army. But at the end of 1905 “the situation” was not yet +“well in hand.” Since his election to Congress in 1912, +Governor Curry has told me that in 1905 many thousands of people of +Samar participated actively as part of the enemy’s force in the +field during that period. By the spring of 1906 Governor Curry was +getting a grip on the situation, and in the latter part of March of +that year, some of the main outlaw chiefs agreed to surrender to him. +The report of Colonel Wallace C. Taylor, commanding the constabulary of +the Third District, which included Samar states<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11886src" href="#xd20e11886" name="xd20e11886src">1</a>: +“After several weeks of negotiating, during which time the camp +of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb516" href="#pb516" name= +"pb516">516</a>]</span>Pulahanes was visited by Governor Curry, and the +Pulahan officers visited the settlement at Magtaon”—a +settlement in south central Samar—“an understanding was +arrived at by which the Pulahanes were to surrender, March 24, 1906. +Instead of surrendering as agreed, the Pulahanes, commanded by Nasario +Aguilar, made a treacherous attack on the constabulary garrison on the +day and hour appointed for the surrender.” The constabulary +numbered some fifty men, the pulajans about 130. After the pulajans +opened fire they made a rush on the constabulary and a hand-to-hand +fight ensued. Colonel Taylor’s report continues:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">After the first rush the fighting continued fiercely, +and when the last of the pulahanes disappeared there remained but seven +enlisted men of the constabulary able to fight. Seven more were lying +about more or less seriously wounded and twenty-two were dead. Captain +Jones received a bad spear thrust in the chest early in the fight, but +fought on, regardless. Lieutenant Bowers received a gunshot wound +through the left arm, which, however, did not put him out of the fight. +Thirty-five dead pulahanes were found on the field and eight more have +since been found some distance off. The number of wounded who escaped +cannot be determined. The unarmed Americans present with Governor Curry +escaped to the river and afterwards rejoined Captain Jones who armed +them.</p> +</div> +<p>The explanation of this treachery, as given by Governor Curry, is +curious and interesting. The outlaws had intended in good faith to +surrender as a result of his negotiation with them, but at the last +moment there arrived to witness the surrender certain native officials +and other natives bitterly hated by the Pulajans and wholly mistrusted +by them. Their arrival caused the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb517" +href="#pb517" name="pb517">517</a>]</span>outlaws to suspect treachery +themselves and that was the cause of their change of plans. It was not +until the end of the year 1906 that the various energetic campaigns +which followed the Magtaon incident finally began to work more or less +complete restoration of public order by gradual elimination of the +enemy through killings, captures, and surrenders. An idea of the +seriousness and magnitude of these operations may be gathered without +going into the details, from the annual report for 1906 of General +Henry T. Allen commanding the Philippines Constabulary. This report, +dated August 31, 1906<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11901src" href= +"#xd20e11901" name="xd20e11901src">2</a>, states:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">At present seventeen companies of scouts and four +companies of American troops under Colonel Smith, 8th U. S. Infantry, +are operating against the pulahanes, but with success that will be +largely dependent upon time and attrition.</p> +</div> +<p>General Allen adds: “The entire 21st Regiment [of Infantry] is +also in Samar.” These facts are here given because they relate to +the period covered by the certificate of the Philippine Commission of +March 28, 1907, heretofore alluded to, and which will be more fully +dealt with hereinafter, which stated that “a condition of general +and complete peace” had prevailed throughout the archipelago for +two years prior to March 28, 1907. Without a brief exposition of all +these matters, it would be impossible to enable the reader to feel the +pulse of the Filipino people as it stood at the time of the election of +their assembly in 1907. The fact of our having been unable to +discontinue Filipino-killing altogether for any considerable period +from 1899 to the end of 1906 is too obviously relevant to the state of +the public mind in 1907 to need elaboration. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb518" href="#pb518" name="pb518">518</a>]</span></p> +<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e11916src" href="#xd20e11916" name="xd20e11916src">3</a> deals +at some length with disturbances which occurred in the island of Leyte +(area 3000 square miles, population nearly 400,000), beginning in the +middle of June. It describes among other things a visit of +Governor-General Ide to Tacloban, the capital of Leyte, made in +consequence of said disturbances, and conferences held by him there +with Major-General Wood, commanding all the United States forces in the +Philippines, Brigadier-General Lee, commanding the Department of the +Visayas (which included Leyte, headquarters, Iloilo), Colonel Borden, +commanding the United States forces in the island of Leyte, Colonel +Taylor, the chief of the constabulary of the District, etc. Certainly +from this formidable gathering of notables, it is clear that there was +about to take place in Leyte what our friends of the Lambs’ Club +in New York would call “An all star performance.” Leyte was +four to five hundred miles from Manila. Yet so serious was the +disturbance that the highest military and civil representatives of the +American Government in the archipelago deemed it necessary to meet in +the island which was the scene of the trouble with a view of handling +it. Yet in the Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906 one finds +the usual rotund rhetoric treating the disturbances as of no +“political” significance—which was only another way +of claiming that they were not serious. It is difficult to handle this +aspect of the matter without imputing to the civil authorities intent +to deceive, but to leave such an imputation unremoved would be to miss +the whole significance of the matter. As has already been made clear, +when Judge Taft, Judge Ide, and their colleagues of the Philippine +Commission had left Washington for Manila in 1900 Mr. McKinley had +assured <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb519" href="#pb519" name= +"pb519">519</a>]</span>them he had no doubt that the better element of +the Philippine people, once they understood us, would welcome our rule. +As soon as they set foot in the Philippine Islands they had at once +begun to act upon the theory that there was no real fundamental +opposition to us on the part of the people of the Philippines and had +continued obstinately to act upon that theory ever since. Certainly the +attitude of the civil government toward the disturbances in Leyte in +1906 is not surprising when the mind adverts for a moment to the +panorama of the five more or less sanguinary years already fully +described hereinbefore and then takes the following bird’s-eye +glance at the official reports for those years.</p> +<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1900, (page 17) had +said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">A great majority of the people long for peace and are +entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the +supremacy of the United States.</p> +</div> +<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1901 (page 7) had +said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The collapse of the insurrection came in May.</p> +</div> +<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1902 (page 3) had +said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The insurrection as an organized attempt to subvert +the authority of the United States in these islands is entirely at an +end,</p> +</div> +<p>referring farther on to “the whole Christian Philippine +population” as “<i>enjoying</i> civil government.” If +the “enjoyment” thus described had been genuine, continued, +profound, and sincere, it would have been <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb520" href="#pb520" name="pb520">520</a>]</span>another story. But +the net attitude of the civil government toward the general health of +the body politic, relatively to public order, reminds one of the +cheerful gentleman who remarked of his invalid friend, “He seems +to be ‘enjoying’ poor health.”</p> +<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1903 (page 25) says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The conditions with respect to tranquillity in the +islands have greatly improved during the last year.</p> +</div> +<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1904 (page 1) says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The great mass of the people, however, were domestic +and peaceable.</p> +</div> +<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1905 (part 1, page 59) +says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">On the whole life and property have been as safe as in +other civilized countries.</p> +</div> +<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906 (page 40) says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Viewing the entire situation the islands are in a +peaceable and orderly condition aside from——</p> +</div> +<p>various disorders which fill some ten pages of the report.</p> +<p>The inflexible attitude of the Commission from the beginning, of +treating each successive disturbance of public order as a purely +“local issue,” after General Hancock’s method with +the tariff, is thus sufficiently apparent. They always refuse to see in +successive outbreaks in various parts of the Islands any evidence +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb521" href="#pb521" name= +"pb521">521</a>]</span>of general and unanimous lack of appreciation +for a benign alien civil government. Therefore it was of course clearly +a foregone conclusion, in 1906, that Governor Ide, who had been in the +Islands all these years, was going to be <span class="corr" id= +"xd20e11979" title="Source: wholely">wholly</span> unable to see +anything in the disturbances in Leyte in the least tending to show that +American rule was unpopular. And yet it was a matter of common +knowledge all over the Visayan Islands that Jaime Veyra, then Governor +of Leyte, elected by the people, was one of the most obnoxious +anti-Americans in the archipelago. Both the army and constabulary were +ordered out in Leyte and a good deal of fighting occurred before order +was restored. The report of General Allen, commanding the constabulary +for that year<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11982src" href="#xd20e11982" +name="xd20e11982src">4</a> shows one engagement with the outlaws in +Leyte participated in by the constabulary and the 21st Regular +Infantry, in which the enemy numbered 450 and left forty-nine dead upon +the field. All this period is covered by the certificate of general and +complete peace of 1907, in the fall of which year a Philippine +legislature was elected. And those of the membership of that body not +in favor of Philippine independence were almost as few as the Socialist +party in the American House of Representatives, which, I believe, +consists of Representative Berger. True, the peace certificate does not +ignore the Leyte outbreak. It “forgets and forgives it,” so +to speak, as we shall see.</p> +<p>Governor Ide left the Islands finally on September 20, 1906, having +resigned. Why he should have resigned, it is difficult to say. Take it +all in all, he made a splendid Governor-General, and ought to have been +allowed to remain. He knew the Islands from Alpha to Omega and had been +there six years. His going out of office to make way for still another +Governor-General <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb522" href="#pb522" +name="pb522">522</a>]</span>was wholly uncalled for. So far as the +writer is informed, he was, when he left, still blessed with good +health. He had filled a very considerable place in the history of his +country most creditably. He had drawn up a fine code of laws for the +Islands known as the Ide code. He had made a great minister of finance, +successfully performing the perilous task of transferring the currency +of the country from a silver basis to a gold basis, and in so doing had +proven himself fully a match, in protecting the interests of the +Government, for the wiley local financiers representing the Hong Kong +and Shanghai Bank, the chartered bank of India, Australia, and China, +and other institutions run by experienced men of more or less piratical +tendencies. As Governor-General of the Islands, his justice, firmness, +and courtliness of manner combined to produce an administration in +keeping with the dignity of his great office. After returning to the +United States, he remained in private life for a time, and was finally +given a comparatively unimportant post as minister to a second-class +country, Spain, which post he still occupies (in 1912).</p> +<p>When, fresh from the memory of the Samar massacres of 1904, I landed +at Seattle, at the end of my last homeward-bound journey across the +Pacific, in April, 1905, one of the “natives” of Seattle +asked me: “Have those people over there ever got quiet +yet?” The question itself seemed an answer to the orthodox +official attitude at Manila, which had so long been elaborately +denying, as to each successive local outbreak, that such outbreak bore +any relation to the original insurrection, or was any wise illustrative +of the general state of public feeling in the Islands. At the time the +question was asked, the answer was, “Not entirely.” Not +until toward the end of 1906 did “Yes” become a correct +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb523" href="#pb523" name= +"pb523">523</a>]</span>answer to the question. In other words, there +were no more serious outbreaks after 1906, nor was a state of general +and complete peace ever finally established until then. Since 1906 +there have been occasional despatches from Manila recounting small +episodes of bloodshed, several of which have had quite a martial ring. +These have related merely to the country of the Mohammedan Moros, who +are as wholly apart from the main problem as the American Indian to-day +is from our tariff and other like questions. The Moros are indeed what +Kipling calls “half savage and half child.” They never did +have anything more to do with the Filipino insurrection against us than +the American Indian had to do with the Civil War. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb524" href="#pb524" name="pb524">524</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11886" href="#xd20e11886src" name="xd20e11886">1</a></span> +<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 2, p. 255.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11901" href="#xd20e11901src" name="xd20e11901">2</a></span> See +page 227, <i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 2.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11916" href="#xd20e11916src" name="xd20e11916">3</a></span> +<i>Report, Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 1, p. 37.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e11982" href="#xd20e11982src" name="xd20e11982">4</a></span> See +<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 2, p. 228.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch21" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XXI</h2> +<h2 class="main">Governor Smith—1907–9</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">Oh, but Honey, <i>dis</i> rabbit dess +<i>’bleeged</i> ter climb <i>dis</i> tree.</p> +<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">Uncle Remus.</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">“On September 20, 1906,” says the +<i>Report of the Philippine Commission for 1907</i>,<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e12022src" href="#xd20e12022" name="xd20e12022src">1</a> +“the resignation of the Hon. Henry Clay Ide as Governor-General +became effective, and on that date the Hon. James F. Smith was +inaugurated as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.”</p> +<p>The year 1907 will be known most prominently to the future history +of our Far Eastern possession as the year of the opening of the +Philippine Assembly, which momentous event occurred on October 16th. +But in the departments both of Politics and Psychology it should be +known as the year of the Great Certificate. The Great Certificate was a +certificate signed by certain eminent gentlemen on March 28, 1907, +which made the preposterous affirmation that <i>a condition of general +and complete peace</i> had prevailed throughout the archipelago, except +among the non-Christian tribes, for the two years immediately +preceding. Taken in its historic setting, that certificate can by no +possibility escape responsibility, as “accessory after the +fact” at least, to the pretence that a similar condition had +prevailed ever <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb525" href="#pb525" name= +"pb525">525</a>]</span>since President Roosevelt’s final +war-whoop of July 4, 1902, published to the American troops in the +Islands on the day named. That war-whoop, it will be remembered, was in +the form of a presidential proclamation congratulating General Chaffee +and “the gallant officers and men under his command” on +some “two thousand combats, great and small,” and +declaring, in effect, that Benevolent Assimilation was at last +triumphantly vindicated, and that opposition to American rule was at an +end. The certificate of March 28, 1907, appears at pages 47–8 of +the <i>Report of the Philippine Commission for 1907</i>, part 1. If we +consider what is <i>now</i> going on in the Islands as +“modern” history, and the days of the early fighting as +“ancient” history, this certificate will serve as the +connecting link between the two. It furnishes the key-note to all that +had happened during the American occupation prior to 1907, and the +key-note of all that has happened since. Therefore, though somewhat +long, it is deemed indispensable to clearness to submit here in full +the text of</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">THE GREAT CERTIFICATE OF 1907</p> +<p>Whereas the census of the Philippine Islands was completed and +published on the twenty-seventh day of March, nineteen hundred and +five, which said completion and publication of said census was, on the +twenty-eighth day of March, nineteen hundred and five, duly published +and proclaimed to the people by the governor-general of the Philippine +Islands with the announcement that the President of the United States +would direct the Philippine Commission to call a general election for +the choice of delegates to a popular assembly, <i>provided that a +condition of general and complete peace with recognition of the +authority of the United States should be certified by the Philippine +Commission to have continued in the territory of the Philippine Islands +for <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb526" href="#pb526" name= +"pb526">526</a>]</span>a period of two years after said completion and +publication of said census</i>; and</p> +<p>Whereas since the completion and publication of said census there +have been <i>no serious disturbances of the public order save and +except</i> those caused by the noted outlaws and bandit chieftains, +Felizardo and Montalon, and their followers in the provinces of Cavite +and Batangas, and those caused in the provinces of Samar and Leyte by +the non-Christian and fanatical pulahanes resident in the mountain +districts of the said provinces and the barrios contiguous thereto; +and</p> +<p>Whereas the overwhelming majority of the people of said provinces of +Cavite, Batangas, Samar, and Leyte have not taken part in said +disturbances and have not aided or abetted the lawless acts of said +bandits and pulahanes; and</p> +<p>Whereas the great mass and body of the Filipino people have, during +said period of two years, continued to be law-abiding, peaceful, and +loyal to the United States, and have continued to recognize and do now +recognize the authority and sovereignty of the United States in the +territory of said Philippine Islands: Now, therefore, be it</p> +<p>Resolved by the Philippine Commission in formal session duly +assembled, That it, said Philippine Commission, do certify, and it +<i>does hereby certify</i>, to the President of the United States +<i>that for a period of two years after the completion and publication +of the census a condition of general and complete peace, with +recognition of the authority of the United States, has continued to +exist</i> and now exists in the territory of said Philippine Islands +not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes; and be it +further</p> +<p>Resolved by said Philippine Commission, That the President of the +United States be requested, and is hereby requested, to direct said +Philippine Commission to call a general election for the choice of +delegates to a popular assembly of the people of said territory in the +Philippine Islands, which assembly shall be known as the Philippine +Assembly.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb527" href="#pb527" name= +"pb527">527</a>]</span></p> +<p>Let us examine these amiable liberties thus taken with the facts of +history by men of irreproachable private character, briefly analyzing +their action. Such an examination and analysis are indispensable to a +clear understanding by a great free people whose proudest boast is love +of fair play, of whether the Filipino people, or any appreciable +fraction of them, have ever in the least consented, or do now in the +least consent, to our rule, as the small minority among us interested +in keeping the Islands, have systematically sought, all these years, to +have this nation believe. As the above certificate of 1907 was the last +hurdle that Benevolent Assimilation had to leap on the Benevolent +Hypocrisy course over which we had to gallop in order to get from the +freeing of Cuba to the subjugation of the Philippines, let us glance +back for a moment at the first hurdle or two, leapt when Mr. Taft was +in the Philippine saddle.</p> +<p>Judge Taft had said on November 30, 1900:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">A great majority of the people long for peace and are +entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the +supremacy of the United States<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12077src" +href="#xd20e12077" name="xd20e12077src">2</a>;</p> +</div> +<p>and, pursuant to that idea, he had set up his civil government on +July 4, 1901. He never did thereafter admit that he was mistaken in his +original theory, but kept on trying to fit the facts to his theory, +hoping that after a while they <i>would</i> fit. He “clung to his +policy of disinterested benevolence with a tenacity born of +conviction,” to borrow a phrase from Governor-General +Smith’s inaugural address of 1907. But in this same inaugural +address of Governor Smith of 1907, you find, for the first time in all +the Philippine state papers, a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb528" +href="#pb528" name="pb528">528</a>]</span>frank admission of the actual +conditions under which the civil government of 1901 was in fact set up. +Says he:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>While the smoke of battle still hung over the hills +and valleys of the Philippines and every town and barrio in the islands +was smoking hot with rebellion</i>, she [the United States] replaced +the military with a civil regime and on the smouldering embers of +insurrection planted civil government.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12095src" href="#xd20e12095" name="xd20e12095src">3</a></p> +</div> +<p>That confession, made with the bluntness of a most gallant soldier, +is as refreshing in its honesty as the Roosevelt war-whoop of 1902. +There shall be no tiresome repetition here concerning the original +withholding of the facts from the American people in 1898–9, but +to place in juxtaposition Secretary of War Root’s representations +to the American public in the year last named, and the actual facts as +stated <i>earlier in the same year</i> by General MacArthur, one of our +best fighting generals, during the thick of the early fighting, in an +interview already noticed in its proper chronological place, will +forever fix the genesis of the original lack of frankness as to +conditions in the Philippines which has naturally and inexorably made +frankness as to those conditions impossible ever since. As late as +October 7, 1899, Mr. Root—who had not then and has not since been +in the Philippines—had said in Chicago, in a speech at a dinner +of the Marquette Club:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Well, against whom are we fighting? Are we fighting +the Philippine nation? No. There is none. There are hundreds of +islands, inhabited by more than sixty tribes, speaking more than sixty +different languages, and all but one are ready to accept American +sovereignty.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb529" href="#pb529" name= +"pb529">529</a>]</span></p> +<p>As early as the beginning of April, 1899, just after the taking on +March 31st of the first insurgent capital, Malolos, General MacArthur, +who commanded our troops in the assault on that place, had said, in an +interview with a newspaper man afterwards verified by the General +before the Senate Committee of 1902 as substantially correct:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">When I first started in against these rebels, I +believed that Aguinaldo’s troops represented only a faction. +* * * <i>I did not like to believe that the whole population +of Luzon * * * was opposed to us</i> * * *. But +after having come thus far, and having been brought much in contact +with both <i>insurrectos</i> and <i>amigos</i>,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12125src" href="#xd20e12125" name="xd20e12125src">4</a> <i>I have +been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are +loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he heads</i>.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e12134src" href="#xd20e12134" name= +"xd20e12134src">5</a></p> +</div> +<p>The presidential election of 1900 had been fought out, in the midst +of considerable bitterness, on the idea that the Root view was correct +and the MacArthur view was altogether mistaken. So that after 1900, the +McKinley Administration was irrevocably committed to the Root +view.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12142src" href="#xd20e12142" name= +"xd20e12142src">6</a> The Philippine Government had, after 1900, +diligently set to work to live up to the Root view, and to fit the +facts to the Root view by prayer and hope, accompanied by asseveration. +Hence in 1901 the alleged joyous sobs of welcome with which the +Filipino people are, in effect, described in the report <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb530" href="#pb530" name="pb530">530</a>]</span>of +the Philippine Commission for that year as having received the +“benign” civil government, said sobs or other +manifestations having spread, if the Commission’s report is to be +taken at its face value, “like wild-fire.” Hence also the +attempt of 1902 to minimize the <span class="corr" id="xd20e12147" +title="Source: insursurrection">insurrection</span> of 1901–2, in +Batangas and other provinces of southern Luzon, conducted by what +Governor Luke E. Wright, in a speech delivered at Memphis in the latter +part of 1902, called “the die-in-the-last-ditch +contingent.” Hence the quiet placing of the province of Surigao +in the hands of the military in 1903 without suspension of the writ of +habeas corpus, and the failure to order out the army in Albay in 1903 +and in Samar in 1904. Hence also the prompt use of the army in Samar, +Batangas, and Cavite in 1905, after the presidential election was +safely over. Hence also the seething state of sedition which smouldered +in the Visayan Islands in 1906, punctuated by the outbreak in Leyte of +that year.</p> +<p>The psychologic processes by which the distinguished gentlemen who +signed the Great Certificate of March 28, 1907, got their own consent +to sign it make the most profoundly interesting study, relatively to +the general welfare of the world, in all our Philippine experiments so +far. They are the final flowering of the plant Political Expediency. +They are the weeds of benevolent casuistry that become from time to +time unavoidable in a colonial garden tended by a republic based on the +consent of the governed and therefore by the law of its own life +unfitted to run any other kind of a government frankly. These processes +find their origin in the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, +1902, known as the Philippine Government Act. Three days after +President Roosevelt approved the Act, he issued his proclamation of +July 4, 1902, above noticed, declaring <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb531" href="#pb531" name="pb531">531</a>]</span>the insurrection at +an end. Section 6 of that Act provided:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Whenever the existing insurrection in the Philippine +Islands shall have ceased, and <i>a condition of general and complete +peace shall have been established therein</i>, and the fact shall be +certified to the President by the Philippine Commission, the President, +upon being satisfied thereof, shall order a census of the Philippine +Islands to be taken by said Philippine Commission.</p> +</div> +<p>This census was intended to be preliminary to granting the Filipinos +a legislature of their own, but as a legislature full of +<i>insurrectos</i> would of course stultify its American sponsors +before all mankind, it was announced in effect, in publishing the +census programme, that no legislature would be forthcoming if the +Filipinos did not quit insurrecting, and remain “good” for +two years. If they did remain good for two years after the census was +finished, then they should have their legislature. During the lull of +“general and complete” peace which, in the fall of 1902, +followed the suppression of the Batangas insurrection of 1901–2, +and preceded the Ola insurrection of 1902–3 in the hemp provinces +of southern Luzon, the Commission made, on September 25, 1902, the +certificate contemplated by the above Act of Congress, and the taking +of the census was accordingly ordered by the President of the United +States, Mr. Roosevelt, by a proclamation issued the same day.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e12167src" href="#xd20e12167" name= +"xd20e12167src">7</a> Section 7 of the aforesaid Act of Congress +provided:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Two years after the completion and publication of the +census, in case such condition of general and complete peace with +recognition of the authority of the United States <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb532" href="#pb532" name= +"pb532">532</a>]</span>shall have continued in the territory of said +islands <i>not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes</i>, +and such facts shall have been certified to the President by the +Philippine Commission, the President upon being satisfied thereof shall +direct said Commission to call, and the Commission shall call, a +general election for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly of +the people of said territory in the Philippine Islands, which shall be +known as the Philippine Assembly.</p> +</div> +<p>On March 27, 1905, the President of the United States was duly +advised that the census had been completed, and on March 28th, the +presidential proclamation promising the Filipinos a legislature two +years later if in the meantime they did not insurrect any, was duly +published at Manila. It is true that there is no Philippine state paper +signed by anybody, either by the President of the United States, or the +Governor-General of the Philippines, or any one else, certifying to a +condition of “general and complete peace” between the +certificate to that effect made by the Philippine Commission on +September 25, 1902, above mentioned, which authorized commencing the +census (and was justified by the facts), and the presidential promise +of March 28, 1905, that if they would “be good” for two +years more, they should have a legislature. But the whole manifest +implication of the representations of fact sought to be conveyed by the +action both of the Washington and the Manila authorities at the date of +the presidential promise of March 28, 1905, is that a condition of +general and complete peace had obtained ever since the last certificate +to that effect, the certificate of September 25, 1902. Yet, as we saw +in the chapter covering the last year of Governor Wright’s +administration, besides the Samar disturbances that lasted all through +1905, a big insurrection was actually <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb533" href="#pb533" name="pb533">533</a>]</span>in full swing in +Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna provinces, on March 28, 1905, had then +been in progress since before the first of the year, and continued +until the latter part of 1905, the then Governor-General, Governor +Wright, having, by proclamation issued January 31, 1905, declared +Cavite and Batangas to be in a state of insurrection, ordered the +military into those provinces, and suspended the writ of habeas corpus. +President Roosevelt’s proclamation of March 28, 1905, can by no +possibility be construed as saying to the Filipinos anything other than +substantially this: “You have not insurrected any since my +proclamation of July 4, 1902. If you will be good two years +<i>more</i>, you shall have a legislature.” What then was the +Philippine Commission to do at the end of those two years, peppered, as +they had been, with most annoying outbreaks in various provinces not +inhabited by “Moros or other non-Christian tribes.” During +the presidential campaign of 1904 the Commission had committed +themselves, as we have seen, to the proposition that nothing serious +was going on at that time in Samar. So how could they take frank +official cognizance on paper of the reign of terror let loose there by +their delay in ordering out the army until after the presidential +election, a delay which, like a delay of fire-engines to arrive at the +scene of a fire, had permitted the Samar outbreak to gain such headway +that it took two years to finally put it down? Then there was the +outbreak of 1906 in Leyte, described in the last chapter, as to which +even the Commission had admitted in their annual report for that +year<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12189src" href="#xd20e12189" name= +"xd20e12189src">8</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Possibly its [Leyte’s] immediate vicinity to +Samar has had to do with the disturbed conditions.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb534" href="#pb534" name= +"pb534">534</a>]</span></p> +<p>In other words, <i>possibly</i>, a fire <i>may</i> spread from one +field of dry grass to another near by.</p> +<p>As to the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna insurrection of 1905, in an +executive order dated September 28, 1907,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12207src" href="#xd20e12207" name= +"xd20e12207src">9</a>—noticed in a previous chapter, but too +pertinent to be entirely omitted here—wherein are set forth the +reasons for withholding executive clemency from the condemned leaders +of that movement, Governor-General Smith describes in harrowing terms +“a reign of terror, devastation, and ruin in three of the most +beautiful provinces in the archipelago,” wrought by the condemned +men, who he says “assumed the cloak of patriotism, and under the +titles of ‘Defenders of the Country,’ and ‘Protectors +of the People’ proceeded to inaugurate” said reign of +terror. These men were most of them former insurgent officers who had +remained out after the respectable generals had all surrendered. This +Cavite-Batangas-Laguna insurrection was <i>the very sort of thing which +the conditional promise of a legislature made by Congress to the +Filipino people</i> in Sections 6 and 7 of the Act of July 1, +1902—the Philippine Government Act—<i>had stipulated should +not happen</i>. This is no mere <i>dictum</i> of my own. In the case of +Barcelon against Baker, 5 <i>Philippine Reports</i>, pp. 87 <i>et +seq.</i>, already very briefly noticed in a previous chapter, the +Supreme Court of the Islands had, in effect, so held. Section 5 of the +Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, had provided that if any state of +affairs serious enough should arise, the Governor of the Philippines +should have authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus “when +in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may +require it.” Sections 6 and 7 of the same Act had provided, on +the other hand, that if a condition of general and complete peace +should prevail for a stated <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb535" href= +"#pb535" name="pb535">535</a>]</span>period the Filipinos should have a +legislature. In the case of Barcelon against Baker the Supreme Court +held that the situation contemplated by Section 5 of the Act of +Congress had arisen in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas. That, of +course, automatically, so to speak, made the postponement of the +Philippine Assembly a necessary logical sequence, under the provisions +of Sections 6 and 7. These Sections 6 and 7 promised the Filipinos a +legislature in the event the conditions contemplated by Section 5 +should not arise. Barcelon, who was one of the (non-combatant) +reconcentrados restrained of his liberty at Batangas, claimed that his +detention as such reconcentrado by the defendant in the habeas corpus +proceeding, the constabulary officer, Colonel Baker, was unlawful, in +that, he being charged with no crime, such detention deprived him of +his liberty without due process of law. The Philippine Commission, +however, had declared, by virtue of the authority vested in it by +Section 5 of the Act of Congress aforesaid, that a state of +insurrection existed in Cavite and Batangas, and accordingly the +Governor-General had suspended the writ of habeas corpus and declared +martial law in those provinces. The Attorney-General representing the +Philippine Commission before the court rested the Government’s +case on the proposition that the petitioner was not entitled to claim +the ordinary “due process of law” because “open +insurrection against the constituted authorities” existed in the +provinces named. And the Supreme Court upheld his contention. In so +holding, they say, among other things (page 93), in construing Section +5 of the Act of Congress we are considering:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Inasmuch as the President, or Governor-General with +the approval of the Philippine Commission, can suspend the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb536" href="#pb536" name= +"pb536">536</a>]</span>privilege of the writ of habeas corpus only +under the conditions mentioned in the said statute, it becomes their +duty to make an investigation of the existing conditions in the +archipelago, <i>or any part thereof</i>, to ascertain whether there +actually exists a state of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, and +that the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the +writ of habeas corpus. When this investigation is concluded, and the +President, or the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine +Commission, <i>declares that there exists these conditions</i>, and +that the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the +writ of habeas corpus, can the judicial department of the Government +investigate the same facts and declare that no such conditions +exist?</p> +</div> +<p>They answer “No!” The head note of the decision is as +follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be +suspended in the Philippine Islands in the case of rebellion, +insurrection, and invasion, when the public safety requires it, by the +President of the United States, or by the Governor-General of the +Philippine Islands with the approval of the Philippine Commission.</p> +</div> +<p>Thus the Supreme Court of the Islands squarely held that <i>on the +fourth day of August, 1905</i> (the day the writ of habeas corpus was +made returnable), <i>open insurrection existed against the constituted +authorities in the Islands</i>, in the provinces named, <i>and had +existed since the Executive Proclamation of January 31st, previous, +declaring a state of insurrection</i>, and on that ground denied the +writ. Yet the Commission certified on March 28, 1907, that a state of +general and complete peace as contemplated by the Act of Congress +conditionally promising a legislature, had prevailed for the two years +preceding. In other words the Philippine <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb537" href="#pb537" name="pb537">537</a>]</span>Commission declared a +state of insurrection to exist in certain populous provinces, and was +upheld by the Supreme Court of the Islands in so doing, and later +certified to the continuance of a state of general and complete peace +covering the same period.</p> +<p>All the uncandid things—uncandid in failure to take the +American people into their confidence—that have been done by all +the good men we have sent to the Philippines from the beginning, have +been justified by those good men to their own consciences on the idea +that, because the end in view was truly benevolent, therefore the end +justified the means. As a matter of fact, American Benevolent +Assimilation in the Philippines has, in its practical operation, worked +more of misery and havoc, first through war, and since through +legislation put or kept on the statute books by the influence of +special interests in the United States with Congress, “than any +which has darkened their unhappy past” to use one of Mr. +McKinley’s early expressions deprecating doing for the +Philippines what we did for Cuba.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12263src" +href="#xd20e12263" name="xd20e12263src">10</a></p> +<p>But let us see just how much the Philippine Commission that signed +the peace certificate of March 28, 1907, swallowed, and how they +swallowed it. It will be observed that they sugar-coated their +certificate with a lot of whereases. The first of these recites +President Roosevelt’s promise of March 28, 1905, that the +Filipinos should have a legislature two years thereafter +“provided that a condition of general and complete peace with +recognition of the authority of the United States should be certified +by the Philippine Commission to have continued in the territory of the +Philippine Islands for a period of two years” after the +proclamation. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb538" href="#pb538" name= +"pb538">538</a>]</span>Whereas number two, it will be noted, goes on to +state that there have been “no serious disturbances of public +order save and except” those in Cavite, Batangas, Samar, and +Leyte,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12273src" href="#xd20e12273" name= +"xd20e12273src">11</a> the magnitude of which has been fully described +in previous chapters. Of the Cavite-Batangas insurrection, the only one +they had previously formally admitted to <i>be</i> an insurrection, +they say it was “caused by certain noted outlaws and bandit +chieftains [naming them], and their followers.” Obviously this +was hardly sufficient to show that an insurrection they had once +officially recognized as such was not in fact such at all. So in order +to justify a statement that “a condition of general and complete +peace” had continued in these two great provinces of Cavite and +Batangas, which they had but shortly previously declared to be in a +state of insurrection, and been upheld by the Supreme Court in so +doing, they resort to the old Otis expedient of 1898–9, worked on +the American people through Mr. McKinley to show absence of lack of +consent-of-the-governed. This expedient, as we have seen in the earlier +chapters of this book, consisted in vague use of the word +“majority.” It had stood Judge Taft in good stead in the +campaign of 1900, because when he then said that “the great +majority of the people” were “entirely willing” to +accept American rule, there was no earthly way to disprove it in time +for the verdict of the American people to be influenced by the +unanimity of the Filipinos against a change of masters in lieu of +independence. It was the only possible expedient for an American +conscience, because every American naturally feels that unless he can, +by some sort of sophistry, persuade himself that “the +majority” of the people want a given thing, then the thing is a +wrong thing to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb539" href="#pb539" name= +"pb539">539</a>]</span>force upon them. So the ethical hurdle the +Commission had to leap in order to sign the certificate of 1907 was +cleared thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The overwhelming majority of the people of said +provinces have not taken part in said disturbances and have not aided +and abetted the lawless acts of said bandits.</p> +</div> +<p>As a matter of fact, the report of the American Governor of +Cavite—and conditions were conceded to be identical in the two +provinces of Cavite and Batangas—shows that the reason it was so +hard to suppress the Cavite-Batangas troubles of 1905 was that the +people would not help the authorities to apprehend the outlaws. No +doubt the King of England would have signed a similar certificate as to +the people of the shires and counties in which Robin Hood, Little John, +and Friar Tuck, held high carnival. Of course I do not mean to libel +the fair fame of that fine freebooter Robin Hood and his companions by +placing the rascally leaders of the bands of outlaws now under +consideration in the same jolly and respectable class with those +beloved friends of the childhood of us all. But the Cavite-Batangas +“patriots” of 1905 could never have given the authorities +as much trouble as they did if the people had not at least taken secret +joy in discomfiture of the American authorities. Until finally +suppressed, all such movements as these always grew exactly as a +snow-ball does if you roll it on snow. Says Governor Shanks, a Major of +the 4th United States Infantry, who was Governor of Cavite, in 1905 in +his report for that year,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12287src" href= +"#xd20e12287" name="xd20e12287src">12</a> in explaining the uprising +under consideration, and the way it grew: “The Filipino likes to +be on the winning side.” Certainly this <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb540" href="#pb540" name="pb540">540</a>]</span>is +not peculiar to the Filipino. Governor Shanks proceeds:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The prestige acquired (by the uprising) at San Pedro +Tunasan, Paranaque, Taal, and San Francisco de Malabon had great weight +in creating active sympathy for ladrone bands and leaders. Something +was needed to counterbalance the effect of their combined successes, +and the appearance of regular troops was just the thing needed.</p> +</div> +<p>This explains how “the overwhelming majority” of which +the certificate of 1907 speaks was obtained in Cavite. It took six +months to obtain said “majority” at that. I suppose the +campaigning of the American regulars might be credited with obtaining +the “majority,” and the reconcentration of brother Baker of +the constabulary might be accorded the additional credit of making the +majority “overwhelming.” If you have, as election tellers, +so to speak, a soldier with a bayonet on one side, and a constabulary +officer with a reconcentration camp back of him on the other, you can +get an “overwhelming majority” for the continuance of +American rule even in Cavite province.</p> +<p>Through men I commanded during the early campaigning, I have killed +my share of Filipinos in the time of war; and after the civil +government was set up I had occasion to hang a good many of them, under +what seemed to me a necessary application of the old Mosaic law, +“An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a +life.” But I thank God I have never been a party to the +insufferable pretence that they, or any appreciable fraction of them, +ever consented to our rule. This, however, is the whole theory of the +Philippine Commission’s certificate of March 28, 1907. It is +curious how generously and supremely frank a brave soldier will get +when he forgets to be a politician. In <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb541" href="#pb541" name="pb541">541</a>]</span>one of his state +papers of 1907 Governor-General Smith<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12305src" href="#xd20e12305" name="xd20e12305src">13</a> speaks +of General Trias, who had been Lieutenant-General of the insurgent army +in the days of the insurrection, and next in rank to Aguinaldo himself, +as one “whose love of country had been tested on many a well +fought field of honorable conflict.” Contrast this tribute to the +respectability of the original Philippine war for independence against +us with the long list of stale falsehoods already reviewed in this +volume, on the faith of which, in the presidential campaign of 1900, +the American people were persuaded that to deny to the Filipinos what +they had accorded to Cuba was righteous! The leaders of the +Cavite-Batangas uprising of 1905 had been officers of the insurgent +army, and that was the secret of their hold upon the people of those +provinces. It is true that they must have been pretty sorry officers, +and that they were <i>ladrones</i> (brigands). They were cruel and +unmitigated scoundrels working for purely selfish and vainglorious +ends. But it was the cloak of patriotism, however, infamously misused, +that gained them such success as they attained in 1905. Says the +American Governor of Cavite province in his annual report for +1906<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12313src" href="#xd20e12313" name= +"xd20e12313src">14</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The province should be most carefully watched. I am +convinced that <i>ladrone leaders do not produce conditions</i>, but +that <i>the conditions and attitude of the public produce +ladrones</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>So much for the Cavite-Batangas hurdle. And now as to the Samar and +Leyte hurdle.</p> +<p>The signers of the certificate of 1907 justify their certificate as +to Samar and Leyte on a very ingenious theory. The Act of Congress of +July 1, 1902, already <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb542" href= +"#pb542" name="pb542">542</a>]</span>cited, which had provided for the +taking of a census preliminary to the call of an election for delegates +to a legislature, had recognized the crude ethnological status of the +Moros and other non-Christian tribes. These had never had anything +whatever to do with the insurrection against us. Therefore in making +the continuance of a state of general and complete peace for a +prescribed period a condition precedent to granting the Filipinos a +legislature, the Act of 1902 had limited that condition precedent to +“the territory of said Islands not inhabited by Moros or other +non-Christian tribes.” In fact President Roosevelt’s +proclamation of September 25, 1902, already noticed, ordering the +taking of the census on the theory that a state of general and complete +peace then existed, explains that this theory is entirely consistent +with trouble among the Moros and other non-Christian tribes because +<i>they</i>, it says, quoting from a statement of the Philippine +Commission previously made to the President, “never have taken +any part in the insurrection.” The Moros and other non-Christian +tribes were, so to speak, in no sense assets of the Philippine +insurrection. All the rest of the population was—that is, if +there was anything in the veteran General MacArthur’s grim jest +of 1900, prompted by Governor Taft’s half-baked opinion to the +contrary, that “ethnological homogeneity” was the secret of +the unanimity of the opposition we met, and that somehow people +“<i>will</i> stick to their own kith and kin.” When the +Philippine Government Act of 1902 was drawn nobody pretended for a +moment that there were any non-Christian tribes either in Samar or +Leyte. The whole population of those Islands were valuable +<i>assets</i> of the insurrection. If any one doubts it, let him ask +the 9th Infantry. You will find in the Census of 1903 <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb543" href="#pb543" name="pb543">543</a>]</span>that +there are no non-Christian tribes credited either to Samar or +Leyte.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12346src" href="#xd20e12346" name= +"xd20e12346src">15</a> When the Philippine Government Act of 1902 was +drafted, the exception about Moros and other non-Christian tribes was +intended to except merely certain types of people as distinct from the +great mass of the Philippine population as islands are from the sea. +The fact is, no person connected with the Philippine Government +<i>either before or after</i> the certificate under consideration, ever +thought of classifying the ignorant country people of the uplands and +hills of Samar or Leyte, as “non-Christian tribes.” The +Philippine Census of 1903 does not so classify them. The very volume of +the <i>Report of the Philippine Commission for 1907</i> in which the +certificate aforesaid appears, does not. In that volume,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e12361src" href="#xd20e12361" name= +"xd20e12361src">16</a> the report of the Executive Secretary deals +elaborately with the subject of non-Christian tribes. Professor +Worcester of the Philippine Commission has for the last twelve years +been the grand official digger-up of non-Christian tribes. He takes as +much delight at the discovery of a new non-Christian tribe in some +remote, newly penetrated mountain fastness, as the butterfly catcher +with the proverbial blue goggles does in the capture of a new kind of +butterfly. The Executive Secretary’s report, out of deference to +the professor, omits no single achievement of his with reference to his +anthropological hobby. It treats, with an enthusiasm that would delight +Mrs. Jellyby herself, of “the progress that was made during the +fiscal year in the work of civilizing non-Christian tribes +<i>scattered</i> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb544" href="#pb544" +name="pb544">544</a>]</span>throughout the archipelago.” It gives +an alphabetical list of all the provinces where there are non-Christian +tribes, and, under the name of each province it gives notes as to the +progress during the year with those tribes. <i>Neither Samar nor Leyte +appear in that list of provinces.</i> So that the Samar +“Pulajans,” or “Red Breeches” +fellows,—“fanatical” Pulajans, they are called in the +certificate—were “non-Christian tribes” for peace +certificate purposes only. One thing which makes it most difficult of +all for me to understand how these gentlemen got their consent to sign +that certificate is that each non-Christian tribe in the Philippines +has a language of its own, whereas the country people of the uplands +and mountains of Samar and Leyte who are labelled—or +libelled—“non-Christian tribes” in the certificate of +1907, were no more different from the rest of the population of those +islands than, for instance, the ignorant mountain people of Virginia or +Kentucky are different, ethnologically, from the inhabitants of +Richmond or Louisville. In his report for 1908,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12375src" href="#xd20e12375" name="xd20e12375src">17</a> +Governor-General Smith himself makes this perfectly clear, where he +describes the Samar Pulajan, or mountaineer, thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The Pulajan is not a robber or a thief by +nature—quite the contrary. He is hard working, industrious, and +even frugal. He had his little <i>late</i><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12386src" href="#xd20e12386" name="xd20e12386src">18</a> of hemp +on the side of the mountain, and breaking out his <i>picul</i><a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e12394src" href="#xd20e12394" name= +"xd20e12394src">19</a> of hemp, he carried it hank by hank for miles +and miles over almost impassable mountain trails to the nearest town or +barrio. There he offered it for sale, and if he refused the price +tendered, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb545" href="#pb545" name= +"pb545">545</a>]</span>which was generally not more than half the +value, he soon found himself arrested on a trumped-up charge, and +unless he compromised by parting with his hemp he found himself, after +paying his fine and lawyer’s fees, without either hemp or +money.</p> +</div> +<p>The non-Christian tribes, on the other hand, never have anything to +do with the civilized people. The Act of Congress of 1902, therefore, +had no sort of reference to the simple, ignorant, and ordinarily docile +mountain folk who tilled the soil, revered the priests, paid their +<i>cedula</i> or head tax like all the rest of the population of the +Islands, and carried their agricultural products from season to season, +their hemp and the like, to the coast towns to market. In other words, +inclusion of the Samar “Pulajans,” or “Red +Breeches” brigade, and the Leyte bandits, in the peace +certificate of 1907, as “non-Christian tribes” was an +afterthought, having no foundation either in logic or fact. It was a +part of Benevolent Assimilation. This is clearly apparent from +President Roosevelt’s message to Congress of December, +1905.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12411src" href="#xd20e12411" name= +"xd20e12411src">20</a> You do not find any buncombe about +“non-Christian tribes” in that message. In there reviewing +the Samar and other insurrections of 1905 in the Philippines, you find +him dealing with the real root of the evil with perfect honesty, though +adopting the view that <i>the Filipino people</i> were to blame +therefor, because <i>we</i> had placed too much power in the hands of +an ignorant electorate, which had elected rascally officials. +“Cavite and Samar,” he says, “are instances of +reposing too much confidence in the self-governing power of a +people.” If we had let the Filipinos go ahead with their little +republic in 1898, instead of destroying it as we did, they knew and +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb546" href="#pb546" name= +"pb546">546</a>]</span>would have utilized the true elements of +strength they had, viz., a very considerable body of educated, +patriotic men having the loyal confidence of the masses of the people. +But we proceeded to ram down their throats a preconceived theory that +<i>the only</i> road to self-government was for an alien people to step +in and make the ignorant masses the <i>sine qua non</i>. Yet if there +was one point on which Mr. McKinley had laid more stress than on any +other, in his original instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Taft +Commission, that point was the one consecrated in the following +language of those instructions:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">In all the forms of government and administrative +provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the commission +should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is +designed <i>not for * * * the expression of our theoretical +views</i>, etc.</p> +</div> +<p>Of course the ignorant electorate we perpetrated on Samar as an +“expression of our theoretical views” proved that we had +“gone too fast” in conferring self-government, or, to quote +Mr. Roosevelt, had been “reposing too much confidence in the +self-governing power of a people,” if to begin with the rankest +material for constructing a government that there was at hand was to +offer a fair test of capacity for self-government. But President +Roosevelt’s message, above quoted, shows you that the +“ignorant electorate” was merely an ignorant electorate, +and not a non-Christian tribe, as the Philippine Commission later had +the temerity to certify they were. Now the plain, unvarnished, +benevolent truth is just this: The Commission knew that nobody in the +United States, whether they were <i>for</i> retaining the Islands or +<i>against</i> retaining them, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb547" +href="#pb547" name="pb547">547</a>]</span>had any desire to postpone +granting a legislature to the Philippine people. So in their +certificate they simply included everybody who had given trouble in +Samar and Leyte as “non-Christian tribes.” The only +justification for this was that they had in fact acted in a most +un-Christianlike manner,—<i>i.e.</i>, for people who devotedly +murmur prayers to patron saints in good standing in the church +calendar. In making their certificate, the Commission simply ignored +the various uprisings of the preceding two years. They simply said, +generously, “Oh, forget it.” They knew nobody in the United +States begrudged the Filipinos their conditionally promised +legislature, or cared to postpone it. The leading Filipinos begged the +authorities to “forget” the various disturbances that had +occurred since the publication of the census, and there was a very +general desire in the Islands to let bygones be bygones, wipe the +slate, and begin again. Any other attitude would have meant that the +legislature would have to be postponed. Then the opposition in the +United States would want to know why, and by 1908 Philippine +independence might become an issue again. In the eyes of the +Commission, the end, being benevolent, justified stretching the +language of the Act of 1902 as if it had been the blessed veil of +charity itself—<i>i.e.</i>, the end justified the means. In fact +it <i>did</i>—almost—justify the means. But not quite. The +moral quality of the Great Certificate of 1907 was not as reprehensible +as General Anderson’s dealings with Aguinaldo, already described, +which, like the certificate, were a necessary part of the benevolent +hypocrisy of Benevolent Assimilation of an unconsenting people. Yet +General Anderson is an honorable man. It was not as bad as General +Greene’s juggling Aguinaldo out of his trenches before Manila in +a friendly way, and <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb548" href="#pb548" +name="pb548">548</a>]</span>failing to give him a receipt for said +trenches, as he had promised to do, because such a receipt would show +co-operation and “might look too much like an alliance.” +This also was done on the idea that the end justified the means. Yet +General Greene is an honorable man. The signers of the great peace +certificate of 1907 are all honorable men. But they signed that +certificate, just the same. “Judge not that ye be not +judged.” All I have to say is, I would not have signed that +certificate. I would have said: “No, gentlemen, the end does +<i>not</i> justify the means. The Philippine Assembly must be +postponed, if we are going to deal frankly with Congress and the folks +at home. The conditions Congress made precedent to the grant of an +assembly have <i>not</i> been met, and we each and all of us know it. +We owe more to our own country and to truth than we do to the +Filipinos. The Act of Congress of 1902 did not vest in the Philippine +Commission authority to pardon disturbances of public order. It imposed +upon the Commission an implied duty to report such disturbances, fully +and frankly. It is not true that there has been a continuing state of +general and complete peace in these Islands for the last two years, and +I for one will not certify that there has been.”</p> +<p>The truth is, the attitude of the signers of the certificate was +like that of Uncle Remus, when interrupted by the little boy in one of +his stories. When Uncle Remus gets to the point in the rabbit story +where the rabbit thrillingly escapes from the jaws of death, +<i>i.e.</i>, from the jaws of the dogs, by climbing a tree, the rapt +listener interrupts: “Why, Uncle Remus, a rabbit can’t +climb a tree.” To which Uncle Remus replies, with a reassuring +wave of the hand, “Oh, but Honey, <i>dis</i> rabbit dess +<i>’bleeged</i> ter climb <i>dis</i> tree.”</p> +<p>Should any of my good friends still in the Philippines <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb549" href="#pb549" name="pb549">549</a>]</span>feel +disposed to censure such levity as the above, I can only say, as +Kipling writes from England to his Anglo-Indian friends in a foreword +to one of his books:</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">I have told these tales of our life</p> +<p class="line xd20e12488">For a sheltered people’s mirth,</p> +<p class="line">In jesting guise,—but ye are wise,</p> +<p class="line xd20e12488">And ye know what the jest is worth.</p> +</div> +<p class="first">Moreover, my authority to speak frankly about these +matters is also aptly stated by the same great poet thus:</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<div class="lg"> +<p class="line">I have eaten your bread and salt,</p> +<p class="line xd20e12488">I have drunk your water and wine,</p> +<p class="line">The deaths ye died I have watched beside</p> +<p class="line xd20e12488">And the lives that ye led were mine.</p> +</div> +<div class="lg"> +<p class="line">Was there aught that I did not share</p> +<p class="line xd20e12488">In vigil or toil or ease,</p> +<p class="line">One joy or woe that I did not know,</p> +<p class="line xd20e12488">Dear friends across the seas?</p> +</div> +</div> +<p class="first">The above reflections are not placed before the reader +to show him what a pity it is that the writer was not a member of the +Philippine Commission at the time of their certificate of 1907, or to +show what a fine thing for our common country it would be if he were +made a member of that Commission now. He is, personally, as +disinterested as if Manila were in the moon, for he cannot live in the +tropics any more. The effect of a year or so of residence there upon +white men invalided home for tropical dysentery and then returning to +the Islands is like the effect of water upon a starched shirt. However, +it is believed that the facts of official record collected in this +chapter up to this point are a <i>demonstration</i> of this +proposition, to wit: <i>What the Philippine Government needs more than +anything else is that <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb550" href= +"#pb550" name="pb550">550</a>]</span>the minority party in the United +States should be represented on the Commission</i>. By this I do not +mean representation by what are called, under Republican +Administrations, “White House” Democrats, nor what under a +Democratic Administration, if one should ever occur, would probably be +called “Copperhead Republicans.” I mean the genuine +article. A Democrat who has cast his fortunes with the Philippines is +no longer a Democrat relatively to the Philippines, because the +Democratic party wants to get rid of the Philippines and the Democrat +in the Philippines of course does not. How absurd it is to talk about +former Governors Wright and Smith, as “life-long +Democrats,” by way of preliminary to using their opinions as +“admissions.” In the law of evidence, an +“admission” is a statement made against the interest of the +party making it.</p> +<p>The first election for representatives in the Philippine Assembly +was held on July 30, 1907, and on October 16th thereafter the Assembly +was formally opened by Secretary of War, William H. Taft. The various +“whereases” hereinabove reviewed, importing complete +acquiescence in American rule since President Roosevelt’s +Proclamation of July 4, 1902, were first duly read, and then the +Assembly was opened. Of course, no man could have been elected to the +Assembly without at least pretending to be in favor of independence, +and all but a corporal’s guard of them were outspoken in favor of +the proposition. As the present Governor-General Mr. Forbes, said, +while Vice-Governor, in the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> for February, +1909:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">To deny the capacity of one’s country for +* * * self-government is essentially unpopular.</p> +</div> +<p>When he visited the Philippines to open their Assembly in 1907, Mr. +Taft had said nothing definite and final <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb551" href="#pb551" name="pb551">551</a>]</span>on the question of +promising <span class="corr" id="xd20e12539" title= +"Source: in dependence">independence</span> since his departure from +the Islands in 1903. His then benevolent unwillingness to tell them +frankly he did not think they had sense enough to run a government of +their own, and that they were unfit for self-government, has already +been reviewed. For two years after 1903 Governor Wright had made them +pine for the return of Mr. Taft. They longed to hear again some of the +siren notes of the celebrated speech “the Philippines for the +Filipinos.” They had gotten very excited and very happy over that +speech. Of course they would not have gotten very excited over +independence supposed to be coming long after they should be dead and +buried. During the two dark frank years of Governor Wright’s +<i>régime</i>, they had frequently been told that they were not +fit for independence. So that when Secretary of War Taft had visited +the Islands in 1905 they all had been on the <i>qui vive</i> for more +statements vaguely implying an independence they might hope to live to +see. During the visit of 1905 the time of the visiting Congressional +party was consumed principally with tariff hearings, and comparatively +little was said on the subject uppermost in the minds of all Filipinos. +It is true that Mr. Taft said then <i>he</i> was of the opinion that it +would take a generation or longer to get the country ready for +self-government, but he said it in a tactful, kindly way, and did not +forever crush their hopes. So when he went out to the Islands to open +the assembly in 1907, the attitude of the whole people in expectation +of some definite utterances on the question of a definite +<i>promise</i> of independence at <i>some</i> future time, was just the +attitude of an audience in a theatre as to which one affirms “you +could hear a pin fall.” In this regard Mr. Taft’s +utterances were as follows<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12558src" href= +"#xd20e12558" name="xd20e12558src">21</a>: <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb552" href="#pb552" name="pb552">552</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I am aware that in view of the issues discussed at the +election of this assembly I am expected to say something regarding the +policy of the United States toward these islands. I cannot speak with +the authority of one who may control that policy. The Philippine +Islands are territory belonging to the United States, and by the +Constitution, the branch of that government vested with the power and +charged with the duty of making rules and regulations for their +government is Congress. The policy to be pursued with respect to them +is therefore ultimately for Congress to determine. * * * I +have no authority to speak for Congress in respect to the ultimate +disposition of the Islands.</p> +</div> +<p>After that there was some talk about “mutually beneficial +trade relations” and “improvement of the people both +industrially and in self-governing capacity.” But with regard to +the “process of political preparation of the Filipino +people” for self-government the Secretary said that was a +question no one could certainly answer; and so far as he was concerned +he thought it would take “considerable longer than a +generation.” Somewhere in the early Philippine State papers there +is a quotation used by Mr. Taft from Shakespeare about “Keeping +the word of promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope.” The +Filipinos have eagerly read for the last twelve years every utterance +of Mr. Taft’s that they could get hold of. If any of those +embryonic statesmen of the first Philippine Assembly, familiar with the +various Taft utterances, had looked up the context of the Shakespearian +quotation above alluded to, he would have found it to be as +follows:</p> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">And be these juggling fiends no more +believ’d,</p> +<p class="line">That palter with us in a double sense:</p> +<p class="line">That keep the word of promise to our ear</p> +<p class="line">And break it to our hope.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12580src" href="#xd20e12580" name="xd20e12580src">22</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb553" href="#pb553" name= +"pb553">553</a>]</span></p> +<p>Since the announcement by Secretary of War Taft at the opening of +the Philippine Assembly in October, 1907, of the policy of indefinite +retention of the Islands with undeclared intention, the Filipinos have +of course clearly understood that if they were ever to have +independence they must look to Congress for it. But they know Congress +is not interested in them and that they have no influence with it, and +that the Hemp Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Sugar Trust, have. So +that since 1907, both the American authorities in the Philippines and +the Filipinos have settled down, the former suffused with +benevolence—hardened however by paternalistic firmness, the +latter stoically, to the programme of indefinite retention with +undeclared intention. No conceivable programme could be devised more +ingeniously calculated to engender race hatred. The Filipino newspapers +call the present policy one of “permanent administration for +inferior and incapable races.” The Act of Congress of July 1, +1902, known as the Philippine Government Act, which is the +“Constitution,” so to speak, we have given the Filipinos, +accords “liberty of the press” in the exact language of our +own Constitution. The native press does not fail to use this liberty to +the limit. Naturally the American press does not remain silent. So here +are a pair of bellows ever fanning the charcoals of discontent. And the +masses of the Filipino people read the Filipino papers. If they cannot +read, their children can. In one of the reports of one of the American +constabulary officials in the Philippines, there is an account of the +influence of the native press too graphic to be otherwise than +accurate. He says one can often see, in the country districts, a group +of natives gathered about some village Hampden, listening to his +reading the latest diatribe against the American Occupation. Never was +there <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb554" href="#pb554" name= +"pb554">554</a>]</span>such folly in the annals of statesmanship. In +their native papers, the race situation of course comes in for much +comment. Now the most notorious and inflexible fact of that race +situation is that the colonial Anglo-Saxon does not intermarry with +“the yellow and brown” subject people, as the Latin +colonizing races do. It would be an over-statement of the case to say +that the Filipinos to-day had rather have the Spaniards back as their +overlords instead of us. In 1898, they “tasted the sweets of +liberty,” to use an expression of one of their leaders, and I am +perfectly sure that to-day the desire of all those people for a +government of their own is so genuine and universal as that it amounts +to a very hopeful positive factor in the equation of their capacity for +self-government. But there is no doubt that many of the Filipinos after +all have a very warm place in their hearts for the Spanish people. How +could it be otherwise when so many of the Filipinos are sons and +grandsons of Spaniards? Much of like and dislike in life’s +journey is determined pre-natally. On the other hand, the American +women in the Philippines maintain an attitude toward the natives quite +like that of their British sisters in Hong Kong toward the Chinese, and +in Calcutta toward the natives there. The social status of an American +woman who marries a native,—I myself have never heard of but one +case—is like that of a Pacific coast girl who marries a Jap. This +is merely the instinct of self-defence with which Nature provides the +weaker sex, just as she provides the porcupine with quills. But look at +the other side of the picture. When an American man marries a native +woman, he thereafter finds himself more in touch with his native +“in-laws” it is true, but correspondingly, and ever +increasingly, out of touch with his former associations. This is not as +it should be. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb555" href="#pb555" name= +"pb555">555</a>]</span>But it is a most unpleasant and inexorable fact +of the present situation. In an address delivered at the Quill Club in +Manila on January 25, 1909, Governor Smith, after reciting the various +beneficent designs contemplated by the government and the various +public works consummated (at the expense of the people of the Islands) +deplored, in spite of it all, what he termed “the growing gulf +between the races.” Said he:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">An era of ill feeling has started between Americans +and Filipinos, and, I hesitate to say it, race hatred.</p> +</div> +<p><i>Cherchez la femme!</i> You find her, on the one hand, in the +American woman whose attitude has been indicated, and you find her, on +the other, in the refined and virtuous native woman, who finds her +American husband’s relations to his compatriots +altered—queered—since his marriage to her, no matter how +faithful a wife and mother she may be. This is the unspeakably cruel +situation we have forced upon the Filipino people—whom I really +learned to respect, and became much attached to, before I left the +Islands—<i>and President Taft knows it as well as I do</i>. Yet +he does not take the American people into his confidence. He simply +worries along with the situation, wishing it would get better, but +knowing it will get worse. That this situation is a permanent one is +clearly shown by all the previous teachings of racial history. In his +<i>Winning of the West</i>, written in 1889, speaking of the French +settlers in the Ohio valley before 1776, and the cordial social +relations of the dominant race with the natives—relations which +have always obtained with all Latin races under like +circumstances—Mr. Roosevelt says (vol. i., page 41): <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb556" href="#pb556" name="pb556">556</a>]</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">They were not trammelled by the queer pride which +makes a man of English stock unwilling to make a red-skinned woman his +wife, though anxious enough to make her his concubine.</p> +</div> +<p>Men of English stock have changed but little in the matter of race +instinct since 1776. If we had a definite policy, declared by Congress, +promising independence, the American attitude in the Philippines toward +the Filipinos would at once change, from the present impossible one, to +our ordinary natural attitude of courtesy toward all foreigners, +regardless of their color.</p> +<p>On May 7, 1909, the Honorable James F. Smith took his departure from +the Philippine Islands forever and turned over the duties of his office +to the Honorable W. Cameron Forbes, as Acting President of the +Commission and Governor-General. As in the case of Governors Wright and +Ide, so in that of Governor Smith, no reason is apparent why the +Washington Government should have been willing to dispense with the +services of the incumbent. This was peculiarly true in the case of +General Smith. He was but fifty years of age when he left the Islands +in 1909. He has rendered more different kinds of distinguished public +service than any American who has ever been in the Philippine Islands +from the time Dewey’s guns first thundered out over Manila Bay +down to this good hour. Going out with the first expedition in 1898 as +Colonel of the 1st California Regiment, he distinguished himself on +more than one battlefield in the early fighting and in recognition +thereof was made a brigadier-general. Subsequent to this he became +Military Governor of the island of Negros, that one of the six +principal Visayan Islands which gave less trouble during the +insurrection and after than any other—a <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb557" href="#pb557" name= +"pb557">557</a>]</span>circumstance doubtless not wholly unrelated to +General Smith’s wise and tactful administration there. Later on +during the military <i>régime</i> he became Collector of Customs +of the archipelago. The revenues from customs are the principal source +of revenue of the Philippine Government and the sums of money handled +are enormous. The customs service, moreover, in most countries, and +especially in the Philippines, is more subject to the creeping in of +graft than any other. General Smith’s administration of this post +was in keeping with everything else he did in the Islands. When the +civil government was founded by Judge Taft in 1901, he was appointed +one of the Justices of the Supreme Court and filled the duties of that +office most creditably. Thence he was promoted to the Philippine +Commission, which is, virtually, the cabinet of the Governor-General. +Still later he became Vice-Governor, and finally Governor, serving as +such from September, 1906, to May, 1909. Any other government on earth +that has over-seas colonies and recognizes the supreme importance of a +maximum of continuity of policy, would have kept Governor Smith as long +as it could have possibly induced him to stay, just as the British kept +Lord Cromer in Egypt. Governor Smith was succeeded by a young man from +Boston, who had come out to the Islands four years before, and who, +prior to that time, had never had any public service in the United +States of any kind, had never been in the Philippine Islands, and +probably had never seen a Filipino until he landed at Manila.</p> +<p>General Smith is now (1912) one of the Judges of the Court of +Customs Appeals at Washington. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb558" +href="#pb558" name="pb558">558</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12022" href="#xd20e12022src" name="xd20e12022">1</a></span> Pt. +1, p. 36.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12077" href="#xd20e12077src" name="xd20e12077">2</a></span> +<i>Report of Taft Philippine Commission for 1900</i>, p. 17.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12095" href="#xd20e12095src" name="xd20e12095">3</a></span> See +<i>Report of U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 229.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12125" href="#xd20e12125src" name="xd20e12125">4</a></span> +<i>Amigo</i>, in Spanish, means friend. Every non-combatant Filipino +with whom our people came in contact in the early days always claimed +to be an “amigo,” and never was, in any single +instance.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12134" href="#xd20e12134src" name="xd20e12134">5</a></span> See +testimony of General MacArthur before the Senate Committee of 1902, +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 1942.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12142" href="#xd20e12142src" name="xd20e12142">6</a></span> The +adverse minority report on the pending Jones bill, which bill proposes +ultimate Philippine independence in 1921, is full of the old +insufferable drivel about “tribes,” and of the rest of the +Root views of 1900.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12167" href="#xd20e12167src" name="xd20e12167">7</a></span> See +<i>Report of U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 211.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12189" href="#xd20e12189src" name="xd20e12189">8</a></span> Part +1, p. 38.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12207" href="#xd20e12207src" name="xd20e12207">9</a></span> +<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 37.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12263" href="#xd20e12263src" name="xd20e12263">10</a></span> See +President McKinley’s annual message to Congress of December, +1899, <i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1899, p. 34.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12273" href="#xd20e12273src" name="xd20e12273">11</a></span> +Provinces totalling about a million people.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12287" href="#xd20e12287src" name="xd20e12287">12</a></span> +<i>Report of U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 1, p. 211.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12305" href="#xd20e12305src" name="xd20e12305">13</a></span> +<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 38.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12313" href="#xd20e12313src" name="xd20e12313">14</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i>, 1906; pt. 1, p. 225.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12346" href="#xd20e12346src" name="xd20e12346">15</a></span> To +be absolutely accurate, there are 688 people classified as +“wild” in the Census figures as to Samar, and 265,549 are +put down as civilized; the total of population being 266,237. +<i>All</i> the 388,922 people of Leyte are put down as civilized. See +<i>Philippine Census</i>, Table of Population, vol. ii., p. 123.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12361" href="#xd20e12361src" name="xd20e12361">16</a></span> +<i>Report of Philippine Commission for 1907</i>, pt. 1, p. 195.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12375" href="#xd20e12375src" name="xd20e12375">17</a></span> See +<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1908, pt. 1, p. 62.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12386" href="#xd20e12386src" name="xd20e12386">18</a></span> +Tract. You speak of the small farmer’s “<i>late</i> of +hemp” in the Philippines as you do of his “patch of +cotton” in the United States.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12394" href="#xd20e12394src" name="xd20e12394">19</a></span> A +<i>picul</i> is a bale of a given quantity—weight. +“Breaking out a <i>picul</i> of hemp” is analogous, +colloquially, to “picking a bale of cotton.”</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12411" href="#xd20e12411src" name="xd20e12411">20</a></span> See +<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1905, p. 103.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12558" href="#xd20e12558src" name="xd20e12558">21</a></span> See +<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 215.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12580" href="#xd20e12580src" name="xd20e12580">22</a></span> +<i>Macbeth</i>, Act V., Sc. 8.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch22" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XXII</h2> +<h2 class="main">Governor Forbes—1909–1912</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">The trouble with this country to-day is that, under +long domination by the protected interests, a partnership has grown up +between them and the Government which the best men in the Republican +party could not break up if they would.—<span class="sc">Woodrow +Wilson.</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">When Governor Forbes assumed the duties of +Governor-General of the Philippines, some ten years after the +ratification of the Treaty of Paris whereby we bought the Islands, he +was the ninth supreme representative of American authority we had had +there since the American occupation began. The following is the +list:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>(1) Gen.</td> +<td>Thomas M. Anderson</td> +<td>June 30, 1898–July 25, 1898</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>(2) Gen.</td> +<td>Wesley Merritt</td> +<td>July 25, 1898–Aug. 29, 1898</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>(3) Gen.</td> +<td>Elwell S. Otis</td> +<td>Aug. 29, 1898–May 5, 1900</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>(4) Gen.</td> +<td>Arthur MacArthur</td> +<td>May 5, 1900–July 4, 1901</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>(5) Hon.</td> +<td>William H. Taft</td> +<td>July 4, 1901–Dec. 23, 1903</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>(6) Hon.</td> +<td>Luke E. Wright</td> +<td>Dec. 23, 1903–Nov. 4, 1905</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>(7) Hon.</td> +<td>Henry C. Ide</td> +<td>Nov. 4, 1905–Sept. 20, 1906</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>(8) Hon.</td> +<td>James F. Smith</td> +<td>Sept. 20, 1906–May 7, 1909</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>(9) Hon.</td> +<td>W. Cameron Forbes</td> +<td>May 7, 1909–<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12719src" href= +"#xd20e12719" name="xd20e12719src">1</a></td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>No one of these distinguished gentlemen has ever had any authority +to tell the Filipinos what we expect ultimately to do with them. They +have not known themselves. Is not this distinctly unfair both to +governors and governed? <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb559" href= +"#pb559" name="pb559">559</a>]</span></p> +<p>Before Governor Forbes went to the Philippines he had been a largely +successful business man. He is a man of the very highest personal +character, and an indefatigable worker. He has done as well as the +conditions of the problem permit. But he is always between Scylla and +Charybdis. American capital in or contemplating investment in the +Islands is continually pressing to be permitted to go ahead and develop +the resources of the Islands. To keep the Islands from being exploited +Congress early limited grants of land to a maximum too small to attract +capital. So those who desire to build up the country, knowing they +cannot get the law changed, are forever seeking to invent ways to get +around the law. And, being firm in the orthodox Administration belief +that discussion of ultimate independence is purely academic, +<i>i.e.</i>, a matter of no concern to anybody now living, Governor +Forbes is of course in sympathy with Americans who wish to develop the +resources of the Islands. On the other hand, he knows that such a +course will daily and hourly make ultimate independence more certain +never to come. So do the Filipinos know this. Therefore they clamor +ever louder and louder against all American attempts to repeal the +anti-exploiting Acts of Congress by “liberal” +interpretation. Many an American just here is sure to ask himself, +“Why all this ‘clamor’? Do we not give them good +government? What just ground have they for complaint?” Yes, we do +give them very good government, so far as the Manila end of the +business is concerned, except that it is a far more expensive +government than any people on the earth would be willing to impose on +themselves. But their main staples are hemp, sugar, and tobacco, and we +raise the last two in this country. Their sugar and tobacco were +allowed free entry into the United <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb560" +href="#pb560" name="pb560">560</a>]</span>States by the Paine Law of +1909 up to amounts limited in the law, but the Philippine people know +very well that American sugar and tobacco interests will either dwarf +the growth of their sugar and tobacco industries by refusing to allow +the limit raised—the limit of amounts admitted free of +duty—or else that our Sugar Trust and our Tobacco Trust will +simply ultimately eliminate them by absorption, just as the Standard +Oil Company used to do with small competitors. In this sort of prospect +certainly even the dullest intellect must recognize just ground for +fearing—nay for <i>plainly foreseeing</i>—practical +industrial slavery through control by foreign<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12735src" href="#xd20e12735" name="xd20e12735src">2</a> +corporations of economic conditions. So much for the two staples in +which the Philippines may some day become competitors of ours. It took +Mr. Taft nine years to persuade American sugar and tobacco that they +would not be in any immediate danger by letting in a little Philippine +sugar and tobacco free of duty. Then they consented. Not until then did +they promise not to shout “Down with cheap Asiatic labor. We will +not consent to compete with it.” Their mental reservation was, of +course, and is, “if the Philippine sugar and tobacco industries +get too prosperous, we will either buy them, or cripple them by +defeating their next attempt to get legislation increasing the amounts +of Philippine sugar and tobacco admitted into the United States free of +duty.” And the Filipinos <i>know</i> that this is the fate that +awaits two out of the three main sources of the wealth of their +country. Their third source of wealth, their main staple, is the +world-famous Manila hemp. This represents more than half the value of +their total annual exports. And as to it, “practical industrial +slavery through control by foreign corporations of economic +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb561" href="#pb561" name= +"pb561">561</a>]</span>conditions” is to-day not a <i>fear</i>, +but a <i>fact</i>. The International Harvester Company has its agents +at Manila. The said company or allied interests, or both, are large +importers of Manila hemp. The reports of all the governors-general of +the Philippines who have preceded Governor Forbes tell, year after +year, of the millions “handed over” to American hemp +importers through “the hemp joker” of the Act of Congress +of 1902, hereinafter explained, in the chapter on Congressional +Legislation (<a href="#ch26">Chapter XXVI</a>.). Why did these +complaints—made with annual regularity up to Governor +Forbes’s accession—cease thereafter? You will find these +complaints of his predecessors <i>transcribed</i> in the chapter +mentioned, because if I had re-stated them you might suspect +exaggeration. The “rake-off” of the American importers of +Manila hemp for 1910 was nearly $750,000, as fully explained in +<a href="#ch26">Chapter XXVI</a>.</p> +<p>Governor Forbes will be in this country when this book is issued. I +think he owes it to the American people to explain why he does not +continue the efforts of his predecessors to halt the depredations of +the Hemp Trust. Why does he content himself in his last annual report +with a mild allusion to the fact that the condition of the hemp +industry is “not satisfactory”? I have said that Governor +Forbes is a man of high character, and take pleasure in repeating that +statement in this connection. The truth is we are running a political +kindergarten for adults in the Philippines, and those responsible for +the original blunder of taking them, and all their political heirs and +assigns since, have sought to evade admitting and setting to work to +rectify the blunder. Unmasked, this is what the policy of Benevolent +Assimilation now is. They allege an end, and so justify all the ways +and means. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb562" href="#pb562" name= +"pb562">562</a>]</span>Benevolent Assimilation needs the support of the +International Harvester Company and of all other Big Business +interested directly or indirectly in Manila hemp. The end justifies the +means. Hence the silence. Philippine gubernatorial reticence is always +most reticent about that particular subject on which at the time the +American people are most peculiarly entitled to information. As long as +public order was the most pressing question, Philippine gubernatorial +reticence selected that branch of our colonial problem either for +especial silence or for superlatively casual allusion, as we have +already seen. So now with the economic distresses. Frankness would +obviously furnish too much good argument for winding up this Oriental +receivership of ours. The Philippine Government will never tell its +main current troubles until after they are over. But as the present +trouble—the economic depredations of powerful special +interests—must necessarily be fruitful of discontent which will +crop out some day to remind us that as we sow so shall we reap, any one +who helps expose the root of the trouble is doing a public service. No +Congressman who in silence would permit Big Business to prey upon his +constituents as Governor Forbes has, could long remain in office. +Taxation without representation may amount to depredation, and yet +never be corrected, when the powers that prey have the ear of the +court, and the victims cannot get the ear of the American people. So +the Hemp Trust continues to rob the Filipinos under the forms of law, +and the Mohonk Conference continues to kiss Benevolent Assimilation on +both cheeks. And Dr. Lyman Abbott periodically says Amen. I am not +speaking disrespectfully of Dr. Abbott. I am deploring the lack of +information of our people at home as to conditions in the Philippines. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb563" href="#pb563" name= +"pb563">563</a>]</span></p> +<p>It is a relief to turn from such matters to some of the real +substantial good we have done out there to which Governor Forbes has +heretofore publicly pointed with just pride. In an article in the +<i>Atlantic Monthly</i> for February, 1909, Governor Forbes (then +Vice-Governor) said, among other things:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We have completed the separation of Church and State, +buying out from the religious orders their large agricultural +properties, which are now administered by the government for the +benefit of the tenants.</p> +</div> +<p>This statement I cannot too cordially endorse. It would be grossly +unfair not to accord full measure of acclaim to Governor Taft for the +way he worked out the problem of the Friar Lands. He has been attacked +in some quarters in this regard, and most unjustly. Not being a +Catholic, and all my people being Protestants, I have no fear of being +suspected of special pleading in the matter. The working out of the +Friar Land problem by Governor Taft in the Philippines was a splendid +piece of constructive statesmanship. He was at his greatest and best in +that very transaction. The Treaty of Paris had guaranteed that all +vested rights should be respected, including those of ecclesiastical +bodies. The friars had long owned the lands in question. There can be +no particle of doubt on this point. The tenants on the land had all +long ago attorned to them, father and son, from time out of mind, +paying rent regularly. But by claiming jurisdiction over their +tenants’ souls also, and getting that jurisdiction effectively +recognized, the thrifty friars used to raise the rent regularly, +quieting incipient protest with threats of eternal punishment, or +protracted stay in purgatory. The advent of our government let loose a +revolt against the authority of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb564" href="#pb564" name="pb564">564</a>]</span>friars generally, +and, their spiritual hold once loosened, this led the tenants to +dispute the land titles of their spiritual shepherds, who were also +their temporal landlords. Of course the titles had all been long +recorded, and looked after by the best legal talent the country +afforded. As long as you control the future of your tenant’s +soul, you can make him pay his last copeck for rent. But as soon as +that control is lost, the man on whom the governing of the country +thereafter devolves has a certain prospect of a great agrarian +revolution on his hands, having in it many elements of substantial +righteousness. Governor Taft’s capacious mind, prompted by his +strongest instinct, love of justice, conceived the idea of having the +Philippine Government raise the money to buy the Friar Lands, by +issuing bonds, and then buying the Friars out and re-selling the land +to the tenants on long time, on the instalment plan, the instalments to +be so graduated as to be equal to a moderate rental. Each tenant stayed +right where he had been all the time, in possession of the tract he had +always tilled, he and his father before him. To arrange all this it +took an Act of Congress authorizing the bond issue, and a visit to Rome +to arrange the bargain with the Pope. Some say His Holiness drove a +hard bargain with Governor Taft, or to put it another way, that +Governor Taft paid the Church people too much for the land. He did not. +He may not have counted pennies with them, but the lands were worth +what he paid for them. And the purchase protected the faith and honor +of our government, as pledged by the Treaty of Paris, and at the same +time prevented an agrarian revolution—which would have had a lot +of elemental justice on its side.</p> +<p>Another of the good works we have done in the Philippines, to which +Governor Forbes points in his <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb565" +href="#pb565" name="pb565">565</a>]</span>magazine article above +mentioned, is thus noted by him:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We have put the finances on a sound and sensible +basis.</p> +</div> +<p>To this also I say Amen. The Forbes article then goes on to say that +the government of the Islands is self-supporting. This is true, except +the $14,000,000 a year it costs us to keep out there a garrison of +12,000 American troops (supplemented by certain native scouts—see +chapter on “Cost of the Philippines,” hereafter). This +garrison is conceded to be a mere handful, sufficient merely, and +intended merely—as a witty English woman has put it in a book on +the Philippines—“to knock the Filipino on the head in case +he wants his liberty before the Americans think he is fit for +it.” In other words, we only attempt to keep force enough there +to quell any outbreak that might occur. So far as possible invasion by +any foreign power is concerned, our $14,000,000 per annum is an +absolutely dead loss. Brigadier-General Clarence Edwards, U. S. A., +commanding the Bureau of Insular Affairs, said recently<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e12790src" href="#xd20e12790" name= +"xd20e12790src">3</a> before the Finance Committee of the Senate:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I would never think of the Philippines as a military +problem for defence. If any nation wants them, it is merely a +declaration of war.</p> +</div> +<p>What a shameful admission for a great nation to subscribe to, +relatively to people it pretends to be protecting! The programme of the +War Department is to abandon the Islands to their fate, for the time +being at least, in our next war, letting them remain a football until +the end of such war, when, as an independent republic they could, and +would, rally as one man to the defence of their country against +invasion, and <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb566" href="#pb566" name= +"pb566">566</a>]</span>would, with a little help from us, make life +unbearable for an invading force. As things stand, we are just as +impotent as Spain was out there in 1898, and it is utter folly to +forget what happened then.</p> +<p>But to return to Governor Forbes’s article and to a pleasanter +feature of the situation. He says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We have established schools throughout the +archipelago, teaching upward of half a million children.</p> +</div> +<p>This also is true, and greatly to our credit. But as the American +hemp trust mulcts the Philippine hemp output about a half million +dollars a year (as above suggested, and later, in another chapter, more +fully explained), it follows that each Filipino child pays the hemp +trust a dollar a year for the privilege of going to school.</p> +<p>And now let us consider the most supremely important part of +Governor Forbes’s magazine article above quoted. The burden of +the song of the adverse minority report on the pending Jones bill +(looking to Philippine independence in 1921)<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12815src" href="#xd20e12815" name="xd20e12815src">4</a> is that +because there are certain “wild tribes” scattered +throughout the archipelago, in the mountain fastnesses, therefore we +should cling to the present policy of indefinite retention with +undeclared intention until the wild tribes get civilized. Governor +Forbes’s article is an absolute, complete, and final answer to +the misinformed nonsense of the minority report aforesaid. He says, +apropos of public order:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It is now safe to travel everywhere throughout the +Islands without carrying a weapon, excepting only in some of the remote +parts of the mountains, where lurk bands of wild tribes who might +possibly mistake the object of a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb567" +href="#pb567" name="pb567">567</a>]</span>visit, and in the southern +part of the great island of Mindanao which is inhabited by intractable +Moros.</p> +</div> +<p>The foregoing unmasks, in all its contemptible falsehood, the +pretence that the presence of a few wild tribes in the Philippines is a +reason for withholding independence from 7,000,000 of Christian people +in order that a greedy little set of American importers of Manila hemp +may fatten thereon. True, hemp is not edible, but it is convertible +into edibles—and also into campaign funds. That the existence of +these wild tribes—the dog-eating Igorrotes and other savages you +saw exhibited at the St. Louis Exposition of +1903–4—constitute infinitely less reason for withholding +independence from the Filipinos than the American Indian constituted in +1776 for withholding independence from us, will be sufficiently +apparent from a glance at the following table, taken from the +<i>American Census of the Islands of 1903</i> (vol. ii., p. +123):<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12829src" href="#xd20e12829" name= +"xd20e12829src">5</a></p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td><i>Island</i></td> +<td><i>Civilized</i></td> +<td><i>Wild</i></td> +<td><i>Total</i></td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Luzon</td> +<td>3,575,001</td> +<td>223,506</td> +<td>3,798,507</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Panay</td> +<td>728,713</td> +<td>14,933</td> +<td>743,646</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cebu</td> +<td>592,247</td> +<td></td> +<td>592,247</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Bohol</td> +<td>243,148</td> +<td></td> +<td>243,148</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Negros</td> +<td>439,559</td> +<td>21,217</td> +<td>460,776</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Leyte</td> +<td>357,641</td> +<td></td> +<td>357,641</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Samar</td> +<td>222,002</td> +<td>688</td> +<td>222,690</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Mindanao</td> +<td>246,694</td> +<td>252,940</td> +<td>499,634</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>I think the above table makes clear the enormity of the injustice I +am now trying to crucify. Without stopping to use your pencil, you can +see that Mindanao, the island where the “intractable Moros” +Governor <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb568" href="#pb568" name= +"pb568">568</a>]</span>Forbes speaks of live, contains about a half +million people. Half of these are civilized Christians, and the other +half are the wild, crudely Mohammedan Moro tribes. Above Mindanao on +the above list, you behold what practically <i>is</i> the Philippine +archipelago (except Mindanao), viz., Luzon and the six main Visayan +Islands. If you will turn back to pages 225 <i>et seq.</i>, especially +to page 228, where the student of world politics was furnished with all +he needs or will ever care to know about the geography of the +Philippine Islands, you will there find all the rocks sticking out of +the water and all the little daubs you see on the map eliminated from +the equation as wholly unessential to a clear understanding of the +problem of governing the Islands. That process of elimination left us +Luzon and the six main Visayan Islands above, as constituting, for all +practical governmental purposes all the Philippine archipelago except +the Moro country, Mindanao (<i>i.e.</i>, parts of it), and its adjacent +islets; Luzon and the Visayan Islands contain nearly 7,000,000 of +people, and of these the wild tribes, as you can see by a glance at the +above table, constitute less than 300,000, sprinkled in the pockets of +their various mountain regions. Nearly all these 300,000 are quite +tame, peaceable, and tractable, except, as Governor Forbes suggests, +they “might possibly mistake the object of a visit.” The +half million “intractable Moros” of Mindanao, plus those in +the adjacent islets, make up another 300,000. These last, it is true, +will need policing for some time to come, but whether we do that +policing by retaining Mindanao, or whether we let the Filipinos do it, +is a detail that has no standing in court as a reason for continuing to +deny independence to the 7,000,000 of people of Luzon and the Visayan +Islands because they have some 300,000 backward people in the backwoods +of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb569" href="#pb569" name= +"pb569">569</a>]</span>their mountains. Yet see how the ingenuity of +inspired ignorance states the case, by adding the 300,000 tame tribes +of Luzon and the Visayas to the 300,000 fierce Moro savages away down +in Mindanao, near Borneo, so as to get 600,000 “wild” +people, and then alluding to the fact that so far only 200,000 +Filipinos are qualified to vote. Says the report of the minority of the +Committee on Insular Affairs on the pending Jones bill (proposing +independence in 1921):</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The wild and uncivilized inhabitants of the islands +outnumber, 3 to 1, those who would be qualified to vote under the +pending bill [the Jones bill].</p> +</div> +<p>You see the minority report is counting women and children, when it +talks about the wild tribes, but not when it talks about voters. +According to universally accepted general averages, among 7,500,000 +people you should find 1,500,000 adult males. No one doubts that of +these, by 1921, 500,000 will have become qualified voters. No one can +deny that any such country having 500,000 qualified voters, the bulk of +whom are good farmers, and the cream of whom are high-minded educated +gentlemen, and all of whom are intensely patriotic, will be in good +shape for promotion to independence. What wearies me about this whole +matter is that the minority report above mentioned is permitted to get +off such “rot,” and the <i>New York Times</i>, the <i>Army +and Navy Journal</i>, and others, to applaud it, while the +Administration sits by, silent, and reaps the benefit of such stale, +though not intentional, falsehoods, without attempting to correct them, +so that our people may get at the real merits of the question. You see +this silence inures to the benefit of the interests that have cornered +the Manila hemp industry. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb570" href= +"#pb570" name="pb570">570</a>]</span></p> +<p>In the campaign of 1912 for the Republican nomination for the +Presidency, there was much mutual recrimination between Colonel +Roosevelt and Mr. Taft about which of them had been kindest to the +International Harvester Company. It seems to me it is “up +to” Governor Forbes, who in the Philippines has served under the +present President and his predecessor also, to explain why he has +abandoned the fight, so long waged by previous governors-general, to +get what former Governor-General James F. Smith calls “the [hemp] +joker” of the Act of Congress of 1902 concerning the Philippines, +wiped from the statute books of this country. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb571" href="#pb571" name="pb571">571</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12719" href="#xd20e12719src" name="xd20e12719">1</a></span> In +June, 1912, Governor Forbes was still Governor-General.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12735" href="#xd20e12735src" name="xd20e12735">2</a></span> By +“foreign” I mean, of course, American, <i>i.e.</i>, +non-resident.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12790" href="#xd20e12790src" name="xd20e12790">3</a></span> +Hearings on Sugar, April 5, 1912.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12815" href="#xd20e12815src" name="xd20e12815">4</a></span> +Introduced in the House of Representatives by Hon. W. A. Jones, of Va., +Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs of the House, in March, +1912.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12829" href="#xd20e12829src" name="xd20e12829">5</a></span> See +also, in connection with this table, the folding map of the archipelago +at the end of the book.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch23" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XXIII</h2> +<h2 class="main">“Non-Christian” Worcester</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">The cry of remote distress is ever faintly heard.</p> +<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">Gibbon’s</span> <i>Decline +and Fall of the Roman Empire</i>.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">In the year 1911, the editor of one of the great +metropolitan papers told me that President Taft told him that the +Honorable Dean C. Worcester, the Secretary of the Interior of the +Philippine Government, was “the most valuable man we have on the +Philippine Commission.” Certainly, reproduction of such an +indorsement from so exalted a source shows a wish to be fair, in one +who considers Professor Worcester the direst calamity that has befallen +the Filipinos since the American occupation, neither war, pestilence, +famine, reconcentration, nor tariff-wrought poverty excepted. During +all my stay in the Philippines I never did have any official relations +of any sort with the Professor, and only met him, casually, once, in +1901. The personal impression left from the meeting was distinctly that +of an overbearing bully of the beggar-on-horseback type. Conscious of +liability to error, and preferring that the reader should judge for +himself, I give the main circumstances upon which this impression is +based. Soon after the central insular government was set up, in 1901, +Judge Taft and certain other members of the Philippine Commission, the +Professor among the number, came into my judicial district to organize +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb572" href="#pb572" name= +"pb572">572</a>]</span>provincial governments. Their coming to each +town where they stopped was telegraphed in advance, and before they +reached the town where I then was holding court each one of the +American colony of the town was designated by common consent to look +after a fraction of the Taft party during their stay. The Professor +fell to my lot. I always was unlucky. However, their stay was only a +few hours. While they were there, I had occasion to observe that the +Professor spoke Spanish quite well and so remarked to him. The +well-bred reply was: “You’ll find that I know a great many +things you might not think I knew.” Whether this was merely +“The insolence of office” cropping out in a previously +obscure young man suddenly elevated to high station, or whether it was +an evidence of the Commissioner’s idea of the relation of the +Executive Department of a government to its Judiciary, is a +question.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12975src" href="#xd20e12975" name= +"xd20e12975src">1</a> At all events I think the incident gives an +insight into the man not irrelevant to what is hereinafter submitted. I +have met a number of other Americans since who had received impressions +similar to my own. And the Professor’s whole subsequent course in +the Islands corroborates those impressions. I have never talked to any +American in the Philippines who had a good word for him. Of course, +Power, like Property, will always have friends. So that even Professor +Worcester may have <i>some</i> friends, among his fellow-countrymen +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb573" href="#pb573" name= +"pb573">573</a>]</span>in those far-away Islands. But it has already +been made clear in a former chapter how entirely possible it is for a +man occupying high position in the government out there to be very +generally and cordially disliked by his own countrymen there and +actually not know it. Whether this is true of Professor Worcester, or +not, as a general proposition it is quite possible. One thing is +certain, namely, that he is very generally and very cordially detested +by the Filipinos. That this detestation is perfectly natural under the +circumstances, and entirely justifiable, and that it is a cruel +injustice to those people, as well as a monumental piece of folly, to +keep the Professor saddled upon them, it is now in order to show.</p> +<p>In <a href="#ch6">Chapter VI</a> (<i>ante</i>), we made the +acquaintance of two young naval officers. Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and +Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, who, in the fall of 1898, while the fate of +the Philippines hung in the balance at Paris, and peace still reigned +in the Islands between us and the Filipinos, made a trip through the +interior of Luzon, covering some six hundred miles, and afterwards +furnished Admiral Dewey with a written report of their trip, which was +later published as a Senate document. Professor Worcester’s +greatest value to President Taft, and also the thing out of which has +grown, most unfortunately, what seems to be a very cordial mutual +hatred between him and the Filipinos, is his activities in the matter +of discovering, getting acquainted with, classifying, tabulating, +enumerating, and otherwise preparing for salvation, the various +non-Christian tribes. These tribes have already been briefly dealt with +in <a href="#ch21">Chapter XXI</a>. (<i>ante</i>), apropos of that part +of the Great Peace Certificate of 1907 which related to the +“Moros and other non-Christian tribes”—uncivilized +tribes which, being as distinct from the <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb574" href="#pb574" name="pb574">574</a>]</span>great mass of the +Filipino people as islets from the sea, had had no more to do with the +insurrection against us, than the Pawnees, Apaches, and Sioux Indians +had to do with our Civil War of 1861–5. They were also dealt +with, somewhat, in the chapter preceding this. Long before Professor +Worcester was permanently inflicted upon the Filipino people, one of +the young naval officers above mentioned, Mr. Sargent, published an +article in the <i>Outlook</i> for September 2, 1899,<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e13003src" href="#xd20e13003" name="xd20e13003src">2</a> based +on this trip through the interior of Luzon, made by authority of +Admiral Dewey the year before. In the course of his article Mr. Sargent +says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Some years ago, at an exposition held at Barcelona, +Spain, a man and woman were exhibited as representative types of the +inhabitants of Luzon. The man wore a loin cloth, and the woman a scanty +skirt. It was evident that they belonged to the lowest plane of +savagery.</p> +</div> +<p>He adds:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>I think no deeper wound was ever inflicted upon the +pride of the real Filipino people than that caused by this exhibition, +the knowledge of which seems to have spread throughout the island.</i> +The man and woman, while actually natives of Luzon, were captives of a +wild tribe of Igorrotes of the hills.</p> +</div> +<p>Professor Worcester was originally a professor of zoölogy, or +something of that sort, in a western university. In the early nineties +he had made a trip to the Philippines, confining himself then mostly to +creeping things and quadrupeds—lizards, alligators, pythons, +unusual wild beasts, and other forms of animal life of the kind much +coveted as specimens by museums and <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb575" href="#pb575" name="pb575">575</a>]</span>universities. In +1899, just after the Spanish War, he got out a book on the Philippines, +and as an American who had been in the Philippines was then a <i lang= +"la">rara avis</i>, it came to pass that the reptile-finder ultimately +became a statesman. He was brought, possibly by conscious worth, to the +notice of President McKinley, accompanied the Schurman Commission to +the Islands, in 1899, and the Taft Commission in 1900, and finally +evolved into his present eminence as Secretary of the Interior and +official chief finder of non-Christian tribes for the Philippine +Government.</p> +<p>The best known of the wild tribes in the Philippines are the +Igorrotes, the dog-eating savages you saw at the St. Louis Exposition +in 1903–4, the same Mr. Sargent speaks of in his article in the +<i>Outlook</i>. Of course it was not a desire to misrepresent the +situation, but only the enthusiasm of a zoölogist, +anthropologically inclined, and accustomed to carry a kodak, which +started the Professor to photographing the dog-eating Igorrotes and +specimens of other non-Christian tribes soon after the Taft Commission +reached the Philippines. But you cannot get far in the earlier reports +of the Taft Commission, which was supposed to have been sent out to +report back on the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government, +without crossing the trail of the Professor’s +kodak—pictures of naked Igorrotes and the like. This, however +innocent, must have been of distinct political value in 1900 and 1904 +in causing the heart of the missionary vote in the United States to +bleed for those “sixty different tribes having sixty different +languages” of which Secretary Root’s campaign speeches made +so much. It must also have greatly awakened the philanthropic interest +of exporters of cotton goods to learn of those poor “savage +millions” wearing only a loin cloth, when they could be wearing +yards of cotton <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb576" href="#pb576" +name="pb576">576</a>]</span>cloth. By the time the St. Louis Exposition +came off, in 1903–4, it was decided to have the various tribes +represented there. So specimens were sent of the Igorrote tribe, the +Tagalos, the Visayans, the Negrito tribe, and various other tribes. The +Tagalos, the Visayans, etc., being ordinary Filipinos, did not prove +money-makers. But it was great sport to watch the Igorrotes preparing +their morning dog. So it was the “non-Christian tribes” +that paid. It was they that were most advertised. It was the +recollection of them that lingered longest with the visitor to the +Exposition, and there was always in his mind thereafter an association +of ideas between the Igorrotes and Filipino capacity for +self-government generally. Many representative Filipinos visited the +St. Louis Exposition, saw all this, and came home and told about it. +One very excellent Filipino gentleman, a friend of mine, who was +Governor of Samar during my administration of the district which +included that island, sent me one day in October, 1904, a satirical +note, enclosing a pamphlet he had just received called <i>Catalogue of +Philippine Views at the St. Louis Exposition</i>. He knew I would +understand, so he said in the note, that the pamphlet was sent +“in order that you may learn something of certain tribes <i>still +extant</i> in this country.” Concerning all this, I can say of my +own knowledge exactly what Naval Cadet Sargent said concerning the +lesser like indignity of the <i>one</i> Igorrote couple exhibited at +Barcelona <i>while the Filipinos were asking representation in the +Spanish Cortes, viz.</i>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I think no deeper wound was ever inflicted upon the +pride of the real Filipino people than that caused by this exhibition, +the knowledge of which seems to have spread throughout the islands.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb577" href="#pb577" name= +"pb577">577</a>]</span></p> +<p>You see our Census of 1903 gave the population of the Philippines at +about 7,600,000 of which 7,000,000 are put down as civilized +Christians; and of the remaining 600,000, about half are the savage, or +semi-civilized, crudely Mohammedan Moros, in Mindanao, and the adjacent +islets down near Borneo. The other 300,000 or so uncivilized people +scattered throughout the rest of the archipelago, the +“non-Christian tribes,” which dwell in the mountain +fastnesses, remote from “the madding crowd,” cut little +more figure, if any, in the general political equation, than the +American Indian does with us to-day. Take for instance the province of +Nueva Vizcaya, in the heart of north central Luzon. That was one of the +provinces of the First Judicial District I presided over in the +Islands. I think Nueva Vizcaya is Professor Worcester’s +“brag” province, in the matter of non-Christian +anthropological specimens, both regarding their number and their +variety. Yet while I was there, though we knew those people were up in +the hills, and that there were a good many of them, the civilized +people all told us that the hill-tribes never bothered them. And on +their advice I have ridden in safety, unarmed, at night, accompanied +only by the court stenographer, over the main high-road running through +the central plateau that constitutes the bulk of Nueva Vizcaya +province, said plateau being surrounded by a great amphitheatre of +hills, the habitat of the Worcester pets.</p> +<p>The non-Christian tribes in the Philippines have been more widely +advertised in America than anything else connected with the Islands. +That advertisement has done more harm to the cause of Philippine +independence by depreciating American conceptions concerning Filipino +capacity for self-government, than anything that could be devised even +by the cruel ingenuity of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb578" href= +"#pb578" name="pb578">578</a>]</span>studied mendacity. And Professor +Worcester is the P. T. Barnum of the “non-Christian tribe” +industry. The Filipinos, though unacquainted with the career of the +famous menagerie proprietor <i>last</i> named, and his famous remark: +“The American people love to be humbugged,” understand the +malign and far-reaching influence upon their future destiny of the work +of Professor Worcester, and his services to the present Philippine +policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention, through +humbugging the American people into the belief that the Islands must be +retained until the three hundred thousand or so Negritos, Igorrotes, +and other primitive wild peoples sprinkled throughout the archipelago +are “reconstructed.” Is it any wonder that the Filipinos do +not love the Professor? To keep him saddled upon them as one of their +rulers is as tactful as it would be to send Senator Tillman on a +diplomatic mission to Liberia or Haiti.</p> +<p>Not long ago the famous magazine publisher Mr. S. S. McClure, who, I +think, is trying to make his life one of large and genuine usefulness +for good, said to me that if we gave the Filipinos self-government we +would shortly have another Haiti or Santo Domingo on our hands. He must +have seen some of Professor Worcester’s pictures of Igorrotes and +Negritos scattered through public documents related to the question of +Filipino capacity for self-government. Mr. McClure has never, I +believe, been in the Islands; and the cruelly unjust impression he had +innocently received was precisely the impression systematically +developed all these years through the Worcester kodak.</p> +<p>In February, 1911, there appeared an article in the <i>Sunset</i> +magazine for that month entitled “The Philippines as I Saw +them.” The contributor of the article is no less a personage than +the Honorable James F. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb579" href= +"#pb579" name="pb579">579</a>]</span>Smith, former Governor-General of +the Islands. At the top of the article one reads the legend +“Illustrated by Photographs through the Courtesy of the Bureau of +Insular Affairs.” If you read this legend understandingly, you +can, in so doing, hear the click of the Worcester kodak. General +Smith’s article is smeared all over with such pictures. One is +merrily entitled “Eighteen Igorrot Fledglings Hatched by the +American Bird of Freedom.” Another is entitled “Subano Man +and woman, Mindanao.” Another is a picture of an Ifugao home in +the province of Nueva Vizcaya, hereinabove mentioned. Ifugao is the +name of one of the wild tribes, one of the results of Professor +Worcester’s anthropological excavations of the last few years. In +front of the Ifugao home stands the master of the house, clothed in a +breech-clout. Next in the menagerie in the article under consideration +you find a group of Ifugao children, then a Bagobo of Mindanao, then +some other specimen with a curious name, in which there is a woman +naked from the waist up and a man in a loin-cloth. Then follows a +picture of a Tingyan girl from Abra province. And, to cap the climax, +among the last of these pictures you find a Filipino couple pounding +rice. The rice pounders are ordinary Filipinos. The woman is decently +dressed; the man is clothed only from the waist down, having divested +himself of his upper garment, as is customary in order to work at hard +labor more comfortably in hot weather. I do not so much blame General +Smith for this libellous panorama of pictures, scattered though they +are through an article by him on “The Philippines as I Saw +them.” He probably illustrated his article with what the Bureau +of Insular Affairs sent him, without giving much thought to the matter. +But the Bureau of Insular Affairs appears to neglect no occasion +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb580" href="#pb580" name= +"pb580">580</a>]</span>to parade the Philippine archipelago’s +sprinkling of non-Christian tribes before the American public, fully +knowing that the hopes of the Filipinos for independence must depend +upon impressions received by the American people concerning the degree +of civilization they have reached.</p> +<p>For all these wanton indignities offered their pride and +self-respect, the Filipinos well know they are primarily indebted to +Professor Worcester and his non-Christian tribe bureau. The feud +between the Professor and the Filipino people—the bad blood has +been growing so long that the incident hereinafter related justifies +its being called a feud—has been peculiarly embittered by the +missionary aspect of the non-Christian industry. The great body of the +Filipino people, the whole six or seven millions of them, are +Catholics—most of them devout Catholics. Presumably, their desire +for salvation by the method handed down by their forefathers would not +be affected by a change from American political supervision to +independence. Yet the darkest thing ahead of Philippine independence +prospects is the Protestant missionary vote in the United States. +Bishop Brent, Episcopal Bishop of the Philippines, one of the noblest +and most saintly characters that ever lived, has devoted his life +apparently to missionary work in the Philippines, having twice declined +a nomination as Bishop of Washington (D.C.). The only field of endeavor +open to Bishop Brent and his devoted little band of co-workers is the +non-Christian tribes. It seems that the Catholic and Protestant +ecclesiastical authorities in the Islands get along harmoniously, a +kind of <i lang="la">modus vivendi</i> having been arranged between +them, by which the Protestants are not to do any proselyting among the +seven millions of Catholic Christians. So this field of endeavor is +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb581" href="#pb581" name= +"pb581">581</a>]</span>the one Professor Worcester has been +industriously preparing during the last twelve years. Obviously, every +time Professor Worcester digs up a new non-Christian tribe he increases +the prospective harvest of the Protestants, thus corralling more +missionary vote at home for permanent retention of the Philippines. +Professor Worcester is quoted in a Manila paper as saying, “I am +under no delusion as to what may be accomplished for the primitive wild +people. It takes time to reconstruct them.” This remark is +supposed to have been made in a speech before the Young Men’s +Christian Association of Manila. Neither is Mr. Taft under any delusion +as to how valuable is religious support for the idea of retaining the +Philippines as a missionary field. The nature of the above allusion to +Bishop Brent should certainly be sufficient to show that the writer +yields to no one in affectionate reverence and respect for that rare +and noble character. But neither Bishop Brent nor any one else can +persuade him that it is wise to abandon the principle that Church and +State should be separate, in order that our government may go into the +missionary business. Since it has become apparent that the Philippines +will not pay, the Administration has relied solely on missionary +sentiment. In one of his public utterances Mr. Taft has said in effect, +“The programme of the Republican party with regard to the +Philippines is one which will make greatly for the spread of Christian +civilization throughout the Orient.”</p> +<p>The foregoing reflections are not intended to raise an issue as to +the wisdom of foreign missions. They are simply intended to illustrate +how it is possible and natural for President Taft to consider Professor +Worcester “the most valuable man we have on the Philippine +Commission.” The Professor’s menagerie is a <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb582" href="#pb582" name= +"pb582">582</a>]</span>vote-getter. Also, President Taft’s whole +Philippine policy being founded upon the theory that “the great +majority” of the Filipino people are in favor of alien thraldom +in lieu of independence, he tolerantly permits their editors to +“let off steam” through clamor for independence. This +privilege they do not fail to exercise to the limit. The attitude of +the Insular Government permits the native press much latitude of +“sauciness,” in deference to the American idea about +liberty of the press. In the exercise of this privilege during the last +few years the native press has gone the limit. However, there was no +way to stop them, on the principle to which we had committed ourselves. +The thing was very mischievous, and became utterly intolerable. There +was a native paper called <i lang="es">Renacimiento</i> (Renaissance). +This paper was long permitted to say things more or less seditious in +character which no self-respecting government should have tolerated. +This was done pursuant to the original theory, obstinately adhered to +up to date, that there was no real substantial unwillingness to +American rule. Of course, if this were true, newspaper noise could do +no harm. Therefore it was permitted to continue. Finally, however, like +a boy “taking a dare,” the <i lang="es">Renacimiento</i> +published an article on Professor Worcester which intimately and +sympathetically voiced the general yearning of the Filipino people to +be rid of the Professor. In so doing, however, the hapless editor +overstepped the limits of American license, and got into the toils of +the law, by saying things about the Professor that rendered the editor +liable to prosecution for criminal libel. The Professor promptly took +advantage of this misstep, to the great joy of the authorities, who had +been previously much goaded by independence clamor. The result was that +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb583" href="#pb583" name= +"pb583">583</a>]</span>the paper was put out of business and the editor +was put in jail. No doubt the editor ought to have been put in jail, +but his incarceration incidentally served to tone down Filipino clamor +for independence. Subsequent to this <i lang="fr">coup +d’état</i>, the Professor did a little venting of feelings +in his turn. He made a speech at the Y. M. C. A. on October 10, 1910, +which was a highly unchristian speech to be gotten off in an edifice +dedicated to the service of Christ. The Manila papers give only +extracts from the speech, and I have never seen a copy of it. From the +newspaper accounts, it seems that the Professor was determined to, and +did, relieve his feelings about the Filipinos. The Manila +<i>Cable-News</i> of October 11, 1910, quotes the Professor as +referring to his pets, the non-Christian tribes, as “ancestral +enemies of the Christians.” Thus for the first time is developed +an attitude of being champion of the uncivilized pagan remnant, left +from prehistoric times, against the Christians of the Islands. The +<i>Cable-News</i> also says that Professor Worcester “laughed at +the idea that the Islands belonged to the <i>so-called civilized</i> +people and held that if the archipelago belonged to any one it +certainly belonged to its original owners the Negritos.” This +remark about the “<i>so-called <span class="corr" id="xd20e13108" +title="Source: civilised">civilized</span> people</i>” was as +tactful as if President Taft should address a meeting of colored people +in a doubtful state and call them “niggers.” Another of the +Manila papers gives an account of the speech from which it appears that +the burly Professor succeeded in amusing himself at least, if not his +audience, by suggestions as to the superior fighting qualities of the +Moros over the Filipinos, which suggestions were on the idea that the +Moros would lick the Filipinos if we should leave the country. (The +Moros number 300,000, the Filipinos nearly 7,000,000.) The +Professor’s remarks <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb584" href= +"#pb584" name="pb584">584</a>]</span>in this regard, according to the +paper, were a distinct reflection upon the courage of the Filipinos +generally as a people. The effect of Professor Worcester’s speech +before the Y. M. C. A. may be well imagined. However the facts of +history do not leave the imagination unaided. The Philippine Assembly, +representing the whole Filipino people, and desiring to express the +unanimous feeling of those people with regard to the Worcester speech, +unanimously passed, soon after the speech was delivered, a set of +resolutions whereof the following is a translation:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Resolved that the regret of the Assembly be recorded +for the language attributed to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, +Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Government in a discourse +before the Young Men’s Christian Association, October 10, 1910. +It is improper and censurable in a man who holds a public office and +who has the confidence of the government. And as the statements made as +facts are false, slanderous, and offensive to the Philippine people, +their publication is a grave violation of the instructions given by +President McKinley which required that public functionaries should +respect the sensibilities, beliefs, and sentiments of the Philippine +people, and should show them consideration. The words and the conduct +of Mr. Worcester tend to sow distrust between the Americans and the +Filipinos, whose aspirations and duties should not separate them but +unite them in the pathway which leads to the progress and emancipation +of the Philippine people. The influence of Mr. Worcester has caused +injury to the feelings of the Filipinos, <i>encouraged race hatred, and +tended to frustrate the task undertaken by men of real good will</i> to +win the esteem, confidence, and respect of the Philippine people for +the Americans.</p> +<p>Resolved further that this House desires that these facts +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb585" href="#pb585" name= +"pb585">585</a>]</span>should be communicated to the President of the +United States through the Governor of the Philippines and the Secretary +of War.</p> +</div> +<p>Presumably these resolutions were forwarded “to the President +of the United States through the Governor of the Philippines and the +Secretary of War.” But apparently they were pigeonholed when they +reached Washington. I stumbled on them in the Insular Affairs Committee +of the House of Representatives whither they had landed through Mr. +Slayden of Texas. The distinguished veteran Congressman from Texas, +being known as an enemy of all wrong things, was appealed to by certain +persons in the United States to bring the matter to the attention of +Congress. He did so by presenting to the House of Representatives an +American petition which embodied a copy of the resolutions of the +Philippine Assembly.</p> +<p>It thus becomes apparent that one of Professor Worcester’s +principal elements of value is in bullying the Filipinos, and thereby +smothering manifestations of a desire for independence, the existence +of which desire is denied by President Taft’s Administration. The +more the Filipinos cry for independence the greater seems the sin of +holding them in subjection. So that Professor Worcester is very +valuable in silencing independence clamor and thereby creating an +appearance of consent of the governed, when there is no consent of the +governed whatsoever.</p> +<p>In describing the discontent in distant provinces under brutal +pro-consuls, which contributed largely to the final disintegration of +the Roman Empire, Gibbon says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The cry of remote distress is ever faintly heard.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb586" href="#pb586" name= +"pb586">586</a>]</span></p> +<p>The total failure of the above temperate, dignified, and vibrant +protest of the Philippine Assembly to reach the ears of the American +people is but another reminder that history repeats itself. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb587" href="#pb587" name= +"pb587">587</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e12975" href="#xd20e12975src" name="xd20e12975">1</a></span> The +greatest defect of the Philippine Government was in the beginning, and +still is, that the Philippine Commission, which is the executive +authority, controls the appointment and assignment of the trial judges, +and also, largely, their chances for promotion to the Supreme Bench of +the Islands. The Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the +President of the United States, often on recommendation of the +Commission, but thereafter they are absolutely independent. The trial +judges ought also to be appointed by the President of the United +States.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13003" href="#xd20e13003src" name="xd20e13003">2</a></span> +Republished, <i>Congressional Record</i>, January 9, 1900, p. 715.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch24" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XXIV</h2> +<h2 class="main">The Philippine Civil Service</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">Is our Occupation of the Philippines to be temporary, +like our occupation of Cuba after the Spanish War, or +“temporary” like the British Occupation of Egypt since +1882? <i>The Unsettled Question.</i></p> +<p>The policy to be pursued is for Congress to determine. I have no +authority to speak for Congress in respect to the ultimate disposition +of the Islands.</p> +<p class="xd20e236">Secretary of War <span class="sc">Wm. H. +Taft</span> to Philippine Assembly, 1907.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the +Philippine Government Act, is entitled “An Act <i>temporarily</i> +to provide” a government for the Philippine Islands. The young +American who goes out to the Philippines to take a position with the +Insular Government there has usually read his share of Kipling, and his +imagination likes to analogize his prospective employment to the +British Indian Civil Service. The latter, however, offers a career. But +what does the former offer? Take the prospects of the rank and file, as +set forth by Mr. J. R. Arnold, of the Executive Bureau of the +Philippine Government, in an article published in the <i>North American +Review</i> for February, 1912. Suppose a young man goes out to the +Philippines at a salary of $1200. Mr. Arnold discusses fully and +frankly the cost of living in the Islands, and how much higher board, +lodging, etc., are out there than in the United States. He states +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb588" href="#pb588" name= +"pb588">588</a>]</span>that board and lodging will cost $15 to $20 a +month more than here. So that, so far, a salary of $1200 in the +Philippines would seem equivalent to a salary of say approximately $950 +in the United States—say in Washington. Also he calls attention +to the fact that the government will pay your way <i>out</i>, but you +must get back the best way you can. He does not say so, but the walking +is not good all the way from Manila to Washington. Seriously, according +to the authority from whom we are quoting, it costs $225 to $300 to get +back. So if you come back at the end of a three years’ +stay—you must contract to stay at least that long—you must +have laid by, taking his maximum return fare as the more prudent figure +to reckon on, one hundred dollars a year to buy your return ticket. Mr. +Arnold does not say so, but it is a fact, that various little expenses +<i>will</i> creep in that are sure to amount, even with the most +rigidly frugal, to $50 per annum that you would never have spent in the +United States. You are hardly respectable in the Philippines if you do +not have a <i>muchacho</i>. <i>Muchacho</i>, in Spanish, means the same +as <i>garçon</i> in French, or valet in English. But +<i>muchachos</i> are as thick as cigarettes in the Philippines. And you +can hire one for about $5 a month. To resolve not to have a +<i>muchacho</i> in the Philippines would be like resolving at home +never to have your shoes shined, or your clothes pressed. It would be +contrary to the universal custom of the country, and would therefore be +“impossible.” You have not been long in the Philippines +before you get tired of telling applicants for the position of +<i>muchacho</i> that you do not want one, and, benumbed by the +universal custom, you accept the last applicant. You <i>must</i> figure +on a <i>muchacho</i> as one of your “fixed charges.” Count +then an extra $50 annual necessary expense that you <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb589" href="#pb589" name= +"pb589">589</a>]</span>would not have at home. If you do not succumb to +the <i>muchacho</i> custom, you will get rid of the $50 in other ways +fairly classifiable as necessary current expenses. Thus, if you take +from your $1200, worth $950 in Manila, as above stated, the $100 per +annum necessary to be laid by against your home-coming, and the other +$50 last suggested, your salary of $1200 per annum in Manila becomes +equivalent to one of $800 at home, so far as regards what you are +likely to save by strict habits of economy. In other words, to figure +how you are going to come out in the long run, if you go out as a $1200 +man, while your social position will be precisely that of a man +commanding the same salary in a government position in Washington, you +must knock off a third of the $1200. This is not the way Mr. Arnold +states the case exactly. I am simply taking his facts, supplemented by +what little I have added, and stating them in a way which will perhaps +illustrate the case better to some people. Mr. Arnold says you are apt +to get up as high as $1500 and finally even to $1800 in three to five +years. Suppose you do have that luck. Still, if, as has been made plain +above, you must consider $1200 in Manila as equal to only $800 in +Washington (so far as regards what you are going to be able to save +each year), by the same token you must consider $1500 in Manila as +being equal to only $1000 in Washington, and $1800 as only $1200.</p> +<p>The utmost limit of achievement in the Philippine Government +service, the only one of the higher positions not subject to political +caprice, the only one regarded out there as a “life +position”—and this excepts neither the Governorship of the +Islands nor the Commissionerships—is the position of Justice of +the Supreme Court. The salary is $10,000 per annum, American money. But +there is not an American judge on that bench who <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb590" href="#pb590" name= +"pb590">590</a>]</span>would not be glad at any moment to accept a +$5000 position as a United States District Judge at home. All of them +whom I know are most happily married. But I believe their wives would +quit them if they refused such an offer from the President of the +United States, or else get so unhappy about it that they would accept +and come home.</p> +<p>While we have now considered the case from bottom to top, we did not +originally figure on the young American going out to the Philippines +otherwise than single. In this behalf Mr. Arnold himself says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I do not think it can be fairly called other than +risky for an American to attempt to practise love in a cottage in the +Philippines.</p> +</div> +<p>Says the late Arthur W. Fergusson—who gave his life to the +Philippine Civil Service—in his annual report for 1905, as +Executive Secretary:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>The one great stumbling-block, and which no +legislative body can eradicate, is the fact that very few Americans +intend to make the Philippines their permanent home, or even stay here +for any extended period.</i> This is doubtless due to the location of +the islands, their isolation from centres of civilization and culture, +the enervating climate, lack of entertainment and desirable +companionship, and distance from the homeland. <i>Every clerk</i>, no +matter what his ideals or aspirations, <i>realizes after coming here +that he must at some time in the future return to the United States and +begin all over again</i>. After spending a year or more in the islands, +the realization that the sooner the change is made the better, becomes +more acute. This condition causes, doubtless, the class of men who are +not adventurous or fond of visiting strange climes to think twice +before accepting an appointment for service in these islands, and +generally to remain away, and a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb591" +href="#pb591" name="pb591">591</a>]</span>great majority of those who +do come here to leave the service again after a very short period of +duty.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13229src" href="#xd20e13229" name= +"xd20e13229src">1</a></p> +</div> +<p>Then Mr. Fergusson comes to the obvious but apparently unattainable +remedy, which he says is</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">to make a Philippine appointment a permanent means of +livelihood by providing an effective system of transfers to the Federal +service after a reasonable period of service here. * * * +Under the present regulations <i>influence must be brought to bear at +Washington</i> in order that requisition may be made by the Chief of +some bureau there for the services of a clerk desiring to transfer.</p> +</div> +<p>You see, if a Washington Bureau, say the Coast and Geodetic Survey, +or the Geological Survey, sends a man out to the Islands, he is never +for a moment separated from the Federal Civil Service or the Federal +Government’s pay-roll. The same is true of civilian employees of +the army. But the man in the Insular Service, when he wants to get back +home, is little better off than if he were in the employ of the Cuban +Government, or the British Indian Government, or that of the Dutch East +Indies. Mr. Fergusson also says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It is believed to be useless to try to influence men +to come out here unless there is something <i>permanent</i> offered to +them at the expiration of a reasonable term of service. * * * +<i>The average European is content to live and die “east of +Suez”; the average American is not.</i> * * * I am +firmly convinced that a <i>permanent</i> service under present +conditions is entirely out of the question.</p> +</div> +<p>How can you have “a <i>permanent</i> service” unless you +have a definite declared policy? Why not declare <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb592" href="#pb592" name="pb592">592</a>]</span>the +purpose of our Government with the regard to the Islands?</p> +<p>In his annual report for 1906<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13270src" +href="#xd20e13270" name="xd20e13270src">2</a> Mr. Fergusson says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Our relations to the islands are such that the +education and specialization of a distinct body of high class men +purposely for this service as is done in England for the Indian +service, will probably be always a practical impossibility.</p> +</div> +<p>He then goes on to reiterate his annual plea for a law providing for +transfer as <i>a matter of right, not of influence</i>, from the +Philippine Civil Service to the Federal Civil Service in the United +States, and tells of a very capable official of his bureau who got a +chance during the year just closed to transfer from the Philippines to +a $1400 government position in the United States, and was glad to get +it, although $1400 was “considerably less than half what he +received here.” Mr. Fergusson quickly gives the key to all this +in what he calls “the haunting fear of having to return to the +States <i>in debilitated health and out of touch with existent +conditions, only to face the necessity of seeking a new +position</i>.” He adds:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">That this is not a mere theory is proven by the number +of army (civilian) employees who contentedly remain year after +year.</p> +</div> +<p>In 1907, Mr. Fergusson reports on the same subject<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e13294src" href="#xd20e13294" name="xd20e13294src">3</a>: +“Matters do not seem to be improving,” and that the +Director of the Insular Civil Service informs him that “during +the fiscal year there were <i>five hundred voluntary separations from +the service by Americans</i>, of whom one hundred were college +graduates.” He adds: “When <i>the expense of getting and +bringing out new men, and <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb593" href= +"#pb593" name="pb593">593</a>]</span>of training them to their new work +is considered</i>, the <i>wastefulness of the present system is +evident</i>.”</p> +<p>You do not find any quotations from any of the Fergusson disclosures +in Mr. Arnold’s <i>North American Review</i> article. He would +probably have lost his job, if he had quoted them. Yet the evils +pointed out by Mr. Fergusson come from one permanent source, the +uncertainty of the future of every American out there, due to the +failure of Congress to declare the purpose of the Government.</p> +<p>On January 30, 1908, Arthur W. Fergusson died in the service of the +Philippine Government. No general law putting that service on the basis +he pleaded for to the day of his death has ever yet been passed. Since +his death, his tactful successor appears to have abandoned further +pleading, and concluded to worry along with the permanently lame +conditions inherent in the uncertainty as to whether we are to keep the +Islands permanently or not, rather than embarrass President Taft by +discouraging young Americans from going to the Islands.</p> +<p>The report of the Governor-General of the Philippines for 1907, +Governor Smith, says<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13319src" href= +"#xd20e13319" name="xd20e13319src">4</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>American officials and employees have rarely made +up their minds to cast their fortunes definitely with the Philippines +or to make governmental service in the tropics a career.</i> Many of +those who in the beginning were so minded, due to ill health or the +longing to return to friends or relatives, changed front and preferred +to return to the home land, there to enjoy life at half the salary in +the environment to which they were accustomed. * * * That +which operates probably more than anything else to induce good men +drawing good salaries to abandon the service * * * is the +knowledge that they have nothing to look forward to <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb594" href="#pb594" name="pb594">594</a>]</span>when +broken health or old age shall have rendered them valueless to the +government.</p> +</div> +<p>If Congress should ever care to do anything to improve the +Philippine Civil Service and the status of Americans entering the same, +certainly the one supremely obvious thing to do is to make transfer +back to the civil service in the United States after a term of duty in +the Islands <i>a matter of right</i>. <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb595" href="#pb595" name="pb595">595</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13229" href="#xd20e13229src" name="xd20e13229">1</a></span> See +<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 1, p. 89 <i>et +seq.</i></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13270" href="#xd20e13270src" name="xd20e13270">2</a></span> +<i>Report Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 1, p. 99.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13294" href="#xd20e13294src" name="xd20e13294">3</a></span> <i>U. +S. Philippine Commission Report</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 149.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13319" href="#xd20e13319src" name="xd20e13319">4</a></span> See +<i>Report Philippine Commission for 1907</i>, pt. 1, p. 80.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch25" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XXV</h2> +<h2 class="main">Cost of the Philippines</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">If ’t were well to do right, ’t were +better still if ’t were more profitable.</p> +<p class="xd20e236"><i>Cynic Maxims.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">General Otis’s annual report for 1899,<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e13352src" href="#xd20e13352" name= +"xd20e13352src">1</a> dated August 31st, gives the number of Americans +killed in battle in the Philippines, from the beginning of the American +occupation to that date, as 380. This includes those wounded who +afterwards died of such wounds. His report for 1900,<a class="noteref" +id="xd20e13357src" href="#xd20e13357" name="xd20e13357src">2</a> +covering the period from his 1899 report to May 5, 1900, gives the +number of Americans killed in battle from August 31, 1899, to May 1, +1900, as 258. General MacArthur succeeded General Otis in command of +the American forces in the Philippines on May 5, 1900. General +MacArthur’s annual report for 1901,<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13362src" href="#xd20e13362" name="xd20e13362src">3</a> gives the +number of Americans killed in battle between May 5, 1900, and June 30, +1901, as 245. Thus the total number of Americans killed in battle up to +the time the Civil Government was set up in 1901, was 883. The military +reports do not always give the insurgents killed during the periods +they cover. But on June 4, 1900, as we saw in a previous chapter, +General MacArthur reported the number of Filipinos killed up to that +time, so far as our records showed, to be something over 10,000. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb596" href="#pb596" name= +"pb596">596</a>]</span>General MacArthur’s report, above quoted, +giving our killed for the period it covers (May 5, 1900, to June 30, +1901), at 245, gives the insurgent killed for the same period as 3854. +If we add this 3854 to the 10,000 killed up to about where May merged +into June in 1900, we have 13,854 Filipinos killed up to the time Judge +Taft was inaugurated as Governor, in 1901. There was no record, of +course, obtainable or attempted, by the Eighth Army Corps, of Filipinos +who were wounded and not captured and who subsequently died. It is +quite safe to assume that such fatalities must have swelled the +enemy’s list up to the time of the setting up of the Civil +Government far above 16,000 killed. Thus, as has heretofore been +stated, the ratio of the enemy’s loss to our loss was, literally, +at least 16 to 1, up to the time the civil government was set up. +General MacArthur’s report for 1900<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13370src" href="#xd20e13370" name="xd20e13370src">4</a> would +seem to bear out the above ratio. He there gives the number of our +killed, from November 1, 1899, to September 1, 1900, including the +wounded who afterwards died of such wounds, at 268, and the +<span class="corr" id="xd20e13376" title= +"Source: Filipino">Filipinos</span> killed, “as far as of +record,” 3227. While these last figures make our killed for the +period they relate to, considerably over 200, and the enemy’s +killed but a very small figure over 3200, still, making allowances for +the enemy’s wounded that died afterwards, of which of course we +have no record, the 16 to 1 ratio would seem to give a fairly accurate +probable estimate of the relative loss of life.</p> +<p>These figures are explained by the facts, already noticed +hereinbefore, that most of our people knew how to shoot and the +Filipinos did not. The great part of their army were raw recruits who +did not understand the use of two sights on a rifle, and frequently +relied solely on the one at the muzzle, not even lifting up the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb597" href="#pb597" name= +"pb597">597</a>]</span>sight near the lock which when not in use lies +flat along the gun-barrel, with the result that they almost invariably +got the range too high and shot over our heads.</p> +<p>Because the military reports overlap each other in many instances, +it is not possible to state accurately how many men the Eighth Army +Corps lost by disease, but our loss chargeable to this account was not +far from our fatalities on the battlefield.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13385src" href="#xd20e13385" name="xd20e13385src">5</a></p> +<p>It is not possible to even approximate the enemy’s loss other +than on the battlefield. The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey +Philippine Atlas gives the table estimating the population of the +various provinces of the Philippine archipelago prior to the American +occupation. This estimate gives the population of Batangas province at +312,192. <i>The American Census of the Philippines of 1903</i> gives +the population of Batangas province at 257,715.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13396src" href="#xd20e13396" name="xd20e13396src">6</a> This +would present a difference in the population of Batangas prior to 1898 +and its population after the war of 54,477. The provincial secretary of +Batangas province made a report to Governor Taft on December 18, +1901<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13399src" href="#xd20e13399" name= +"xd20e13399src">7</a> on the condition of the province generally. This +report, as it appears in the Senate Document, is a translation from the +Spanish. The portion which relates to the reduction of the population +of Batangas province reads as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by +disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over +200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the +province had.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb598" href="#pb598" name= +"pb598">598</a>]</span></p> +<p>Of course these appalling figures<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13412src" href="#xd20e13412" name="xd20e13412src">8</a> must be +taken with a grain of salt. In the first place, the man who furnished +them was merely reproducing the general impression of his neighbors as +to the diminution of the population of the province. He does not +pretend to be dealing with official statistics. On the other hand, all +of the yearly reports of the various native provincial officers are, as +a general rule, pathetically optimistic. They all seem to think it +their duty to present a hopeful view of the situation. In fact if you +read these reports one after the other, the various signers seem to vie +with one another in optimism as if their tenure of office depended upon +it. So that, balancing probabilities, it would seem unlikely that the +provincial secretary of Batangas would have stated more than what he at +least believed to represent actual conditions, and the results of the +war. A comparison of the Atlas population tables above mentioned with +the census tables of 1903 shows no very startling difference in the +population of any of the other provinces of the archipelago before and +after the war except Batangas. It is also notorious that Batangas +suffered by the war more than any other province in the Philippine +Islands. However, a glance at the table of population of the various +provinces of the Census of 1903<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13415src" +href="#xd20e13415" name="xd20e13415src">9</a> shows you fifty provinces +with a total of 7,635,426 people. While we will never know whether +Batangas did or did not lose one hundred thousand as a result of the +war and its consequences, still, if it did, the other forty-nine +provinces above mentioned must have lost as many more, that is to say, +must have lost another hundred thousand. So that while it is all a +matter of surmise, with nothing more <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb599" href="#pb599" name="pb599">599</a>]</span>certain to go on than +the foregoing, it would really seem by no means absurd to assume the +Filipino loss of life, other than on the battlefield, caused by the +war, and the famine, pestilence, and other disease consequent thereon, +at not far from 200,000 people. In more than one province, the people +died like flies, especially the women and children, as a result of +conditions incident to and consequent upon the war. This will not seem +an over-statement to men who have lived much among people that do not +know much about how to take care of themselves in the midst of great +calamities, people who <i>will</i> eat meat of animals carried off by +disease, in time of famine; who <i>will</i> drink water contaminated by +what may for euphony be called sewage; and who are unprovided with any +save traditional home remedies against cholera, small-pox, etc.</p> +<p>As to the cost of the Philippines in money, it used to be said in +the early days that we paid $20,000,000 for a $200,000,000 +insurrection. Just what the Islands have cost us up to date in money it +is utterly impossible to figure out with any degree of certainty, +except that a safe minimum may be arrived at. Said the distinguished +Congressman from Texas, Honorable James L. Slayden, in a speech which +appears in the <i>Congressional Record</i> of February 25, 1908 (pp. +2532 <i>et seq.</i>):</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">On this point, and in reply to a resolution of the +Senate in 1902, the Secretary of War reported that the cost of the army +in the Philippines from June 30, 1898, to July 1, 1902, had been +$169,853,512.00. To this let us add $114,515,643.00, the admitted cost +of the army in the Philippines from May 1, 1902, to June 30, 1907, and +we will have a grand total of $284,369,155.00. That does not take into +account the additional cost of the navy.</p> +</div> +<p>Nor, be it noted, does it count the $20,000,000 we <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb600" href="#pb600" name="pb600">600</a>]</span>paid +Spain for the Islands, which item, is, however included in another part +of Mr. Slayden’s speech.</p> +<p>The only other estimate of what the Islands have cost, made in the +last few years, which seems to be specially worthy of consideration, is +one which appeared in the <i>New York Evening Post</i> of March 6, +1907. This estimate was prepared by one of the best trained and most +conservative newspaper men in the United States, Mr. Edward G. Lowry, +then Washington correspondent of the <i>Evening Post</i>, and since +1911, its managing editor. The total which Mr. Lowry arrives at is +$308,369,155, up to that time. There have been various absurd estimates +made recklessly without knowledge, but Mr. Lowry’s estimate is +very carefully studied out, and presented in detail in the newspaper +referred to. From the testimony of Mr. Slayden and Mr. Lowry, given as +a result of their inquiries into the matter, it would thus seem that +the Islands must have cost us by the end of 1907 something like +$300,000,000. The Insular Government is now self-sustaining, except as +to military affairs.</p> +<p>The cost per annum of the Philippine (native) scouts, of which there +are 4000, is paid out of the United States Treasury, and amounts to +$2,000,000 per annum.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13453src" href= +"#xd20e13453" name="xd20e13453src">10</a> The number of American troops +in the islands for the last few years has been about 12,000. Those who +are wedded to the present Philippine policy of indefinite retention +with undeclared intention, insist that our military expenses in the +Philippines, in respect to the regular army out there, are not fairly +chargeable as a part of the current expenses of the Philippine +occupation. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb601" href="#pb601" name= +"pb601">601</a>]</span>This argument must be admitted to have some +force as far as the navy is concerned, but as to the army it is clearly +without merit. Under the Act of Congress reorganizing the army of the +United States after the Spanish War, provision was made for a skeleton +army of about 60,000 men capable of expansion to something like 100,000 +in time of war. The method of expansion thus contemplated was to have +companies of, say, for illustration, sixty men, in time of peace, which +companies could be recruited up to a war footing of one hundred men, in +time of war. The suggestion that the cost of the part of the regular +army which we have to keep in the Philippines is not chargeable to the +Philippines because those same troops would have to be somewhere in the +United States if they were not where they are, is not well taken. If we +did not need 12,000 men continually in the Philippines, the army could +be at once reduced by that much without affecting its present +organization. If we had no troops in the Philippines this would not +mean the absolute elimination from the army of enough <i>regiments</i> +to represent twelve thousand men. It would not eliminate any existing +organization. It would simply mean contraction of the number of men in +the several companies of the several regiments of the army toward a +peace basis to the extent of a total of twelve thousand men, more or +less. The War Department has long figured on the cost of an American +soldier in the Philippines per annum including his pay, allowances, and +transportation out and back, at $1000 per annum. The cost of 12,000 +soldiers at $1000 per annum is $12,000,000, per annum. The conclusion +would, therefore, seem inevitable that the extra military current +expense chargeable to our occupation of the Philippines is $12,000,000, +per annum, outside the Philippine scouts, or, a total <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb602" href="#pb602" name="pb602">602</a>]</span>of +$14,000,000. Even if the Philippines have cost us $300,000,000, that is +no reason why we should continue to run a kindergarten for adults out +there, and let the Monroe Doctrine run to seed. “Something” +<i>is not</i> “bound to turn up.” The Philippine Islands +will <i>not</i> prove a blessing in disguise. In every war with a +nation having discontented colonial subjects, the enemy will always +strike the colony first, and hope for aid from the inhabitants +thereof.</p> +<p>Even if the Philippines <i>have</i> cost us $300,000,000, we are a +nation of nearly 100,000,000 people. So they have cost us, all told, in +the neighborhood of only about $3 a piece. And we subjugated them by +mistake, after freeing a less capable people, the Cubans.</p> +<p>The Panama Canal is to be finished in 1913. This means a splendid, +but free-for-all contest, for the trade of South America. In South +America we will meet a tremendous pro-German sentiment, and a by no +means inconsiderable anti-“Yankee” sentiment. The bigger +Germany’s army and navy grows, the more she will loom up as the +one great menace to the peace of the world, and the one avowed enemy of +the Monroe Doctrine. We need to build up a Pan-American <i>esprit de +corps</i>, based on the instinct of self-defence. We <i>must</i> win +the good will of South America, and we cannot do it so long as we +insist, in another part of the world, upon the righteousness of the +principle of one Christian people policing a weaker Christian people, +ostensibly to keep them from having revolutions, and really in the hope +of ultimate profit. To free the Filipinos should be the first step we +take after the Panama Canal is completed toward getting ourselves +foot-loose entirely, with a view of getting everything from the +Canadian border to the Argentine wheat fields and beyond, solidly and +sincerely <i>for</i> the Monroe Doctrine. <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb603" href="#pb603" name="pb603">603</a>]</span>In that direction +lies our only sensible and reasonable hope that the canal will get for +us the trade and friendship of South America. With such tremendous +issues at stake, what does it matter to the richest nation on earth +what the Philippines cost? What does it matter, anyhow, how much it +costs to do right? <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb604" href="#pb604" +name="pb604">604</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13352" href="#xd20e13352src" name="xd20e13352">1</a></span> +<i>War Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 142.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13357" href="#xd20e13357src" name="xd20e13357">2</a></span> +<i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 559–560.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13362" href="#xd20e13362src" name="xd20e13362">3</a></span> See +<i>War Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 98.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13370" href="#xd20e13370src" name="xd20e13370">4</a></span> +<i>War Department Report</i>, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13385" href="#xd20e13385src" name="xd20e13385">5</a></span> From +July 31, 1898, to May 24, 1900, we lost 1138 men by disease. See +special report of the Surgeon-General of the Army, <i>Senate Document +426</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. By the middle of 1900 our soldiers had +pretty well learned how to take care of themselves in the tropics.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13396" href="#xd20e13396src" name="xd20e13396">6</a></span> See +vol. ii., p. 102.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13399" href="#xd20e13399src" name="xd20e13399">7</a></span> See +<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 887.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13412" href="#xd20e13412src" name="xd20e13412">8</a></span> +Appalling, because there are forty-nine other provinces besides +Batangas.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13415" href="#xd20e13415src" name="xd20e13415">9</a></span> Vol. +ii., p. 123.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13453" href="#xd20e13453src" name="xd20e13453">10</a></span> See +page 78 of the special report of the Secretary of War Taft on the +Philippines, January 23, 1908, transmitted by President Roosevelt to +Congress, January 27, 1908, <i>Senate Document 200</i>, 60th Cong., 1st +Sess.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch26" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XXVI</h2> +<h2 class="main">Congressional Legislation</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">Taxation without representation is good cause for +revolt.</p> +<p class="xd20e236"><i>American Speech of 1776.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">As a colony of Spain the Philippines enjoyed certain +special privileges in the way of trade with the “mother +country.” When at the beginning of our military occupation in +1898 General Otis detailed an army officer to take charge of the +Customs House, he continued for the time being the Spanish tariff laws +concerning imports and exports. On September 17, 1901, the Philippine +Commission passed a tariff act<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13505src" +href="#xd20e13505" name="xd20e13505src">1</a> fixing the duties on +imports into the Islands and also continuing to a considerable extent +the system of duties on Philippine exports inherited from the Spanish +régime. Among the products of the Philippine Islands on which +the Act of September 17, 1901, imposed an export tax were the +following:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Hemp, 75c. per 100 kilos<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13511src" href="#xd20e13511" name="xd20e13511src">2</a>; sugar, +5c. per 100 kilos; manufactured tobacco, $1.50 per 100 kilos; raw +tobacco, $1.50 down to 75c. per 100 kilos.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13517src" href="#xd20e13517" name="xd20e13517src">3</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb605" href="#pb605" name= +"pb605">605</a>]</span></p> +<p>On March 8, 1902, the United States Congress passed an Act, +“temporarily to provide revenue for the Philippine Islands and +for other purposes.” The Act of 1902 re-enacted the +Commission’s tariff law for the Philippines of September 17, +1901, with one change, hereinafter to be discussed, as to its export +tax features. As to the tariffs to be collected at our custom-houses on +Philippine products shipped to the United States, the Act of 1902 +reduced the rates fixed by the Dingley tariff to seventy-five per cent. +of said rates. That was all Congress did in the way of lowering our +tariff wall to Philippine products until 1909, when the Payne-Aldrich +tariff bill became a law. This twenty-five per cent. reduction was no +better than no reduction whatever would have been.</p> +<p>Governor Taft pleaded very earnestly with Congress, at the time of +the passage of the Philippine Tariff Act of March 8, 1902, for a +<i>substantial</i> reduction of the Dingley tariff rate on sugar and +tobacco, so as to give his “constituents”—his +Filipinos—something in lieu of the markets they had had under +Spain. But our sugar and tobacco interests defeated his efforts, +because they feared what they termed “competition with cheap +Asiatic labor.”</p> +<p>The Act of Congress of March 8, 1902, repealed the export duties +imposed by the Act of the Philippine Commission of September 17, 1901, +as to exports to the United States, <i>leaving unrepealed</i>, however, +<i>the export duty on Philippine products shipped to foreign +countries</i>. Section 2 of said Act of 1902 provided, as to exports +from the Philippines to the United States, that the rates of duty upon +products of the Philippine Archipelago coming into the United States, +should be less any duty or tax levied, collected, and paid thereon +(under the Act of the Philippine Commission of September <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb606" href="#pb606" name="pb606">606</a>]</span>17, +1901, aforesaid) upon the shipment thereof from the Philippine +Archipelago. This sounds liberal enough. It is, as far as it goes. But +what those familiar with the hemp infamy of the Act of 1902 call +“the joker” in it, is as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">All <i>articles</i>, the growth and product of the +Philippine Islands, <i>admitted</i> into the ports of the United States +<i>free of duty</i> under the provisions of this act, and coming +directly from said islands to the United States, for use and +consumption therein, shall be hereafter exempt from any export duties +imposed in the Philippine Islands.</p> +</div> +<p>This also sounds liberal, on first reading, but its object was, and +its effect has been, to enable the American Hemp Trust to corner and +control the Manila hemp industry. <i>There is but one article of +Philippine export which any one in the United States is interested in, +that was admitted into the United States free of duty under the Dingley +Act.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e13555src" href="#xd20e13555" name= +"xd20e13555src">4</a> <i>That article is hemp.</i> The object of the +law was to favor Americans interested in exporting hemp from Manila to +the United States as against Europeans exporting it to England and +other foreign countries. This does not look, on its face, either +unpatriotic or un-Christian. It is not unpatriotic or un-Christian, +ordinarily, to favor your own people, as against their foreign +competitors. The moral quality of such favoritism, however, must depend +on who is to pay for it. Under the Act of 1902, the Manila authorities +have always collected an export tax on hemp coming to the United +States, just as they do on hemp going from Manila to foreign countries, +exactly as if the law abolishing the export tax on hemp coming to the +United States had never been passed. Later, on proof that the hemp was +<i>in fact</i> carried to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb607" href= +"#pb607" name="pb607">607</a>]</span>the United States and used and +consumed therein, they refund the export tax. This is on the idea that +they cannot tell where the hemp is <i>going to</i> until they know +where it went to, nor where it is <i>going to be</i> “used and +consumed” until they know where it <i>was in fact</i> finally +“used and consumed.” Of course the small farmer is in no +position to follow his bale of hemp into the markets of the world and +show, if it happens to go to the United States, that it did in fact go +there and that it was there “used and consumed,” and, +finally obtaining the proof of this, submit it to the Manila Government +and get his little export tax on his bale of hemp refunded. Only the +big buyer’s agents at Manila are in a position to do this. So the +hemp crop is bought and moved under conditions which are the same as if +<i>all</i> hemp were subject to an export tax. And only the big fish +get the benefit. For instance, the International Harvester Company has +its hemp buyers at Manila. And as to the part of the Philippine hemp +crop it handles, it can, of course, follow the hemp to its ultimate +consumption in the United States, make the proof, and get the +refund.</p> +<p>The wealth of the Philippines is practically entirely agricultural. +Neither mining nor manufactures cut any appreciable figure. Hemp, +sugar, tobacco, and copra<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13581src" href= +"#xd20e13581" name="xd20e13581src">5</a> are the chief staples and main +exports, and of the first of these Secretary of War Taft says in one of +his reports:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13584src" href="#xd20e13584" +name="xd20e13584src">6</a></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The chief export in value and quantity from the +Philippines is Manila hemp, it amounting to between 60 and 65 per cent. +of the total exports.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb608" href="#pb608" name= +"pb608">608</a>]</span></p> +<p>Let us see just how far, according to the annual reports of our own +agents in the Philippines—those charged by us with governing +them,—this piece of legislation gotten through by “special +privilege” has depressed the Manila hemp industry, the chief +source of wealth of the Islands. And before we even get to the main +trouble, let us permit the Insular Government to “place on the +screen,” as a preliminary “view,” a glance at what +the instinct of self-preservation of American sugar and tobacco +interests, fearing competition from “cheap Asiatic labor,” +have deemed it necessary to do to the Philippine sugar and tobacco +industries, through the Dingley tariff. The annual report of the +Philippine Commission for 1904, before it gets to the subject of hemp, +draws a most gloomy picture of how we killed the markets for sugar and +tobacco the Islands had under Spain, and gave them none instead. They +speak of “the languishing state of these industries” (p. +26), and describe a state of affairs that sounds more like Egypt under +Pharaoh than anything else, including a cattle disease that carried off +ninety per cent. of the beasts of burden of the country, and wholesale +destruction of crops by locusts.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13596src" +href="#xd20e13596" name="xd20e13596src">7</a> What they have to say of +the annual tribute levied by the American Hemp Trust, through Congress, +on the Manila hemp industry, should not be re-stated, but quoted. They +say:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13599src" href="#xd20e13599" name= +"xd20e13599src">8</a></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We desire to call attention to the injustice effected +upon the revenues of the islands by section 2 of the Act of Congress +approved March 8, 1902, which provides that the Philippine Government +shall refund all export duties imposed upon articles exported from the +islands into and consumed in the United States. Under the provisions of +this section there has been collected in the Philippine <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb609" href="#pb609" name= +"pb609">609</a>]</span>Islands, since its enactment down to the close +of the fiscal year 1904, the sum of $1,060,460.20 United States +currency, which is refundable. <i>These refundable duties are +principally upon hemp exportations to the United States, and are in +effect a gift of that amount to the manufacturers of the United States +who use hemp in their operations.</i></p> +</div> +<p>They add:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">It is manifestly a discrimination in favor of our +manufacturers as against those of foreign countries. No good reason is +perceived why this <i>bounty to American manufacturers</i> should be +extracted from the treasury of the Philippine Islands, and it is +respectfully submitted that the law authorizing it should be +repealed.</p> +</div> +<p>The annual report of the Philippine Commission for 1905, after the +usual complaint about being made a political football by Benevolent +Assimilation on the one side, and Louisiana and our sugar-beet States +on the other, and the usual annual and true description of the +consequent poverty, says concerning hemp:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We have several times in our reports called attention +to the practical workings of that portion of the Act of Congress +approved March 8, 1902, which provides for the refund of duties paid on +articles exported from the Philippine Islands to the United States and +consumed therein, and have as repeatedly recommended its repeal. <i>It +is a direct burden upon the people of the Philippine Islands, because +it takes from the insular treasury export duties collected from the +people and gives them to manufacturers of hemp products in the United +States.</i> These manufacturers were already prosperous before this +bounty was given <i>them</i> and <i>it seems hardly consistent with our +expressions of purpose to build up and develop the Philippine Islands +when we are</i> thus enriching a few of our own people at their +expense.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13636src" href="#xd20e13636" name= +"xd20e13636src">9</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb610" href="#pb610" name= +"pb610">610</a>]</span></p> +<p>By the end of the fiscal year 1905 (June 30), the American importers +of Manila hemp—of whom the International Harvester Company and +its allied interests are the most influential—had, under the +operation of the rebate system based on the Act of 1902, milked the +Philippine people to the tune of about $1,000,000. Says the Philippine +Commission’s annual report for 1905, immediately after the +passage last above quoted:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The amount of duties refunded under this act to +manufacturers in the United States during the three years ending June +30, 1905, is $1,057,251.12. Many of the departments of the government +are much hampered in their operations because of the lack of funds, +notably the bureau of education, and were the sum thus taken available +for educational purposes, to say nothing of any other, the government +would be enabled to give instruction to thousands of Filipino children +whom they are now unable to reach and who must remain steeped in +ignorance because of the lack of funds to provide such instruction.</p> +</div> +<p>Said the Manila Chamber of Commerce to the Taft Congressional party +in August, 1905: “The country is in a state of financial +collapse.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13650src" href= +"#xd20e13650" name="xd20e13650src">10</a></p> +<p>Says the Philippine Commission’s report for 1906 (pt. 1, p. +68):</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The Commission has repeatedly called attention in its +reports to the action of Congress providing for a refund of duties paid +on articles exported from the Islands to the United States and consumed +therein. The reasons that led the Commission heretofore to recommend +the repeal of that provision are still operative. Since the passage of +that act on March 8, 1902, the amount of duties collected and paid into +the Philippine treasury and handed over to <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb611" href="#pb611" name= +"pb611">611</a>]</span>manufacturers in the United States down to June +30, 1906, is $1,471,208.47. <i>This money has been taken out of the +poverty of the insular treasury to be delivered directly into the hands +of manufacturers of cordage and other users of Philippine hemp in the +United States for their enrichment.</i> The cordage interests are +prosperous and do not need this help; the Philippine Islands are poor. +Legislation which takes money directly from the Philippine treasury and +passes it over to a particular industry in the United States is not +founded on sound principles of political economy or of justice to the +Filipinos. We renew our recommendation for the repeal of this +provision.</p> +</div> +<p>You also find in the Commission’s report for 1906 the usual +annual protests against the Dingley tariff on Philippine sugar and +tobacco. Said the Honorable Henry C. Ide in an article in the <i>New +York Independent</i> for November 22, 1906, written shortly after he +retired from the office of Governor-General of the Philippines and +returned to the United States: “By annexation we killed the +Spanish market for Philippine sugar and tobacco, and our tariff shuts +these products from the United States market, and to-day both these +[industries] are practically prostrated.” In their annual report +for 1907, the Philippine Commission say with regard to the American +corner on Philippine hemp:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13675src" href= +"#xd20e13675" name="xd20e13675src">11</a> “The price of hemp has +fallen from an average of twenty pesos ($10 American money) per +picul<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13678src" href="#xd20e13678" name= +"xd20e13678src">12</a> to thirteen pesos per picul.” It thus +appears that by judicious manipulation of the hemp market at Manila, +through the leverage of the refund system, based on collection and +subsequent refunding of the export tax on hemp coming to the United +States, the Manila agents of the American hemp manufacturers had, as +early as 1907, beat the price of hemp down to not far above half of +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb612" href="#pb612" name= +"pb612">612</a>]</span>what it had been formerly. To-day (1912) the +Filipino hemp farmer gets for his hemp just one half what he got just +ten years ago. During all this period of economic depression, the +public utterances and State papers both of President Roosevelt and Mr. +Taft are full of such preposterous stuff as the following:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">No great civilized power has ever managed with such +wisdom and disinterestedness the affairs of a people committed by the +accident of war to its hands.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13686src" +href="#xd20e13686" name="xd20e13686src">13</a></p> +</div> +<p>This is what Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft were <i>publicly +pretending</i> to believe. But at practically the same time, during as +dark a year, economically, as the American occupation has seen, 1907, +let us see what they were privately admitting to their intimate +friends.</p> +<p>In the <i>North American Review</i> for January 18, 1907, in an +article contributed to that <i>Review</i> by the author of this volume, +our treatment of the Philippine people, through our Congress, was +briefly discussed. The article chanced to attract the attention of Mr. +Andrew Carnegie, who gave a considerable sum of money to have it +reprinted and distributed. Some correspondence followed between us, in +the course of which Mr. Carnegie stated that he had been at the White +House shortly before writing me, and described what happened as +follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">When at supper with the President [Mr. Roosevelt] +recently, pointing to Judge Taft [then Secretary of War], who sat +opposite, he [President Roosevelt] said: “Here are the two men in +all the world most anxious to get out of the Philippines.”</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb613" href="#pb613" name= +"pb613">613</a>]</span></p> +<p>In another letter Mr. Carnegie described this same incident, this +other letter’s version of President Roosevelt’s +supper-table remark being:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Here are the two men in America most anxious to get +rid of them [the Philippines].<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13712src" +href="#xd20e13712" name="xd20e13712src">14</a></p> +</div> +<p>Now why all this public boasting about our +“disinterestedness,” when, if he had been a Filipino, +Colonel Roosevelt would probably have hunted up all the American +speeches of 1776 about taxation without representation, and played +hide-and-seek with the public prosecutor at Manila, to see how far he +could violate the sedition statute without getting in jail? And why +this private admission to his friend Mr. Carnegie, which neither he nor +Mr. Taft has ever publicly made? Why did he not send a message to +Congress showing up the hemp rebate system? Simply because to do so +would lose support for the Administration, would alienate powerful +interests from the fatuous policy of Benevolent Assimilation bequeathed +to Mr. Roosevelt by Mr. McKinley. His party was irrevocably committed +to indefinite retention of the Islands. It was like Lot’s wife. +It could not turn back. So the protected and subsidized interests were +permitted to continue to prey upon the Philippine people. Tariff evils +were never President Roosevelt’s specialty. Nor has war against +intrenched privilege of any sort ever been Mr. Taft’s specialty. +Mr. Taft went out to the Philippines in 1907 to open the Philippine +Assembly. In 1908 he came back and made a report to President Roosevelt +which is as bland as his Winona declaration that the Payne-Aldrich bill +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb614" href="#pb614" name= +"pb614">614</a>]</span>is “the best tariff bill the Republican +party ever passed.” It makes the American reader’s heart +swell with pious pride at what he is doing for his “little brown +brother,” in the matter of vaccination, sewers, school-books, and +the like. President Roosevelt sent this report to Congress, accompanied +by a message, from which we have already quoted. In that same message +he said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">I question whether there is a brighter page in the +annals of international dealing between the strong and the weak than +the page which tells of our doings in the Philippines.</p> +</div> +<p>Apparently, Messrs. Roosevelt and Taft thought, in 1907, that +granting the Filipinos a little debating society solemnly called a +legislative body, but wholly without any real power, was ample +compensation for deserted tobacco and cane plantations and for the +price of hemp being beat down below the cost of production by +manipulation through an Act of Congress passed for the benefit of +American hemp manufacturers. If we had had a Cleveland in the White +House about that time, he would have written an essay on taxation +without representation, with the hemp infamy of this Philippine Tariff +Act of 1902 as a text, and sent it to Congress as a message demanding +the repeal of the Act. But the good-will of the Hemp Trust is an asset +for the policy of Benevolent Assimilation. The Filipino cannot vote, +and the cordage manufacturer in the United States can. No conceivable +state of economic desolation to which we might reduce the people of the +Philippine Islands being other than a blessing in disguise compared +with permitting them to attend to their own affairs after their own +quaint and mutually considerate fashion, the Hemp Trust’s rope, +tied into a slip-knot by the Act of 1902, must not be removed from +their throats. By judicious manipulation of sufficient hemp rope, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb615" href="#pb615" name= +"pb615">615</a>]</span>you can corral much support for Benevolent +Assimilation. Therefore, to this good hour, the substance of the hemp +part of the Philippine Tariff Act of March 8, 1902, remains upon the +statute books of the United States, to the shame of the nation.</p> +<p>At last, under the Payne tariff law of 1909, Mr. Taft’s long +and patient quiet work with Congressional committees prevailed upon +Congress and the interests to admit Philippine sugar and tobacco to +this country free of duty, up to amounts limited in the Act.<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e13729src" href="#xd20e13729" name= +"xd20e13729src">15</a> Since then you find the reports of our American +officials in the Philippines palpitating with gratitude to Congress. As +a matter of fact all Congress had said to the Filipinos by its action +may be summed up about thus: “The sugar and tobacco interests of +this country have at last realized that such little of the sugar and +tobacco you raise as may stray over to this side of the world will not +be in the least likely to hurt them. Therefore they have graciously +decided, in their benignity, to permit you to live, provided you do not +get too prosperous.” But this very same Payne bill continued the +export tax features of the Act of 1902. Section 13 of the Payne bill is +as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Section 13. That upon the exportation to any foreign +country from the Philippine Islands, or the shipment thereof to the +United States or any of its possessions, of the following articles +there shall be levied, collected, and paid thereon the following export +duties: <i>Provided</i>, <i>however</i>, <span class="corr" id= +"xd20e13741" title="Source: That">that</span> all articles the growth +and product of the Philippine Islands coming directly from said +islands, to the United States or any of its possessions for use and +consumption therein shall be exempt from any export duties imposed in +the Philippine Islands:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>352.</td> +<td>Abaca (hemp), gross weight, 100 kilos, 75 cents.</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>353.</td> +<td>Sugar, gross weight, 100 kilos, 5 cents. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb616" href="#pb616" name= +"pb616">616</a>]</span></td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>354.</td> +<td>Copra, gross weight, 100 kilos, 10 cents.</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>355.</td> +<td>Tobacco, gross weight:</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p>(<i>a</i>) Manufactured or unmanufactured, except as otherwise +provided, 100 kilos, $1.30.</p> +<p>(<i>b</i>) Stems, clippings, and other wastes of tobacco, 100 kilos, +50 cents.</p> +</div> +<p>Let us briefly glance at the net results of this law, and its +predecessor, the Act of 1902, the export features of which it +re-enacted. It is important that every fair-minded American who can +possibly spare the time should take such a glance at what Congress has +done to the Philippine hemp industry, because of the obvious bearing +that such taxation without representation will probably have on the +attitude of the Philippine people whenever we get into a war with a +foreign power. Certainly the legislation Congress has perpetrated upon +them, at the behest of special interests in the United States, has not +soothed the original desire of those people to be free and +independent.</p> +<p>At page 27 of the report of the Philippine Collector of Customs for +1910, a table is given showing the export duties subject to refund +collected under the Act of Congress of March 8, 1902, and deposited in +the Philippine treasury to the credit of the Insular Government at the +end of each fiscal year (June 30), as follows:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1902</td> +<td>$ 71,064.69</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1903</td> +<td>527,228.10</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1904</td> +<td>462,433.83</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1905</td> +<td>486,475.56</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1906</td> +<td>433,991.79</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1907</td> +<td>433,458.58</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1908</td> +<td>370,513.36</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1909</td> +<td>598,917.69</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td></td> +<td class="sum">$3,384,083.60</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb617" href="#pb617" name= +"pb617">617</a>]</span></p> +<p>The following table, taken from this same annual report of the +Collector of Customs of the Philippines for 1910 (p. 22) shows the size +(weight in kilograms), and value, of the annual Philippine hemp crop +from 1899 to 1910, both inclusive. It gives in one set of columns the +total exported to all countries, and in the other the part which comes +to the United States:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td></td> +<td colspan="2"><i>To All Countries.</i></td> +<td colspan="2"><i>To United States.</i></td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top" class="unit"> +<td></td> +<td>Kilos</td> +<td>Value</td> +<td>Kilos</td> +<td>Value</td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1899</td> +<td>59,840,368</td> +<td>$ 6,185,293</td> +<td>23,066,248</td> +<td>$ 2,436,169</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1900</td> +<td>76,708,936</td> +<td>11,393,883</td> +<td>25,763,728</td> +<td>3,446,141</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1901</td> +<td>112,215,168</td> +<td>14,453,110</td> +<td>18,157,952</td> +<td>2,402,867</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1902</td> +<td>109,968,792</td> +<td>15,841,316</td> +<td>45,526,960</td> +<td>7,261,459</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1903</td> +<td>132,241,594</td> +<td>21,701,575</td> +<td>71,654,416</td> +<td>12,314,312</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1904</td> +<td>131,817,872</td> +<td>21,794,960</td> +<td>61,886,592</td> +<td>10,631,591</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1905</td> +<td>130,621,024</td> +<td>22,146,241</td> +<td>73,351,136</td> +<td>12,954,515</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1906</td> +<td>112,165,384</td> +<td>19,446,769</td> +<td>62,045,088</td> +<td>11,168,226</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1907</td> +<td>114,701,320</td> +<td>21,085,081</td> +<td>58,388,504</td> +<td>11,326,864</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1908</td> +<td>115,829,080</td> +<td>17,311,808</td> +<td>48,813,720</td> +<td>7,684,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1909</td> +<td>149,991,866</td> +<td>15,883,577</td> +<td>79,210,362</td> +<td>8,534,288</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>1910</td> +<td>170,788,629</td> +<td>17,404,922</td> +<td>99,305,102</td> +<td>10,399,397</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>If you have the time and inclination, you can easily figure out the +annual “rake-off” of the American hemp importers from the +above table. For instance, take the last year, 1910: 99,305,102 kilos +at 75 cents per 100 kilos is $744,788.26, which is more than 4% of +$17,404,922, the total value of the hemp crop of the archipelago for +that year. Add this $744,788.26 to the $3,384,183.60 shown by the above +table of refundable duties collected from 1902 to 1909 inclusive, and +you have over $4,000,000 rebates accruing to American importers of +Manila hemp from 1902 to 1910 inclusive.</p> +<p>In his remarks on Section 13 of the Payne Law of <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb618" href="#pb618" name="pb618">618</a>]</span>1909 +(above set forth), in the House of Representatives, May 13, +1909,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13995src" href="#xd20e13995" name= +"xd20e13995src">16</a> Hon. Oscar W. Underwood said, in part:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">When you put a tax on your people for engaging in +export trade, to that extent you lessen their ability to successfully +meet their foreign competitor and reduce the territory in which they +can successfully dispose of their surplus products abroad. Our +forefathers in writing the Constitution of the United States, +recognizing the false principle on which an export tax was based, put +it in the fundamental law of our land that the United States Government +should not lay export taxes. <i>If we enact this law, we write into the +statute book for the Philippine Islands, legislation which is little +short of barbarous, legislation that no government in the civilized +world except Turkey, and Persia, and other second-class nations +countenance to-day.</i></p> +</div> +<p>But the hemp interests won out and the section was adopted. In an +argument for the repeal of the export tax, delivered in the House of +Representatives August 19, 1911, the Philippine delegate, Hon. Manuel +L. Quezon, said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">There is one section in the Philippine tariff law, +approved August 5, 1909, which is <i>seriously injuring the proper +commercial development of the islands</i>.</p> +</div> +<p>Of course the earnestness with which Mr. Quezon pleaded his cause +may be imagined from the circumstance that, as he says, he is +continually advised by letters from his people, and verily believes +that <i>if the export tax is not taken off soon the Philippine hemp +industry will be entirely destroyed</i>, and the hemp farmers will have +to take to raising something else in lieu of hemp, because the present +prices hardly permit them to live. In the course of his speech Mr. +Quezon offered <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb619" href="#pb619" name= +"pb619">619</a>]</span>the following truly eloquent and absolutely +unanswerable argument:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Although it has been decided by the Supreme Court of +the United States that the provisions of the Constitution are not in +force in the Philippines, I have serious doubts as to whether said +decision also meant that this Government has the power to enact laws +for the islands which are expressly prohibited by the Constitution in +the United States.</p> +</div> +<p>It is through the courtesy of Mr. Quezon that such light as I may +have been able to throw on the subject has been obtained. He has shown +me letters from the Philippine Chamber of Commerce at Manila and other +commercial organizations prophesying ruin to the Manila hemp industry +in the event the export tax should continue. One of these letters is +addressed to the two Philippine Commissioners in Congress, Mr. Legarda +and Mr. Quezon. It informs them of the hopes of the Filipinos at Manila +that they, Messrs. Legarda and Quezon, may be successful in their +campaign to get the law repealed and that many of them (the Filipinos +at Manila) feel hopeful of results in that regard. Speaking for their +fellow countrymen at Manila, they say, “The optimists are of the +opinion that the matter being in such good hands as yours will be +carried to a successful conclusion.” Then they give the darker +side of the picture thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">But the representatives at this capital of the famous +syndicate, the International Harvester Company, are of the opinion that +we will be able to accomplish nothing, and theirs is an opinion to +which great weight should be attached, because <i>the vast interests +which that concern represents can set in motion powerful influences to +keep the present law as it is</i>, since it concerns their interest to +do so.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb620" href="#pb620" name= +"pb620">620</a>]</span></p> +<p>Mr. Quezon has also shown me a letter written to him, March 30, +1911, by his and my warm personal friend, Hon. James F. Smith, formerly +Governor-General of the Philippines, now (1912) Judge of the Court of +Customs Appeals at Washington, D. C., in which letter General Smith +says, concerning the operation of that part of the export tax act of +March 8, 1902 (continued by the Payne Tariff Law of 1909) by which +American manufacturers are relieved from the payment of the export tax +on Manila hemp:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><i>In effect this really and truly amounts to the +payment by the Philippine Government and the Filipino people of a large +subsidy to American manufacturers of hemp.</i> More than that, this +concession to the American manufacturer, by enabling him to undersell +his British competitor, gives him an undue control of the situation and +has put him in a position, to some extent, to control prices for the +raw product.</p> +</div> +<p>It seems to me that the American people had better look to their own +liberties, when they remember that in the campaign for the Republican +nomination in 1912, the Roosevelt Headquarters gave out that pending +the Roosevelt dictation of Mr. Taft’s nomination in 1908, the +International Harvester Company furnished a floor of its Chicago +building to the Taft people, this interesting fact being part of the +leakage from the Roosevelt-Taft quarrel caused by the Roosevelt charge +that Mr. Taft was unfit for re-election because he “meant well +<i>feebly</i>”; and when it is recalled, on the other hand, that +in the Roosevelt campaign of 1912 for the presidential nomination for a +third term, Mr. George W. Perkins,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14049src" +href="#xd20e14049" name="xd20e14049src">17</a> <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb621" href="#pb621" name="pb621">621</a>]</span>the +very personification of undue corporation influence with the +Government, assumed the rôle of Warwick for an ex-President who, +when President, had repudiated the advice of his counsel, Governor +Harmon, that a railroad company<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14057src" +href="#xd20e14057" name="xd20e14057src">18</a> be prosecuted for taking +rebates <i>because the vice-president of the company was his personal +friend</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14067src" href="#xd20e14067" +name="xd20e14067src">19</a> But let us return to the Philippine +rebates, and their corner-stone, the export tax, Section 13 of the +Payne-Aldrich Tariff.</p> +<p>In the case of Fairbanks <i>vs.</i> United States, 181 U. S. Supreme +Court Reports, page 290, a case in which the court was asked to declare +a certain Act of Congress unconstitutional and void, because it imposed +what was virtually an export tax, the opinion of the court cites the +absolute inhibition against such a tax imposed by our Federal +Constitution, and says concerning the wise theory on which this +fundamental tenet of our government rests:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The requirement of the Constitution is that exports +should be free from any governmental burden.</p> +</div> +<p>The decision then goes on to elaborate on what it terms “that +freedom from governmental burden in the matter of exports which it was +the intention of our Constitution to protect and preserve.” +Finally, the court uses an expression which is certainly a stinging +rebuke to any law-making power that permits the selfish greed of a +little set of importers to get a law passed imposing for their special +benefit a paralyzing export tax on the chief staple of a helpless +colony:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The power to tax is the power to destroy.</p> +</div> +<p>But Mr. Quezon has no vote in Congress and his voice was not heard, +at least not heeded. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb622" href="#pb622" +name="pb622">622</a>]</span></p> +<p>The summation of the whole matter is this: Both the Philippine +people and the American people are, and long have been, suffering from +unjust taxation through laws for which special selfish financial +interests in the United States, exercising grossly undue influence on +governmental action, are responsible. Neither will ever get relief +until the government of this nation is wrested from the control of the +money-hogs and restored to the people. Until that is done, selfish +greed will continue to sow sedition in the Philippines, and socialism +in the United States. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb623" href= +"#pb623" name="pb623">623</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13505" href="#xd20e13505src" name="xd20e13505">1</a></span> Act +230, U. S. Philippine Commission.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13511" href="#xd20e13511src" name="xd20e13511">2</a></span> For +the convenience of readers who do not constantly use the metric system: +A kilo is about <span class="corr" id="xd20e13513" title= +"Source: 225">2.25</span> lbs.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13517" href="#xd20e13517src" name="xd20e13517">3</a></span> +According to what part of archipelago grown.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13555" href="#xd20e13555src" name="xd20e13555">4</a></span> The +Payne law of 1909 continued the export tax, etc.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13581" href="#xd20e13581src" name="xd20e13581">5</a></span> Dried +cocoa-nut meat, used to make soaps and oils. I do not deal with copra +because it nearly all goes to Europe, principally to Marseilles.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13584" href="#xd20e13584src" name="xd20e13584">6</a></span> +<i>Senate Document 200</i>, 1908, Sixtieth Congress, First Session.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13596" href="#xd20e13596src" name="xd20e13596">7</a></span> I +have myself seen a cloud of locusts three miles long.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13599" href="#xd20e13599src" name="xd20e13599">8</a></span> +<i>Report</i>, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1904, pt. 1, pp. +26–7.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13636" href="#xd20e13636src" name="xd20e13636">9</a></span> +<i>Report</i>, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, pp. +72–3.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13650" href="#xd20e13650src" name="xd20e13650">10</a></span> +Senator Newlands, <i>North American Review</i>, December, +1905<span class="corr" id="xd20e13655" title="Not in source">.</span> +Senator Newlands was one of the party.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13675" href="#xd20e13675src" name="xd20e13675">11</a></span> Part +1, p. 99.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13678" href="#xd20e13678src" name="xd20e13678">12</a></span> +137½ lbs.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13686" href="#xd20e13686src" name="xd20e13686">13</a></span> +President Roosevelt’s message to Congress of January 27, 1908, +transmitting report of Secretary of War Taft on the Philippines.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13712" href="#xd20e13712src" name="xd20e13712">14</a></span> +Before assuming to use these letters in this book, I sent them to Mr. +Carnegie and asked his permission to so use them. He returned them to +me with his consent entered on the back of one of them.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13729" href="#xd20e13729src" name="xd20e13729">15</a></span> +300,000 tons of sugar, 150,000,000 cigars, etc.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e13995" href="#xd20e13995src" name="xd20e13995">16</a></span> +<i>Congressional Record</i>, May 13, 1909, p. 2009.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14049" href="#xd20e14049src" name="xd20e14049">17</a></span> Mr. +Perkins is chairman of the Finance Committee of the International +Harvester Company, a hundred million dollar corporation owning divers +subsidiary companies which make twine and cordage. See <span class= +"sc">Moody’s Manual</span>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14057" href="#xd20e14057src" name="xd20e14057">18</a></span> The +Atcheson, Topeka & <span class="corr" id="xd20e14059" title= +"Source: Sante">Santa</span> Fe.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14067" href="#xd20e14067src" name="xd20e14067">19</a></span> Paul +Morton.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch27" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XXVII</h2> +<h2 class="main">The Rights of Man</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">The rights of man cannot be changed. It is the +government which attempts to change them that must +change.—<span class="sc">Webster.</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">It was the homely common sense of Mr. Lincoln that +first reminded us most vividly how like to the sins of an individual +are those of a nation. To the Southern man who admires Mr. Lincoln as +one of the great figures of all time, he seems like a great physician, +who, with malice toward none and with charity for all, kept vigil for +four years at the bedside of a sick nation through all the long agony +of its efforts to throw off from its system the inherited curse of +slavery. Of course, human slavery was a relic of barbarism. But in +fixing the Rights of Man, the founders of the Republic actually +overlooked the fact that a negro was a human being. So that, vast +property rights having accrued pursuant to that mistake, the march of +progress had to wipe them out, no matter whom it hurt financially. The +enormity of the iniquity of human slavery did not dawn suddenly and +exclusively upon William Lloyd Garrison. He is not the sole, original +inventor and patentee of the idea. Lord Macaulay’s father was +doing the same sort of agitating in England about the same time. +Westminster Abbey has its monument to the elder Macaulay, just as +Commonwealth Avenue has its monument to the elder Garrison. +Simultaneous <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb624" href="#pb624" name= +"pb624">624</a>]</span>like stirrings occurred elsewhere throughout +Christendom. But, of course, in America, arguments for the emancipation +of the slave first took root most readily in a thrifty section of our +liberty-loving country which had nothing to lose by abolition.</p> +<p>John Quincy Adams once said that our government was “an +experiment upon the heart of man.” It is because this government +of the people by the people for the people was a deliberate and +thoughtful attempt upon the part of its founders to apply the Golden +Rule as a doctrine of international and inter-individual law, that we +believe our form of government is the last hope of mankind. It is, as +we conceive it, the voice of humanity raised in protest against the +proposition that might makes right. It is, as we conceive it, a +government which entered the lists of the nations as the champion of +the human mind, in the great struggle of Mind for the mastery over +Matter, the world-old struggle between Good and Evil, Light and +Darkness. Our government, like everything else, must follow the law of +its being, or die. Its first great sin in violation of the Rights of +Man was due to heredity. We inherited the institution of slavery, the +governmental exception to the rule that all men are created with equal +right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This was a sin +against human liberty, one of the “unalienable” Rights of +Man, upon which the Republic purported to be builded. The consequences +of that sin are still with us; but, except for the occasional +bloody-shirt waver, whose intellectual resources are not sufficient to +provide him with a live issue, we are meeting those consequences, as a +nation, bravely, and with the mutual forbearance born of the fact that +none are wholly free from responsibility for present difficulties.</p> +<p>Our second great national sin was a yielding to the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb625" href="#pb625" name= +"pb625">625</a>]</span>temptation of the environment which arose, +unforeseen, after a splendid war waged for the Rights of Man against +Spain in Cuba. The Philippine war was waged to subjugate the Filipino +people, because Mr. McKinley believed it would be financially +profitable to us to own the islands, and in the face of the fact that +the only thing he knew officially about the Filipino people was that +Admiral Dewey thought them superior to the Cubans and more capable of +self-government. The war in the Philippines was, therefore, a war +against the Rights of Man. Nowhere in any state paper has any American +statesman, soldier, or sailor, had the temerity to invoke the name of +God in connection with the retention of the Philippine Islands. Nowhere +in any American state paper connected with the Philippines is there any +reference to “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” +The sin of our Philippine policy is that it is a denial of the right of +a people to pursue happiness <i>in their own way</i> instead of in +<i>somebody else’s</i> way. It is a denial of the very principles +in maintenance of which we went to war against Spain to free Cuba, as +we had previously gone to war against England to free ourselves.</p> +<p>Now the reason the nation blundered into taking the Philippines was +that it believed the Filipinos to be, not a people, but a jumble of +savage tribes. But the reason the men who controlled the action of the +government at the time took the Philippines was because they believed +they would pay. Nevertheless, there was a sufficient number of our +fellow-citizens—controlled, some by altruistic motives and some +by sordid motives—to cause the nation to follow the lead of those +then in control. If the men then in control had taken the people into +their confidence, the blunder would never have been made. If the +correspondence <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb626" href="#pb626" name= +"pb626">626</a>]</span>between Mr. McKinley and the Paris Peace +Commission in the fall of 1898, from which the injunction of secrecy +was not removed until 1901, had been given out at the time, the treaty +would never have been ratified except after some such declaration as to +the Philippines as was made concerning Cuba, some reaffirmance of +allegiance to faith in our cardinal tenet—the right of every +people to pursue happiness in their own way, free from alien +domination. The Bacon resolution of 1899, which was along this line, +was defeated only by the deciding vote of the presiding officer, the +Vice-President of the United States. The passage of that resolution +would have prevented the Philippine Insurrection. Had it passed, the +Filipinos would no more have had occasion to think of insurrection than +the Cubans did. It was Mr. McKinley alone who decided to take the +Philippines. Congress was not called together in extra session. The +people were not consulted, except from the rear-end of an observation +car.</p> +<p>Most people, whether they be lawyers or not, are more or less +acquainted with the doctrine of what is called in law a “<i>bona +fide</i> purchaser without notice.” No man can claim to be a +<i>bona fide</i> purchaser without notice, when he knows enough about +the subject matter of his purchase to put him on reasonable notice of +the existence of facts which, had he taken the trouble to verify them, +would have caused him to halt and not purchase. The correspondence in +1898, made public in 1901, withheld by Mr. McKinley until after his +second election in 1900, is sufficient to have made any honest man ask +himself some such question as this: “After all, is it not quite +possible that those people <i>can</i> run a decent government of their +own? Admiral Dewey says they are superior to the Cubans.” But +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb627" href="#pb627" name= +"pb627">627</a>]</span>Mr. McKinley did not pursue this inquiry, as it +was his duty to do. He took the islands because he believed they would +pay, knowing nothing in particular about the Filipinos, except what he +had learned from Admiral Dewey’s brief comment, yet hoping in +spite of it that they would turn out sufficiently unfit for +self-government for the event to vindicate the purchase. To demonstrate +that the Filipinos were wholly unfit for the treatment accorded the +Cubans was the only possible justification of the initial departure +from the traditions of the Republic and from the principles which were +its corner-stone. And he made the departure because the business +“interests” of the country then believed—erroneously +they all now admit—that it would pay. He decided to treat eternal +principles as “worn-out formulæ.” Senator Hoar once +declined an invitation extended by his own city of Worcester, to +deliver a eulogy on Mr. McKinley, because of his Philippine policy. +True, he tempers the asperity of this action thus: “It was not +because I was behind any other man in admiration or personal affection +for that lofty and beautiful character. But * * * if a great +Catholic prelate were to die, his eulogy should not be pronounced by a +Protestant.”<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14135src" href= +"#xd20e14135" name="xd20e14135src">1</a> But all Senator Hoar’s +speeches against the McKinley Philippine policy were as emphatic as +Luther’s ninety-five theses. He was in possession at the time, +along with the rest of the Senate, of the correspondence with the Paris +Peace Commission made public after the presidential election of +1900.</p> +<p>Ever since Mr. McKinley took the Philippines, it has been the +awkward but inexorable duty of the defenders of that good man’s +fame to deprecate Filipino capacity for self-government. President +Taft’s chief life-work since this century began has been to take +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb628" href="#pb628" name= +"pb628">628</a>]</span>care of his martyred predecessor’s fame, +by proving that Mr. McKinley guessed right in 1898 when he bought the +Philippines and trusted to luck to be able to make out, in spite of +what Admiral Dewey had said, a case sufficiently derogatory to Filipino +intelligence to justify the purchase and subjugation of the islands at +the very time we were freeing Cuba. Obviously, then, the more utterly +unfit for self-government in the present or the near future Mr. Taft +can make the Filipinos out, the nearer he gets to vindicating the +memory of Mr. McKinley, that is, with men of his own, (Mr. +Taft’s) high character. He insists on treating as children a +people who got up a well-armed army of thirty-odd thousand men in three +or four months and held at bay, for two years and a half, some 125,000 +husky American soldiers, over five times as many as it took to drive +Spain from the Western hemisphere. Physical force is the basis of all +government among men. If President Taft had anything of the soldier +instinct of his immediate predecessor, he would not sniff demagoguery +in the proposition that military efficiency is a better guaranty of +capacity for self-government than all the school-books in the world, +and that proven passionate willingness to die for freedom from alien +domination is the best guaranty conceivable against internecine strife. +It was a tremendous struggle with his own conscience that Mr. McKinley +went through with before he decided to repudiate the principles on +which we took Cuba in order, for a money consideration euphemistically +called “trade expansion,” to take the Philippines. He had +advices before him at the time making it reasonably certain that this +meant trouble with the Filipinos, i.e., bloodshed in the Philippines, +the extent of which none could foresee, and about which he was of +course apprehensive. In the matter of instructing <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb629" href="#pb629" name="pb629">629</a>]</span>our +Paris Peace Commissioners to insist on Spain’s ceding us the +Philippines, Mr. McKinley took no moral ground tenable like a rock, +such as truly great men take in great crises of their country’s +history. He did not attempt to lead the people. He simply decided that +it would be a <i>popular</i> thing to do to take the islands. Fresh +from a war entered upon to emancipate the Cubans from alien domination, +he took a step which both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt warned him +beforehand would <span class="corr" id="xd20e14149" title= +"Source: probaby">probably</span> mean war—to subjugate, against +their will, a people superior to the Cubans. And in taking this step, +he took into his confidence, neither the people who paid for the war, +nor the soldiers who fought it. To deny that his motives were +benevolent would be simply stupid. But he followed the mob which +shouted from the rear-end of his observation car and repeated by cable +to the Paris Peace Commission, what the mob yelled. Ever since the +supposed Philippine Klondyke whispered in President McKinley’s +ear “Eat of the imperial fruits of a colonial policy,” the +archives of this government—the reports of the State, War, and +Navy Departments, and the Congressional Documents—have reeked +with the inevitable consequences of our fall from our high estate. No +man can serve two masters. Philanthropy for pecuniary profit is a +paradox. Duplicity ever follows deviation from principle. In our +dealings in 1898 with Aguinaldo you find vacillation on the part of +military commanders who personally did not know what fear was, and +embarrassed hypocrisy in dealing with him on the part of men wearing +the shoulder-straps of the American army, athwart the frankness of +whose gaze no such shadow had ever fallen before. You find systematic +concealment of our intentions in dealing with the insurgents, for fear +they would insurge before <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb630" href= +"#pb630" name="pb630">630</a>]</span>the Treaty was signed, and thus +cause such a revulsion of feeling in <i>our</i> country against the +purchase of <i>theirs</i> as to defeat the ratification of the treaty. +After that, you find a systematic minimizing of the opposition to our +rule, reinforced by subtle depreciation of Filipino intelligence, and +backed up by a “peace-at-any-price” policy, periodically +punctuated by the horrors of war without its dignity. The denial of +Filipino opposition to our rule, which opposition means merely a +natural longing for freedom from alien rule, has gradually been +abandoned. Nobody now clings to that stale fiction. Also, a long course +of chastening, through reconcentration and kindred severities +subsequent to the official announcement of a state of general peace, +has at last gotten the situation as to public order well in hand. The +only question for those who affect that “decent respect to the +opinions of mankind” which the men of 1776 had in mind is, +“Are the Filipinos a people?” President Taft was originally +with Senator Hoar on the Philippine question. At least he was an +“anti-expansionist.” In all the heat of subsequent +controversy he has never made bold to deny the general proposition of +the unalienable right of every people to liberty and the pursuit of +happiness in their own way. His position is that the Filipino people +must be made an exception to the rule because they are not <i>a +people</i>. This is the strongest I can state his proposition for him. +It is very difficult to state even with apparent plausibility, anything +which denies the right of every community of people to immunity from +alien domination. The case must be an extreme one. The issue which the +writer raises with the President’s policy is that the Filipinos +<i>are</i> a people.</p> +<p>I know of no graver responsibility that an American statesman can +take upon himself before the bar of <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb631" href="#pb631" name="pb631">631</a>]</span>history than to deny +the right of any given people to self-government. Certainly any man who +denies that right at least assumes the burden of proof that they are +unfit to attend to their own affairs. Mr. McKinley assumed it without +pretending to know anything much about the Filipinos, the motive being +that the Islands would be profitable to us. When Mr. Taft went to the +Philippines in 1900, he went, not to investigate the correctness of Mr. +McKinley’s assumption, which was implied in the purchase, but to +champion it; not to give advice concerning the righteousness of having +taken over the Philippines, but to bolster up the policy. He assumed +the burden of proof before he knew anything about the facts. The burden +has been on him ever since. Any subordinate who helps him to bear that +burden, finds favor in his eyes. But the burden is greater than he can +bear. The proof fails. The proof shows that the Filipino people ought +to be allowed to pursue happiness in their own way instead of being +made to pursue it in Mr. Taft’s way. Once you pretend that our +true object in the Philippines is the “pursuit of +happiness” for them, The Taft policy is condemned by the facts; +and that is why I am opposed to it. The record shows this. He admits +it. But he insists, with a sigh, that in some other generation they +will be happy. Meantime, we are drifting toward our next war carrying +in tow 8,000,000 of human beings who, if neutralized and let alone +would not be disturbed by our next war, but whose destinies now must be +dependent upon the outcome of such war, however little they may be +concerned in the issues which bring it about.</p> +<p>The shifty opportunism which once actually held out to the Filipinos +the hope of some day becoming a State of the United States of America, +has long since <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb632" href="#pb632" name= +"pb632">632</a>]</span>lapsed into the silence of shame, because no +American ever honestly believed that the American people would ever +countenance any such preposterous proposition. And so a free republic +based on representative government is face to face with the proposition +of having a “crown colony” on its hands which wishes to be, +and could soon be made fit to be, a free republic also.</p> +<p>If a federal republic cannot live half slave and half free, can it +live with millions of the governed denied a voice in the federal +government confessedly forever? <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb633" +href="#pb633" name="pb633">633</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14135" href="#xd20e14135src" name="xd20e14135">1</a></span> +<i>Autobiography of Seventy Years</i>, vol. ii., p. 317.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch28" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XXVIII</h2> +<h2 class="main">The Road to Autonomy</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<div class="lgouter"> +<p class="line">Oh be ye not dismayed</p> +<p class="line">Though ye stumbled and ye strayed.</p> +</div> +<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Kipling</span>—<i>A +Song of the English.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">He who points out a wrong without being prepared to +suggest a remedy presumes upon the patience of his neighbor without +good and sufficient cause. Up to this point the wrong has been +unfolded, with such ability as was vouchsafed the narrator, “from +Genesis to Revelations,” so to speak; also his own attitude as an +eye-witness, and its evolution from the Mosaic doctrine of an eye for +an eye and a tooth for a tooth, to the more Christian doctrines of the +New Testament. Let us now consider the remedy.</p> +<p>In the course of our travels with the army in the earlier chapters +of this book, we first followed its northern advance, from Manila over +the great central plain drained by the Rio Grande and crossed by the +railroad connecting Manila Bay with Lingayen Gulf; its further advance +from the northern borders of the plain over the mountains of Central +Luzon; and its march from the central mountains to the northern sea, at +the extreme northern end of the archipelago. We thus saw in detail the +military conquest and occupation of that part of Luzon lying north of +the Pasig River. Before leaving that part of the subject, the way the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb634" href="#pb634" name= +"pb634">634</a>]</span>provinces thus occupied were grouped into +military districts was indicated. Following the lines of the military +occupation, it was shown that Northern Luzon was naturally and +conveniently susceptible of division into four groups of provinces, +which groups might ultimately be evolved into self-governing +commonwealths—States of a Philippine Federal Union, as +follows:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Name of State</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Ilocos<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14219src" href="#xd20e14219" +name="xd20e14219src">1</a></td> +<td>6,500</td> +<td>650,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cagayan<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14232src" href="#xd20e14232" +name="xd20e14232src">2</a></td> +<td>12,000</td> +<td>300,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pangasinan<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14242src" href="#xd20e14242" +name="xd20e14242src">3</a></td> +<td>4,500</td> +<td>625,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Pampamga<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14252src" href="#xd20e14252" +name="xd20e14252src">4</a></td> +<td>5,000</td> +<td>650,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Total</td> +<td class="sum">28,000</td> +<td class="sum">2,225,000</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>It will be remembered that after our narrative had followed the +occupation of Northern Luzon by the American forces to practical +completion, we turned to that part of Luzon lying south of Manila, and +followed the military occupation as it was gradually extended from the +Pasig River to the extreme point of Southern Luzon. Before closing the +review of that military panorama, suggestions were made for an ultimate +grouping of the provinces of Southern Luzon into two governmental units +intended to be ultimately evolved into states. Those suggestions +contemplated grouping the provinces of the lake region bordering on the +Laguna de Bay and the adjacent provinces, into a territory designated +for convenience as Cavite.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14269src" href= +"#xd20e14269" name="xd20e14269src">5</a> This territory was to include +all of Southern Luzon except the hemp peninsula, which lies to the +south of the Lake <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb635" href="#pb635" +name="pb635">635</a>]</span>country. It was also suggested in the same +connection that the three provinces of the hemp peninsula might form a +convenient ultimate State of Camarines. In other words, two states can +be made out of Southern Luzon as follows:</p> +<div class="table"> +<table> +<thead> +<tr valign="top" class="label"> +<td><i>Name of State</i></td> +<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td> +<td><i>Population</i></td> +</tr> +</thead> +<tbody> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Cavite</td> +<td>8,500</td> +<td>700,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Camarines</td> +<td>7,000</td> +<td>600,000</td> +</tr> +<tr valign="top"> +<td>Total</td> +<td class="sum">15,500</td> +<td class="sum">1,300,000</td> +</tr> +</tbody> +</table> +</div> +<p>To recapitulate: All of Luzon except Manila and the vicinity can at +once be divided into the six groups of provinces above +mentioned—“territories,” having what we are +accustomed in the United States to call a “territorial form of +government,” and intended to be made states later. Luzon is about +the size of Cuba (a little over 40,000 sq. miles), is twice as thickly +populated (nearly 4,000,000 to Cuba’s 2,000,000), and is not +cursed with a negro question, as Cuba is.</p> +<p>The above totals, be it remembered, are only round numbers, but they +get us “out of the woods” so to speak, and away from a lot +of unpronounceable names. They show you how to handle Luzon as if it +were about the size of Ohio—which it is. And, as has already been +made clear in the earlier part of this volume, Luzon +“<i>is</i>” the Philippines, in a very suggestive sense of +the phrase, since it contains half the land area of the archipelago +(outside of the Mohammedan island of Mindanao), and half the total +population of the whole archipelago, besides being eight or ten times +as large as any other island of the group except Mindanao; and it also +contains the city which is the capital and chief port of the +archipelago, and has been the seat of <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb636" href="#pb636" name="pb636">636</a>]</span>government for over +three hundred years—Manila. And Manila is eight or ten times as +large as any other town in the archipelago.</p> +<p>After the occupation of Luzon, General Otis’s extension of our +occupation to the Visayan islands was reviewed, and in that connection +it was pointed out that each of the six largest of those islands to +wit, Panay, Negros, Cebu, Leyte, Samar, Bohol, might be ultimately +evolved into six states.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14321src" href= +"#xd20e14321" name="xd20e14321src">6</a></p> +<p>The smaller islands lying between Luzon and Mindanao could easily be +disposed of governmentally by being attached to the jurisdiction of one +of the said six islands.</p> +<p>There is to-day no reason why a dozen Americans could not be at once +appointed governors of the twelve prospective autonomous commonwealths +above indicated, just as the President of the United States has in the +past appointed governors for New Mexico, Arizona, and other territories +of the United States which have subsequently been admitted to the +Union. If the Congress of the United States should promise the +Filipinos independence, to be granted as soon as American authority in +the Islands should so recommend, the dozen territorial governments +intended to be evolved into states of an ultimate federal union could +soon be whipped into shape where they could take care of themselves to +the extent that our state governments to-day take care of themselves. +American representatives of American authority in the Islands, sent out +to work out such a programme, might be instructed to watch these twelve +territorial governments, granting to each the right to elect a governor +in lieu of the appointed governor as soon as in their judgment a given +territory was worthy of it. I have no doubt <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb637" href="#pb637" name="pb637">637</a>]</span>that +such recommendations would follow successively as to all of said +prospective states inside of four or five years. Whether this plan is +wise or not, it certainly is not, as far as I am concerned, “half +baked.” Some five years ago, in the <i>North American +Review</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14338src" href="#xd20e14338" +name="xd20e14338src">7</a> I suggested that Luzon could be so organized +within less than ten years by American territorial governors selected +for the work, naming the Honorable George Curry of New Mexico, formerly +Governor of the territory of New Mexico, and now a member of Congress +therefrom, as an ideal man to organize one such territory. It is true +that there are not eleven other men as well qualified for the work as +Governor Curry. In fact he is probably better qualified for the work +than any man living. The language used as to Governor Curry in the +<i>North American Review</i> article referred to was as follows:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">If the inhabitants of these regions were told by a man +whom they liked and would believe, as they would Curry, that they were +to have autonomous governments like one of the Western Territories of +the United States, at the very earliest possible moment, and urged to +get ready for it, they could and would, under his guidance. We would +get a co-operation from those people we do not now get and never will +get, so long as we keep them in uncertainty as to what we are going to +do with them. If next year we should formally disclaim intention to +retain the islands permanently, and set to work to create autonomous +Territories destined ultimately to be States of a Federated Philippine +Republic, whenever fit, we would soon see the way out of this tangle, +and behold the beginning of the end of it.</p> +</div> +<p>Whenever the twelve territorial governments should be gotten into +smooth working order under elected <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb638" +href="#pb638" name="pb638">638</a>]</span>native governors, the +Philippine archipelago would then be <i>nearly</i> ready for +independence, so far as its internal affairs are concerned. The danger +of their being annexed on the first pretext by some one of the great +land-grabbing powers should be met by our guaranteeing them their +independence, as we do Cuba, until they could be protected by +neutralization treaties, such as protect Belgium and Switzerland +to-day, as explained in the chapter which follows this. Powers not +specifically granted to the several states-in-embryo should of course, +until the final grant of independence, be reserved to the central +government at Manila. Manila and Rizal province would be available at +almost any time as a thirteenth state. So that when the twelve states +above suggested had shown themselves capable of local self-government, +Manila and Rizal province might be added to make the final one of +thirteen original states of a Philippine Republic.</p> +<p>Any American who has seen a Filipino <i>pueblo</i> transformed, as +if by magic, from listless apathy to a state of buzzing and busy +enthusiasm suggestive of a bee-hive, by preparations for some church +<i>fiesta</i>, or for the coming of some dignitary from Manila, has +seen something analogous to what would happen if the Filipino body +politic should suddenly be electrified by a promise of independence +under some such programme as the above. A generous rivalry would at +once ensue all over the archipelago in each of the twelve prospective +states. Each would seek to be the first to be recommended by American +authority as ready for statehood. I do not believe the annals of +national experience contain any analogy where every member of a given +community has rallied to a common cause more completely than the whole +Filipino people would rally to such a prospective programme of +independence. The <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb639" href="#pb639" +name="pb639">639</a>]</span>unanimity would be as absolute as the kind +we saw among the American people at the outbreak of the Spanish War, +when Congress one fine morning placed fifty millions of dollars at the +disposal of President McKinley by a unanimous vote.</p> +<p>I especially invite attention to the fact that the above programme +throws away nothing that has been done by us in the Islands in the last +twelve years in the way of organization. It simply takes it and builds +upon it. Congress should not attempt to work out the details from this +end of the line. We should send men out there from here to work them +out, with local co-operation from the leading Filipinos. Men animated +by the idea of working out a programme under which <i>the living</i> +may hope to see the independence of their country, should be sent out +to take the place of the men now there who are irrevocably committed to +the programme of indefinite retention with undeclared intention, which +holds out no hope to the living. It is not wise to arrange the details +of the programme by act of Congress without a year or two of study of +the situation by such men <i>on the ground</i>. An act of Congress +which goes into details before getting the recommendations of such men +will inevitably set up a lot of straw men easy for the other side to +knock down. All you need is a program, sanctioned by Congress, +containing a promise of independence, and men sent out to the islands +to work out the program. They would report back from time to time, and +the Congress by whose authority they went out would have no hesitation +in being guided by their recommendations. If unpatriotic greed for +office among the Filipinos, or other opposition animated by evil +motives, should block the game, your Americans so sent out would have +to recommend the calling of a halt. This ever-present shadow in the +background <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb640" href="#pb640" name= +"pb640">640</a>]</span>would in turn throw the shadow of ostracism over +all demagogues.</p> +<p>Meantime the Filipinos should be given a Senate, or upper house, in +which, the thirteen prospective “states” should be +represented by two men, the bill therefor to be framed out there, and +sent back here to Congress for approval. This would give them under the +plan here suggested, as soon as the Americans sent out should so +recommend, a Senate of twenty-six members. At present, if the native +Assembly, or lower house, does not pass the annual appropriations +necessary to run the government, the appropriation act of the preceding +year again becomes law. At present, the upper house is the Philippine +Commission. By withholding its consent, it can prevent any legislation +whatsoever. So, at present, the Assembly is little more than a debating +society. All questions as to appropriations, veto of legislation, and +other details, in the event the Filipinos are given a Senate also, +should be left to be fixed in the bill recommended by the men sent out +to work out the program of promise.</p> +<p>On March 20, 1912, Honorable W. A. Jones, the distinguished veteran +Congressman from Virginia, who is Chairman of the Committee on Insular +Affairs, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill entitled +“A bill to establish a qualified independence for the +Philippines, and to fix the date when such qualified independence shall +become absolute and complete.” The greater part of what precedes +this paragraph of this chapter was written prior to March 20, 1912. Mr. +Jones’s bill works out the details of the independence problem in +a manner somewhat different from the plan I suggest, but that does not +make me any the less heartily in favor of the principle which his bill +embodies. The supreme virtue of the Jones <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb641" href="#pb641" name="pb641">641</a>]</span>bill is that it +promises Independence at a fixed date, July 4, 1921. It ends the cruel +uncertainty, so unjust to both the Filipinos and to the Americans in +the Philippines, that is contained in the present program of indefinite +retention with undeclared intention. Five years ago, in the <i>North +American Review</i> for January 18, and June 21, 1907, the writer +hereof expressed the belief that an earlier date was feasible, +thus:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">If three strong and able men, familiar with insular +conditions, and still young enough to undertake the task<a class= +"noteref" id="xd20e14388src" href="#xd20e14388" name= +"xd20e14388src">8</a> were told by a President of the United States, by +authority of the Congress, “Go out there and set up a respectable +native government in ten years, and then come away,” they could +and would do it, and that government would be a success; and one of the +greatest moral victories in the annals of free government would have +been written by the gentlemen concerned upon the pages of their +country’s history.</p> +</div> +<p>As Mr. Jones’s bill allows four years more of time, I believe +it to be absolutely safe.</p> +<p>Governor Curry, the Congressman from New Mexico hereinabove +mentioned, who spent eight years in the Philippines, agrees with the +fundamental principle of the Jones bill, that as to making a definite +promise <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb642" href="#pb642" name= +"pb642">642</a>]</span>of Independence within a few years, and does not +consider 1921 too early.</p> +<p>Under the present law, the Philippine Assembly has some eighty +members, each supposed to represent 90,000 people, more or less. This +tallies, roughly, with the census total of population, which is +7,600,000.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14400src" href="#xd20e14400" +name="xd20e14400src">9</a> Under the existing law in the Philippines, +the qualifications for voting are really of two kinds, though nominally +of three kinds. There is a property qualification, and there is an +educational qualification. In any case, in order to vote, the +individual must be twenty-one years old, and must have lived for six +months in the place where he offers to vote. The property qualification +requires that the would-be voter own at least $250 worth of property, +or pay a tax to the amount of $15. The explanation of how a man may not +own $250 worth of property and yet pay $15 taxes is that under the old +Spanish system, which we partially adopted, a man might pay such +<i>cedula</i> or poll-tax as he preferred, according to a graduated +scale, certain civic rights being accorded to those voluntarily paying +the higher poll-tax which were denied to those paying less. The +educational qualification requires the would-be voter to speak, read, +and write either English or Spanish, or else to have held certain +enumerated small municipal offices under the Spaniards—before the +American occupation. Mr. Jones’s bill proposes to add the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb643" href="#pb643" name= +"pb643">643</a>]</span>speaking, reading, and writing of the native +dialect of a given locality<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14408src" href= +"#xd20e14408" name="xd20e14408src">10</a> to the educational +qualification. This would double, or perhaps triple, the electorate, +and would, in my judgment, be wise. Thousands upon thousands of natives +who only <i>speak</i> a little Spanish can both <i>speak, read, and +write</i> their native Tagalo, Ilocano, or Visayan, as the case may be. +The total of those qualified to vote for members of the Assembly in +1907 was only about 100,000. At a later election, that number was +doubled. If there are 7,500,000 people in the archipelago, one fifth of +these should represent the adult male population, say 1,500,000. Under +Mr. Jones’s bill, the electorate would probably increase to half +a million long before the date he proposes for independence, July 4, +1921. But all such details as qualification for voting might, it seems +to me, be left to people on the ground, their recommendations +controlling. Under a promise of independence by 1921, a very fair +electorate of at least one third, possibly one half, of the adult male +population, could be built up. As the majority report on the Jones +Bill, dated April 26, 1912, says:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">For nearly ten years the average public-school +enrolment has not been less than 500,000.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14421src" href="#xd20e14421" name="xd20e14421src">11</a></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb644" href="#pb644" name= +"pb644">644</a>]</span></p> +<p>I believe that the Moros should be left as they are for the present. +The time for solving that problem has not yet been reached. Mr. Jones +himself evidently bases his idea of allowing the Moro country +representation in the Philippine Congress, or legislature provided by +his bill, on the probability that enough Christian people will vote, +down there, to make up an electorate that would not be +“impossible,” <i>i.e.</i>, absurd. For instance, he tells +me that a great many people have moved into Mindanao from the northern +islands for commercial reasons, and, if I recollect correctly, that +Zamboanga, the most beautiful little port in Mindanao, which hardly had +10,000 people when I was there, now has possibly 50,000. But the Moro +question need not stand in the way of setting up an independent +government in the Philippines in 1921, as proposed by his bill. You +have material for thirteen original states, representing a population +of nearly seven million Christian people, in Luzon and the six main +Visayan Islands. Why delay the creation of this republic on account of +250,000 semi-civilized, crudely Mohammedan Moros in Mindanao—a +separate island lying off to the south of the proposed +republic?<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14430src" href="#xd20e14430" name= +"xd20e14430src">12</a> A happy solution of the matter would be to send +Mr. Jones out there as Governor-General and let him work out the +problem on the ground. He has had a long and distinguished career in +the public service, twenty-two years in Congress. His public record and +speeches on the Philippine question from the beginning would make him +to the Filipinos the very incarnation of a <i>bona fide</i> intention +on our part to give them their independence <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb645" href="#pb645" name="pb645">645</a>]</span>at +the earliest practical moment, that is, at some time which <i>the +living</i> might hope to see. When Governor Taft and Mr. Root drew the +Philippine Government Act of 1902, the former had already been +president of the Philippine Commission for two years, had been all over +the archipelago, and knew it well. Suppose the Taft policy should be +substituted by the more progressive Jones policy. Mr. Jones, or whoever +is to change the policy, ought to have as much acquaintance with the +subject, acquired on the ground, as Mr. Taft had when he formulated his +policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention. The nucleus +of the Taft policy was stated by Governor Taft to the Senate Committee +in 1902, as follows<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14445src" href= +"#xd20e14445" name="xd20e14445src">13</a>:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">My own judgment is that the best policy, if a policy +is to be declared at all, is to declare the intention of the United +States to hold the islands indefinitely, until the people shall show +themselves fit for self-government, under a gradually increasing +popular government, when their relation to the United States, either of +statehood, or of quasi-independence, like the colony of Australia or +Canada, can be declared after mutual conference.</p> +</div> +<p>The policy which Mr. Jones has favored for the last twelve years is +almost as well known to the Filipinos as are the views of Mr. Taft +himself.</p> +<p>In conclusion, the writer desires to say, with especial emphasis, +that the suggestions outlining the plan which forms the bulk of this +chapter are presented in a spirit of entire deference to the views of +any one else who may have considered this great subject carefully, +especially to the views of Mr. Jones, whose bill is so entirely right +in principle. The one supreme need of the situation is a definite +legislative declaration which <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb646" +href="#pb646" name="pb646">646</a>]</span>shall make clear to all +concerned—to the Filipino demagogue and the American grafter, as +well as to the great body of the good people of both races out +there—that the governing of a remote and alien people is to have +no permanent place in the purposes of our national life; and that we do +<i>bona fide</i> intend to give the Filipinos their independence at a +date in the future which will interest <i>the living</i>, by extending +to <i>the living</i> the hope to see the independence of their country. +And the Jones Bill does that. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb647" +href="#pb647" name="pb647">647</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14219" href="#xd20e14219src" name="xd20e14219">1</a></span> P. +252, <i>ante</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14232" href="#xd20e14232src" name="xd20e14232">2</a></span> P. +255.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14242" href="#xd20e14242src" name="xd20e14242">3</a></span> P. +258.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14252" href="#xd20e14252src" name="xd20e14252">4</a></span> Pp. +258–9.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14269" href="#xd20e14269src" name="xd20e14269">5</a></span> The +name is immaterial, but the grouping is convenient and practicable, +though not the only grouping practicable.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14321" href="#xd20e14321src" name="xd20e14321">6</a></span> +<i>See</i> p. 267, <i>ante</i>.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14338" href="#xd20e14338src" name="xd20e14338">7</a></span> For +June 21, 1907.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14388" href="#xd20e14388src" name="xd20e14388">8</a></span> In +the article quoted from I named three men, adding “or any three +men of like calibre.” One of the three was Justice Adam C. +Carson, of the Philippine Supreme Court, who has been a member of the +Philippine Judiciary since the Taft Civil Government was founded in +1901. If this book has gained for me any character in the estimation of +any reader who is or may hereafter be clothed with authority, I desire +to say here, on the very highest public grounds, that, in my judgment, +Judge Carson is the most considerable man we have out there now +(1912)—a good man to have in an emergency. Though not as learned +in the law as his colleague, Justice Johnson—who is quite the +equal, as a jurist, of most of the Federal judges I know in the United +States, Judge Carson is a man of great breadth of view, and is +peculiarly endowed with capacity to handle men and situations +effectively and patriotically.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14400" href="#xd20e14400src" name="xd20e14400">9</a></span> Says +the census of the Philippines of 1903, vol. ii., p. 15: “The +total population of the Philippine Archipelago on March 2, 1903, was +7,635,426. Of this number, 6,987,686 enjoyed a considerable degree of +civilization, while the remainder, 647,740, consisted of wild +people.” By this same Census, the Moros are classified as +uncivilized, and the population of the island on which they live, +Mindanao, is given at about 500,000 (499,634, vol. ii., p. 126), of +which about half only (252,940) are Moros, the rest being civilized. +The total of the uncivilized people of the archipelago, according to +the Census, is 647,740 (vol. ii., p. 123), less than 400,000, leaving +out the Moros.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14408" href="#xd20e14408src" name="xd20e14408">10</a></span> +Tagalo, Ilocano, and Visayan are the three main dialects that have been +evolved into written language by the patience of the Spanish priests in +the last couple of hundred years or so. Probably five sixths of the +people of the archipelago speak some one of these three dialects. In +fact they can hardly be called “dialects,” for there are +plenty of books—novels, plays, grammars, histories, dictionaries, +etc.—written in Tagalo, Ilocano, or Visayan. Every educated +Filipino of the well-to-do classes grows up speaking Spanish and the +dialect of his native province, while the latter is the only language +spoken by the less fortunate people of his neighborhood, the poorer +classes.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14421" href="#xd20e14421src" name="xd20e14421">11</a></span> This +report is numbered Report 606, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., and accompanies H. +R. 22143 (the Jones Bill).</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14430" href="#xd20e14430src" name="xd20e14430">12</a></span> +According to the <i>American Census of the Philippines</i>, of 1903, +the total population of Mindanao is 499,634 (see vol. ii., p. 126), of +which 252,940 are Moros, and the rest civilized. In addition to said +252,940 Moros on Mindanao, the adjacent islets contain some 25,000 +Moros.</p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd20e14445" href="#xd20e14445src" name="xd20e14445">13</a></span> See +<i>Senate Document</i> 331, 1902, p. 339.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div id="ch29" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="label">Chapter XXIX</h2> +<h2 class="main">The Way Out</h2> +<div class="epigraph"> +<p class="first">Respect for the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland +has now taken such lodgment in the conscience of Europe that its +violation would inevitably provoke a storm of indignation.</p> +<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">M. de Martens</span> in the +<i lang="fr">Revue des Deux Mondes</i>.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">On March 25, 1912, Honorable W. A. Jones, of Virginia, +Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced a +resolution (<i>H. J. 278</i>) proposing the neutralization of the +Philippines, to accompany his Philippine Independence Bill discussed in +the preceding chapter. Such a resolution, accompanying such a bill, +both introduced by one of the majority leaders in the House of +Representatives, lifts the question of Philippine neutralization out of +the region of the “academic,” and brings it forward as a +thing which must, sooner or later, command the serious consideration +both of Congress and the country. There have been many such resolutions +before that of Mr. Jones. But they are all the same in principle. All +contemplate our guaranteeing the Filipinos their independence until the +treaties they propose shall be consummated. In 1911, there were at +least nine such resolutions proposing neutralization of the +Philippines, introduced by the following named gentlemen, the first a +Republican, the rest Democrats:</p> +<p>Mr. McCall, of Massachusetts; Mr. Cline, of Indiana; <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb648" href="#pb648" name="pb648">648</a>]</span>Mr. +Sabath, of Illinois; Mr. Garner, of Texas; Mr. Peters, of +Massachusetts; Mr. Martin, of Colorado; Mr. Burgess, of Texas; Mr. +Oldfield, of Arkansas; and Mr. Ferris, of Oklahoma.</p> +<p>Because the neutralization plan to provide against the Philippines +being annexed by some other Power in case we ever give them their +independence would, if successfully worked out, reduce by that much the +possible area of war, and be a distinct step in the direction of +universal peace, it is certainly worthy of careful consideration by the +enlightened judgment of the Congress and the world.</p> +<p>Mr. McCall is the father of the neutralization idea, so far as the +House of Representatives is concerned, application of it to the +Philippines having been first suggested at the Universal Peace +Conference of 1904, by Mr. Erving Winslow, of Boston. Mr. McCall has +been introducing his neutralization resolution at every Congress for a +number of Congresses past.</p> +<p>The McCall Resolution (<i>H. J. Res. 107</i>) is the oldest, and +perhaps the simplest, of the various pending resolutions for the +neutralization of the Philippines, and is typical of all. It reads:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">JOINT RESOLUTION</p> +<p>Declaring the purpose of the United States to recognize the +independence of the Filipino people as soon as a stable government can +be established, and requesting the President to open negotiations for +the neutralization of the Philippine Islands.</p> +<p><i>Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United +States of America in Congress assembled</i>:</p> +<p>That in accordance with the principles upon which its government is +founded and which were again asserted by it at the outbreak of the war +with Spain, the United States <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb649" +href="#pb649" name="pb649">649</a>]</span>declares that the Filipino +people of right ought to be free and independent, and announces its +purpose to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government, +republican in form, can be established by them, and thereupon to +transfer to such government all its rights in the Philippine Islands +upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, and to leave the +sovereignty and control of their country to the Filipino people.</p> +<p><i>Resolved</i>, That the President of the United States be, and he +hereby is, requested to open negotiations with such foreign Powers as +in his opinion should be parties to the compact for the neutralization +of the Philippine Islands by international agreement.</p> +</div> +<p>If the McCall Resolution, or any one of the kindred resolutions, +were passed, and complied with by the President of the United States, +and accepted by the other Powers, and the Filipinos were helped to +organize territorial governments such as Arizona and New Mexico were +before they became States, several such territories could form the +nucleus about which to begin to build at once, as indicated in the +chapter on “The Road to Autonomy.” A number of such +territories could be made at once as completely autonomous as the +governments of the territories of Arizona and New Mexico were before +their admission to our Union. With those examples to emulate, together +with the tingling of the general blood that would follow a promise of +independence and a national life of their own, similar territorial +governments could be successively organized, as indicated in the +preceding chapter, throughout the archipelago. These could, in less +than ten years, be fitted for admission to a federal union of +autonomous territories, with the string of our sovereignty still tied +to it, and an American Governor-General still over the whole, as now. +And when the last island knocked <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb650" +href="#pb650" name="pb650">650</a>]</span>for admission and was +admitted, the string could be cut, and the Federal Union of Territories +admitted, through our good offices, to the sisterhood of nations, as an +independent Philippine republic. They would not bother the rest of the +world any more than Belgium and Switzerland do, which are likewise +protected by neutralization.</p> +<p>The idea of international neutralization is not without pride of +ancestry or hope of posterity. It was born out of the downfall of +Napoleon I. The Treaty of Paris of 1815 declared that</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, as +well as its independence of outside influences, are in conformity with +the true interests of European politics.</p> +</div> +<p>The Congress of Vienna, held afterwards in the same year, at which +there were present, besides the various monarchs, such men as +Wellington, Talleyrand, and Metternich, solemnly and finally reiterated +that declaration. Would not “the neutrality and +inviolability” of the Philippines be gladly acceded to by the +great Powers as being “in conformity with the true interests of +European politics,” and Asiatic politics as well?</p> +<p>Says M. De Martens, in an article in the <i lang="fr">Revue des Deux +Mondes</i> for November 15, 1903:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Respect for the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland +has now taken such lodgment in the conscience of the civilized nations +of Europe that its violation would inevitably provoke a storm of +indignation.</p> +</div> +<p>At present, the Philippines are a potential apple of discord thrown +into the Balance of Power in the Pacific. The present policy of +indefinite retention by us, with undeclared intention, leaves everybody +guessing, including <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb651" href="#pb651" +name="pb651">651</a>]</span>ourselves. Now is the accepted time, while +the horizon of the future is absolutely cloudless, to ask Japan to sign +a treaty agreeing not to annex the Philippine Islands after we give +them their independence. By her answer she will show her hand. The +overcrowded monarchies do not pretend any special scruples about +annexing anything annexable. Germany very frankly insists that she +became a great Power too late to get her rightful share of the +earth’s surface, and that she <i>must</i> expand somewhither. And +only the virile menace of the Monroe Doctrine has so far stayed her +heavy hand from seizing some portion of South America. But probably +none of the Powers would object to converting the Philippines into +permanently neutral territory, by the same kind of an agreement that +protects Switzerland.</p> +<p>The Treaty of London of 1831, relative to Belgium and Holland, +declares:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Within the limits indicated, Belgium shall form an +independent and perpetually neutral state. She shall be required to +observe this same neutrality toward all the other states.</p> +</div> +<p>The signatories to this treaty were Great Britain, France, Austria, +Prussia, and Russia. Forty years after it was made, during the +Franco-Prussian war, when Belgium’s neutrality was threatened by +manifestations of intention on the part both of France and of Prussia +to occupy some of her territory, England served notice on both parties +to the conflict that if either violated the territorial integrity of +Belgium, she, England, would join forces with the other. And the treaty +was observed. The specific way in which observance of it was compassed +was this: Great Britain made representations to both France and +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb652" href="#pb652" name= +"pb652">652</a>]</span>Germany which resulted in two identical +conventions, signed in August, 1870, at Paris and Berlin, whereby any +act of aggression by either against Belgium was to be followed by +England’s joining forces with the other against the aggressor. So +long as human nature does not change very materially, “the +green-eyed monster” will remain a powerful factor in human +affairs. The mutual jealousy of the Powers will always be the saving +grace, in troubled times, of neutralization treaties signed in time of +profound peace. If “Balance of Power” considerations in +Europe have protected the Turkish Empire from annexation or +dismemberment all these years, without a neutralization treaty, why +will not the mutual jealousy of the Powers insure the signing and +faithful observance of a treaty tending to preserve the Balance of +Power in the Pacific? Who would object?</p> +<p>The Panama Canal is to be opened in 1913. We want South America to +be a real friend to the Monroe Doctrine, which she certainly is not +enthusiastic about now, and will never be while we remain wedded to the +McKinley Doctrine of Benevolent Assimilation of unconsenting +people—people anxious to develop, under God, along their own +lines. In 1906, while Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Root +made a tour of South America. He told those people down there, at Rio +Janeiro, by way of quieting their fears lest we may some day be moved +to “improve” <i>their</i> condition also, through +benevolent assimilation and vigorous application of the +“uplift” treatment:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">We wish for * * * no territory except our +own. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and +weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as +those of the greatest empire, and we deem <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb653" href="#pb653" name="pb653">653</a>]</span>the observance of +that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of +the strong.</p> +</div> +<p>That Rio Janeiro speech of Mr. Root’s is as noble a +masterpiece of real eloquence, its setting and all considered, as any +utterance of any statesman of modern times. Among other things, he +said:</p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">No student of our times can fail to see that not +America alone but the whole civilized world is swinging away from its +old governmental moorings and intrusting the fate of its civilization +to the capacity of the popular mass to govern. By this pathway mankind +is to travel, whithersoever it leads. <i>Upon the success of this, our +great undertaking, the hope of humanity depends.</i></p> +</div> +<p>As Secretary of War, “civilizing with a Krag,” Mr. Root +reminds one of Cortez and Pizarro. As Secretary of State, he permits us +to believe that all the great men are not dead yet.</p> +<p>If, in making that Rio Janeiro speech, Mr. Root laid to his soul the +flattering unction that the minds of his hearers did not revert +dubiously to his previous grim missionary work in the Philippines, +where the percentage of literacy is superior to that of more than one +Latin-American republic, he is very much mistaken. If he is laboring +under any such delusion, let him read a book written since then by a +distinguished South American publicist, called <i>El Porvenir de La +Americana Latina</i> (“The Future of Latin America”). If he +does not read Spanish, he can divine the contents of the book from the +cartoon which adorns the title-page. The cartoon represents the +American eagle, flag in claw, standing on the map of North America, +looking toward South America as if ready for flight, its beak bent over +Panama, the shadow of its wings already darkening <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb654" href="#pb654" name="pb654">654</a>]</span>the +northern portions of the sister continent to the south of us. To get +the trade of South America, in the mighty struggle for commercial +supremacy which is to follow the opening of the Panama Canal, we must +win the confidence of South America. We will never do it until we do +the right thing by the Filipinos. Concerning the Philippines, South +America reflects that we annexed the first supposedly rich +non-contiguous Spanish country we ever had a chance to annex that we +had not previously solemnly vowed we would not annex. We must choose +between the Monroe Doctrine of mutually respectful Fraternal Relation, +which contemplates some twenty-one mutually trustful republics in the +Western Hemisphere, all a unit against alien colonization here, and the +McKinley Doctrine of grossly patronizing Benevolent Assimilation, which +contemplates some 8,000,000 of people in the Eastern Hemisphere, all a +unit against alien colonization there—a people, moreover, whose +friendship we have cultivated with the Gatling gun and the gallows, and +watered with tariff and other legislation enacted without knowledge and +used without shame.</p> +<p>We should stop running a kindergarten for adults in Asia, and get +back to the Monroe Doctrine. There are only two hemispheres to a +sphere, and our manifest destiny lies in the Western one. We do not +want the earth. Our mission as a nation is to conserve the republican +form of government, and the consent-of-the-governed principle, and to +promote the general peace of mankind by insuring it in our half of the +earth. The first thing to do to set this country right again is to get +rid of the Philippines, and give them a square deal, pursuant to the +spirit of the neutralization resolutions now pending before Congress. +All these resolutions contain the one supreme need of the hour, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb655" href="#pb655" name= +"pb655">655</a>]</span>an honest declaration of intention. The longer +we fight shy of that, the less likely we are ever to give the Filipinos +their independence, and the deeper we get into the mire of mistaken +philanthropy and covert exploitation.</p> +<p>We should resume our original programme of blazing out the path and +making clear the way up which any nation of the earth may follow when +it will. That path lies along the line of actually attempting as a +nation a practical demonstration of the Power of Righteousness, or, in +other words, the existence of an Omnipotent Omniscient Benevolent Good +(whether you spell it with one <i>o</i> or with two is not important) +shaping, guiding, and directing human affairs, such demonstration to be +made through the concerted action of a self-governing people under a +written Constitution based on equality of opportunity and the Golden +Rule.</p> +<p>As a people we are very young yet. It is not yet written in the Book +of Time how long this nation will survive. So far, our government is +only an experiment. But, as John Quincy Adams once said, it and its +Constitution are “an experiment upon the human heart,” to +see whether or not the Golden Rule will work in government among men. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb657" href="#pb657" name= +"pb657">657</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="back"> +<div id="index" class="div1 index"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">Index</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">(Ph. = Philippines or Philippine, according to +context. Pop. = population.)</p> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">A</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Abra province, <a href="#pb252" class= +"pageref">252</a></p> +<p>Adjutant-General Corbin, cablegrams of 1899 to Otis, <a href= +"#pb211" class="pageref">211</a>, <a href="#pb306" class= +"pageref">306</a></p> +<p>Agriculture, wealth of Ph. is in, <a href="#pb607" class= +"pageref">607</a>;<br> +Sugar Trust, Tobacco Trust, Hemp Trust, and Ph. sugar, tobacco, and +hemp, <a href="#pb560" class="pageref">560</a>–1, <a href= +"#pb565" class="pageref">565</a>, <a href="#pb569" class= +"pageref">569</a>–70<span class="corr" id="xd20e14640" title= +"Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb604" class= +"pageref">604</a>–622</p> +<p>Aguinaldo, personal equation of, <a href="#pb5" class= +"pageref">5</a>, <a href="#pb240" class="pageref">240</a>;<br> +present demeanor <a href="#pb6" class="pageref">6</a>;<br> +early dealings with Consul Pratt, <a href="#pb7" class= +"pageref">7</a>–15;<br> +and Wildman, <a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a>;<br> +with Admiral Dewey, <a href="#pb16" class= +"pageref">16</a>–45;<br> +with General Anderson, <a href="#pb46" class= +"pageref">46</a>–66;<br> +with Merritt, <a href="#pb67" class="pageref">67</a>–87;<br> +with Otis, <a href="#pb88" class="pageref">88</a>–106, <a href= +"#pb164" class="pageref">164</a>–185;<br> +escape through our lines, November, 1899, <a href="#pb246" class= +"pageref">246</a>;<br> +capture, 1901, <a href="#pb332" class="pageref">332</a>–9;<br> +takes oath of allegiance, <a href="#pb340" class="pageref">340</a>;<br> +issues proclamation, <a href="#pb341" class="pageref">341</a></p> +<p>Albay province, area and pop., <a href="#pb265" class= +"pageref">265</a>;<br> +insurrection of 1902–3 in, <a href="#pb432" class= +"pageref">432</a>–436</p> +<p>Alger, R. A., resigns as Secretary of War, <a href="#pb222" class= +"pageref">222</a></p> +<p>Allen, H. T., General, on constabulary loyalty, <a href="#pb403" +class="pageref">403</a>;<br> +on Samar situation in 1904, <a href="#pb480" class= +"pageref">480</a>–1, <a href="#pb488" class= +"pageref">488</a>;<br> +in 1906, <a href="#pb517" class="pageref">517</a></p> +<p>Ambos Camarines. see Camarines</p> +<p>American governors of Ph., 1898–1912, list of, <a href= +"#pb558" class="pageref">558</a></p> +<p>American Imperialism contrasted with British, <a href="#pb127" +class="pageref">127</a>, <a href="#pb449" class="pageref">449</a></p> +<p>“American Ireland,” why make Ph., <a href="#pb508" +class="pageref">508</a></p> +<p>American troops, total in Ph., February 4, 1899, <a href="#pb186" +class="pageref">186</a>;<br> +total employed in Ph. insurrection, <a href="#pb316" class= +"pageref">316</a>;<br> +cost of, to-day, <a href="#pb600" class="pageref">600</a></p> +<p><i>Amigo</i>, campaign meaning of, <a href="#pb201" class= +"pageref">201</a>, <a href="#pb242" class="pageref">242</a></p> +<p>Anderson, T. M., General, dealings with Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb46" +class="pageref">46</a>–66</p> +<p>Angeles, MacArthur’s advance from, <a href="#pb238" class= +"pageref">238</a></p> +<p>“Anti-expansionist,” Eighth Army Corps overwhelmingly +so, <a href="#pb192" class="pageref">192</a>, <a href="#pb199" class= +"pageref">199</a></p> +<p>Archipelago, Ph., geography simplified, <a href="#pb228" class= +"pageref">228</a></p> +<p>Aringay fight, <a href="#pb119" class="pageref">119</a></p> +<p>Army songs of Ph.: under Otis, <a href="#pb186" class= +"pageref">186</a>;<br> +under MacArthur, <a href="#pb270" class="pageref">270</a>;<br> +under Chaffee, <a href="#pb392" class="pageref">392</a></p> +<p>Army, Taft belittling of work of, <a href="#pb299" class= +"pageref">299</a>;<br> +annual cost of, in Ph., to-day, <a href="#pb600" class= +"pageref">600</a>–03</p> +<p>Army and Navy Journal, <a href="#pb569" class="pageref">569</a></p> +<p>Arnold, Commander, U. S. N., <a href="#pb236" class= +"pageref">236</a></p> +<p>Arnold, J. R., on Ph. Civil Service, <a href="#pb587" class= +"pageref">587</a>–590</p> +<p>Aryat, Lawton’s advance from, <a href="#pb234" class= +"pageref">234</a></p> +<p>Assembly, Philippine, opening of, <a href="#pb550" class= +"pageref">550</a>;<br> +address of Secretary Taft, <a href="#pb552" class="pageref">552</a></p> +<p>Autonomy, road to, <a href="#pb633" class= +"pageref">633</a>–646</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">B</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Bacon, A. O., speech in Senate, January 18, 1899, +<a href="#pb163" class="pageref">163</a>;<br> +resolution of 1899, <a href="#pb175" class= +"pageref">175</a>–7;<br> +vote on, <a href="#pb178" class="pageref">178</a>–9;<br> +letter to author <a href="#pb181" class="pageref">181</a>–2;<br> +attitude about Bell and Batangas, <a href="#pb393" class= +"pageref">393</a></p> +<p>Bacoor, convention of, Aug. 6, 1898, <a href="#pb71" class= +"pageref">71</a>–2;<br> +insurgent capital moved from, to Malolos, <a href="#pb95" class= +"pageref">95</a>–6</p> +<p>Balangiga massacre, <a href="#pb377" class="pageref">377</a></p> +<p>Bandholtz, Col., Albay insurrection, <a href="#pb423" class= +"pageref">423</a>–5</p> +<p>Barcelon <i>vs.</i> Baker, <a href="#pb511" class= +"pageref">511</a>–12, <a href="#pb534" class="pageref">534</a> +<i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Barrett, John, on Malolos congress, <a href="#pb103" class= +"pageref">103</a>–4</p> +<p>Barry, T. H., General, letter to Secretary Root, <a href="#pb334" +class="pageref">334</a></p> +<p>Bass, John F., war correspondent, on insurgent campaign against +Manila, May–July, 1898, <a href="#pb82" class= +"pageref">82</a>;<br> +on Iloilo fiasco, <a href="#pb153" class="pageref">153</a>, <a href= +"#pb157" class="pageref">157</a>;<br> +on MacArthur’s advance on Caloocan, <a href="#pb195" class= +"pageref">195</a>–8;<br> +signer of round robin, <a href="#pb219" class="pageref">219</a>, +<a href="#pb221" class="pageref">221</a></p> +<p>Bataan province, area and pop. <a href="#pb256" class= +"pageref">256</a></p> +<p>Batangas province, area and pop. <a href="#pb263" class= +"pageref">263</a>;<br> +insurrection of, 1901–02 in, <a href="#pb371" class= +"pageref">371</a> <i>et seq.</i>; <a href="#pb384" class= +"pageref">384</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> +losses by the war, <a href="#pb597" class="pageref">597</a>–8</p> +<p>Batchelor, J. B., Captain, overruns Cagayan valley, <a href="#pb253" +class="pageref">253</a>–4</p> +<p>Bates, J. C., General, First Division, Eighth Corps, succeeding +Lawton, <a href="#pb260" class="pageref">260</a> <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb658" href="#pb658" name="pb658">658</a>]</span></p> +<p>Batson, Matthew A., Major, wounded at Aringay, <a href="#pb119" +class="pageref">119</a>, <a href="#pb246" class="pageref">246</a></p> +<p>Bayambang, council of war, <a href="#pb241" class= +"pageref">241</a>–2</p> +<p>Belgium, neutralization of, <a href="#pb651" class= +"pageref">651</a></p> +<p>Bell, J. F., General, estimate of Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb5" class= +"pageref">5</a>;<br> +report, August, 1898, <a href="#pb74" class="pageref">74</a>, <a href= +"#pb142" class="pageref">142</a>;<br> +in advance on Caloocan, <a href="#pb197" class="pageref">197</a>;<br> +Colonel <a href="#pb36" class="pageref">36</a>th Vol. Inf., <a href= +"#pb237" class="pageref">237</a>;<br> +in Batangas, <a href="#pb386" class="pageref">386</a> <i>et +seq.</i></p> +<p>Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, <a href="#pb139" class= +"pageref">139</a>–151;<br> +a Pandora Box, <a href="#pb151" class="pageref">151</a>;<br> +Otis’s doctoring of, <a href="#pb164" class="pageref">164</a>, +<a href="#pb191" class="pageref">191</a>;<br> +Aguinaldo’s counter-proclamation, <a href="#pb169" class= +"pageref">169</a>;<br> +Filipinos in 1898 like Canadians in 1911, <a href="#pb284" class= +"pageref">284</a>–5</p> +<p>Benguet province, area and pop. <a href="#pb252" class= +"pageref">252</a></p> +<p>Biac-na-Bato, treaty of, <a href="#pb3" class="pageref">3</a></p> +<p>Biñang fight, <a href="#pb261" class="pageref">261</a></p> +<p>Bishop. Wm. H., Major, charges against considered, <a href="#pb200" +class="pageref">200</a>–202</p> +<p>Bitterness, of war, <a href="#pb198" class= +"pageref">198</a>–205; <a href="#pb299" class= +"pageref">299</a></p> +<p>“Black Hole of” Albay, <a href="#pb501" class= +"pageref">501</a></p> +<p>“Blame of those ye better,” policy, <a href="#pb448" +class="pageref">448</a></p> +<p>Bliss, C. N., Sec’y of Interior, sends geologist to Ph., +<a href="#pb48" class="pageref">48</a></p> +<p>Blount, J. H., with Maccabebe scouts, <a href="#pb235" class= +"pageref">235</a>, <a href="#pb261" class="pageref">261</a>;<br> +army to bench, <a href="#pb361" class="pageref">361</a>;<br> +<i>cochero</i> incident, <a href="#pb366" class="pageref">366</a>;<br> +Justice of Peace incident, <a href="#pb368" class= +"pageref">368</a>;<br> +Ola incident, <a href="#pb435" class="pageref">435</a>;<br> +resignation as judge, <a href="#pb499" class="pageref">499</a></p> +<p>Blunder of taking Ph., admitted by Taft, <a href="#pb44" class= +"pageref">44</a>, <a href="#pb291" class="pageref">291</a></p> +<p>Bohol, area, pop. etc., <a href="#pb228" class= +"pageref">228</a>;<br> +disturbances of 1901–2, <a href="#pb371" class="pageref">371</a> +<i>et seq<span class="corr" id="xd20e15211" title= +"Not in source">.</span></i>;<br> +proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href= +"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a></p> +<p>“Boss, Am I the,” <a href="#pb186" class= +"pageref">186</a></p> +<p>Boutelle, Lieut., killed in action, <a href="#pb235" class= +"pageref">235</a></p> +<p>Bowers, Lieut., testimony on Samar massacres, <a href="#pb458" +class="pageref">458</a>;<br> +wounded, <a href="#pb516" class="pageref">516</a></p> +<p>Bray, Mr., of Singapore, <a href="#pb4" class="pageref">4</a></p> +<p>Brent, C. H., Bishop, <a href="#pb580" class="pageref">580</a> <i>et +seq.</i></p> +<p>Bryan, W. J., position on Treaty of Paris, <a href="#pb130" class= +"pageref">130</a>;<br> +on Filipino capacity for self-government, <a href="#pb296" class= +"pageref">296</a>–7</p> +<p>Bulacan province, area and pop. <a href="#pb233" class= +"pageref">233</a></p> +<p>Burgess neutralisation resolution, <a href="#pb648" class= +"pageref">648</a></p> +<p>Burke, on “Conciliation with America,” revised, <a href= +"#pb323" class="pageref">323</a></p> +<p>Butt, A. W., Major, <a href="#pb76" class="pageref">76</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">C</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Caducoy, Juliano, Samar brigand, <a href="#pb456" +class="pageref">456</a>–7</p> +<p>Cagayan, province, area and pop. <a href="#pb255" class= +"pageref">255</a>;<br> +proposed State of, <a href="#pb255" class="pageref">255</a>, <a href= +"#pb634" class="pageref">634</a></p> +<p>Cailies, Juan, General, assassination orders, <a href="#pb314" +class="pageref">314</a>;<br> +surrender, <a href="#pb341" class="pageref">341</a></p> +<p>Calderon, Lieut., list of Samar massacres of 1904, <a href="#pb460" +class="pageref">460</a>–7</p> +<p>California regiment earns laurels, Feb’y 4–5, 1899, +<a href="#pb193" class="pageref">193</a></p> +<p>Caloocan, advance on, <a href="#pb195" class="pageref">195</a>;<br> +capture, <a href="#pb207" class="pageref">207</a></p> +<p>Calumpit, capture of, by MacArthur, <a href="#pb212" class= +"pageref">212</a>;<br> +Funston’s river-crossing incident, <a href="#pb212" class= +"pageref">212</a></p> +<p>Camarines, province of, area and pop. <a href="#pb265" class= +"pageref">265</a>;<br> +proposed State of, <a href="#pb265" class="pageref">265</a>–6, +<a href="#pb635" class="pageref">635</a></p> +<p>Campaign songs of Ph.:<br> +under Otis, <a href="#pb186" class="pageref">186</a>;<br> +under MacArthur, <a href="#pb270" class="pageref">270</a>;<br> +under Chaffee, <a href="#pb392" class="pageref">392</a></p> +<p>Capacity for self-government, of Filipinos:<br> +Gen. Chas. King on, <a href="#pb273" class="pageref">273</a>;<br> +Dewey on, <a href="#pb41" class="pageref">41</a>;<br> +Bass, J. F., on, <a href="#pb82" class="pageref">82</a>;<br> +Barrett, John, on, <a href="#pb103" class="pageref">103</a>;<br> +Dr. Heiser<span class="corr" id="xd20e15404" title= +"Not in source">,</span> on<span class="corr" id="xd20e15407" title= +"Not in source">,</span> <a href="#pb104" class="pageref">104</a>;<br> +author’s views, <a href="#pb105" class="pageref">105</a>;<br> +Wilcox and Sargent’s<span class="corr" id="xd20e15421" title= +"Not in source">,</span> <a href="#pb120" class="pageref">120</a>;<br> +Gen. Merrit’s, <a href="#pb190" class="pageref">190</a>;<br> +Mr. Bryan’s, <a href="#pb296" class="pageref">296</a></p> +<p>Capital punishment, author’s views on, <a href="#pb320" class= +"pageref">320</a>–24</p> +<p>Capture of Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb332" class= +"pageref">332</a>–9</p> +<p>Carabo Society, <a href="#pb278" class="pageref">278</a></p> +<p>Carabaos, destruction of <a href="#pb90" class="pageref">90</a>%, +<a href="#pb399" class="pageref">399</a></p> +<p>Carnegie, Andrew, Roosevelt-Taft supper-table confession to, about +Ph., <a href="#pb612" class="pageref">612</a>–13</p> +<p>Carpet-bag feature of Taft civil government, <a href="#pb304" class= +"pageref">304</a></p> +<p>Carson, A. C., army to bench, <a href="#pb361" class= +"pageref">361</a>;<br> +call on author, <a href="#pb502" class="pageref">502</a>;<br> +estimate of, <a href="#pb641" class="pageref">641</a></p> +<p>Carter, W. H., General, and Samar, in 1904, <a href="#pb454" class= +"pageref">454</a>, <a href="#pb465" class="pageref">465</a>, <a href= +"#pb506" class="pageref">506</a>–7</p> +<p>Cartoon, Filipino, of 1899, <a href="#pb191" class= +"pageref">191</a>–2</p> +<p>Casiguran Bay, <a href="#pb335" class="pageref">335</a></p> +<p>Castner, Joseph, Lieut., <a href="#pb253" class= +"pageref">253</a></p> +<p>Catholic Church in Ph., <a href="#pb134" class= +"pageref">134</a>;<br> +Taft and, <a href="#pb563" class="pageref">563</a></p> +<p>Cavite, province, area and pop. <a href="#pb263" class= +"pageref">263</a>;<br> +proposed State of, <a href="#pb263" class="pageref">263</a>–4, +<a href="#pb635" class="pageref">635</a></p> +<p>Cebu, area and pop. <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br> +disturbances of 1901–2 in, <a href="#pb371" class= +"pageref">371</a>;<br> +proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href= +"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a></p> +<p>Censorship of press, Otis’s, <a href="#pb219" class= +"pageref">219</a>;<br> +round robin, <a href="#pb220" class="pageref">220</a></p> +<p>Chaffee A. R., General, reprimanded by Roosevelt, <a href="#pb376" +class="pageref">376</a>;<br> +differences with Taft, <a href="#pb377" class="pageref">377</a></p> +<p>Chapelle, Archbishop, opinion of Otis, <a href="#pb88" class= +"pageref">88</a>;<br> +on the $20,000,000, <a href="#pb133" class= +"pageref">133</a>–4</p> +<p>Chase, Captain, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p> +<p>Church property in Ph., <a href="#pb134" class= +"pageref">134</a>;<br> +Taft and, <a href="#pb563" class="pageref">563</a></p> +<p>Civil government of 1901, prematurity of, <a href="#pb300" class= +"pageref">300</a>;<br> +general view of, <a href="#pb362" class="pageref">362</a></p> +<p>Civil Service of Ph., <a href="#pb473" class="pageref">473</a>, +<a href="#pb587" class="pageref">587</a></p> +<p>Cleveland Grover, on Ph., <a href="#pb183" class="pageref">183</a> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb659" href="#pb659" name= +"pb659">659</a>]</span></p> +<p>Cline neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb647" class= +"pageref">647</a></p> +<p>Coghlan, Capt. U. S. N., capture of Spanish garrison at Olongapo, +<a href="#pb44" class="pageref">44</a></p> +<p>Collins, Robert, war correspondent, round robin incident, <a href= +"#pb219" class="pageref">219</a></p> +<p>“Colonization, we blundered into,” Taft, <a href="#pb44" +class="pageref">44</a>, <a href="#pb291" class="pageref">291</a>;<br> +apotheosis of, <a href="#pb486" class="pageref">486</a>–490</p> +<p>Commerce, <a href="#pb604" class="pageref">604</a> <i>et +seq.</i></p> +<p>Commission, Philippine: Schurman, <a href="#pb31" class= +"pageref">31</a>, <a href="#pb171" class="pageref">171</a>, <a href= +"#pb217" class="pageref">217</a>;<br> +Taft, <a href="#pb282" class="pageref">282</a>–344</p> +<p>Congressional legislation, <a href="#pb604" class= +"pageref">604</a>–622</p> +<p>Constabulary, early uncertainty about, <a href="#pb403" class= +"pageref">403</a>;<br> +inadequacy of, <a href="#pb404" class="pageref">404</a></p> +<p>Copra, <a href="#pb607" class="pageref">607</a></p> +<p>Corbin, Adjutant-General, on “impatience of the [American] +people” in 1899, <a href="#pb211" class="pageref">211</a>, +<a href="#pb306" class="pageref">306</a></p> +<p>Correspondents, war, round robin, <a href="#pb219" class= +"pageref">219</a></p> +<p>Cost of living in Ph., <a href="#pb588" class= +"pageref">588</a>–590</p> +<p>Cost of Ph., annual now, <a href="#pb600" class= +"pageref">600</a>;<br> +total, in life and money, <a href="#pb595" class="pageref">595</a> +<i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Crowder, E. H., Lieut.-Col., <a href="#pb158" class= +"pageref">158</a>, <a href="#pb201" class="pageref">201</a></p> +<p>Currency, <a href="#pb522" class="pageref">522</a>, <a href="#pb565" +class="pageref">565</a></p> +<p>Curry, George, <a href="#pb413" class="pageref">413</a>, <a href= +"#pb508" class="pageref">508</a>, <a href="#pb515" class= +"pageref">515</a>, <a href="#pb637" class="pageref">637</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">D</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Davis, C. K., Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122" +class="pageref">122</a></p> +<p>Davis, O. K., war correspondent, quoted <a href="#pb82" class= +"pageref">82</a>;<br> +signs round robin, <a href="#pb219" class="pageref">219</a></p> +<p>Day, Wm. R., Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122" class= +"pageref">122</a>;<br> +position, <a href="#pb134" class="pageref">134</a></p> +<p>Declaration of Independence, Aguinaldo’s, <a href="#pb38" +class="pageref">38</a>;<br> +Bacoor convention, <a href="#pb71" class="pageref">71</a></p> +<p>Defencelessness of Philippines, <a href="#pb565" class= +"pageref">565</a></p> +<p>Denby, Charles, <a href="#pb273" class="pageref">273</a>–5</p> +<p><i>Denver Post’s</i> Japanese proposition, <a href="#pb161" +class="pageref">161</a></p> +<p>Department [military] of Northern Luzon, Districts of, <a href= +"#pb252" class="pageref">252</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> +of Southern Luzon, <a href="#pb263" class="pageref">263</a>–5</p> +<p>Despotism, Ph. Government a benevolent, <a href="#pb439" class= +"pageref">439</a>–41</p> +<p>De Veyra, Jaime, <a href="#pb505" class="pageref">505</a></p> +<p>Dewey, George, Admiral, original telegram to Aguinaldo, <a href= +"#pb7" class="pageref">7</a>;<br> +at Hong Kong before battle of Manila Bay, <a href="#pb16" class= +"pageref">16</a>;<br> +the battle, <a href="#pb16" class="pageref">16</a>;<br> +subsequent dealings with Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb20" class= +"pageref">20</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> +cablegram about Filipino superiority to Cubans, <a href="#pb41" class= +"pageref">41</a>;<br> +position against annexation of Ph., <a href="#pb45" class= +"pageref">45</a>, <a href="#pb125" class="pageref">125</a>;<br> +issue with Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb189" class="pageref">189</a></p> +<p>Dingley Act, <a href="#pb605" class="pageref">605</a>, <a href= +"#pb608" class="pageref">608</a>, <a href="#pb611" class= +"pageref">611</a>, <a href="#pb615" class="pageref">615</a></p> +<p>Dodd, Captain, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p> +<p>Dubois, Senator, Taft party of 1905, <a href="#pb356" class= +"pageref">356</a>–7</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">E</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Education, <a href="#pb566" class="pageref">566</a>, +<a href="#pb643" class="pageref">643</a></p> +<p>Edwards, Clarence R., Colonel, conspicuous gallantry in early +fighting, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>;<br> +desk general since, <a href="#pb211" class="pageref">211</a>;<br> +admits Ph. indefensible, <a href="#pb565" class="pageref">565</a></p> +<p>Eight Army Corps, overwhelmingly against annexing Ph., <a href= +"#pb192" class="pageref">192</a>, <a href="#pb198" class= +"pageref">198</a></p> +<p>Ethnological homogeneity of Filipinos, <a href="#pb295" class= +"pageref">295</a>, <a href="#pb298" class="pageref">298</a>, <a href= +"#pb318" class="pageref">318</a></p> +<p>Europe’s smiles of 1899–1900, <a href="#pb289" class= +"pageref">289</a></p> +<p>Exploitation, Filipino apprehensions, <a href="#pb183" class= +"pageref">183</a>;<br> +constant American pressure for, <a href="#pb559" class= +"pageref">559</a></p> +<p>Export tax, constitutionality of, questioned, <a href="#pb619" +class="pageref">619</a>, <a href="#pb621" class="pageref">621</a>;<br> +depressing effect on hemp industry, <a href="#pb604" class= +"pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">F</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Family life of Filipinos, <a href="#pb491" class= +"pageref">491</a></p> +<p>February 4, 1899, battle of, <a href="#pb193" class= +"pageref">193</a></p> +<p>Feito, Governor of Samar, 1904, during the massacres, <a href= +"#pb461" class="pageref">461</a>–2</p> +<p>Fergusson, A. W., on Winthrop appointment, <a href="#pb443" class= +"pageref">443</a>;<br> +on Ph. Civil Service, <a href="#pb590" class= +"pageref">590</a>–3;<br> +death, <a href="#pb593" class="pageref">593</a></p> +<p>Ferris neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class= +"pageref">648</a></p> +<p>Filipinos, traits in peace and war, <a href="#pb185" class= +"pageref">185</a>;<br> +hospitality, <a href="#pb119" class="pageref">119</a>;<br> +calibre of educated, <a href="#pb103" class="pageref">103</a></p> +<p>First Expedition to Ph., McKinley on, <a href="#pb46" class= +"pageref">46</a>–7</p> +<p>Forbes, Gov.<span class="corr" id="xd20e16042" title= +"Not in source">,</span> <a href="#pb558" class= +"pageref">558</a>–570</p> +<p>Freedom re-defined, <a href="#pb304" class= +"pageref">304</a>–5</p> +<p>Friar lands, Governor Taft and, <a href="#pb563" class= +"pageref">563</a>–4</p> +<p>Frye, Wm. P., Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122" class= +"pageref">122</a>;<br> +position, <a href="#pb132" class="pageref">132</a>–3</p> +<p>Funston, Frederick, General, crosses river under fire, <a href= +"#pb212" class="pageref">212</a>;<br> +captures Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb332" class= +"pageref">332</a>–9</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">G</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Garner neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" +class="pageref">648</a></p> +<p>Geography of Ph., <a href="#pb225" class= +"pageref">225</a>–8</p> +<p>Gilmore, Lieut., U. S. N., capture, <a href="#pb257" class= +"pageref">257</a>;<br> +rescue, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p> +<p>Governors of Ph., American, 1898–1912, list of, <a href= +"#pb558" class="pageref">558</a>;<br> +their great power, <a href="#pb439" class="pageref">439</a></p> +<p>Gray, George, Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122" class= +"pageref">122</a>;<br> +position, <a href="#pb129" class="pageref">129</a>, <a href="#pb135" +class="pageref">135</a></p> +<p>Green, Jimmie (American “Tommy Atkins”), sentiments in +1898, at Manila, about “expansion,” <a href="#pb172" class= +"pageref">172</a></p> +<p>Guerrilla warfare decreed by insurgents, <a href="#pb242" class= +"pageref">242</a>;<br> +tactics described, <a href="#pb310" class="pageref">310</a></p> +<p>Guzman case, <a href="#pb113" class="pageref">113</a>–14</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">H</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Hannay, Lieut., <a href="#pb248" class= +"pageref">248</a></p> +<p>Hardin, E. E., Col., <a href="#pb266" class="pageref">266</a></p> +<p>Hardwick, T. W., M. C., <a href="#pb482" class="pageref">482</a> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb660" href="#pb660" name= +"pb660">660</a>]</span></p> +<p>Hare, L. R., Col., <a href="#pb237" class="pageref">237</a></p> +<p>Harvester Trust, <a href="#pb561" class="pageref">561</a>–2, +<a href="#pb570" class="pageref">570</a>, <a href="#pb610" class= +"pageref">610</a>–11, <a href="#pb619" class= +"pageref">619</a></p> +<p>Harvey. G. R. Ass’t Atty. Gen., <a href="#pb469" class= +"pageref">469</a>–70, <a href="#pb479" class= +"pageref">479</a>–483</p> +<p>“Hate,” etc., policy, <a href="#pb448" class= +"pageref">448</a></p> +<p>Hazzard, Captain, <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p> +<p>Hazzard, Lieut., <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p> +<p>Heat prostrations of 1899, <a href="#pb208" class= +"pageref">208</a>–9</p> +<p>Heidt, G. V., Lieut., <a href="#pb248" class="pageref">248</a></p> +<p>Heiser, Dr., on Ph. Assembly, <a href="#pb104" class= +"pageref">104</a></p> +<p>Hemp, Governor Forbes’s reticence about, <a href="#pb561" +class="pageref">561</a>;<br> +Congressional legislation concerning, <a href="#pb604" class= +"pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> +American corner on, <a href="#pb611" class= +"pageref">611</a>–12</p> +<p>Hierarchy, Ph. official, imperious influence, <a href="#pb439" +class="pageref">439</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Higgins, R. R. manager, <a href="#pb101" class="pageref">101</a></p> +<p>Hoar, Senator, interview with McKinley, <a href="#pb145" class= +"pageref">145</a>;<br> +declines deliver eulogy on, <a href="#pb627" class= +"pageref">627</a></p> +<p>Home life of Filipinos, <a href="#pb491" class="pageref">491</a></p> +<p>Homogeneity of Ph. people:<br> +Taft on, <a href="#pb295" class="pageref">295</a>;<br> +American census on, <a href="#pb298" class="pageref">298</a>;<br> +MacArthur on, <a href="#pb318" class="pageref">318</a>.<br> +See <a href="#pb133" class="pageref">133</a></p> +<p>Hong Kong Junta, minutes of, May 4, 1898, <a href="#pb25" class= +"pageref">25</a>, <a href="#pb96" class="pageref">96</a>–7</p> +<p>Howland, C. R., Captain, <a href="#pb238" class= +"pageref">238</a></p> +<p>Howze, R. L., Lt.-Col., <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p> +<p>Hughes, General, <a href="#pb186" class="pageref">186</a></p> +<p>Humor, Filipino, cartoon, <a href="#pb191" class= +"pageref">191</a>–2</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">I</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Ickis, W. H., army to bench, <a href="#pb361" class= +"pageref">361</a></p> +<p>Ide, H. C., certain statements by, examined, <a href="#pb469" class= +"pageref">469</a>, <a href="#pb477" class="pageref">477</a>–9, +<a href="#pb486" class="pageref">486</a>–7;<br> +succeeds Gov. Wright, <a href="#pb515" class="pageref">515</a>;<br> +resigns, <a href="#pb521" class="pageref">521</a>;<br> +estimate of, <a href="#pb522" class="pageref">522</a></p> +<p>Igorottes, <a href="#pb575" class="pageref">575</a>–6</p> +<p>Ilocanos, “Yankees of” Ph., <a href="#pb247" class= +"pageref">247</a></p> +<p>Ilocos, proposed State of, <a href="#pb252" class= +"pageref">252</a>–3, <a href="#pb634" class="pageref">634</a></p> +<p>Ilocos Norte area and pop. <a href="#pb252" class= +"pageref">252</a></p> +<p>Ilocos Sur area and pop. <a href="#pb252" class= +"pageref">252</a></p> +<p>Iloilo fiasco, <a href="#pb152" class= +"pageref">152</a>–163</p> +<p>Iloilo speech of Governor Taft, 1903, <a href="#pb437" class= +"pageref">437</a>–8</p> +<p>Imperialism, American and British, compared, <a href="#pb127" class= +"pageref">127</a>, <a href="#pb449" class="pageref">449</a></p> +<p>Independence, Declaration of, Aguinaldo’s first formal, +<a href="#pb38" class="pageref">38</a>;<br> +Bacoor convention, <a href="#pb71" class="pageref">71</a>;<br> +ante-bellum minutes of Hong Kong Junta, <a href="#pb25" class= +"pageref">25</a></p> +<p>Insurrection proper, 1899–1901, <a href="#pb186" class= +"pageref">186</a>–344;<br> +of 1901–2, <a href="#pb371" class= +"pageref">371</a>–402;<br> +of 1903, <a href="#pb409" class="pageref">409</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> +of 1904, <a href="#pb452" class="pageref">452</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> +of 1905, <a href="#pb506" class="pageref">506</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> +Leyte disorders of 1906, <a href="#pb518" class="pageref">518</a> <i>et +seq.</i></p> +<p>International Harvester Company, <a href="#pb607" class= +"pageref">607</a>, <a href="#pb610" class="pageref">610</a>, <a href= +"#pb619" class="pageref">619</a>–20</p> +<p>Iowa, <a href="#pb51" class="pageref">51</a>st, at Iloilo, <a href= +"#pb155" class="pageref">155</a></p> +<p>Isabela province, area and pop. <a href="#pb255" class= +"pageref">255</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">J</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Japan and the Philippines, <a href="#pb328" class= +"pageref">328</a>–331</p> +<p>Jellyby, Mrs., Uncle Sam as, <a href="#pb358" class= +"pageref">358</a></p> +<p>Johnson, Justice, <a href="#pb641" class="pageref">641</a></p> +<p>Joint High Parleying Board, Otis’s, <a href="#pb173" class= +"pageref">173</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Jones, Captain, wounded, <a href="#pb516" class= +"pageref">516</a></p> +<p>Jones Independence Bill, <a href="#pb640" class="pageref">640</a> +<i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Jones neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb647" class= +"pageref">647</a></p> +<p>Judiciary, Ph., its greatest need, <a href="#pb572" class= +"pageref">572</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">K</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Katipunan Society, <a href="#pb113" class= +"pageref">113</a></p> +<p>Kenly, W. L., Lieut., <a href="#pb214" class="pageref">214</a></p> +<p>Kidd, Benj., <a href="#pb486" class="pageref">486</a></p> +<p>Kindness, Taft ideas on, <a href="#pb304" class= +"pageref">304</a></p> +<p>King, Charles, General, views, <a href="#pb273" class= +"pageref">273</a></p> +<p>King. Edw. L., Lieut., <a href="#pb244" class="pageref">244</a></p> +<p>Kipling, R., <a href="#pb486" class="pageref">486</a></p> +<p>Knox, Commander, U. S. N., <a href="#pb236" class= +"pageref">236</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">L</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">“Lack of a common language” fetich, +<a href="#pb298" class="pageref">298</a></p> +<p>Laguna province, area and population, <a href="#pb263" class= +"pageref">263</a>;<br> +disturbances of 1901–2, <a href="#pb372" class= +"pageref">372</a>;<br> +of 1905, <a href="#pb509" class="pageref">509</a></p> +<p>Lands, Friar, <i>see</i> Friar lands</p> +<p>Language, lack of a common, discussed, <a href="#pb298" class= +"pageref">298</a></p> +<p>Lawton, H. W., General, arrives, <a href="#pb209" class= +"pageref">209</a>;<br> +Laguna expedition, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>;<br> +“this accursed war,” <a href="#pb211" class= +"pageref">211</a>;<br> +Northern advance, <a href="#pb234" class="pageref">234</a>;<br> +good-bye to Young, <a href="#pb239" class="pageref">239</a>;<br> +killed, <a href="#pb306" class="pageref">306</a></p> +<p>Legarda, B. Ph. delegate in Congress, <a href="#pb619" class= +"pageref">619</a></p> +<p>Legislation, Congressional, <a href="#pb604" class= +"pageref">604</a>–622</p> +<p>Lepanto-Bontoc, area and pop. <a href="#pb252" class= +"pageref">252</a></p> +<p>LeRoy, James, on Taft, <a href="#pb438" class="pageref">438</a></p> +<p>Leyte, area and pop. <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br> +disorders of 1906, <a href="#pb518" class="pageref">518</a>;<br> +proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href= +"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a></p> +<p>Lingayen Gulf expedition, <a href="#pb234" class= +"pageref">234</a>–6</p> +<p>Locusts, <a href="#pb608" class="pageref">608</a></p> +<p>Lodge, H. C, on Treaty of Paris, <a href="#pb130" class= +"pageref">130</a>;<br> +Aguinaldo jest, <a href="#pb239" class="pageref">239</a>;<br> +“Trade Expansion” speech, <a href="#pb275" class= +"pageref">275</a>;<br> +on Spanish War, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a>, <a href= +"#pb276" class="pageref">276</a>;<br> +on chronic disorder in Cuba, <a href="#pb343" class= +"pageref">343</a></p> +<p>Logan, Major, killed, <a href="#pb238" class="pageref">238</a></p> +<p><i>London Times</i>, May 5, 1898, <a href="#pb35" class= +"pageref">35</a></p> +<p>Long, Secretary, cautions Dewey, <a href="#pb98" class= +"pageref">98</a></p> +<p>Lopez, “Presidente” etc., <a href="#pb154" class= +"pageref">154</a></p> +<p>Lowry, E. G., <a href="#pb600" class="pageref">600</a></p> +<p>Luna, Captain, drowned, <a href="#pb244" class="pageref">244</a></p> +<p>Luzon, preponderating importance, <a href="#pb225" class= +"pageref">225</a>;<br> +central plain, <a href="#pb232" class="pageref">232</a>;<br> +wild tribes, <a href="#pb232" class="pageref">232</a>;<br> +size, <a href="#pb362" class="pageref">362</a> <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb661" href="#pb661" name="pb661">661</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">M</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">MacArthur and the war, <a href="#pb270" class= +"pageref">270</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>MacArthur, General:<br> +on Aguinaldo and Filipinos, <a href="#pb23" class="pageref">23</a>, +<a href="#pb309" class="pageref">309</a>;<br> +advance on Caloocan, <a href="#pb195" class="pageref">195</a>, <a href= +"#pb207" class="pageref">207</a>;<br> +up R. R., <a href="#pb234" class="pageref">234</a>;<br> +differences with Taft, <a href="#pb307" class="pageref">307</a>, +<a href="#pb382" class="pageref">382</a>;<br> +on conditions of 1900–1, <a href="#pb310" class="pageref">310</a> +<i>et seq.</i>;<br> +drastic proclamation, <a href="#pb323" class= +"pageref">323</a>–5;<br> +final advice, <a href="#pb355" class="pageref">355</a></p> +<p>McCall neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class= +"pageref">648</a></p> +<p>McCutcheon, John T., war correspondent, round robin, <a href= +"#pb219" class="pageref">219</a>;<br> +Biñang fight, <a href="#pb261" class="pageref">261</a></p> +<p>McKinley, President, Cuban message of 1897, <a href="#pb2" class= +"pageref">2</a>, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a>;<br> +war message of 1898, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a>;<br> +Aguinaldo’s letter to, <a href="#pb36" class= +"pageref">36</a>;<br> +cable to Dewey of Aug. <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a>, <a href= +"#pb41" class="pageref">41</a>;<br> +annual message of 1898, <a href="#pb47" class="pageref">47</a>, +<a href="#pb216" class="pageref">216</a>;<br> +instructions to Merritt, <a href="#pb50" class="pageref">50</a>;<br> +to Peace Commissioners, <a href="#pb98" class="pageref">98</a>, +<a href="#pb122" class="pageref">122</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> +Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, <a href="#pb139" class= +"pageref">139</a>–151;<br> +text of, <a href="#pb147" class="pageref">147</a>;<br> +its reception at Iloilo, <a href="#pb156" class="pageref">156</a>;<br> +at Manila, <a href="#pb164" class="pageref">164</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br> +message of 1899, <a href="#pb188" class="pageref">188</a>–9;<br> +Taft commission foreshadowed in, <a href="#pb287" class= +"pageref">287</a>;<br> +instructions to, <a href="#pb359" class="pageref">359</a>, <a href= +"#pb405" class="pageref">405</a>, <a href="#pb421" class= +"pageref">421</a>, <a href="#pb476" class="pageref">476</a></p> +<p>Maccabebe scouts, writer detailed to, <a href="#pb235" class= +"pageref">235</a>;<br> +their allegiance analyzed, <a href="#pb333" class= +"pageref">333</a>;<br> +used to capture Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p> +<p>Magtaon fight, <a href="#pb516" class="pageref">516</a></p> +<p><i>Maine</i>, U. S. S., blown up, <a href="#pb3" class= +"pageref">3</a></p> +<p>Malabon landing party episode, <a href="#pb209" class= +"pageref">209</a></p> +<p>Malolos, insurgent capital, <a href="#pb95" class= +"pageref">95</a>–6;<br> +Congress of, <a href="#pb99" class="pageref">99</a>–102;<br> +capture, <a href="#pb208" class="pageref">208</a></p> +<p>Man, rights of, <a href="#pb623" class= +"pageref">623</a>–632</p> +<p>Manila, siege of, <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a> <i>et +seq.</i>;<br> +fall of, <a href="#pb83" class="pageref">83</a>–7;<br> +importance of, <a href="#pb225" class="pageref">225</a>–6</p> +<p>Manila-Dagupan Railway, Higgins claim, <a href="#pb101" class= +"pageref">101</a></p> +<p>Manufactures <a href="#pb607" class="pageref">607</a></p> +<p>Map of archipelago, see end of volume</p> +<p>March, P. C., Major, <a href="#pb238" class="pageref">238</a></p> +<p>Mark Tapley, Taft as, <a href="#pb355" class="pageref">355</a></p> +<p>Martin neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class= +"pageref">648</a></p> +<p>Masbate, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a></p> +<p>Mascardo surrenders, <a href="#pb341" class="pageref">341</a></p> +<p>Massacre of Americans at Manila, “plot” considered, +<a href="#pb199" class="pageref">199</a></p> +<p>Melliza, R., at Iloilo, <a href="#pb159" class="pageref">159</a></p> +<p>Merritt, Wesley, General, <a href="#pb46" class= +"pageref">46</a>;<br> +instructions, <a href="#pb50" class="pageref">50</a>–2;<br> +double-dealing, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>;<br> +“juggling,” <a href="#pb81" class="pageref">81</a>;<br> +receives surrender Manila, <a href="#pb67" class="pageref">67</a>, +<a href="#pb86" class="pageref">86</a>;<br> +advice at Paris, <a href="#pb127" class="pageref">127</a>;<br> +complimentary estimate of Filipinos, <a href="#pb190" class= +"pageref">190</a></p> +<p>Miller, M. P., General, Iloilo expedition, <a href="#pb152" class= +"pageref">152</a>–163</p> +<p>Millet, F. D., war correspondent, on insurgent siege of Manila, +<a href="#pb67" class="pageref">67</a>–9;<br> +on Greene’s “juggling,” <a href="#pb80" class= +"pageref">80</a>–1;<br> +on inauguration of Malolos government, <a href="#pb99" class= +"pageref">99</a></p> +<p>Mindanao, area and pop., <a href="#pb229" class= +"pageref">229</a>;<br> +distinct problem, <a href="#pb230" class="pageref">230</a>–1</p> +<p>Mindoro, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a></p> +<p>Mining, <a href="#pb607" class="pageref">607</a></p> +<p>Misamis, insurrection of 1902–3, <a href="#pb442" class= +"pageref">442</a>–3</p> +<p>Missionary vote in U. S., darkest thing ahead of Ph. independence, +<a href="#pb580" class="pageref">580</a></p> +<p>Mitchell, Lieut., <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p> +<p>Monroe doctrine and Ph., <a href="#pb602" class="pageref">602</a>, +<a href="#pb654" class="pageref">654</a></p> +<p>Moore, Commander, U.S.N., <a href="#pb236" class= +"pageref">236</a></p> +<p>Moros, <a href="#pb230" class="pageref">230</a>–1<span class= +"corr" id="xd20e17192" title="Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb567" +class="pageref">567</a>–9<span class="corr" id="xd20e17198" +title="Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb577" class= +"pageref">577</a><span class="corr" id="xd20e17203" title= +"Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb583" class= +"pageref">583</a><span class="corr" id="xd20e17209" title= +"Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb644" class="pageref">644</a></p> +<p>Municipal governments, dual, described, <a href="#pb316" class= +"pageref">316</a>–18</p> +<p>Mustin, H. C., Ensign, <a href="#pb236" class="pageref">236</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">N</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Nazro, Lieutenant-Commander, <a href="#pb236" class= +"pageref">236</a></p> +<p>Negroes, Filipinos not, <a href="#pb364" class= +"pageref">364</a>–5</p> +<p>Negros, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br> +proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href= +"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a></p> +<p>Neutralization—the “way out,” <a href="#pb647" +class="pageref">647</a>;<br> +history of, <a href="#pb650" class="pageref">650</a>;<br> +pending resolutions proposing, <a href="#pb648" class= +"pageref">648</a></p> +<p>Newlands, F. G., Senator, quoted <a href="#pb356" class= +"pageref">356</a>–7, <a href="#pb610" class="pageref">610</a></p> +<p>Newspapers: round robin of 1899, <a href="#pb220" class= +"pageref">220</a>;<br> +present subtle censorship, <a href="#pb440" class="pageref">440</a></p> +<p>Newton, H. W., Captain, <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p> +<p>Ninth Infantry, Balangiga massacre, <a href="#pb377" class= +"pageref">377</a></p> +<p>Northern Luzon (military) “Department of,” Districts of, +<a href="#pb252" class="pageref">252</a>–8</p> +<p>Nueva Ecija, area and pop., <a href="#pb233" class= +"pageref">233</a></p> +<p>Nueva Vizcaya, area and pop., <a href="#pb255" class= +"pageref">255</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">O</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Ohio, size of Luzon, <a href="#pb232" class= +"pageref">232</a></p> +<p>Ola, Simeon, <a href="#pb423" class="pageref">423</a> <i>et +seq.</i>, <a href="#pb436" class="pageref">436</a></p> +<p>Oldfield neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class= +"pageref">648</a></p> +<p>Olongapo garrison, surrender of, <a href="#pb58" class= +"pageref">58</a></p> +<p>Otis and the war: Feb. to fall, 1899, <a href="#pb186" class= +"pageref">186</a>–223;<br> +thence to May, 1900, <a href="#pb224" class= +"pageref">224</a>–269</p> +<p>Otis, E. S., General, quoted, <a href="#pb30" class= +"pageref">30</a>;<br> +succeeds Merritt, <a href="#pb88" class="pageref">88</a>;<br> +Chapelle’s estimate of him, <a href="#pb88" class= +"pageref">88</a>;<br> +writer’s, <a href="#pb89" class="pageref">89</a>;<br> +ante-bellum dealings with Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb88" class= +"pageref">88</a>–106, <a href="#pb164" class="pageref">164</a> +<i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Outbreak of February 4, 1899, <a href="#pb186" class= +"pageref">186</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">P</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Palanan, Aguinaldo captured at, <a href="#pb336" +class="pageref">336</a>–8</p> +<p>Pampanga province, area and pop., <a href="#pb233" class= +"pageref">233</a></p> +<p>Panama Canal horoscoped, <a href="#pb652" class= +"pageref">652</a></p> +<p>Panay island, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class= +"pageref">228</a>;<br> +proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href= +"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb662" +href="#pb662" name="pb662">662</a>]</span></p> +<p>Pandora Box, Benevolent Assimilation policy proves, <a href="#pb150" +class="pageref">150</a>–1</p> +<p>Pangasinan province, area and pop., <a href="#pb233" class= +"pageref">233</a></p> +<p>Paragua, <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a></p> +<p>Paris Peace Commission, <a href="#pb122" class= +"pageref">122</a>;<br> +negotiations, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>–138</p> +<p>Paris, Treaty of, <a href="#pb121" class= +"pageref">121</a>–138</p> +<p>Parker, Alton B., controversy of 1904 with Taft, <a href="#pb483" +class="pageref">483</a></p> +<p>Parker, James, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#pb248" class= +"pageref">248</a></p> +<p>Patriotism of Filipinos, <a href="#pb185" class="pageref">185</a>, +<a href="#pb190" class="pageref">190</a>, <a href="#pb297" class= +"pageref">297</a></p> +<p>Payne Law of 1909, <a href="#pb615" class="pageref">615</a></p> +<p>Peace protocol, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>; treaty, +<a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>–138</p> +<p>Perkins. G. W., <a href="#pb620" class="pageref">620</a>–1</p> +<p>Peters neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class= +"pageref">648</a></p> +<p>Phelan, H. DuR., <a href="#pb159" class= +"pageref">159</a>–162</p> +<p>Philippine archipelago, geography simplified, <a href="#pb225" +class="pageref">225</a>–8</p> +<p>Philippine Assembly, opening of, <a href="#pb550" class= +"pageref">550</a>; address of Secretary Taft, <a href="#pb552" class= +"pageref">552</a></p> +<p>Philippine Civil Service, <a href="#pb473" class="pageref">473</a>, +<a href="#pb587" class="pageref">587</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Philippine Government Act, <a href="#pb587" class= +"pageref">587</a></p> +<p>“Philippines for Filipinos,” Taft policy, <a href= +"#pb437" class="pageref">437</a>;<br> +Iloilo speech, <a href="#pb437" class="pageref">437</a>–8</p> +<p>Pilar, Gregorio, General, death and burial, <a href="#pb248" class= +"pageref">248</a>–9</p> +<p>Placido, Hilario Tal, <a href="#pb336" class= +"pageref">336</a>–8</p> +<p>Policy, Taft, Ph., stated, <a href="#pb645" class= +"pageref">645</a></p> +<p>Political expediency, controlling factor in Ph. affairs, <a href= +"#pb448" class="pageref">448</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Pratt, Spencer, U. S. Consul General at Singapore, dealings with +Aguinaldo<span class="corr" id="xd20e17563" title= +"Not in source">,</span> <a href="#pb4" class= +"pageref">4</a>–15</p> +<p>Press, censorship of, by Otis, <a href="#pb220" class= +"pageref">220</a>;<br> +war correspondents, round robin, <a href="#pb220" class= +"pageref">220</a>–1;<br> +virtual censorship now, <a href="#pb440" class="pageref">440</a></p> +<p>Protocol, peace, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a></p> +<p>Public opinion in Ph., negligible, <a href="#pb442" class= +"pageref">442</a>–3</p> +<p>Public order, not finally established until 1906, <a href="#pb522" +class="pageref">522</a></p> +<p>Purpose of U. S., uncertainty as to, <a href="#pb174" class= +"pageref">174</a>–175</p> +<p>Putnam, G. R., count of Ph. Islands, <a href="#pb227" class= +"pageref">227</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">Q</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Quezon, Manuel L., Ph. delegate in Congress, speech +against export tax, <a href="#pb618" class= +"pageref">618</a>–19</p> +<p>Quinlan, D. P., Aringay fight, <a href="#pb246" class= +"pageref">246</a>;<br> +buries Gregorio Pilar, <a href="#pb249" class="pageref">249</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">R</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Race friction between Filipinos and Americans, +<a href="#pb438" class="pageref">438</a>;<br> +increased by Taft policy, <a href="#pb439" class="pageref">439</a>, +<a href="#pb447" class="pageref">447</a>;<br> +deplored by Gov. Smith, <a href="#pb493" class="pageref">493</a>;<br> +social equality muddle, <a href="#pb554" class="pageref">554</a> <i>et +seq.</i></p> +<p>Rebate system under export tax, iniquities of, <a href="#pb616" +class="pageref">616</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Reconcentration in Batangas, 1902, <a href="#pb388" class= +"pageref">388</a></p> +<p>Reconcentration Law, <a href="#pb416" class= +"pageref">416</a>–422</p> +<p>Reconstruction days in Ph., <a href="#pb238" class= +"pageref">238</a>–9, <a href="#pb381" class= +"pageref">381</a>–2</p> +<p>Refund of export tax, <a href="#pb616" class="pageref">616</a></p> +<p>Reid, Whitelaw, Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122" class= +"pageref">122</a>;<br> +position, <a href="#pb132" class="pageref">132</a>;<br> +$20,000,000 hint, <a href="#pb136" class="pageref">136</a>–7</p> +<p>“Rid of Philippines,” Roosevelt-Taft private confession +to Carnegie of desire to be, <a href="#pb612" class= +"pageref">612</a>–14</p> +<p>Rights of Man, <a href="#pb623" class= +"pageref">623</a>–632</p> +<p>Rios, Montero, at Paris, <a href="#pb136" class= +"pageref">136</a></p> +<p>Road to Autonomy, <a href="#pb633" class= +"pageref">633</a>–646</p> +<p>Roosevelt, T., Vice-President, crass ignorance of 1900 about +Filipinos, <a href="#pb10" class="pageref">10</a>, <a href="#pb230" +class="pageref">230</a>;<br> +presidential amnesty proclamation of 1902, <a href="#pb312" class= +"pageref">312</a>, <a href="#pb375" class="pageref">375</a>, <a href= +"#pb397" class="pageref">397</a>–8;<br> +opinion of Taft in 1901, <a href="#pb406" class="pageref">406</a>;<br> +hypothetical interview, <a href="#pb409" class= +"pageref">409</a>–414;<br> +supper-table confession to Andrew Carnegie about Ph., <a href="#pb612" +class="pageref">612</a>–13</p> +<p>Root, Elihu, Secretary of War, ignorance of 1899, and uncandor of +1900, <a href="#pb188" class="pageref">188</a>, <a href="#pb243" class= +"pageref">243</a>, <a href="#pb327" class="pageref">327</a>, <a href= +"#pb331" class="pageref">331</a>, <a href="#pb413" class= +"pageref">413</a>;<br> +succeeds Alger, <a href="#pb223" class="pageref">223</a>–4;<br> +political buncombe of 1900 and public admission of 1904, <a href= +"#pb279" class="pageref">279</a>–280;<br> +Rio Janeiro speech, <a href="#pb652" class= +"pageref">652</a>–3;<br> +intellectual greatness, <a href="#pb224" class="pageref">224</a></p> +<p>Round robin of war correspondents, <a href="#pb219" class= +"pageref">219</a>–222</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">S</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Sabath neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" +class="pageref">648</a></p> +<p><i>Samar</i>, U. S. S., off San Fabian, <a href="#pb236" class= +"pageref">236</a></p> +<p>Samar, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br> +in 1901–2, <a href="#pb372" class="pageref">372</a> <i>et +seq.</i>, <a href="#pb452" class="pageref">452</a>;<br> +massacres of 1904, <a href="#pb453" class= +"pageref">453</a>–498;<br> +disturbances of 1905–6, <a href="#pb503" class= +"pageref">503</a>–8.<br> +See also, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href="#pb636" +class="pageref">636</a></p> +<p>Sandico, alleged massacre order of, <a href="#pb200" class= +"pageref">200</a>.</p> +<p>San Fernando, de Pampanga, <a href="#pb212" class= +"pageref">212</a>;<br> +de Union, taken by Young and his cavalry, <a href="#pb246" class= +"pageref">246</a></p> +<p>San Isidro taken by Lawton, <a href="#pb235" class= +"pageref">235</a></p> +<p>San Juanico strait, described, <a href="#pb452" class= +"pageref">452</a></p> +<p>Sargent, L. R., Naval Cadet, trip through Luzon, <a href="#pb107" +class="pageref">107</a>–120;<br> +on Igorrote exhibitions, <a href="#pb574" class="pageref">574</a></p> +<p>Schools, number of children in, <a href="#pb566" class= +"pageref">566</a>, <a href="#pb643" class="pageref">643</a></p> +<p>Schurman Commission, <a href="#pb31" class="pageref">31</a>, +<a href="#pb171" class="pageref">171</a>, <a href="#pb217" class= +"pageref">217</a>;<br> +Otis’s impatience with, <a href="#pb218" class= +"pageref">218</a></p> +<p>Schwan, Theodore, General, “South line” expedition, +Jan–Feb. 1900, <a href="#pb260" class="pageref">260</a> <i>et +seq.</i></p> +<p>Scouts, Philippine, annual cost, now, <a href="#pb600" class= +"pageref">600</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb663" href="#pb663" +name="pb663">663</a>]</span></p> +<p>Sewall, Captain, <a href="#pb209" class="pageref">209</a>, <a href= +"#pb245" class="pageref">245</a></p> +<p>Shanks, Governor of Cavite, <a href="#pb539" class= +"pageref">539</a></p> +<p>Singapore, Pratt and Aguinaldo at, <a href="#pb7" class= +"pageref">7</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Slayden. J. L., M. C., <a href="#pb585" class="pageref">585</a>, +<a href="#pb599" class="pageref">599</a></p> +<p>Smith, General Jacob, Samar campaign, 1901–2, <a href="#pb378" +class="pageref">378</a>–9;<br> +made scapegoat, <a href="#pb380" class="pageref">380</a></p> +<p>Smith, James F., Col., First Californians made brigadier, <a href= +"#pb193" class="pageref">193</a>–4;<br> +army to bench, <a href="#pb361" class="pageref">361</a>;<br> +succeeds Gov. Ide, <a href="#pb524" class="pageref">524</a>;<br> +peace certificate of 1907, <a href="#pb525" class="pageref">525</a> +<i>et seq.</i>;<br> +resigns <a href="#pb556" class="pageref">556</a>;<br> +letter on hemp iniquity of Payne law, <a href="#pb620" class= +"pageref">620</a></p> +<p>Social life of American colony, <a href="#pb440" class= +"pageref">440</a></p> +<p>Songs, Philippine campaign:<br> +under Otis, <a href="#pb186" class="pageref">186</a>;<br> +under MacArthur, <a href="#pb270" class="pageref">270</a>;<br> +under Chaffee, <a href="#pb392" class="pageref">392</a></p> +<p>Sonnichsen, Albert, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p> +<p>Sorsogon province, area and pop., <a href="#pb265" class= +"pageref">265</a></p> +<p>Spanish War, President McKinley’s message of winter of 1897, +preceding, <a href="#pb2" class="pageref">2</a>;<br> +war message, April 1898, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a>;<br> +peace protocol, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>;<br> +treaty, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>–138</p> +<p>Spenlow and Jorkins, Taft and Chaffee likened to, <a href="#pb390" +class="pageref">390</a></p> +<p>Spooner, Senator, <a href="#pb169" class="pageref">169</a></p> +<p>Starr, C. G., Major, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>, +<a href="#pb235" class="pageref">235</a></p> +<p>Stewart, Senator, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a></p> +<p>Sugar and tobacco, Ph., under Payne law, <a href="#pb560" class= +"pageref">560</a>;<br> +other Congressional legislation concerning, <a href="#pb604" class= +"pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Supper-table confession of Roosevelt and Taft to Carnegie about Ph., +<a href="#pb612" class="pageref">612</a>–13</p> +<p>Surigao insurrection of 1903, <a href="#pb414" class= +"pageref">414</a>–16</p> +<p>Switzerland, neutralization of, <a href="#pb650" class= +"pageref">650</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">T</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Taft, W. H., “we blundered into +colonization,” <a href="#pb44" class="pageref">44</a>, <a href= +"#pb291" class="pageref">291</a>;<br> +original reluctance to go to Ph., <a href="#pb291" class= +"pageref">291</a>;<br> +Roosevelt-Taft confession to Carnegie of desire to be “rid +of” Ph., <a href="#pb612" class="pageref">612</a>–13;<br> +Taft commission of 1900, genesis of idea of, <a href="#pb288" class= +"pageref">288</a>;<br> +situation on its arrival at Manila, <a href="#pb282" class= +"pageref">282</a>–7;<br> +its initial attitude, <a href="#pb291" class= +"pageref">291</a>–4;<br> +belittles work of army, <a href="#pb299" class="pageref">299</a>;<br> +insists enemy friendly, <a href="#pb301" class= +"pageref">301</a>–5;<br> +ignores army views, <a href="#pb306" class="pageref">306</a>;<br> +“peace at any price” policy, <a href="#pb307" class= +"pageref">307</a>;<br> +Governor, 1901–2, <a href="#pb345" class= +"pageref">345</a>–402;<br> +prematurity of civil government, <a href="#pb360" class= +"pageref">360</a>;<br> +disorders which followed, <a href="#pb371" class= +"pageref">371</a>–402;<br> +last year as Governor, 1903, <a href="#pb403" class= +"pageref">403</a>–445;<br> +Surigao disorders, <a href="#pb414" class= +"pageref">414</a>–16;<br> +reconcentration law, <a href="#pb416" class= +"pageref">416</a>–422;<br> +Misamis insurrection, <a href="#pb422" class= +"pageref">422</a>–3;<br> +Albay “reign of terror,” <a href="#pb423" class= +"pageref">423</a>–5;<br> +magnitude and details of, <a href="#pb426" class= +"pageref">426</a>–9;<br> +“Black Hole of” Albay, <a href="#pb430" class= +"pageref">430</a>–4;<br> +Taft unpopularity with Americans in Ph., explained, <a href="#pb437" +class="pageref">437</a>;<br> +Iloilo speech, <a href="#pb438" class="pageref">438</a>;<br> +“bullyragging” Americans, <a href="#pb439" class= +"pageref">439</a>;<br> +absoluteness of his power, <a href="#pb439" class= +"pageref">439</a>–445;<br> +becomes Secretary of War, <a href="#pb446" class="pageref">446</a>;<br> +St. Louis speech, 1907, <a href="#pb357" class="pageref">357</a>;<br> +opens Ph. Assembly, 1907, <a href="#pb550" class="pageref">550</a>;<br> +address, <a href="#pb552" class="pageref">552</a>;<br> +Friar lands, splendid work in matter of, <a href="#pb563" class= +"pageref">563</a>;<br> +likewise as to Ph. finances, <a href="#pb565" class= +"pageref">565</a>;<br> +and public education, <a href="#pb566" class="pageref">566</a></p> +<p>Tariff Act of 1902, export tax features, <a href="#pb605" class= +"pageref">605</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Tarlac, MacArthur enters, <a href="#pb239" class= +"pageref">239</a></p> +<p>Tarlac province, area and pop., <a href="#pb233" class= +"pageref">233</a></p> +<p>Tayabas province, area and pop., <a href="#pb263" class= +"pageref">263</a>;<br> +disorders in, 1901–2, <a href="#pb372" class= +"pageref">372</a></p> +<p>Taylor, J. R. M., Captain, <a href="#pb200" class= +"pageref">200</a></p> +<p>Taylor, Wallace C., Colonel, <a href="#pb516" class= +"pageref">516</a></p> +<p>Tila pass, battle of, <a href="#pb248" class="pageref">248</a></p> +<p>Tillman, Senator, <a href="#pb169" class="pageref">169</a></p> +<p>Tiño, General, surrenders, <a href="#pb341" class= +"pageref">341</a></p> +<p>Tobacco, Congressional legislation concerning, <a href="#pb604" +class="pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Trade, <a href="#pb604" class="pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>Treaty of Paris, <a href="#pb121" class= +"pageref">121</a>–138;<br> +how we came to pay the $20,000,000, <a href="#pb136" class= +"pageref">136</a>–8</p> +<p>“Tribes” and tribal state fetich, <a href="#pb295" +class="pageref">295</a>–8, <a href="#pb566" class= +"pageref">566</a>–9, <a href="#pb575" class= +"pageref">575</a>–81</p> +<p>Twenty-ninth Inf., U. S. V., <a href="#pb266" class= +"pageref">266</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">U</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Underwood, Oscar W., <a href="#pb286" class= +"pageref">286</a>;<br> +speech against Philippine export tax, <a href="#pb618" class= +"pageref">618</a></p> +<p>Union province, area and pop., <a href="#pb252" class= +"pageref">252</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">V</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Vanderlip, F. A., position on Ph., in 1898, <a href= +"#pb49" class="pageref">49</a>, <a href="#pb123" class= +"pageref">123</a></p> +<p>Vigan, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p> +<p>Villa Simeon, <a href="#pb112" class="pageref">112</a>–15;<br> +diary of Aguinaldo’s flight, <a href="#pb240" class= +"pageref">240</a>, <a href="#pb246" class="pageref">246</a></p> +<p>Visayan Islands, <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br> +seditious state in 1905, <a href="#pb505" class="pageref">505</a></p> +<p>Volunteers of 1898, <a href="#pb194" class="pageref">194</a>;<br> +of 1899, <a href="#pb270" class="pageref">270</a>–8, <a href= +"#pb280" class="pageref">280</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">W</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">War with Filipinos, progressive bitterness of, +<a href="#pb198" class="pageref">198</a> <i>et seq.</i></p> +<p>“Water-cure,” <a href="#pb202" class= +"pageref">202</a>–5</p> +<p>Way out, the, <a href="#pb647" class="pageref">647</a> <i>et +seq.</i></p> +<p>Wealth of Ph. agricultural, <a href="#pb607" class= +"pageref">607</a></p> +<p>Wheaton, General, <a href="#pb234" class= +"pageref">234</a>–8</p> +<p>White man, tropics, effect on, <a href="#pb208" class= +"pageref">208</a>–9, <a href="#pb549" class="pageref">549</a>, +<a href="#pb590" class="pageref">590</a>–3</p> +<p>Whitsett, G. P., <a href="#pb361" class="pageref">361</a> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb664" href="#pb664" name= +"pb664">664</a>]</span></p> +<p>Wilcox-Sargent trip, <a href="#pb107" class= +"pageref">107</a>–120</p> +<p>Wild tribes, <a href="#pb295" class="pageref">295</a>–8, +<a href="#pb566" class="pageref">566</a>–9, <a href="#pb575" +class="pageref">575</a>–581</p> +<p>Wildman, U. S. Consul, Hong Kong, early dealings with Aguinaldo, +<a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a></p> +<p>Williams, U. S. Consul, Manila, <a href="#pb29" class= +"pageref">29</a>, <a href="#pb34" class="pageref">34</a>, <a href= +"#pb77" class="pageref">77</a>–78, <a href="#pb345" class= +"pageref">345</a></p> +<p>Wilfley, Atty. Gen., <a href="#pb114" class="pageref">114</a>, +<a href="#pb502" class="pageref">502</a></p> +<p>Winship, B., Lieut., <a href="#pb76" class="pageref">76</a></p> +<p>Winship, Emory, Lieut., U. S. N., off Malabon, <a href="#pb207" +class="pageref">207</a></p> +<p>Winslow, Erving, <a href="#pb648" class="pageref">648</a></p> +<p>Winthrop, Beekman, <a href="#pb443" class="pageref">443</a></p> +<p>Wood, General, <a href="#pb288" class="pageref">288</a></p> +<p>Worcester, D. C., <a href="#pb571" class="pageref">571</a> <i>et +seq.</i></p> +<p>Wright, Luke, E., Governor:<br> +1904, <a href="#pb445" class="pageref">445</a>–498;<br> +1905, <a href="#pb499" class="pageref">499</a>–514</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">Y</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">“Yankees of Philippines,” Ilocanos so +called<span class="corr" id="xd20e18593" title="Not in source">,</span> +<a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p> +<p>Young, R. W., Major, <a href="#pb212" class="pageref">212</a></p> +<p>Young, General, <a href="#pb235" class="pageref">235</a> <i>et +seq.</i>, <a href="#pb251" class="pageref">251</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divHead"> +<h3 class="main">Z</h3> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Zambales province, area and pop., <a href="#pb256" +class="pageref">256</a></p> +<p>Zapote River, battle of, <a href="#pb213" class= +"pageref">213</a>–14</p> +</div> +</div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href= +"#toc">Contents</a>]</span> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"></p> +<div class="figure xd20e18630width" id="map"><img src="images/map.jpg" +alt="Sketch map of the Philippines." width="537" height="720"> +<p class="figureHead">Sketch map of the Philippines.</p> +</div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="transcribernote"> +<h2 class="main">Colophon</h2> +<h3 class="main">Availability</h3> +<p class="first">This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no +cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give +it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License +included with this eBook or online at <a class="exlink" title= +"External link" href= +"https://www.gutenberg.org/">www.gutenberg.org</a>.</p> +<p>This eBook is produced by the Online Distributed Proofreading Team +at <a class="exlink" title="External link" href= +"https://www.pgdp.net/">www.pgdp.net</a>.</p> +<p><b>James Henderson Blount</b> (1869–1918) was a US judge who +went in to the Philippines as a volunteer shortly after the US took +over this colony from Spain. After his experiences, he became critical +of the US policy in the Philippines, and urged for an early +independence of the country.</p> +<p><i>The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898–1912</i> +(first published in 1912) is a critical work on the American rule in +the Philippines. This work is much criticized by Dean Worchester in his +book, <i><a class="pglink" title="Link to Project Gutenberg ebook" +href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12077">The Philippines, Past and +Present</a></i> (1914), also present in Project Gutenberg. The latter +was only returning the favor, as Dean Worcester receives in this work a +full chapter of harsh criticism.</p> +<p>This book is prepared from scans of the first edition, available at +the Internet Archive: <a class="exlink" title="External link" href= +"http://www.archive.org/details/americanoccupati01blou">1</a>, +<a class="exlink" title="External link" href= +"http://www.archive.org/details/americanoccupat01blougoog">2</a>, +<a class="exlink" title="External link" href= +"http://www.archive.org/details/americanoccupat00blougoog">3</a>.</p> +<p>However, the illustrations, including the scan of the title page +have been taken from scans of the second edition from 1913: <a class= +"exlink" title="External link" href= +"http://www.archive.org/details/americanoccupati00blou">1</a>.</p> +<h3 class="main">Encoding</h3> +<p class="first"></p> +<h3 class="main">Revision History</h3> +<ul> +<li>2011-06-10 Started.</li> +</ul> +<h3 class="main">External References</h3> +<p>This Project Gutenberg eBook contains external references. These +links may not work for you.</p> +<h3 class="main">Corrections</h3> +<p>The following corrections have been applied to the text:</p> +<table width="75%" summary= +"Overview of corrections applied to the text."> +<tr> +<th>Page</th> +<th>Source</th> +<th>Correction</th> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e933">9</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">d’ état</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">d’état</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e2009">55</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">infering</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">inferring</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e2100">59</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">recognise</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">recognize</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e2228">63</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">similiar</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">similar</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e2892">97</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insistance</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insistence</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e3003">104</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">broad-guaged</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">broad-gauged</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e3122">112</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">she</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">the</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e5588">229</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">substanially</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">substantially</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e5938">246</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">pt.</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">pp.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e6730">267</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">jursidiction</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">jurisdiction</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e7156">295</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd20e7859">343</a>, +<a class="pageref" href="#xd20e13655">610</a>, <a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e15211">658</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">[<i>Not in source</i>]</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">.</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e7753">334</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">quitely</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">quietly</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e7797">339</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">,</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">[<i>Deleted</i>]</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e7808">340</a>, <a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e11303">481</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Malacanan</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Malacañan</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e8805">394</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insurgent</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insurgents</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e9067">414</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">become</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">becoming</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e9268">426</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">[<i>Not in source</i>]</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">]</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e11474">488</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">presidental</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">presidential</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e11552">495</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">analagous</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">analogous</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e11979">521</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">wholely</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">wholly</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e12147">530</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insursurrection</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insurrection</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e12539">551</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">in dependence</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">independence</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e13108">583</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">civilised</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">civilized</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e13376">596</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Filipino</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Filipinos</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e13513">604</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">225</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">2.25</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e13741">615</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">That</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">that</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e14059">621</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Sante</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Santa</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e14149">629</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">probaby</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">probably</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e14640">657</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd20e17192">661</a>, +<a class="pageref" href="#xd20e17198">661</a>, <a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e17203">661</a>, <a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e17209">661</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">;</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">,</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e15404">658</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd20e15407">658</a>, +<a class="pageref" href="#xd20e15421">658</a>, <a class="pageref" href= +"#xd20e16042">659</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd20e17563">662</a>, +<a class="pageref" href="#xd20e18593">664</a></td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">[<i>Not in source</i>]</td> +<td class="width40" valign="bottom">,</td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +</div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The American Occupation of the +Philippines 1898-1912, by James H. 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